# Helping the People of my Enemy:
## Humanitarian Aid during Refugee Crises

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**BACKGROUND:** Understanding the logic behind Humanitarian Aid transfers have empirical implications for conflict management and prevention strategies because it can provide policy recommendation in order to reduce the fund collection gap we see in the world; a Venezuelan refugee receives around USD 100 while a Syrian almost USD 5,000. The Venezuelan Diaspora size is around 5.5 million while the Syrian one is over 6.5 million.

## THEORY

- The UN Voting record provides evidence on a country's voting similarity to the US (Wang, 1999).
- The efficiency of International Organizations is defined by the capacity of coordination of its members. (Koremenos et al., 2001).
- There are "perceptions of gravity" depending on number of refugees (Ogata, 1994).

## DATA

- The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA).
- UN Affinity Scores.
- Refugee and migration data The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

## METHODS

1. Collected humanitarian aid transfers from the Financial Tracking service.
2. Described the history and causes of each of the four refugee crises (South Sudan, Syria, Rohingya and Venezuela) in a qualitative analysis.
3. Tested the hypotheses with multilevel mixed-effect models with the Contribution Amount of a transfer as dependent variable and the UN Voting Distance as the independent variable

Through the mechanism of **burden sharing**, major powers deliver **humanitarian aid** to countries whose leaders might be perceived as hostiles.



Donors Countries/Organizations:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | Australia | G | Sweden | M | Education Cannot Wait Fund |
| B | Canada | H | United Kingdom | N | European Commission |
| C | Germany | I | United States | O | United Nations Children's Fund |
| D | Japan | J | Central Emergency Response Fund | P | World Food Programme |
| E | Kuwait | K | EC-EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey | Q | Private Donors |
| F | Norway | L | EC's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Dept. | R | Others |

Figure 1. Humanitarian Aid Transfers between donor countries, organizations and refugee crises.

## RESULTS

| Independent Variables | Model 1 Coef. | Model 1 S.E. | Model 2 Coef. | Model 2 S.E. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 4 Dependent Variable: Contribution Amount (log) | | | |
| UN Voting Distance | 0.395*** | (0.019) | 0.398*** | (0.019) |
| Migrants (log) | 0.155*** | (0.039) | 0.147*** | (0.038) |
| *Coordination* | -0.133** | (0.043) | | |
|   5 countries | | | 0.724* | (0.404) |
|   19 countries | | | -0.120 | (0.543) |
| **Control Variables** | | | | |
| Regional Plan (1,0) | 0.180*** | (0.037) | 0.336** | (0.103) |
| Multiple Recipients (1,0) | 0.541*** | (0.151) | 0.571*** | (0.151) |
| *Contribution Status* | | | | |
|   Paid Contribution | 0.189*** | (0.039) | 0.189*** | (0.039) |
|   Pledge | 0.514* | (0.286) | 0.513* | (0.285) |
| ***Cross-level Interactions*** | | | | |
| *Regional × Coordination* | | | | |
|   5 countries | | | -0.147 | (0.110) |
|   19 countries | | | -1.955*** | (0.307) |
| Constant | 10.558*** | (0.699) | 9.727*** | (0.628) |
| ***Random Effects*** | | | | |
| Constant Variance | 0.338 | (0.240) | 0.103 | (0.075) |
| Residuals Variance | 2.733 | (0.037) | 2.722 | (0.037) |
| Observations | 10,526 | | 10,526 | |
| Log-Likelihood | -20238.431 | | -20215.575 | |
| $\chi^2$ | 522.821 | | 576.301 | |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 1. Multilevel Mixed-Effect Models of Transfers for Humanitarian Aid during a Refugee Crisis.

## CONCLUSIONS

- Donor's perception matter when deciding where and how much humanitarian aid transfer is allocated for a given refugee crisis.
- Through burden sharing, major powers channel humanitarian aid to refugee-receiving countries.
- Higher number of refugees is likely to increase the perception of gravity; thus, receiving more humanitarian aid than other crises with lesser numbers.
- Major powers will prefer to channel funds to bordering countries where the refugee crises originated.

## REFERENCES

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