

Imitating the Typography From Classic Hindawi Journals (i.e., from ‘Fixed Points as Nash Equilibria’ (Torres-Martínez, 2006))

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July 15, 2023

This uses Computer Modern (TeX default).

Let $Y \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a convex set. A function $v : Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is *quasiconcave* if, for each $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, we have $v(\lambda y_1 + (1 - \lambda)y_2) \geq \min\{v(y_1), v(y_2)\}$, for all $(y_1, y_2) \in Y \times Y$.

[*Nash-2*.] Given $\mathcal{G} = \{I, S_i, V^i\}$, suppose each set $S_i \in \mathcal{H}$ and that objective functions are continuous in its domain and *quasiconcave* in its own strategy. Then there is a Nash equilibrium for \mathcal{G} .

[*Kakutani*.] Given $X \in \mathcal{H}$, every closed-graph correspondence $\Phi : X \rightrightarrows X$, with $\Phi(x) \in \mathcal{H}$ for all $x \in X$, has a fixed point, provided that $\Phi(x) = \prod_{j=1}^m \pi_j^m(\Phi(x))$ for each $x \in X \subset \mathbb{R}^m$.

The article proves that $[Nash-2] \rightarrow [Kakutani]$.

Ok, sufficient display of math symbols.

See <https://github.com/pachadotdev/varsityblues> for a set of complete LaTeX templates to be used with R Markdown or Quarto.