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# Hardening Kubeflow Security for Enterprise Environments

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## Introduction

- What is Kubeflow?
- Who uses it and why?

## Security working group

- CVE image scanning
- SBOMs

## Network

- Architecture
- Authentication

## Example security issues and solutions

- Rootless containers
- Profile controller permissions
- Namespace sharing
- Multi-user artifact storage
- Multi-user ml-metadata
- KFP UI namespace verification
- Appendix: KFP denial of service


## Conclusion

# What is Kubeflow?

- Open-source MLOps platform on K8s
- Building, scaling, orchestrating ML workflows
- Standardize and automate the iterative ML Workflow
- Reusable modular pipelines, hyperparameter tuning, online IDEs, lineage tracking, multi-tenancy, model serving
- Developed by Google, IBM, AWS, Arrikto, DHL, VMware, ...
- CNCF incubating project [donated by Google](#)



1.7 Released



How to implement the **iterative** ML Workflow on Kubernetes?

# Who uses it and why?

- Various industries including Telecommunication, finance, medical, insurance
  - Especially the regulated sectors
- IBM, Google, AWS, Bloomberg, DHL, Deutsche Telekom, VMware, Arrikto, Capital One, Walmart, Uber, Spotify, Shopify, PayPal, Hospitals, ...
- Google even uses Kubeflow (Vertex AI) as default ML platform on GCP
- No similar open-source ML orchestration alternative available
- Vendor agnostic, scalable, sovereign, standardized and fairly secure
  - So similar reasons as for on-premises Kubernetes

# Security working group

## Policies & Procedures

- 🕒 Define policies and procedures

## Security Best Practices

Enforce security best practices

- ✓ [Authenticate API calls](#)
- ✓ [Least privilege RBAC](#)
- ✓ CVE scanning
- 🕒 SBOM

## Discussions

Slack,  
bi-weekly meetings,  
meeting notes

## Tackle security issues

Some issues are covered on the following slides


# CVE image scanning

Working Group	Images	Critical CVE	High CVE	Medium CVE	Low CVE
AutoML	13	12	83	58	6
Pipelines	28	44	300	239	12
Workbenches (Notebooks)	3	9	32	39	6
Kserve	12	53	406	277	33
Common	29	22	175	117	8


Canonical pledged to fix all critical and high CVEs

# Secure Software Supply Chain

## Integrate Software Bill Of Materials (SBOM)




# Architecture





# Authentication via session or token



- Oidc-authservice supports only interactive sessions for humans in KF 1.6
- We had to simulate web browsers and disable 2FA for machines
- 1.7 has programmatic authentication with Kubernetes serviceaccounts ✓


- We had a lot of problems over the last years
  - Services were [misconfigured](#) and allowed to fake the userid header
  - E.g. Workbenches, Volumes, etc. allowed to impersonate other users
  - Even the user-management was [unprotected](#) a year ago
- ✓ We fixed these issues upstream
- ✓ Hardened Istio with [security best-practices](#)
- ✓ Added [Networkpolicies](#) as a second layer of defense

# Rootless containers

- Root is in general an unnecessary security risk
  - Despite efforts such as [usernamespaces in Kubernetes](#)
- Forbidden by company policies in enterprise environments
- By default containers still run as root, also in user-controlled namespaces
- ✓ Over the last two years we made it possible to run 99 % rootless
- ✓ [Istio-CNI](#) for rootless Istio initcontainers (rootful CNI daemonset)
- ✓ Enforce PodSecurityPolicies ([example](#)) or [PodSecurityStandards](#)
- Limitation: Podman and Kaniko do not support rootless builds yet

# Profile controller permissions

- [Profile-controller](#) (PC) creates user namespaces and adds rolebindings and serviceaccounts in that namespace
- [Pipelines-profile-controller](#) (PPC) adds secrets and deployments to user namespaces
- Problem: Both use the cluster-admin role
- One exploit in the Kubeflow namespace and you can become cluster-admin
- There should be a reduced clusterrole
- Merge PC and PPC to reduce complexity




# Namespace sharing

- You can share your namespace with collaborators
  - Sharing is broken from a K8s security perspective
  - Escalation from default-viewer to default-editor
  - Alice steals the serviceaccount token, leaves the company and impersonates Bob with the bearer token
- 
- Solution 1: “Disable Sharing”
  - Solution 2: “Regenerate all generated secrets, serviceaccounts and pods when removing a collaborator”


Sharing is  
Daring

Share with  
Collaborator




# Multi-user artifact storage MinIO / S3

- KFP uses Minio as S3 storage
- Issue: Users share the minio admin secret and all artifacts
- PoC: [isolate](#) artifacts per user
- TODO: Get rid of passwords and use Istio [namespace origin for authorization](#)
- TODO: find replacement for [Old minio image with CVEs](#) (Apache 2 -> AGPL)



# Multi-user ML-MetaData

- Metadata for pipeline run artifacts
- Also used heavily by [TensorFlow](#)
- No multi-tenancy support
- MLMD is just shared for all users
- Solution for KFP 1: Just disable it
- KFP 2 requires MLMD
- TODO: Isolate it per user for KFP 2
- Looking for [volunteers](#)



# KFP UI namespace verification



**Output artifacts**

Output	main-logs
<a href="https://minio://mlpipeline/artifacts/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf/2023/03/14/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf-155362232/generate-data-Output.tgz">minio://mlpipeline/artifacts/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf/2023/03/14/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf-155362232/generate-data-Output.tgz</a> <a href="#">View All</a>	<a href="https://minio://mlpipeline/artifacts/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf/2023/03/14/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf-155362232/generate-data-Output.tgz">minio://mlpipeline/artifacts/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf/2023/03/14/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf-155362232/generate-data-Output.tgz</a>

Runtime execution graph. On

[https://kubeflow.apps. \[redacted\] /pipeline/artifacts/minio/mlpipeline/artifacts/kf-pipelines...23/03/14/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf-155362232/generate-data-Output.tgz?namespace=workshop](https://kubeflow.apps. [redacted] /pipeline/artifacts/minio/mlpipeline/artifacts/kf-pipelines...23/03/14/kf-pipelines-ide-development-v26jf-155362232/generate-data-Output.tgz?namespace=workshop)

- If Alice spies Bobs S3 artifact filepath, then KFP UI allows Alice to read the content
- Just remove the **?namespace=xxx** parameter and the UI will not check permissions
- Technical debt:
  - UI server skips the protected KFP-API server and accesses MinIO directly
  - Artifact proxy in the user namespace is rather obsolete



# Appendix: KFP denial of service

- Due to inefficient database queries
  - The database remains locked for a long time
  - All subsequent user requests against KFP API fails
  - Sabotaging other users and projects
  - Issue: <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/issues/6845>
- Proposed solution:
  - *Replace nested subqueries with joins wherever possible*
  - *Joins* have better performance
  - *Joins* are more readable for experienced developers
  - It looks like [update with join](#) is not supported by squirrel/mysqlite
  - Pure MySQL works, we might have to update the library
  - Looking for volunteers

# Conclusion

- ✓ Authenticate most API calls
- ✓ Lower privilege RBAC
- ✓ Security working group
- ✓ CVE image scanning
- ✓ SBOMs
- ✓ Authentication via serviceaccount
- ✓ Istio improvements
- ✓ Networkpolicies
- ✓ Rootless containers
- Profile controllers permissions
- Namespace sharing
- Multi-user artifact storage
- Multi-user ml-metadata
- KFP UI namespace verification
- KFP Denial of service

# Join us!

Kubeflow welcomes new contributors!



join the community



#kubeflow/security



security WG  
meeting minutes

# Thank you



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Please scan the QR Code above  
to leave feedback on this session

# Selected contributions overview

Kubeflow member (promoted by Google) for around 2 years <https://github.com/kubeflow/internal-acls/pull/509>

- **Argo:**
- <https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/pull/3785>
- **kubeflow/pipelines:**
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/4479>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/4645>
- was dropped in favor of the argo emissary executor
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/5278>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/5294>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/5695>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/5742>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/5743>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/6537>
- also affecting  
Kubeflow/manifests/contrib/metacontroller
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/6622>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/6691>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/6882>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/6892>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/7031>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/7155>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/7311>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/8270>
- **Ray integration:**
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2383>
- <https://github.com/ray-project/kuberay/pull/750>
- <https://github.com/ray-project/kuberay/pull/752>
- <https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/31563>
- **BentoML integration:**
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2350>
- **kubeflow/kubeflow:**
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/5668>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/5891>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/6148>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/6216>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/6216>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/6241>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/6656>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/6673>
- **kubeflow/manifests:**
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/1759>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2013>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2121>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2189>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2205>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2254>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2298>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2304>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2348>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2357>
- **Kserve:**
- <https://github.com/kserve/kserve/pull/1996>
- **Seldon:**
- <https://github.com/SeldonIO/seldon-core/pull/3141>
- **Jupyterlab:**
- [https://github.com/jupyter-server/kernel\\_gateway/pull/321](https://github.com/jupyter-server/kernel_gateway/pull/321)
- <https://github.com/jupyter-incubator/sparkmagic/pull/541>
- <https://github.com/jupyter-incubator/sparkmagic/pull/549>
- **Open PRs:**
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2329>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/website/pull/3403>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/7729>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/7725>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/katib/pull/1768>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/pull/6160>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/6629>
- **Mentoring, implementation help and reviewing:**
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/issues/6702>
- Tobias Goerke first Kubeflow contribution
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/7819> Major overhaul of KFP security with Diana Atanasova
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/pull/2286> Contribution Guidelines
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/issues/6228>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/issues/2014>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/issues/5718>
- Emissary executor and rootless pipelines
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/kubeflow/issues/6662>
- Security Agenda
- Telekom Data Science Platform Kubeflow distribution
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/manifests/issues/2312>
- <https://github.com/kubeflow/website/pull/3403>