

# CSE 575: Advanced Cryptography

## Fall 2024

### Lecture 23

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# Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Background: pairing groups
- Polynomial commitment schemes (PCS)
- PCS security
- The Kate-Zaverucha-Goldberg (KZG) construction
- KZG security

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# Announcements

- HW4 is out, due 12/6
- Rest of class: no typeset lecture notes.
  - Can get extra credit for typesetting

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# Pairing groups

Let  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$  be cyclic groups of order  $q$

A map  $e: \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_t$  is bilinear if

$\forall u, v \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $a, b \in \{0, \dots, q-1\}$ ,

$$e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab}$$

\* non-degenerate:  $e(g, g) \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}_t}$  ?

\* eff-computable

Note:  $\mathbb{G}$  has pairing  $\Rightarrow$  no DDH  $\forall u, v \in \mathbb{G}$   $g$  generator  
(Exercise)

Symmetric vs. asymmetric

$$e: \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_t$$

$$\begin{cases} u = g^x \\ v = g^y \end{cases}$$

$$e(u, v) = e(g^x, g^y) = e(g^{xy})$$

# Pairing groups

Example: BLS12-381

q

$$e: \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_t$$

$\mathbb{G}_1$ : 256-bit subgroup of elliptic curve  
 $y^2 = x^3 + 4$   
over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  for 381-bit P

$\mathbb{G}_2$ : same-size subgroup of " $y^2 = x^3 + 4$ "  
over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$

$\mathbb{G}_t$ : same-size q subgroup  $\mathbb{F}_{p^{12}}^\times$

Evaluate e via "Miller's algorithm"

embedding  
degree

$\approx 10x$  slower than scalar mult.

# Pairing groups

Take

$$\text{"commitment"} \quad \text{Com}(x) := g^x$$

Given

$$c_x \ c_y \ c_z \quad \text{check } x+y=z \\ c_x \cdot c_y = c_z$$

Check  $x+y=z$  ? pairing.

$$e(c_x, c_y) = ? e(g, c_z)$$

If  $x+y=z$  then

$$e(g^x, g^y) = e(g, g)^{xy} = e(g, g)^z \\ = e(g, g^z)$$

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# Polynomial commitment schemes

- $\text{Setup}(n)$ : output  $\text{PP}$  ( $n$  is degree bound)
- $\text{Commit}(\text{PP}, P)$ : output  $C_p$  and opening  $r$
- $\text{Open}(\text{PP}, C_p, P, z, r)$ : output  $\sigma_T$  and  $v$  s.t.  
 $P(z) = v$
- $\text{Verify}(\text{PP}, C_p, z, v, \sigma_T)$ : output  $0/1$

Lots of syntactic variations!

$$C_p / \sigma_T \in \mathcal{G} \quad \text{PP} \in \{\text{o}, \text{i}\}^*$$

$$P \in \mathbb{F}_q[X]$$

$$z, v, r \in \mathbb{F}_q$$

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- **PCS security**
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# PCS security

Eval Binding

Hiding:  $C_P$  hides  $P$   
Correctness: honest( $\pi, v$ )  
verifies

$G_{PCS,n}^t$ :

$PP \leftarrow \text{Setup}(n)$

$P, Z, C_P, (\pi_1, v_1), (\pi_2, v_2) \leftarrow A(PP)$

Ret  $\text{Ver}(PP, C_P, Z, v_1, \pi_1) = 1$

$\wedge \text{Ver}(PP, C_P, Z, v_2, \pi_2) = 1$

$\wedge v_1 \neq v_2$

PCS is n-EB : if  $\forall n \text{ PPT } \mathcal{A}$ ,

$$\Pr[G_{PCS,n}^t = 1] = \text{negl}$$

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$\mathbb{F}_q[x]$ 

# KZG commitments

$$P(z) = v \iff P(x) - v = q(x)(x-z)$$

$$P(x) = q(x)(x-z) + v$$

$$P(x) - v = q(x)(x-z)$$

Main idea:  $P(z) = v$  iff  $\exists q(x)$ , s.t.

$$\frac{P(x) - v}{(x-z)} = q(x)$$

# KZG commitments

Setup( $n$ ):

$$\begin{array}{c} \gamma \in \mathbb{F}_q \\ \parallel \\ D_i \end{array}$$

Ret  $(g, g^\gamma, g^{\gamma^2}, \dots, g^{\gamma^n}) \in \mathbb{G}^{n+1}$

Open( $\text{pp}, c_p, P, Z, r := \xi$ ):

- Compute  $p(x) = v$
- Compute witness  $a(x) = \frac{p(x)-v}{x-z}$
- Compute  $c_q$  as in Commit
- Ret  $(c_q, v)$

Verify( $\text{pp}, c_p, z, v, \pi$ ):

Ret  $e(\pi, D_i/g^z) \stackrel{?}{=} e(g, c_p/g^v)$

Correctness:

$$e(g^{a(z)}, g^{\gamma-z}) = e(g, g)^{a(z)(\gamma-z)}$$

Comm + ( $\text{pp}, P$ ):

Parse  $P$  as  $a_0, a_1, \dots, a_n$

Compute  $c_p = g^{p(z)}$   
with  $p(x) = \sum a_i x^i$

$$n = \overline{k}$$

$$p(x) = b_1 x + a_0 \quad (g, g^{\gamma})$$

$$D_1, D_0, a_1, a_0$$

$$g^{a_1 z} \cdot g^{a_0} = g^{a_1 z + a_0}$$

Multi-scalar multiplication

$$= e(g, g)^{p(z)-v} = e(g, c_p/g^v)$$

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# Security of KZG

Thm: If  $n$ -strong DH holds in  $\mathbb{G}$ ,  
KZG is  $n$ -EB

$n$ -strong DH:

$G_n^A$ :

$\tau \in \mathbb{F}_q$ ; compute  $pp := (g, g^\tau, g^{\tau^2}, \dots, g^{\tau^n})$

$(z, h) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{(pp)}$   
 $Ret h = g^{z-\tau}$