

CSE 575: Advanced Cryptography

Fall 2024

Lecture 25 (last lecture!!!)

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Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- “Prescribed” permutation check PIOP
- Compiling (P)IOPs to arguments
- Semester retrospective

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Announcements

- Final is out, due 12/14 11:59pm.
 - Take **at most** one week, but you choose when to start.
- Rest of class: no typeset lecture notes.
 - Can get extra credit for typesetting
- This is our last class!
 - *Please* do your course evals – I really appreciate feedback!

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"Prescribed" permutation check

Let $w: \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ be a map that permutes \mathbb{Z} according to $\sigma: [k] \rightarrow [k]$

$$w(w^i) = w^{\sigma(i)} \text{ for } i \in k$$

Prove f, g are the same on \mathbb{Z} ;

$$\text{up to } w: f(a) = g(w(a)) \text{ for}$$

Observe: if $(w(a), f(a))$ is a term of $(a, g(a))$

then $f(a) = g(w(a))$ at $a \in \mathbb{Z}$

Proof:

$$U = \{(w(1), f(1)), (w(\omega), f(\omega)), \dots, (w(\omega^{k-1}), f(\omega^{k-1}))\}$$

$$V = \{(1, g(1)), (\omega, g(\omega)), \dots, (\omega^{k-1}, g(\omega^{k-1}))\}$$

"Prescribed" permutation check

Observe : if $(w(a), f(a))$ is a term of $(a, g(a))$

then $f(a) = g(w(a)) \forall a \in \Omega$

Proof :

$$U = \{(w(1), f(1)), (w(\omega), f(\omega)), \dots, (w(\omega^{k-1}), f(\omega^{k-1}))\}$$

$$V = \{(1, g(1)), (\omega, g(\omega)), \dots, (\omega^{k-1}, g(\omega^{k-1}))\}$$

Our claim implies that $\exists \sigma$ s.t. $U[\sigma(i)] = V[i]$ i.e.

let $\sigma(i) = j$

$$\underline{U[j]} = \underline{V[i]}$$

$$(w(\omega^j), f(\omega^j)) = (\omega^i, g(\omega^i))$$

$$\frac{w(\omega^j)}{f(\omega^j)} = \frac{\omega^i}{g(\omega^i)} \Rightarrow f(\omega^j) = g(w^i)$$



"Prescribed" permutation check

$$\hat{f}(X, Y) = \prod_{a \in \Omega} (X - Y W(a) - f(a))$$

total degree K

$$\hat{g}(X, Y) = \prod_{a \in \Omega} (X - Y a - g(a))$$

Lemma: $\hat{f} \equiv \hat{g}$ iff $(W(a), f(a))$ is a permutation
of $(a, g(a))$

Proof: (\Rightarrow) Use unique factorization of \hat{f}, \hat{g}


(\Leftarrow) construct \hat{f}, \hat{g} , observe they must be same b/c factors are the same

"Prescribed" permutation check


$P(S, P, X, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{P}_S)$:

compute trace T ,
interpolate it

Plank PLOPs
 $\mathcal{W}(d_S, d_P, X)$:



"Prescribed" permutation check



IP computes
 $f(r, s)$
 $g(r, s)$

$\xleftarrow{\text{product check}}$ $\prod_{a \in \Sigma} \frac{(r - sw(a) - f(a))}{(r - sa - g(a))} = 1$

$$h(x) = \frac{\sum sw(x) - f(x)}{\sum sx - g(x)}$$

Completeness: follows from \hat{f}/\hat{g}

Soundness: $\leq \frac{2^d}{|TF|}$ by soundness of product check

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Security of arguments

Compile $(P) / \text{OP}$ to argument?

1. Everywhere you see 'label ℓ_f ',
replace with $\ell_f \in \text{Com}(f)$
2. Ver randomness the same
3. When P sends eval of f at z ,
send $(\Pi, V) \in \text{PC.EvaKPP}(\ell_f, f, z, r)$
4. Ver's final check
verifies all Π using PC.Ver

[BCS16]

Security of arguments

Thm: let $\Pi = \langle P, V, (d_1, \dots, d_k) \rangle$ be
a PIOP for R and $PC = \langle \text{Setup}, \text{Com}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verif} \rangle$
be a poly comm.t. If Π is complete/sound
and PC is eval binding*, then

$$A[\Pi, PC]$$

is complete (sound)

Proof: non-trivial!

Compiling PIOPs to arguments

The rest of the way to zk-SNARKs

1. Fiat-Shamir:
interactive arg \Rightarrow non-interactive argument

2. ZK:
define ZK-PiOP + hiding for PC,
show transform gives ZK arg

3. Knowledge Soundness

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Looking back

Info-Theoretic Security

Comp. Ind

Sym crypto

asymmetric

ZKPs

Piops