

EECS 498/CSE 598: Zero-Knowledge Proofs

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Lecture 5



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Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Multilinear extensions
- Relations, languages, the class NP
- Cryptography background
- Interactive proofs

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Announcements

- Project 1 is online
- Autograder is working
- I saw a good movie this weekend =>



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Multilinear extensions

Let $\{0, 1\}^V$ be bit strings

Any $f \in \mathbb{F}_P^{2^V}$ is a $f: \{0, 1\}^V \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_P$

Def:

A v -variate poly g extends $f: \{0, 1\}^V \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_P$

if $i \in \{0, 1\}^V$, $g(i) = f(i)$

$g: \mathbb{F}_P^V \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_P$ (where $g(i) = g(i_0, i_1, \dots, i_{v-1})$
where $i = \sum_j z^j i_j$)

Multilinear extensions (MLE)

Thm:

Any function $F: \{0,1\}^V \rightarrow F_P$

has a unique MLE.

Proof:

Define

$$X_w(X_1, \dots, X_V)$$

$$:= \prod_{i=1}^V (X_i w_i + (1-X_i)(1-w_i))$$

$$X_w(X) := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \vec{x} = \vec{w} \\ 0 & \text{o/w} \end{cases}$$

Claim: \tilde{F} is unique

$$\tilde{F}(X_1, \dots, X_V) := \sum_{w \in \{0,1\}^V} f(w) \cdot X_w(X_1, \dots, X_V)$$

Claim:

\tilde{F} extends f

Claim:
 \tilde{F} is MLE

X_w is MLE

\tilde{F} is lin comb of MLE

Multilinear extensions

$$\begin{aligned} \chi_w(x_1, \dots, x_v) &= \prod_{i=1}^v (x_i w_i + (1-x_i)(1-w_i)) \\ &= \chi_{w_1, \dots, w_{v/2-1}}(x_1, \dots, x_{v/2-1}) \chi_{w_{v/2}, \dots, w_v}(x_{v/2}, \dots, x_v) \end{aligned}$$

\tilde{f} extends f

break \tilde{f} into 'chunks'

Multilinear extensions

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Relations and languages, the class NP

A language L is subset of $\{0, 1\}^*$
 $L \Rightarrow$ set of objects - sharing a property

$$L_{3CNFSAT} \quad L_{3COL} \quad X \in L$$

A relation R is a subset of $\{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^*$

Associate R_L to L via "witness"

$$X \in L \text{ iff } \exists w \text{ s.t. } (X, w) \in R_L$$

A "checker"/"verifier" V for R_L is an algorithm

takes (X, w) , outputs 1 if $(X, w) \in R_L$,
0 o/w

Relations and languages, the class NP

NP :

Class of languages

with deterministic PT
verifiers

$\forall_{3\text{CNFSAT}} \exists^w$

An NP-complete language: rank-one constraint systems (R1CS)

Field \mathbb{F} , numbers $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$

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Field \mathbb{F} , numbers $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$

R1CS is defined by three matrices $A, B, C \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times n}$.

Say that $z \in \mathbb{F}^n$ satisfies the R1CS if:

$$(A \cdot z) \circ (B \cdot z) = C \cdot z$$

Notation: operator \circ just means element-wise multiplication of vectors. Also called “Hadamard product”

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Can split z into a “public” part $x \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ and “private” part $w \in \mathbb{F}^{n-\ell}$...

s.t.

$$z = (x, w)$$

satisfies

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Security definitions and adversaries

↳ Formal statement
about a testable ability
of an adversary to "do something"
→ break a protocol

Sec defs: a few important parts

- setup (parameters)
- generate challenge instance
- run some adversary, gets its output
give it oracles
- success condition

Crypto: adversaries "efficient"

Example security definition: the discrete logarithm problem

$\log_G A$
x s.t. $xG = A$

$\text{DL}^{\mathbb{G}, G, p}(\mathcal{A})$:

$x \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_p$

$x' \leftarrow \$ \mathcal{A}(xG, \mathbb{G}, G, p)$

Return $x = x'$

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}} \text{DL}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{DL}^{\mathbb{G}, G, p}(\mathcal{A}) = 1]$$

DL hard in \mathbb{G}
If $\forall \text{n uPPT } \mathcal{A}$,
 $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}} \text{DL}(\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda)$

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Interactive proofs

Properties of interactive proofs

(If time) Finishing up Schwartz-Zippel