

EECS 575: Advanced Cryptography

Fall 2022

Lecture 16

Paul Grubbs

paulgrub@umich.edu

Beyster 4709

Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Recap from last time
- Public-Key Encryption: syntax and security
- Group theory background
- Discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems
- El Gamal encryption



Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Recap from last time
- Public-Key Encryption: syntax and security
- Group theory background
- Discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems
- El Gamal encryption


Announcements

- HW4 is out, due 11/7 → + Discussion
- Alexandra's office hours are cancelled this week
 - I will host extra OH to make up for her absence; time TBD (Piazza)

Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Recap from last time
- Public-Key Encryption: syntax and security
- Group theory background
- Discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems
- El Gamal encryption

Authenticated Encryption



- replay attacks
- communication volume
- forward secrecy / post-compromise
- More!

Authenticated Encryption

How to agree on a Shared Secret?

Public - Key encryption!


Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Recap from last time
- Public-Key Encryption: syntax and security
- Group theory background
- Discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems
- El Gamal encryption

Alice

Public-Key Encryption

$(pk, sk) \leftarrow PKE.Gen(1^k)$



$c \leftarrow PKE.Enc(pk, m)$

c



sk
"Bob"

$m = PKE.Dec(sk, c)$

How is this possible ? ! ? ! !

* Math! *

IND-CPA for PKE

IND-CPAO^A:

$K \leftarrow \text{Gen}$

$b \leftarrow A^{\text{Enc}(\cdot), C_0(\cdot, \cdot)}$

$C_0(m_0, m_1)$:

$\text{Ret Enc}(K, m_0)$

IND-CPAI^A:

$K \leftarrow \text{Gen}$

$b \leftarrow A^{\text{Enc}(\cdot), C_1(\cdot, \cdot)}$

$C_1(m_0, m_1)$:

$\text{Ret Enc}(K, m_1)$

Q: Can IND-CPA PKE
be deterministic?

A: No.

IND-CPAO^A:

$(PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{PKE}.\text{Gen}$

$b \leftarrow A^{C_0(\cdot, \cdot)}(PK)$

$C_0(m_0, m_1)$:

$\text{Ret PKE}.\text{Enc}(PK, m_0)$

IND-CPAI^A:

$(PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{PKE}.\text{Gen}$

$b \leftarrow A^{C_1(\cdot, \cdot)}(PK)$

$C_1(m_0, m_1)$:

$\text{Ret PKE}.\text{Enc}(PK, m_1)$

IND-CPA for PKE

Exercise :

Thm: If IND-CPA PKE for one-bit msgs exists, then IND-CPA PKE for $\text{poly}(n)$ -bit msgs exists.

Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Recap from last time
- Public-Key Encryption: syntax and security
- **Group theory background**
- Discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems
- El Gamal encryption

Background on group theory

Group operation has

- $G = \{S, \cdot\}$ - identity: $\exists e \in S$ s.t. $e \cdot x = x$
- inverses: $\forall x \in S, \exists y \in S$ s.t. $x \cdot y = e$
- associative $\forall x, y, z$
$$x \cdot (y \cdot z) = (x \cdot y) \cdot z$$

Order of group: $|S|$

Fact: $x \in S$

$\underbrace{x \cdot x \cdot \dots \cdot x}_{|S|} = e$

E.g.

\mathbb{Z}_N^* , \mathbb{Z}_p^* , Elliptic curve group

$$\rightarrow y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \text{ mod } p$$

(x, y) satisfying eqn

Background on group theory

Cyclic group. G is cyclic if $\exists g$ s.t.

$$G = \{g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{|S|-1}\}$$

\mathbb{Z}_p^* is cyclic

Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Recap from last time
- Public-Key Encryption: syntax and security
- Group theory background
- Discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems
- El Gamal encryption

Discrete Logarithm Problem

Given X , Hard to compute $\underbrace{x}_{\in \mathbb{Z}_p^*}$ s.t. $X = g^x$

"discrete logarithm"

of X w.r.t. g

Integer between
0 and $|S|-1$

Let $S \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} P, g$. If no PPT \mathcal{A}

$$\Pr_{\substack{(P,g) \in S \\ y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*}} [\mathcal{A}(P, g, y) = \log_g y] = \text{negl}(d)$$

Diffie-Hellman Problem(s)

Cyclic group G w/ generator g , $\text{ord}(g) = q$
HARD to compute g^{ab} given

$$(g, g^a, g^b)$$

"Computational" DH assumption

Decisional DH assumption:

$$a, b, c \in \{0, \dots, q-1\}$$

$$(g, \underbrace{g^a}_{\downarrow}, \underbrace{g^b}_{\downarrow}, \underbrace{g^c}_{\downarrow}) \approx_c (g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$$

Diffie-Hellman Problem(s)

$$H_0(g^{ab} | g^a, g^b) = 0$$

$$H_0(g^e | g^a, g^b) = \log \text{ord}(G)$$

No entropy at all, but
com. ind. from uniform random!

Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Recap from last time
- Public-Key Encryption: syntax and security
- Group theory background
- Discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problems
- El Gamal encryption

ElGamal PKE

$P = 2q+1$, q prime

$\overline{QR_P^*}$

$$g, \text{ord} = \frac{P-1}{2} = q$$

$\overline{\mathbb{Z}_P^*}$

• Gen: Sample $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$,

Set $PK = g^a$ and $SK = a$
Ret (PK, SK)

• Enc(PK, m) [$m \in QR_P^*$]:

- Sample $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, $R = g^r$

$$c_0 = R$$

$$c_1 = (PK)^r \cdot m$$

- Ret (c_0, c_1)

• Dec($SK, (c_0, c_1)$):

- Compute $T = (c_0)^{SK} = g^{SK \cdot r}$

- Ret c_1 / T

ElGamal PKE

Thm: If DDH holds in \mathbb{F}_p^* ,
then ElGamal PKE is IND-CPA

Proof: Exercise.

Replace $g^{sk \cdot r}$ with g^e using DDH.

Argue ctxt is indep. of message m_0/m_1 .