

# **EECS 575: Advanced Cryptography**

## **Fall 2022**

## **Lecture 20**

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# Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements
- Recap from last time
- Analyzing full-domain hashing, pt. 1
- Analyzing full-domain hashing, pt. 2
- Zero knowledge
- Interactive proofs

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# Announcements

- HW5 online, due 11/18 11/21

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# Random Oracle model

- Heuristic : all parties access global random f'n

G<sup>A</sup>:

-  $\leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\dots, H(\cdot)}()$

H(x):

If  $x \notin T$ :

$y \leftarrow \epsilon_0 / \beta^n$

$T[x] = y$

Ret  $T[x]$

]

Lazy Sampling:  
Sample f'n one entry  
at a time

# Full-domain hash (FDH) signatures

$SIG^H[F_S]$ :

- Gen : Ret  $(\underline{s}, t) \leftarrow SK^{(n)}$  param for TDP
- Sign $^H(SK, t, m)$ :  
Ret  $\underline{f}_{S,t}^{-1}(H(m))$
- Ver $^H(PK, \sigma, m)$ :  
Ret  $\underline{f}_S(\sigma) = ? H(m)$   
 $\Rightarrow \sigma = f_S^{-1}(H(m))$

E.g. TDP : RSA perm

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# FDH analysis (sketch)

Ihm: If  $f_S$  is TDP, then

$\text{SIG}^H[f_S]$  is UF-CMA  
modelling H as RO

Proof:

Step 0: write UF-CMA<sup>A</sup>  $\text{SIG}^A[f_S]$

→ Step 1: move UF-CMA'  
reduce adversary's success prob.

Step 2: build reduction that  
simulates UF-CMA' for it

Handle  
RO programming

# FDH analysis (sketch)

Simplifications (wlog)

- A makes  $\text{Poly}(n)$  RO calls
- A outputs something
- A queries  $H(m)$  before  $\text{Sign}(m)$
- A never repeats query to H
- A queries ROM on attempted forgery

# FDH analysis (sketch)

UF- $\langle MA_{SIG}^A \rangle_{f_{fs}}$ :

$(s, t) \leftarrow s(1^n); Q = \{t\}; T = \{t\}$

$(m', \sigma') \leftarrow A^{Sign, H} \underbrace{(s)}$

Ret  $F_s(\sigma') = H(m')$

$\wedge m' \notin Q$

$Sign(m)$ :

$\sigma = F_{S,C}^{-1}(H(m))$

$Q \cup \{m\} = \sigma$

Ret  $\sigma$

$H(m)$ :

$E F^M \notin T$ :  
 $y \leftarrow \epsilon_0, \beta^n$   
 $T[m] = y$

Ret  $T[m]$

Note:

Unique Sigs,  
so UF  $\Rightarrow$  SUF

# UF-CMA'

$\text{UF-CMA}_{\text{SIG}^H[\text{f}_S]}^{1_A}$

in CP  
of A's  
inputs/outputs

$F$ :  $\begin{cases} t \in \{1, \dots, q\}; m^t = 1; i=0 \\ (s, t) \in S(\Gamma); Q = \{\}; T = \{\} \end{cases}$   
 $(m'; o') \leftarrow A^{\text{Sign}, H}(s)$   
 $b = F_s(o') = H(m')$   
 $1_{m' \notin Q}$

If  $m' = m^*$  &  $b \leftarrow 1$   
 Ret 1  
 Ret 0

$H(m)$ :

If  $i = i^*$ :  $m^* = m \leftarrow$

If  $m \neq t$ :  
 $y \in \Sigma^*/\beta^n$   
 $T[m] = y$

itt  
 Ret  $T[m]$

$\text{Sign}(m)$ :

If  $m = m^*$  then  $\text{fa}: 1 \leftarrow$

$\sigma = \bigcup_{i \in \Gamma} (H(m))$   
 $Q[m] = \sigma$

Ret  $\sigma$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Pr[\text{UF-CMA}_{\text{SIG}^H[\text{f}_S]}^{1_A} = 1] &= \Pr[\text{UF-CMA}_{\text{SIG}^H[\text{f}_S]}^{1_A} = 1 \mid m' = m^*] \\
 &= \Pr[\text{UF-CMA}_{\text{SIG}^H[\text{f}_S]}^{1_A} = 1] \Pr[m' = m^* \mid \text{UF-CMA}_{\text{SIG}^H[\text{f}_S]}^{1_A} = 1] \\
 &\quad = \frac{1}{\alpha}
 \end{aligned}$$

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# Simulator for TDP inversion

$\$^{\tilde{H}}(s, \gamma)$ :  
 $i^* \leftarrow [1, \dots, q]; m^* = \perp$

$Q = []; T = []$

$(m', o') \leftarrow \text{Sign}, \tilde{H}(s)$

If  $m' = m^*$ :

Ret  $\sigma'$

Else fail

$$\begin{aligned} f_s(\sigma') &= H(m') \\ &= H(m^*) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} f_s(\sigma') &= \gamma \\ \sigma' &= f_s^{-1}(\gamma) \end{aligned}$$

$\tilde{H}(m)$ :  
If  $i = c^*$  then  
 $T[i] = (x_i, m, \gamma_i)$   
 $m^* = m; i \leftarrow i + 1; \text{Ret } \gamma_i$   
else  
 $x_i \leftarrow \{x_0, x_1\}$   
 $\gamma_i = f_s(x_i)$   
 $T[i] = (x_i, m, \gamma_i)$   
 $i \leftarrow i + 1; \text{Ret } \gamma_i$

$\text{Sign}(m)$ :  
Find  $(x_i, m_i, \gamma_i)$  s.t.  $m = m_i$   
If  $x \neq \perp$  then Ret  $x_i$   
Else fail

# Simulator for TDP inversion

Last step: Argue

$$\Pr \{ \delta(s, y) = x \text{ s.t. } f_s(x) = y \} \\ = \Pr \{ \text{UFCA}^{\text{SIG}}_{f_s} = 1 \}$$

Why?

- pub key  $s$  has right dist.
- RO queries + Sign queries are uniform random
- Adversary must win on uniform random choice of RO query

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# Zero-knowledge

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# Interactive proofs