

# **EECS 498/598: Encrypted Systems**

## **Winter 2022**

# **Lecture 2: Crypto Preliminaries**

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# Agenda for this lecture

- Announcements, introduction, notation
  - PRFs, concrete vs. asymptotic security
- Symmetric-key cryptography
  - PRPs, MACs, AEAD
  - The random oracle model
- Asymmetric cryptography
  - PKE, signatures, key exchange
- Discussion

# Announcements

- lecture schedule
- Canvas submission for paper reviews

# Introduction and notation: PRFs

Reminder about applied crypto


Theory and practice

Syntax  
Semantics  
Security definitions

↳ Instantiations  
use cases  
performance  
(typical)

# Introduction and notation: PRFs

Pseudo random function




Function that is "random-looking":

output looks like a random sample in  $\mathcal{Y}$

→ Make this precise?

# Introduction and notation: PRFs

Code-based game for defining security



# Introduction and notation: PRFs

PRFRans $\stackrel{?}{F}$

$b \leftarrow \$ A^{RC^{\cdot})}$

Ret b

Implicitly  
defined table

R(x):

IF  $[I[x] = 1]$

$T[x] \leftarrow \$ y$

Ret  $T[x]$

Explicit code  
of oracle

Input sanity  
checking omitted

Output space  
of PRF

"Ideal world"

# Concrete vs. asymptotic security

1. Concrete: measure advantage of adversary against fixed function (input/output space)

$$\text{AdvPRF}(\lambda, F) =$$

$$\left| \Pr[\text{PRF}_{\text{real}}[F^\lambda] = 1] - \Pr[\text{PRF}_{\text{rand}}[F^\lambda] = 1] \right|$$

2. Asymptotic: Define PRF security as function of 'security parameters' that grows to infinity.

$F$  is a good PRF if for all nonpt adversaries,

$$\text{AdvPRF}(\lambda, F) = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

# Concrete vs. asymptotic security

## Asymptotic:

- + Simplifies analysis
- Harder to reason about security for fixed FNS  
E.g. AES only defined for 3 params!
- Need to parameterize everything by sec. param.
- I'll use concrete security in lectures.  
You'll see both
- PRF instantiations
  - HMAC-SHA-256

- Blake 2
- SHA3

## Concrete:

- + captures exact runtimes and advantages
- + security theorems lead to easy bit security estimates
- analyses much more complicated.  
Sensitive to model

## Perf:

~1 gigabyte/second

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# Pseudorandom permutations (PRPs)

block cipher

$$E: \mathcal{B} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$$

- permutation for all keys
- can invert given the key

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Real}_E^A \\ \hline K \leftarrow R \\ b \leftarrow A^{E(K, \cdot)} \\ \text{Ret } b \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Rand}_E^A \\ \hline \pi \leftarrow \text{Perms}(\mathcal{M}) \\ b \leftarrow \pi^{\pi^{-1}(b)} \\ \text{Ret } b \end{array}$$

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PRP}}(A, E) = |\Pr[\text{Real}_E^A = 1] - \Pr[\text{Rand}_E^A = 1]|$$

# Pseudorandom permutations (PRPs)

## Instantiations:

- AES

Amazing  
Design

Most CPUs have  
AES instruction

- 3DES / DES

↳ First standard for  
commercial crypto

## Use cases:

- Data encryption  
(building block of  
AEADs)
- pseudo random  
number generator

→ /dev/urandom

## Perf:

> 8 million calls  
per second

Very fast!

# Message authentication codes (MACs)

$\text{MAC} = (\text{Kg}, \text{Tag}, \text{Verify})$   $\xrightarrow{\text{Key gen}}$  Takes key/msg and tag, outputs 0/1

Takes key/msg, outputs tag

UFCMA<sub>MAC</sub>:

$K \leftarrow \text{Kg}$

$\overline{\text{Tag}}(K, \cdot)$

$(m, t) \leftarrow A$

~~$m \neq T$~~

$\text{Ret } \overline{\text{Ver}}(K, m, t) = 1$

Rules out "trivial wins"!

$\overline{\text{Tag}}(K, m)$ :

$T \leftarrow T \cup \{m\}$

$\text{Ret } \overline{\text{Tag}}(K, m)$

Measures A's ability to "forge" tag for new message

UFCMA<sub>1</sub> game:

Identical except no

$m \& T$  check.

$\Pr[\text{UFCMA}_1^{\text{to MAC}} = 1] = 1$

$\begin{cases} \overline{\text{Tag}}(\cdot) \\ K_0 \end{cases}$ :  
 $t \leftarrow \overline{\text{Tag}}("hello")$   
 $\text{Ret } "hello", t$

# Message authentication codes (MACs)

Instantiations:

HMAC-SHA-256

Carter-Wegman MACs

Common → GMAC, Poly1305  
AES-CMAC

Use cases:

- secure channels
- cookies authentication

Performance:

Comparable to PRF. Very fast

# Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)

$AEAD = (Kg, Enc, Dec) \xrightarrow{\text{keygen}} \text{key, ciphertext, header}$

Keygen takes key, message, header

- \* Combined confidentiality + integrity
- \* integrity-protected associated data (e.g. IP packet header)
- \* Security:
  - ciphertexts "look like" random bits
  - can't create valid ciphertext w/out key

# Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)

Instantiations:

- AES-CBC-then-HMAC-SHA-256
- GCM, ChaCha20/Poly1305

Use cases:

- encrypt data  
in network protocols

Perf:

AES-GCM : 12 million /second

(possible to get ~ 1 cycle / kbyte !)

# Random Oracle Model

For time reasons, skip.

Resources on Piazza

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# Public-Key Encryption

$PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec)$

outputs public key and private key

takes public key and message

private key and ciphertext

\* encrypt data to someone w/o shared secret

## use cases:

- key establishment
- cryptocurrency  
(privacy in payments)


## Perf:

- ~1000x slower than AEAD
- Enc for RSA: 17.6 K/sec  
Dec for RSA: 900/sec

## Instantiations:

- RSA encryption [RSA 78]
- ElGamal and variants
  - $K_F$  for  $p \approx 2-3$  k bits
  - Now: Elliptic curves
  - Post-quantum crypto  
Chris Peikert  
Ask Chad !!

# Digital Signatures



- \* Integrity protection + authentication
- \* Security: unforgeability

## Use cases:

- authenticate server in TLS
- Code signing in package manager
- transaction signing in cryptocurrencies

## Perf:

3.3K sigs/second  
4.2K verify/second

## Instances:

RSA sigs

DSA

ECDSA

Schnorr

BLS  $\leftarrow$  pairings of elliptic curves

# Key Exchange

- Interactive protocol between  $\geq 2$  parties to agree on shared secret
- security models complex, out of scope
  - confidentiality of key: secret should
  - authenticity of parties

use case:

key establishment in  
TLS, IPsec, Signal...

Perf:

1.3k ECDHE / second

(How many does Google do?)

Instantiations:

Diffie - Hellman [DH 76]

Today:

~~ECDHE~~

ECDHE — ephemeral  
(forward secrecy)  
Next week!

RSA enc

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# Discussion

- (Many) more topics will be covered this semester.
- Not very familiar with something we discussed?
  - Don't panic!
- Learning things independently is a “meta”-skill. Takes practice