Introduction to Verification of System Software

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System Software

"[S]oftware designed to provide a platform for other software."

Examples

- compilers
- operating system kernels
- file systems

Properties

- mostly well understood
- regularly evaluated by researchers
- important to businesses, society, ...

Problem: Trustworthiness of System Software

- programmers and users rely on interfaces
- crashes and failures affect many clients
- "building blocks" of important services
- how to make guarantees about functionality & security?

Program Bugs, Defects, Infections, and Failures

From Zeller's Why Programs Fail:

Defect incorrect program code (code bug)

Infection incorrect program state (state bug)

Failure observable incorrect program behavior (behavior bug)

Methods to Avoid and Remove Bugs

```
Code type checking, static analysis, ...

Runtime debugging, testing, monitoring, ...
```

The Limits of Testing


"Testing shows the presence, not the absence of bugs."

-E.W. Dijkstra, NATO SE Conference, 1969

Two Approaches To Program Verification

- 1 show absence of infections (state bugs)
- 2 show absence of defects (code bugs)

Classic Method: (Software) Model Checking



Classic Method: Deductive Verification

```
/*@ requires
  @ a != null && 0 <= i < a.length && 0 <= j < a.length;
  @ assigns
  @ a[i], a[j];
  @ ensures
  @ swapped{Old, Here}(a, i, j);
  @*/
public static void swap(int[] a, int i, int j) {
  int tmp = a[i];
  a[i] = a[j];
  a[j] = tmp;
}</pre>
```

Problem 1: Surprises

Surprise property or behavior of a program that can't be classified as feature/problem, for lack of specification

Problem 2: Code Level vs. Algorithm/Design Level

- benefits of verification of algorithms/design documented ...
- ... but guarantees do not extend to systems (machine code)

Algorithm/Design Level

```
binarySearch(a, key):
  low := 0;
  high := size(a) -1;
  while (low <= high) {</pre>
    mid := (low + high) / 2;
    midVal := a[mid];
    if (midVal < key)</pre>
      low := mid + 1;
    else if (midVal > key)
      high := mid - 1;
    else
      return mid;
  return -low - 1;
```

Code-Level Specification


```
/*0 requires a != null && sorted(a, 0, a.length - 1);
  @ behavior has_key:
  @ assumes \exists integer i;
  0 <= i <= a.length - 1 && a[i] == key;
  @ ensures a[\result] == key;
  @ behavior has_not_key:
  @ assumes \forall integer i;
  0 <= i <= a.length - 1 ==> a[i] != key;
  @ ensures insertion_point(-\result - 1, key, a);
  @*/
public static int binarySearch(int[] a, int key)
```

Verified Code

```
public static int binarySearch(int[] a, int key) {
  int low = 0:
  int high = a.length -1;
  while (low <= high) {</pre>
    int mid = low + ((high - low) / 2);
    int midVal = a[mid];
    if (midVal < key) {</pre>
    low = mid + 1:
    } else if (midVal > key) {
      high = mid - 1;
    } else {
      return mid;
  return -low - 1;
```

Verification Using Proof Assistants

- encode definitions/programs in (higher-order) formalism
- 2 prove propositions interactively using powerful tactics
- 3 check soundness of every low-level step



examples: Coq, HOL4, HOL Light, Isabelle/HOL, Lean, Nuprl, ...

Some Large-Scale Verification Projects

Project	Year	Assistant	LOC
4-Color Theorem Odd Order Theorem	2005	Coq	60k
	2012	Coq	150k
Kepler Conjecture	2015	HOL Light	500k
CompCert	2009	Coq	40k
seL4	2009	Isabelle/HOL	200k
Verdi Raft	2016	Coq	50k

Effort in Large-Scale Projects

Project	Domain	Effort
CompCert	C compiler	> 8 person years
seL4	OS kernel	> 22 person years
Verdi Raft	distributed systems	> 2 person years

A Verified Software Development Workflow (in Coq)

- Write purely functional program
- Write specification and prove program correct
- **SECTION** Extract program to practical language (OCaml, Haskell, ...)
- 4 Link extracted program to libraries for I/O, communication, ...

```
Fixpoint alternate 11 12 :=
                                    Inductive alt :=
                                                                         let rec alternate 11 12 =
match 11 with
                                    | alt nil : forall 1.
                                                                          match 11 with
| | | | \Rightarrow 12
                                      alt [] 1 1
                                                                             \Pi \rightarrow 12
l h1 :: t1 ⇒
                                    | alt_step : forall a l t1 t2,
                                                                           l h1 :: t1 →
match 12 with
                                      alt 1 t1 t2 \rightarrow
                                                                           (match 12 with
 \ \ \sqcap \ \Rightarrow \texttt{h1} \ :: \ \texttt{t1}
                                      alt (a :: t1) l (a :: t2).
                                                                             | [] → h1 :: t1
 l h2 :: t2 ⇒
                                                                            l h2 :: t2 →
   h1 :: h2 :: alternate t1 t2 Lemma alt_alternate :
                                                                              h1 :: (h2 ::
 end
                                      forall 11 12 13.
                                                                              (alternate t1 t2)))
end.
                                      alt 11 12 13 \rightarrow
                                      alternate 11 12 = 13.
                                    Proof
                                    (* omitted proof script ... *)
                                    Qed.
```

- 1. Coq program
- 2. Coq spec/proof
- 3. OCaml program

Case Study: CompCert

- (almost) end-to-end verified compiler for C subset in Coq
- compiled code performance comparable to gcc -01
- target: PowerPC, ARM, and x86(-64) assembly
- sold commercially
- applied in embedded systems development

Unsupported by CompCert

- unstructured switch (e.g., "Duff's device")
- long double type
- variable-length arrays

CompCert Correctness: Semantic Preservation

```
Theorem transf_c_program_correct: forall (p: Csyntax.program) (tp: Asm.program) (b: behavior), transf_c_program p = 0K tp \rightarrow program_behaves (Asm.semantics tp) b \rightarrow exists b', program_behaves (Csem.semantics p) b' \wedge behavior_improves b' b.
```


Leveraging CompCert for Program Verification

How to obtain guarantees about specific C programs?

- 1 encode C program in Coq using clightgen
- 2 specify properties of program in Coq
- 3 prove that program satisfies specification in Coq
- 4 guarantees hold for CompCert-generated assembly

https://vst.cs.princeton.edu

CompCert Passes



CompCert's Trusted Computing Base

- Coq's proof checker
- C semantics reflects meaning of C99 specification
- OCaml extraction preserves meaning of Coq's language
- OCaml compiler, runtime, libraries, OS, hardware

Earlier version of CompCert tested differentially against gcc and clang; no wrong-code errors found.

Try out CompCert (for Research Purposes)

- https://compcert.inria.fr
- easiest to install via OPAM: https://opam.ocaml.org

```
opam repo add coq-rl https://coq.inria.fr/opam/released
opam install coq-compcert
```

```
ccomp -c src1.c
ccomp -c src2.c
ccomp -o exec src1.o src2.o
```