Penetration Test Report

1. Executive Summary

A comprehensive vulnerability assessment and penetration test were conducted on two domains, specifically targeting Metasploitable 2 and its DVWA (Damn Vulnerable Web Application) component. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the security posture of Metasploitable 2 and to determine its susceptibility to potential cyber-attacks. The testing approach simulated the actions of a malicious attacker with the following key objectives:

- **Evaluate Defense Penetration:** Assess if a remote attacker could breach the security defenses of Metasploitable 2.
- **Assess Security Impact:** Determine the potential impact of a security breach on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Metasploitable 2's information systems, including its internal infrastructure.

Through this assessment, we identified and exploited security vulnerabilities that could allow a remote attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information. All tests were performed with the same level of access as an external Internet user, adhering to industry standards and guidelines to ensure a controlled and realistic evaluation environment.

These findings provide insight into the current security landscape of Metasploitable 2 and highlight areas for improvement to protect against unauthorized access and maintain data integrity.

1.1. Scope

IP Address	
Name	Metasploitable 2.0
System Type	Host
OS Information	Ubuntu 8.04 (hardy) on Linux kernel 2.6

Domain	192.168.8.x/dvwa

Name	Damn Vulnerable Web Application
System Type	Host
OS Information	Ubuntu 8.04 (hardy) on Linux Kernel 2.6

1.2. Methodology

Industry-standard tools and frameworks were employed throughout the vulnerability assessment and penetration testing process, ensuring a comprehensive and structured approach. Key tools included:

- **Nmap** for network discovery and scanning,
- **Metasploit Framework** for exploiting known vulnerabilities,
- Various **information-gathering tools** to collect system and network details,
- **Parrot OS** penetration testing suite
- **Automated vulnerability scanners** for thorough detection of potential weaknesses.

The assessment adhered to a standardized penetration testing methodology, consisting of the following phases:

1. **Information Gathering:** Collecting relevant data on the target systems.
2. **Vulnerability Assessment:** Identifying and evaluating potential security vulnerabilities.
3. **Exploitation:** Attempting to exploit identified vulnerabilities to assess risk impact.
4. **Remediation Recommendations:** Providing actionable guidance to mitigate discovered vulnerabilities.

Each phase followed established best practices and industry standards to ensure a realistic, effective, and controlled testing environment.

1.3. Limitations

The vulnerability assessment and penetration test were limited to only the designated in-scope IP addresses and domains. Testing did not include vulnerabilities related to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks or mobile applications, as these were explicitly considered out of scope.

1.4. Risk Severity Information

High	This level represents the most severe vulnerabilities. Successful exploitation of high-risk vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to partially or completely compromise application data. This may include unauthorized modification or deletion of critical data. Immediate remediation is recommended to protect sensitive information.
Medium	Medium-risk vulnerabilities present considerable threats that can allow an attacker to gain non-critical information about the application or service. While less urgent than high-risk issues, medium-risk vulnerabilities should be addressed promptly after high-risk vulnerabilities are mitigated.
Low	Low-risk vulnerabilities pose minimal threats and may allow an attacker to access non-sensitive information. While this information is not intended for public access, it is not considered critical. Addressing these vulnerabilities is advisable, though they are a lower priority than high- and medium-risk issues.

2. Summary of Findings

Scope – 192.168.8.194

No.	Vulnerability	Risk	Testing Scale
1	Detected a Bind Shell Backdoor	High	Exploited
2	FTP Backdoor Detection	High	Exploited
3	Password not Set for MySQL root User	High	Exploited
4	Weak Credentials Used in VNC	High	Exploited
5	Detected a Backdoor in IRC	High	Exploited
6	Default Credentials Used in Apache Tomcat	High	Exploited
7	Weak Credentials Used in SSH	High	Exploited

8	Anonymous FTP Login Enabled	Medium	Exploited
9	Weak Credentials Used in FTP	Medium	Exploited
10	Cleartext Authentication is Supported by FTP	Low	Not Exploited

Scope – 192.168.8.194/dvwa

No	Vulnerability	Risk	Testing Scale
1	Weak Credentials used for Login	High	Exploited
2	SQL Injection	High	Exploited
3	Unrestricted File Upload	High	Exploited
4	Command Execution	High	Exploited

3. Technical Review

3.1 Information Gathering

3.1.1 Discovering the Target Network

As the first step of information gathering, the network which is needed the testing was discovered. Nmap was used for this purpose.



Target network could be identified by the IP 192.168.32.133.

3.1.2 Enumerating Open Ports and Services

A basic port scan was performed with Nmap in order to identify all open ports , services associated with the ports and versions of the services in the target IP.



About 30 open ports could be identified including commonly used ports. So, as the next step, each of these commonly used ports were enumerated.

3.1.3 FTP Enumeration

Two FTP services could be identified residing in ports 21 and 2121 respectively. Enumeration was performed for both ports.

As the first step of FTP enumeration, a banner grabbing was performed with Netcat.





FTP service which resides in port 21 could be observed to be running vsFTPD version 2.3.4 and the FTP service resides in port 2121 could be observed to be running ProFTPD version 1.3.1 which is an FTP server.

Then Searchsploit tool was used to identify any potential exploits available for the aforementioned FTP versions.





The FTP version in port 21 could be identified as vulnerable to a backdoor command execution and a Metasploit module is available for exploiting the vulnerability.

Then both FTP services were tested for anonymous login, with providing anonymous as the username and a blank password.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# nmap -p 21 --script ftp-anon 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-31 13:43 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00068s latency).

PORT   STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open  ftp
|_ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.40 seconds
```

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# nmap -p 2121 --script ftp-anon 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-31 13:45 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00055s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.38 seconds
```

FTP service in port 21 allowed anonymous login, while port 2121 did not.

Then a credential brute forcing was performed using “ftp-brute” Nmap script on both ports.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# nmap -p 21 --script ftp-brute 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-31 13:46 EDT
NSE: [ftp-brute] usernames: Time limit 10m00s exceeded.
NSE: [ftp-brute] usernames: Time limit 10m00s exceeded.
NSE: [ftp-brute] passwords: Time limit 10m00s exceeded.
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.0010s latency).

PORT   STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open  ftp
| ftp-brute:
|   Accounts:
|     user:user - Valid credentials
|_  Statistics: Performed 3649 guesses in 602 seconds, average tps: 5.9
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 602.56 seconds
```

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# nmap -p 2121 --script ftp-brute 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-31 14:01 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00053s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.39 seconds
```

Valid credentials could be found only for the FTP service on port 21.

Then a Wireshark packet capturing was performed on both ports in order to check unencrypted credentials passing through the network.



FTP services on both ports were passing credentials as plain text through the network.

Then both FTP services were tested for FTP bounce vulnerability with Nmap.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# nmap -p 21 --script ftp-bounce 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-31 14:39 EDT
NSE: [ftp-bounce] PORT response: 500 Illegal PORT command.
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00071s latency).

PORT   STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open  ftp
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.85 seconds

┌──(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# nmap -p 2121 --script ftp-bounce 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-31 14:48 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00076s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE
2121/tcp open  ccproxy-ftp
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.45 seconds
```

Both FTP services were not vulnerable to FTP bounce vulnerability, which uses “PORT” command to request access to ports indirectly through the use of the victim machine by an attacker.

3.1.4 SSH Enumeration

Secure shell (SSH) service could be identified on the default port 22.

As the first step of SSH enumeration, a username brute forcing was performed with the use of “ssh_enumusers” Metasploit module.

```
msf6 > search ssh_enumusers

Matching Modules
================

   #  Name                                  Disclosure Date  Rank    Check  Description
   -  ----                                  ---------------  ----    -----  -----------
   0  auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_enumusers   .                normal  No     SSH Username Enumeration
   1    \_ action: Malformed Packet         .                .       .      Use a malformed packet
   2    \_ action: Timing Attack            .                .       .      Use a timing attack


Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 2, use 2 or use auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_enumusers
After interacting with a module you can manually set a ACTION with set ACTION 'Timing Attack'

msf6 > use 0
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_enumusers) > set rhost 192.168.32.133
rhost ⇒ 192.168.32.133
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_enumusers) > set user_file /home/pamodysix/users.txt
user_file ⇒ /home/pamodysix/users.txt
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_enumusers) > exploit

[*] 192.168.32.133:22 - SSH - Using malformed packet technique
[*] 192.168.32.133:22 - SSH - Checking for false positives
[*] 192.168.32.133:22 - SSH - Starting scan
[+] 192.168.32.133:22 - SSH - User 'user' found
[+] 192.168.32.133:22 - SSH - User 'root' found
[+] 192.168.32.133:22 - SSH - User 'msfadmin' found
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

Three users could be identified as

1. user
2. Root
3. msfadmin.

Then an algorithm brute force was performed with “ssh2-enum-algos” Nmap script to identify supported algorithms by the SSH service.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# nmap -p22 192.168.32.133 --script ssh2-enum-algos
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-01 02:05 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00069s latency).

PORT   STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open  ssh
| ssh2-enum-algos:
|   kex_algorithms: (4)
|       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
|       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
|       diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
|       diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
|   server_host_key_algorithms: (2)
|       ssh-rsa
|       ssh-dss
|   encryption_algorithms: (13)
|       aes128-cbc
|       3des-cbc
|       blowfish-cbc
|       cast128-cbc
|       arcfour128
|       arcfour256
|       arcfour
|       aes192-cbc
|       aes256-cbc
|       rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
|       aes128-ctr
|       aes192-ctr
|       aes256-ctr
|   mac_algorithms: (7)
|       hmac-md5
|       hmac-sha1
|       umac-64@openssh.com
|       hmac-ripemd160
|       hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com
|       hmac-sha1-96
|       hmac-md5-96
|   compression_algorithms: (2)
|       none
|_      zlib@openssh.com
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.46 seconds
```

Weak SSH keys were enumerated with “ssh-hostkey” Nmap script.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# nmap -p22 192.168.32.133 --script ssh-hostkey --script-args ssh_hostkey=full
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-01 02:07 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00060s latency).

PORT   STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open  ssh
| ssh-hostkey:
|   ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBALz4hsc8a2Srq4nlW960qV8xwBG0JC+jI7fWxm5METIJH4tKr/xUTwsTYEYnaZLzcOiy21D3ZvOwYb6AA376
5zdgCd2Tgand7F0YD5UtXG7b7fbz99chReivL0SIWEG/E96Ai+pqYMP2WD5KaOJwSIXSUajnU5oWmY5×85sBw+XDAAAAFQDFkMpmdFQTF+oRqaoSNVU7
Z+hjSwAAAIBCQxNKzi1TyP+QJIFa3M0oLqCVWI0We/ARtXrzpBOJ/dt0hTJXCeYisKqcdwdtyIn8OUCOyrIjqNuA2QW217oQ6wXpbFh+5AQm8Hl3b6C6
o8lX3Ptw+Y4dp0lzfWHwZ/jzHwtuaDQaok7u1f971lEazeJLqfiWrAzoklqSWyDQJAAAAIA1lAD3xWYkeIeHv/R3P9i+XaoI7imFkMuYXCDTq843YU6T
d+0mWpllCqAWUV/CQamGgQLtYy5S0ueoks01MoKdOMMhKVwqdr08nvCBdNKjIEd3gH6oBk/YRnjzxlEAYBsvCmM4a0jmhz0oNiRWlc/F+bkUeFKrBx/D
2fdfZmhrGg==
|_  ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAstqnuFMBOZvO3WTEjP4TUdjgWkIVNdTq6kboEDjteOfc65TlI7sRvQBwqAhQjeeyyIk8T55gMDkO
D0akSlSXvLDcmcdYfxeIF0ZSuT+nkRhij7XSSA/Oc5QSk3sJ/SInfb78e3anbRHpmkJcVgETJ5WhKObUNf1AKZW++4Xlc63M4KI5cjvMMIPEVOyR3AKm
I78Fo3HJjYucg87JjLeC66I7+dlEYX6zT8i1XYwa/L1vZ3qSJISGVu8kRPikMv/cNSvki4j+qDYyZ2E5497W87+Ed46/8P42LNGoOV8OcX/ro6pAcbEP
UdUEfkJrqi2YXbhvwIJ0gFMb6wfe5cnQew==
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.49 seconds
```

Authentication methods for SSH was enumerated with “ssh-auth-methods” Nmap script and found that both public-key and password are accepted.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# nmap -p22 192.168.32.133 --script ssh-auth-methods --script-args="ssh.user=msfadmin"
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-01 02:09 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00062s latency).

PORT   STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open  ssh
| ssh-auth-methods:
|   Supported authentication methods:
|     publickey
|_    password
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.62 seconds
```

3.1.5 SMTP Enumeration

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) service could be identified on the default port 25. Users of SMTP were enumerated with “smtp_enum” metasploit module.

Some default users in UNIX systems such as mail , postmaster , user and www-data could be identified.

3.1.6 NetBIOS Enumeration

NetBIOS (SMB) service could be identified on the default ports 139 and 445.

As the first step of SMB enumeration, enum4linux was used to identify users, workgroups and Nbtstat information.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# enum4linux -a 192.168.32.133
Starting enum4linux v0.9.1 ( http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/application/enum4linux/ ) on Fri Nov  1 02:35:19 2024

 ========================( Target Information )========================

Target ........... 192.168.32.133
RID Range ........ 500-550,1000-1050
Username ......... ''
Password ......... ''
Known Usernames .. administrator, guest, krbtgt, domain admins, root, bin, none


 ======================( Enumerating Workgroup/Domain on 192.168.32.133 )======================


[+] Got domain/workgroup name: WORKGROUP
```



Then Nmap was utilized with “smb-vuln” script to identify potential vulnerabilities.



SMB services could be identified as not vulnerable to **ms10-054** which is SMB pool overflow vulnerability and **ms10-061** which is Microsoft print spooler service impersonation vulnerability.

3.1.7 VNC Enumeration

Virtual Network Computing (VNC) service, which is used to remotely control another computer, could be identified on the default port 5900.

Nmap script “vnc-info” was utilized to enumerate the VNC service.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# nmap -sV --script vnc-info -p 5900 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-01 03:57 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00074s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE VERSION
5900/tcp open  vnc     VNC (protocol 3.3)
| vnc-info:
|   Protocol version: 3.3
|   Security types:
|_    VNC Authentication (2)
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.95 seconds
```

As the security type used here is VNC authentication, it may be vulnerable to authentication bypasses.

3.1.8 IRC Enumeration

Internet Relay Chat (IRC) service could be identified on the default port 6667. Nmap script "irc-info" was utilized to gather basic information of the service.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# nmap -sV --script irc-info -p 6667 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-01 03:59 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00068s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE VERSION
6667/tcp open  irc     UnrealIRCd
| irc-info:
|   users: 1
|   servers: 1
|   lusers: 1
|   lservers: 0
|   server: irc.Metasploitable.LAN
|   version: Unreal3.2.8.1. irc.Metasploitable.LAN
|   uptime: 0 days, 2:37:54
|   source ident: nmap
|   source host: B3AD3EB4.37AF7B9E.FFFA6D49.IP
|_  error: Closing Link: holfciyrh[192.168.32.134] (Quit: holfciyrh)
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)
Service Info: Host: irc.Metasploitable.LAN

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.76 seconds
```

IRC version was identified as Unreal 3.2.8.1 which contains a major vulnerability known as UnrealIRCD 3.2.8.1 Backdoor Command Execution. So, Nmap's "ircunrealircd-backdoor" script was used to confirm the vulnerability.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# nmap -sV --script irc-unrealircd-backdoor -p 6667 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-01 04:01 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00066s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE VERSION
6667/tcp open  irc     UnrealIRCd
|_irc-unrealircd-backdoor: Looks like trojaned version of unrealircd. See http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Jun/277
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)
Service Info: Host: irc.Metasploitable.LAN

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.78 seconds
```

3.1.9 Apache Tomcat Enumeration

A default Tomcat web server implementation could be identified on port 8180, and admin login page could be identified in http://192.168.8.194:8180/admin/ path.



As this is a default web server, it is possible that default account credentials for Admin login page are still in use.

Nmap script “http-default-accounts” was utilized to identify any default credentials in use inside this web server implementation. It could confirm that default credentials are still in use in the web server implementation.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# nmap -p 8180 --script http-default-accounts 192.168.32.133
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-01 04:38 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.133
Host is up (0.00075s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE
8180/tcp open  unknown
| http-default-accounts:
|   [Apache Tomcat] at /manager/html/
|     tomcat:tomcat
|   [Apache Tomcat Host Manager] at /host-manager/html/
|_    tomcat:tomcat
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:22:C1:CD (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.18 seconds
```

3.1.10 Web Application Enumeration

A web application called Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) could be identified on HTTP port 80 in http://192.168.8.194/dvwa path. Tests were conducted on this web application considering it as a separate domain.

As the first step of enumerating the web application, Nikto was used to scan the web application in order to identify existing vulnerabilities and gather critical information.



Nikto could identify many vulnerabilities, flaws and interesting facts associated with the web application.

As there are hidden directories in web applications which are not visible to normal users, **Gobuster** was utilized to brute force hidden directories. Brute forcing was performed using different wordlists.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# gobuster dir -u http://192.168.32.133/dvwa -w /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt
===============================================================
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
===============================================================
[+] Url:                     http://192.168.32.133/dvwa
[+] Method:                  GET
[+] Threads:                 10
[+] Wordlist:                /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes:   404
[+] User Agent:              gobuster/3.6
[+] Timeout:                 10s
===============================================================
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
===============================================================
/.htpasswd            (Status: 403) [Size: 301]
/.htaccess            (Status: 403) [Size: 301]
/about                (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> login.php]
/.hta                 (Status: 403) [Size: 296]
/config               (Status: 301) [Size: 327] [--> http://192.168.32.133/dvwa/config/]
/docs                 (Status: 301) [Size: 325] [--> http://192.168.32.133/dvwa/docs/]
/external             (Status: 301) [Size: 329] [--> http://192.168.32.133/dvwa/external/]
/favicon.ico          (Status: 200) [Size: 1406]
/index                (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> login.php]
/index.php            (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> login.php]
/instructions         (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> login.php]
/login                (Status: 200) [Size: 1289]
/logout               (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> login.php]
/php.ini              (Status: 200) [Size: 148]
/phpinfo              (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> login.php]
/phpinfo.php          (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> login.php]
/README               (Status: 200) [Size: 4934]
/robots               (Status: 200) [Size: 26]
/robots.txt           (Status: 200) [Size: 26]
/setup                (Status: 200) [Size: 3549]
/security             (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> login.php]
Progress: 4614 / 4615 (99.98%)
===============================================================
Finished
===============================================================
```

A firewall fingerprinting was performed using wafw00f tool to identify the web application firewall, and there wasn't a WAF involved.

```
┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/pamodysix]
└─# wafw00f http://192.168.32.133/dvwa/

                ~ WAFW00F : v2.2.0 ~
    The Web Application Firewall Fingerprinting Toolkit

[*] Checking http://192.168.32.133/dvwa/
[+] Generic Detection results:
[-] No WAF detected by the generic detection
[~] Number of requests: 7
```

3.2 Internal Network Vulnerability Findings

Scope – 192.168.32.133

A) Detected a Bind Shell Backdoor

Risk Factor	High
Type	Remote
CVSS Base Score	10

Description

A specific port on the victim machine is bound by a bind shell and it listens for an incoming connection from an attacker machine. In a malicious perspective, this bind shell acts as a backdoor to the system.

In this machine, an open root bind shell could be identified, listening on port 1524 without any authentication being required. This shell can be used to obtain root access directly by an attacker with connecting to the port remotely and sending commands directly. A sign of previous breach is indicated through this bind shell.

Impact

Sensitive data of the system may have already breached. In addition, an attacker can easily gain high privilege access to the system without providing any credentials by utilizing simple networking tools such as Netcat.

Recommendations

- Verification should be performed to identify whether the system is compromised.
- If the system is compromised, follow a proper incident response plan.
- Remove the bind shell and reinstall the system if necessary.
- Close the open port 1524, which contains the bind shell.
- Check the system periodically for suspicious open ports and services running, and take necessary actions.

B) **FTP Backdoor Detection**

Risk Factor	**High**
Type	**Remote**
CVSS Base Score	**10**
CVE	**CVE-2011-2523**

Description

FTP service resides on port 21 is vsFTPD version 2.3.4, which has a backdoor by default, and it opens a shell on TCP port 6200.

Impact

A reverse shell can be opened by an attacker after the successful exploitation of this vulnerability, and it leads to total compromise of the system.

Recommendations

vsFTPD version 2.3.4 is outdated. So, update the vsFTPD to the latest 3.0.4 version.

C) **Weak Credentials used in VNC**

Risk Factor	High
Type	Remote
CVSS Base Score	10

Description

Virtual Network Computing is widely used for remotely control another computer with the use of a graphical user interface. It should be secured with proper passwords because it deals with sensitive data. However, authentication password for VNC server in this machine is set to the value “password” which is not secure.

Impact

Any remote attacker will be able to login to the VNC service and gain access to the shared computing resources.

Recommendations

- Disable VNC if it is not needed.
- Apply a strong password and refrain from using default credentials.
- Change authentication keys for each and every shared computer.
- Verify whether the shared computing resources are compromised.

D) Detected a Backdoor in IRC