

# L07 Complexity of Computing NE


CS 295 Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory  
Ioannis Panageas

Inspired and some figures  
by C. Daskalakis slides and T. Roughgarden notes

# Warm-up: Reductions in NP

## Example: INDEPENDENT SET (IS) Problem

Given a simple undirected graph  $G(V, E)$  and  $k$ , is there an **independent set** in  $G$  of size  $\geq k$ . Independent set is called a set  $I \subset V$  of vertices such that pairwise the vertices in  $I$  are **not connected**.




Graph  $G$ .

Vertices  $v_3, v_5, v_7, v_8$  form an **independent set**.

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**Claim:** INDEPENDENT SET is **NP-complete**.


**Proof:** (1) INDEPENDENT SET **belongs** to **NP** (why?).

(2) Reduce 3-SAT to INDEPENDENT SET. Since 3-SAT is NP-hard, INDEPENDENT SET is NP-hard.

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(1), (2) imply IND. SET is NP-complete!

# 3-SAT reduction to IS

## Problem: 3-SAT

Given a Boolean expression  $E$ , such that  $E$  is a **conjunction** of **clauses**, where each clause is a **disjunction** of exactly 3 **literals**, is  $E$  **satisfiable**?

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A **literal** is a Boolean expression consisting of just a single Boolean variable, or the negation of a Boolean variable.

- Example: “ $\neg x_1$ ” and “ $x_2$ ” are literals.

A **clause** is a Boolean expression of the form “ $\ell_1 \vee \ell_2 \vee \cdots \vee \ell_k$ ”, i.e. a **disjunction** of some literals  $\ell_1, \ell_2, \dots, \ell_k$ . In 3-SAT  $k = 3$ .

- Example: “ $C_1 \equiv x_1 \vee \neg x_2 \vee x_3$ ” is a clause.

A Boolean expression is a conjunction of clauses.

Example: “ $E \equiv C_1 \vee C_2 \vee C_3$ ” is a clause.

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**Satisfiability:** Can you assign True, False to the variables so that the expression is True?

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


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# 3-SAT reduction to IS

**Claim:** Expression  $E$  with  $k$  clauses is satisfiable if and only if the induced graph  $G$  has an IS of size  $k$ .

Therefore, given a **graph  $G$  and a  $k$** , if we can identify in **poly-time** if there exists an **Independent Set of size at least  $k$** , then we can solve in **poly-time 3-SAT**.

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**Question:** Can the problem of computing a Nash Equilibrium be NP-complete?

**Answer:** (Megiddo) Suppose we have a reduction from SAT to NASH, s.t any solution to the instance of NASH tells us whether or not the SAT instance has a solution. Then we could turn this into a nondeterministic algorithm for verifying that an instance of SAT has no solution: Just guess a solution of the NASH instance, and check that it indeed implies that the SAT instance has no solution. NP = co-NP (unlikely).

# The class PLS

PLS (Polynomial-time Local Search) is a complexity class intended to exemplify local search problems. An abstract local search problem is specified by **three polynomial-time algorithms**.

Canonical Problem: LOCAL MAX-CUT

Given an undirected graph  $G = (V, E)$  with non-negative weights  $w_e$  on edges, find a cut  $(S, \overline{S})$  that maximizes the total weight of cut edges. You are allowed to do only **local moves that improve the objective, i.e.**, moving one vertex  $v$  from one side of the cut to the other that improves the total weight of cut edges.

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Remark: (classic) MAX-CUT is **NP-Complete**.

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2. The second algorithm takes as input an instance and a feasible solution, and returns the **objective function value** of the solution (for LOCAL MAX-CUT it is the sum of the total weight of the edges crossing the cut).

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3. The third algorithm takes as input an instance and a feasible solution and either reports **“locally optimal”** or **produces a better solution** (for LOCAL MAX-CUT it checks all possible  $|V|$  moves. If one improves the objective choose that move).

**Theorem (Local Max-cut is PLS-complete).** *The LOCAL MAX-CUT problem is PLS-complete.*

# The complexity of Pure Nash Eq.

**Theorem** (**PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete**). *The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.*

*Proof.* We show first that PNE CONGESTION GAMES  $\in$  PLS.

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- The third algorithm checks if the given strategy profile  $s$  is a PNE; if not, we find an agent  $i$  that deviates from  $s_i$  to another pure  $s'_i$  and decreases her utility. Then  $\Phi(s'_i, s_{-i}) < \Phi(s_i, s_{-i})$ . This can be done **polynomial time in the description of the game**.

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
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- The cost  $c_{r_e}/c_{\bar{r}_e}$  of a resource  $r_e$  or  $\bar{r}_e$  is 0 if one agent uses it and  $w_e$  if two players use it.

This transformation is **poly-time**.

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Each agent has two strategies, **red** and **green**.

Say agents  $v_1, v_2$  choose red and  $v_3, v_4$  choose green. Cost of  $v_1, v_2$  is  $w_{e_1}$  and of  $v_3, v_4$  is  $w_{e_5}$ .

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
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Therefore:


- **Cuts with larger weight** correspond to strategy profiles with **smaller potential**.
- **Local maxima of cuts** of  $G$  correspond to **local minima of the potential function**.

# The class PPAD

Suppose that an exponentially large graph with vertex set  $\{0,1\}^n$  (i.e,  $2^n$  vertices) is defined by two circuits:




Example:




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
Canonical Problem:

**END OF THE LINE:** Given  $P, N$ : If  $0^n$  is an unbalanced node, find another unbalanced node. Otherwise return  $0^n$ .

**PPAD** (Papadimitriou 94'): All problems in FNP reducible to END OF THE LINE.

# 2D Sperner's Lemma


**Theorem** (**A trichromatic triangle always exist**). Consider triangulation of  $2d$  simplex  $\Delta$  and a proper 3-coloring, that assign each vertex a different color and inside vertices on each edge of  $\Delta$  use only the two colors of the respective endpoints. Then there always exists a **trichromatic triangle (odd in number!)**.






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
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
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
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
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*Proof.* We introduce an outer boundary for convenience that does not create new trichromatic triangles. Next we define a directed walk starting from the bottom-left triangle.



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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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# 2D Sperner's Lemma

*Proof cont.*


- The walk **cannot exit** the outer triangle (why?).
- The walk does **not contain  $\rho$  shapes** (why?).



# 2D Sperner's Lemma

*Proof cont.*

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- The walk does **not contain  $\rho$  shapes** (why?).



The walk will terminate inside somewhere!  
That small triangle should be trichromatic!




# 2D Sperner's Lemma

*Proof cont.*

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- The walk does **not contain  $\rho$  shapes** (why?).

Sperner's Lemma can be generalized for higher dimensions. SPERNER problem is like END OF THE LINE!

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# BROUWER

**Definition** (**BROUWER**). *The problem BROUWER is defined below:*

**Input:** *A poly-time algorithm  $\Pi_F$  for the **evaluation of a function**  $F : [0, 1]^m \rightarrow [0, 1]^m$ , a constant  $K$  such that  $F$  is  **$K$ -Lipschitz** and accuracy  $\epsilon$ .*

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
We will show that

BROUWER  $\rightarrow$  SPERNER

# 2D BROUWER reduction to SPERNER

Let  $F : [0, 1]^2 \rightarrow [0, 1]^2$ . By uniform continuity there exists a  $\delta(\epsilon)$  so that

$$\|x - y\|_{\infty} \leq \delta \Rightarrow \|F(x) - F(y)\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon.$$




Diameter of each cell  
is at most  $\delta(\epsilon)$

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
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
Color the nodes of the triangulation according to the direction of  $f(x) - x$ .



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
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


Tie-break at the boundary angles, so that the resulting coloring respects the boundary conditions!

# 2D BROUWER reduction to SPERNER


**Claim.** Choose  $\delta = \min(\delta(\epsilon), \epsilon)$  and let  $v^y$  be the yellow vertex of a trichromatic triangle. It holds that

$$\|F(v^y) - v^y\|_\infty \leq 2\epsilon.$$



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
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# 2D BROUWER reduction to SPERNER

**Claim.** Choose a yellow vertex of a triangle


This will be in HW2.

$$\|T(u^*) - u^*\|_\infty \leq 2\epsilon.$$



Diameter of each cell is at most  $\delta(\epsilon)$

Color the nodes of the triangulation according to the direction of  $f(x) - x$ .



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# NASH reduction to BROUWER

We will not see the proof, just an idea.

# NASH reduction to BROUWER

We will not see the proof, just an idea.

Consider the  $2 \times 2$  matching pennies.

	H	T
H	<b>1, -1</b>	<b>-1, 1</b>
T	<b>-1, 1</b>	<b>1, -1</b>

Consider the function  $f$  from the proof of Nash.


$$f_{is_i}(x) = \frac{x_i(s_i) + \max\{u_i(s_i; x_{-i}) - u_i(x), 0\}}{1 + \sum_{s' \in S_i} \max\{u_i(s'; x_{-i}) - u_i(x), 0\}}$$

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Draw the vector field for  $f(x) - x$ .





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



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



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
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


Nash equilibrium  $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})!$

# Inclusions we showed



**Theorem** ((NASH is PPAD-complete) Daskalakis, Goldberg, Papadimitriou).  
*NASH is PPAD-complete.*





# Inclusions: The full picture

