BARRIERS TO DEMOCRATIZATION: A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE

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Early optimism that the Arab spring would lead to a democratization of at least some regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has in many quarters given way to pessimism that the uprisings have instead spawned crackdowns on dissidents (Bahrain), renewed dictatorships (Tunisia), states on the verge of failure (Libya and Yemen), a rise to power of forces with an uncertain commitment to democracy (Egypt) and even a tragic civil war (Syria).

Much of the recent western literature on democratization in the MENA region has emphasized that the Arab revolts, though drawing inspiration from one another, have very different social bases in different countries, and operate within countries that pose very distinctive challenges in terms of pre-existing social and political divisions, and the extant level of social trust without which democratic interactions are extraordinarily difficult. They differ, too, in the nature of the regimes they confronted—all were corrupt, neo-patriarchal and repressive, but in distinctive ways that created diverse challenges for successor governments. Finally, these countries also differ dramatically in terms of the divisions among opponents of the old regime and the relative organizational strength of various opponents, notably various branches of political Islam and secular forces (Anderson, 2011).

The literature, particularly that produced prior to the so-called "Arab spring," has also focused on a common set of barriers to democratization. Two themes have been particularly important. One is the desire of self-interested elites to remain in power so that they continue to extract economic rents from their control both over state revenue and the broader economy (through both illegal and semi-legal means). A second set of factors often cited as acting as a barrier are religious and cultural beliefs and their influence on individuals' behavior, notably a hostility of Islam to pluralism and popular participation in government (see for example Kedourie, 1994; Lewis, 1994), a weak division within the Islamic tradition between religion and politics [Lewis, 1996], and the treatment of women and girls in most Muslim-majority countries (Fish, 2002). Other authors, however, have disputed that notion that Islam and democracy are incompatible, noting that support for democracy is quite strong in many Arab societies while opinions on the appropriate role for shariʿa law are divided (Tessler, 2002; Tessler and Gao,

2005; Tessler, Jamal and Robbins, 2012; Braizat, 2010; Roy, 2012; Baker, 2012; Diamond, 2010)

Drawing upon examples primarily from post-Mubarak Egypt, this exploratory paper argues that analysis of democratization in MENA should consider a different focus. Instead of prioritizing attention on attitudes and beliefs, we identify specific democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors, and take a more comprehensive approach to understanding the conditions under which those behaviors are more or less likely to occur. While in no way denying the importance of attitudes and beliefs, this paper argues that they are one of several critical constraints on democratization processes that must be examined together.

In this perspective, democratization is like many public policy objectives in that it can be sustained only if a broad array of ordinary citizens and organizations behave in ways that are consistent with the enunciated objectives of the policy, and refrain from behaviors that undermine that objective. In the shorthand that will be used in this paper, widespread behavioral "compliance" with those objectives is necessary. Building governments based on popular sovereignty requires widespread civic participation through voting. Creating accountable and effective governments requires public access to information, as well as civic actors willing and able to serve as government watchdogs. Tolerance of difference in societies based on majority rule requires articulation of legal standards permitting free speech but protecting minority rights. Indeed, for some policies, like bans on hate speech, changing the behavior of some target group of citizens is the whole point of the policy.

The challenges for Arab societies aspiring to make the transition from authoritarianism to stable democracy are daunting. In moving toward democracy, getting rid of old regimes is the (relatively) easy part; regularizing new democracy-enhancing processes and behaviors and having them accepted as normal and expected—and de-normalizing other behaviors that threaten democratic behavior—is the hard part. If most citizens do not vote, elections and newly formed transitional governments will lose their legitimacy. If citizens do not monitor governmental abuse, new governments may feel that they can rule with impunity. If political parties resort to intimidation to win elections, then the results of those elections will be questioned, and other groups will feel that they need to do the same. At best, democratizing societies are likely to be unstable if individuals and organizations repeatedly engage in democracy-threatening behaviors, if those democracy-threatening behaviors are common and are perceived as "normal" and

acceptable, and if behaviors that reinforce democracy are infrequent, or are seen as exceptional or of dubious acceptability.

The analysis in this paper proceeds in three steps. The first section develops a general conceptual framework based in behavioral economics and the analysis of policy regimes. In laying the foundations for the analysis of democratic behaviors in the next section, this section will develop four broad sets of arguments. First, it will develop a comprehensive analytical framework for analyzing factors that reinforce or serve as barriers to specific behaviors, using a common set of categories that can be used to examine a wide variety of behaviors. In this framework, individual behavior and behavioral change are seen as the product of three broad sets of factors: beliefs (including information and cognition, cultural beliefs and peer effects), incentives (including incentive and sanctioning, monitoring and enforcement) and capacity (including resources and autonomy to act free from coercion by others). Because most serious "compliance gaps" at both the individual and aggregate levels result not from a single barrier to a particular behavior but from multiple barriers, failure to think comprehensively about those barriers can lead both to an inadequate understanding of compliance problems and to poor policy design and implementation. Particular attention is given here to resource and autonomy constraints that make compliance more difficult or costly, even for those who wish to comply.

Second, it will argue that even within individual societies, there are wide variations in the nature of compliance regimes (official rules of the game) and "enforcement regimes" (actual patterns of behavior by front-line government workers) governing specific behaviors. These compliance and enforcement regimes may provide a strong impetus to democracy reinforcing behaviors, weak reinforcement or none at all, or even make it less likely that such behaviors occur. The role of transitional governments in promoting democracy-enhancing behaviors is of course critical: democratization is unlikely to occur unless governments establish compliance regimes and enforcement regimes that encourage democracy-reinforcing behavior and discourage democracy-threatening behavior. Revolutionary uprisings throughout the region have sought to sweep away governments that routinely broke the law and modeled democracy-threatening peer behaviors, such as flagrant untruthfulness, lack of accountability and illegitimate use of coercive force against regime opponents. Newly established transitional governments have quickly lost credibility when they fail to maintain security and undertake meaningful restructuring of what Egyptians call the "deep state": the durable state institutions,

personnel and policies that persist from the previous regime. If they are to become stable democracies, these societies need to focus on behaviors not just of citizens but of also government.

Third, attention is given to heterogeneity within program target groups in the barriers they face to engaging in particular barriers and their ability and willingness to overcome those barriers. Because targets are heterogeneous, specific policy instruments and the "settings" on those instruments (Hall, 1993) that are aimed at modal targets may fail to secure compliant behavior from targets with different characteristics.

Finally, the boundaries of target populations, the compliance and enforcement regimes that are put in place to secure desired behavior, and levels of compliance that are considered acceptable are all socially and politically-determined constructions that reflect social views and the political power of target groups and their political allies (see Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Thus these compliance and enforcement regimes may be heavily contested, and may change over time.

The second section of the paper identifies several key democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors, what is known about factors that facilitate or inhibit their occurrence and strategies to address those barriers. It also argues that while most compliance behaviors in specific policy sectors, are self-reinforcing—that is, more of that behavior leads to even more of that behavior being produced—many democracy-enhancing behaviors are not self-reinforcing. However, many democracy-threatening behaviors are in fact self-reinforcing. The final section of the paper identifies specific strategies and "leverage points" that can be used to enhance democracy-building. It argues that civic education, while important, is unlikely to produce substantial increases in democracy-enhancing behavior and declines in democracy-threatening behaviors in the absence of other environmental changes, especially government compliance and enforcement regimes that are firmly committed to producing more democracy-enhancing behaviors and reducing democracy-threatening ones.

I. BEHAVIORAL CHANGE AND COMPLIANCE: AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW

The first contemporary definition of "compliance" offered by the Oxford English Dictionary is "acting in accordance with, or the yielding to a desire, request, condition, direction,

etc." Compliance, in short, is concerned with *behavior*. The literature on compliance usually limits its purview to situations in which the target is aware of the request or expectation for compliance, even if it is not made explicitly (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Compliant behavior may, but need not, involve willing agreement to behave in a particular way: grudging—even compelled—compliance is still compliance, though it is likely to incur higher monitoring and enforcement costs (May, 2004; Alford, 2009: 22). Many citizens are not entirely happy about their tax bills, for example, but most still pay them, although they do so much more in some countries than others—e.g., more in Chile than Argentina (Bergman 2009). There are substantial and diverse literatures on why individuals and organizations (notably businesses) do or do not comply with public policies. These literatures span the fields of political science, economics, law, and psychology (see for example Bergman, 2009; Cialdini, 2003; Kahan, 1997; Meier and Morgan, 1982; Tyler, 2006; Winter and May, 2001; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Etienne, 2011).

The nature of compliance and of government's expectations about acceptable and unacceptable behaviors—what can be called the "compliance regime"—varies considerably across objectives and behaviors. Indeed, there may also be substantial variation *across countries* in terms of what behavior is expected, from whom it is expected, and how strongly it is demanded. As shown in the left hand columns of Table 1, the behavior that is relevant to governments' objectives is in some cases relatively simple—e.g., encouraging voting—while in other cases it is much more complex, such as permitting free expression while promoting tolerance of difference. In some cases, governments may encourage or require very specific actions—what can be labeled "positive compliance"—while in other cases, they may discourage or forbid specific actions—"negative compliance"—without being highly prescriptive about what behavior *is* preferred. In some cases (e.g. outlawing the use of violence by citizens) there is both a legal obligation to comply and clear and specific boundaries on what is acceptable behavior, while in others (e.g. expanding access to information while protecting citizen privacy) there is not (Alford, 2009: 35). Some compliance demands are infrequent (e.g., voting) or even one-time events (e.g., registering for the military draft) while others (e.g. ensuring justice and accountability for victims of violence or equal access to vital public services, such as clean water) are ongoing.

A second broad set of characteristics concerns target populations of compliance expectations. Some behaviors are required of the population as a whole, while others are

targeted at specific groups—and have particular sub-populations that are particularly likely to be non-compliant. Even within the target populations of specific policies, some individuals and organizations may be less responsive to particular incentives than others. Some may be harder to monitor. Some may have less information or greater difficulties in obtaining information. Strategies that secure compliance from the modal member of the target population may not work for all: admonitions to tolerate free speech rights of others, for example, may have little impact on those individuals and organizations who have very specific, religiously-based conceptions of what behaviors are acceptable. An effective analysis of target compliance should consider impacts of policy incentives, monitoring, resources, etc. on specific *sub-groups* of target populations to take account of heterogeneity with regard to each of the barriers outlined above. So monitoring and penalizing hate speech by religious leaders may be part of a larger strategy of promoting tolerance of religious minorities. Calculations about the opportunity costs of compliance—that is, what the target is giving up by complying—may also vary substantially from individual to individual.

Policy success obviously depends on aggregate levels of compliance as well as individual compliance (Figure 2). Aggregate compliance can be thought of as the sum of all actions (and non-actions) of compliance by individuals and organizations whose behavior is relevant to a policy objective. Indeed, policymakers may not care very much about a small number of individual acts of non-compliance as long as the aggregate rate of compliance remains high. And even fairly high rates of individual non-compliance that might be acceptable for one behavior (e.g., non-voting) are probably not fatal to a democracy, but even modest levels of political violence or coercion against parties and voters easily can undermine a democracy, especially if it prompts retaliation. At the aggregate as well as the individual level, the boundary between "adequate" levels of compliance and "inadequate" levels of compliance which indicate a "compliance problem" or a "policy failure" are often unclear, and may change over time.

Compliance and Enforcement Regimes

Government efforts to secure compliance vary substantially in how *intrusive* they are, and the options can be ranked roughly in order of intrusiveness (for similar categorizations, see Schneider and Ingram, 1990, and Rist et al 2003). At the low end of intrusiveness, governments can simply *provide information* to targets about how to comply with policy without actually saying that it is preferred. Governments can also combine information with *admonition* to

undertake or forego particular actions consistent with their policy objectives. Admonition is used in a variety of sectors, from teen pregnancy prevention to anti-smoking campaigns. Governments can also *provide resources* to help targets achieve desired behavior: aid to NGOs for civic education, for example. As behavioral economists have stressed, governments can *manipulate choice architecture*—that is, the range of choices that individuals and organizations can choose from, the nature of defaults, and how available options are framed. Governments can also use *positive and negative incentives* to try to obtain compliance with government policies. . While positive and negative incentives are similar in nature, negative incentives are likely to be perceived as more intrusive by target populations, because they make targets worse off than with no intervention. Finally, at the upper end of the intrusiveness scale, governments may also *require or prohibit* specific behaviors and punish non-compliant behavior. What Hall (1993) has called the "settings" on specific instruments may also vary greatly, however. Very intense settings on instruments at the low end of the intrusiveness scale may be perceived as more intrusive—and have bigger effects on behavior—than low settings on more intrusive instruments. For example, a recent meta-analysis of tobacco control measures found that weak tobacco control labels do not have a discernible effect on smoking levels but that large graphic labels do (Levy et al, 2004).

The instrument or instruments that governments use to secure compliance, the settings on those instruments, and the targeting of those instruments can be labeled the official "compliance regime." The compliance regime includes the official rules regarding incentives and sanctions, allocation of resources, provision of information, etc. How those rules are actually monitored and enforced can be called the "enforcement regime."

There is wide variety in the nature of compliance regimes and enforcement regimes, as shown in the right-hand columns in Table 1. Formal rules are more likely to be developed, substantial resources are more likely to be devoted to monitoring and enforcement, and sanctions are more likely to be severe and to be imposed with no exceptions in situations where even very rare acts of non-compliance pose an unacceptable risk to policy objectives: that is, where consistent and universal compliance is demanded. Enforcement of airport security rules on bringing weapons or explosives onto airplanes is an example of such a "100 percent compliance-seeking" sector. It should be noted, however, that the line between what formal rules state is compliant behavior and what is actually demanded—between the compliance and enforcement

regimes—is not always very clear, and may not match the stated rules. In enforcing restrictions on political campaigning outside polling stations on election day, for example, implementers may be more concerned with avoiding gross violation of policy than in enforcing the letter of the law. Legal scholar Mark Edwards (2006) has labeled these legal grey areas "parameters of acceptable deviance."

It should not be assumed, moreover, that governments' actual compliance and enforcement regimes are consistent with their stated objectives. As shown on the vertical axis in Figure 1, governments may establish compliance regimes that are strong and consistent with particular objectives, involving strong legal mandates, intrusive policy instruments, and very specific demands for the behavior that they seek. They may also have weak or mixed compliance regimes or even (as shown on the lower part of the figure) compliance regimes that actively discourage the behavior consistent with their stated objectives. Similarly, as shown on the horizontal access, enforcement regime--the behavior of front-line government workers may strongly reinforce the compliance regime, enforce it only weakly, or actively undermine it.

Barriers to Compliant Behavior

The social science literature has identified eight broad sets of underlying barriers that lead to a "target compliance gap" between program objectives and actual compliance levels (Weaver, forthcoming). These barriers can be divided into three broad categories. First are problems with external *perceived incentives* to comply, which can be decomposed into incentive and sanction problems, monitoring problems, and enforcement problems. A second set of issues involves what can be called *willingness* to comply, specifically information and cognition problems, attitude and beliefs problems, and peer effects. A third set of issues involves the target group's *capacity* to respond, including both resource and autonomy problems (see Alford, 2009). While these categories necessarily involve some overlap and ambiguity, they do provide a comprehensive set of tools for thinking about barriers to compliant behavior.

Incentives and Sanctions: The official set of incentives and sanctions established by government statute and regulation are the basis of the official "compliance regime." (Figure 1) High rates of target compliance are unlikely where the positive incentives and/or negative sanctions are not sufficient or certain enough to ensure compliance. For example, the practice of forging citizen signatures to register a new political party is not likely to stop unless the penalty for non-compliance obviates the possibility of the aspiring party from entering the political arena.

However, it is important to have a thorough understanding of how targets themselves view those costs and benefits and to recognize that the elements of this calculus, and the weights given to various elements, may not be immediately obvious to program administrators or easy to change. In Egypt, making the judicial system more efficient and effective may not increase the number of lawsuits brought by Coptic plaintiffs if they fear mob violence, should they win their cases.

Monitoring: Even when incentive structures are well designed, the social science literature suggests that monitoring is an important contributor to target compliance. Studies of business regulation, for example, suggest that non-compliant behavior is likely to be deterred "by frequent inspections, thorough inspections, and inspectors' willingness to issue sanctions when violations are not corrected as ordered." (May, 2004:45). High rates of target compliance are especially hard to achieve, however, where compliance is difficult or costly to monitor. Monitoring effective delivery of clean water to households, as an element of social justice demanded by demonstrators, is expensive because households are geographically dispersed across millions of sites. Monitoring is likely to be especially problematic where the activities involved are illegal, take place in private, or both, as in the case of households in "informal" slum neighborhoods (*ashawiyyat*), whose poor citizens have been discriminated against when it comes to the building of public infrastructure, and who tap illegally into water mains and electricity lines.

Enforcement: Monitoring and enforcement form the basis for what I have referred to as enforcement regimes (Figure 1) In practice, monitoring and enforcement are usually interlinked. Election monitors must detect violations before fines can be assessed, for example. But it is important to treat monitoring and enforcement as analytically separate to highlight that detecting non-compliance with monitoring does not automatically lead to enforcement. This is especially true when both monitoring and enforcement functions are performed by frontline workers (e.g., police and intelligence officers) who have effective discretion, have incentives not to enforce uniformly in all situations, and are not themselves effectively monitored on their enforcement. In these situations, frontline workers may choose to enforce based on considerations such as the offering of bribes to "look the other way," lowering their workloads, and avoiding unpleasant or even dangerous confrontations with policy targets (Lipsky, 2010).

Information and cognition problems: Information problems can be an important barrier to compliance. Policy targets may lack information that would make them more likely to comply,

either by affecting their capacity to comply, or their willingness to comply—for example, by providing information that it is in their interests to do so. They may also have information that is incorrect, or that they do not know how to interpret and use. It may be unclear to targets what constitutes cooperation or compliance. Information is often costly to acquire, and individuals and organizations who are uncertain about the payoff of compliance may not make that investment. Compliance is likely to be especially problematic when technical knowledge needed to comply is high and the expertise of targets is low. Thus, while civil society watchdog organizations may be intent on making government spending more accountable, they cannot play this role effectively if the government does not produce and share detailed, reliable information about government budgeting and spending, and if the civil society activists lack basic analytic skills in budget analysis and impact evaluation.

In recent years, a growing literature in behavioral economics has highlighted a number of cognitive and decision-making limitations of individuals, including loss aversion, procrastination and inertia, myopia (discounting of future relative to current benefits), impulsiveness, satisficing, anchoring effects, fatalism, and susceptibility to variations in the way that options are framed (see for example Kahneman, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). These limitations may skew decisions away from what a rational individual would choose, including decisions to comply with or deviate from government policies.

Attitudes and Beliefs: Attitude and beliefs constitute a very broad set of influences on and differential responses in target compliance. Previous research suggests that "[c]ompliance is brought about through trust, mutual regard and respect" (Braithwaite, 1995: 229) between those from whom compliance is expected and those who are designated to secure compliance. Transitional Arab governments that have promised deep reform of authoritarian systems but failed to make meaningful progress are now suffering serious credibility gaps. As an expression of frustration with a government that has disappointed them, Egyptian demonstrators participating in the January 2013 riots marking the second anniversary of the 25 January Revolution deliberately started their protests at nine PM after a curfew was set to start at that time in three of the most troubled cities.

A first belief-based barrier to compliance is where there is a wide chasm between those who set compliance expectations and deeply-held cultural beliefs of those who are expected to comply. In many Arab societies, for example, there is a strong desire for sons, in part because

having sons is seen as a form of insurance against income loss in old age. In some countries, it affects school enrollment rates of girls and leads to lower female literacy. Second, belief that the policy itself is not fair or not administered equitably is likely to inhibit voluntary policy compliance (Rothstein, 2005; Tyler, 2006; Levi and Sacks, 2009). Finally, a generalized mistrust of a government among specific segments of the population—if, for example, it is dominated by members of another ethnic, religious or linguistic group—may lead to increased levels of non-compliance.

Peer Effects: The analysis to this point has assumed that actions of individual policy targets are independent—that the actions of one target do not affect the behavior of others. But a very broad array of evidence suggests that this is not the case: perceptions that other similarly situated targets are complying generally make program targets more likely to comply, while high rates of non-compliance by peers lead to non-compliance.

Simply knowing non-compliers may signal that non-compliance is unlikely to be detected and punished. But there is also a potential normative effect. Compliance is likely to be higher when non-compliance is seen as socially unacceptable. This can cut both ways, however: an individual (or corporation) in a society where tax avoidance is rife may say: "No one else pays taxes, why should I?" In these situations, there is a conflict between what Robert Cialdini (2003) has called injunctive norms (what people in a community or society generally see as "the right thing to do") and descriptive norms (what people usually do). Under Mubarak, the minimum wage for public sector workers remained unchanged for 26 years, throwing millions into poverty. As many openly failed to perform their assigned duties efficiently, in part because they were forced to work multiple jobs, the work ethic was subtly undermined, reflecting the prevailing mentality, "You pretend to pay me and I pretend to work." Getting people to obey the injunctive norm when the descriptive norm suggests a very different pattern of behavior is very difficult.

In addition to normative aspects of peer effects, there may also be a competitive aspect, particularly with respect to compliance by businesses. Business managers may fear a loss of competitive position if they comply with a regulatory requirement (e.g., withholding payroll taxes from employees or instituting a smoking ban in restaurants) unless all of their peers do so as well. As with the purely normative aspects of peer effects, publicizing high rates of non-compliance may actually raise non-compliance rates as previous compliers change their behavior to avoid perceived competitive disadvantage. Achieving compliance in economies with large

"informal sectors" is especially difficult because they typically operate outside the scope of government regulations regarding employment of under-age children, environmental controls and other policy elements. In the case of democracy-threatening behaviors, similar competitive effects are a major risk: if it is perceived that one's election opponents are gaining an unfair advantage by intimidating candidates or voters, for example, then, the perception that survival depends on adopting the same tactics will be strong.

Target Resources: Program targets may also lack the resources that they need to adapt to a policy, even if they want to comply and recognize the incentives to do so. This is especially true when compliance costs are very high. Resources in this context refers not just to financial resources, but to a broad array of context-specific assets. Information, clearly an important resource affecting compliance, is addressed separately above. But other resources can also be critical: in addition to financial assets, resources such as good health, human capital, strong social networks, and physical proximity to existing public infrastructure can be important. While cash resources can be transferred relatively easily (though there may be political resistance), other resources, such as human capital, may require substantial effort and time to acquire, and may be difficult and expensive for government to provide. Targets who have multiple resource disadvantages are likely to have particularly severe problems complying with some policies.

Autonomy Issues: Targets may also be non-compliant because they lack autonomy over their decisions or outcomes resulting from them, even if they would prefer to comply. Autonomy problems may be of several types. Persons suffering from physical addictions are the most obvious example of targets lacking autonomy. For example, many smokers would like to comply with admonitions and negative incentives (high cigarette taxes) to quit smoking, but have difficulty doing so because of their addiction. In case of democracy-threatening behaviors, the over-centralization of government, the lack of a clear organizational management structures and the failure to delegate authority undermine the ability of local government officials to respond to the needs of citizens they are meant to serve. The appointment, rather than election, of key local authorities also undermines autonomy. In Egypt, citizens may resort to informal neo-patriarchal networks or neighborhood "toughs" rather than local government officials to solve basic problems, such as breaches of neighborhood security or poor garbage collection.

Complex Roots of Non-Compliance

The argument so far has argued that a comprehensive framework for understanding target compliance and non-compliance is necessary to explain why non-compliance occurs. But the primary focus has been on examining specific barriers separately for individual targets. In addition to specific barriers to target compliance, relationships between those barriers and the characteristics of target populations may also inhibit policy compliance.

Multiple Barriers for Individual Targets: It is often necessary for multiple barriers to compliance to be overcome if a target is to comply, especially when the targets of policy are heterogeneous. Looking at only a single barrier means that many phenomena of non-compliance are likely to be poorly understood. Multiple barriers may cause non-compliance in several ways. One is where a single behavior (or a series of similar, repeated behaviors) of compliance is required, but where several barriers to compliance exist. The second is where multiple, distinct behaviors are needed to produce the desired outcomes—e.g., avoiding the spread of contagious disease outbreaks through improved sanitation, travel restrictions, self-quarantine, etc.—with distinctive barriers to non-compliance for each of those behaviors.

Multiple Targets: Achievement of many policy objectives requires the simultaneous compliance by *multiple* sets of program targets, with distinct behaviors. Governments may be much more insistent on compliance by one target group than another, even if action by both is required to achieve program objectives. Indeed, policymakers may not regard secondary targets as a target group at all, not recognizing that behavior from this latter group that is inconsistent or uncooperative with government objectives may be as fatal to the policy as non-compliant behavior by the primary target population. Potential secondary targets are likely to resist any efforts that define them as a policy target if that means that they will be subject to intrusive, insistent and specific demands for compliance. In a democracy-inhibiting example, cracking down on police and intelligence officials who torture suspects will not be effective if an unreformed judiciary fails to prosecute them because of a lack of political will, weak forensic investigation abilities or the limited capacity of a system overwhelmed with cases.

The Social and Political Construction of Compliance and Enforcement Regimes

The compliance and enforcement regimes—instruments, settings and targeting—that emerge with respect to a particular behavior is likely to depend both on the political resources of

competing interests to influence the policymaking process and on what Schneider and Ingram (1993) have referred to as the "social construction" of real and potential target groups—whether those groups are seen as generally valued and important or as groups to be disapproved of and feared, as shown on the left hand side of Figure 1. In general, more intrusive mechanisms are likely to be used when (a) there is a high degree of societal and elite consensus that a very high level of aggregate compliance is necessary, but (b) significant barriers to compliance exist for at least some of the target population—i.e., it is not likely to occur without government intervention. In many cases, however, the precise nature of the behavior that is expected, the boundaries of the potential target group, the levels of individual and aggregate compliance needed, as well the appropriate compliance and enforcement regime for attaining better outcomes, are contested. Interests may compete in putting forward claims that social benefits can be produced if their group is left alone—not considered a target—and compliance with a specific behavioral standard is *not* demanded. Alternatively, they may argue that social benefits can be produced if their narrowly-targeted group is given specific resources or positive incentives. Providing resources or positive incentives to a target population is likely to be more problematic, however, when (1) the resource needs of clients are heterogeneous, (2) compliance is costly and complicated for targets, (3) the target group is unpopular and lacks political resources and allies, and (4) resource barriers and compliance requirements are not "one-shot" but stretch over time.

Because perceptions of key compliance barriers, targets, appropriate aggregate compliance levels, etc., are at least in part socially constructed, they may vary substantially across countries in the same policy sector. Judgments about what levels of individual and aggregate compliance are adequate may be heavily politicized: if the media or opposition political parties engage in blame-generating attacks claiming that specific instances or levels of aggregate compliance constitute a shocking policy failure, blame-avoiding governments are likely to respond by setting higher targets for aggregate compliance, using more intrusive compliance-seeking mechanisms, and stepping up monitoring and enforcement of individual compliance. The glare of public scrutiny and potential for international condemnation increases as social media become more widespread and international NGOs, such as Transparency International and Freedom House, issue lists comparing and ranking governments on different measures, such a perceptions of corruption and freedom. Just as some teachers may attempt to improve student performance on exams by "teaching to the test," the Egyptian government under

Mubarak adopted some policies designed to improve its position on an international corruption ranking.

II. DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIORS: IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS

The distinctive analytical arguments laid out in the previous section can be summarized in four broad propositions. First, there are multiple barriers to compliance in many behaviors. Resource and autonomy barriers can be an important impediment to compliance, but they are often under-examined. Second, the existence of multiple barriers to compliance is likely to lead to low levels of aggregate compliance, even when individual targets confront only some of those barriers, because it is difficult to design and implement compliance and enforcement regimes that address the distinct barrier profiles of individual targets. Third, when target populations are heterogeneous, particularly low levels of individual compliance are likely to be concentrated among targets with multiple, and very serious, resource and/or autonomy barriers to compliance. Fourth, more intrusive compliance and enforcement regimes—including both the instruments used and the settings on those instruments—are more likely to be imposed: (1) where there is a strong elite and popular consensus that something close to 100 percent aggregate compliance is necessary, (2) where the target population lacks political resources, and (3) where the target population is negatively constructed in the dominant political discourse. Under these conditions, strong evidence of compliance failure—i.e., a low level of aggregate compliance relative to targets or expectations—is likely to lead to a shift to a more intrusive compliance and enforcement regime when a population is negatively constructed and politically weak, but to a weakening of compliance expectations and goals when the target population is positively constructed and powerful.

This section takes the general lessons about behavioral change and compliance and applies them to democratization more explicitly. Most of the elements of the analysis of behavioral change and compliance analyzed in the previous section of the paper and summarized in the paragraph above carry over very substantially to an analysis of democratization. First and most obviously, democratization clearly involves multiple behaviors, many of which are very complex and need to be carried out (or in the case of democracy-threatening behaviors, avoided) frequently, over a long period of time. Each behavior has a distinctive set of barriers and a distinctive target population, both in terms of breadth of those from whom compliance is sought

and particular sub-groups of the population that are particularly at risk of non-compliance. Democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors also vary in compliance regimes, notably in how consistently individuals and organizations must comply to work toward stable democratization. Empirically, there is very strong variation across regimes in the MENA region on the nature of compliance and enforcement regimes (though most are not particularly favorable to democratization) and in the nature and size of target populations who are likely to engage in democracy-threatening behavior. It is also important to consider multiple barriers for each behavior, and to assess both the importance of individual behaviors and the probability of addressing them successfully—the most serious barriers may also be the most difficult to address. It is important to think about target populations as heterogeneous—strategies that work for one segment of the target population may not work for others. Several strategies can be utilized to address each behavior that is sought; which strategies are employed depends on factors such as what specific barriers exist, whether or not universal compliance is required. Finally, it is important not just to prioritize specific behaviors depending on their importance to democracy promotion but also to consider multi-stage strategies within specific behaviors, beginning with less-intrusive instruments and moving to more intrusive instruments as public support for those strategies increases.

We begin by identifying a small number of important democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors by the public: voting, monitoring government abuse, tolerance of diversity and respect for the rule of law. Although these behaviors are heavily influenced by the actions of government officials, as discussed below, we emphasis how behaviors by the public are influenced by resources and autonomy as well as by information and attitudes/beliefs. Second we identify key barriers to each of the democracy-enhancing behaviors and reinforcers of democracy-threatening behaviors. We then identify specific strategies for addressing the most important barriers and reinforcers of specific behaviors, including both short- and long-term approaches and potential "leverage points" where modest investments may have big payoffs in terms of democracy-enhancing behavior. Conditions that are likely to facilitate or limit the success of specific strategies are also discussed.

Voting and Elections: Table 2 shows some of the key barriers to voting in post-Mubarak Egypt. During the Mubarak era, citizens18 years and older were required to register to vote. In fact, voter registration was low among the adult population, resulting in elections determined by

in some cases by single-digit voter turnouts. Disincentives to vote included a widespread perception of elections as the window dressing of a sham democracy. These perceptions were based on manipulation of vote counts, including ballot stuffing; under-the-table payments, or threats, aimed at government employees and others to cast their ballots for particular candidates; interference with the registration of candidates seeking election, including detention of potential candidates and the high jacking of applications to miss required deadlines; and high barriers to the registration of opposition political parties (Blaydes, 2008). Some opposition candidates who dared run for office, notably presidential candidate Ayman Nour, later faced long periods of detention based on trumped up charges and a slew of civil lawsuits lodged by "concerned" citizens seeking to curry favor with the regime. Accordingly, Egyptians who bothered to vote in elections generally were considered by their peers either to be weak-minded tools of an autocratic regime or corrupted by illicit incentives. Moreover, the voting requirement was not enforced.

Then and now citizens inclined to participate in elections have been affected by conditions directly affecting the voting experience. Judges have supervised vote casting in polling places, because of the perception that they are one of the least corruptible institutions in the country. This has resulted in elections occurring over multiple days, rather than a single day, because of the limited number of available judges, and contributed to long lines at the polls. Another factor is the growing fear of violence at polling places, or aimed at the candidates themselves, which could be improved by improved security measures.

Information deficits about the issues and candidates at stake are a critical issue affecting voting behavior. These have resulted both from restrictions on or interference with media coverage, and the limited scope of fact-based, investigative journalism. The latter has been hampered, in part, by the deliberate opacity of government operations and the lack of laws or policies ensuring citizens' "right to information".

In the two years following Mubarak's removal in February 2011, transitional authorities organized several elections that reflect the country's dynamic and evolving political culture. With many Egyptians voting for the first time in their lives, turnout for the first constitutional referendum in March 2011 was relatively high (41 percent), despite complaints from some quarters about the short period to formulate the issues placed on the ballot (a process dominated by the governing Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or SCAF); the limited timeframe to

educate the electorate about the ballot issues; and the simple "yes" or "no" vote permitted on the several issues bundled together. Voters were allowed to participate using their national ID cards, rather than voter registration cards required for previous elections, eliminating an important barrier to voting.

The successful passing of that referendum established new rules relating to the registration of political candidates, among other issues, creating a positive incentive for Egyptians to view elections in a more favorable light. Voter enthusiasm remained relatively high, as measured by turnout (55 percent), in the parliamentary elections that followed (held in stages between November 2011 and January 2012), with voting hours extended to accommodate long lines of voters. But turnout waned for the presidential election, held in May and June 2012 with 46 percent casting ballots, and for the second constitutional referendum in December 2012, in which only 33 percent of the electorate voted. Cynicism about the political process deepened when President Morsi issued a decree to stifle legal challenges to the constitution drafting process, and when that process was rushed to completion even after many members of the Constitutional Assembly, which was selected by a parliament dominated by Islamists, boycotted the meetings. Nearly a quarter of the Constitutional Assembly quit in protest before the constitutional drafting process was completed—mostly persons identified with liberal or secular viewpoints, and members of the Coptic minority.

Throughout this period, one important policy that reinforced democracy were changes in the rules regarding the formation of political parties and registration of political candidates, enabling a wide spectrum of new parties to emerge (IFES, 2011). Another was enabling citizens to vote with their national ID cards, encouraging more to participate in elections. Other government actions reinforced barriers to electoral participation, however, notably a failure by SCAF to organize a broad national dialogue about the constitution drafting process, including whether parliamentary and presidential elections should be held before or after the Constitutional Assembly completed its work. Once Islamists were elected to more than 70 percent of parliamentary seats and an Islamist president led the government, their insensitivity to ensuring continued participation of representatives from minority groups and political viewpoints, not to mention women, in the Constitution drafting process significantly degraded the democratic political culture that the uprising was meant to usher in.

Monitoring Governmental Abuses: A key arena of democracy-enhancing behavior involves participation by citizens playing a wide variety of roles as government watchdogs, political party activists, investigative journalists, community organizers, etc. Many in Egypt and other transitional Arab countries view such activism as a means of "taking back" their states and societies from parasitic, unaccountable governments. Governments, however, tend to view civil society activism largely as a threat, even though some NGOs focus primarily on filling important social service gaps in health and education created by inadequate government services.

Table 3 outlines some important barriers to government monitoring in Egypt, focusing on links between government performance, restrictions on civil society activism and the challenges of implementing internal bureaucratic reforms. The Mubarak government "bought" citizen loyalty in part by creating millions of unnecessary and poorly supervised civil service jobs. Salaries were not adjusted to keep up with the cost of living, and burgeoning bureaucracies often lacked even the most minimal managerial structures to monitor performance and assure maximal use of resources. A newly imposed performance based budgeting requirement for government ministries was largely ignored because of a lack of internal knowledge about how to implement it and other resource constraints. Corruption in the civil service increased dramatically, as workers sought to supplement inadequate salaries, and labor unrest was fed by any attempts to lay off unneeded workers. In the post-Mubarak era, wildcat strikes have become a signature activity throughout the economy but especially in government departments, as workers have clamored for more secure work contracts and higher pay. In short, civic activists focused on creating a leaner, more efficient and accountable government through government monitoring face enormous challenges.

In the two years since the onset of the uprising, authorities have extended controls initiated by the Mubarak regime that amount to democracy-threatening activities designed to limit the mobilization of citizens working to monitor and improve government behavior. Controls on civic activism that restrict civil society ability to monitor government abuses include restrictions on media independence, the tight regulation of the NGO sector, and limitations on political organizing. Civic activists engaged in human rights, labor and political activism, and the journalists who cover their work, have been characterized by authorities as undermining national security at the behest of foreign interests. Activists seeking to expand their freedom of their operations have challenged these restrictions in creative ways. For example, most Egyptian

human rights organizations have registered as civil companies (the same registration used by for-profit law firms) to avoid the restrictions incumbent on organizations registered as non-profit organizations.

Monitoring government behavior depends upon access to information, whether sourced by the media or released by the government about its activities. Citizens can hold governments accountable for performance only if they have detailed information about the budgeting and spending of public resources and the design and implementation of laws and policies. On their part, activists must develop advanced skills to assess such information if they are to fulfill the role of watchdogs, skills that most NGOs in Egypt need to develop further.

Signs that democracy is not well entrenched in Egypt include intrusive regulation of the NGO sector, as well as reported plans to tighten the already onerous NGO Association law, especially limitations on foreign funding; restrictions on face-to-face survey research, which can be conducted only following approval by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, a government entity traditionally run by an army general; and unofficial control by the National Security Agency over access to the National Archives, which routinely denies entry to scholars and others. While the Morsi government is readying a right to information law scheduled for release in March 2013, critics note that the current draft gives executive and legislative authorities control over access to information, which opposition leaders outside government view as highly problematic. Perhaps most emblematic of imperfect democracy in Egypt is a lack of transparency about military budgeting and expenditures, including information about the military's extensive income generating activities that rely in part on soldier and prison labor and benefit from state subsidies of energy. This is part of a bigger problem of poor civilian control over the security sector—police, intelligence and military forces.

Tolerance of Diversity: Respect for diversity and protection of minority rights lie at the heart of democracy, a system of government designed to promote liberty and the pursuit of happiness within reasonable constraints. Even highly homogeneous societies encompass diversity based on religion, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age, etc. Established democracies strike different balances between values and political principles that can be at odds with each other, such as support for free expression versus regulation of hate or libelous speech, and the right of access to information versus the right to privacy. Emerging democracies are challenged to find their own balances, and how they handle these issues reflects deeper social values. So, for

example, conservative democratic societies may choose to outlaw public nudity, but do they go too far if they mandate specific dress codes in accordance with one interpretation of religious prescript? They may decide to criminalize public drunkenness, but should they tolerate the sale and responsible use of alcoholic beverages? And what about freedom of conscience—the right to choose one's religion or embrace atheism—or of sexual orientation? Are minority rights adequately protected through affirmative action or application of personal status laws according to religious faith, even when the minority in question is consistently outvoted in parliament? And how should an emerging democracy regulate the expression of opposition to mainstream views? Should demonstrators be free to organize a protest without a permit or to block traffic on a busy roadway at will? These and other knotty issues are typical of dilemmas confronting young democracies.

Ironically, authoritarian governments sometimes "solve" such problems through administrative fiat or repressive force. Advancements in women's rights, hard fought by Egyptian activists and eventually championed by former first lady Suzanne Mubarak, are in danger of being rolled back by democratically elected but conservative Islamists now in power. It should be a concern, moreover, that authorities in Egypt continue to permit mob violence against Christians, which appears to have increased in the past two years. In another democracy-threatening act, a widow and her seven children who converted to Christianity were recently sentenced to 15 years in prison as apostates.

Table 4 outlines barriers conditioning tolerance of diversity and expression of minority viewpoints. In the first two years of the post-Mubarak transition, authorities have failed to pass laws that would protect many basic freedoms. Instead, the new constitution represents a step backward from the 1971 constitution because it couches rights in the context of vaguely defined family and social values, making it easier for the government to rule against minority groups and political opponents.

Legal action has become a common tool to suppress freedom of expression of diverse views. Defining criticism of public figures or institutions as a crime is a democracy-threatening behavior aimed at suppressing political opposition. Approximately 18 persons have been charged with defaming the judiciary, while 17 have been charged with defaming the president. Others are under investigation, including Bassem Yusuf, accused of maligning President Morsi on his popular TV show, which features Jon Stewart-style political satire. Some have been charged with

defaming religion, including one of the region's most famous comedians, Adel Iman, who was convicted for insulting Islam, although that was overturned on appeal. Since he was elected, Morsi has used his powers to close one TV station, ban issues of newspapers and investigate journalists.

The air of growing insecurity is fed by religious extremists, who issue incitements to violence against political opponents—threats taken more seriously in Egypt following the assassination of a leading secular activist in Tunisia. At the same time, thin skins are in wide evidence throughout the political spectrum, with expressions of opposing viewpoints interpreted as personal insults. The Morsi government frequently characterizes opponents as thugs and criminals, while the secular opposition has described the Morsi government as Nazi-like. The general absence of peer modeling behavior, in which political leaders consistently express their views in measured terms and articulate respect for those who disagree with them, threatens democracy. Clearly will take time and visionary leadership to transform the Mubarak-constructed political culture from one in which political opponents are denounced in the darkest terms as illegitimate and a threat to national security to a culture that tolerates the give and take of democratic politics.

Democracy in also undermined by internal weakness and political divisions among the secular parties and movements opposed to the Morsi government. Secular party leaders engage in democracy-threatening behavior when they advocate the overthrow of a democratically elected president, after they lost parliamentary and presidential elections and two constitutional referenda. Their inconsistent responses to attempts by the government to initiate a "national dialogue" reflect well-founded cynicism about the government's intentions while sending mixed signals to their own followers. Meanwhile, organized secular parties and movements appear to be losing influence over unemployed youth, growing numbers of whom seem determined to violently overthrow the elected government through a "revolution of the hungry." Poorly trained and controlled security forces facing furious mobs of demonstrators add fuel to growing instability by their attacks on demonstrators, while the mass and social media contribute to the atmosphere of fear and insecurity when they serve as mouthpieces for extremists. Government officials appeal to ordinary Egyptians tired of civil unrest by suggesting that any dissent will lead to the breakdown of the state and perhaps even civil war.

The growing divide between Muslims and Christians and violent attacks against women are also signs that the Egyptian experiment with democracy is not going well. Although Muslim-Christian tolerance was widely expressed by millions of demonstrators as a basic moral value during the 18-day uprising that led to Mubarak's removal, Christians increasingly view themselves as a persecuted minority at risk of mob violence, and immigration has risen sharply. Failure to control mob violence against Christians and to prosecute those responsible for it, as well continued constraints on freedom of conscience, are democracy-threatening behaviors. The formation of vigilante groups to protect women from attacks during demonstrations signals the ongoing weakness of security forces and the vulnerability of women.

Respect for the Rule of Law: Table 5 outlines constraints against the rule of law in Egypt. Recent research suggests that Egyptians strongly endorse the rule of law, want to see wrongdoers held accountable and believe that continued impunity will contribute to lawlessness and unrest (Barsalou, 2013). It is no surprise, therefore, that Egyptians were riveted by the first sight of Hosni Mubarak and his sons in the dock in August 2011, along with other leaders of his regime. Many were disappointed, however, by the limited scope of the charges against them and were critical of an unconvincing legal process when the Ministry of Interior's noncooperation forced the judiciary to undertake their own (inadequate) forensic investigations of charges relating to the use of violence against demonstrators.

Clearly there is strong appetite in Egypt for justice for victims, but the unreformed judiciary continues to disappoint. Since the downfall of Mubarak, the government has conducted approximately 35 trials of police charged with injuring or killing demonstrators; only two were found guilty and imprisoned, while the rest were acquitted or given suspended sentences. Civilians have strongly advocated for an end to military court trials for civilians (following the arrest and rapid judgments in military courts against some 12,000 civilian demonstrators), and for the accountability of members of the armed forces to civilian (as opposed to military) courts. The widespread failure to achieve justice through legal means for victims has contributed to rising tension and lower confidence in government.

In a recent survey, Egyptians prioritized security sector reform to bring police, intelligence and military forces under the firm control of civilian authorities (Barsalou 2013). Efforts by civil activists pushing for security sector reform have been largely ignored. The transitional regime has not adopted a variety of strategies that could address widespread mistrust of its willingness to

undertaking meaningful reform, such as the purging and criminal prosecution of the worst perpetrators of torture and violence against civilians and the overhaul of educational strategies of the National Police Academy. The inadequate performance of the police to deliver security encourages vigilantism, which is in growing evidence. Perceptions that the security sector remains above the law has led activists and victims to illegal, but understandable, attacks, as when thousands invaded police stations and secret prisons in March 2011 to interrupt the shredding and burning of incriminating documents.

Weaknesses in the judiciary also undermine efforts to transform Egypt into a democratic state and society. While elements of the judiciary strongly resisted efforts by Mubarak to bring them under his control, internal divisions within the judiciary are widening in post-Mubarak Egypt, and the system is overwhelmed by a growing mountain of cases and by unrealistic public expectations. The weak forensic investigative capacity of the judiciary is a critical gap in an environment in which the Ministry of Interior refuses to undertake, or actively undermines, investigations.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

This paper has sketched out a general framework for examining compliance with government policy and provided a very preliminary test of the framework's implications for democratization by looking at several specific democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors. These behaviors differ substantially in the breadth of their target populations, the degree to which high rates of aggregate compliance are required to the complexity of responses that they require. What is striking is that democratic stability requires that a complex set of behaviors be carried out frequently and consistently by broad populations, including the government itself.

These cases suggest a number of conclusions about constraints on policies that seek behavioral change to achieve government objectives. A first conclusion is that the lines between democracy-promoting and democracy-threatening mechanisms are often unclear, such as the wavering line between promoting free expression and suppressing hate speech.

Second, a comprehensive analysis of barriers is necessary even with "simple" behaviors because most compliance problems involve multiple barriers. Moreover, which barriers are critical in inhibiting compliant behavior can differ substantially across sectors and behaviors and over time. Some barriers that have been understudied as sources of non-compliance with behavioral

change objectives. In particular, while attitudes and beliefs are an important constraint on democracy enhancing behavior, other constraints—notably resource and autonomy constraints and peer effects—need to be given more attention both by researchers and by policymakers. Moreover, resources are often politically difficult for governments to transfer (even if they want to, which they usually do not) and hard for policy targets to acquire and use effectively.

Third, the cases suggest that heterogeneity among targets can be an important source of non-compliance. Compliance and enforcement regimes aimed at the "modal" target, or at the easiest targets to reach, are likely to be ineffective at reaching those who have distinctive resources, information levels, autonomy, peer groups, etc. But governments are often not very effective at differentiating among heterogeneous target populations, and differentiation through increased monitoring and enforcement may require a high degree of intrusiveness. It may also provoke accusations of discrimination and unequal treatment.

Fourth, analysis needs to pay at least as much attention to democracy-threatening behaviors as to democracy enhancing behaviors [say more here]

Fifth, the cases suggest very starkly—and consistent with prior work by Schneider and Ingram and others—that compliance and enforcement regimes established by governments are critical constraints on democracy-enhancing behaviors—and often important sources of and facilitators of democracy-threatening behavior. Government is a huge part of the problem in transitional states, so focus of the literature on changing citizen behavior must be expanded to also focus on changing government behavior.

Finally, this analysis suggests that proponents of democratization will need to think about multi-stage strategies, which vary over time in the key behaviors they address, the barriers to those behaviors, and the intrusiveness of the instruments that they employ. In a relatively "benign" environment in which governments and mass beliefs were both supportive of democracy, government could begin with relatively unobtrusive measures to promote behavioral change and then proceed to more intrusive and controversial ones as public support for democratization grew and democracy-threatening behaviors were "denormalized" (see Figure 3). Such a sequence can be seen in other areas of behavior change such as efforts to reduce tobacco consumption, where relatively easy steps such as providing information about the dangers of smoking were provided first, followed up later by more intrusive measures such as stronger admonitions in cigarette pack warnings, bans on advertising and smoking in public places.

What is at stake in most of the MENA region is a much broader set of changes that essentially transform political and social culture in environments that are much less benign, as shown in Tables 2 to 5. These changes are unlikely to be accepted universally, and least of all by those with the greatest access to coercive power. In changing behavior, coercive strategies often work best, but coercive strategies to increase democracy-enhancing behavior undermine the very objectives they seek to advance. Some potential intervention steps to change compliance and enforcement regimes and individual and group propensities to engage in democracy-enhancing behaviors are summarized in Figure 4. Necessary if insufficient strategies include bringing under control violent elements of the security apparatus and "spoilers" operating outside of government, establishing the rule of law, and launching credible, transparent investigations of the former regime to re-establish public trust—activities that must be performed early in the process. Constructing new legal frameworks (compliance regimes), including writing a constitution that clearly protects basic rights, ensures the protection of minorities and permits tolerance of diversity and freedom of expression, are also essential. These challenges are daunting, consisting of nothing less than transforming the "Arab street"—a subject population controlled and manipulated by an unaccountable government—into an Arab public in which the social contract between the governed and the governors includes mutually reinforcing rights and obligations incumbent on citizens and authorities.

In view of these complex challenges and historical precedents, it is clear that transformation of authoritarian Arab Spring countries into societies governed by democratic norms and governmental institutions will be a long-term process. Moreover, it is unclear what the best order the interventions should be undertaken, but it is unlikely that starting with less intrusive measures would be a recipe for success. Civics and peace education programs operating at the community level and in schools should be given a role to play but their limitations should also be recognized (Saloman, 2006). The values they promote are unlikely to take hold if they are not reinforced by civil and political behaviors and institutional developments that promote and sustain democracy.

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Figure 1. A Typology of Democracy-Enhancing and Democracy-Undermining Compliance and Enforcement Regimes



Figure 2. A Model of Target Compliance and Non-Compliance



Figure 3. Multiple States for Democracy-Strengthening Initiatives in a "Benign" Environment



Figure 4. Strategies to Improve Prospects for Democratization



TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED DEMOCRACY ENHANCING AND DEMOCRACY THREATENING BEHAVIORS

Policy Objective	Behavior Characteristics				Target population characteristics		Compliance and enforcement regime characteristics	
	Complexity (e.g., single or multiple behaviors)	Cost of compliance	Specificity and Boundary Clarity	Frequency of behavior	Breadth of target population	Sub-groups at particular risk of non-compliance	Degree of insistence on Compliance	Consistency and Universality of Compliance required
Voting	Simple	Generally low	High	Low	All adults		Low	Moderately high
Monitoring government abuse	Complex	Moderate	Varies	High	NGOs and media			Must be consistent, but not universal
Tolerance of diversity	Complex	High	High	High	All citizens and government	Most of the population, depending on the issue	High	Must be consistent
Civil Discourse	Complex	High	High	High	All citizens and government			

TABLE 2
COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR SOUGHT: VOTING
TARGET POPULATION(S): ALL ADULT CITIZENS AND GOVERNMENT

BARRIERS LIMITING AND CONDITIONS FACILITATING COMPLIANCE	STRATEGIES TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE	CONDITIONS ENHANCING OR LIMITING EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES
Incentives • Perception of elections as shams based on prior electoral manipulation	• Permit broad spectrum of parties to register and compete in elections • Facilitate election monitoring and transparency in vote-counting	• Parties that win post-transition elections seek to weaken threats to their power • Election losers who call for overthrow of elected winners
• Fear of election violence or retribution for voting	• Improve security in voting places • Provide personal security for candidates • Improve security around party offices • Criminalize the public statement of threats of violence against parties or candidates	• State security apparatus capacity that lacks capacity or is not committed to democracy
• Long lines to vote	• Extend voting hours • Increase number of polling places • Increase number of, and training for, poll workers • Hold elections on weekends when fewer voters are working	• Resource limitations on expenditures to upgrade the voting process • Exclusive reliance on judges as poll workers (both an enhancing and limiting factor)
Monitoring	• Create organization to oversee enforcement of election rules and process, including limits on campaign spending, etc.	• Weak state revenues and administrative capacity
Enforcement • Non-enforcement of voting requirement	• Create clear penalties for violations • Announce intention to enforce voting requirement and follow through on doing so	• Weak or unwilling state security apparatus • Weak, unwilling or overloaded judicial system to try violators
Information and Cognition • Information deficits about candidates and issues	• Increase press freedom • Incentivize state and independent media to increase high quality public affairs programming	• Low standards of fact-based and investigative journalism

Attitudes and Beliefs • Mistrust of government • Mistrust of political opposition	• Honor results of elections • Provide basic public services and regularize illegal communities	• Weak respect for democratic process, e.g., when a party urges voters to participate in an election it can win but to boycott an election it is likely to lose • Covert, hostile infiltration of party membership/leadership structures to undermine political opponents • Weak state revenues and administrative capacity
Peer Effects • Absence of perceived obligation to vote based on past low turnouts and perceived lack of meaningful choice	• Emphasize obligation to vote through media campaigns and grassroots voter education courses • Publicize increases in voter turnout as "descriptive norm" • Disseminate information about voting participation by respected public and cultural figures, such as entertainers, religious leaders, public intellectuals and youth activists	• Suspicion of vote manipulation or other violations of election rules, such as limitations on campaign spending • Anti-voting behavior publicly modeled by respected figures
Resources • Lack of documents needed to vote	• Simplify voter identification requirements—e.g., enabling all adults to vote using ID cards, rather than voter registration cards	• Weak administrative capacity to issue ID cards universally
Autonomy • May be coercion not to participate or not to express true preferences	• Pass and enforce laws that protect free expression of diverse viewpoints • Increase media attention on leaders who express democratic values, including tolerance of diversity	• Threatened or actual violence against dissenters from mainstream positions • Failure to prosecute those who use violence against those with minority or dissenting viewpoints

TABLE 3
COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR SOUGHT: MONITORING GOVERNMENT ABUSE
TARGET POPULATION(S): NGOs, MEDIA

BARRIERS LIMITING AND CONDITIONS FACILITATING COMPLIANCE	STRATEGIES TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE	CONDITIONS ENHANCING OR LIMITING EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES
Incentives • Fear that government is too big to fix • Perception that corruption will continue no matter what	• Prioritize reform of limited number of government sectors, such as security forces and judiciary • Identify relatively simple measures to reduce corruption, such as lifestyle checks (revealing incompatibility between salaries and living standards), public disclosure of income by public officials, and adoption of conflict of interest regulations	• Bloated state bureaucracy • Government reform includes layoffs that increase unemployment and contribute to labor unrest • Inadequately paid civil servants not held internally accountable for their performance
Monitoring	• Build coalition of NGOs to create division of monitoring labor focused on key sectors • Hire former civil servants who understand internal workings of particular government agencies • Pressure international governments and vendors to disclose their sales (such as weapons) and training programs • Provide funding to NGOs and journalists to enhance monitoring capacity • Develop university courses to build financial monitoring skills • Call for open parliamentary hearings prior to appointment of persons to high public office	• Expanded funding to increase monitoring capacity through enhanced education, training, hardware and software acquisition, etc. • Supportive relationships/communications with effective monitoring organizations in other countries • International standards/treaties/mechanisms promoting accountable government behavior
Enforcement • Non-enforcement of right to information law or performance-based budgeting by government	• Advocate for clear and significant penalties for non-compliance • Incorporate evidence of past performance in	• Weak capacity of government to institute new practices, such as performance based budgeting

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	assessments of electoral candidates or persons considered for important government appointments	• Executive control of important government positions without parliamentary oversight or through elections • Limited government capacity to secure, catalogue, store and share important government documents
Information and Cognition • Lack of access to information on government performance • Veto power of intelligence services over public archives and survey research	• Advocate for enactment of a right to information law • Advocate for insider trading and conflict of interest regulations and for blind trusts to manage the assets of high officials during government service • Advocate for containment of intelligence service intrusions into research and other aspects of daily life • Promote investigative journalism around issues of transparency and accountability	• Lack of consistency in information provided by government • Failure to provide detailed budget and spending information at local and regional, as well as national, levels of government • Government weakness in implementing regulations concerning the collection/preservation of government materials • Government weakness in creating adequate systems for cataloguing and sharing government materials
Attitudes and Beliefs • Lack of public understanding about the importance of the right to information • Widespread belief that the sharing of information will undermine national security • Cultural norms/behaviors permitting conflict of interest, insider trading, etc. •	• Conduct educational campaigns about the right to information (balanced by the right to privacy) • Improve civics curricula in schools and universities • Organize open forums to air the information versus national security debate • Research and expose case studies where lack of transparency, conflict of interest and insider trading harmed the public interest	• Deep-rooted traditions against sharing information and transparency ("information is power"), even one government department with another • Government perceives/labels efforts to promote transparency as attacks on national security
Peer Effects	• Model internal best practices in transparency and	• Suspicion that any criticism of government

BARRIERS LIMITING AND CONDITIONS FACILITATING COMPLIANCE	STRATEGIES TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE	CONDITIONS ENHANCING OR LIMITING EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES
	conflict of interest containment by NGOs and media organizations playing watchdog roles • Monitor behavior in evenhanded way, regardless of politics	represents manipulation by outside forces • "Yellow" journalism that undermines media • credibility • Politicized NGOs that don't monitor behavior of political allies
Resources • Weak NGO and media capacity to assess and evaluate information	• Ease restrictions on NGO funding	• Government perceives NGO and media independence as a threat to its power
• Weak NGO capacity to disseminate findings of abuse	• Use cell phones, internet, and social media to disseminate evidence on abuse	• Limited access by the general public (especially the poor) to the internet and social media
Autonomy • Restrictive NGO and media licensing laws • Restrictions on NGO activities (e.g., survey research)	• Ease restrictions on NGO licensing, activities and funding	• Government perceives NGO and media independence as a threat to its power

TABLE 4
COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR SOUGHT: TOLERANCE OF DIVERSITY
TARGET POPULATION(S): NGOs, MEDIA, GENERAL POPULATION

BARRIERS LIMITING AND CONDITIONS FACILITATING COMPLIANCE	STRATEGIES TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE	CONDITIONS ENHANCING OR LIMITING EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES
Incentives • Fear of prosecution for defamation, blasphemy, etc. • Fear of being attacked/killed by extremists for expressing views • Fear that strikes and demonstrations will lead to economic and social breakdown	• Pass laws protecting freedom of expression, while outlawing hate speech • Criminalize public incitements, including religious edicts, to attack or kill opponents or those with differing views • Pass laws that preserve basic freedoms for minorities relating to personal status issues (divorce, marriage, inheritance, etc.) and religious practices, including freedom of conscience • Organize support campaigns for those charged with blasphemy, etc. • Engage in/permit public demonstrations and strikes, but under controlled conditions to prevent violence/public endangerment	• Widespread media coverage of hate speech, including broadcasting of incitements to attack political opponents • Politicized state prosecutors and judges who pursue charges against persons expressing diverse views within free speech limitations • Use of violence by demonstrators and poorly controlled security forces, leading to injury, death, destruction of property and the breakdown of social order • Limit interpretation of human rights by referencing vague family and cultural values • Weakness of, and internal divides among, secular opposition to Islamist government
Monitoring	• Monitor declarations by religious leaders and others who use religious sermons and the media (including social media) to promote hate speech or incite violence	• Limited ability to control social media

Enforcement	• Enforce laws against hate speech and incitement of violence • Protect minorities and other vulnerable persons (e.g. women) against violence by arresting/prosecuting their attackers	• Tolerance of mob violence against minorities and women • Weak and poorly controlled security forces • Limited capacity of judiciary, overwhelmed by cases
Information and Cognition • Political culture and institutions shaped by decades of authoritarianism	• Conduct educational campaigns about democratic values and practices, including tolerance of diversity, protection of minority rights and understanding that compromise is the outcome of bargaining among diverse political actors	• Limited capacity of NGOS and weak educational institutions
Attitudes and Beliefs • Political culture based on vilification of opponents	• Conduct educational campaigns about democratic values and practices, including tolerance of diversity, protection of minority rights and understanding that stable democracy is based on compromises negotiated by diverse political actors • Organize fora/debates/dialogues to cultivate appreciation of different viewpoints and promote political compromise •	• Intolerance of disagreement, including characterizing political opposition as criticism undermining personal honor and dignity
Peer Effects • Unwillingness to compromise	• Abide by the outcomes of legitimate elections even when in opposition • Support leaders who express respect for their opponents • Support leaders who work together to contain the negative impact of extremists and other "spoilers"	• Extremists and other "spoilers" actively work to undermine political compromises and raise tensions • Media focus on extremists who make "news" that increases audience size
Resources • External, foreign funding for those espousing intolerance and extremism • Weak controls over social media	• Support education promoting broader understanding of democratic values, while cutting support to those violating hate speech laws or inciting violence	

Autonomy • Restrictive media and NGO licensing laws	• Ease restrictions on NGO licensing, activities and funding	

TABLE 5

COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR SOUGHT: RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW
TARGET POPULATION(S): GENERAL POPULATION, NGOs, MEDIA

BARRIERS LIMITING AND CONDITIONS FACILITATING COMPLIANCE	STRATEGIES TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE	CONDITIONS ENHANCING OR LIMITING EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES
Incentives • Fear that the absence of the rule of law will increase violence and impunity	• Advocate for civilian control over/reform of security forces • End military trials of civilians; enable civilian courts to try military • Bolster due process by ensuring that defendants have access to legal advice • Make/enforce laws regulating firearm possession	• Restrictions on NGO monitoring activities and funding • Weak or poorly controlled security forces
Monitoring	• Monitor and report egregious violations of law	• Limited capacity of NGOs
Enforcement	• Purge/retrain security forces to make them more responsive and effective • Ensure judicial independence and improve operating capacity • Prosecute torturers and others responsible for most egregious crimes resulting in injury/death; if prosecution not possible, remove them from power through negotiated amnesties • Control behavior of neighborhood gangs and other criminal elements • Apply the law uniformly	• Weak, poorly controlled or overburdened policing and judicial systems • Weak forensic investigation capabilities • Conflict of interests between security and judicial systems

BARRIERS LIMITING AND CONDITIONS FACILITATING COMPLIANCE	STRATEGIES TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE	CONDITIONS ENHANCING OR LIMITING EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES
Information and Cognition	• Improve forensic investigation capacity • Establish politically balanced commissions composed of respected individuals to investigate major violent events that publicly share findings based on testimony from multiple witnesses	• Lack of legal or constitutional guarantees ensuring citizens' right to information Entrenched traditions of opacity in governmental operations
Attitudes and Beliefs • Mistrust of government's commitment to rule of law • Established traditions of impunity throughout society whereby the strong prey on the weak without accountability	• Media coverage of trials and other procedures that send that message that wrongdoing will be punished • Fair application of the law regardless of political connections, social class, etc.	• Decades of impunity that breed cynicism about government and society
Peer Effects • Widespread vigilantism • Fear of backlash by extremists if the law is applied	• Enforce restrictions on vigilante activity	• Rising crime rates as "bad" security forces are purged from their positions • Public expectation that all should be held accountable, even if doing so is logistically unfeasible
Resources • Weak, poorly controlled security forces • Weak, overwhelmed judiciary	• Increase resources to build stronger policing and judicial sectors	
Autonomy • Imperfect judicial independence • Weak civilian control over armed forces • Significant restrictions on NGOs		