

Automated Analysis of Election Audit Logs

Abstract

The voting audit logs produced by electronic voting systems contain data that could be useful for uncovering procedural errors and election anomalies, but they are currently unwieldy and difficult for election officials to use in post-election audits. In this work, we develop new methods to analyze these audit logs for the detection of both procedural errors and system deficiencies. Our methods can be used to detect votes that were not included in the final tally, machines that may have experienced hardware problems during the election, and polling locations that exhibited long lines. We tested our analyses on data from the South Carolina 2010 elections and were able to uncover, solely through the analysis of audit logs, a variety of problems, including vote miscounts. We created a public web application that applies these methods to uploaded audit logs and generates useful feedback on any detected issues.

1 Introduction

Election officials are tasked with the difficult job of ensuring fair and smooth elections. It is their responsibility to ensure that ballots are cast, collected, and tallied properly and that every registered voter who comes to a polling place to vote is given the opportunity to do so. This requires that every polling location is staffed with well-trained poll-workers and provisioned with enough ballots and balloting stations to accommodate all voters. A number of election day events can thwart even the best efforts on the part of election officials; surges of voters all arriving to vote at the same time, malfunctioning machines, and poll-worker errors are a few. Information about election day events can help officials, and researchers who study elections, better understand what worked and what did not work and better prepare for the next election.

In the November 2010 U.S. elections, 33% of reg-

istered voters were using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines [11]. Federal standards require that electronic voting machines generate detailed audit logs for use during post-election audits. Unfortunately, while the logs contain large amounts of data, it is not immediately obvious what sort of useful information can be learned from the data. Furthermore, even simple tallies are cumbersome, time consuming, and prone to human error if done manually. For these reasons, election officials do not regularly perform countywide post-election analysis of the log data.

However, log data contains a trove of information that can shed light on what takes place at the polling place on election day. For example, election officials can use the information to learn about voting machines that may need maintenance, or ways that poll-workers and other resources may be better allocated.

In this work, we aim to make DRE audit log analysis more useful and accessible to election officials and other interested parties. We develop new methods to analyze audit logs for the detection of both procedural errors and system deficiencies. We created AuditTool¹, a public web application that provides our fully automated analyses as a free service for use by election officials or interested third parties.

A strength of our tool is that even in the face of missing data, we are still able to pull out useful information. Our research contributes to the election audit process in the following ways.

- We introduce methods for identifying, solely from publicly available audit logs, potential errors in the software, hardware, and system configuration of DREs .
- We introduce methods for identifying instances of human error by poll workers. Furthermore, we differentiate between random errors and patterns of er-

¹The name of the tool has been blinded for anonymous submission.

ror that suggest shortcomings in the training election workers receive.

- We introduce a new method for conducting a statistical analysis of voter flow. This allows for improved resource allocation in future elections.
- We conduct a case study using our methods and identify instances of poor worker training, long voting lines, and missing votes during the 2010 South Carolina election.
- Using our experience with the case study, we suggest new content that, if included in election log files, would allow for additional useful analysis.

We implement these methods for the ES&S iVotronic DRE; the 2010 South Carolina data was already publicly available through a previous Freedom of Information Act request and the iVotronic was used in that election. The iVotronic system is a standalone, portable, touchscreen system that records vote totals, ballot images and an event log on internal flash memory. The iVotronic voting machine is one of the most widely deployed DREs in the U.S. In 2010, 422 jurisdictions tallying more than 22 million registered voters used this system [12]. In addition, the types of analyses we identify and our algorithms for analysis are applicable to other DRE voting systems that produce the necessary audit logs.

In this work we assume that DRE audit logs are complete, accurate, trustworthy, and free of accidental or malicious tampering. Detecting and preventing audit log tampering is outside the scope of this work.

2 Background

2.1 Introduction to the iVotronic DRE

A brief description of the iVotronic’s functionality and its main system components follows.

Voting terminal. The voting terminal is a stand-alone touchscreen voting unit. It is equipped with an internal battery and a removable compact flash card Personalized Electronic Ballot (PEB). The PEB is a proprietary cartridge required to operate the iVotronic terminal. Typically, counties deploy two types of PEBs to the precinct: a) a master PEB and b) an activator PEB. They are interchangeable, but poll workers are trained to keep them separate and use them for different purposes.

- **Master PEB.** Poll workers use the master PEB to open and close all terminals on election day. When a terminal is closed, it uploads its vote totals onto the PEB inserted into it. The PEB

accumulates the precinct totals so that they can later be uploaded and included in the official tally.

- **Activator PEBs.** Activator PEBs are used by poll workers to activate ballots for voters. Each voters session with the voting terminal starts with a poll worker inserting an Activator PEB into the terminal.

Removable Compact Flash (CF) card. The CF cards are programmed at Election Central and installed in the back of the voting terminal prior to deployment at the polling location. They store the event log and ballot images when the terminal is closed for voting. Once the polls close, the CF cards are removed from the back of the terminal and delivered to election headquarters on election night.

2.2 iVotronic Audit Data

The ES&S voting solution produces many log files, but in our analysis we focus on three: the event log (EL152.lst), the ballot image file (EL155.lst), and the system log (EL68a.lst).

The event log (EL152.lst) comes from the removable CF card and contains audit log entries from each iVotronic terminal used in the election. The log records, in chronological order, all events that occurred on that machine during the election. Each event log entry includes the iVotronic’s terminal serial number, the PEB’s serial number, the date and time, the event that occurred and a description of the event.

The ballot image file (EL155.lst) is also from the removable CF card and contains all ballot images saved by the iVotronic terminals during the voting process. The ballot images are segregated by precinct and terminal where the votes were cast.

The system log listing file (EL68a.lst) chronologically tracks activity in the election reporting database at the election headquarters. It contains the totals accumulated in the various precincts during election night reporting, as well as any warnings or errors reported by the software during the tabulation process. The system log also tracks the uploading of PEBs and CF cards to the election-reporting database.

3 Analysis

Our system is structured as a set of analyses, each one designed to shed light on one particular aspect of election-day and post election-day activities. In this section we present a description of our analyses.

3.1 Analyses of Interest

We focus on analyses that we expect to be most useful to election officials or interested third parties. First, since vote-counting is fundamental to elections, we use the audit logs to detect instances of cast votes being undercounted. We do this by looking for discrepancies between the different log files that indicate some votes have been left out of the final tally.

Second, we use audit logs to identify incidents of lines at polling locations. Long lines in the voting place can negatively affect the fairness of elections. There is a positive correlation between line length and the likelihood of a voter reneging – that is, leaving the polling location without voting [10]. A study conducted by the Voting Rights Institute of the Democratic National Committee found that as many as 3% of voters in the 2004 general election in Ohio reneged [4]. A field study conducted during the 2008 presidential primary in California observed close to 2% of voters leaving the polling location without voting when there were lines [10]. In addition to reneging, voters may be deterred from going to the polling place in the first place if they expect long lines, which is known as balking. A case study of the 2004 presidential election estimates that between 4% and 4.9% of voters in Franklin County, Ohio may have balked for fear of encountering long lines [1]. Finally, incidents of long lines do not occur with equal probability at all precincts. Locations in lower socioeconomic neighborhoods have a higher chance of experiencing long lines on election day [10, 4]. For these reasons, understanding where and how often long lines occur is important for gauging the success and fairness of an election and can help election officials better allocate resources at the next election.

To this end, we conduct two analyses. In the first, we find all locations that were open past the official poll closing time and use this as a proxy for the existence of long lines at the end of the day. Election officials might also like to know when lines occurred throughout the day or whether there were lines earlier in the day that had disappeared by closing time. We perform the former analysis for those subset of locations that stayed open late. In other words, for those locations that stayed open late, we are able to show through analysis of the audit logs, at what other times of day they likely had long lines. In Section 6 we suggest simple improvements to the log data that would make our long lines analysis possible for all precincts, not just those that stayed open late.

In our third set of analyses, we identify a number of seemingly small election-day issues that can have a very real, negative effect on the accuracy and fairness of an election. These include: failure to follow procedures on the part of poll workers, incorrectly set internal clocks on

the DREs, malfunctioning machines, and malfunctioning displays that go unnoticed. Failing to follow election-day protocol can lead to a loss of votes when a machine is not correctly closed out at the end of the day. Incorrectly set clocks may prevent a voting machine from starting up on time [14]. In addition, incorrectly set clocks make analysis of the audit log data more difficult and less reliable. Malfunctioning machines could result in fewer working machines on election day. Fewer machines can mean longer lines at the polling place. The number of machines per voter is also associated with the residual vote rate (the rate at which cast votes have errors that prevent them from being included in the final tally); the higher the number of machines, the more likely the cast votes get counted [4]. Finally, incorrect displays might cause a voter to cast a vote other than as intended.

3.2 Algorithms

We describe here the algorithms used in each of our analyses. For the majority of these we only consider data from election day between the hours of 7 A.M. and 7 P.M., which are the times that polls open and close in South Carolina. In our preliminary analysis, we found examples of log entries with seemingly incorrect timestamps. We identified two types of timestamp errors: errors resulting from incorrectly set clocks and errors resulting from apparent bugs in the timestamp mechanism itself. Given only a timestamp in the logs, it is impossible to know whether it is correct; however, we developed a number of heuristics to find those terminals that likely do have an incorrect clock. We may miss some terminals with an incorrect clock, but we try to minimize the number of false reports we give. We provide the user with a report detailing the results of this timestamp analysis.

AuditTool detects whether any votes were left out of the tally. We assume the tabulation software is correct and instead use the audit logs to check that all cast votes are entered into the tabulation software. Recall that each voting terminal’s vote totals are loaded onto a PEB when polls are closed and then all these PEBs’ data are loaded in to the election reporting database. There are two points in this process where votes could be omitted: a terminal may be forgotten and never closed, so that no PEB contains its vote totals; or a PEB used to close a terminal might be forgotten and not uploaded to the database. We show how to use the audit logs to detect both of these problems.

When searching the audit logs for instances of PEBs that were not uploaded, we compared the contents of the event log and ballot image files to that of the systems log listing file. We first identify, by parsing the event log, the set of PEBs used to close out voting terminals and then verify each one appears as uploaded in the system log

file. When a PEB is missing from the system log file, we report the case because it signifies that the PEB was not uploaded and the votes may not be in the certified totals.

Looking for terminals that were never closed is a challenging problem: essentially we need to identify events that are missing from the logs. We do this by finding terminals that were opened, but never closed.

AuditTool also reports on polling locations that stayed open late and that had long lines throughout the day. To identify locations that stayed open past 7 P.M., AuditTool first compiles a list of every terminal in the event log file for which the last vote was cast after 7 P.M. Then, using information from the ballot image file, the algorithm groups terminals by polling location and computes the mean time of the last cast vote for each group. We take the mean in order to account for any chance error in the timestamps. Finally, we report which polling locations stayed open late and also provide, for every county, a chart detailing the number of polling locations that stayed open late and by how long.

Identifying locations that had lines throughout the day is trickier. We start by positing that when there is a line of voters waiting, there will be negligible idle time for each machine between voters. We would like to identify windows of time where this was the case for a particular polling location. (Note that this does not allow us to differentiate between voters standing in line and voters arriving in a steady stream that keeps the machines at maximum capacity. It is a shortcoming of our approach, but seems difficult to avoid given only the log data.) The analysis is complicated however, by the fact that the logs do not record an event when a new ballot is activated for a voter, only when a ballot is cast. Given the timestamps t_1 and t_2 of two cast vote events for voters v_1 and v_2 , it could be the case that v_2 walked up to the terminal as soon as v_1 cast her vote and then spent $t_2 - t_1$ minutes marking her ballot before casting her vote. Or, it could be that the terminal was idle for most of $t_2 - t_1$ and at the last moment, voter v_2 approached the terminal, quickly marked her ballot and then cast her vote. If we knew how long the average voter took to mark her ballot we could use that to estimate the length of the idle time between two consecutive cast vote events. We do not know that information directly, but we can infer it from the logs we have. We know which locations were open after 7 P.M. and we also know that a polling location should only stay open late if there are people waiting in line at the official poll closing time. We assume this protocol is followed, and that the line moves efficiently, and therefore the terminals in a given location experience very little idle time between voters after 7 P.M. We also assume the time it takes to mark a ballot is a random variable and these late voters are a random sample of the entire voting population for that precinct. Therefore the average time it takes them to

vote represents the time it takes the average voter in the precinct to vote.² We then look for other times throughout the day where the time between votes is similar to or less than the time between votes after 7 P.M. Starting at 7 A.M., for each location, we look at each one hour window that starts on the hour and compile the set S_1 of time-between-consecutive-votes for every machine in that location during the window. Next we compare this set to S_2 , the time-between-consecutive-votes for every machine in that location after 7 P.M. If the mean of S_1 is less than the mean of S_2 , this suggests times in S_1 were shorter than in S_2 and there possibly were long lines in that window. We then perform the Mann Whitney U statistical test to determine whether the observed difference in mean is likely due to chance error. For windows where the two-tailed p-value is less than 0.05, there is evidence that the difference in mean is real and there possibly were long lines during the window when S_1 was collected. For those precincts open after 7 P.M., we report the hours during the day that possibly experienced long lines.

Note that we only perform this analysis on locations that were open after 7 P.M. This analysis would be useful to perform on all locations – after all, it is possible a polling place had long lines early in the day, but was still able to close on time – however, doing so would require assuming that the late voters are a random sample of the entire voting population across all precincts in the county and have a representative average time-to-vote; this is not a safe assumption. The average time to vote depends on a number of factors that can vary widely from precinct to precinct, including: the number of issues on the ballot, the clarity and length of the writing on the ballot, and the socio-economic level of the polling location [10, 1]. Between locations, the average time to vote can vary by as much as 1.5 minutes [10].

We also report on machines that had an uncalibrated display at the time when a vote was cast; there is the possibility that those votes may not have been cast as intended. When detecting votes cast on uncalibrated machines, we looked for three specific events in the event log: a machine uncalibrated event, a vote cast event, and a machine recalibrated event. We used a simple finite state machine with states = {uncalibrated machine with no votes cast, uncalibrated machine with at least one vote cast, calibrated machine} and tracked the current state of each terminal as we iterated through the event log. We then report any machine that had ever been in the state “uncalibrated machine with at least one vote cast.”

The procedural errors we are concerned with are: not

²It is possible that voters who arrive later in the day are from a particular population that has a different average time-to-vote than voters who arrive earlier in the day, however, in their field study of the California 2008 primary, Spencer and Markovitz found that, at a given location, the average time to vote was constant throughout the day [10], so we feel our assumption is not unreasonable.

printing zero tapes, casting votes with master PEBs, and opening and closing a machine with different PEBs. For each polling location, we check that every machine in the location recorded printing zero tapes, that each machine was opened and closed with the same PEB, and that no PEB used to open or close a machine was also used to cast a vote.

Last, we consider how to detect missing data: audit data that was not recorded, but should have been. In some cases, this may be impossible; if there is no trace of a terminal in any of the logs, we have no way of knowing that its data is missing given only the logs. We focused on the audit data for cast votes and find votes for which either the cast vote event was missing or the ballot image was missing. We can not detect a cast vote which is missing both the cast vote event and the ballot image. For each voting terminal, we compare the number of cast vote events in the event log with the number of ballot images in the system log. We report those terminals where the two values are not equal as the logs must be missing data from those machines.

4 Implementation

We built a web application called AuditTool to give election officials and advocacy groups easy access to our toolset. AuditTool requires the user to upload an event log and a ballot images file; we strongly suggest they also submit the system log to take advantage of the full range of analyses our tool provides. AuditTool uses only publicly available log data and does not store any information from the logs, so does not endanger voter privacy.

AuditTool produces reports that warn election officials about possible miscounts or procedural errors. Each report provides details about the errors found and explains the possible consequences of the error and suggests, where applicable, steps the election officials might take to address the error.

5 Results

This section discusses our findings after running our tool on the audit logs from the South Carolina 2010 General Election. We tested our analysis using log files downloaded from the website titled South Carolina Voting Information.³

5.1 Missing Votes

Our analysis shows that a total of 15 PEBs containing 2082 votes were not uploaded from the 14 counties that

we audited in South Carolina. Figure 1 summarizes the PEBs not uploaded during the General 2010 elections.

County	PEBs used to collect votes	PEBs not uploaded	Votes not uploaded
Anderson	77	1	163
Colleton	36	1	122
Georgetown	36	1	92
Greenville	154	3	500
Horry	121	2	189
Richland	128	5	648
Sumter	60	2	368

Figure 1: PEBs not uploaded and their corresponding votes.

AuditTool also identified a few instances of machines not being closed. A machine must be closed in order to collect the votes and audit data from that machine. There was a single machine that was not closed in each of the following counties: Greenville County, Horry County, and Sumter County. If this was a close election, information such as this could be cause for an extensive audit or recount of the votes.

Figure 2 shows some of AuditTools output on Greenville Countys log files.




Figure 2: Feedback for officials when detecting votes not having been uploaded.

5.2 Calibration Errors

We found seven counties where at least one machine was possibly not calibrated when votes were cast on that machine. An uncalibrated display could potentially cause votes to not be cast as intended. Our report suggests an election official or technician inspect these machines for possible calibration issues; see Figure 3.

³www.scvotinginfo.com

Report #1: Votes cast when the voting machine screen may not have been calibrated

The following machines may have recorded votes being cast while the terminal screen seemed to have calibration problems. You may wish to find these machines and check whether their screen is properly calibrated and verify the votes.

In Red Bank (#18),	machine 5123670 had votes cast when it was possibly not calibrated.
In Pilgrim Church (#64),	machine 5130458 had votes cast when it was possibly not calibrated.
In Lexington #3 (#70),	machine 5123550 had votes cast when it was possibly not calibrated.

Figure 3: Feedback for election officials when calibration issues are detected.

5.3 Audit Data

In several counties, the audit logs appeared to be incomplete. Our analysis detected six counties that did not have the same set of machines in both the event log and ballot images file. Florence County had the most inconsistencies with 65 machines that had votes cast on them according to the event log, but no ballot images. We also saw cases where there were ballot images for votes cast on machines that did not record any events on the event log. In addition to an unusually large amount of missing data, the analysis of Florence County showed machines that did not have the same number of votes cast as ballot images. See Figure 4 for example output from AuditTool.

Report #3: Machines whose vote count differed between files

The following machines appear to have inconsistencies across the audit data. We recommend that you gather vote data from the following machines, upload it, and update the audit data. From the data provided, we cannot infer the locations of the machines.

Machine Serial #	Votes according to event log	Votes according to ballot images
5130310	4	0

Figure 4: Feedback when incomplete audit data is detected.

5.4 Procedural Errors

Our findings reveal the need for improvements in poll worker training. When opening and closing a machine, the same master PEB should be used, but in 11 counties there were machines opened and closed with differ-

ent PEBs. Our results showed an association between this error and certain precincts where poll workers made those mistakes repeatedly. When this error is made multiple times at a single precinct, it indicates that perhaps the poll workers do not know the procedures, whereas a random distribution of these errors across polling locations probably means a mistake was made. Colleton County had five instances of this procedural error, but four of those instances took place at one polling location. Figure 5 shows this report from Colleton County.

A poll worker assigns each voter a PEB to use when it is that voter's turn. When voters cast votes, they should do so with a non-master PEB. For most precincts in Florence County, this error never occurred, however, four precincts had large numbers of this error; Mill Branch had this error on 56 out of 540 votes, Pamplico 2 had this error on 82 out of 579 votes, McAllister Hill had this error on 102 out of 749 votes, and Effingham had this error on 86 out of 591 votes. This pattern of errors again suggests certain pollworkers did not know the proper procedure. Figure 6 shows this relationship in Florence County.

Report #9: Machines opened and closed with different PEBs

The following machines were opened and closed with different PEBs. You may wish to review your poll worker training manual.

In Mashawville (#15),	machine 5138893 was opened with PEB 156178 and closed with PEB 156226.
In Walterboro No 4 (#32),	machine 5129946 was opened with PEB 155914 and closed with PEB 155925.
In Walterboro No 4 (#32),	machine 5133679 was opened with PEB 155914 and closed with PEB 155925.
In Walterboro No 4 (#32),	machine 5138439 was opened with PEB 155914 and closed with PEB 155925.
In Walterboro No 4 (#32),	machine 5138563 was opened with PEB 155914 and closed with PEB 155925.

Figure 5: AuditTool reports machines that were opened and closed with different PEBs.

5.5 Date/Time Errors

AuditTool found 1465 out of 4994 machines across 12 counties whose date was changed during election day voting. Figure 7 shows an example of a 1-hour time change for Georgetown County. This county had 125 out of 140 machines adjusted nearly exactly one hour back in time. This suggests the wrong Daylight Savings Time algorithm was in use, as mentioned in previous audits [3].

Anomalous time changes were detected in 18 machines. An anomaly is any occurrence of an unexplained date change while a machine is open for voting. Figure 8 is an example that occurred in Richland County. The machine was manually corrected about 30 minutes later.




Figure 6: This histogram shows the percentage of votes at each precinct that were cast with a master PEB. The precincts that showed the highest percentages had between 56 and 102 instances of this error.

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119932 SUP 11/02/2010 12:38:20 0001510 Vote cast by voter
SUP 11/02/2010 12:48:17 0001510 Vote cast by voter
SUP 11/02/2010 12:49:12 0001649 Term - entered service menus
SUP 11/02/2010 12:49:18 0000114 Select: Setup & Configuration Menu
SUP 11/02/2010 12:49:18 0000300 Start password procedure
SUP 11/02/2010 12:49:35 0000116 Select: Configure Terminal
SUP 11/02/2010 12:49:39 0000117 Select: Set Time and Date
SUP 11/02/2010 13:53:39 0001656 Set terminal date and/or time
SUP 11/02/2010 13:53:45 0001633 Terminal shutdown
SUP 11/02/2010 14:03:51 0001510 Vote cast by voter

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Figure 7: Resetting an iVotronic clock by one hour in Georgetown County.

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157374 SUP 11/02/2010 10:22:50 0001510 Vote cast by voter
SUP 11/02/2010 10:28:26 0001510 Vote cast by voter
SUP 11/02/2010 10:37:13 0001510 Vote cast by voter
SUP 04/30/2010 06:13:05 0001510 Vote cast by voter
SUP 04/30/2010 06:18:44 0001510 Vote cast by voter
SUP 04/30/2010 06:25:33 0001510 Vote cast by voter
SUP 04/30/2010 06:28:18 0001510 Vote cast by voter

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Figure 8: This date anomaly occurred in Richland County during election day.

5.6 Long Lines

We found 671 out of a total of 942 South Carolina precincts stayed open late. Berkeley County had the highest incidence of delayed closing times with 93% of polling locations closing after 7 P.M. Figure 9 depicts the precincts that closed late in Berkeley County. In the future, resources could be allocated to those polling locations that stayed open the latest to help move their lines more quickly. To detect possible lines before 7 P.M., we looked at only the precincts that were open late. Figure 10 show the time periods when the Berkeley County precincts experienced long lines before 7 P.M. Figure 11 shows the details of the results of the Mann Whitney U statistical test for long lines.




Figure 9: Precincts that closed late in Berkeley County.

6 Future Voting Systems Suggestions

While many other DRE systems do capture data in their audit logs similar to what the iVotronic does, no other widely deployed voting system makes it as easy to gather all the audit logs from all of the voting machines into a single place. As a result, while our methods are in principle applicable to other deployed voting systems, in practice this would require additional effort from election officials. Future voting system standards introduce stronger requirements for audit logs; this could make it easier to apply our analyses to other voting systems [15].

We believe that the following recommendations will make audit files more usable.

Vendors should document the meaning of all events. We found audit logs with event messages, such as “UNKNOWN,” “Warning PEB I/O flag set,” and “Warning




Figure 10: Long lines in Berkeley County.

# Precinct	Long Lines Time	Sample Size	Median Time	U-value	Two-tailed p-value
All precincts	7:00 p.m. - closing time	1257	3.57	N/A	N/A
26 Huger	4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.	37	2.88	15,759	0.0
	6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.	39	2.70	14,741.5	0.0
10 Cordesville	12:00 m. - 1:00 p.m.	32	3.16	14,765.5	0.01
24 Hilton Cross Rd	12:00 m. - 1:00 p.m.	53	2.98	24,407	0.0
	5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.	52	3.21	24,332.5	0.0
20 Hanahan 1	5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.	48	3.28	24,968	0.04
58 Medway	7:00 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.	51	3.02	23,965.5	0.0
	6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.	68	2.73	30,245	0.0
34 Moncks Comer 4	4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.	84	3.26	45,274	0.03
37 Russellville	11:00 a.m. - 12:00 m.	47	3.02	22,496.5	0.0
	1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.	34	3.04	15,691	0.0
	2:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.	44	2.92	17,490	0.0
	3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.	60	2.48	20,789.5	0.0
	4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.	50	3.20	25,064	0.02
	6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.	51	2.88	20,709.5	0.0
29 Macedonia	7:00 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.	42	3.07	19,821	0.0
45 Stratford 2	7:00 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.	68	3.06	31,825	0.0
	12:00 m. - 1:00 p.m.	78	3.21	42,027	0.03
7 Cainhoy	2:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.	51	3.25	26,770.5	0.046
	6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.	59	2.78	22,364.5	0.0
60 Whitesville 2	7:00 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.	32	2.83	12,105	0.0
	6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.	51	3.25	26,361.5	0.03
57 Liberty Hall	6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.	49	2.98	24,473	0.01
39 Sangaree 2	6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.	86	2.99	41,377.5	0.0
49 Wassamassaw 2	5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.	110	3.28	60,667.5	0.03
35 Pimlico	7:00 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.	58	2.83	22,526	0.0
	5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.	68	3.0	32,026	0.0
11 Cross	9:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.	97	3.37	51,907.5	0.01
	11:00 a.m. - 12:00 m.	85	3.17	46,088	0.03
12 Daniel Island 1	11:00 a.m. - 12:00 m.	125	3.35	70,085.5	0.046
13 Daniel Island 2	11:00 a.m. - 12:00 m.	138	3.3	76,555	0.02

Figure 11: Long lines in Berkeley County.

I/O flagged PEB will be used,” which sound ominous, however we could not determine the gravity of the issue. Despite combing through all of ES&Ss publicly available information about the iVotronic, the meaning of these events still remain a mystery [13, 6, 7].

Accuracy of date and time logging needs improvement. When the machine has an incorrect clock, time-stamps are inaccurate and it becomes difficult to recreate election day events. In addition, some audit log analyses, such as the open late analysis, are made more difficult by unreliable timestamps.

Make system manuals available to the public. Voting machine audit logs are public information. The general public can request them under the Freedom of Information Act. In the same fashion, we recommend that voting system manuals be made freely available. This would allow the public to see for themselves if there were any problems that should be addressed.

Capture the ballot activation event. Recording the time each ballot is activated (as opposed to only recording when the ballot is cast) would make it easier to learn when the voting machines were heavily used and when they were idle. This is a simple change that would not compromise voter privacy, and would make it simple for an automated tool such as AuditTool to extract information about long lines during the day.

7 Related Work

Two recent studies used event logs from the iVotronic voting system to audit elections [3, 9]. Buell et al. [3] analyzed the same South Carolina elections that we did and also discovered votes not included in the certified counts and problems with the audit data. By consulting additional audit materials, such as the printed results tapes, the authors were able to offer possible explanations for why the problems occurred. Our work takes a slightly different approach. We focus on developing an automated analysis of the publicly available audit log data that can be used by anyone. While our tool did discover and report similar problems, we simply report what was wrong, but can not provide a possible explanation for the cause of the error as we do not have access to printed results tapes.

Sandler et al. [9] analyzed vote tallies by comparing each machine’s protected vote count to the printed results tapes. Their report also finds time-stamps that were most likely inaccurate. With further investigation, they concluded that the machine hardware clock was incorrect. Our research provides analyses to identify similar problems, but in a way that can be automated.

There has also been research on using the audit logs to analyze election-day procedure and activity. Antonyan et al. showed how event logs could be used to determine

if a machine acted “normally” on election day [2]. They built a finite state machine that models the sequences of events that a well-behaved AccuVote-OS scanner might produce and used it to analyze AccuVote-OS logs. This type of analysis could be useful for the iVotronic systems that we studied, too.

Other work has focused specifically on detecting or predicting long lines. Formal models adapted from queuing theory and simulations of voter queues can be used to better understand the factors that affect the length and duration of lines at the polling place [1, 5]. Our work is complementary, and in fact information about election day events gathered by AuditTool can be used to inform the queuing models. A field study, such as that done by Spencer and Markovitz [10], can provide ground truth about the occurrence of long lines on election day, but in the absence of that ideal, our analysis can provide some information about the time and duration of long lines.

Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) are a different type of audit log. Unlike the audit logs we used in our analyses, VVPATs are viewed and verified by the voter and are more suited to audits concerning a DRE incorrectly capturing a voters intent. Our work is more concerned with identifying cases of cast votes not being included in the final count, or issues at the polling place that might prevent the voter from casting their vote in the first place. With VVPATs, as long as a certain percentage of voters do check their paper ballot [8], the voting machine need not be assumed correct, whereas our analyses do make this assumption.

8 Conclusion

This paper develops methods to analyze audit data from DRE voting machines. It introduces new methods for extracting information about election-day activities and post-election anomalies from audit data. We conduct an audit on the 2010 South Carolina election using these methods and are able to detect instances of missing votes, procedural errors, and likely instances of lines throughout the day. With this information, election officials can improve poll worker training, resource allocation, election tabulation procedures, and voting machine preparation testing. Based on our experience during this research, we make suggestions for future audit logs that would make an automated analysis such as ours even more informative.

We built a web application, AuditTool, to perform these analyses. Users can upload the DRE log files to our website and run the analyses. By automating our analyses we can provide intelligent feedback to election officials during the canvassing process and help them quickly correct any problems in order to produce accurate election results. AuditTool is freely available online.

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