# HALBORN CTF - SOLDITY AUDIT REPORT

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#### 1. HalbornToken.sol

- a. Anyone can upgrade the contract to a malicious contract. After upgrading to the malicious contract,
  - i. Loans address can be set to any address.
  - ii. Unlimited minting of tokens.
  - iii. Unlimited burning of tokens.

#### 2. HalbornNFT.sol

- a. Anyone can upgrade the contract to a malicious contract. After upgrading to the malicious contract,
  - i. Price can be set to any value.
  - ii. ETH can be stolen from the contract.
- b. Anyone can set the merkle root.
- c. Inaccurate \_exists check.

## 3. HalbornLoans.sol

- a. Anyone can upgrade the contract to a malicious contract. After upgrading to the malicious contract,
  - i. Loans address can be set to any address.
  - ii. Unlimited minting of tokens.
  - iii. Unlimited burning of tokens.
  - iv. ETH can be stolen from the contract.
  - v. Price can be set to any value.
- b. Reentrancy in with drawCollateral function.
- c. Incorrect usedCollateral calculation in returnLoan function.
- d. Incorrect check for collateral availability in getLoan function.
- e. usedCollateral is not decremented after withdrawing collateral.
- f. Constructor for a UUPS Upgradeable Contract without Disable Initializer Check.
- g. Immutable variable in Upgradeable contract

# **Summary**

Report for Halborn CTF Solidity Smart contracts.

Contracts in Scope:

- 1. HalbornToken.sol
- 2. HalbornNFT.sol
- 3. HalbornLoans.sol

# **Project Summary:**

Project Name	_ Smart Contract
Description	The Audit report of Halborn CTF smart contracts with Static and Manual analysis.
Platform	EVM Compatible Chains
Smart Contract Language	Solidity
Codebase	
Contract Address	

## **Audit Summary**

Delivery Date	26 - 03 - 2024
Audit Methodology	Static analysis, Manual Review

# **Vulnerability Summary**

Total Issues	11
High	11
Medium	0
Low	0

## 1. HalbornToken.sol

## 1) Insufficient Access Control

#### **Issue**

```
43
44 | function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal override {}
45 |
46
```

The function authorize upgrade has insufficient access control.

## Recommendation

Use onlyOwner modifier for the function

## 2. HalbornNFT.sol

## 1) Insufficient Access Control

## **Issue**

The function authorize upgrade has insufficient access control.

#### Recommendation

Use onlyOwner modifier for the function

## 2) Insufficient Access Control

#### **Issue**

```
function setMerkleRoot(bytes32 merkleRoot_) public {

merkleRoot = merkleRoot_;

3

}
```

The function setMerkleRoot has insufficient access control.

#### Recommendation

Use onlyOwner modifier for the function

## 3) Inaccurate \_exists check

```
function mintAirdrops(uint256 id, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof) external {
require(_exists(id), "Token already minted");

47
```

#### **Issue**

The require statement wants to prevent minted tokens from being airdropped but the check is incorrect.

## Recommendation

Apply require(! exists(id), "Token already minted");

## 3. HalbornLoans.sol

## 1) Insufficient Access Control

#### **Issue**

```
73
74 function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal override {}
75 }
```

The function authorize upgrade has insufficient access control.

## Recommendation

Use onlyOwner modifier for the function

## 2) Reentrancy in withdrawCollateral function

#### **Issue**

Reentrancy issue in withdrawCollateral function.

## Recommendation

Apply nonReentrant modifier from Openzeppelin.

## 3) Incorrect usedCollateral calculation in returnLoan function

#### **Issue**

```
function returnLoan(uint256 amount) external {
    function returnLoan(uint256 amount) external {
        require(usedCollateral[msg.sender] >= amount, "Not enough collateral");
        require(token.balanceOf(msg.sender) >= amount);
        usedCollateral[msg.sender] += amount;
        token.burnToken(msg.sender, amount);
}
```

usedCollateral mapping is incremented for any user even when the user returns the loan using returnLoan function

#### Recommendation

Decrement the usedCollateral for that user.

## 4) Incorrect check for collateral availability in getLoan function

#### **Issue**

The require statement will always be true for any amount bigger than totalCollateral - usedCollateral

## Recommendation

Change the < sign to >= sign.

## 5) usedCollateral is not decremented after withdrawing collateral

#### **Issues**

usedCollateral is not decremented after withdrawing collateral

#### Recommendation

Decrement the usedCollateral variable when user withdraws the collateral

# 6) Constructor for a UUPS Upgradeable Contract without Disable Initializer Check

#### **Issue**

```
constructor(uint256 collateralPrice_) {
collateralPrice = collateralPrice_;
}
```

Constructor is being used in an upgradeable contract

## Recommendation

Do not use the constructor. Use initialize functions to initialize the variables and add \_disableInitializers function from Openzeppelin so that the new implementation is never initialized through the constructor.

## 7) Immutable variable in Upgradeable contract

#### Issue

```
uint256 public immutable collateralPrice;
```

Immutable variable is used in an upgradeable contract

#### Recommendation

Do not use an immutable variable. Instead set up the value of the variable using the initialize function and never change it again.