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Education

Ph.D. in Economics, New York University, 2015-2021 (expected)
M.A. in Economics, Escola de Economia de Sao Paulo (EESP-FGV), 2013-2014
B.Sc. in Economics, Escola de Economia de Sao Paulo (EESP-FGV), 2009-2012

References

Professor Debraj Ray
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Professor Ariel Rubinstein
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Professor Erik Madsen
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Professor David Pearce
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Teaching and Research Fields

Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Financial Economics.

Teaching Experience

Fall 2019	Microeconomic Analysis (Undergrad), NYU, TA for David Pearce
Spring 2019	Microeconomic Analysis (Undergrad), NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall 2018	Microeconomics (PhD), NYU, TA for Alberto Bisin
Fall 2018	Microeconomic Analysis (Undergrad), NYU, TA for David Pearce
Spring 2018	Microeconomic Analysis (Undergrad), NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall 2016	Macroeconomics (PhD), NYU, TA for Jaroslav Borovicka / Lars Lundquivist

Conference Presentations

15th Economics Graduate Student Conference at Washington University of St. Louis (2020 - scheduled)

2019 Summer School of the Econometric Society

11th NYU Search Theory Workshop (2018)

2018 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance

Skills

Proficient in Python, Matlab, Stata, LaTeX

Languages: English (fluent), Portuguese (native), French (basic), Spanish (basic)

Other Professional Activities

Referee for the American Economic Review

Assistant to the co-editor (Debraj Ray) at the American Economic Review

Fellowships

2020–2021	Departmental Dissertation Fellowship, NYU Economics Department
2015–2020	Henry M. McCracken Fellowship, NYU

Job Market Paper

Information Acquisition and Disclosure by a Biased Advisor

Why do people seek information from conflicted sources, such as Instagram influencers or financial advisors? In this paper, I provide an answer to this question by showing that an advisor's bias may improve the informativeness of his advice. A biased sender acquires a signal about an object's quality and commits to a rule to disclose its realizations to a receiver, who then chooses whether to buy the object. Optimal disclosure rules typically conceal negative signal realizations when the object's sale is very profitable to the sender and positive signal realizations when the sale is less profitable. Despite this strategic concealment of some signal realizations, the receiver may prefer being informed by a more biased sender, as the sender's bias produces an additional incentive to invest in acquiring a precise signal of the object's quality.

Working Papers

Conveying Value Via Categories (with Debraj Ray), revision requested at *Econometrica*

A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotonic categorization of quality. We characterize the sender's optimal monotonic categorization. Using our characterization, we study the optimality of full pooling or full separation, the alternation of pooling and separation, and make precise a sense in which pooling is dominant relative to separation. We discuss applications, extensions and generalizations, among them the design of a grading scheme by a profit-maximizing school which seeks to signal student qualities and simultaneously incentivize students to learn. Such incentive constraints force monotonicity, and can also be embedded as a distortion of the school's prior over student qualities, generating a categorization problem with distinct sender and receiver priors.

Informed Intermediaries, revision requested at *Theoretical Economics*

I develop a theory of intermediation in a market in which agents meet bilaterally to trade assets and buyers have limited commitment to pay. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These in-

formed agents can secure trades by setting punish- ments to traders who have previously defaulted. Absent these punishments, no trade can be sustained. The punishment strategy affects prices in trades and also determines which trades are hindered due to the risk of default. Intermediation can be endogenously generated when punishment strategies are asymmetric and yield some agents either more effective opportuni- ties to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades. I show that asymmetric equilibria typically yield higher value to informed agents, at the expense of value to uninformed ones, and are robust to the introduction of a cost of information.

Work in Progress

Segregation and Disaggregated Sorting (with Nikhil Vellodi)

We study a matching model where each individual belongs to a pool, and searching for a match outside one's pool is more costly than within it. We are interested in the effects of lowering search costs (within and outside each pool) on the equilibrium sorting patterns. As search costs diminish, the incentives of intermediate skill types to "search up" increase. As such, the intermediate types become "less interested" in matching with low skill types, who therefore have lower returns, and refrain, from searching outside of their pool. We relate this result to the empirical observation that secularly matches at the top of the skill distribution have become less assortative (high skilled workers have become less likely to marry other high skilled workers), while matches at the bottom of the skill distribution have become more assortative. In a separate empirical section, we interpret segregation as a measure of search costs across pools within the same commuting zone and validate predictions of the model.

Signaling in Matches

I study a problem of signaling in matches whereby, when deciding to form a group, individuals consider not only how the collaboration might enhance their productive output, but also what the outcome of the group production signals about their own individual ability. This problem of matching to signal is a significant departure from traditional matching models because the signaling value of a match in itself depends on the conjectured matching pattern held by the observer. When agents match only based on the productive outcome, there is a unique equilibrium, with positive assortative matching when the match expected value function is supermodular and negative assortative matching when it is submodular. I show that, when signaling value is incorporated, multiple equilibria can emerge, as well as equilibrium matching patterns that are not "in line" with the modularity of the match expected value function.