

PAULA ONUCHIC
www.paulaonuchic.com
p.onuchic@nyu.edu or paula.onuchic@economics.ox.ac.uk

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Address 19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
Phone +44 07763 770387

Placement Director: David Cesarini david.cesarini@nyu.edu 646-413-8576
Graduate Administrator: Ian Johnson ian.johnson@nyu.edu 212-998-8901

Employment

Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2021--present

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, New York University, 2015–2021
MA in Economics, Escola de Economia de Sao Paulo (EESP-FGV), 2013-2014
BS in Economics, Escola de Economia de Sao Paulo (EESP-FGV), 2009-2012

References

Professor Debraj Ray
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
debraj.ray@nyu.edu

Professor Ariel Rubinstein
19 West Fourth St., 5th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
rariel@tauex.tau.ac.il

Professor Erik Madsen
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
emadsen@nyu.edu

Professor Ian Jewitt
Nuffield College – University of Oxford
New Road – Oxford – UK OX1 1NF
ian.jewitt@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

Teaching and Research Fields

Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics

Teaching Experience

Spring and Fall 2023
22/23 and 23/24 Academic Year
Fall 2021 and Fall 2022
2015-2020
2016

Theories of Discrimination – Mphil/DPhil Lecturer – Oxford
Co-organizer Economic Theory Reading Group – Oxford
MPhil/DPhil Microeconomics Class Teacher – Oxford
Microeconomics TA (undergrad and PhD) – NYU
Macroeconomics TA (PhD) – NYU

Job Market Paper

Disclosure and Incentives in Teams (with João Ramos)

We consider a team production environment augmented with a stage in which the team decides how to communicate their productive outcome to outside observers. In this context, we characterize equilibrium disclosure of team outcomes when team disclosure choices aggregate individual recommendations through some deliberation procedure. We show that equilibria often involve partial disclosure of the team's outcome and establish a relation between the deliberation procedure and the observer's equilibrium attribution of blame for non-disclosed outcomes (“team failures”) across team members. We show that through this blame-attribution channel a team's deliberation procedure determines individuals' incentives to contribute effort to team production. We then characterize deliberation procedures that provide strong effort incentives in different productive environments.

Publications

Informed Intermediaries

Published in *Theoretical Economics*, January 2022.

Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects (with Debraj Ray)

Published in the *American Economic Review*, January 2023.

Conveying Value via Categories (with Debraj Ray)

Publication forthcoming in *Theoretical Economics*.

Other Working Papers

Advisors with Hidden Motives

Statistical Discrimination and Statistical Informativeness (with Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander, and Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey)

Recent Contributions to Theories of Discrimination – Revision requested by the *JPE:Microeconomics*.

Seminars and Conference Presentations

2024	University of Reading, CSEF - Naples, CREST
2023	University of Manchester, University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University, Bilkent University, University of Mannheim, Toulouse School of Economics, Bocconi University, London School of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, University of California San Diego, Carnegie Mellon University, Duke University + UNC Chapel Hill, Brown University, University of Miami, NEAT Seminar, LMU Munich, HEC Paris - Workshop on Persuasion and Communication, Southeast Theory Festival, ESSET Gerzensee, SAET - Paris, Bonn-Mannheim Junior Workshop in Economic

	Theory, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, Columbia Conference in Economic Theory, ASU Theory Conference, Transatlantic Theory Workshop
2022	Caltech, Aalto University, SFU+UBC+Calgary Theory Seminar Series, Cambridge Janeway Networks Seminar, University of Essex, Queen Mary University, University of Bristol, Insper, IIES-Stockholm, NHH Norwegian School of Economics, University of Nottingham, UC Berkeley, Southeast Theory Festival, Transatlantic Theory Workshop, Humboldt+Toronto Theory Conference
2021	Michigan State University, Israeli Theory Seminar, UCL, Warwick, University of Toronto, Paris School of Economics, London School of Economics, 43rd Meeting of the Brazilian Econometric Society, 2021 Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Transatlantic Theory Workshop, Seminars in Economic Theory
2020	Oxford University, 42nd Meeting of the Brazilian Econometric Society, 15th Economics Graduate Student Conference at Washington University of St. Louis
Earlier	2019 Summer School of the Econometric Society, 11th NYU Search Theory Workshop, 2018 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance

Professional Activities

Refereeing	American Economic Review, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of the European Economic Association, Economic Journal, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Journal of Public Economics
Research Affiliate	CEPR Research Affiliate (starting January 2024)
Conference Organizer	NRET Fest – NYU 2022
Co-Organizer	2022/23 and 2023/24 Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Assistant to the Co-editor	Assistant to Debraj Ray at the American Economic Review
Scientific Committee	Member of the Scientific Committee 43 rd Annual Meeting of the Brazilian Econometric Society

Other Information

Programming Skills:	MATLAB, Python
Languages:	English (fluent), Portuguese (native), French (basic), Spanish (basic).
Citizenship:	Brazil

