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**Education**

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2015-2021 (expected)  
MA in Economics, Escola de Economia de Sao Paulo (EESP-FGV), 2013-2014  
BS in Economics, Escola de Economia de Sao Paulo (EESP-FGV), 2009-2012

**References**

**Professor Debraj Ray**  
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**Professor Erik Madsen**  
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**Professor David Pearce**  
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**Teaching and Research Fields**

Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Financial Economics.

**Teaching Experience**

Fall 2019	Microeconomic Analysis (Undergrad), NYU, TA for David Pearce
Spring 2019	Microeconomic Analysis (Undergrad), NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall 2018	Microeconomics (PhD), NYU, TA for Alberto Bisin
Fall 2018	Microeconomic Analysis (Undergrad), NYU, TA for David Pearce
Spring 2018	Microeconomic Analysis (Undergrad), NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall 2016	Macroeconomics (PhD), NYU, TA for Jaroslav Borovicka / Lars Lundquist

## **Seminars and Conference Presentations**

42nd Meeting of the Brazilian Econometric Society (2020 - scheduled)  
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar (2020 - scheduled)  
15th Economics Graduate Student Conference at Washington University of St. Louis (2020 - scheduled)  
2019 Summer School of the Econometric Society  
11th NYU Search Theory Workshop (2018)  
2018 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance

## **Skills**

Proficient in Python, Matlab, Stata,  $\text{\LaTeX}$   
Languages: English (fluent), Portuguese (native), French (basic), Spanish (basic)

## **Other Professional Activities**

Referee for *The American Economic Review*  
Assistant to the co-editor (Debraj Ray) at *The American Economic Review*

## **Fellowships**

2020–2021	Departmental Dissertation Fellowship, NYU Economics Department
2015–2020	Henry M. McCracken Fellowship, NYU

## **Job Market Paper**

### *Advisors with Hidden Motives*

Why do people seek information from conflicted sources, such as Instagram influencers or financial advisors? In this paper, I provide an answer to this question by showing that an advisor's hidden motives may improve the informativeness of his advice. A sender acquires a signal about an object's quality and commits to a rule to disclose its realizations to a receiver, who then chooses to buy the object or to keep an outside option of privately known value. Optimal disclosure rules typically conceal negative signal realizations when the object's sale is very profitable to the sender and positive signal realizations when the sale is less profitable. Using such disclosure rules, the advisor is able to steer sales from lower- to higher-profitability objects. I show that, despite this strategic concealment of some signal realizations, the receiver may prefer being informed by a non-transparent sender, because the sender's hidden motives produce an additional incentive to invest in acquiring a precise signal of the object's quality. I use my model to evaluate policies that are commonly proposed in the context of financial advisors, such as mandatory disclosure of commissions and commission caps.

## **Working Papers**

### *Conveying Value Via Categories* (with Debraj Ray), revision requested at *Econometrica*

A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotonic categorization of quality. We characterize the sender's optimal monotonic categorization. Using our characterization, we study the optimality of full pooling or full separation and the alternation of pooling and separation, and make precise a sense in which pooling is dominant relative to separation. We discuss applications, extensions and generalizations, among them the design of a grading scheme by a profit-maximizing school that seeks to signal student qualities and simultaneously incentivize students to learn. Such incentive constraints force monotonicity, and can also be

embedded as a distortion of the school's prior over student qualities, generating a categorization problem with distinct sender and receiver priors.

*Informed Intermediaries*, revision requested at *Theoretical Economics*

I develop a theory of intermediation in a market in which agents meet bilaterally to trade assets and buyers have limited commitment to pay. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by setting punishments for traders who have previously defaulted. Absent these punishments, no trade can be sustained. The punishment strategy affects prices in trades and also determines which trades are hindered due to the risk of default. Intermediation can be endogenously generated when punishment strategies are asymmetric and yield some agents either more effective opportunities to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades. I show that asymmetric equilibria typically yield higher value to informed agents, at the expense of value to uninformed ones, and are robust to the introduction of a cost of information.

## **Work in Progress**

*Segregation and Disaggregated Sorting* (with Nikhil Vellodi)

We study a matching model where heterogeneous individuals belong to pools, and searching for a match outside one's pool is more costly than within it. As search costs decrease (within and outside each pool), the incentives of intermediate types to "search up" increases more than for low types. As such, intermediate types become more likely to match with higher types, while low types refrain from searching outside of their pool and match more often with other low types. We relate this result to the empirical observation (Eika, Mogstad and Zafar, 2019) that, in the United States, matching at the top of the skill distribution has become less assortative over the last 60 years, while matches at the bottom of the skill distribution have become more assortative in that same period. In a separate empirical section, we interpret segregation as a measure of search costs across pools within the same commuting zone and validate predictions of the model.

*Signaling in Matches*

I study a problem of signaling in matches whereby, when deciding to form a group, individuals consider not only how the collaboration might enhance their productive output, but also what the outcome of the group production signals about their own individual ability. This problem of matching to signal is a significant departure from traditional matching models because the signaling value of a match in itself depends on the conjectured matching pattern held by the observer. When agents match only based on the productive outcome, a unique equilibrium exists, with positive assortative matching when the match expected value function is supermodular and negative assortative matching when it is submodular. I show that, when signaling value is incorporated, multiple equilibria can emerge, as well as equilibrium matching patterns that are not "in line" with the modularity of the match expected value function.