

# CMSC389R

## Web II



**COMPUTER SCIENCE**  
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND



announcements

Any questions so far?

## recap

- HTTP requests (ie. GET/POST)
- Maintaining state (ie. cookies, etc)
- Some common vulns
  - XSS
  - SQLi

# I don't know what to say. #116



FallingSnow opened this issue 9 days ago · 666 comments



FallingSnow commented 9 days ago • edited ▾

EDIT 26/11/2018:

- Am I affected?:

If you are using anything crypto-currency related, then maybe. As discovered by @maths22, the target seems to have been identified as copay related libraries. It only executes successfully when a matching package is in use (assumed to be copay at this point). If you are using a crypto-currency related library and if you see flatmap-stream@0.1.1 after running `npm ls event-stream flatmap-stream`, you are most likely affected. For example:

```
$ npm ls event-stream flatmap-stream
...
flatmap-stream@0.1.1
...
```

- What does it do:

Other users have done some good analysis of what these payloads actually do.

- [#116 \(comment\)](#)
- [#116 \(comment\)](#)
- [#116 \(comment\)](#)

- What can I do:

By this time fixes are being deployed and npm has yanked the malicious version. Ensure that the developer(s) of the package you are using are aware of this post. If you are a developer update your event-stream dependency to `event-stream@3.3.4`. This protects people with cached versions of event-stream.

## Assignees

No one assigned

## Labels

None yet

## Projects

None yet

## Milestone

No milestone

## Notifications

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346 participants



and others

The event-stream npm package was originally created and maintained by Dominic Tarr. However, this popular package has not been updated for a long time now. According to Thomas Hunter's post on Medium, "Ownership of **event-stream**, was transferred by the original author to a malicious user, **right9ctrl**. The malicious user was able to gain the trust of the original author by making a series of meaningful contributions to the package."

The malicious owner then added a malicious library named flatmap-stream to the events-stream package as a dependency. This led to a download and invocation of the event-stream package (using the malicious 3.3.6 version) by every user. The malicious library download added up to nearly **8 million** downloads since it was included in September 2018.

The malicious package represents a highly targeted attack and affects an open source app called **bitpay/copay**. Copay is a secure bitcoin wallet platform for both desktop and mobile devices. "We know the malicious package specifically targets that application because the obfuscated code reads the description field from a project's package.json file, then uses that description to decode an AES256 encrypted payload", said Thomas in his post.

# OWASP Top 10


1. Injection
2. Broken Authentication
3. Sensitive Data Exposure
4. XML External Entities (XXE)
5. Broken Access Control
6. Security Misconfiguration
7. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
8. Insecure Deserialization
9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
10. Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

## Local File Inclusion

- Attacker includes a file path local to the server as input to a vulnerable field
- Can lead to:
  - Code execution (server & client)
  - DoS
  - Sensitive Information Disclosure

# Local File Inclusion

<http://vulnerable.com>



# Local File Inclusion





# Local File Inclusion



# Local File Inclusion



Directory  
Traversal  
Attack

# Local File Inclusion (ATTACK)

http://vulnerable.com



http://vulnerable.com/view.php?filename=../../../../  
../../../../etc/shadow



Web Server

view.php:

```
<?php
include("a/".$_GET["filename"]);
?>
```

FILESYSTEM:

```
/server/view.php
/server/a/dog.jpg
/server/a/cat.png
...
/etc/shadow
...
```


## Remote File Inclusion

- Similar to LFI, but attacker includes a remote path as input to a vulnerable field
- Can lead to:
  - Code execution (server & client)
  - DoS
  - Sensitive Information Disclosure


# Remote File Inclusion



# Remote File Inclusion



# Remote File Inclusion (ATTACK)



# 0wned

!C99madShell v. 2.1 madnet edition ADVANCED!

Software: Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS), [PHP/5.1.6](#)  
uname -a: Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.18-194.el5 #1 SMP Fri Apr 2 14:38:35 EDT 2010 i686  
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache) context=user\_u:system\_r:httdp\_t:s0  
Safe-mode: [OFF \(not secured\)](#)  
/var/www/html/ drwxr-xr-x  
Free 836.96 MB of 3.78 GB (21.64%)

HOME <=> UPDIR Search Buffer Tools Proc. FTP brute Sec. SQL PHP-code Self remove Logout

Listing folder (4 files and 3 folders):

Name	Size	Modify	Owner/Group	Perms	Action
..	LINK	31.01.2011 14:54:34	0/0	drwxr-xr-x	I <input type="checkbox"/>
.	LINK	29.04.2011 07:09:02	500/0	drwxr-xr-x	I <input type="checkbox"/>
[drupal-5.23]	DIR	11.08.2010 13:46:30	500/500	drwxr-xr-x	I <input type="checkbox"/>
[drupal-6.20]	DIR	22.04.2011 03:57:15	500/500	drwxr-xr-x	I <input type="checkbox"/>
[osticket_1.6.0]	DIR	28.04.2011 10:54:47	500/500	drwxr-xr-x	I <input type="checkbox"/>
<a href="#">c99.php</a>	137.94 KB	29.04.2011 07:29:39	500/500	-rw-rw-r--	I E D <input type="checkbox"/>
drupal-5.23.tar.gz	750.26 KB	11.08.2010 13:46:31	500/500	-rw-rw-r--	I E D <input type="checkbox"/>
drupal-6.20.tar.gz	1.05 MB	15.12.2010 13:16:29	500/500	-rw-rw-r--	I E D <input type="checkbox"/>
osticket_1.6.0.tar.gz	385.1 KB	07.10.2010 21:22:39	500/500	-rw-rw-r--	I E D <input type="checkbox"/>

With selected:

:: Command execute ::

Enter:

Select:

:: Search ::

☒ - regexp

:: Upload ::

( Read-Only )

:: Make Dir ::

( Read-Only )

:: Make File ::

( Read-Only )

:: Go Dir ::

:: Go File ::

--[ c99madshell v. 2.1 madnet edition ADVANCED EDITED BY MADNET | <http://securityprobe.net> | Generation time: 0.0063 ]--



# Web Application Firewalls (WAF)

- Used by webapps prevent attacks such as XSS, SQLi, RFI/LFI, misconfigs, etc
- Typically rule-based
- Can be implemented in:
  - Server code (Apache ModSecurity, etc)
  - Appliance between network and server (Barracuda, etc)
  - Cloud (AWS WAF, Cloudflare, etc)

## (Some) Approaches to WAF Bypasses

- How does WAF normalize input data?
  - Decode HTML entities?
  - Escape characters?
  - Enforce null byte string termination?
- Is it using regex to match signatures?
  - Blocks 'OR '1'='1'
  - Allows '|| 0x50 is not null

# challenges

<http://142.93.136.81:8893/>

Wreak havoc



## resources

- [Natas OverTheWire](#)
- [JuiceShop](#)
- [Gruyere](#)
- [Ringzer0team](#)
- [OWASP Top 10](#)

## homework #12

Will not be posted.

Get ready for the final!