

# The Russia-Ukraine War: Comprehensive Strategic and Tactical Assessment as of May 11, 2025

The Russia-Ukraine war continues to evolve with significant developments across multiple fronts as of May 11, 2025. Russian forces have recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City in the Vovchansk area, while Ukrainian forces have made tactical gains near Toretsk and continue their operations in Russia's Kursk Oblast, which began in August  $2024^{[1]}$  [2]. On the diplomatic front, Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10, maintaining Russia's position that any ceasefire must include conditions supporting Russia's long-term goal of controlling Ukraine [3] [4]. Military casualties continue to mount, with Russia suffering approximately 790,000 killed or wounded according to recent Western estimates, while Ukraine has acknowledged 400,000 casualties [5]. The humanitarian situation remains dire, with the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission reporting a 23% increase in Ukrainian civilian casualties between March and April 2025, and an 84% year-over-year increase [6]. As the summer campaigning season approaches, military analysts warn it could become the deadliest period of the entire conflict, with both sides attempting to achieve strategic objectives after three years of grueling warfare [7].

#### **Territorial Control and Recent Battlefield Developments**

#### **Current Territorial Control Assessment**

The territorial situation in Ukraine remains largely static on a strategic level despite intense tactical fighting across multiple sectors of the front. According to recent assessments, neither side has achieved significant territorial gains that would alter the strategic balance of the conflict since early 2024 [2]. Russian forces have not seized any significant towns in Ukraine since capturing Avdiivka in February 2024, and the only mid-sized settlement Russian forces have seized since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka, which had a pre-war population of only 5,000 [2]. This relative stalemate reflects the strengthened Ukrainian defensive capabilities supported by Western military aid, as well as Russia's inability to concentrate sufficient combat power for decisive breakthroughs despite its numerical advantages in personnel and material [2]. The territorial situation is best characterized as a war of attrition with both sides making limited tactical advances while failing to achieve strategic breakthroughs.

Ukrainian forces continue to hold territory in Russia's Kursk Oblast following their surprise cross-border operation launched in August 2024, which forced Russia to redeploy troops from other frontline areas  $^{[2]}$ . This operation represents the only significant change to the territorial status quo in recent months and continues to stretch Russian defensive resources  $^{[2]}$ . The incursion has become a point of pride for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who specifically highlighted the "repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast" during Russia's Victory Day celebrations,

notably the only recent military operation he chose to feature  $\frac{[3]}{2}$ . This emphasis underscores the symbolic and strategic importance Moscow places on reclaiming this territory, though Ukrainian forces maintain their positions as of May 11,  $2025^{\frac{[3]}{2}}$ .

## **Russian Advances in Kharkiv Region**

Russian forces have recently intensified operations northeast of Kharkiv City, particularly in the Vovchansk direction. Geolocated footage published on May 10 confirms that Russian forces have advanced in northern Vovchansk, northeast of Kharkiv City  $^{[1]}$ . Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on May 11 that Russian forces have significantly increased the tempo of operations in this area, escalating from one to two daily assaults to as many as five  $^{[1]}$ . This operational intensification suggests a renewed Russian focus on the Kharkiv axis, potentially aiming to draw Ukrainian reserves away from other sectors or to establish more favorable defensive positions north of Ukraine's second-largest city  $^{[1]}$ .

The Russian units identified in this sector include elements of the "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment, possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment  $^{[1]}$ . The deployment of special operations forces to this sector indicates the tactical importance Russia assigns to operations near Vovchansk. While these advances remain limited in territorial scope, they represent the most significant Russian progress in the Kharkiv region in recent months and may signal preparations for expanded operations as weather conditions improve with the arrival of summer  $^{[1]}$   $^{[7]}$ . The increased operational tempo near Kharkiv also demonstrates Russia's continued ability to mount offensive operations despite high casualty rates over the past three years  $^{[7]}$   $^{[5]}$ .

# **Ukrainian Operations in Kursk Oblast**

Ukrainian forces continue to maintain their positions in Russia's Kursk Oblast, representing the most significant territorial gain by either side in the past year  $^{[2]}$   $^{[4]}$ . The incursion, launched in August 2024, was a strategic surprise that compelled Russia to redeploy forces from other sectors of the front and establish new defensive lines within Russian territory  $^{[2]}$ . Recent intelligence indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced further in Kursk Oblast, though the exact extent of these advances is not specified in available reporting  $^{[4]}$ . The continued Ukrainian presence on Russian soil serves multiple strategic purposes: it forces Russia to maintain defensive forces away from Ukrainian territory, provides Ukraine with a potential bargaining chip in any future negotiations, and demonstrates Ukraine's capability to conduct offensive operations despite resource constraints  $^{[2]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

The Kursk operation appears to have achieved its strategic objective of exacerbating Russia's shortage of operational reserves by forcing the redeployment of forces that might otherwise be engaged on the main fronts in Ukraine [2]. Putin's specific mention of this area during Victory Day celebrations underscores the political significance Russia attaches to this territorial incursion [3]. For Ukraine, maintaining this position represents both a tactical success and a psychological victory, demonstrating their ability to hold territory inside Russia proper despite Moscow's repeated claims that Ukrainian forces would be expelled  $\frac{[3]}{2}$ . As summer approaches, both sides are likely to intensify operations in this sector, with Russia seeking to reclaim its territory and Ukraine working to solidify or potentially expand its positions [7].

## Situation in Luhansk Oblast and Kupyansk Direction

In Luhansk Oblast, Russian forces continue offensive operations without making confirmed advances. On May 10 and 11, Russian forces conducted attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Mala Shapkivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka [1]. This persistent pressure reflects Russia's continued strategic objective to capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast [1]. Despite months of concentrated effort, Russian forces have failed to achieve the operational objective of capturing Kupyansk or making significant territorial gains in this sector [2].

Russian military sources previously indicated that seizing the remaining areas of Luhansk Oblast was a key objective to be accomplished by Victory Day on May 9,  $2025^{\frac{[2]}{2}}$ . The failure to achieve this goal despite concentrated effort highlights the effectiveness of Ukrainian defensive operations in this sector, which have successfully integrated Western-supplied weapons systems and tactical drone operations to blunt Russian advances [2]. The continued fighting in this region demonstrates Russia's commitment to eventually securing complete control of the territories it claims to have annexed, despite the high cost in personnel and equipment [1] [2]. Ukrainian forces have effectively contested this area by exploiting terrain features, employing extensive minefields, and utilizing precision strikes against Russian logistics and command nodes [2] [7].

## **Developments in Donetsk Oblast and Toretsk**

The situation in Donetsk Oblast remains highly contested, with both sides achieving limited tactical successes in different areas. Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Druzhba, northeast of Toretsk, as confirmed by geolocated footage published on May 10 [1]. Conversely, Russian sources claim advances north of Oleksandropil toward Zorya and near Romanivka, southwest of Toretsk, though these claims remain unconfirmed by independent sources [1]. The intense fighting in this sector demonstrates its tactical significance, with both sides committing substantial resources to offensive and counter-offensive operations [1] [4].

Russian forces have been attempting to seize Toretsk for approximately a year without success, another objective that military sources indicated was targeted for capture by Victory Day  $2025^{\frac{[2]}{2}}$ . The town's continued defense by Ukrainian forces represents a significant achievement, especially given the numerical advantages enjoyed by Russian forces in this sector  $^{\frac{[2]}{2}}$ . Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District) and the "Tserber" group of the Russian 109th Separate Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating in central Toretsk, while elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade are striking Ukrainian positions near Yablunivka, southwest of Toretsk  $^{[1]}$ . This detailed order of battle information indicates the concentration of Russian forces in this relatively small sector, highlighting its operational importance to the Russian command  $^{[1]}$ .

Ukrainian tactical drone operations and improved integration with defensive operations appear to have contributed significantly to stalling Russia's offensive against Toretsk in 2024 and early  $2025^{\boxed{12}}$ . The contested nature of this front exemplifies the current character of the conflict, with both sides capable of limited advances but unable to achieve decisive breakthroughs that would fundamentally alter the strategic situation  $\boxed{11}$   $\boxed{21}$ .

## **Operations in Zaporizhia and Kherson**

In Zaporizhia Oblast, Russian forces continued offensive operations on May 11 but failed to make confirmed territorial advances [1]. Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on May 10 and 11 [1]. These operations reflect Russia's objective to maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City [1]. Despite persistent efforts, Russian forces have been unable to achieve significant tactical gains in this sector, demonstrating the effectiveness of Ukrainian defensive preparations and the degradation of Russian offensive capabilities after three years of high-intensity conflict [1] [2].

In the Kherson direction, Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations on May 11 without making advances  $^{[1]}$ . Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 11 that Russian forces are attempting to land small infantry groups on islands in the Dnipro River Delta to conduct reconnaissance on Ukrainian positions  $^{[1]}$ . This activity suggests Russia maintains interest in gathering intelligence for potential future operations across the Dnipro River, though large-scale amphibious operations appear beyond current Russian capabilities in this sector  $^{[1]}$ . The Kherson front has remained relatively stable since Ukrainian forces liberated the western (right) bank of the Dnipro River and the city of Kherson in November 2022, with primarily artillery exchanges and reconnaissance activities characterizing operations in this area  $^{[1]}$   $^{[2]}$ .

The relative stability of these southern fronts masks the ongoing attrition of forces on both sides through artillery duels, drone strikes, and limited probing attacks [1] [7]. Ukrainian forces have effectively utilized Western-supplied precision weapons to target Russian command posts, ammunition depots, and concentration areas behind the front lines, complicating Russian logistics and command and control [2]. Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to employ overwhelming artillery advantages to pressure Ukrainian defensive positions, though with limited tactical success [1] [7].

#### **Russian Military Strategy and Tactical Adaptations**

#### **Current Russian Strategic Objectives**

Russia's strategic objectives in Ukraine remain consistent with its long-term goal of gaining control over Ukrainian territory and preventing Ukraine's integration with Western security structures. The Kremlin's rejection of the latest US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on May 10 reaffirms that Russia will only accept conditions that support its maximal goals and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing  $^{[4]}$ . This approach reflects Russia's fundamental strategic calculation: that it can outlast Western support for Ukraine and ultimately force Kyiv to accept unfavorable terms through continued military pressure and attrition  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

Despite failing to achieve any of its self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, Russia continues to pursue incremental advances with the apparent belief that cumulative tactical gains will eventually translate into strategic success [2]. Russian forces had set

objectives to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining areas of Luhansk Oblast by Victory Day on May 9, 2025, but failed to accomplish any of these goals despite concentrated efforts over the past year  $^{[2]}$ . This consistent failure to meet operational timelines suggests significant deficiencies in Russian military planning, execution, or capability assessment  $^{[2]}$ . Nevertheless, Russia maintains the initiative on most fronts through its willingness to accept high casualty rates and commit substantial material resources to offensives  $^{[7]}$   $^{[5]}$ .

The Kremlin's current negotiating position would leave a postwar Ukraine "partitioned, isolated, and defenseless," effectively ending Ukrainian statehood in its current form  $^{[7]}$ . This maximalist position indicates that Russia continues to pursue comprehensive strategic goals rather than limited territorial objectives, despite the high cost of the conflict to date  $^{[7]}$   $^{[5]}$ . Russian President Vladimir Putin recently stated that Russia has "sufficient strength and resources to take the war in Ukraine to its logical conclusion," signaling continued commitment to achieving dominance through military means rather than meaningful compromise  $^{[7]}$ .

#### **Evolution of Russian Assault Tactics**

Russian assault tactics have evolved significantly over three years of combat, with recent developments showing increased sophistication in small-unit operations. Rather than relying solely on massive artillery preparations followed by armored assaults, Russian forces now increasingly employ motorbikes and other improvised vehicles to advance in small groups and infiltrate Ukrainian defensive lines  $^{[7]}$ . This tactical adaptation reflects lessons learned from high casualty rates during previous large-scale frontal assaults and demonstrates Russia's ability to adapt its operational approach  $^{[7]}$ .

These small-unit infiltration tactics are supported by a complex integration of strike drones, glide bombs, and artillery, creating a multi-domain challenge for Ukrainian defenders [7]. This approach makes it increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to direct reinforcements to threatened sectors or provide medical and engineering support to frontline positions [7]. The end goal remains forcing Ukrainian tactical withdrawals through combined pressure, allowing Russian forces to advance incrementally across multiple sectors without incurring the massive casualties associated with large-scale frontal assaults [7].

Russian forces have also adapted their tactics to counter Ukrainian drone capabilities, which have proven highly effective throughout the conflict. During Victory Day parades, Russian forces showcased tanks equipped with counter-drone netting, while personnel were observed riding in Chinese-made all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and Russian-made buggies  $^{[2]}$ . These tactical adaptations directly respond to Ukrainian drone operations and demonstrate Russia's commitment to preserving these innovations in future military operations rather than reverting to pre-2022 forms of combat  $^{[2]}$ .

# **Drone and Precision Weapons Employment**

Russian forces have dramatically expanded their employment of unmanned systems and precision weapons throughout the conflict. On the night of May 10-11 alone, Russian forces launched 108 Shahed and decoy drones against Ukraine from multiple launch locations including Bryansk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea [1]. The

Ukrainian Air Force reported downing 60 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine, while 41 decoy drones were "lost in location," meaning Ukrainian forces lost track of them [1]. This massive drone campaign demonstrates Russia's commitment to striking deep into Ukrainian territory using relatively low-cost unmanned systems to degrade infrastructure, exhaust air defenses, and maintain psychological pressure on the population [1]

Russian forces have increasingly leveraged reconnaissance and strike drones to destroy frontline Ukrainian positions and damage Ukrainian cities throughout the war  $^{[2]}$ . During Victory Day celebrations, Russian state media prominently displayed Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Zala reconnaissance drones; Lancet-51 and Lancer-52 loitering munitions; and Geran and Garpiya long-range strike drones  $^{[2]}$ . This public emphasis on unmanned systems reflects their growing importance in Russian military operations and suggests Russia views these capabilities as a technological success story worth highlighting to domestic audiences  $^{[2]}$ .

The imminent threat of more sophisticated attacks looms, with the United States Embassy in Kyiv issuing a warning on May 9 about a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine expected over the next several days, potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles  $^{[4]}$ . Additionally, Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine, further expanding Russia's strike capabilities  $^{[4]}$ . These developments indicate Russia's continued prioritization of long-range precision strike capabilities as a central element of its military strategy in Ukraine  $^{[4]}$ .

## **Technological Innovations Displayed During Victory Day**

Russian officials used the May 9 Victory Day celebrations to highlight technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years  $^{[2]}$ . These displays provide insight into which capabilities Russia considers most successful and worthy of continued development. Russian state media showed forces displaying various drone systems during the Moscow parade, including Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Zala reconnaissance drones; Lancet-51 and Lancer-52 loitering munitions; and Geran and Garpiya long-range strike drones  $^{[2]}$ . The prominence of these systems in national celebrations demonstrates their perceived importance to Russia's war effort  $^{[2]}$ .

Beyond unmanned systems, Russian forces also showcased adaptations to ground mobility and force protection. State news outlet RIA Novosti posted footage showing Russian forces riding in Chinese-made all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and Russian-made buggies during a Victory Day parade in Khabarovsk City  $^{[2]}$ . Russian media also showed tanks equipped with counter-drone netting at a Victory Day parade in Yekaterinburg  $^{[2]}$ . These defensive adaptations directly respond to Ukrainian tactical innovations, particularly the widespread use of first-person-view (FPV) drones and other unmanned systems that have proven highly effective against Russian armored vehicles  $^{[2]}$ .

Russia's willingness to highlight these adaptations during Victory Day parades suggests the military intends to preserve these innovations in future operations rather than reverting to pre-2022 forms of combat  $^{[2]}$ . This approach indicates that despite significant losses, the Russian military has demonstrated institutional learning and adaptation, though the effectiveness of these measures against evolving Ukrainian capabilities remains uncertain  $^{[2]}$ . The prominent

display of these systems also serves a propaganda purpose, framing technological innovation as a form of "victory" for domestic audiences despite limited territorial gains [2].

## **Counter-Drone Adaptations and Defensive Measures**

Russian forces have implemented significant counter-drone adaptations in response to Ukraine's effective employment of unmanned systems throughout the conflict. The most visible defensive measure has been the installation of protective netting on tanks and other armored vehicles, as displayed during Victory Day parades  $^{[2]}$ . This improvised protection aims to prematurely detonate the small warheads carried by Ukrainian FPV drones before they can damage critical components of armored vehicles  $^{[2]}$ . While not foolproof, these measures have forced Ukrainian drone operators to develop more sophisticated attack techniques and target selection criteria  $^{[2]}$ .

Beyond physical protection measures, Russian forces have adapted their movement and concealment tactics to minimize vulnerability to Ukrainian drone surveillance and strikes. The increased use of all-terrain vehicles, buggies, and motorcycles represents a shift toward smaller, more mobile platforms that present less valuable targets and can more easily utilize terrain for concealment  $\frac{[2]}{I}$ . These vehicles support the evolution toward small-unit tactics that infiltrate rather than directly assault Ukrainian positions, reducing vulnerability to Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes that have proven devastating against large formations  $\frac{[7]}{I}$ .

Electronic warfare has become an increasingly important component of Russian counter-drone operations. Russian forces have deployed a variety of jamming systems to disrupt the control links between Ukrainian operators and their drones  $^{[2]}$ . These systems create "electronic bubbles" around high-value targets and command posts, though their effectiveness varies and they remain vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-measures  $^{[2]}$ . The electronic warfare domain has evolved into a complex competition between increasingly sophisticated jamming systems and counter-jamming technologies on both sides  $^{[2]}$ .

Despite these adaptations, Ukrainian drone operations continue to impose significant costs on Russian forces, demonstrating the ongoing challenge of developing effective counter-drone measures in modern warfare  $^{[2]}$  . The prominence of these defensive adaptations in Russian military displays indicates both the seriousness with which Russia views the drone threat and its commitment to developing more effective counters  $^{[2]}$ .

## **Command and Control Structures and Identified Units**

The deployment of specific Russian units across the front provides insight into Russian command priorities and force allocation decisions. In the Kharkiv direction, elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk, indicating the deployment of specialized forces to this sector [1]. This suggests a high priority for operations northeast of Kharkiv City, potentially as part of a broader effort to secure the border region or apply pressure on Ukraine's second-largest city [1].

In the Toretsk direction, elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District) and

the "Tserber" group of the Russian 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are operating in central Toretsk [1]. Additionally, elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are striking Ukrainian positions near Yablunivka, southwest of Toretsk [1]. This concentration of forces from the Southern Military District, including both regular Russian units and integrated former proxy forces, highlights the operational importance Russia assigns to the Toretsk direction [1].

These unit identifications reveal several aspects of Russian force management. First, the continued operation of former proxy forces now formally integrated into the Russian military structure demonstrates Russia's efforts to professionalize and standardize what were previously separate command structures  $^{[1]}$ . Second, the deployment of specialized units such as Spetsnaz to specific sectors indicates Russian prioritization of certain operational objectives  $^{[1]}$ . Third, the identified artillery support units suggest Russia maintains significant indirect fire capabilities despite high ammunition expenditure rates throughout the conflict  $^{[1]}$ .

Russian command and control has generally improved since the early phases of the invasion, with better coordination between air, ground, and electronic warfare assets  $^{[2]}$   $^{[7]}$ . However, the continued inability to achieve breakthrough operations despite numerical advantages suggests persistent limitations in operational planning, coordination, or execution at the operational level  $^{[2]}$ .

# **Ukrainian Defensive Operations and Counteroffensive Efforts**

# **Ukrainian Strategic Priorities**

Ukrainian strategic priorities have evolved in response to battlefield realities and resource constraints. With diminished Western support and facing a numerically superior adversary, Ukraine has shifted from ambitious counteroffensive plans in 2023 to a more defensive posture focused on preserving combat power, holding key terrain, and maximizing the cost imposed on Russian forces [2] [7]. This strategic reorientation reflects a pragmatic assessment of the current correlation of forces and available resources [2] [7].

A key Ukrainian strategic innovation has been the Kursk incursion launched in August 2024, which created a new front on Russian territory and forced Moscow to redirect resources from offensive operations in Ukraine  $^{[2]}$ . This operation has successfully exacerbated Russia's shortage of operational reserves and demonstrated Ukraine's ability to seize and maintain the initiative in select sectors despite overall resource constraints  $^{[2]}$ . The continued Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast represents both a tactical achievement and a potential bargaining chip for future negotiations  $^{[2]}$   $^{[4]}$ .

Ukrainian forces have deliberately targeted Russian vulnerabilities beyond the immediate battlefield. Long-range strikes against ammunition depots, defense industry facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have at times compromised Russia's ability to supply frontline units and have compounded the rising costs of Russia's war $^{[2]}$ . These strikes represent a strategy of attacking the foundations of Russian military power rather than merely contesting frontline positions $^{[2]}$ . This approach aims to gradually degrade Russia's war-making capacity through persistent attrition of key systems and infrastructure $^{[2]}$ .

While maintaining diplomatic openness to peace initiatives, Ukrainian leadership has accepted that active defense will likely be necessary throughout 2025. Ukraine's acceptance of a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire demonstrates willingness to pursue diplomatic solutions, but the strategy must simultaneously prepare for continued high-intensity combat operations given Russia's rejection of the proposal [4] [7]. Ukraine's overarching strategic goal remains preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty while imposing sufficient costs on Russia to eventually force a negotiated settlement on acceptable terms [4] [7].

#### **Integration of Western Weapons Systems**

Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression, though the pace and volume of this support has fluctuated throughout the conflict  $^{[4]}$ . Ukrainian forces have successfully integrated a wide range of Western weapons systems into their defensive operations, significantly enhancing combat effectiveness against numerically superior Russian forces  $^{[2]}$ . The effective employment of these systems has been particularly evident in the defense of critical sectors such as Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk, where Ukrainian forces have successfully blunted Russian offensive operations despite significant disadvantages in personnel and conventional artillery  $^{[2]}$ .

Precision strike capabilities provided by Western partners have enabled Ukraine to conduct increasingly effective deep strikes against Russian logistics, command and control nodes, and force concentrations  $^{[2]}$ . These capabilities have partially offset Russia's advantages in conventional artillery through the precise targeting of ammunition depots, degrading Russian supply chains and forcing the relocation of logistics hubs beyond the range of certain systems  $^{[2]}$ . However, restrictions on the use of some Western systems against targets inside Russia proper have limited Ukraine's ability to fully interdict Russian logistics and staging areas, particularly those supporting operations in border regions such as Kharkiv Oblast  $^{[2]}$ .

Air defense systems supplied by Western partners have proven crucial in protecting Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure from Russian missile and drone strikes [1] [6]. Despite these systems, Russian aerospace operations continue to inflict significant damage, as evidenced by the 84% year-over-year increase in civilian casualties, many resulting from air attacks [6]. This demonstrates both the importance of Western air defense support and the need for its continued expansion to address the evolving Russian air campaign [6].

If Ukrainian forces maintain their defensive lines despite dwindling supplies of US military aid, it would provide a powerful argument for pro-Ukrainian politicians in Europe and the United States to strengthen support [7]. This defensive success could potentially convince skeptics in the American administration to adopt a firmer stance toward Russia and maintain vital military assistance to Kyiv [7]. The effectiveness of Western systems in Ukrainian hands has become a crucial factor in the political debates surrounding continued support [7].

## **Drone Operations and Electronic Warfare Capabilities**

Ukrainian drone operations have become a defining feature of the conflict, transforming battlefield dynamics and partially offsetting Russia's advantages in conventional firepower and manpower. Ukraine's successful integration of tactical drone operations with ground forces appears to have stalled Russia's offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 and early 2025, demonstrating the strategic impact of these relatively low-cost systems [2]. First-personview (FPV) drones in particular have proven highly effective against Russian armored vehicles and personnel, forcing significant tactical adaptations including the widespread use of protective netting on tanks and changes in vehicle employment [2].

Beyond tactical applications, Ukraine has developed increasingly sophisticated long-range drone capabilities for striking targets deep within Russian territory  $^{[2]}$ . These operations target military installations, logistics hubs, and petroleum infrastructure, imposing economic costs on Russia's war effort and forcing the reallocation of air defense assets away from the front lines  $^{[2]}$ . The psychological impact of these strikes demonstrates Ukraine's ability to project power despite conventional limitations and contributes to domestic pressure on Russian leadership  $^{[2]}$ .

Electronic warfare has emerged as a critical domain where Ukrainian forces have demonstrated significant innovation and adaptability. Ukrainian electronic warfare units have developed effective countermeasures against Russian jamming systems, allowing continued drone operations despite intense electronic suppression efforts  $^{[2]}$ . The competition between jamming and counter-jamming capabilities has driven rapid technological evolution on both sides, with Ukrainian forces often demonstrating greater adaptability due to their integration of civilian technical expertise and Western support  $^{[2]}$ .

Ukrainian drone operators continue to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures to overcome Russian countermeasures, demonstrating remarkable innovative capacity despite resource constraints  $^{[2]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This adaptability has been particularly evident in the continued effectiveness of Ukrainian drone strikes despite the proliferation of Russian counter-drone measures such as protective netting, electronic jammers, and distributed air defense systems  $^{[2]}$ . The integration of these capabilities with conventional operations represents one of Ukraine's most significant military achievements during the conflict  $^{[2]}$ .

#### **Defensive Fortifications and Tactics**

Ukrainian defensive preparations have evolved substantially since the initial invasion, with extensive fortification systems now protecting key sectors of the front. These defenses typically incorporate multiple lines of trenches, hardened firing positions, anti-tank obstacles, and extensive minefields, creating defense in depth designed to attrit attacking Russian forces before they can reach primary defensive positions [2] [7]. The effectiveness of these preparations has been demonstrated by Russia's failure to achieve breakthrough operations despite concentrated efforts against critical sectors such as Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk [2].

Ukrainian defensive tactics have increasingly incorporated the lessons of three years of highintensity combat against a numerically superior adversary. Rather than attempting to defend every meter of front line, Ukrainian forces often employ elastic defense concepts, allowing tactical withdrawals from untenable positions while maintaining the integrity of the overall defensive system [2] [7]. This approach conserves combat power while maximizing attrition of attacking Russian forces, particularly when combined with pre-planned artillery and drone strikes against assault formations [2] [7].

The integration of various capabilities has become a hallmark of effective Ukrainian defense. Artillery, both traditional and precision systems, works in concert with drone surveillance and strike platforms, electronic warfare assets, and mobile reserve formations to create a multidomain challenge for attacking Russian forces [2]. This integration allows Ukrainian commanders to compensate for numerical disadvantages by maximizing the impact of available resources and exploiting the vulnerabilities of Russian assault tactics [2] [7].

Despite these effective defensive measures, the cumulative pressure of Russian offensive operations across multiple sectors continues to strain Ukrainian resources. The need to distribute limited personnel and equipment across a front line exceeding 1,000 kilometers creates persistent vulnerabilities that Russian forces attempt to exploit through simultaneous pressure on multiple axes  $\frac{[2]}{[7]}$ . This strategic challenge remains one of the most significant facing Ukrainian military leadership, requiring continuous reassessment of force allocation priorities based on evolving Russian operations  $\frac{[2]}{[7]}$ .

## **Kursk Incursion: Strategic Purpose and Current Status**

The Ukrainian incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, launched in August 2024, represents one of the most significant strategic innovations of the conflict. By creating a new front on Russian territory, Ukrainian forces successfully forced the reallocation of Russian resources away from offensive operations elsewhere, directly targeting Russia's shortage of operational reserves [2]. This operation demonstrated Ukraine's ability to seize and maintain the initiative despite overall resource constraints and has proven surprisingly durable, with Ukrainian forces maintaining their positions nine months after the initial assault [3] [2].

The strategic purpose of the Kursk operation appears to be multifaceted. Beyond forcing Russian redeployments, it creates a potential bargaining chip for future negotiations, demonstrates Ukraine's offensive capabilities to domestic and international audiences, and imposes a political cost on Russian leadership by challenging the narrative of effective border security [3] [2]. Putin's specific mention of this operation during Victory Day celebrations, referring to the "repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast" as the only recent military operation featured, underscores its political significance for the Kremlin [3].

Recent reports indicate that Ukrainian forces have made additional advances in Kursk Oblast, though the specific extent and locations of these gains remain unspecified in available reporting  $^{[4]}$ . This ongoing operational success suggests Ukraine maintains both the capability and the strategic intent to sustain pressure on this front despite resource constraints elsewhere  $^{[4]}$ . The continued Ukrainian presence on Russian soil represents both a tactical achievement and a psychological victory against Russian claims that foreign forces would be swiftly expelled from its territory  $^{[3]}$   $^{[2]}$ .

As the summer campaign season approaches, both sides are likely to intensify operations in this sector. Russia will face increasing domestic pressure to eliminate the Ukrainian presence on its soil, while Ukraine will seek to maintain or potentially expand its positions to maximize leverage

and continue imposing costs on Russian force allocation decisions [7]. The future of this unusual front within Russian territory will serve as an important indicator of both sides' offensive and defensive capabilities in the coming months [2] [7].

#### **Ukrainian Tactical Innovations and Adaptations**

Ukrainian forces have demonstrated remarkable tactical innovation throughout the conflict, developing new approaches to overcome Russia's advantages in personnel and firepower. Perhaps most notable has been the integration of civilian technical expertise into military operations, particularly in the drone domain  $^{[2]}$ . Ukrainian forces have leveraged the country's strong information technology sector and engineering talent to develop and rapidly field increasingly sophisticated unmanned systems, from tactical FPV drones to long-range strike platforms  $^{[2]}$ . This civil-military integration has allowed Ukraine to partially offset Russia's advantages in conventional military production  $^{[2]}$ .

The adaptation of commercial technologies for military purposes has become a Ukrainian specialty, with ordinary consumer drones modified for reconnaissance and strike missions, civilian vehicles converted for military transport, and commercial electronics repurposed for command and control functions  $^{[2]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This approach maximizes the impact of limited resources while minimizing dependence on complex international supply chains for certain capabilities  $^{[2]}$ . The speed of this innovation cycle-from concept to battlefield deployment-has consistently outpaced Russian countermeasures  $^{[2]}$ .

Ukrainian forces have also demonstrated effective adaptation in combined arms operations, integrating Western-supplied systems with Soviet-era equipment and newly developed capabilities  $^{[2]}$ . This hybrid approach allows Ukrainian units to leverage the strengths of various systems while mitigating individual weaknesses  $^{[2]}$ . For example, Western precision munitions might be guided to targets identified by Ukrainian-developed drone systems, while Soviet-era artillery provides suppressive fires  $^{[2]}$ . This pragmatic approach to force development has proven surprisingly effective against Russian operations despite significant material disadvantages  $^{[2]}$ .

Decentralized command and control has emerged as another Ukrainian tactical strength, with unit leaders empowered to make decisions based on local conditions rather than waiting for approval through a hierarchical chain of command  $^{[2]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This approach enhances responsiveness to rapidly evolving battlefield situations and allows for the exploitation of fleeting opportunities  $^{[2]}$ . While this decentralization occasionally results in coordination challenges, it has generally provided Ukrainian forces with greater tactical agility than their more rigidly controlled Russian counterparts  $^{[2]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

#### **Diplomatic Landscape and Peace Initiatives**

#### **US-Ukrainian Ceasefire Proposal: Details and Reactions**

The United States and Ukraine have proposed a general ceasefire of 30 days or more, which Ukrainian authorities have already accepted  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This proposal represents the latest attempt to de-escalate the conflict and potentially create conditions for more substantive peace negotiations  $^{[4]}$ . The proposal is notable for being unconditional, not requiring specific territorial concessions or political commitments from either side before implementation  $^{[7]}$ . This approach aims to create space for diplomacy without prejudicing the ultimate resolution of territorial or political disputes  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for this US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on May 10, demonstrating Western unity in backing diplomatic initiatives alongside continued military support  $^{[4]}$ . This coordinated diplomatic positioning aims to increase pressure on Russia to engage constructively with peace efforts while maintaining a unified front among Ukraine's international partners  $^{[4]}$ . The involvement of multiple Western powers in supporting this initiative reflects recognition of the need for a broad international consensus to achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict  $^{[4]}$ .

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the immediate prospects for implementing the proposed ceasefire appear limited due to Russia's unequivocal rejection. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected the proposal on May 10, maintaining Russia's position that any ceasefire must include conditions supporting Moscow's long-term objectives in Ukraine  $^{[3]}$   $^{[4]}$ . This rejection demonstrates the fundamental disconnect between Western and Russian approaches to resolving the conflict, with Moscow viewing temporary ceasefires without political concessions as contrary to its strategic interests  $^{[3]}$   $^{[4]}$ .

The timing of this ceasefire proposal, coinciding with Victory Day celebrations and the approach of the summer campaign season, represents an attempt to forestall anticipated Russian offensive operations  $^{[2]}$   $^{[7]}$ . By publicly proposing and accepting reasonable ceasefire terms, Ukraine and its Western partners also seek to reinforce the narrative that Russia bears responsibility for the conflict's continuation  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This narrative framing remains important for maintaining domestic and international support for Ukraine amid war fatigue in some Western countries  $^{[7]}$ .

#### **Kremlin's Position and Demands**

The Kremlin has consistently rejected ceasefire proposals that do not include conditions supporting Russia's long-term goal of gaining control over Ukraine and preventing its integration with Western security structures  $^{[3]}$   $^{[4]}$ . Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's rejection of the latest US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on May 10 reaffirms this position, demonstrating Moscow's continued preference for military pressure over meaningful diplomatic compromise  $^{[3]}$   $^{[4]}$ . Russia's approach appears calculated to allow the resumption of offensive operations from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing, rather than freezing the conflict along current lines  $^{[4]}$ .

Russia's maximalist negotiating position would effectively leave postwar Ukraine "partitioned, isolated, and defenseless," undermining Ukrainian sovereignty and potentially ending Ukrainian statehood in its current form [7]. These demands go far beyond the current battlefield situation,

where Russia controls approximately 18% of Ukrainian territory despite three years of high-intensity conflict [5]. The disparity between Russia's military achievements and diplomatic demands highlights Moscow's continued belief that time favors its position, with the expectation that Western support for Ukraine will eventually diminish [4] [7].

Putin's recent statement that Russia has "sufficient strength and resources to take the war in Ukraine to its logical conclusion" signals continued commitment to achieving Russian objectives through military means rather than substantive compromise  $^{[7]}$ . This rhetoric, combined with military preparations for an intensified summer offensive, suggests Moscow sees little incentive for meaningful diplomatic engagement under current conditions  $^{[7]}$ . Instead, Russian strategy appears focused on demonstrating to domestic and international audiences that its army is capable of achieving victory in Ukraine despite failing to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital in more than three years of warfare  $^{[7]}$ .

Russia's diplomatic position has remained remarkably consistent throughout the conflict, reflecting core strategic objectives that transcend the immediate battlefield situation [3] [4] [7]. This consistency suggests that meaningful diplomatic progress would likely require either significant changes in the military balance of power or fundamental recalculation of Russian strategic priorities-neither of which appears imminent based on current trends [4] [7].

## **UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing Initiatives**

The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing has emerged as an important diplomatic and military support structure for Ukraine, particularly as questions have arisen about the sustainability of American assistance  $^{[4]}$ . This coalition expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10, demonstrating continued European commitment to backing diplomatic initiatives alongside military support  $^{[4]}$ . This coordinated position aims to maintain Western unity in the face of Russian intransigence and signal continued resolve to support Ukraine regardless of potential changes in US policy  $^{[4]}$ .

Beyond diplomatic initiatives, the Coalition of the Willing has focused on providing military assistance to Ukraine through bilateral and multilateral channels  $^{[4]}$ . This support includes training, equipment, ammunition, and intelligence sharing designed to enhance Ukrainian defensive capabilities  $^{[4]}$ . The coalition's approach reflects recognition that Ukraine's negotiating position depends directly on its ability to maintain viable defensive lines and impose costs on Russian offensive operations  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

The coalition also serves an important political function by demonstrating European security autonomy at a time of uncertainty regarding the long-term reliability of American security guarantees  $^{[4]}$ . By taking a leadership role in supporting Ukraine, European powers seek to establish their credibility as security providers and demonstrate resolve in confronting Russian aggression that directly threatens European security interests  $^{[4]}$ . This political dimension adds significance to the coalition's diplomatic and military initiatives beyond their immediate impact on the Ukraine conflict  $^{[4]}$ .

As the conflict continues, the Coalition of the Willing faces significant challenges in sustaining and potentially expanding support for Ukraine amid competing priorities and resource constraints  $^{[4]}$  . European defense industrial capacity remains limited compared to Russian

production, creating persistent challenges in matching Russia's ability to sustain high-intensity operations over extended periods  $^{[7]}$ . Nevertheless, the coalition's continued engagement represents an important counterweight to Russian expectations that Western support for Ukraine will eventually collapse  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

# **International Diplomatic Efforts and Third-Party Mediation**

International diplomatic efforts to resolve the Ukraine-Russia conflict have produced limited tangible results despite numerous initiatives over three years of warfare. Third-party mediation attempts have struggled to bridge the fundamental gap between Ukrainian insistence on territorial integrity and sovereignty and Russian demands for substantial territorial concessions and limitations on Ukrainian security arrangements [4] [7]. This divergence of core positions has complicated efforts by potential mediators to identify viable compromise solutions [4] [7].

Various countries have attempted to position themselves as potential mediators, including Turkey, China, Brazil, and India, though none has achieved breakthrough diplomatic results  $^{[4]}$ . These efforts often confront the reality that Russia perceives limited incentive for substantive compromise under current conditions, believing that time and attrition favor its position  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ . Meanwhile, Ukraine remains understandably reluctant to accept terms that would compromise its sovereignty or territorial integrity, particularly given the history of Russian violations of previous agreements  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

International organizations including the United Nations have maintained humanitarian focus while achieving limited progress on conflict resolution. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine continues to document the human cost of the conflict, reporting that Ukrainian civilian casualties increased 23% between March and April 2025 and increased by 84% between April 2024 and April 2025 $^{[6]}$ . These humanitarian dimensions add urgency to diplomatic efforts while simultaneously highlighting the gap between international aspirations for peace and battlefield realities $^{[6]}$ .

The international diplomatic landscape surrounding the conflict continues to evolve as countries balance competing priorities including economic interests, security concerns, and normative commitments to international law  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This complex environment creates both opportunities and constraints for peace initiatives, with the effectiveness of diplomatic efforts remaining contingent on developments on the battlefield and shifts in the strategic calculations of key actors  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

# **Implications of Failed Peace Initiatives on Military Operations**

The consistent failure of peace initiatives has significant implications for military operations on both sides. For Russia, the rejection of ceasefire proposals signals continued commitment to achieving objectives through military means rather than diplomatic compromise  $^{[3]}$   $^{[4]}$ . This approach is reflected in preparations for intensified operations during the summer campaign season, with British intelligence reporting that Russia sustained approximately 160,000 casualties during the first four months of 2025 alone-the highest total for this period since the start of the invasion  $^{[7]}$ . These losses indicate Russia's willingness to accept extraordinary costs to maintain offensive pressure across multiple sectors  $^{[7]}$   $^{[5]}$ .

For Ukraine, failed peace initiatives reinforce the necessity of maintaining effective defensive capabilities despite resource constraints and war fatigue [4] [7]. Ukrainian forces must prepare for what military analysts warn could be the deadliest phase of the entire conflict during the coming summer campaign [7]. This preparation includes both conventional defensive measures and continued development of asymmetric capabilities to offset Russia's advantages in personnel and material [2] [7]. Ukrainian strategic planning must simultaneously pursue diplomatic openings while preparing for sustained high-intensity combat operations [4] [7].

The diplomatic impasse directly influences operational tempo and resource allocation decisions. Without the prospect of imminent ceasefire implementation, both sides must commit resources to sustaining combat operations rather than repositioning for a potential frozen conflict  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This dynamic drives continued high ammunition expenditure rates, equipment attrition, and personnel losses that might otherwise be moderated in anticipation of diplomatic progress  $^{[7]}$   $^{[5]}$ . The resulting operational intensity contributes to the steadily increasing human cost of the conflict  $^{[6]}$   $^{[5]}$ .

The persistent diplomatic stalemate also affects strategic risk calculations regarding potential escalation pathways. With limited prospects for negotiated de-escalation, both sides must consider how various escalatory steps might alter the strategic balance without triggering unintended consequences  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This complex risk management challenge shapes decisions regarding strikes against sensitive targets, the employment of novel capabilities, and operations in politically sensitive areas such as Russia's Kursk Oblast  $^{[2]}$   $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

## **Analysis of Potential Diplomatic Pathways Forward**

Potential diplomatic pathways for resolving the Ukraine-Russia conflict remain severely constrained by the fundamental divergence between Ukrainian and Russian core objectives  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ . Any sustainable diplomatic solution would need to address territorial control, security guarantees, sanctions relief, reconstruction funding, and accountability for war crimes-issues on which the parties hold diametrically opposed positions  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ . This divergence creates a situation where military developments will likely continue to shape diplomatic possibilities rather than vice versa  $^{[4]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

One potential pathway involves a limited initial agreement focused on specific humanitarian or security issues rather than comprehensive conflict resolution  $^{[4]}$ . Such an approach might include prisoner exchanges, demilitarized zones around critical infrastructure, or deconfliction mechanisms to reduce risks of unintended escalation  $^{[4]}$ . While limited in scope, such agreements could potentially build minimal trust and demonstrate the possibility of implementation, creating foundations for more substantive negotiations  $^{[4]}$ . However, Russia's rejection of even limited ceasefire proposals suggests limited near-term prospects for this approach  $^{[3]}$   $^{[4]}$ .

Another pathway involves increased international pressure on both parties to compromise, potentially through coordinated incentives and disincentives from key international actors  $^{[4]}$  . This approach would require unprecedented coordination among diverse countries with varying interests in the conflict, many of whom maintain significant economic or political relationships with Russia  $^{[4]}$  . The historical record of such coordinated international pressure producing substantial conflict resolution outcomes remains mixed at best  $^{[4]}$  .

The most likely diplomatic pathway remains one in which military developments eventually create conditions where both parties perceive sufficient incentive to engage in meaningful negotiations [4] [7]. This likely requires either significant battlefield developments that alter the strategic calculus or domestic political shifts that change leadership priorities [4] [7]. Until such conditions emerge, diplomatic initiatives will likely continue to produce limited tangible results despite their importance for signaling intentions and maintaining international support [4] [7].

# **Western Military Support and International Involvement**

#### **Current Status of US Military Aid**

US military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression, though uncertainty surrounds its long-term sustainability  $^{[4]}$ . The current administration has maintained substantial assistance packages while attempting to consolidate international support through diplomatic initiatives such as the proposed ceasefire  $^{[4]}$ . American military aid encompasses a wide range of capabilities including air defense systems, precision-guided munitions, armored vehicles, and intelligence support critical to Ukrainian operational planning and targeting  $^{[4]}$ .

The effectiveness of American weapons systems in Ukrainian hands has been demonstrated by the stalled Russian offensives against key objectives such as Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk  $^{[2]}$ . Ukrainian forces have successfully integrated these capabilities with their existing equipment and tactical innovations to blunt Russian numerical advantages and impose significant costs on attacking forces  $^{[2]}$ . This battlefield effectiveness provides a powerful argument for continued support despite competing priorities and resource constraints  $^{[2]}$   $^{[7]}$ .

However, challenges to sustaining this support include domestic political considerations, competing global security priorities, and finite production capacity for certain critical systems  $^{[4]}$ . These factors create uncertainty regarding the long-term reliability of American assistance, contributing to Ukrainian efforts to diversify international support through initiatives such as the UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing  $^{[4]}$ . Ukrainian officials recognize that maintaining and potentially expanding Western support requires demonstrating continued battlefield effectiveness despite resource constraints  $^{[7]}$ .

If Ukrainian forces successfully prevent significant Russian advances during the coming summer campaign despite dwindling supplies of US military aid, it would strengthen the position of pro-Ukrainian advocates in policy debates [7]. This defensive success could potentially convince



- 1. https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025
- 2. <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-202">https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-202</a>
  <a href="mailto:5">5</a>
- 3. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
- 4. https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025
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- 7. <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-coming-summer-offensive-could-be-deadliest-of-the-entire-war/">https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-coming-summer-offensive-could-be-deadliest-of-the-entire-war/</a>