1 The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange System

1.1 Mechanism

Goal: Alice and Bob want to exchange a shared "secret key" via an insecure channel. (Incidentally, the shared secret key is usually used for encryption and decryption with a symmetric cipher.)

- Alice and Bob choose and publish a large prime p and an integer g with large prime order in $\mathbb{F}_p^*$.
- Alice chooses a secret $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, computes $A := g^a \mod p$, and sends $A \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ to Bob via the insecure channel.
- Bob chooses a secret $b \in \mathbb{Z}$, computes $B := g^b \mod p$, and sends $B \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ to Alice via the insecure channel.
- Bob computes $A^b = (g^a)^b = g^{ab} \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$.
- Alice computes $B^a = (g^b)^a = g^{ab} \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$.
- Alice and Bob have both arrived at $g^{ab} \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$, which is to be their shared secret.

1.2 Security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange system

- The presumed security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange system is based on the presumed difficulty in solving the

  > **The Diffie-Hellman Problem**:
  > Let p be a prime, and $g \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$. Given $A, B \in \langle g \rangle \subset \mathbb{F}_p^*$, find $g^{ab} \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$, where $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ are determined by $A = g^a$ and $B = g^b$.

  Note that the solution of the Diffie-Hellman problem does NOT require the knowledge of a and b, but only that of $g^{ab} \in \langle g \rangle$.

- It is clear that an efficient algorithm for the Discrete Logarithm Problem will lead to an efficient algorithm for the Diffie-Hellman Problem. An efficient algorithm of the Discrete Logarithm Problem will break the Diffie-Hellman key exchange system.

  > **The Discrete Logarithm Problem**:
  > Let p be a prime, and $g \in \mathbb{F}_p$ be a primitive element, i.e. $\mathbb{F}_p^* = \langle g \rangle$. Given any $h \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$, find $x \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $h = g^x$.

2 The ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem

2.1 Mechanism

Goal: Bob wants to send Alice an encrypted message via an insecure channel.

- Alice chooses and publishes a large prime p and an integer g with large prime order in $\mathbb{F}_p^*$.
- Alice chooses a secret $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, with $1 \leq a \leq p-1$, computes $A := g^a \mod p$, and publishes $A \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ as her public key.
- Bob chooses a plaintext $m \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$, and a secret random ephemeral key $k \in \mathbb{Z}$, with $1 \leq k \leq p-1$. Bob computes $B_1 := g^k \mod p$, and $B_2 := m \cdot A^k \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$. Bob's ciphertext is (B_1, B_2) and Bob sends it to Alice via the insecure channel.
- Alice decrypts Bob's ciphertext (B_1, B_2) by computing $B_2 \cdot (B_1^a)^{-1} \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$. Note that

$$B_2 \cdot (B_1^a)^{-1} \equiv (m \cdot A^k) \cdot (g^{ak})^{-1} \equiv m \cdot (g^a)^k \cdot (g^{ak})^{-1} \equiv m \cdot (g^{ak}) \cdot (g^{ak})^{-1} \equiv m \mod p$$

2.2 Security of the ElGamal public key cryptosystem

- The ElGamal public key encryption system is at least as secure as the difficulty of Diffie-Hellman problem, in the sense that en ElGamal oracle (efficient solver of the ElGamal cryptosystem problem) can be used to efficiently solve the Diffie-Hellman problem.

3 The RSA Public Key Cryptosystem

3.1 Mechanism

Goal: Alice wants to send Bob an encrypted message through an insecure channel.

- Bob chooses his public key $(n, e) \in \mathbb{N}^2$ and private key $d \in \mathbb{N}$. Bob publishes his public key.
  - $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is called the modulus, with $n = pq$, where p and q are large distinct prime numbers. Note that Bob publishes n but keeps p and q secret.
  - $e \in \mathbb{N}$ is the called encryption exponent, and satisfies $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$.
  - $d \in \mathbb{N}$ is the called decryption exponent, and is determined by e and $n = pq$ via $d = e^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{(p-1)(q-1)}$. Note that $e^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{(p-1)(q-1)}$ exists since $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$.
- Alice
  - chooses plaintext $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n = \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$.
  - encrypts her plaintext m using Bob's public key (n, e) by raising $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ to the e^{th} power. In other words, Alice computes her ciphertext $c = m^e \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.
  - sends to Bob through the insecure channel the ciphertext $c \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.
- Bob decrypts the ciphertext $c \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ from Alice by taking the e^{th} root of c in $\mathbb{Z}_n$ using his private key $d \in \mathbb{N}$ as follows:
$$c^d = (m^e)^d = m^{ed} = m^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} = m \cdot (m^{(p-1)(q-1)})^k = m \cdot (1)^k = m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$$
  - The second last equality follows from $m^{(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv 1 \mod n$, which follows immediately from Euler's Theorem. It can also be justified with Fermat's Little Theorem as follows:
$$\text{Fermat's Little Theorem} \implies \begin{cases} m^{(p-1)(q-1)} = \left(m^{p-1}\right)^{q-1} \equiv 1 \mod p, & \text{and} \\ m^{(p-1)(q-1)} = \left(m^{q-1}\right)^{p-1} \equiv 1 \mod q. \end{cases}$$
  Hence, $m^{(p-1)(q-1)} - 1$ is divisble by both p and q, and hence also by $pq = n$ (since p and q are distinct primes). Thus, $m^{(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv 1 \mod n = pq$.

3.2 Comments

- One-way function (easy): Exponentiation in $\mathbb{Z}_n$.
  - Repeating Squaring Algorithm
- (Difficult) inverse function: Taking roots in $\mathbb{Z}_n$, for $n = pq$, where p and q are large distinct prime numbers.
- Trapdoor: If the factorization of $n = pq$ is known, then we can convert the inverse function (taking roots in $\mathbb{Z}_n$, which is slow) to an exponentiation in $\mathbb{Z}_n$, which is fast.

3.3 How to find large prime numbers?

- Generate a large N-bit (say $N = 1024$) random number x, i.e. $2^{N-1} < x < 2^N$. Use an efficient primality test to check whether x is prime. If so, we are done. If not, repeat until we succeed.

- The Prime Number Theorem (from Analytic Number Theory) gives an estimate of how many times we need to try before succeeding. The Prime Number Theorem states that

$$\lim_{x\to\infty} \frac{\pi(x)/x}{1/\ln(x)} = 1,$$

where $\pi(x)$ is the number of prime numbers less than or equal to x. Hence, it implies that, for large values of N, the probability that a randomly selected integer $x \in (2^{N-1}, 2^N)$ is prime is approximately

$$\frac{1}{\ln(2^N)}$$

Conversely, this implies that, on average, out of every $\ln(2^N) = N \cdot \ln(2) \approx 0.693 \cdot N$ randomly and independently selected integers from $(2^{N-1}, 2^N)$, one of them will be a prime number. For example, if $N = 1024$, then $0.693 \cdot N \approx 709.78$; in other words, if we are selecting random integers from $(2^{1023}, 2^{1024})$, then on average, we expect repeating approximately 710 times before we succeed in selecting a prime number. Note that $2^{1023} = 10^{1023\times\log_{10}(2)} \approx 10^{1023\times 0.301} \approx 10^{307.95}$.

- The Miller-Rabin Primality test
  - **Proposition** Let p be an odd prime and write $p-1 = 2^k t$, where t is odd. Then, for each $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ with $p \nmid a$, one of the following is true:
    - $a^t \equiv 1 \mod p$, or
    - One of a^t, a^{2t}, a^{4t}, ..., $a^{2^{k-1}t}$ is congruent to $-1 \mod p$.
  - **Corollary** Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}$ be an odd number, with $n-1 = 2^k t$, t being odd. Then, n is composite, if any of the following is true:
    - There exists $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gcd(a, n) > 1$.
    - There exists $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$, and $a^t \not\equiv 1 \mod n$, and $a^{2^i t} \not\equiv -1 \mod n$, for each $i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, k-1$.
  - **Proposition** Let n be an odd composite number. Then, at least 75% of integers between 1 and $n-1$ are Miller-Rabin witnesses for n.

3.4 Factorization algorithms

- Pollard's $p-1$ factorization algorithm

This method "probably" works for producing a non-trivial factor for composite $n \in \mathbb{N}$ admitting a prime factor p such that $p-1$ is a product of small primes.

  - **Proposition:** Let $n = pq$, where p and q are distinct prime numbers. Then the following two statements hold:

- For each $L \in \mathbb{N}$, we have the following implications:

$$(p-1) \mid L \quad \Longrightarrow \quad p \mid (a^L - 1)$$

- For any $a \in \mathbb{N}$ with $p \nmid a$ and $q \nmid a$, and any $L \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} p \mid (a^L - 1) \\ q \nmid (a^L - 1) \end{array}\right\} \quad \Longrightarrow \quad p = \gcd(a^L - 1, n)$$

– **Key observations:**

- If $p-1$ is a product of small primes, then $(p-1) \mid N!$, for some not-too-large N.
- If $(q-1) \nmid N!$, then $q \nmid (a^{N!} - 1)$ is "probably" true.
- If $p-1$ is a product of small primes, and $q-1$ is NOT so, then computing $\gcd(a^{k!} - 1, n)$, for $k = 2, 3, \ldots$, will "probably" yield p as a non-trivial factor of n.

- Factorization via difference of squares

– **Key observations:**

Suppose we know that $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is odd and composite. We want to find a non-trivial factor of n.

- If we can find $a, b \in \mathbb{N}$ such that n is the difference of their squares, i.e. $n = a^2 - b^2 = (a-b)(a+b)$, then computing $\gcd(a-b, n)$ will yield a non-trivial factor of n.
- Conversely, suppose $n = cd$. Since n is odd, both c and d must also be odd. Hence, $a := \frac{1}{2}(c+d) \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $b := \frac{1}{2}(c-d) \in \mathbb{Z}$. And, $a^2 - b^2 = \cdots = cd = n$. In other words, every composite odd integer can be written as the difference of two squares.
- If some multiple kn is a difference of squares, i.e. $kn = a^2 - b^2 = (a-b)(a+b)$, then computing $\gcd(a-b, n)$ will "probably" yield a non-trivial factor of n, since it should be unlikely that n divides $a - b$.
- In summary, if we could find $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $a^2 \equiv b^2 \mod n$, then computing $\gcd(a-b, n)$ will probably yield a non-trivial factor of n.

– **Outline of general procedure:**

(1) **Find B-smooth perfect squares in $\mathbb{Z}_n$.** Find many $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_r \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that every prime factor of $c_i \equiv a_i^2 \mod n$ is less than or equal to B.
(2) Find sub-collections $c_{i_1}, c_{i_2}, \ldots, c_{i_s}$ such that $c_{i_1} c_{i_2} \cdots c_{i_s} \equiv b^2 \mod n$ are perfect squares in $\mathbb{Z}_n$.
(3) Let $a := a_{i_1} a_{i_2} \cdots a_{i_s} \mod n$. Then, computing $\gcd(a-b, n)$ will probably yield a non-trivial factor of n.

– Comments on the general procedure:

- Step (3) can be performed efficiently using the Euclidean Algorithm.
- Step (2) is equivalent to solving a homogeneous (sparse) system of linear equations over $\mathbb{F}_2$.
- The main challenge in difference-of-squares factorization is Step (1), namely, given $n \in \mathbb{Z}$, finding enough B-smooth perfect squares in $\mathbb{Z}_n$.

4 Algorithms for solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem

The Discrete Logarithm Problem

- Let G be a finite cyclic group of order $N \geq 2$, and let $g \in G$ be a generator of G.
- Let $h \in G \setminus \{ e \}$ be given.
- Find $x \in \mathbb{N}$, $1 \leq x < N$, such that $g^x = h$.

4.1 Shank's Baby-Step-Giant-Step Algorithm

Theory:

- Let $n := 1 + \lfloor \sqrt{N} \rfloor$, where $\lfloor \sqrt{N} \rfloor$ is the round-down of $\sqrt{N}$. Note, trivially, that $n^2 > N$.
- Define:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{S}_1 &:= \{ g^i \mid i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, n \} = \{ e, g, g^2, g^3, \ldots, g^n \} \\ \mathcal{S}_2 &:= \{ h \cdot (g^{-n})^i \mid i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, n \} = \{ h, h \cdot (g^{-n}), h \cdot (g^{-n})^2, h \cdot (g^{-n})^3, \ldots, h \cdot (g^{-n})^n \} \end{aligned}$$

- Then, it turns out that $\mathcal{S}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_2 \neq \varnothing$.
- For any $i, j \in \{ 0, 1, 2, \ldots, n \}$ such that $g^i = h \cdot (g^{-n})^j \in \mathcal{S}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_2$, the positive integer $x := i + jn \in \mathbb{Z}$ is a solution to the Discrete Logarithm Problem.

Outline of proof:

- $h \in \langle g \rangle \setminus \{ e \} \implies$ there exists $x \in \mathbb{N}$, $1 \leq x < N$, such that $g^x = h$.
- Then, $x = nq + r$, with $0 \leq r < n$ and $q \geq 0$. We claim that the quotient q in fact satisfies: $q < n$. Indeed, $x < N$ implies

$$q = \frac{x - r}{n} \leq \frac{N}{n} < \frac{n^2}{n} = n.$$

- Hence, $g^x = h$ can be rewritten as follows:

$$g^x = h \iff g^{nq+r} = h \iff g^r = h \cdot (g^{-n})^q \in \mathcal{S}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_2 \,, \quad \text{for some } 0 \leq r, q < n$$

Pseudocode:

(1) Let $n := 1 + \lfloor \sqrt{N} \rfloor$, where $\lfloor \sqrt{N} \rfloor$ is the round-down of $\sqrt{N}$.

(2) Generate $\mathcal{S}_1 = \{ g^i \mid i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, n \} = \{ e, g, g^2, g^3, \ldots, g^n \}$.

(3) Form the hash table $\mathcal{T}$:

key g^i	e	g	g^2	g^3	$\cdots$	g^n
value i	0	1	2	3	$\cdots$	n

(4)
```
gn := g^{-n};
temp := h;
for j = 0, 1, 2, ...
    if (T{temp} exists) {
        i := T{temp};
        return(i + n*j);
    } else {
        temp := temp * gn;
    }
end
```

Complexity: $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N})$

- The generation of $\mathcal{S}_1$ takes approximately n multiplications.
- The generation of the hash table takes $\mathcal{O}(1)$ computation steps.
- The loop takes $\mathcal{O}(n)$ computational steps.
- Hence, the whole algorithm takes $\mathcal{O}(n+n+1) = \mathcal{O}(n) = \mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N})$ computational steps.

4.2 The Pohlig-Hellman Algorithm

Summary:

- The Pohlig-Hellman Algorithm renders efficiently solvable the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in any finite cyclic group G whose order $|G|$ is a product of powers of small primes.
- This is achieved with two results of Pohlig-Hellman:
  - The DLP in a finite cyclic group G with $|G| = N = p_1^{\alpha_1} p_2^{\alpha_2} \cdots p_t^{\alpha_t}$ can be "converted" to t distinct associated DLP's in groups of orders $p_1^{\alpha_1}, \ldots, p_t^{\alpha_t}$, respectively. Here, "converted" means that the solutions of the associated DLP's can be "combined", via the Chinese Remainder Theorem, to give the solution of the original DLP.
  - The DLP in a finite cyclic group of prime power order p^α can be "converted" to a series of DLP's, each in a group of power p.
  - This last set of DLP's in groups of prime power must then be solved by methods other than Pohlig-Hellman, for example, either by brute force, or by Shank's Baby-Step-Giant-Step method. Thus, if each of the primer orders involved is relatively small (*e.g.*, efficiently solvable by brute force or Baby-Step-Giant-Step), then the original DLP can be efficiently solved.

Theory:

- The assumption that $h \in G = \langle g \rangle$ implies the solvability of $g^x = h$ for $x \in \{ 0, 1, 2, \ldots, N-1 \}$.
- Let $N = p_1^{\alpha_1} p_2^{\alpha_2} p_3^{\alpha_3} \cdots p_t^{\alpha_t}$ be the prime factorization of N. Then, it turns out that the following associated discrete logarithm problems (in finite cyclic groups with prime power order):

$$g_i^{y_i} = h_i, \quad \text{where} \quad g_i := g^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}}, \ h_i := h^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}}, \ \text{and} \ i = 1, 2, \ldots, t,$$

  are also solvable for

$$y_i \in \{ 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p_i^{\alpha_i} - 1 \}.$$

  If we also have their solutions y_i, then we can compute x using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, namely, by solving the following simultaneous congruences for $x \in \{ 0, 1, 2, \ldots, N-1 \}$:

$$x \equiv y_i \mod p_i^{\alpha_i}, \quad \text{for} \ i = 1, 2, \ldots, t.$$

  Outline of proof:

  The solvability of $g^x = h$ implies the solvability of the auxiliary discrete logarithm problems $g_i^{y_i} = h_i$ for $y_i \in \{ 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p_i^{\alpha_i} - 1 \}$, for each $i = 1, 2, \ldots, t$, since

$$g^x = h \implies (g^x)^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}} = (h)^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}} \implies \left(g^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}} \right)^x = (h)^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}} \implies (g_i)^x = h_i \implies (g_i)^{y_i} = h_i,$$

  where $y_i := x \bmod p_i^{\alpha_i}$. Here, note that $\operatorname{ord}(g_i) = p_i^{\alpha_i}$, for each $i = 1, 2, \ldots, t$. Next, observe that, for each $i = 1, 2, \ldots, t$,

$$\begin{aligned} \left(g^{-x} \cdot h\right)^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}} &= \left(g^{-x}\right)^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}} \cdot (h)^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}} = \left(g^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}}\right)^{-x} \cdot (h)^{N/p_i^{\alpha_i}} \\ &= (g_i)^{-x} \cdot h_i \\ &= (g_i)^{-y_i} \cdot h_i, \ \text{since} \ x \equiv y_i \mod p_i^{\alpha_i}, \ \text{and} \ \operatorname{ord}(g_i) = p_i^{\alpha_i} \\ &= 1_G, \ \text{since} \ g_i^{y_i} = h_i \end{aligned}$$

Hence, $\operatorname{ord}(g^{-x} \cdot h)$ *divides* $\dfrac{N}{p_i^{\alpha_i}}$*, for each* $i = 1, 2, \ldots, t$*, which in turn implies that* $\operatorname{ord}(g^{-x} \cdot h)$ *divides* $\gcd\left(\frac{N}{p_1^{\alpha_1}}, \ldots, \frac{N}{p_t^{\alpha_t}}\right)$*. However,* $\dfrac{N}{p_1^{\alpha_1}}, \ldots, \dfrac{N}{p_t^{\alpha_t}}$ *have no non-trivial common divisors, and hence* $\gcd\left(\frac{N}{p_1^{\alpha_1}}, \ldots, \frac{N}{p_t^{\alpha_t}}\right) = 1$*. Thus,* $\operatorname{ord}(g^x \cdot h) = 1$*; hence,* $g^x = h$*, as desired.*

- The discrete logarithm problem in a finite cyclic group of prime power order p^α can be "converted" to a series of discrete logarithm problems in finite cyclic groups, each of order p.

  Outline of proof:

  Let $G = \langle\, g \,\rangle$ *be a finite cyclic group, with* $|\, G \,| = p^\alpha$*, where* $p \in \mathbb{N}$ *is a prime number,* $\alpha \in \mathbb{N}$*, and* $g \in G$ *is a generator of* G*. Given* $h \in G$*, we wish to find* $x \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p^\alpha - 1 \,\}$ *such that* $g^x = h$*.*

  We make two key observations:

  - $\operatorname{ord}\left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right) = p$*, and*
  - *we may express* $x \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p^\alpha - 1 \,\}$ *as a linear combination of powers of* p*:*

$$x = x_0 + x_1\, p + x_2\, p^2 + x_3\, p^3 + \cdots + x_{\alpha-1}\, p^{\alpha-1}, \quad \text{where } x_i \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1 \,\}.$$

  Assuming we have an "oracle" that can solve the discrete logarithm problem in a finite cyclic group of order p*, we can then sequentially solve for* $x_0, x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{\alpha-1}$ *as solutions to discrete logarithm problems in groups of order* p*, starting with* x_0*.*

  Raising both sides of $g^x = h$ *to the power of* $p^{\alpha-1}$ *yields:*

$$\begin{aligned}
\left(g^{x_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-1}} = (\, h \,)^{p^{\alpha-1}} &\implies (\, g^{x_0} \,)^{p^{\alpha-1}} \cdot \left(g^{\sum_{i=1}^{t-1} x_i p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-1}} = (\, h \,)^{p^{\alpha-1}} \\
&\implies \left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{x_0} \cdot (\, g^{p^\alpha} \,)^{\sum_{i=1}^{t-1} x_i\, p^{i-1}} = (\, h \,)^{p^{\alpha-1}} \\
&\implies \left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{x_0} = (\, h \,)^{p^{\alpha-1}}, \quad \text{since } g^{p^\alpha} = 1_G .
\end{aligned}$$

  Since $\operatorname{ord}\left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right) = p$*, we can use our oracle to obtain* $x_0 \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1 \,\}$*.*

  Assuming we have successfully solved for $x_0 \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1 \,\}$*, we raise both sides of* $g^x = h$ *to the power* $p^{\alpha-2}$ *and obtain:*

$$\begin{aligned}
\left(g^{x_0 + x_1 p + \sum_{i=2}^{t-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-2}} = (\, h \,)^{p^{\alpha-2}} &\implies (\, g^{x_0} \,)^{p^{\alpha-2}} \cdot (\, g^{x_1 p} \,)^{p^{\alpha-2}} \cdot \left(g^{\sum_{i=2}^{t-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-2}} = (\, h \,)^{p^{\alpha-2}} \\
&\implies (\, g^{x_0} \,)^{p^{\alpha-2}} \cdot \left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{x_1} \cdot (\, g^{p^\alpha} \,)^{\sum_{i=2}^{t-1} x_i\, p^{i-2}} = (\, h \,)^{p^{\alpha-2}} \\
&\implies \left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{x_1} = \left(h \cdot g^{-x_0} \right)^{p^{\alpha-2}}, \quad \text{since } g^{p^\alpha} = 1_G .
\end{aligned}$$

  We can now use our oracle to obtain $x_1 \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1 \,\}$*.*

Assuming we have successfully solved for $x_0, x_1 \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1 \,\}$, we raise both sides of $g^x = h$ to the power $p^{\alpha-3}$ and obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \left(g^{\sum_{i=0}^{1} x_i\, p^i + x_2 p^2 + \sum_{i=3}^{t-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-3}} = (\, h\,)^{p^{\alpha-3}} \\
\Longrightarrow\quad & \left(g^{\sum_{i=0}^{1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-3}} \left(g^{x_2 p^2} \right)^{p^{\alpha-3}} \left(g^{\sum_{i=3}^{t-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-3}} = (\, h\,)^{p^{\alpha-3}} \\
\Longrightarrow\quad & \left(g^{\sum_{i=0}^{1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-3}} \left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{x_2} \left(g^{p^{\alpha}} \right)^{\sum_{i=3}^{t-1} x_i\, p^{i-3}} = (\, h\,)^{p^{\alpha-3}} \\
\Longrightarrow\quad & \left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{x_2} = \left(h \cdot g^{-\sum_{i=0}^{2-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-3}}, \quad \text{since } \; g^{p^{\alpha}} = 1_G\,.
\end{aligned}$$

We can now use our oracle to obtain $x_2 \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1 \,\}$.

Assuming we have successfully solved for $x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{k-1} \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1 \,\}$, we raise both sides of $g^x = h$ to the power $p^{\alpha-k-1}$ and obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \left(g^{\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} x_i\, p^i + x_k p^k + \sum_{i=k+1}^{t-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}} = (\, h\,)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}} \\
\Longrightarrow\quad & \left(g^{\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}} \left(g^{x_k p^k} \right)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}} \left(g^{\sum_{i=k+1}^{t-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}} = (\, h\,)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}} \\
\Longrightarrow\quad & \left(g^{\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}} \left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{x_k} \left(g^{p^{\alpha}} \right)^{\sum_{i=k+1}^{t-1} x_i\, p^{i-k-1}} = (\, h\,)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}} \\
\Longrightarrow\quad & \left(g^{p^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{x_k} = \left(h \cdot g^{-\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} x_i\, p^i} \right)^{p^{\alpha-k-1}}, \quad \text{since } \; g^{p^{\alpha}} = 1_G\,.
\end{aligned}$$

We can now use our oracle to obtain $x_k \in \{\, 0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1 \,\}$.

- The preceding two observations together imply that the original discrete logarithm problem in the group G, with $|\, G\,| = N = p_1^{\alpha_1} p_2^{\alpha_2} \cdots p_t^{\alpha_t}$, can be reduced to a number of associated DLP's in groups of order p_i, $i = 1, 2, \ldots, t$. If each of these associated DLP's can be solved sufficiently quickly in practice, then so can the original DLP in G. These associated DLP's in groups of order p_i will be solved in practice by methods other than Pohlig-Hellman, such as by brute force, or by Shank's Baby-Step-Giant-Step method (*i.e.* the "oracle" mentioned above is either brute-force, or Baby-Step-Giant-Step, *etc.*). In particular, if each p_i is "small" (relative to the capacity of the brute-force or the Baby-Step-Giant-Step methods), then the original DLP in G can be solved.

4.3 The Index Calculus Method