# Midterm Crypto PKI Lab Report

Parag Mhatre

#### Task 1

In this task, we create a Certificate Authority (CA) to self sign our certificates. The first thing that we do is to get our own <code>openssl.cnf</code> file. We do this by copying the file from /usr/lib/ssl/. The next thing that we do is to create a file tree as shown on the right. The content of the serial file is 1000. The file <code>index.txt</code> is an empty file. We have to provide a password while creating the CA. This step outputs two files - <code>ca.key</code> and <code>ca.crt</code>.

```
demoCA
                                                ca.key
                                                                    openssl cnf
                         ca crt
   🕽 🖨 🗊 🏻 Terminal
[02/22/20]seed@VM:~/.../PKI$ openssl req -new -x509 -keyout ca.key -out ca.crt -
config openssl.cnf
Generating a 2048 bit RSA private key
writing new private key to 'ca.key
Enter PEM pass phrase:
Verifying - Enter PEM pass phrase:
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:
Locality Name (eg, city) []:
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:
Email Address []:
 [02/22/20]seed@VM:~/.../PKI$
```


### Task 2

In this task, we create a certificate for the website - SEEDPKILab2018.com. To do this, we first create a private/public key pair which is outputted in server.key. The next step is to generate a certificate signing request for the CA to sign the certificate. We do this and the request is generated in a file called server.csr. The final step is to actually sign the certificate using the CA that we created. We change OpenSSL policy to a less restrictive policy called policy anything and sign the certificate thereby creating a file called server.crt.

```
ca.crt
                    ca.key
                                    openssl.cnf
                                                        server.crt
                                                                          server.csr
 🖢 🗐 🛈 Terminal
                                        = AU
            countryName
            stateOrProvinceName
                                        = Some-State
                                        = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
            organizationName
            commonName
                                         = SEEDPKILab2018.com
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                 CA: FALSE
            Netscape Comment:
                 OpenSSL Generated Certificate
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
40:9F:FE:16:A7:F2:D0:92:08:28:D9:85:4A:BE:6E:33:22:20:B9:62
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                 keyid:E1:F2:E0:C1:E5:67:95:DB:A2:A2:7B:2C:88:A1:C6:90:5A:D4:50:7
Certificate is to be certified until Feb 21 19:53:11 2021 GMT (365 days)
Sign the certificate? [y/n]:y
1 out of 1 certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]y
Write out database with 1 new entries
Data Base Updated
[02/22/20]seed@VM:~/.../PKI$
```

#### Task 3

We deploy a certificate in an HTTPS server provided in openssl in this task. We want to host the website with the domain name - SEEDPKILab2018.com. So, first thing that we do is add an entry in the hosts file in /etc/hosts. Then we create a server.pem by concatenating server.key and server.crt. This .pem file is required to host an HTTPS website. Then we test the file by hosting the server via the openssl's built-in feature. The server is started on port 4433. When we check the website via a browser, we see an warning - "seedpkilab2018.com:4433 uses an invalid security certificate. The certificate is not trusted because the issuer certificate is unknown". This is because the browser does not have our custom CA as a registered root CA like other popular CAs like VeriSign. Once we add the CA to the registered CAs on the browser, the browser will recognize the CA and open the website.



When we modify a single byte in server.pem, openssl server shoots an error and it doesn't start successfully.

If we use localhost instead of seedpkilab2018.com, then the browser shoots up an warning. I think that this is because the domain name is different than that of in the pem file.

#### Task 4


In this task, we deploy an HTTPS website using an certificate via an apache web server. We modify the <code>000-default.conf</code> and <code>default-ssl.conf</code> available in the <code>/etc/apache2/sites-available</code>. We set the ServerName attribute as the domain name of the website and create a new folder for the website in <code>/var/www/</code>. When the configuration is done, we can perform the configurest, enable ssl and restart the apache server. Once the server starts successfully, visit the website from your browser.



## Server Working at seedpkilab2018.com


#### Task 5

In this task, we try to simulate a Man-in-the-middle attack scenario. We first setup a malicious website using the apache web server's virtual host feature. Now, to make the user land on our malicious website, we will simply manually poison the dns cache of the user by editing the /etc/hosts file. Now, when we try to browse the genuine website, we are directed to the malicious website and it is opened as shown below. We can see that it shoots an error saying that we have a bad cert domain error. Thus PKI saves the victim from visiting the malicious website as the website does not have a certificate that matches its domain name.



#### Task 6

In this task, we try to repeat the above, but considering that the attacker has compromised the root CA and he/she can generate certificates. So we generate a certificate that matches the domain of the malicious server and redo the whole man-in-the-middle simulation as above. We can see that the victim can now land on the malicious website successfully without him knowing that the website is malicious. Thus we understand that if an attacker gains access to the root CA, then he/she can circumvent the protections that the PKI ensures for the users.



Server Working at seedpkilab2018.com