# Quotes captured from Bibliography v.2

<$> Wortham, B. D. “The way we think about the way we think: Architecture is a paradigm for reconsidering research.” {*Journal of Architectural Education*. } **61** no.1 (2007): 44-53.

/// Here is an em dash— it is longer than this en dash:–. And here is a funky word:ÇœlëkcÆnth. And here is an ellipsis:…!

Boyer notes that Johns Hopkins University was the first institution founded upon this conception of research as the primary mission of the university. p. 9

n.5 from Boyer, Ernest L. *Scholarship Reconsidered*. US Gov: ERIC, 1990. %%

^S: Architectural design ; Architectural models ; Architecture ; Enlightenment ; Modernism (Art)

1851 is a notable year on this point because it marks the moment (according to Britain’s census) that the country becomes official urbanized; in other words, more people lived in urban areas than in rural. This typological change in place will have socioeconomic consequences and prompt the partnership of Friedrich Engels with Karl Marx in discussions of labor and economy. p. 5

n.7 from Boyer, Ernest L. {*Scholarship Reconsidered.* }US Gov: ERIC, 1990. %%

^S: Hyperobject ; Urbanism

http://github.com/paralogismos/qris/releases/tag/v0.10.1

<$> Bermúdez, José Luis. {*Thinking without Words*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003.

“The picture put forward here is compatible with the global workspace theory of consciousness of Bernard Baars (1988) and the dispositional higher-order thought theory of Peter Carruthers (2000a). Carruthers puts the theory forward as a theory of phenomenal consciousness where availability of the contents of consciousness to higher-order thought or theory of mind resources give the contents their phenomenal character. ... Carruthers also adheres to a Fodorian version of modular theory of mind, but I think that the same cognitive architecture is available for a less radical non-modular version of mind that nevertheless takes seriously the idea of cerebral specialisation even though it is not possible to give a constant and exact distribution for the specialisation.” p. 9

^S: Psychology Philosophy / Brain

From Carruthers, Peter. *The Architecture of the Mind*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2006. %%

>>> Peter Carruthers

https://github.com/paralogismos/qris/releases/tag/v0.10.1

<$> Ferrari, Massimo. “Ernst Cassirer’s legacy: History of philosophy and history of science.” {*Journal of Transcendental Philosophy*. } **2** no.1 (2021): 85-109.

To be sure, a turning point is represented by Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927), certainly one of Cassirer’ s most influential books. Individuum und Kosmos is a splendid work composed in connection with the milieu of the Warburg Library and influenced by the image of the Renaissance which Aby Warburg himself had elaborated in his fascinating analysis both of the rebirth of Paganism and of ancient astrological beliefs in the early 15th century. p. 98

^S: Cosmology ; Renaissance ; Cassirer

<$> Rotman, Brian. “Forword.” In {*Diagrams and Gestures*. } ed. F. La Mantia, C. Alunni and F. Zalamea. Cham: Springer, 2023 (?).

...the influential theory of Gilles Châtelet on gesture’s role in the creation of mathematical operations. According to Châtelet, whose writings can be considered an enabling background or proof of concept of the very idea of pairing the two concepts, diagrams are not independent of gestures, but make their appearance as schematic objects that “freeze” gestures mid-flight and “cut out” new ones; creating from their gestural inputs something new by mobilizing the gestures that exist in an implicit or virtual state “inside” them. p. vi

Said of Châtelet, Gilles. { *Figuring Space*. } Dordrecht; London: Springer, 2000 (1993).%%

<$> Boole, Mary Everest. {*Symbolical Methods of Study*. } London: K. Paul, Trench, 1884.

His (B. W. Betts’) attempt seems to have taken a similar direction to that of George Boole in logic, with the difference that, whereas Boole’s expression of the Laws of Thought is algebraic, Betts expresses mind growth geometrically; that is to say, his growth-formulre are expressed in numerical series, of which each can be pictured to the eye in a corresponding curve. When the series are thus represented, they are found to resemble the forms of leaves and flowers. p. ?

Said of Cook, Louisa S. and Benjamin W. Betts. *Geometrical Psychology*. London: G. Redway, 1887. %%

<$> Gurwitsch, Aron. {*Field of Consciousness*. } Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964 (1957).

As Dewey has pointed out in his article, “The vanishing subject in the psychology of James,” (Journal of Philosophy, vol. 37, 1940, pp. 591 ff.), there is, in James’s The Principles of Psychology, besides the descriptive and subjective strain, a trend towards a “biological behavioristic account of psychological phenomena.” If fully and consistently developed, the trend in question leads to a psychology not only without ‘soul’ but also without consciousness. p. 179

n.78 in Gurwitsch %%

>>> John Dewey

3 authors here Dewey, James, Gurwitsch –jmr

<$> Ingold, Tim. {*Knowing from the Inside: Cross-Disciplinary Experiments with Matters of Pedagogy*. } London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.

[A]ccording to phenomenologist Hubert Dreyfus, something needs to be at stake for [all] participants [in an educational setting]. ... : ‘if the teacher shows his involvement … and emotionally dwells on the choices that have led him to his conclusions and actions, the students will be more likely to let their own successes and failures matter to them’ p. ?

See Dreyfus 2001: 38–9; From Jan van Boeckel in Tim Ingold Knowing from the inside. %%

<$> Ihmig, Karol-Nobert. “Ernst Cassirer and the Structural Conception of Objects in Modern Science: The Importance of the ‘Erlanger Programm’.” {*Science in Context*. }**12** no.4 (1996, 1999): 513-529.

Eighteen years after Cassirer, the physicist Arthur Eddington pointed out the fundamental importance of the structural approach in physics, and, in this context, he worked out the decisive function of the group concept: “Physical science consists of purely structural knowledge, so that we know only the structure of the universe which it describes. This is not a conjecture as to the nature of physical knowledge; it is precisely what physical knowledge as formulated in present-day theory states itself to be. In fundamental investigations the conception of group-structure appears quite explicitly as the starting point, and nowhere in the subsequent development do we admit material not derived from groupstructure. p. 528

>>>Eddington (1939, 1967:142f)

penultimate sentences %%

<$> Ellis, Eugenia Victoria. “Magic Squares and Claude Bragdon’s Theosophic Architecture.” {*Nexus Network Journal*. **5** no.1 (Summer, 2004): 79-92.

If it be true that the soul of the world is about to animate the materialism of modern life it will create for itself a new language of power and beauty, and architecture will again become a living art, for architecture deals in visible symbols, and visible symbols form the very language of mysticism. p. 1

This theory was founded on four interrelated parts that were distinct and yet indivisible due to their mutual correspondences: nature, the human body, number and geometry, and music. These four aspects formed the basis of Bragdon’s gothic mysticism that emphasized a cosmological relationship between the body and the building through number, geometry and harmonic proportions. p. 2

The instrument the Ancients used to take their measurements was the gnomon, which literally means interpreter. p. 6

^S: ^w gnomon

<$> Fisette, Denis. {*Husserl’s Logical Investigations Reconsidered*. } Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2003.

Husserl calls the noesis the meaning-giving element of the act, and the noema he calls the meaning given in the act. p. 13

>>> Dagfinn Follesdal

^S: ^w noema ; ^w noesis

<$> Helmholtz, Hermann von. “On the facts underlying geometry.” In {*Epistemological Writings*. } ed. R. S. Cohen and Yehuda Elkana. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1977 (1868) (39-71).

My investigations on spatial intuitions in the field of vision induced me also to start investigations on the question of the origin and essential nature of our general intuitions of space. The question which then forced itself upon me, and one which also obviously belongs to the domain of the exact sciences, was at first only the following: how much of the propositions of geometry has an objectively valid sense? And how much is on the contrary only definition or the consequence of definitions, or depends on the form of description? In my opinion, this question is not to be answered all that simply. For in geometry we deal constantly with ideal structures, whose corporeal portrayal in the actual world is always only an approximation to what the concept demands, and we only decide whether a body is fixed†, its sides flat and its edges straight, by means of the very propositions whose factual correctness the examination is supposed to show. p. ?

From the Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen no. 9, 3 June 1868. Reprinted in Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen vol. II, pp. 618–639. %%

<$> Kwinter, Sanford. “Reality: Virtual, augmented, transpersonal.” {*Log*. } **51** (2021): ??

William James, who coined the latter italicized term [Radical Empiricism], provides us with a blueprint for a theory of natural empathy -- no place or state of being outside of the experience of this world is required in order to account for the unity of this world. p. 170

n. 25 %%

<$> Kelso, J. A. Scott. “Metastable Mind.” In {*Cognitive Architecture*. }ed. D. Hauptmann and W. Neidich. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2011 (116-138).

Notice that all the usual measures used previously in coordination dynamics to measure and quantify stability and loss of stability such as local and global relaxation times, switching times, fluctuations, and so forth no longer apply in the metastable regime (for reviews of theory and experiments establishing the utility of these quantities, see notational references). p. 125

<$> Hillman, James. {*Re-visioning Psychology*}. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

And in our own time the ‘bricoleur’ is still someone who works with his hands and uses devious means compared to those of a craftsman. The characteristic feature of mythical thought is that it expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire ... it has nothing else at its disposal. Mythical thought is therefore a kind of intellectual ‘bricolage.’ p. 250

^S: ^w bricolage

<$> Martin, Charles Burton. {*The Mind in Nature*. } Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 (2008).

This dubious invocation of levels of being with duplicated causes and effects at each level is tempting only because compositionalist accounts tend to be grossly inadequate. Any supposed over-and-aboveness of wholes to their constitutents, however, becomes totally incomprehensible when the roles of the constituents are given their fair due in a well-developed compositional model. pp. 37, 8

<$> Anjum, Rani Lill and Stephen Mumford. “Dispositionalism: A dynamic theory of causation.” In {*Everything Flows*. } ed. D.J. Nicholson and J. Dupré. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 (61-75).

A dispositional account of causation should reject the old stimulus–response model of how causal powers are activated. Such a view comes too close to the two event model, which we have said should be overturned. Instead, Martin’s notion of mutual manifestation serves us better, ... p. 63

(Martin 2008: 48–51) %%

<$> Cummins, Robert. {*The World in the Head*. } Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

A mind, complete with consciousness and a subjective point of view—the Nagel property, in short—may after all be more than a mere thinker, more than a mere cognitive engine.” p. 1

<$> Northrop, F.S.C. {*The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*. }New York: MacMillan Company, 1947.

///It appears that this step by step procedure can be divided into the following explicit stages:

(1) the discovery by analysis of the basic theoretical root of the problem;

(2) the selection of the simplest phenomenon exhibiting the factors involved in the difficulty;

(3) the inductive observation of these relevant factors;

(4) the projection of relevant hypotheses suggested by these relevant facts;

(5) the deduction of logical consequences from each hypothesis, thereby permitting it to be put to an experimental test;

(6) the clarification of one’s initial problem in the light of the verified hypothesis; and

(7) the generalization of one’s solution by means of a pursuit of the logical implications of the new concepts and theory with respect to other subject matter and applications. p. 28

<$> Cassirer, Ernst. {*The Problem of Knowledge; Philosophy, Science, and History Since Hegel*, } with William H. Woglom and Charles William Hendel (trs). New Haven; London: Yale UP; Oxford University Press, 1950 (1940).

The beginnings of it [constantly increasing self-sufficiency of pure projective thinking] were already evident in the seventeenth century, with Desargues and Pascal, but the process attained full maturity and a consciousness of its methodological independence only with Poncelet, who first set up a program for a geometry that was based no longer on ideas of size and measure but on the concept and the study of pure relationship of position. His Traite des proprietes projectives des figures (18~~) was significant not only from a mathematical but from a general epistemological standpoint as well, because he adopted Leibniz’ principle of continuity and sought to give it validity in a new way, by introducing into geometry the idea of the imaginary. p. 49

<$> Bundgaard, Peer F. “The grammar of aesthetic intuition: on Ernst Cassirer’s concept of symbolic form in the visual arts.” {*Synthese*. } **179** no.1 (2011): 43-57.

Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) also include the problem of genericity and non-genericity in their principles underlying artistic expression and experience. However, they reach exactly the opposite conclusion from mine here, namely, that artists in general avoid the “suspicious coincidences” displayed in non-generic viewpoints, since they hinder automatic object recognition. This is wrong on a purely empirical basis: artists massively resort to non-generic viewpoints and configurations in order to morphologically enhance the saliency of their paintings. It is furthermore wrong for reasons that could be revealed by an ad absurdum argument: applied to language, their argument would indeed imply that since as a rule humans avoid syntactic, semantic, phonetic, and prosodic oddities in their language use, in order not to hinder the automatic recognition of the communicated meaning, then such oddities are also carefully avoided in the poetic use of language. Eventually, the argument is also wrong for a somewhat deeper reason: the authors do not seem to operate with the essential distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual significations. This distinction is key in Husserl’s phenomenology, where it concerns the huge program of founding conceptual-logical structures on pre-conceptual, intuitive meanings. It is nowadays the cornerstone in Jean Petitot’s impressive work in morphodynamic semiotics, the neuroscience of vision as well as aesthetic inquiries. p. 52, 3

“n. 12 see: (Petitot 1992, 2003, 2004). %%

<$> Rudrauf, D., A. Lutz, . D. Cosmelli, J.p. Lachaux and M. Le Van Quyen. “From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela’s exploration of the biophysics of being.” {*Biological Research*. } **36** no.1 (2003): 27-65.

Here, the notion of cause does not have the local value of “efficient causation,” but that of “structuring causes,” “context sensitive constraints” (Thompson and Varela, 2001) that shape the response properties of the system as in a field. This idea was already well developed in “Not one not two” (1976). p. ?

^S: Varela