AuctioNN: A Simulation-Driven Bidding Engine for Large-Scale Cost-Per-Action Optimization

Param Kapur, Cameron Adams, Quinn Behrens, Ernie Zhang {paramkapur, cadams, qbehrens, irenez}@reed.edu

April 25, 2025

Abstract

AuctioNN is a sandbox framework and decision engine that evaluates whether a neural-network–guided bidding policy can reduce system-wide cost-per-action (CPA) while meeting campaign-specific goals and operational constraints. The instrumented simulator streams impression requests one at a time, emulating an external, first-price and second-price ad exchange. We rigorously compare the proposed policy against heuristic baselines using marginal CPA, total conversions, and revenue uplift. Results generalize to media owners such as iHeart that simultaneously monetize their owned&operated (O&O) inventory and purchase incremental reach on open exchanges. The full architecture, mathematical formulation, and open research questions are documented here.

1 Introduction and Motivation

Large media publishers increasingly extend their reach by buying impressions on open ad exchanges. Operating 10^3 – 10^4 concurrent campaigns in real time raises three entangled challenges:

- 1. Win the *right* inventory—impressions that drive post-click or post-view conversions.
- 2. Respect campaign goals—especially CPA targets stipulated in insertion orders.
- 3. Obey operational constraints—budgets, pacing, and user-level frequency capping.

This work posits that a neural model, combined with explicit budget/frequency bookkeeping, can outperform classical heuristics that ignore conversion likelihood.

2 How an Open Ad Exchange Works

For each page-view or app launch, the exchange issues a bid request containing contextual metadata (timestamp, device, geo, etc.). Every buyer has roughly 100 ms to (i) decide whether to participate and (ii) transmit a bid price. The highest bid wins and immediately pays the clearing price. In most modern exchanges this is a first-price auction; the winner pays its own bid. However, some exchanges use different auction models like second-price or programmatic guaranteed (PG) auctions. Any downstream conversion event (purchase, signup, ...) is reported asynchronously, often minutes to days later.

3 System Architecture & Environment

AuctioNN treats the exchange as an online stream, delivering impression I_t at discrete time t. For every impression the engine must (a) decide whether to bid, (b) pick a campaign, and (c) set the bid price. Table 1 formalizes the symbols used throughout the paper.

Table 1: Core symbols and state variables.

Symbol / Term	Meaning
	Tricking .
I_t	Impression delivered at discrete time t .
$features(I_t)$	All metadata included in the bid request.
C	Active campaign set.
$c \in C$	One specific campaign.
$budget_remaining[c]$	Dollars left for campaign c .
$p_{\text{conv}}(c, I_t)$	Predicted conversion probability if c wins I_t .
$value_per_conv[c]$	Advertiser-declared value of one conversion.
$\operatorname{target_CPA}[c]$	Optional maximum CPA for campaign c .
$ad_stock[user, c]$	Recent exposure score (models ad fatigue).
$score(c, I_t)$	Scalar used to select the winning campaign.
bid	Dollar price sent to the exchange.
$clearing_price$	Amount paid if the bid wins (= bid in first-price).
marginal CPA	Δ Spend/ Δ Conversions over a window.

3.1 End-to-End Decision Loop

The procedure below executes for *every* incoming impression.

```
Algorithm 1 AuctioNN per-impression decision loop
```

```
Require: incoming impression I_t
     1: Receive I_t; extract features(I_t)
     2: Eligibility gate:
                                       C_{\mathrm{elig}} \! \leftarrow \! \{c \! \in \! C \mid \mathtt{budget\_remaining}[c] > 0 \ \land \ \mathtt{ad\_stock}[\mathrm{user}, c] < \tau \}
     4: for all c \in C_{\text{elig}} do
                                    p_{\text{conv}}(c, I_t) \leftarrow f_{\theta}(\text{teatures}(I_t), \text{embed}(c), \text{same}(c), \text{sam
                                       p_{\text{conv}}(c, I_t) \leftarrow f_{\theta}(\text{features}(I_t), \text{embed}(c), \text{ad\_stock}[\text{user}, c])
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 > see §4
     8: c^* \leftarrow \arg\max_c \operatorname{score}(c, I_t)
     9: expected_value \leftarrow p_{\text{conv}}(c^*, I_t) \times \text{value\_per\_conv}[c^*]
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            \triangleright \beta = 1 initially<sup>1</sup>
10: bid \leftarrow \beta \times \text{expected\_value}
11: Transmit bid; observe win/loss and clearing_price
                                       budget_remaining[c^*] -= clearing_price
13:
                                       ad\_stock[user, c^*] += 1
14:
15: end if
16: Log (I_t, c^*, \text{bid}, \text{win/loss}, \text{time}, \text{utility}) for offline analysis
```

3.2 Decision Loop Pipeline

The figure below illustrates the decision loop in a block diagram.




Figure 1: Fully connected block diagram of AuctioNN's *per-impression* decision loop, emphasising the continuous stream of impressions $I_{t-1}, I_t, I_{t+1}, \ldots$ The compound *Inference & Selection* stage first scores every campaign with a neural network and then chooses c via the displayed arg-max rule.

4 Neural Model

Objective. Estimate conversion probability conditioned on both the *impression* and the *campaign*. This is analogous to a contextual click-through-rate model but with a conversion label.

Feature vector.

- Categorical embeddings: device type, operating system, DMA, and campaign ID.
- Temporal features: hour-of-day and day-of-week encoded as sine/cosine pairs.
- Continuous exposure feature: current ad_stock (per-user, per-campaign).

Architecture. Two fully connected layers (128 \rightarrow 64) with ReLU activations, followed by a sigmoid output; $\approx 55 \,\mathrm{k}$ parameters. Exported as TorchScript for $\leq 1 \,\mathrm{ms}$ inference on an Apple M2 core.

Training. Binary cross-entropy on historical (impression, conversion) pairs. Severe class imbalance ($\mathcal{O}(10^{-3})$ converters) is mitigated via positive-class weighting and mini-batch stratification. The data pipeline materialises a 7-day attribution window (see §7).

5 Evaluation Methodology

We benchmark three policies:

- 1. Random—bid a constant \$1 CPM on a random eligible campaign.
- 2. **Heuristic**—industry default: bid proportional to campaign value, ignoring p_{conv} .
- 3. AuctioNN (proposed)—full decision loop of §3.2.

5.1 Success Metrics

- Marginal CPA (Δ Spend/ Δ Conversions) relative to baseline.
- Total conversions aggregated across all campaigns.
- Revenue uplift (= advertiser value media cost).
- Pacing error: $|actual spend planned spend|/planned spend \le 0.05$.
- Latency: distributive $p_{95} \le 2 \,\mathrm{ms}$ per impression on a MacBook M-series laptop.

6 Implementation Notes

7 Open Questions and Future Work

8 Conclusion

AuctioNN provides a controlled environment to test whether modern ML can simultaneously optimise CPA, satisfy campaign obligations, and execute within the harsh latency limits of real-time

bidding. The architecture is intentionally minimal yet extensible, enabling rigorous $ablation\ studies$ of every engineering choice—from eligibility gates to neural features to bid shading policies.