

Translation from C to logical formulas

Paul RAYNAUD M1 Informatique

Laboratory: VERIMAG

Team : PACSS

Tutors :

Michaël PÉRIN; David MONNIAUX

Magistère M1 presentation

Motivation

- Computers omnipresence
 - Computers are everywhere in our society to help us in our daily life.
 - However bugs happen really often.
- In the critical systems
 - The Health, the aviation, energy, information, finance

C \rightarrow logical formulas

- Why?
 - We can automatically generate Hoare's triplet from source code
 - We can solve this formulas with a Solver Module Theorie (SMT), to check if the generated implications are valid or not
- How?
 - By choosing a compiler/semantic.
 - We need to get a Control Flow Graph (CFG) .

Existing tools for program verification

- Seahorn is a tool performing program verification.
 - Based on LLVM compiler, with an ambiguous semantic, and with a non-alterable logical translation
- The choice of a compiler : CompCert C
 - A well-defined semantic (in Coq).
 - Without any miscompilation.
 - Thus a robust foundation to prove the translation into logical formulas.
- Z3
 - The most general powerfull SMT solver
 - Use in a successful similar project

Goal

```
int absolute_value(int a){  
    if( a > 0){  
        return a;  
    }  
    else {  
        return -a ;  
    }  
}
```

Compcert C+ tool

Logical formulas

tool

Z3



Detail our example

```
int absolute_value(int a) {  
    if( a > 0){  
        return a;  
    }  
    else {  
        return -a ;  
    }  
}
```

- Take an integer
- Return the absolute value.
- Thus the value is positive or null.

From C to RTL

```
4: (RTL.Icond ((Op.Ccompimm (Integers.Cgt, BinNums.Z0)), [BinNums.Coq_xH]  
(BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH), (BinNums.Coq_xI BinNums.Coq_xH)))  
3: (RTL.Iop (Op.Oneg, [BinNums.Coq_xH], (BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH),  
BinNums.Coq_xH))  
2: (RTL.Iop (Op.0move, [BinNums.Coq_xH], (BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH),  
BinNums.Coq_xH))  
1: (RTL.Ireturn (Some (BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH)))
```

Preparation :

- 13 intermediary representations.
- the 4th representation, the Register Transfert Language (RTL)
- Extract this fourth representation in a usable form.

From C to an readable RTL


```
4: (RTL.Icond ((Op.Ccompimm (Integers.Cgt, BinNums.Z0)), [BinNums.Coq_xH]  
(BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH), (BinNums.Coq_xI BinNums.Coq_xH)))  
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2: (RTL.Iop (Op.0move, [BinNums.Coq_xH], (BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH),  
BinNums.Coq_xH))  
1: (RTL.Ireturn (Some (BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH)))
```

Compcert print the data above in a readable form like below

```
absolute_value(x1) {  
  4:  if (x1 >s 0) goto 2 else goto 3  
  3:  x2 = (- x1)  
      goto 1  
  2:  x2 = x1  
  1:  return x2  
}
```


From RTL to CFG

```
4: (RTL.Icond ((Op.Ccompimm (Integers.Cgt, BinNums.Z0)), [BinNums.Coq_xH]  
(BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH), (BinNums.Coq_xI BinNums.Coq_xH)))  
3: (RTL.Iop (Op.Oneg, [BinNums.Coq_xH], (BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH),  
BinNums.Coq_xH))  
2: (RTL.Iop (Op.Omove, [BinNums.Coq_xH], (BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH),  
BinNums.Coq_xH))  
1: (RTL.Ireturn (Some (BinNums.Coq_x0 BinNums.Coq_xH)))
```



Making the first structure:

- We refine the RTL structure to keep only the necessary informations, and simplify the CFG.
- Development of a tool to print easily our CFGs.

Reminder about Hoare logic

Hoare triplet : $\{\rho\}program\{\gamma\}$


The sequence rule :
$$\frac{\{\rho\} S1 \{\theta\} \quad \{\theta\} S2 \{\gamma\}}{\{\rho\} S1; S2 \{\gamma\}}$$

The affectation rule :
$$\overline{\{\rho\}x := e \{x' := e \wedge \gamma[x \leftarrow x']\}}$$

The condition rule :
$$\frac{\{\rho \wedge C\}S1\{\gamma\} \wedge \{\rho \wedge \neg C\}S2\{\gamma\}}{\{\rho\}if C then S1 else S2\{\gamma\}}$$

The skip rule (return) :
$$\overline{\{\rho\}skip\{\gamma\}}$$

Application on our example



Introduction to Z3

- Z3
 - Z3 is a typed language
- Problem :
 - RTL isn't typed
 - We have to retrieve the type of each variable to define the predicates in Z3

Retrieve the variable types from the operations

```
x = 5;
```

x is an integer

```
if(x) {  
    y = 3;  
}
```

x is an boolean

y is an integer

```
if(x) {  
    x = x+1;  
}
```

x is typed like a
boolean and a integer
so we choose integer

- Retrieve the type by analyzing the operation .
- But in order to help Z3 we get the minimum type of each variable.

Z3 formulas

```
(forall ( (x_54_2_2 Int ) (x_54_2_1 Int ) (x_54_4_2 Int ) (x_54_4_1 Int ) (x_54_3_2 Int ) (x_54_3_1 Int ) )
  ( and
    ( =>
      ( and
        (P_54_4 x_54_4_1 x_54_4_2 )
        ( = x_54_2_2 x_54_4_2 )
        ( = x_54_2_1 x_54_4_1 )
        ( > x_54_4_1 0 )
      )
      (P_54_2 x_54_2_1 x_54_2_2 )
    )
    ( =>
      ( and
        (P_54_4 x_54_4_1 x_54_4_2 )
        ( = x_54_3_2 x_54_4_2 )
        ( = x_54_3_1 x_54_4_1 )
        (not( > x_54_4_1 0 ) )
      )
      (P_54_3 x_54_3_1 x_54_3_2 )
    )
  )
)
(fforall ( (x_54_3_2 Int ) (x_54_3_1 Int ) (x_54_1_2 Int ) (x_54_1_1 Int ) )
  ( =>
    ( and
      (P_54_3 x_54_3_1 x_54_3_2 )
      ( = x_54_1_1 x_54_3_1 )
      ( = x_54_1_2 ( - x_54_3_1 ) )
    )
    (P_54_1 x_54_1_1 x_54_1_2 )
  )
)
```

```
(forall ( (x_54_2_2 Int ) (x_54_2_1 Int ) (x_54_1_2 Int ) (x_54_1_1 Int ) )
  ( =>
    ( and
      (P_54_2 x_54_2_1 x_54_2_2 )
      ( = x_54_1_1 x_54_2_1 )
      ( = x_54_1_2 x_54_2_1 )
    )
    (P_54_1 x_54_1_1 x_54_1_2 )
  )
)
(fforall ( (x_54_1_2 Int ) (x_54_1_1 Int ) )
  (=>
    (P_54_1 x_54_1_1 x_54_1_2 )
    (post_54 x_54_1_1 x_54_1_2 )
  )
)
```

Adding of Pre-cond/ Post cond and Z3 formulas

Defintion of assumption and assertion

```
(define-fun assume_54 ((x1 Int)(x2 Int)) Bool
  true
)
(define-fun assert_54 ((x1 Int)(x2 Int)) Bool
  (<= 0 x2)
)
```

The link between the assumption and the program

```
(forall ((x1 Int) (x2 Int))
  (=>
    (assume_54 x1 x2)
    (P_54_4 x1 x2 )
  )
)
```

The link between the assertion and the program

```
(forall ( (x_54_1_2 Int ) (x_54_1_1 Int ) )
  (=>
    (P_54_1 x_54_1_1 x_54_1_2 )
    (assert_54 x_54_1_1 x_54_1_2 )
  )
)
```

- Link between the program and the properties
 - Adding the assumptions/assertions of the program.
 - To prove our program the assertions/assumptions has to be true.

Detail about our results

- Expected output of Z3
 - Sat : Z3 has find one invariant for each node of the CFG which respect the assume and the assert.
 - Unsat : Z3 shows that you can't have one invariant for each node of the CFG which can't respect the assume and the assert.
- Unexpected output
 - Time-out : Z3 don't have the time, memory or something else to compute the answer
 - Unknown : Z3 can't find an answer with the given information

Note about the results

- Other strategys
 - Timeout : restrain de starting space to get a local answer.
- To improve:
 - Unsat : currently we are not able to get some valuable informations about Z3 when he make an unsat.

May RTL be the good representation for a verifier ?

- Good points:
 - CFG
 - No register strategy, 1 variable in C mean 1 variable in RTL with added variables
 - Many informations available, to find the lost informations
- Bad point:
 - Informations are not always directly accessible


Future extensions

- Other features
 - Add propriety for particular instructions like the division to forbid the division by 0.
 - Replace the assertions/assumptions by checking directly the properties inside the code
 - In order to help it, give to Z3 some properties and don't let it calculate
- Make the tool usable
 - We have to finish all the RTL instruction define by CompCert C firstly.
 - Prove the tool using Coq. La generation de formules logiques

Questions


Less trivial example (1)

```
int milieu(int a , int b){  
    int x = a;  
    int y = b;  
    while(x < y){  
        x = x + 1;  
        y = y - 1;  
    }  
    return 0;  
}
```



Less trivial example (2)

1500 lines program



Compcert stuff (operation)

```
type instruction =  
| Inop of node  
| Iop of operation * reg list * reg * node  
| Iload of memory_chunk * addressing * reg list * reg * node  
| Istore of memory_chunk * addressing * reg list * reg * node  
| Icall of signature * (reg, ident) sum * reg list * reg * node  
| Itailcall of signature * (reg, ident) sum * reg list  
| Ibuiltin of external_function * reg builtin_arg list * reg builtin_res  
  * node  
| Icond of condition * reg list * node * node  
| Ijumptable of reg * node list  
| Ireturn of reg option
```

Compcert stuff (operation)

```
type operation =  
  Omove  
  Ointconst of Int.int  
  Olongconst of Int64.int  
  Ofloatconst of Int64.int  
  Osingleconst of float32  
  Oindirectsymbol of ident  
  Ocast8signed  
  Ocast8unsigned  
  Ocast16signed  
  Ocast16unsigned  
  Oneg  
  Osub  
  Omul  
  Omulimm of Int.int  
  Omulhs  
  Omulhu  
  Odiv  
  Odivu  
  Omod  
  Omodu  
  Oand  
  Oandimm of Int.int  
  Oor  
  Oorimm of Int.int  
  Oxor  
  Oxorimm of Int.int  
  Onot  
  Oshl  
  Oshlimm of Int.int  
  Oshr  
  Oshrimm of Int.int  
  Oshrximm of Int.int  
  Oshru  
  Oshruimm of Int.int  
  Ororimm of Int.int  
  Oshldimm of Int.int  
  Olea of addressing  
  Omakelong  
  Olowlong  
  Ohighlong  
  Ocast32signed  
  Ocast32unsigned  
  Onegl  
  Oaddlimm of Int64.int  
  Osubl  
  Omull  
  Omullimm of Int64.int  
  Omullhs  
  Omullhu  
  Ondivl
```

```
  Odivlu  
  Omodl  
  Omodlu  
  Oandl  
  Oandlimm of Int64.int  
  Oorl  
  Oorlimm of Int64.int  
  Oxorl  
  Oxorlimm of Int64.int  
  Onotl  
  Oshll  
  Oshllimm of Int.int  
  Oshrl  
  Oshrlimm of Int.int  
  Oshrxlimm of Int.int  
  Oshrlu  
  Oshrluimm of Int.int  
  Ororlimm of Int.int  
  Oleal of addressing  
  Onegf  
  Oabsf  
  Oaddf  
  Osubf  
  Omulf  
  Odivf  
  Onegfs  
  Oabsfs  
  Oaddfs  
  Osubfs  
  Omulfs  
  Odivfs  
  Osingleoffloat  
  Ofloatofsingle  
  Ointoffloat  
  Ofloatofint  
  Ointofsingle  
  Osingleofint  
  Olongoffloat  
  Ofloatoflong  
  Olongofsingle  
  Osingleoflong  
  Ocmp of condition
```