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The genetic engineering of our progeny will likely not begin well. With the discovery of the CRIPSR technology, we now can alter the RNA sequences in humans, allowing us to engineer both the specific organ tissues of a person, only affecting the individual (*somatic*), as well modifying the genes in eggs or sperm, thereby affecting that individual’s descendants (*Germline).* Additionally, we must consider the consequences of *modification* and *selection.* Modification is a much more frightening scenario to consider, where selection is a little simpler, ethically, since it doesn’t involve actively making changes, only *selecting* gametes or embryos. Modification will affect the individual’s sense of identity and autonomy unlike selection.

As with most emerging technologies, we tend to start off sloppy and unbalanced but eventually achieve mastery, polishing the rough edges and tightening the loose parts until finally we’re able to lay that one brick in anticipation of the next one. Building the future with respect to our progeny is the most direct kind of future building one can imagine. The importance cannot be overstated, which is why it’s essential to be educated on the various views that exist so far, such as: the Perfectionist, Libertarian, Human Nature, and Motivation views.

What makes one life objectively better than another? Assuming this question is answerable, the Perfectionist view attempts to answer this by considering the decision-making strategy as a “prima facie” obligation or initial assumption when selecting the embryo or gamete that will have the “best chance” of having the best life. Setting aside the lack of well-defined concepts in Liao’s article, the Perfectionist view is to make the selection based on whether there’s an obvious adverse characteristic such as Rubella. If one embryo contains the predisposition for Rubella and the other doesn’t, you’re obligated to select the embryo without the Rubella. Fair enough, except when you consider stories of people who overcame some illness, and the overcoming itself became a part of their identity. In the case of Rubella, I think it’s obvious to select away from it, but I’ve met many people who were handicapped in some way that often reflect on how grateful they are for their disability and the unique perspective it provided. On the other hand, heart disease (and Rubella) is not an affliction that seems useful to anyone at all. In this case, I would agree that selection away from heart disease would make a reasonable obligation. The perfectionist view is slightly more malleable when considering the author’s description and distinction between the *prima facie obligation* and the *supererogatory reasons,* or selecting on behalf of traits without any *obligation*, but still in favor of one trait over another. This view is straight-forward and reasonable, but things escalate quickly in terms of complexity when the *selector’s choice* is taken into consideration.

The Libertarian view, as is usually the case with Libertarian flavors of any kind, lacks a bit of forethought. “Reproductive choice” being expanded by reproductive technologies (RTs) is a net positive in this view. The “Permissive Libertarian view” is this idea and the “Life Worth Living Libertarian view” sees selection as “morally permissible to engage in selection if the beings selected can have a life worth living”, which is laughably void of substance. In basic scenarios we can reduce the concept back to the Perfectionist view. However, I do appreciate the notion of a *baseline*, which the Libertarian view does include based on Glover’s defense of the view named, the “zero line view.” This gets us a little closer to some sort of objective metric, but we still have a ways to go. The distinction between the Libertarian view (especially the Life Worth Living view (LWL)) and the Perfectionist view is whether selecting an embryo or gamete that has a predisposition for a disability is permissible. I see a hybrid between the Perfectionist view and the LWL being useful as it establishes a baseline that can be influenced through a mass survey or something to initiate such a baseline. Yet it also contends with a goal of acquiring an optimal quality of life, enabling the offspring to overcome other issues instead of Rubella, for example. There’s also the *Sufficientarian view*, which emphasizes a “decent chance to have a sufficiently decent life”, which read more vacant than the vacuum of space. The Sufficientarian view might be useful if it attached the enabling of creative abilities and function to the potential individual as a metric for what constitutes a “sufficiently decent life.” Regardless, many seem to hold the view of this technology as a “Promethean aspiration to remake nature” and how that is somehow wrong or contradictory for humans to want to change nature.

The Human Nature view proclaims RTs as impermissible altogether. This is where I’m reminded of when I get a call from an unidentifiable number and upon answering, I’m greeted with a tacky sales pitch. I hang up immediately. Human flourishing should be the basis of all inquiries related to the topic of RTs but it is exactly our ability to alter nature at levels no other species seems capable of so far that sets us apart. This is not to be suppressed but exalted. To think that humans can interfere at all with nature is itself a contradiction. Just like any other living organism, we require an ecosystem, which means we must alter other, adjacent ecosystems. This is not a inteference problem, it’s just entropy. To my own surprise, I found myself slightly more engaged with the view that emphasizes the *intention* behind the gene selection as it seems to cut to the heart of this delicate, yet complex topic.

The Motivation view argues that there must be a proper intention behind the selection of said embryo or gamete. This is also where selection is not the only circumstance to consider, but *modification*, such as enhancing the potential child in this way or that. Sandel’s objection to enhancement purposes doesn’t seem unreasonable but I do see the enhancement aspect of this topic to be the most promising for our species. Of course, it must be done right and that’s the point of all this, but the potential enhancements should serve more as a compliment to selection as opposed to something mutually exclusive. Small enhancements that allow us to abstract away some of our natural shortcomings rather than, say a disease or disability, may be a beneficial perspective.

The genetic engineering of our progeny will likely not begin well. Liao seemed to have more to say with regards to the Human Nature view while also introducing modification rather than selection, as a focus point. I appreciated the *Really Great Net-Benefit Case* as it’s also a good starting place for this technology but ultimately the Human Species view suffers from the same ignorance as the rest under this category. Whether we are “special” or not seems to me irrelevant except if we’re considering how our unique traits being enhanced can contribute to other species that we may in turn benefit from our contribution. I think highly of trying to get ahead of the consequences of this sort of technology, but it seems likely that, like most societal experiments such as social media, we’ll have to start out wobbly and unbalanced with the need for training wheels until, eventually, we learn how to coast with the wind.