

# Intermediate levels of asymptomatic transmission can lead to the worst population-level outcomes

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SARS-CoV-2 has had devastating effects at the population level. However, many individuals experienced mild cases, making it harder to estimate the magnitude of spread and fatality rate [1]. The ratio of fatalities to documented cases (the case-fatality rate, CFR) is typically between 1%–4%, varying across population because of testing patterns, treatment practice, case definitions, and other factors [2, 3, 4]. But many infections were never documented; the ratio of fatalities to total infections (the infection fatality rate, IFR) has been estimated to be closer to 0.5%–1% for pre-vaccinated populations whose demographics are similar to that of the United States [5]. This means that more than 99% of individuals infected with COVID-19 will survive. Moreover, at least half of the infections are sufficiently mild that they could be classified as subclinical or even asymptomatic.

Individuals infected asymptotically with SARS-CoV-2 can still transmit to others. This means that the presence of asymptomatic infections may have countervailing effects at the population level. On one hand, an asymptomatic infection means that the individual infected avoids hospitalization and fatality. On the other hand, asymptomatic infections are less likely to be detected [6], meaning that they are less likely to take precautions and more likely to infect others. Altogether, the prevalence of asymptomatic infections can paradoxically make population-level outcomes worse than if SARS-CoV-2 was more dangerous at the individual level.

To explore this idea, we propose a simple epidemic model, in which infected individuals can be asymptotically or symptomatically infected, with probabilities  $p$  and  $1 - p$ , respectively (Fig. 1). Asymptotically infected individuals always recover, whereas a fraction  $f$  of symptomatically infected individuals die. Asymptotically and symptomatically infected individuals can also have different infection characteristics, including their transmission rates ( $\beta_a$  and  $\beta_s$ ) and recovery rates

( $\gamma_a$  and  $\gamma_s$ ). Our key assumption is that symptomatically infected individuals take greater precautions than do asymptotically infected individuals (e.g., via reducing contacts or increased mask-wearing) and therefore reduce their transmission rate by a fraction  $\delta$ ; we note that the parameter  $\delta$  may also capture intervention measures that target symptomatically infected individuals, such as symptom-based isolation. For our main simulations, we assume that asymptotically infected individuals have a lower reproduction number—this is modeled by assuming lower transmission rates for asymptotically infected individuals ( $\beta_a = 0.75\beta_s$ ) and equal recovery rates ( $\gamma_a = \gamma_s$ ). We assume that asymptomatic individuals do not die, and evaluate the effects on population-level mortality of changing the asymptomatic proportion  $p$  while holding the fatality rate for *symptomatic* cases,  $f$ , constant (the IFR  $(1 - p)f$  thus decreases as  $p$  increases).

Fig. 1 shows simulated epidemic outcomes using parameters similar to those of the originating strain of SARS-CoV-2, without any mitigation other than that individuals who are symptomatic reduce their transmission rate by  $\delta$ . In the absence of the behavioral effect ( $\delta = 0$ ), the final size decreases with the asymptomatic proportion  $p$  because more symptomatic infections leads to a higher basic reproduction number:

$$\mathcal{R}_0 = (1 - p)(1 - \delta)\mathcal{R}_s + p\mathcal{R}_a, \quad (1)$$

where  $\mathcal{R}_s = \beta_s/\gamma_s$  and  $\mathcal{R}_a = \beta_a/\gamma_a$  represent the reproduction numbers of asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals. This relationship changes as  $\delta$  increases. In particular, when  $\delta > 1 - \mathcal{R}_a/\mathcal{R}_s$  (in this case,  $\delta > 0.25$ ), the basic reproduction number (and thus epidemic size) increases with  $p$  because the effective symptomatic transmission rate (including behavioral response) is less than that the asymptomatic rate. For  $\delta$  in this range, we can find a critical level of asymptomatic proportion,  $p_c$ :

$$p_c = \frac{1 - (1 - \delta)\mathcal{R}_s}{\mathcal{R}_a - (1 - \delta)\mathcal{R}_s} \quad (2)$$

such that  $p > p_c$  is required for an outbreak.

When behavioral protection is high, the effect of asymptomatic proportion on fatalities shows countervailing effects of individual-level protection and population-level risk. For high values of  $\delta$ , the peak fatality occurs at intermediate levels of asymptomatic spread: although less individuals die per infection for higher values of  $p$ , the increase in total infections also leads to an increase in total fatalities. In contrast, when  $\delta$  is small enough such that  $\mathcal{R}_s \geq \mathcal{R}_a$ , then total fatalities decrease with  $p$  because both the number of infections and the IFR  $((1 - p)f)$  decrease with increasing  $p$ .

High values of  $\delta$  required for the nonlinear effects of asymptomaticity on deaths may seem unrealistic—in practice,  $\delta$  cannot be greater than the amount of post-symptomatic transmission. While several studies have estimated the proportion of pre-symptomatic transmission to be around 30%–60% for the SARS-CoV-2 wildtype strain, many of them were likely subject to intervention and behavioral effects already as they were conducted after SARS-CoV-2 awareness became widespread [7]. Instead,




Figure 1: **Schematic diagram and simulations of a model with asymptomatic transmission and symptom-responsive transmission reduction.** (Top)  $S$  represents susceptible individuals;  $E$  represents exposed individuals;  $I_a$  represents asymptotically infected individuals;  $I_s$  represents symptomatically infected individuals;  $R$  represents recovered individuals; and  $D$  represents deceased individuals. See Methods for model details. (Bottom left) Total infections as a function of the proportion of asymptomatic infections  $p$  across a wide range scenarios for  $\delta$ . (Bottom right) Total deaths as a function of the proportion of asymptomatic infections  $p$  across a wide range scenarios for  $\delta$ . We simulate the model for 365 days, assuming  $\beta_s = 0.8/\text{day}$ ,  $\beta_a = 0.75\beta_s$ ,  $\mu = 0.5/\text{day}$ ,  $\gamma_s = \gamma_a = 0.2/\text{day}$ , and  $f = 0.01$ . We assume that  $10^{-4}$  proportion of individuals are initially infected.

81 [8] recently estimated that the proportion of pre-symptomatic transmission can be  
82 as low as 20% (95%CI: 6%–32%) during the first few weeks of the pandemic when  
83 the pandemic-awareness and intervention measures were minimal. There are two  
84 implications for the discrepancy in the estimates of the proportion of presymptomatic  
85 transmission—first, a low proportion of presymptomatic transmission suggests that  
86 high  $\delta$  values are feasible (although not necessarily likely) during the initial pandemic

phase; and second, intermediate levels of behavioral effects ( $\delta > 0$ ) would have been already present early in the pandemic to reduce the proportion of presymptomatic transmission from 20% to 60%.

We therefore consider two additional of mathematical models with increasing complexities to answer a more general question: does intermediate amount of sub-clinical (including both asymptomatic and presymptomatic) transmission lead to a peak in fatalities? First, we analyze a model in which there is a fraction  $\theta$  of transmission occurs presymptomatically and all individuals eventually transition to a symptomatic phase (Supplementary Figure S1). When the reproduction number is fixed, increasing the proportion of presymptomatic transmission  $\theta$  causes larger outbreaks, and therefore more deaths, in the presence of symptom-responsive transmission reduction ( $\delta > 0$ ). However, standard compartmental models implicitly assume that the fatality rate  $f$  is independent of the amount of presymptomatic transmission—in the extreme case where all transmission happens presymptomatically, we assume that the case fatality rate is far lower than in the limit when none of the transmission is in the presymptomatic phase. *[JD: We need a bit more detail here. I have no idea what proportion of COVID deaths are post-viral. Maybe I'm COVID-ignorant, but I want more info: many flu deaths are post-viral, and it's not super-clear how much of a role viral replication (or escape from deep lungs?) plays in fatality.]* We therefore assume a tradeoff between the amount of presymptomatic transmission  $\theta$  and the fatality rate  $f$ :  $f(\theta) = f_0(1 - \theta^a)$ , which monotonically decreases from  $f_0$  to 0; the nonlinearity of the tradeoff is characterized by the power law exponent  $a$ . In the simple case where the fatality rate decreases linearly with  $\theta$ , the relationship between the amount of presymptomatic transmission  $\theta$  and total fatalities is equivalent to that between the amount of asymptomatic transmission and total fatalities in the original model (Fig. 1). As we increase the exponent  $a$ , we obtain a nonlinear tradeoff curve where fatality rate  $f$  remains roughly constant for low to intermediate values of  $\theta$  and suddenly decreases to 0 as  $\theta$  approaches 1; in these cases, peak fatalities occur at intermediate levels of presymptomatic transmission for even lower values of  $\delta = 0.6$ , which now represents reduction in transmission after symptom onset.

We then extend our model to consider the effects of generalized *subclinical* transmission, which includes both presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission (Supplementary Figure S2). In particular, we fix the reproduction number of symptomatic individuals and calculate the proportion of fatalities as a function of the proportion of total subclinical transmission and the proportion of subclinical transmission that is caused by presymptomatic transmission. This generalized model extends the models proposed in Fig. 1, where all subclinical transmission is caused by asymptomatic transmission, and the model shown in Supplementary Figure S1 where all subclinical transmission is caused by presymptomatic transmission. Using the generalized subclinical transmission model, we find a wide variety of scenarios for which peak fatalities occur at intermediate levels of subclinical transmission in the presence of moderate to strong behavioral effects,  $\delta > 0.6$  (Supplementary Figure S2); this pattern is robust even to the absence of a tradeoff between the amount

130 of presymptomatic transmission and the fatality rate. One exception is the case  
 131 discussed earlier in which all subclinical transmission is caused by presymptomatic  
 132 transmission. Hereafter, we focus on asymptomatic infections for simplicity, but our  
 133 conclusions have implications for the more general case of subclinical transmission.

134 We now apply our framework to understand the impact of immunity on total fa-  
 135 talities at the population scale by dividing the population into two groups: immuno-  
 136 logically naive and protected. The dynamics of immunologically naive individuals  
 137 are equivalent to our original model (Fig. 1). The dynamics of protected individuals  
 138 include three additional parameters, which characterize the amount of protection  
 139 against infection  $\epsilon_i$ , symptoms  $\epsilon_s$ , and deaths  $\epsilon_d$  (Fig. 2). For simplicity, we assume  
 140 that the population is exactly split in half (50% naive and 50% protected) and mixes  
 141 homogeneously. We also do not consider the separate effect of immunity on transmis-  
 142 sion (beyond the effect on infection). In other words, we assume that asymptomatic  
 143 infections in protected and unprotected people have the same reproduction numbers  
 144 (and likewise for the symptomatic infections). In practice, both asymptomatic and  
 145 symptomatic infections in protected people are less likely to transmit than their un-  
 146 protected counterparts: asymptomatic infections in protected people may indicate  
 147 limited viral replication or even immune boosting, in which case an exposed indi-  
 148 vidual may successfully fight off the pathogen early in infection before it can be  
 149 transmitted; and symptomatic infections in protected people may reflect a strong  
 150 immune response (rather than high viral load), in which case symptomaticity can  
 151 be a poor proxy for transmission. We assume a relatively strong behavioral effect  
 152  $\delta = 0.8$  for illustration. *[SWP: JD: see if you like what I did in this P, esp in terms*  
 153 *of boosting.]*

154 The impact of protection against infection  $\epsilon_i$  is analogous to changing  $\mathcal{R}_0$  in the  
 155 original model: as immunity provides stronger protection against infection (higher  
 156  $\epsilon_i$ ), the number of deaths decreases and a higher asymptomatic fraction  $p$  is required  
 157 for the infection to spread (Fig. 2A). We note that protection against infection scales  
 158 the fatality curve nonlinearly, reflecting the nonlinear relationship between  $\mathcal{R}_0$  and  
 159 the final size. The impact of protection against symptoms  $\epsilon_s$  is equivalent to changing  
 160 the asymptomatic fraction  $p$  for the protected population: the peaks of the fatality  
 161 curves move to lower values of  $p$  as we increase the degree of protection  $\epsilon_s$  (Fig. 2B).  
 162 Therefore, for low values of  $p$ , protection against symptoms can increase the total  
 163 number of fatalities at the population level by increasing the proportion (and num-  
 164 ber) of asymptomatically infected individuals, who can readily transmit infections  
 165 to other individuals. This also means that the critical level of asymptomatic propor-  
 166 tion decreases, allowing more dangerous infections (with lower  $p$ ) to invade, which  
 167 would not have been able to spread in an otherwise immunologically naive popu-  
 168 lation. We note that the equivalence between protection against symptoms  $\epsilon_s$  and  
 169 fraction asymptomatic  $p$  relies on our assumption that immunity does not provide  
 170 protection against transmission. Protection against deaths  $\epsilon_d$  directly modulates the  
 171 fatality rate for symptomatic cases and therefore linearly scales the fatality curves  
 172 (Fig. 2C).




Figure 2: **Schematic diagram and simulations of a model with symptom-responsive transmission reduction and immunity.** (Top) The subscript  $p$  represents protected individuals. Immunity may provide protection against infection, symptoms, or deaths. The dynamics of immunologically naive individuals are described in Fig. 1. (Bottom) Total deaths as a function of the proportion of asymptomatic infections  $p$  across a wide range scenarios for protection against infection  $\epsilon_i$ , symptoms  $\epsilon_s$ , and deaths  $\epsilon_d$ . We simulate the model for 365 days, assuming  $\beta_s = 4/5/\text{day}$ ,  $\beta_a = 0.75\beta_s$ ,  $\mu = 1/2/\text{day}$ ,  $\gamma_s = \gamma_a = 1/5/\text{day}$ ,  $f = 0.01$ , and  $\delta = 0.8$ . We assume that  $10^{-4}$  proportion of individuals are initially infected.

173 Finally, we use our framework to understand the impact of behavioral effects on  
 174 invading variants (Fig. 3). In doing so, we first simulate the dynamics of a wildtype  
 175 variant for 1 year using our base model (Fig. 1). We then simulate a new variant  
 176 invading a partially immune population using our extended model (Fig. 2), where the  
 177 immunity is solely derived from natural infections caused by the wildtype variant.  
 178 We consider two types of variants (which are simulated separately): one with the  
 179 same severity  $p$  (variant 1, orange) and a milder one with higher  $p$  (variant 2, purple).  
 180 First, we consider a scenario in which immunity only provides protection against




Figure 3: **Dynamics of invading variants under symptom-responsive transmission reduction and immunity.** (A, D) Asymptomaticity–fatality curves for the first (solid lines) and second waves (dashed lines). Points represent specific scenarios we assume for the first and second waves. Fatality curves for the first wave are calculated by simulating an epidemic for 1 year using parameters from Fig. 1 with  $\delta = 0.8$ . Fatality curves for the second wave are calculated by first simulating the first wave assuming  $p = 0.2$  for 1 year to calculate the proportion immune and then simulating the extended model presented in Fig. 2 for two different values of  $p$  as shown. (B, E) Dynamics of infection prevalence for the wildtype variant (black, solid line) and two possible invading variants (colored, dashed line). (C, F) Dynamics of daily deaths for the wildtype variant (black, solid line) and two possible invading variants (colored, dashed line).

181 symptoms,  $\epsilon_s = 0.4$  (Fig. 3A–C). In this case, protection against symptoms allows  
 182 new variants to spread faster, resulting in larger outbreaks (Fig. 3B). Although the  
 183 milder (purple) variant exhibits a faster epidemic growth rate and reaches a higher  
 184 peak (Fig. 3B), it reaches similar peak fatality as the more severe (orange) variant  
 185 (Fig. 3C). The asymptomaticity–fatality curve provides additional insight (Fig. 3A):

186 even though a milder, invading variant (purple square) gives higher peak fatality  
 187 than the original, wildtype variant (black circle), it leads to lower fatalities overall  
 188 because deaths are concentrated over a shorter period of time. In general, when  $\delta$  is  
 189 large, invading variants with similar asymptomaticity  $p$  will spread better and result  
 190 in worse population-level outcomes if immunity (either from vaccination or natural  
 191 infection) provides protection against symptoms.

192 Next, we consider a more realistic scenario in which immunity provides protection  
 193 against both symptoms,  $\epsilon_s = 0.4$ , and infection,  $\epsilon_i = 0.4$  (Fig. 3D–F). In this case,  
 194 cross protection against infection has a large effect on the more severe (orange) vari-  
 195 ant, causing its peak infection prevalence (Fig. 3E) and fatality (Fig. 3F) to be lower  
 196 than that of the original, wildtype variant. Across a wide range of asymptomatic pro-  
 197 portion  $p$ , we find that this immunity profile is sufficient to prevent worse outcomes  
 198 at the population level.

199 In summary, using a simplified model we have shown that asymptomatic infec-  
 200 tions can represent a double-edged sword by providing a better outcome for some  
 201 individuals while facilitating onward transmission that leads to a worse outcome for  
 202 the population as a whole. Extending our framework further shows that the immu-  
 203 nity profile plays a critical role in determining the dynamics of future variants: while  
 204 protection against symptoms protects health at the individual level, it can lead to  
 205 more infections, and potentially more deaths, at the population level.

206 Our simulations of invading variants resemble the dynamics of the SARS-CoV-2  
 207 Omicron variant. Despite moderate levels of vaccine effectiveness against symp-  
 208 tomatic and severe cases caused by the Omicron variant, especially after booster  
 209 shots [9], both vaccine- and infection-derived immunity provided limited protection  
 210 against infections [10]. This immune evasion helped the Omicron variant to cause  
 211 more infections in South Africa than previous variants [11]; even though the Omicron  
 212 variant is probably milder than XXX [12, 13], the number of hospitalizations and  
 213 deaths caused by the Omicron variant was high [14, 15, 16].

214 There are several limitations to our analysis. First of all, behavioral and inter-  
 215 vention effects must be large in order for the fatality to peak at intermediate levels  
 216 of asymptomaticity. While we are able to generalize our results using more realis-  
 217 tic models, incorporating both presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission, the  
 218 transmission rate needs to be reduced by at least 60% after symptom onset for us  
 219 to see the nonlinear effects of subclinical transmission on population-level outcomes.  
 220 *[SWP: what are some other limitations we should address?] [JD: Something about*  
 221 *estimating protection against different endpoints. We should also highlight the im-*  
 222 *portance of doing this estimation.]*

223 SARS-CoV-2 has proven hard to control in large part because transmission is of-  
 224 ten decoupled from symptoms. Although mitigation efforts have often prioritized  
 225 responding to symptoms—including symptom-based testing, fever checks, mask-  
 226 wearing for infectious individuals—a different approach that strives to reduce the  
 227 chance of asymptomatic transmission while increasing treatment of symptomatically  
 228 infected individuals could both reduce infection risk at the source and in the event



229 that individuals are at risk for severe outcomes. As more variants continue to emerge,  
230 updating vaccines to prevent infections, and not just diseases, will be critical to con-  
231 trolling the course of the pandemic. **[JD:** *This is complicated. Maybe regular waves*  
232 *of mild SC2 are a good way to control morbidity in the medium term. There is*  
233 *also an argument to make about symptom-focused responses and evolution toward*  
234 *mildness.]*

## 235 Supplementary Materials

### 236 Methods

#### 237 Models without immunity

First, we consider a simple, compartmental model with asymptomatic and symptomatic infections in a homogeneously mixing population. The model dynamics are as follows:

$$\dot{S} = -\beta_a S I_a - (1 - \delta) \beta_s S I_s \quad (3)$$

$$\dot{E} = \beta_a S I_a + (1 - \delta) \beta_s S I_s - \mu E \quad (4)$$

$$\dot{I}_a = p \mu E - \gamma_a I_a \quad (5)$$

$$\dot{I}_s = (1 - p) \mu E - \gamma_s I_s \quad (6)$$

$$\dot{R} = \gamma_a I_a + (1 - f) \gamma_s I_s \quad (7)$$

$$\dot{D} = f \gamma_s I_s \quad (8)$$

238 where the transmission rate  $\beta$  and recovery rate  $\gamma$  can be potentially differ be-  
 239 tween asymptomatic and symptomatically infected individuals. Here,  $\delta$  denotes the  
 240 reduction in transmissibility due to responsive measures taken by symptomatically  
 241 infected individuals. Throughout the paper, we use parameters that are broadly con-  
 242 sistent with the dynamics of the originating strain of SARS-CoV-2:  $\beta_s = 0.8/\text{day}$ ,  
 243  $\beta_a = 0.75\beta_s$ ,  $1/\mu = 2$  days,  $1/\gamma_s = 1/\gamma_a = 5$  days, and  $f = 0.01$ .

We then consider a model with presymptomatic transmission (and without asymp-  
 tomatic transmission), where all infected individuals eventually develop symptoms:

$$\dot{S} = -\beta_a S I_a - (1 - \delta) \beta_s S I_s \quad (9)$$

$$\dot{E} = \beta_a S I_a + (1 - \delta) \beta_s S I_s - \mu E \quad (10)$$

$$\dot{I}_p = \mu E - \sigma I_p \quad (11)$$

$$\dot{I}_s = \sigma I_p - \gamma_s I_s \quad (12)$$

$$\dot{R} = (1 - f) \gamma_s I_s \quad (13)$$

$$\dot{D} = f \gamma_s I_s \quad (14)$$

244 For this model, the presymptomatic  $\mathcal{R}_p$  and symptomatic  $\mathcal{R}_s$  reproduction numbers  
 245 are given by  $\mathcal{R}_p = \beta_p/\sigma$  and  $\mathcal{R}_s = \beta_s/\gamma_s$  in the absence of the behavioral effect; and  
 246 the basic reproduction number is equal to the sum of the two. Then, the intrinsic  
 247 proportion of presymptomatic transmission is given by:

$$\theta = \frac{\mathcal{R}_p}{\mathcal{R}_p + \mathcal{R}_s}. \quad (15)$$

248 We assume there is a tradeoff between the proportion of presymptomatic transmission  
 249 and fatality rate:

$$f(\theta) = f_0(1 - \theta^a), \quad (16)$$

250 where  $f_0 = 0.01$  represents the baseline fatality rate and the exponent  $a$  is varied  
 251 between 1 and 5. Throughout simulations, we assume  $\mathcal{R}_0 = 4$ ,  $1/\sigma = 2$  days, and  
 252  $1/\gamma_s = 3$  days. All other parameters are same as before.

Finally, we combine both models to include both presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission:

$$\dot{S} = -\beta_a S I_a - (1 - \delta) \beta_s S I_s \quad (17)$$

$$\dot{E} = \beta_a S I_a + (1 - \delta) \beta_s S I_s - \mu E \quad (18)$$

$$\dot{I}_p = \mu E - \sigma I_p \quad (19)$$

$$\dot{I}_a = p \sigma I_p - \gamma_a I_a \quad (20)$$

$$\dot{I}_s = (1 - p) \sigma I_p - \gamma_s I_s \quad (21)$$

$$\dot{R} = \gamma_a I_a + (1 - f) \gamma_s I_s \quad (22)$$

$$\dot{D} = f \gamma_s I_s \quad (23)$$

253 For this model, the reproduction number of individuals who will eventually develop  
 254 symptoms is equal to:  $\mathcal{R}_p + \mathcal{R}_s$ ; similarly, the reproduction number of individuals  
 255 who remain asymptomatic is equal to:  $\mathcal{R}_p + \mathcal{R}_a$ . Since proportion  $p$  of all infections  
 256 is asymptomatic, the basic reproduction number is given by the weighted average of  
 257 these two reproduction numbers:

$$\mathcal{R}_0 = p(\mathcal{R}_p + \mathcal{R}_a) + (1 - p)(\mathcal{R}_p + \mathcal{R}_s) = \mathcal{R}_p + p\mathcal{R}_a + (1 - p)\mathcal{R}_s. \quad (24)$$

258 Then, the proportion of subclinical transmission  $\phi$  is given by:

$$\phi = \frac{\mathcal{R}_p + p\mathcal{R}_a}{\mathcal{R}_0}. \quad (25)$$

For simulations of the combined model, we start by fixing the reproduction number of individuals who will eventually develop symptoms:  $\mathcal{R}_{\text{symp}} = \mathcal{R}_p + \mathcal{R}_s = 4$ . Consistent with previous assumptions, we also assume that asymptomatic reproduction number is lower than that of the symptomatic reproduction number:  $\mathcal{R}_a = \rho \mathcal{R}_s$  where  $\rho = 0.75$ . Then, for a given value of the proportion of subclinical transmission  $\phi$  and proportion of subclinical transmission caused by the presymptomatic transmission,  $\eta = \mathcal{R}_p / (\mathcal{R}_p + p\mathcal{R}_a)$ , we can solve for the transmission rate for each compartment  $\beta$  and the proportion asymptomatic  $p$ . More specifically:

$$\mathcal{R}_p = \frac{\mathcal{R}_{\text{symp}}}{1 + y} \quad (26)$$

$$\mathcal{R}_s = \mathcal{R}_{\text{symp}} - \mathcal{R}_p \quad (27)$$

$$\mathcal{R}_a = \rho \mathcal{R}_s \quad (28)$$

$$p = \left( \frac{1}{\eta} - 1 \right) \frac{\mathcal{R}_p}{\mathcal{R}_a}, \quad (29)$$

259 where  $y = (1/\phi - 1)/\eta + (1/\eta - 1)/\rho$ . All other parameters are same as before.

260 **Model with immunity**

We then model the spread of infection in a partially immune population. The model dynamics are as follows:

$$\dot{S} = -\lambda(t)S \quad (30)$$

$$\dot{E} = \lambda(t)S - \mu E \quad (31)$$

$$\dot{I}_a = p\mu E - \gamma_a I_a \quad (32)$$

$$\dot{I}_s = (1-p)\mu E - \gamma_s I_s \quad (33)$$

$$\dot{R} = \gamma_a I_a + (1-f)\gamma_s I_s \quad (34)$$

$$\dot{D} = f\gamma_s I_s \quad (35)$$

$$\dot{S}_p = -(1-\epsilon_i)\lambda(t)S_p \quad (36)$$

$$\dot{E}_p = (1-\epsilon_i)\lambda(t)S_p - \mu E_p \quad (37)$$

$$\dot{I}_{p,a} = (1-(1-\epsilon_s)(1-p))\mu E_p - \gamma_a I_{p,a} \quad (38)$$

$$\dot{I}_{p,s} = (1-\epsilon_s)(1-p)\mu E_p - \gamma_s I_{p,s} \quad (39)$$

$$\dot{R}_p = \gamma_a I_{p,a} + (1-(1-\epsilon_d)f)\gamma_s I_{p,s} \quad (40)$$

$$\dot{D}_p = (1-\epsilon_d)f\gamma_s I_{p,s} \quad (41)$$

261 where  $\epsilon$  represents the degree of protection against infection, symptoms and death.  
 262 The force of infection  $\lambda(t)$  is given by:

$$\lambda(t) = \beta_a(I_a + I_{p,a}) + (1-\delta)\beta_s(I_s + I_{p,s}). \quad (42)$$

263 Here, subscripts  $p$  denote individuals who are immune and therefore are protected.

# Supplementary Figures




Figure S1: **Schematic diagram and simulations of a model with presymptomatic transmission and symptom-responsive transmission reduction.** (Top)  $S$  represents susceptible individuals;  $E$  represents exposed individuals;  $I_p$  represents presymptomatically infected individuals;  $I_s$  represents symptomatically infected individuals;  $R$  represents recovered individuals; and  $D$  represents deceased individuals. See Methods for model details. (Bottom) Total deaths as a function of the proportion of presymptomatic transmission  $\theta$  across a wide range scenarios for  $\delta$  and a tradeoff between the proportion of presymptomatic infections  $\theta$  and fatality rates  $f$ .




Figure S2: **Schematic diagram and simulations of a model with presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission and symptom-responsive transmission reduction.** (Top)  $S$  represents susceptible individuals;  $E$  represents exposed individuals;  $I_p$  represents presymptomatically infected individuals;  $I_a$  represents asymptotically infected individuals;  $I_s$  represents symptomatically infected individuals;  $R$  represents recovered individuals; and  $D$  represents deceased individuals. See Methods for model details. (Bottom) Total deaths as a function of the proportion of subclinical transmission  $\phi$  across a wide range scenarios for  $\delta$  and a tradeoff between the proportion of presymptomatic infections  $\theta$  and fatality rates  $f$ .

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