

Immune boosting bridges leaky and polarized vaccination models

Sang Woo Park^{1,*}, Michael Li^{2,3}, C. Jessica E. Metcalf^{1,4}, Bryan T. Grenfell^{1,4}, Jonathan Dushoff^{3,5,6}

1 Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

2 Public Health Risk Science Division, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada, Guelph, Ontario, Canada

3 Department of Mathematics & Statistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

4 Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

5 Department of Biology, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

6 M. G. DeGroote Institute for Infectious Disease Research, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

*Corresponding author: swp2@princeton.edu

Abstract

Two different epidemiological models of vaccination are commonly used in dynamical modeling studies. The leaky vaccination model assumes that all vaccinated individuals experience a reduced force of infection ~~by the same amount~~. The polarized vaccination model assumes that some fraction of vaccinated individuals are completely protected, while the remaining fraction remains completely susceptible; this seemingly extreme assumption causes the polarized model to always predict lower final epidemic size than the leaky model under the same vaccine efficacy. However, the leaky model also makes an implicit, unrealistic assumption: vaccinated individuals who are exposed to infection but not infected remain just as susceptible as they were prior to ~~exposures (i.e., independent of previous exposures). To resolve the independence-exposure. To address this latter~~ assumption, we introduce an immune boosting mechanism, through which ~~vaccinated, yet-susceptible~~ partially susceptible individuals can gain protection without developing a

34 transmissible infection. ~~The boosting model further~~ A model where such
35 boosted individuals are perfectly protected predicts identical epidemic dy-
36 namics as the polarized vaccination model, thereby bridging the differences
37 between two models. We further develop a generalized vaccination model
38 to explore how the assumptions of immunity affect epidemic dynamics and
39 estimates of vaccine effectiveness.

Introduction

Vaccination plays a critical role in controlling infectious disease outbreaks by protecting against new infections and associated disease (Iwasaki and Omer, 2020). In particular, if a critical vaccination threshold is reached, the reproduction number (defined as the average number of secondary infections caused by an infected individual) is reduced to below 1, and ~~future~~ epidemics can be prevented (Anderson and May, 1985). But reaching a critical vaccination threshold can be challenging, and vaccines often provide imperfect ~~protections~~ protection (Gandon et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2020).

Partial ~~protections~~ protection provided by vaccination ~~have raised~~ raises important questions about how vaccine efficacy ~~should be measured from~~ clinical trials (and likewise, vaccine effectiveness from real outbreaks). Historically, ~~both (in clinical trials) and~~ vaccine effectiveness (in populations) ~~should be estimated. Traditionally, both~~ efficacy and effectiveness have been ~~estimated~~ estimated by comparing the ~~cumulative (cumulative)~~ proportion of vaccinated individuals ~~who are infected against the cumulative proportion of unvaccinated individuals who are infected within~~ infected in a given time frame to the same proportion among unvaccinated individuals (Farrington, 1993). However, this approach implicitly assumes a single exposure ~~/challenge~~ per individual, and otherwise gives biased estimates, requiring different estimators ~~for~~ specifically tuned to ~~each a particular~~ scenario (Halloran et al., 1991). ~~On the other hand, other~~ Other researchers have suggested using measures based on incidence rates (i.e., the rate at which new infections or cases are generated) to estimating vaccine efficacy, ~~but~~; these methods are also subject to several biases (Rinta-Kokko et al., 2009; Lipsitch and Kahn, 2021). Heterogeneity in mixing patterns, susceptible depletion, and immune waning further ~~hampers~~ hamper our ability to estimate ~~both~~ vaccine efficacy and effectiveness (Halloran et al., 1992; Lipsitch, 2019; Kahn et al., 2022).

Even if vaccine efficacy can be accurately estimated, there are additional challenges to translating these estimates to population-level predictions about epidemic dynamics. In particular, there are two disparate ways of modeling vaccines with imperfect protections: “leaky” and “all-or-nothing” vaccine (Smith et al., 1984), which yield different dynamics even when vaccine efficacy (defined here as proportion of people protected from their first challenge) is held constant. The leaky vaccination model assumes that vaccinated individuals experience a reduced force of infection (e.g., multiplied by a factor $1 - \text{VE}_L < 1$, where VE_L ~~represent vaccine efficacy, which we define as the~~

77 ~~proportion of people protected from their first challenge)~~ represents (leaky)
78 vaccine efficacy. The “all-or-nothing” vaccination model assumes that the
79 proportion VE_P of vaccinated individuals are completely protected and the
80 remaining proportion $1 - VE_P$ of vaccinated individuals are completely sus-
81 ceptible, where VE_P ~~also represents vaccine efficacy~~. ~~This~~ represents (polarized)
82 vaccine efficacy, so-called because this model is analogous to the ~~polarized~~
83 ~~immunity model~~ “polarized” model of cross-immunity, in which infection
84 from one strain gives complete or no protection against other strains (~~Gog and Grenfell, 2002~~)
85 ~~—we thus refer to this model as the polarized vaccination model (Gomes et al., 2014)~~
86 (Gog and Grenfell, 2002; Gomes et al., 2014).

87 There is some empirical support for both leaky (Lind et al., 2023) and
88 polarized vaccines (Langwig et al., 2017), ~~but these two assumptions have~~
89 and the two assumptions can have sharply different consequences for out-
90 break predictions. Specifically, when these two models are used with the
91 same nominal vaccine efficacy $VE_L = VE_P$, they predict different epidemic
92 dynamics, including the final size (Smith et al., 1984): for a high force of
93 infection, almost all individuals eventually get infected in the leaky model,
94 whereas many individuals are permanently protected in the polarized model.
95 Modelers tend to rely on the leaky assumption, including throughout the
96 SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (Dyson et al., 2021; Gozzi et al., 2021; Marziano
97 et al., 2021; Matrajt et al., 2021; Park et al., 2022) with some exceptions
98 (Bubar et al., 2021; Buckner et al., 2021). Various reasons have been given,
99 but most likely is a combination of convenience and tradition.

100 Both models represent simplifications of reality. The leaky model in
101 particular overlooks a potentially important mechanism: individuals in this
102 model do not lose any susceptibility when (implicitly) exposed to a challenge
103 that does not result in infection. In fact, vaccinated individuals who success-
104 fully fight off exposures can experience immune boosting, thus becoming less
105 susceptible to future infections without becoming infectious or developing
106 symptoms from the exposure (Lavine et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2020).

107 In this study, we compare different approaches to dynamical modeling of
108 vaccination and immunity. First, we construct a model with leaky vaccina-
109 tion and boosting, and show that the transmission dynamics of this model
110 can bridge from the dynamics of the standard leaky model (with no boosting)
111 to those of the polarized model (with perfect boosting). Then, we construct
112 a generalized vaccination model, which includes all three mechanisms, and
113 explore its dynamics. Finally, we use our framework to compare measures of
114 vaccine effectiveness.

115 Mathematical models of vaccine-induced im- 116 munity

Throughout the paper, we assume that a population mixes homogeneously and that there is no loss of immunity (including indirectly through deaths and births); the latter assumption essentially corresponds to focusing on a single outbreak. *[JD: I seem to have gone through a loop here, sorry about that, happy with current text.]* We begin with a standard SIR model with a leaky vaccine, in which all vaccinated individuals experience a reduced probability of infection by a factor of $1 - \text{VE}_L$:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -(1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v + \rho S_u \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \gamma_v I_v \quad (6)$$

117 where subscripts u and v indicate the unvaccinated and vaccinated individu-
118 als; λ represents the baseline force of infection experienced by unvaccinated
119 individuals; ρ represents vaccination rate; γ represents the recovery rate;
120 and VE_L represents the vaccine efficacy, which also captures the amount of
121 reduction in the probability of infection. This kind of model is sometimes
122 called “history-based”, since susceptibility of an individual depends only on
123 their history of infections (or vaccination) (Gog and Grenfell, 2002; Gog and
124 Swinton, 2002; Kucharski et al., 2016).

Conversely, the polarized vaccination model assumes that a proportion VE_P of vaccinated individuals become fully immune, whereas the remaining




Figure 1: **A schematic diagram of four different vaccination models.** S represents susceptible individuals. I represents infected individuals. R represents recovered individuals. λ represents force of infection. ρ represents the rate of vaccination. p represents vaccine efficacy. γ represents recovery rate. θ represents the proportion of individuals that remain partially susceptible after vaccination. q represents the proportion of unsuccessful challenges that result in immune boosting. Subscripts u and v represents unvaccinated and vaccinated.

proportion $1 - \text{VE}_P$ remain susceptible:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (7)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_v + (1 - \text{VE}_P)\rho S_u \quad (10)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (11)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \gamma_v I_v + \text{VE}_P \rho S_u \quad (12)$$

125 This is the approach used in “status-based” models of cross immunity—
 126 such models keep track of immune statuses of individuals, rather than their
 127 ~~infection~~ histories (Gog and Grenfell, 2002; Gog and Swinton, 2002; Kucharski
 128 et al., 2016). For this model, the parameter VE_P is the measure of vaccine
 129 efficacy.

130 These two widely used models have important dynamical differences. For
 131 a given set of shared parameters, and the same value of vaccine efficacy, initial
 132 dynamics will be the same, but the permanent protection of individuals in
 133 the polarized model will always result in a lower final outbreak size than
 134 the leaky vaccination model. When both VE and the initial value of \mathcal{R} are
 135 relatively high, this difference is large.

To better understand this gap, we consider an immune-boosting model. The leaky vaccination model implicitly assumes that vaccinated individuals who experience unsuccessful challenges (with probability VE_L) remain susceptible; this is equivalent to assuming that vaccinated individuals are challenged with a lower force of infection $(1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)$. However, in a homogeneously mixing population, we expect both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals to be challenged with identical forces of infection λ . Therefore, the leaky vaccination model implicitly assumes that vaccinated individuals are unaffected by unsuccessful challenges, and thus have an *independent* probability $(1 - \text{VE}_L)$ of infection for every challenge. ~~Instead, the~~ The immune-boosting model on the other hand, assumes that unsuccessful challenges elicit immune response, moving individuals from S_v to R_v compartment at

rate $\text{VE}_L \lambda(t)$ and thereby breaking the independence assumption of the leaky vaccine model:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (13)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (14)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (15)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_v + \rho S_u \quad (16)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (17)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \text{VE}_L \lambda(t)S_v + \gamma_v I_v \quad (18)$$

136 In this model, both unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals are subject to
 137 identical forces of infection, which represent the per capita rate of challenges,
 138 but the outcome of challenges differ.

139 The epidemiological dynamics (i.e., trajectories of I_u and I_v) predicted by
 140 the immune-boosting model (based on leaky vaccination) and the polarized
 141 vaccination model are identical: both models assume that individuals become
 142 vaccinated at rate ρ and move out of the S_v compartment at rate λ and
 143 only differ in when individuals get sorted based on the result of their next
 144 challenge. This equivalence allows us to bridge the difference between the
 145 leaky and polarized vaccination models. The equivalence holds regardless of
 146 infection characteristics of vaccinated individuals (i.e., the duration of their
 147 infection and their transmissibility).

148 Other studies have tried to characterize the differences between leaky
 149 and polarized vaccination models by considering a distribution of suscep-
 150 tibility (i.e., ~~1 — vaccine efficacy~~ 1 — vaccine efficacy [JD: 1 — efficacy might
 151 *be better*]) among vaccinated individuals, where the susceptibility can vary
 152 anywhere between 0 and 1 with some probability distribution (Gomes et al.,
 153 2014). For example, the leaky assumption was previously modeled using a
 154 delta distribution (i.e., all individuals are equally susceptible), whereas the
 155 polarized assumption was previously modeled using a polarized distribution
 156 (i.e., some individuals have complete protection and others have no protec-
 157 tion). While it is possible to bridge these two distributions using a continuous
 158 distributions, this approach also implicitly assumes that unsuccessful chal-
 159 lenges remain just as susceptible. Instead, in Supplementary Materials, we

160 show that ~~epidemic dynamics are independent of the shape~~ under complete
 161 boosting, epidemic dynamics depend only on the mean (not the shape) of the
 162 susceptibility distribution ~~under immune boosting (and instead only depends~~
 163 ~~on the mean susceptibility).~~

Finally, we consider a generalized model that encompasses all three mechanisms above (dichotomous vaccine responses, partial protection, and immune boosting):

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (19)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -[1 - (1 - q)\text{VE}_L]\lambda(t)S_v + (1 - \text{VE}_P)\rho S_u \quad (22)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (23)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \text{VE}_P \rho S_u + q\text{VE}_L \lambda(t)S_v + \gamma_v I_v \quad (24)$$

164 This model includes one new parameter, q , which represents the proportion
 165 of unsuccessful challenges that result in immune boosting. When $q = 0$ (i.e.,
 166 in the absence of boosting), setting $\text{VE}_P = 0$ gives us the leaky vaccination
 167 model. When $q = 1$ (i.e., in the presence of full boosting), setting $\text{VE}_P = 0$
 168 gives us the immune-boosting model, whereas setting $\text{VE}_L = 0$ gives us the
 169 polarized vaccination model. The relationship between these four models are
 170 summarized in Fig. 1. The generalized vaccination model has a combined
 171 vaccine efficacy of $\text{VE} = 1 - (1 - \text{VE}_L)(1 - \text{VE}_P)$. We later analyze the
 172 dynamics of the generalized vaccination model while keeping VE fixed.

173 Model simulations

174 We begin by comparing the dynamics of three individual models: leaky vacci-
 175 nation, polarized vaccination, and immune-boosting models. As an example,
 176 we consider a homogeneously mixing population. In this case, the force of
 177 infection is given by:

$$\lambda = \beta_u I_u + \beta_v I_v \quad (25)$$

For simplicity, we assume that, once infected, both unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals transmit at the same rate $\beta_u = \beta_v = 0.5/\text{day}$ for an average of $1/\gamma = 5$ days. We also assume that $\phi = 0.5$ proportion of individuals are vaccinated at the beginning of an epidemic with 60% efficacy (VE_P or $\text{VE}_L = 0.6$) and that vaccination does not continue during the outbreak ($\rho = 0$). For the leaky vaccination model and the immune-boosting model, we set $S_v(0) = 1 - \phi$ and $R_v(0) = \phi$. For consistency, we then set $S_v(0) = \phi(1 - \text{VE}_P)$ and $R_v(0) = \phi\text{VE}_P$ as our initial condition for the polarized vaccination model.

Fig. 2 compares epidemiological (A–C) and immune-status (D–F) trajectories predicted by the three models. As explained earlier, the leaky vaccination model predicts more infections among vaccinated individuals than the other two models, which predict identical incidence trajectories. The leaky vaccination model also predicts more among unvaccinated individuals because a larger outbreak among vaccinated individuals causes unvaccinated individuals to experience a greater forces of infection over time.

We further find that all three models predict different immune-status trajectories. (Fig. 2D–F). Here, we do not distinguish the sources of antibodies (whether derived from natural infections or vaccinations) and assume that individuals in R_u , S_v , and R_v compartments are seropositive, except in the case of polarized vaccination: in such case, we assume individuals in the S_v compartment are seronegative because they have not retained any immunity from the vaccination. The leaky vaccination model predicts the largest outbreak and therefore the highest levels of seroprevalence (89.7% by the end of the simulation). The immune-boosting model predicts lower seroprevalence (85.6%), reflecting the lower final size, while the polarized vaccination model predicts a still lower seroprevalence (79.9%) because of our assumption that people not protected by polarized vaccination are not seropositive.

We next use the generalized vaccination model to further investigate how the final size of the an epidemic among vaccinated individuals depends on assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity across a wide range of assumptions about the basic reproduction number \mathcal{R}_0 and vaccine efficacy VE (Fig. 3). In particular, we factor vaccine efficacy VE in terms of leaky vaccine efficacy VE_L and polarized vaccine efficacy VE_P , and consider an intermediate case, in which $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}_P = 1 - \sqrt{1 - \text{VE}}$, as well as the extreme cases, in which case $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}$ or $\text{VE}_P = \text{VE}$. First, when $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}$, all vaccinated individuals have identical susceptibility; in this case, increasing the amount of boosting q reduces the final size as expected (see first column




Figure 2: **Simulations of three different vaccination models.** (A–C) Incidence of infection among unvaccinated (blue solid) and vaccinated (red dashed) individuals. (D–F) Immune status over time (compartments R_u , S_v , and R_v). The S_v compartment is not included in the polarized vaccination model because it represents a set of individuals who have not retained any immunity from vaccination. Simulations are performed assuming $\beta_u = \beta_v = 0.5/\text{day}$ for an average infectious periods of $1/\gamma = 5$ days. We also assume that $\phi = 0.5$ proportion of individuals are vaccinated at the beginning of an epidemic with 60% efficacy ($\text{VE}_P = \text{VE}_L = 0.6$) and that vaccination does not continue during the outbreak ($\rho = 0$).

of Fig. 3). We observe biggest effects of boosting at intermediate vaccine efficacy, VE , and high basic reproduction number, \mathcal{R}_0 (see bottom left panel of Fig. 3). When vaccine efficacy is too low (or too high), then boosting has negligible effects because virtually everyone (or virtually no one) gets infected. As we increase \mathcal{R}_0 , the leaky vaccination model predicts that all vaccinated individuals will eventually get infected. On the other hand, the final size predicted by the immune-boosting model cannot be greater than $1 - \text{VE}$. As we increase VE_P (and decrease VE_L accordingly), the generalized vaccination model collapses to the polarized vaccination model, and the final size becomes insensitive to the boosting parameter q .

So far, we have limited our discussions to vaccine efficacy, which we defined as the proportion of people protected from their first challenge. We




Figure 3: Sensitivity of the final size of an outbreak among vaccinated individuals to assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity
 Final size of an outbreak was calculated by simulating the generalized vaccination model for 220 days. All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.

228 distinguish this from vaccine *effectiveness*, which is measured empirically
 229 (Halloran et al., 2009). Here, we compare two ways of estimating vaccine
 230 effectiveness: using cumulative incidence or instantaneous hazard. Several
 231 factors can cause vaccine effectiveness to systematically differ from vaccine
 232 efficacy—in our case, the main reason is the fact that some vaccinated indi-
 233 viduals may be challenged multiple times.

Cumulative incidence refers to the cumulative proportion of infections among unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals; this is commonly used for measuring the vaccine effectiveness in real outbreaks (Farrington, 1993). Since we are modeling a single epidemic without a loss of immunity or multi-

ple infections, we consider the reduction in cumulative incidence throughout the entire epidemic. To do so, we add two additional compartments, which keep track of cumulative incidence among unvaccinated C_u and vaccinated C_v individuals:

$$\frac{dC_u}{dt} = \lambda S_u \quad (26)$$

$$\frac{dC_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L) \lambda S_v \quad (27)$$

Since we are neglecting vaccinations that occur during the outbreak ($\rho = 0$), the cumulative proportion of infections among vaccinated $p_v(t)$ and unvaccinated $p_u(t)$ individuals can be expressed as:

$$p_u(t) = C_u(t)/S_u(0) \quad (28)$$

$$p_v(t) = C_v(t)/S_v(0) \quad (29)$$

234 Then, the estimated vaccine effectiveness at time t is:

$$1 - \frac{p_v(t)}{p_u(t)}. \quad (30)$$

235 On the other hand, instantaneous hazard refers to the per-capita rate at
 236 which unvaccinated $h_u(t)$ and vaccinated $h_v(t)$ individuals get infected if they
 237 have not yet been infected yet. These quantities can be calculated by dividing
 238 the incidence of new infection by the number of uninfected individuals. The
 239 per-capita rate of infection $h_v(t)$ among vaccinated individuals is then given
 240 by:

$$h_v(t) = \frac{(1 - \text{VE}_L) \lambda(t) S_v(t)}{S_v(0) - C_v(t)}, \quad (31)$$

241 where $S_v(0) - C_v(t) \geq S_v(t)$ because vaccinated individuals can leave the $S_v(t)$
 242 compartment via boosting; in other words, we are assuming that boosting is
 243 not observed, and that boosted individuals are neither counted as infected,
 244 nor removed from the denominator. The per-capita rate of infection $h_u(t)$
 245 among unvaccinated individuals is straightforward:

$$h_u(t) = \frac{\lambda(t) S_u(t)}{S_u(t)} = \lambda(t). \quad (32)$$

246 Then, the estimated reduction in hazard at time t is:

$$1 - \frac{h_v(t)}{h_u(t)}. \quad (33)$$

247 We compare two estimates of vaccine effectiveness across a wide range of
 248 assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity in Fig. 4. We assume 60% effi-
 249 cacy throughout (therefore $VE = 0.6$). Under polarized vaccination ($VE_P =$
 250 VE , $VE_L = 0$), the cumulative-incidence reduction always gives correct an-
 251 swers throughout the epidemic—since the susceptible pool among unvacci-
 252 nated and vaccinated individuals is depleted at the same rate λ , the ra-
 253 tios of their proportions of cumulative infections remain constant. Likewise,
 254 the cumulative-incidence reduction also gives correct answers under immune
 255 boosting ($q = 1$). However, when some challenges are not boosted ($q < 1$),
 256 using cumulative incidence underestimates the vaccine efficacy beyond the
 257 exponential growth phase. This is because vaccinated individuals who have
 258 been exposed but are not boosted or infected still remain susceptible to fu-
 259 ture infections; larger final epidemic sizes predicted by these models (Fig. 3)
 260 then translate to a seemingly lower vaccine efficacy.

261 The hazard reduction gives correct answers for the leaky vaccine model
 262 (when $q = 0$, $VE_L = VE$, and $VE_P = 0$) because the ratios of force of
 263 infection that unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals experience are always
 264 constant. However, the hazard reduction overestimates vaccine efficacy in the
 265 presence of immune boosting: since boosted individuals have not yet been
 266 infected, the susceptible pool in the vaccinated group appears to be bigger
 267 than it really is, causing the per-capita rate of infection to seem smaller.
 268 Vaccine efficacy is also overestimated for polarized vaccination for similar
 269 reasons.

270 We note that both estimates give correct answers during the exponential
 271 growth phase, regardless of underlying assumptions about immunity. More
 272 generally, we expect both estimates to give unbiased estimates as long as
 273 the depletion of susceptible pool is negligible among both vaccinated and
 274 unvaccinated individuals; in trial settings, where incidence is relatively low,
 275 this assumption may hold. But estimating vaccine effectiveness from real
 276 outbreaks is expected to be more difficult.

277 Discussion

278 Understanding the degree to which vaccination provides protection against
 279 infections is critical to predicting epidemic dynamics. The polarized model
 280 has been largely neglected in epidemiological modeling, in part due to its
 281 apparently extreme assumption that a fraction of vaccinated individuals do




Figure 4: **Estimates of vaccine effectiveness using reduction in cumulative incidence (A) and hazard (B) over time.** Vaccine effectiveness was calculated by simulating the generalized vaccination model for 220 days. Colored lines represent the estimated vaccine effectiveness. Dashed lines represent the assumed vaccine efficacy. We assume $\mathcal{R}_0 = 2.5$ and a combined efficacy of $VE = 0.6$ throughout. All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.

282 not receive any protection. But the leaky vaccination model also makes an
 283 unrealistic assumption: that vaccinated individuals who are exposed to in-
 284 fections can still remain susceptible, independent of previous exposures. This
 285 assumption causes the leaky vaccination model to always predict a larger epi-
 286 demic final size. This difference can be bridged with immune boosting. With
 287 boosting, vaccinated individuals can attain protection without developing a
 288 transmissible infection. In particular, the leaky model with perfect immune-
 289 boosting model predicts identical epidemic dynamics to the polarized vacci-

290 nation model because individuals in both cases are completely immune after
291 surviving a single challenge.

292 Even though immune boosting and polarized vaccination models predict
293 the same epidemic dynamics, they may have different immune-status dynam-
294 ics. We investigate both aspects using a generalized vaccination model, which
295 encompasses the mechanisms of all three models. The generalized vaccina-
296 tion model includes one additional parameter, which determines the amount
297 of immune boosting. We use this model to show that the epidemic dynamics
298 are most sensitive to the assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity at an
299 intermediate vaccine efficacy.

300 Finally, assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity also have impor-
301 tant implications for estimating vaccine effectiveness. Vaccine effectiveness
302 can be estimated based either on cumulative incidence or on hazard rates.
303 Cumulative-incidence-based effectiveness estimates ~~will reflect initial~~ reflect
304 efficacy for polarized vaccination and ~~immune-boosting~~ complete-boosting
305 models, whereas hazard-based estimates reflect efficacy for the leaky vacci-
306 nation model. Neither method reflects efficacy for intermediate cases. These
307 differences are driven by different assumptions about what happens when in-
308 dividuals are challenged more than once; thus both methods reflect efficacy
309 when the cumulative hazard of infection is low. Conversely, interpretation of
310 effectiveness estimates when a large fraction of unvaccinated individuals have
311 been infected depends on (usually unknown) details of immune dynamics.

312 We rely above on a simplifying assumption that natural infections (as well
313 as polarized vaccination and immune boosting) provide permanent protec-
314 tion against future infections. In practice, both infection- and vaccine-derived
315 immunity wane over time for many pathogens (Heffernan and Keeling, 2009;
316 Lewnard and Grad, 2018; Pérez-Alós et al., 2022). When immunity wanes,
317 polarized vaccination and immune-boosting models may not necessarily pre-
318 dict identical dynamics. In particular, individuals who gain complete protec-
319 tion through polarized immunity may immediately enter the R_v compartment
320 upon vaccination, whereas those who gain complete protection through im-
321 mune boosting take longer to enter the R_v compartment because they need
322 to be exposed to infections. These differences can translate to shorter delays
323 between reinfection events for the polarized immunity model, which in turn
324 can lead to dynamical differences at the population level.

325 There are also other complexities that need to be considered. For exam-
326 ple, individuals who are boosted after vaccination can have different immu-
327 nity profiles compared to those who attained strong protection from vacci-

328 nation alone. These individuals also likely have different immunity profiles
329 from those who have been infected but never been vaccinated. These dif-
330 ferences can also cause polarized vaccination and immune-boosting models
331 to behave differently. Despite these limitations, immune boosting, which is
332 often neglected in epidemic models of vaccination, is still expected to be an
333 important mechanism for understanding dynamics of many pathogens.

334 We have provided a unifying framework for understanding the impact of
335 vaccination on the spread of infectious disease. The specifics of how vaccina-
336 tion translates into immunization defines the population burden of infection
337 via its effect on the epidemic final size. Yet discussion of how the two extreme
338 models commonly used (leaky and polarized) are related has been lacking.
339 By making this link, we both illustrate the spectrum of trajectories expected
340 for a range of configurations, and illuminate the effects of these assumptions
341 on medium-term vaccine effectiveness.

Supplementary Text

Here, we show that, in the presence of immune boosting, epidemic dynamics are independent of the shape of the susceptibility distribution (depending only on mean susceptibility). To do so, we assume that a vaccinated individual's susceptibility $0 \leq p \leq 1$ (i.e., probability of infection given challenge) follows some distribution $f(p)$:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (34)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (35)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (36)$$

$$\frac{\partial S_v(p)}{\partial t} = -\lambda(t)S_v(p) + f(p)\rho S_u \quad (37)$$

$$\frac{\partial I_v(p)}{\partial t} = p\lambda(t)S_v(p) - \gamma_v I_v(p) \quad (38)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \int_0^1 [(1-p)\lambda(t)S_v(p) + \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (39)$$

Due to immune boosting, $S_v(p)$ is always depleted at a per-capita rate of $\lambda(t)$ regardless of the values of p , meaning that the (normalized) distribution of $S_v(p)$ will always follow $f(p)$. To obtain the dynamics of total prevalence $I_v = \int I_v(p) dp$, we can integrate $\partial I_v(p)/\partial t$ across p :

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = \int_0^1 \left[\frac{\partial I_v(p)}{\partial t} \right] dp \quad (40)$$

$$= \int_0^1 [p\lambda(t)S_v(p) - \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (41)$$

$$= \int_0^1 [pf(p)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (42)$$

$$= \bar{p}\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v, \quad (43)$$

where \bar{p} represents the mean of the distribution $f(p)$, and $S_v = \int S_v(p) dp$ represents the proportion of total susceptible, vaccinated individuals. Therefore, the dynamics of total prevalence I_v depends only on the mean susceptibility \bar{p} and not on the shape of the distribution $f(p)$ under immune boosting.

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