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2 Immune boosting bridges leaky and polarized
3 vaccination models

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13 **Abstract**

14 Two epidemiological models of vaccination have been proposed. The leaky
15 vaccination model assumes that all vaccinated individuals experience a re-
16 duced force of infection by the same amount. The polarized vaccination
17 model assumes that some fraction of vaccinated individuals are completely
18 protected, while the remaining fraction remains completely susceptible; this
19 seemingly extreme assumption causes the polarized model to always predict
20 lower final epidemic size than the leaky model under the same vaccine effi-
21 cacy. However, the leaky model also makes an implicit, unrealistic assump-
22 tion: vaccinated individuals who are exposed to infection but not infected
23 remain just as susceptible as they were prior to exposures (i.e., independent
24 of previous exposures). To resolve the independence assumption, we intro-
25 duce an immune boosting mechanism, through which vaccinated, yet sus-
26 ceptible, individuals can gain protection without developing a transmissible
27 infection. The boosting model further predicts identical epidemic dynamics
28 as the polarized vaccination model, thereby bridging the differences between
29 two models. We further develop a generalized vaccination model to explore
30 how the assumptions of immunity affect epidemic dynamics and estimates of
31 vaccine effectiveness.

Introduction

[JD: I would prefer to use “immune-boosting” as an adjective, and save “immune boosting” for when (if?) we use it as a noun. Happy to do the edit if you don’t object.]

Vaccination plays a critical role in controlling infectious disease outbreaks by protecting against new infections and associated disease (Iwasaki and Omer, 2020). In particular, if a critical vaccination threshold is reached, the reproduction number (defined as the average number of secondary infections caused by an infected individual) is reduced to below 1, and future epidemics can be prevented (Anderson and May, 1985). But reaching a critical vaccination threshold can be challenging, and vaccines often provide imperfect protections (Gandon et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2020).

There are two main ways of modeling vaccines with imperfect protections: “leaky” and “all-or-nothing” vaccine (Smith et al., 1984). The leaky vaccination model assumes that vaccinated individuals experience a reduced force of infection (e.g., multiplied by a factor $1 - \text{VE}_L < 1$). The “all-or-nothing” vaccination model assumes that the proportion VE_P of vaccinated individuals are completely protected and the remaining proportion $1 - \text{VE}_P$ of vaccinated individuals are completely susceptible. This model is analogous to the polarized immunity model, in which infection from one strain gives complete or no protection against other strains (Gog and Grenfell, 2002)—we thus refer to this model as the polarized vaccination model (Gomes et al., 2014). Here, both VE_L and VE_P represent vaccine efficacy, which we define as the proportion of people protected from their first challenge.

When these two models are used with the same nominal vaccine efficacy $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}_P$, they predict different epidemic dynamics, including the final size (Smith et al., 1984): for high force of infection, almost all individuals eventually get infected in the leaky model, whereas many individuals are permanently protected in the polarized model. Modelers tend to rely on the leaky assumption, including throughout the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (Dyson et al., 2021; Gozzi et al., 2021; Marziano et al., 2021; Matrajt et al., 2021; Park et al., 2022) with some exceptions (Bubar et al., 2021; Buckner et al., 2021). [JD: Warnings from park2022intermediate.] Various reasons have been given, but most likely is a combination of convenience and tradition.

Both models represent simplifications of reality. The leaky model in particular overlooks a potentially important mechanism: individuals in this model do not lose any susceptibility when (implicitly) exposed to a challenge

69 that does not result in infection. In fact, vaccinated individuals who success-
70 fully fight off exposures can experience immune boosting, thus becoming less
71 susceptible to future infections without becoming infectious or developing
72 symptoms from the exposure (Lavine et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2020).

73 In this study, we compare different approaches to dynamical modeling of
74 vaccination and immunity. First, we construct a model with leaky vaccina-
75 tion and boosting, and show that the transmission dynamics of this model
76 can bridge from the dynamics of the standard leaky model (with no boosting)
77 to those of the polarized model (with perfect boosting). Then, we construct
78 a generalized vaccination model, which includes all three mechanisms, and
79 explore its dynamics. Finally, we use our framework to compare measures of
80 vaccine efficacy.

81 **Mathematical models of vaccine-induced im-** 82 **munity**

Throughout the paper, we assume that a population mixes homogeneously
and that there is no loss of immunity; the latter assumption essentially cor-
responds to focusing on a single outbreak. We begin with a standard SIR
model with a leaky vaccine, in which all vaccinated individuals experience a
reduced force of infection by a factor of $1 - \text{VE}_L$:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -(1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v + \rho S_u \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \gamma_v I_v \quad (6)$$

83 where subscripts u and v indicate the unvaccinated and vaccinated individu-
84 als; λ represents the baseline force of infection experienced by unvaccinated
85 individuals; ρ represents vaccination rate; γ represents the recovery rate;




Figure 1: **A schematic diagram of four different vaccination models.** S represents susceptible individuals. I represents infected individuals. R represents recovered individuals. λ represents force of infection. ρ represents the rate of vaccination. p represents vaccine efficacy. γ represents recovery rate. θ represents the proportion of individuals that remain partially susceptible after vaccination. q represents the proportion of unsuccessful challenges that result in immune boosting. Subscripts u and v represents unvaccinated and vaccinated.

86 and VE_L represents the vaccine efficacy, which also captures the amount of
 87 reduction in the probability of infection. This kind of model is sometimes
 88 called “history-based”, since susceptibility of an individual depends only on
 89 their history of infections (or vaccination) (Gog and Grenfell, 2002; Gog and
 90 Swinton, 2002; Kucharski et al., 2016).

Conversely, the polarized vaccination model assumes that a proportion VE_P of vaccinated individuals become fully immune, whereas the remaining

proportion $1 - \text{VE}_P$ remain susceptible:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (7)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_v + (1 - \text{VE}_P)\rho S_u \quad (10)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (11)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \gamma_v I_v + \text{VE}_P \rho S_u \quad (12)$$

91 This is the approach used in “status-based” models of cross immunity—such
 92 models keep track of immune statuses of individuals, rather than their in-
 93 fection histories (Gog and Grenfell, 2002; Gog and Swinton, 2002; Kucharski
 94 et al., 2016). For this model, the parameter VE_P is the measure of vaccine
 95 efficacy.

96 These two widely used models have important dynamical differences. For
 97 a given set of shared parameters, and the same value of vaccine efficacy, initial
 98 dynamics will be the same, but the permanent protection of individuals in
 99 the polarized model will always result in a lower final outbreak size than
 100 the leaky vaccination model. When both VE and the initial value of \mathcal{R} are
 101 relatively high, this difference is large.

To better understand this gap, we consider an immune boosting model. The leaky vaccination model assumes that vaccinated individuals are challenged with a lower force of infection $(1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)$, but in general it is not realistic to assume that challenges would completely disappear only because of immune status. In a homogeneously mixing population, we expect both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals to be challenged with identical forces of infection λ . Therefore, the leaky vaccination model implicitly assumes that vaccinated individuals have an *independent* probability $(1 - \text{VE}_L)$ of infection for every challenge. Instead, the immune boosting model assumes that unsuccessful challenges elicit immune response, moving individuals from S_v to R_v compartment at rate $\text{VE}_L\lambda(t)$ and thereby breaking the independence

assumption of the leaky vaccine model:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (13)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (14)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (15)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_v + \rho S_u \quad (16)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (17)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \text{VE}_L\lambda(t)S_v + \gamma_v I_v \quad (18)$$

102 In this model, both unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals are subject to
 103 identical forces of infection, which represent the per capita rate of challenges,
 104 but the outcome of challenges differ.

105 The epidemiological dynamics (i.e., trajectories of I_u and I_v) predicted
 106 by the immune-boosting model (based on leaky vaccination) and the polar-
 107 ized vaccination model are identical: both models assume that individuals
 108 become vaccinated at rate ρ and move out of the S_v compartment at rate
 109 λ and only differ in when individuals get sorted based on the result of their
 110 next challenge. This equivalence allows us to bridge the difference between
 111 the leaky and polarized vaccination models. The equivalence holds regard-
 112 less of infection characteristics of vaccinated individuals (i.e., the duration
 113 of their infection and their transmissibility). In Supplementary Materials,
 114 we further show that epidemic dynamics are independent of the shape of the
 115 susceptibility distribution under immune boosting (and instead only depends
 116 on the mean susceptibility); under a leaky vaccination model, however, epi-
 117 demic dynamics are sensitive to the susceptibility distribution (Gomes et al.,
 118 2014).

Finally, we consider a generalized model that encompasses all three mech-
 anisms above (dichotomous vaccine responses, partial protection, and im-

immune boosting):

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (19)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -[1 - (1 - q)\text{VE}_L]\lambda(t)S_v + (1 - \text{VE}_P)\rho S_u \quad (22)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (23)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \text{VE}_P \rho S_u + q\text{VE}_L \lambda(t)S_v + \gamma_v I_v \quad (24)$$

119 This model includes one new parameter, q , which represents the proportion
 120 of unsuccessful challenges that result in immune boosting. When $q = 0$ (i.e.,
 121 in the absence of boosting), setting $\text{VE}_P = 0$ gives us the leaky vaccination
 122 model. When $q = 1$ (i.e., in the presence of full boosting), setting $\text{VE}_P = 0$
 123 gives us the immune boosting model, whereas setting $\text{VE}_L = 0$ gives us the
 124 polarized vaccination model. The relationship between these four models are
 125 summarized in Fig. 1. The generalized vaccination model has a combined
 126 vaccine efficacy of $\text{VE} = 1 - (1 - \text{VE}_L)(1 - \text{VE}_P)$. We later analyze the
 127 dynamics of the generalized vaccination model while keeping VE fixed.

128 Model simulations

129 We begin by comparing the dynamics of three individual models: leaky vacci-
 130 nation, polarized vaccination, and immune boosting models. As an example,
 131 we consider a homogeneously mixing population. In this case, the force of
 132 infection is given by:

$$\lambda = \beta_u I_u + \beta_v I_v \quad (25)$$

133 For simplicity, we assume that, once infected, both unvaccinated and vac-
 134 cinated individuals transmit at the same rate $\beta_u = \beta_v = 0.5/\text{day}$ for an
 135 average of $1/\gamma = 5$ days. We also assume that $\phi = 0.5$ proportion of in-
 136 dividuals are vaccinated at the beginning of an epidemic with 60% efficacy
 137 (VE_P or $\text{VE}_L = 0.6$) and that vaccination does not continue during the out-
 138 break ($\rho = 0$). For the leaky vaccination model and the immune boosting

139 model, we set $S_v(0) = 1 - \phi$ and $R_v(0) = \phi$. For consistency, we then
 140 set $S_v(0) = \phi(1 - \text{VE}_P)$ and $R_v(0) = \phi\text{VE}_P$ as our initial condition for the
 141 polarized vaccination model.

142 Fig. 2 compares epidemiological (A–C) and immune-status (D–F) trajec-
 143 tories predicted by the three models. [JD: We list them just above and in
 144 the figure, I prefer not to list them here.] As explained earlier, the leaky vac-
 145 cination model predicts more cases among vaccinated individuals than the
 146 other two models, which predict identical incidence trajectories. [JD: Say-
 147 ing incidence here is nice, and supports the idea that this is what we should
 148 plot.] The leaky vaccination model also predicts more among unvaccinated
 149 individuals because a larger outbreak among vaccinated individuals causes
 150 unvaccinated individuals to experience a greater forces of infection over time.

151 We further find that all three models predict different immune-status tra-
 152 jectories. (Fig. 2D–F). Here, we do not distinguish the sources of antibodies
 153 (whether derived from natural infections or vaccinations) and assume that
 154 individuals in R_u , S_v , and R_v compartments are seropositive, except in the
 155 case of polarized vaccination: in such case, we assume individuals in the S_v
 156 compartment are seronegative because they have not retained any immunity
 157 from the vaccination. The leaky vaccination model predicts the largest out-
 158 break and therefore the highest levels of seroprevalence (89.7% by the end of
 159 the simulation). The immune boosting model predicts lower seroprevalence
 160 (85.6%), reflecting the lower final size, while the polarized vaccination model
 161 predicts a still lower seroprevalence (79.9%) because of our assumption that
 162 people not protected by polarized vaccination do not are not seropositive.

163 [JD: Completely irrelevant note. If we all had the practice of talking
 164 about proportional changes as log-ratios, then we would say that the relative
 165 likelihood of people being infected (or polarized to unprotected) was $\exp(\text{VE})$
 166 – and then the VE equation becomes $\text{VE} = \text{VE}_L + \text{VE}_P$! It would be so cool.]

167 We next use the generalized vaccination model to further investigate
 168 how the final size of the an epidemic among vaccinated individuals depends
 169 on assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity across a wide range of as-
 170 sumptions about the basic reproduction number \mathcal{R}_0 and vaccine efficacy VE
 171 (Fig. 3). In particular, we factor vaccine efficacy VE in terms of leaky vaccine
 172 efficacy VE_L and polarized vaccine efficacy VE_P , and consider an interme-
 173 diate case, in which $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}_P = 1 - \sqrt{1 - \text{VE}}$, as well as the extreme
 174 cases, in which case $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}$ or $\text{VE}_P = \text{VE}$. First, when $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}$, all
 175 vaccinated individuals have identical susceptibility; in this case, increasing
 176 the amount of boosting q reduces the final size as expected (see first column




Figure 2: **Simulations of three different vaccination models.** (A–C) [JD: Any objection to showing incidence instead of Prevalence? I feel it's a small point where modelers tend to diverge unnecessarily from practitioners.] Prevalence of infection among unvaccinated (I_u , blue solid) and vaccinated (I_v , orange dashed) individuals. (D–F) Immune status over time (compartments R_u , S_v , and R_v). The S_v compartment is not included in the polarized vaccination model because it represents a set of individuals who have not retained any immunity from vaccination. Simulations are performed assuming $\beta_u = \beta_v = 0.5/\text{day}$ for an average infectious periods of $1/\gamma = 5$ days. We also assume that $\phi = 0.5$ proportion of individuals are vaccinated at the beginning of an epidemic with 60% efficacy ($\text{VE}_P = \text{VE}_L = 0.6$) and that vaccination does not continue during the outbreak ($\rho = 0$).

of Fig. 3). We observe biggest effects of boosting at intermediate vaccine efficacy, VE , and high basic reproduction number, \mathcal{R}_0 (see bottom left panel of Fig. 3). When vaccine efficacy is too low (or too high), then boosting has negligible effects because virtually everyone (or virtually no one) gets infected. As we increase \mathcal{R}_0 , the leaky vaccination model predicts that all vaccinated individuals will eventually get infected. On the other hand, the final size predicted by the immune boosting model cannot be greater than $1 - \text{VE}$. As we increase VE_P (and decrease VE_L accordingly), the generalized vaccination model collapses to the polarized vaccination model, and the final size becomes insensitive to the boosting parameter q .




Figure 3: Sensitivity of the final size of an outbreak among vaccinated individuals to assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity
Final size of an outbreak was calculated by simulating the generalized vaccination model for 220 days. All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.

187 So far, we have limited our discussions to vaccine efficacy, which we de-
188 fined as the proportion of people protected from their first challenge. We
189 distinguish this from vaccine *effectiveness*, which is measured empirically
190 (Halloran et al., 2009). Here, we compare two ways of estimating vaccine
191 effectiveness: using cumulative incidence or instantaneous hazard. Several
192 factors can cause vaccine effectiveness to systematically differ from vaccine
193 efficacy—in our case, the main reason is the fact that some vaccinated indi-
194 viduals may be challenged multiple times.

Cumulative incidence refers to the cumulative proportion of infections among unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals; this is commonly used for

measuring the vaccine effectiveness in real outbreaks (Farrington, 1993). Since we are modeling a single epidemic without a loss of immunity or multiple infections, we consider the reduction in cumulative incidence throughout the entire epidemic. To do so, we add two additional compartments, which keep track of cumulative incidence among unvaccinated C_u and vaccinated C_v individuals:

$$\frac{dC_u}{dt} = \lambda S_u \quad (26)$$

$$\frac{dC_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda S_v \quad (27)$$

Since we are neglecting vaccinations that occur during the outbreak ($\rho = 0$), the cumulative proportion of infections among vaccinated $p_v(t)$ and unvaccinated $p_u(t)$ individuals can be expressed as:

$$p_u(t) = C_u(t)/S_u(0) \quad (28)$$

$$p_v(t) = C_v(t)/S_v(0) \quad (29)$$

195 Then, the estimated vaccine effectiveness at time t is:

$$1 - \frac{p_v(t)}{p_u(t)}. \quad (30)$$

196 On the other hand, instantaneous hazard refers to the per-capita rate at
 197 which unvaccinated $h_u(t)$ and vaccinated $h_v(t)$ individuals get infected if they
 198 have not yet been infected yet. These quantities can be calculated by dividing
 199 the incidence of new infection by the number of uninfected individuals. The
 200 per-capita rate of infection $h_v(t)$ among vaccinated individuals is then given
 201 by:

$$h_v(t) = \frac{(1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v(t)}{S_v(0) - C_v(t)}, \quad (31)$$

202 where $S_v(0) - C_v(t) \geq S_v(t)$ because vaccinated individuals can leave the $S_v(t)$
 203 compartment via boosting; in other words, we are assuming that boosting is
 204 not observed, and that boosted individuals are neither counted as infected,
 205 nor removed from the denominator. The per-capita rate of infection $h_u(t)$
 206 among unvaccinated individuals is straightforward:

$$h_u(t) = \frac{\lambda(t)S_u(t)}{S_u(t)} = \lambda(t). \quad (32)$$

207 Then, the estimated reduction in hazard at time t is:

$$1 - \frac{h_v(t)}{h_u(t)}. \quad (33)$$

208 We compare two estimates of vaccine effectiveness across a wide range
 209 of assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity in Fig. 4. We assume 60%
 210 efficacy throughout (therefore $VE = 0.6$). When all unsuccessful challenges
 211 result in immune boosting ($q = 1$, immune boosting model in Fig. 1), the
 212 cumulative-incidence reduction always gives correct answers throughout the
 213 epidemic—since the susceptible pool among unvaccinated and vaccinated in-
 214 dividuals is depleted at the same rate λ , the ratios of their proportions of cu-
 215 mulative infections remain constant. *[JD: I feel like the argument above ap-
 216 plies to polarized, not boosted. The cleanest argument for boosted is that its
 217 results are the same as polarized.]* Likewise, the cumulative-incidence reduc-
 218 tion also give correct answers for the polarized vaccination model ($VE_L = 0$,
 219 $VE_P = VE$). However, when some challenges are not boosted ($q < 1$), using
 220 cumulative incidence underestimates the vaccine efficacy beyond the expo-
 221 nential growth phase. This is because vaccinated individuals who have been
 222 exposed but are not boosted or infected still remain susceptible to future
 223 infections; larger final epidemic sizes predicted by these models (Fig. 3) then
 224 translate to a seemingly lower vaccine efficacy.

225 The hazard reduction gives correct answers for the leaky vaccine model
 226 (when $q = 0$, $VE_L = VE$, and $VE_P = 0$) because the ratios of force of
 227 infection that unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals experience are always
 228 constant. However, the hazard reduction overestimates vaccine efficacy in the
 229 presence of immune boosting: since boosted individuals have not yet been
 230 infected, the susceptible pool in the vaccinated group appears to be bigger
 231 than it really is, causing the per-capita rate of infection to seem smaller.
 232 Vaccine efficacy is also overestimated for polarized vaccination for similar
 233 reasons.

234 We note that both estimates give correct answers during the exponential
 235 growth phase, regardless of underlying assumptions about immunity. More
 236 generally, we expect both estimates to give unbiased estimates as long as
 237 the depletion of susceptible pool is negligible among both vaccinated and
 238 unvaccinated individuals; in trial settings, where incidence is relatively low,
 239 this assumption may hold. But estimating vaccine effectiveness from real
 240 outbreaks is expected to be more difficult.




Figure 4: **Estimates of vaccine effectiveness using reduction in cumulative incidence (A) and hazard (B) over time.** [JD: *Fig still says “hazard”*] Vaccine effectiveness was calculated by simulating the generalized vaccination model for 220 days. Colored lines represent the estimated vaccine effectiveness. Dashed lines represent the assumed vaccine efficacy. We assume $\mathcal{R}_0 = 2.5$ and a combined efficacy of $VE = 0.6$ throughout. All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.

241 Discussion

242 Understanding the degree to which vaccination provides protection against
 243 infections is critical to predicting epidemic dynamics. The polarized model
 244 has been largely neglected in epidemiological modeling, in part due to its
 245 apparently extreme assumption that a fraction of vaccinated individuals do
 246 not receive any protection. But the leaky vaccination model also makes an
 247 unrealistic assumption: that vaccinated individuals who are exposed to in-

248 fections can still remain susceptible, independent of previous exposures. This
 249 assumption causes the leaky vaccination model to always predict a larger epi-
 250 demic final size. This difference can be bridged with immune boosting. With
 251 boosting, vaccinated individuals can attain protection without developing a
 252 transmissible infection. In particular, the leaky model with perfect immune
 253 boosting model predicts identical epidemic dynamics to the polarized vacci-
 254 nation model because individuals in both cases are completely immune after
 255 surviving a single challenge.

256 Even though immune boosting and polarized vaccination models predict
 257 the same epidemic dynamics, they may have different immune-status dynam-
 258 ics. We investigate both aspects using a generalized vaccination model, which
 259 encompasses the mechanisms of all three models. The generalized vaccina-
 260 tion model includes one additional parameter, which determines the amount
 261 of immune boosting. We use this model to show that the epidemic dynamics
 262 are most sensitive to the assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity at an
 263 intermediate vaccine efficacy.

264 Finally, assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity also have impor-
 265 tant implications for estimating vaccine effectiveness. Vaccine effectiveness
 266 can be estimated based either on cumulative incidence or on hazard rates.
 267 Cumulative-incidence-based effectiveness estimates will reflect initial efficacy
 268 for polarized vaccination and immune boosting models, whereas hazard-based
 269 estimates reflect efficacy for the leaky vaccination model. Neither method
 270 reflects efficacy for intermediate cases. These differences are driven by differ-
 271 ent assumptions about what happens when individuals are challenged more
 272 than once; thus both methods reflect efficacy when the cumulative hazard of
 273 infection is low. Conversely, interpretation of effectiveness estimates when
 274 a large fraction of unvaccinated individuals have been infected depends on
 275 (usually unknown) details of immune dynamics.

276 We rely above on a simplifying assumption that natural infections (as well
 277 as polarized vaccination and immune boosting) provide permanent protec-
 278 tion against future infections. In practice, both infection- and vaccine-derived
 279 immunity wane over time for many pathogens (Heffernan and Keeling, 2009;
 280 Lewnard and Grad, 2018; Pérez-Alós et al., 2022). When immunity wanes,
 281 polarized vaccination and immune boosting models may not necessarily pre-
 282 dict identical dynamics. In particular, individuals who gain complete protec-
 283 tion through polarized immunity may immediately enter the R_v compartment
 284 upon vaccination, whereas those who gain complete protection through im-
 285 mune boosting take longer to enter the R_v compartment because they need

286 to be exposed to infections. These differences can translate to shorter delays
287 between reinfection events for the polarized immunity model, which in turn
288 can lead to dynamical differences at the population level.

289 There are also other complexities that need to be considered. For exam-
290 ple, individuals who are boosted after vaccination can have different immu-
291 nity profiles compared to those who attained strong protection from vacci-
292 nation alone. These individuals also likely have different immunity profiles
293 from those who have been infected but never been vaccinated. These dif-
294 ferences can also cause polarized vaccination and immune boosting models
295 to behave differently. Despite these limitations, immune boosting, which is
296 often neglected in epidemic models of vaccination, is still expected to be an
297 important mechanism for understanding dynamics of many pathogens.

298 We have provided a unifying framework for understanding the impact of
299 vaccination on the spread of infectious disease. The specifics of how vaccina-
300 tion translates into immunization defines the population burden of infection
301 via its effect on the epidemic final size. Yet discussion of how the two extreme
302 models commonly used (leaky and polarized) are related has been lacking.
303 By making this link, we both illustrate the spectrum of trajectories expected
304 for a range of configurations, and illuminate the effects of these assumptions
305 on medium-term vaccine effectiveness.

Supplementary Text

Here, we show that, in the presence of immune boosting, epidemic dynamics are independent of the shape of the susceptibility distribution (depending only on mean susceptibility). To do so, consider an immune boosting model that allows for heterogeneity in vaccine-derived immunity. We assume that a vaccinated individual's susceptibility $0 \leq p \leq 1$ follows some distribution $f(p)$:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (34)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (35)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (36)$$

$$\frac{\partial S_v(p)}{\partial t} = -\lambda(t)S_v(p) + f(p)\rho S_u \quad (37)$$

$$\frac{\partial I_v(p)}{\partial t} = p\lambda(t)S_v(p) - \gamma_v I_v(p) \quad (38)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \int_0^1 [(1-p)\lambda(t)S_v(p) + \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (39)$$

Due to immune boosting, $S_v(p)$ is always depleted at a per-capita rate of $\lambda(t)$ regardless of the values of p , meaning that the (normalized) distribution of $S_v(p)$ will always follow $f(p)$. To obtain the dynamics of total prevalence $I_v = \int I_v(p) dp$, we can integrate $\partial I_v(p)/\partial t$ across p :

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = \int_0^1 \left[\frac{\partial I_v(p)}{\partial t} \right] dp \quad (40)$$

$$= \int_0^1 [p\lambda(t)S_v(p) - \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (41)$$

$$= \int_0^1 [pf(p)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (42)$$

$$= \bar{p}\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v, \quad (43)$$

where \bar{p} represents the mean of the distribution $f(p)$, and $S_v = \int S_v(p) dp$ represents the proportion of total susceptible, vaccinated individuals. Therefore, the dynamics of total prevalence I_v depends only on the mean sus-

ceptibility \bar{p} and not on the shape of the distribution $f(p)$ under immune
boosting.

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