

Immune boosting bridges leaky and polarized vaccination models

Sang Woo Park^{1,*}, Michael Li^{2,3}, C. Jessica E. Metcalf^{1,4}, Bryan T. Grenfell^{1,4}, Jonathan Dushoff^{3,5,6}

1 Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

2 Public Health Risk Science Division, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada, Guelph, Ontario, Canada

3 Department of Mathematics & Statistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

4 Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

5 Department of Biology, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

6 M. G. DeGroote Institute for Infectious Disease Research, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

*Corresponding author: swp2@princeton.edu

Abstract

Two different epidemiological models of vaccination are commonly used in dynamical modeling studies. The leaky vaccination model assumes that all vaccinated individuals experience a reduced probability of infection. The polarized vaccination model assumes that some fraction of vaccinated individuals are completely protected, while the remaining fraction remains completely susceptible; this seemingly extreme assumption causes the polarized model to always predict lower final epidemic size than the leaky model under the same vaccine efficacy. However, the leaky model also makes an implicit, unrealistic assumption: vaccinated individuals who are exposed to infection but not infected remain just as susceptible as they were prior to exposure. To address this latter assumption, we introduce an immune boosting mechanism, through which partially susceptible individuals can gain protection without developing a transmissible infection. A model where such boosted individuals are perfectly protected predicts identical epidemic dynamics as

34 the polarized vaccination model, thereby bridging the differences between
35 two models. We further develop a generalized vaccination model to explore
36 how the assumptions of immunity affect epidemic dynamics and estimates of
37 vaccine effectiveness.

Introduction

Vaccination plays a critical role in controlling infectious disease outbreaks by protecting against new infections and associated disease (Iwasaki and Omer, 2020). In particular, if a critical vaccination threshold is reached, the reproduction number (defined as the average number of secondary infections caused by an infected individual) is reduced to below 1, and epidemics can be prevented (Anderson and May, 1985). But reaching a critical vaccination threshold can be challenging, and vaccines often provide partial protection (Gandon et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2020).

Partial protection provided by vaccination raises important questions about how vaccine efficacy (in clinical trials) and vaccine effectiveness (in populations) should be estimated. Traditionally, both efficacy and effectiveness have been estimated by comparing the (cumulative) proportion of vaccinated individuals infected in a given time frame to the same proportion among unvaccinated individuals (Farrington, 1993). However, this approach implicitly assumes a single exposure per individual, and otherwise gives biased estimates, requiring different estimators specifically tuned to a particular scenario (Halloran et al., 1991). Other researchers have suggested using measures based on incidence rates (i.e., the rate at which new infections or cases are generated) to estimating vaccine efficacy; these methods are also subject to several biases (Rinta-Kokko et al., 2009; Lipsitch and Kahn, 2021). Heterogeneity in mixing patterns, susceptible depletion, and immune waning further hamper our ability to estimate vaccine efficacy and effectiveness (Halloran et al., 1992; Lipsitch, 2019; Kahn et al., 2022).

Even if vaccine efficacy can be accurately estimated, there are additional challenges to translating these estimates to population-level predictions about epidemic dynamics. In particular, there are two disparate ways of modeling vaccines with partial protections: “leaky” and “all-or-nothing” vaccine (Smith et al., 1984), which yield different dynamics even when vaccine efficacy (defined here as proportion of people protected from their first challenge) is held constant. The leaky vaccination model assumes that vaccinated individuals experience a reduced force of infection (e.g., multiplied by a factor $1 - \text{VE}_L < 1$, where VE_L represents (leaky) vaccine efficacy. The “all-or-nothing” vaccination model assumes that the proportion VE_P of vaccinated individuals are completely protected and the remaining proportion $1 - \text{VE}_P$ of vaccinated individuals are completely susceptible, where VE_P represents (polarized) vaccine efficacy, so-called because this model is anal-

75 ogous to the “polarized” model of cross-immunity, in which infection from
76 one strain gives complete or no protection against other strains (Gog and
77 Grenfell, 2002; Gomes et al., 2014).

78 There is some empirical support for both leaky (Lind et al., 2023) and
79 polarized vaccines (Langwig et al., 2017), and the two assumptions can
80 have sharply different consequences for outbreak predictions. Specifically,
81 when these two models are used with the same nominal vaccine efficacy
82 $VE_L = VE_P$, they predict different epidemic dynamics, including the final
83 size (Smith et al., 1984): for a high force of infection, almost all individu-
84 als eventually get infected in the leaky model, whereas many individuals are
85 permanently protected in the polarized model. Modelers tend to rely on the
86 leaky assumption, including throughout the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (Dyson
87 et al., 2021; Gozzi et al., 2021; Marziano et al., 2021; Matrajt et al., 2021;
88 Park et al., 2022) with some exceptions (Bubar et al., 2021; Buckner et al.,
89 2021). Various reasons have been given, but most likely is a combination of
90 convenience and tradition.

91 Both models represent simplifications of reality. The leaky model in
92 particular overlooks a potentially important mechanism: individuals in this
93 model do not lose any susceptibility when (implicitly) exposed to a challenge
94 that does not result in infection. In fact, vaccinated individuals who success-
95 fully fight off exposures can experience immune boosting, thus becoming less
96 susceptible to future infections without becoming infectious or developing
97 symptoms from the exposure (Lavine et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2020).

98 In this study, we compare different approaches to dynamical modeling of
99 vaccination and immunity. First, we construct a model with leaky vaccina-
100 tion and boosting, and show that the transmission dynamics of this model
101 can bridge from the dynamics of the standard leaky model (with no boosting)
102 to those of the polarized model (with perfect boosting). Then, we construct
103 a generalized vaccination model, which includes all three mechanisms, and
104 explore its dynamics. Finally, we use our framework to compare measures of
105 vaccine effectiveness.




Figure 1: **A schematic diagram of four different vaccination models.** S represents susceptible individuals. I represents infected individuals. R represents recovered individuals. λ represents force of infection. ρ represents the rate of vaccination. p represents vaccine efficacy. γ represents recovery rate. θ represents the proportion of individuals that remain partially susceptible after vaccination. q represents the proportion of unsuccessful challenges that result in immune boosting. Subscripts u and v represents unvaccinated and vaccinated.

106 Mathematical models of vaccine-induced im- 107 munity

Throughout the paper, we assume that a population mixes homogeneously and that there is no loss of immunity (including indirectly through deaths and births); the latter assumption essentially corresponds to focusing on a single outbreak. We begin with a standard SIR model with a leaky vaccine, in which all vaccinated individuals experience a reduced probability of infection

by a factor of $1 - \text{VE}_L$:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -(1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v + \rho S_u \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \gamma_v I_v \quad (6)$$

108 where subscripts u and v indicate the unvaccinated and vaccinated individu-
 109 als; λ represents the baseline force of infection experienced by unvaccinated
 110 individuals; ρ represents vaccination rate; γ represents the recovery rate;
 111 and VE_L represents the vaccine efficacy, which also captures the amount of
 112 reduction in the probability of infection. This kind of model is sometimes
 113 called “history-based”, since susceptibility of an individual depends only on
 114 their history of infections (or vaccination) (Gog and Grenfell, 2002; Gog and
 115 Swinton, 2002; Kucharski et al., 2016).

Conversely, the polarized vaccination model assumes that a proportion VE_P of vaccinated individuals become fully immune, whereas the remaining proportion $1 - \text{VE}_P$ remain susceptible:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (7)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_v + (1 - \text{VE}_P)\rho S_u \quad (10)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (11)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \gamma_v I_v + \text{VE}_P \rho S_u \quad (12)$$

116 This is the approach used in “status-based” models of cross immunity—
 117 such models keep track of immune statuses of individuals, rather than their
 118 histories (Gog and Grenfell, 2002; Gog and Swinton, 2002; Kucharski et al.,
 119 2016). For this model, the parameter VE_P is the measure of vaccine efficacy.

120 These two widely used models have important dynamical differences. For
 121 a given set of shared parameters, and the same value of vaccine efficacy, initial
 122 dynamics will be the same, but the permanent protection of individuals in
 123 the polarized model will always result in a lower final outbreak size than
 124 the leaky vaccination model. When both VE and the initial value of \mathcal{R} are
 125 relatively high, this difference is large.

To better understand this gap, we consider an immune-boosting model. The leaky vaccination model implicitly assumes that vaccinated individuals who experience unsuccessful challenges (with probability VE_L) remain susceptible; this is equivalent to assuming that vaccinated individuals are challenged with a lower force of infection $(1 - VE_L)\lambda(t)$. However, in a homogeneously mixing population, we expect both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals to be challenged with identical forces of infection λ . Therefore, the leaky vaccination model implicitly assumes that vaccinated individuals are unaffected by unsuccessful challenges, and thus have an *independent* probability $(1 - VE_L)$ of infection for every challenge. The immune-boosting model, on the other hand, assumes that unsuccessful challenges elicit immune response, moving individuals from S_v to R_v compartment at rate $VE_L\lambda(t)$ and thereby breaking the independence assumption of the leaky vaccine model:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (13)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (14)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (15)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_v + \rho S_u \quad (16)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - VE_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (17)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = VE_L\lambda(t)S_v + \gamma_v I_v \quad (18)$$

126 In this model, both unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals are subject to
 127 identical forces of infection, which represent the per capita rate of challenges,

128 but the outcome of challenges differ.

129 The epidemiological dynamics (i.e., trajectories of I_u and I_v) predicted by
130 the immune-boosting model (based on leaky vaccination) and the polarized
131 vaccination model are identical: both models assume that individuals become
132 vaccinated at rate ρ and move out of the S_v compartment at rate λ and
133 only differ in when individuals get sorted based on the result of their next
134 challenge. This equivalence allows us to bridge the difference between the
135 leaky and polarized vaccination models. The equivalence holds regardless of
136 infection characteristics of vaccinated individuals (i.e., the duration of their
137 infection and their transmissibility).

138 Other studies have tried to characterize the differences between leaky and
139 polarized vaccination models by considering a distribution of susceptibility
140 (i.e., $1 - \text{efficacy}$) among vaccinated individuals, where the susceptibility can
141 vary anywhere between 0 and 1 with some probability distribution (Gomes
142 et al., 2014). For example, the leaky assumption was previously modeled us-
143 ing a delta distribution (i.e., all individuals are equally susceptible), whereas
144 the polarized assumption was previously modeled using a polarized distri-
145 bution (i.e., some individuals have complete protection and others have no
146 protection). While it is possible to bridge these two distributions using a con-
147 tinuous distributions, this approach also implicitly assumes that unsuccessful
148 challenges remain just as susceptible. Instead, in Supplementary Materials,
149 we show that under complete boosting, epidemic dynamics depend only on
150 the mean (not the shape) of the susceptibility distribution.

Finally, we consider a generalized model that encompasses all three mech-
anisms above (dichotomous vaccine responses, partial protection, and im-

immune boosting):

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (19)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{dS_v}{dt} = -[1 - (1 - q)\text{VE}_L]\lambda(t)S_v + (1 - \text{VE}_P)\rho S_u \quad (22)$$

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v \quad (23)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \text{VE}_P \rho S_u + q\text{VE}_L \lambda(t)S_v + \gamma_v I_v \quad (24)$$

151 This model includes one new parameter, q , which represents the proportion
 152 of unsuccessful challenges that result in immune boosting. When $q = 0$ (i.e.,
 153 in the absence of boosting), setting $\text{VE}_P = 0$ gives us the leaky vaccination
 154 model. When $q = 1$ (i.e., in the presence of full boosting), setting $\text{VE}_P = 0$
 155 gives us the immune-boosting model, whereas setting $\text{VE}_L = 0$ gives us the
 156 polarized vaccination model. The relationship between these four models are
 157 summarized in Fig. 1. The generalized vaccination model has a combined
 158 vaccine efficacy of $\text{VE} = 1 - (1 - \text{VE}_L)(1 - \text{VE}_P)$. We later analyze the
 159 dynamics of the generalized vaccination model while keeping VE fixed.

160 Model simulations

161 We begin by comparing the dynamics of three individual models: leaky vacci-
 162 nation, polarized vaccination, and immune-boosting models. As an example,
 163 we consider a homogeneously mixing population. In this case, the force of
 164 infection is given by:

$$\lambda = \beta_u I_u + \beta_v I_v \quad (25)$$

165 For simplicity, we assume that, once infected, both unvaccinated and vac-
 166 cinated individuals transmit at the same rate $\beta_u = \beta_v = 0.5/\text{day}$ for an
 167 average of $1/\gamma = 5$ days. We also assume that $\phi = 0.5$ proportion of in-
 168 dividuals are vaccinated at the beginning of an epidemic with 60% efficacy
 169 (VE_P or $\text{VE}_L = 0.6$) and that vaccination does not continue during the out-
 170 break ($\rho = 0$). For the leaky vaccination model and the immune-boosting

171 model, we set $S_v(0) = 1 - \phi$ and $R_v(0) = \phi$. For consistency, we then
 172 set $S_v(0) = \phi(1 - \text{VE}_P)$ and $R_v(0) = \phi\text{VE}_P$ as our initial condition for the
 173 polarized vaccination model.

174 Fig. 2 compares epidemiological (A–C) and immune-status (D–F) trajec-
 175 tories predicted by the three models. As explained earlier, the leaky vac-
 176 cination model predicts more infections among vaccinated individuals than
 177 the other two models, which predict identical incidence trajectories. The
 178 leaky vaccination model also predicts more among unvaccinated individuals
 179 because a larger outbreak among vaccinated individuals causes unvaccinated
 180 individuals to experience a greater forces of infection over time.

181 We further find that all three models predict different immune-status tra-
 182 jectories. (Fig. 2D–F). Here, we do not distinguish the sources of antibodies
 183 (whether derived from natural infections or vaccinations) and assume that
 184 individuals in R_u , S_v , and R_v compartments are seropositive (i.e., have anti-
 185 bodies against the infection), except in the case of polarized vaccination: in
 186 such case, we assume individuals in the S_v compartment are seronegative be-
 187 cause they have not retained any immunity from the vaccination. The leaky
 188 vaccination model predicts the largest outbreak and therefore the highest
 189 levels of seroprevalence (89.7% by the end of the simulation). The immune-
 190 boosting model predicts lower seroprevalence (85.6%), reflecting the lower
 191 final size, while the polarized vaccination model predicts a still lower sero-
 192 prevalence (79.9%) because of our assumption that people not protected by
 193 polarized vaccination are not seropositive.

194 We next use the generalized vaccination model to further investigate
 195 how the final size of the an epidemic among vaccinated individuals depends
 196 on assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity across a wide range of as-
 197 sumptions about the basic reproduction number \mathcal{R}_0 and vaccine efficacy VE
 198 (Fig. 3). In particular, we factor vaccine efficacy VE in terms of leaky vaccine
 199 efficacy VE_L and polarized vaccine efficacy VE_P , and consider an interme-
 200 diate case, in which $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}_P = 1 - \sqrt{1 - \text{VE}}$, as well as the extreme
 201 cases, in which case $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}$ or $\text{VE}_P = \text{VE}$. First, when $\text{VE}_L = \text{VE}$, all
 202 vaccinated individuals have identical susceptibility; in this case, increasing
 203 the amount of boosting q reduces the final size as expected (see first column
 204 of Fig. 3). We observe biggest effects of boosting at intermediate vaccine
 205 efficacy, VE , and high basic reproduction number, \mathcal{R}_0 (see bottom left panel
 206 of Fig. 3). When vaccine efficacy is too low (or too high), then boosting
 207 has negligible effects because virtually everyone (or virtually no one) gets
 208 infected. As we increase \mathcal{R}_0 , the leaky vaccination model predicts that all




Figure 2: **Simulations of three different vaccination models.** (A–C) Incidence of infection among unvaccinated (blue solid) and vaccinated (red dashed) individuals. (D–F) Immune status over time (compartments R_u , S_v , and R_v). The S_v compartment is not included in the polarized vaccination model because it represents a set of individuals who have not retained any immunity from vaccination. Simulations are performed assuming $\beta_u = \beta_v = 0.5/\text{day}$ for an average infectious periods of $1/\gamma = 5$ days. We also assume that $\phi = 0.5$ proportion of individuals are vaccinated at the beginning of an epidemic with 60% efficacy ($\text{VE}_P = \text{VE}_L = 0.6$) and that vaccination does not continue during the outbreak ($\rho = 0$).

209 vaccinated individuals will eventually get infected. On the other hand, the
 210 final size predicted by the immune-boosting model cannot be greater than
 211 $1 - \text{VE}$. As we increase VE_P (and decrease VE_L accordingly), the generalized
 212 vaccination model collapses to the polarized vaccination model, and the final
 213 size becomes insensitive to the boosting parameter q .

214 So far, we have limited our discussions to vaccine efficacy, which we de-
 215 fined as the proportion of people protected from their first challenge. We
 216 distinguish this from vaccine *effectiveness*, which is measured empirically
 217 (Halloran et al., 2009). Here, we compare two ways of estimating vaccine
 218 effectiveness: using cumulative incidence or instantaneous hazard. Several
 219 factors can cause vaccine effectiveness to systematically differ from vaccine
 220 efficacy—in our case, the main reason is the fact that some vaccinated indi-




Figure 3: Sensitivity of the final size of an outbreak among vaccinated individuals to assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity
Final size of an outbreak was calculated by simulating the generalized vaccination model for 220 days. All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.

viduals may be challenged multiple times.

Cumulative incidence refers to the cumulative proportion of infections among unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals; this is commonly used for measuring the vaccine effectiveness in real outbreaks (Farrington, 1993). Since we are modeling a single epidemic without a loss of immunity or multiple infections, we consider changes in total infections in a single outbreak. To do so, we add two additional compartments, which keep track of cumulative

incidence among unvaccinated C_u and vaccinated C_v individuals:

$$\frac{dC_u}{dt} = \lambda S_u \quad (26)$$

$$\frac{dC_v}{dt} = (1 - \text{VE}_L) \lambda S_v \quad (27)$$

Since we are neglecting vaccinations that occur during the outbreak ($\rho = 0$), the cumulative proportion of infections among vaccinated $p_v(t)$ and unvaccinated $p_u(t)$ individuals can be expressed as:

$$p_u(t) = C_u(t)/S_u(0) \quad (28)$$

$$p_v(t) = C_v(t)/S_v(0) \quad (29)$$

222 Then, the estimated vaccine effectiveness at time t is:

$$1 - \frac{p_v(t)}{p_u(t)}. \quad (30)$$

223 On the other hand, instantaneous hazard refers to the per-capita rate at
 224 which unvaccinated $h_u(t)$ and vaccinated $h_v(t)$ individuals get infected if they
 225 have not yet been infected yet. These quantities can be calculated by dividing
 226 the incidence of new infection by the number of uninfected individuals. The
 227 per-capita rate of infection $h_v(t)$ among vaccinated individuals is then given
 228 by:

$$h_v(t) = \frac{(1 - \text{VE}_L) \lambda(t) S_v(t)}{S_v(0) - C_v(t)}, \quad (31)$$

229 where $S_v(0) - C_v(t) \geq S_v(t)$ because vaccinated individuals can leave the $S_v(t)$
 230 compartment via boosting; in other words, we are assuming that boosting is
 231 not observed, and that boosted individuals are neither counted as infected,
 232 nor removed from the denominator. The per-capita rate of infection $h_u(t)$
 233 among unvaccinated individuals is straightforward:

$$h_u(t) = \frac{\lambda(t) S_u(t)}{S_u(t)} = \lambda(t). \quad (32)$$

234 Then, the estimated reduction in hazard at time t is:

$$1 - \frac{h_v(t)}{h_u(t)}. \quad (33)$$

235 We compare two estimates of vaccine effectiveness across a wide range
 236 of assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity in Fig. 4. We assume 60%
 237 efficacy ($VE = 0.6$) throughout, which represents the true value that we
 238 want to estimate. Under polarized vaccination ($VE_P = VE$, $VE_L = 0$), the
 239 cumulative-incidence reduction always gives correct answers throughout the
 240 epidemic—since the susceptible pool among unvaccinated and vaccinated in-
 241 dividuals is depleted at the same rate λ , the ratios of their proportions of cu-
 242 mulative infections remain constant. Likewise, the cumulative-incidence re-
 243 duction also gives correct answers under immune boosting ($q = 1$). However,
 244 when some challenges are not boosted ($q < 1$), using cumulative incidence un-
 245 derestimates the vaccine effectiveness beyond the exponential growth phase.
 246 This is because vaccinated individuals who have been exposed but are not
 247 boosted or infected still remain susceptible to future infections; larger final
 248 epidemic sizes predicted by these models (Fig. 3) then translate to a seem-
 249 ingly lower vaccine effectiveness.

250 The hazard reduction gives correct answers for the leaky vaccine model
 251 (when $q = 0$, $VE_L = VE$, and $VE_P = 0$) because the ratios of force of in-
 252 fection that unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals experience are always
 253 constant. However, the hazard reduction overestimates vaccine effectiveness
 254 in the presence of immune boosting: since boosted individuals have not yet
 255 been infected, the susceptible pool in the vaccinated group appears to be big-
 256 ger than it really is, causing the per-capita rate of infection to seem smaller.
 257 Vaccine effectiveness is also overestimated for polarized vaccination for sim-
 258 ilar reasons.

259 We note that both estimates give correct answers during the exponential
 260 growth phase, regardless of underlying assumptions about immunity. More
 261 generally, we expect both estimates to give unbiased estimates as long as
 262 the depletion of susceptible pool is negligible among both vaccinated and
 263 unvaccinated individuals; in trial settings, where incidence is relatively low,
 264 this assumption may hold. But estimating vaccine effectiveness from real
 265 outbreaks is expected to be more difficult.

266 Discussion

267 Understanding the degree to which vaccination provides protection against
 268 infections is critical to predicting epidemic dynamics. The polarized model
 269 has been largely neglected in epidemiological modeling, in part due to its




Figure 4: **Estimates of vaccine effectiveness using reduction in cumulative incidence (A) and hazard (B) over time.** Vaccine effectiveness was calculated by simulating the generalized vaccination model for 220 days. Colored lines represent the estimated vaccine effectiveness. Dashed lines represent the assumed vaccine efficacy. We assume $\mathcal{R}_0 = 2.5$ and a combined efficacy of $VE = 0.6$ throughout. All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 2.

270 apparently extreme assumption that a fraction of vaccinated individuals do
 271 not receive any protection. But the leaky vaccination model also makes an
 272 unrealistic assumption: that vaccinated individuals who are exposed to in-
 273 fections can still remain susceptible, independent of previous exposures. This
 274 assumption causes the leaky vaccination model to always predict a larger epi-
 275 demic final size. This difference can be bridged with immune boosting. With
 276 boosting, vaccinated individuals can attain protection without developing a
 277 transmissible infection. In particular, the leaky model with perfect immune-

278 boosting model predicts identical epidemic dynamics to the polarized vacci-
279 nation model because individuals in both cases are completely immune after
280 surviving a single challenge.

281 Even though immune boosting and polarized vaccination models predict
282 the same epidemic dynamics, they may have different immune-status dynam-
283 ics. We investigate both aspects using a generalized vaccination model, which
284 encompasses the mechanisms of all three models. The generalized vaccina-
285 tion model includes one additional parameter, which determines the amount
286 of immune boosting. We use this model to show that the epidemic dynamics
287 are most sensitive to the assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity at an
288 intermediate vaccine efficacy.

289 Finally, assumptions about vaccine-derived immunity also have impor-
290 tant implications for estimating vaccine effectiveness. Vaccine effectiveness
291 can be estimated based either on cumulative incidence or on hazard rates.
292 Cumulative-incidence-based effectiveness estimates reflect efficacy for polar-
293 ized vaccination and complete-boosting models, whereas hazard-based esti-
294 mates reflect efficacy for the leaky vaccination model. Neither method reflects
295 efficacy for intermediate cases. These differences are driven by different as-
296 sumptions about what happens when individuals are challenged more than
297 once; thus both methods reflect efficacy when the cumulative hazard of infec-
298 tion is low. Conversely, interpretation of effectiveness estimates when a large
299 fraction of unvaccinated individuals have been infected depends on (usually
300 unknown) details of immune dynamics.

301 We rely above on a simplifying assumption that natural infections (as well
302 as polarized vaccination and immune boosting) provide permanent protec-
303 tion against future infections. In practice, both infection- and vaccine-derived
304 immunity wane over time for many pathogens (Heffernan and Keeling, 2009;
305 Lewnard and Grad, 2018; Pérez-Alós et al., 2022). When immunity wanes,
306 polarized vaccination and immune-boosting models may not necessarily pre-
307 dict identical dynamics. In particular, individuals who gain complete protec-
308 tion through polarized immunity may immediately enter the R_v compartment
309 upon vaccination, whereas those who gain complete protection through im-
310 mune boosting take longer to enter the R_v compartment because they need
311 to be exposed to infections. These differences can translate to shorter delays
312 between reinfection events for the polarized immunity model, which in turn
313 can lead to dynamical differences at the population level.

314 There are also other complexities that need to be considered. For exam-
315 ple, individuals who are boosted after vaccination can have different immu-

316 nity profiles compared to those who attained strong protection from vacci-
317 nation alone. These individuals also likely have different immunity profiles
318 from those who have been infected but never been vaccinated. These dif-
319 ferences can also cause polarized vaccination and immune-boosting models
320 to behave differently. Despite these limitations, immune boosting, which is
321 often neglected in epidemic models of vaccination, is still expected to be an
322 important mechanism for understanding dynamics of many pathogens.

323 We have provided a unifying framework for understanding the impact of
324 vaccination on the spread of infectious disease. The specifics of how vaccina-
325 tion translates into immunization defines the population burden of infection
326 via its effect on the epidemic final size. Yet discussion of how the two extreme
327 models commonly used (leaky and polarized) are related has been lacking.
328 By making this link, we both illustrate the spectrum of trajectories expected
329 for a range of configurations, and illuminate the effects of these assumptions
330 on medium-term vaccine effectiveness.

Supplementary Text

Here, we show that, in the presence of immune boosting, epidemic dynamics are independent of the shape of the susceptibility distribution (depending only on mean susceptibility). To do so, we assume that a vaccinated individual's susceptibility $0 \leq p \leq 1$ (i.e., probability of infection given challenge) follows some distribution $f(p)$:

$$\frac{dS_u}{dt} = -\lambda(t)S_u - \rho S_u \quad (34)$$

$$\frac{dI_u}{dt} = \lambda(t)S_u - \gamma_u I_u \quad (35)$$

$$\frac{dR_u}{dt} = \gamma_u I_u \quad (36)$$

$$\frac{\partial S_v(p)}{\partial t} = -\lambda(t)S_v(p) + f(p)\rho S_u \quad (37)$$

$$\frac{\partial I_v(p)}{\partial t} = p\lambda(t)S_v(p) - \gamma_v I_v(p) \quad (38)$$

$$\frac{dR_v}{dt} = \int_0^1 [(1-p)\lambda(t)S_v(p) + \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (39)$$

Due to immune boosting, $S_v(p)$ is always depleted at a per-capita rate of $\lambda(t)$ regardless of the values of p , meaning that the (normalized) distribution of $S_v(p)$ will always follow $f(p)$. To obtain the dynamics of total prevalence $I_v = \int I_v(p) dp$, we can integrate $\partial I_v(p)/\partial t$ across p :

$$\frac{dI_v}{dt} = \int_0^1 \left[\frac{\partial I_v(p)}{\partial t} \right] dp \quad (40)$$

$$= \int_0^1 [p\lambda(t)S_v(p) - \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (41)$$

$$= \int_0^1 [pf(p)\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v(p)] dp \quad (42)$$

$$= \bar{p}\lambda(t)S_v - \gamma_v I_v, \quad (43)$$

where \bar{p} represents the mean of the distribution $f(p)$, and $S_v = \int S_v(p) dp$ represents the proportion of total susceptible, vaccinated individuals. Therefore, the dynamics of total prevalence I_v depends only on the mean susceptibility \bar{p} and not on the shape of the distribution $f(p)$ under immune boosting.

References

- Anderson, R. M. and R. M. May (1985). Vaccination and herd immunity to infectious diseases. *Nature* 318(6044), 323–329.
- Anderson, R. M., C. Vegvari, J. Truscott, and B. S. Collyer (2020). Challenges in creating herd immunity to SARS-CoV-2 infection by mass vaccination. *The Lancet* 396(10263), 1614–1616.
- Bubar, K. M., K. Reinholt, S. M. Kissler, M. Lipsitch, S. Cobey, Y. H. Grad, and D. B. Larremore (2021). Model-informed COVID-19 vaccine prioritization strategies by age and serostatus. *Science* 371(6532), 916–921.
- Buckner, J. H., G. Chowell, and M. R. Springborn (2021). Dynamic prioritization of COVID-19 vaccines when social distancing is limited for essential workers. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118(16), e2025786118.
- Dyson, L., E. M. Hill, S. Moore, J. Curran-Sebastian, M. J. Tildesley, K. A. Lythgoe, T. House, L. Pellis, and M. J. Keeling (2021). Possible future waves of SARS-CoV-2 infection generated by variants of concern with a range of characteristics. *Nature communications* 12(1), 1–13.
- Farrington, C. (1993). Estimation of vaccine effectiveness using the screening method. *International journal of epidemiology* 22(4), 742–746.
- Gandon, S., M. Mackinnon, S. Nee, and A. Read (2003). Imperfect vaccination: some epidemiological and evolutionary consequences. *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences* 270(1520), 1129–1136.
- Gog, J. and J. Swinton (2002). A status-based approach to multiple strain dynamics. *Journal of mathematical biology* 44(2), 169–184.
- Gog, J. R. and B. T. Grenfell (2002). Dynamics and selection of many-strain pathogens. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 99(26), 17209–17214.
- Gomes, M. G. M., M. Lipsitch, A. R. Wargo, G. Kurath, C. Rebelo, G. F. Medley, and A. Coutinho (2014). A missing dimension in measures of vaccination impacts. *PLoS pathogens* 10(3), e1003849.

369 Gozzi, N., P. Bajardi, and N. Perra (2021). The importance of non-
370 pharmaceutical interventions during the COVID-19 vaccine rollout. *PLoS*
371 *computational biology* 17(9), e1009346.

372 Halloran, M., I. Longini, and C. Struchiner (2009). *Design and Analysis of*
373 *Vaccine Studies*. Statistics for Biology and Health. Springer New York.

374 Halloran, M. E., M. Haber, and I. M. Longini Jr (1992). Interpretation and
375 estimation of vaccine efficacy under heterogeneity. *American Journal of*
376 *Epidemiology* 136(3), 328–343.

377 Halloran, M. E., M. Haber, I. M. Longini Jr, and C. J. Struchiner (1991).
378 Direct and indirect effects in vaccine efficacy and effectiveness. *American*
379 *journal of epidemiology* 133(4), 323–331.

380 Heffernan, J. and M. Keeling (2009). Implications of vaccination and
381 waning immunity. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sci-*
382 *ences* 276(1664), 2071–2080.

383 Iwasaki, A. and S. B. Omer (2020). Why and how vaccines work. *Cell* 183(2),
384 290–295.

385 Kahn, R., S. J. Schrag, J. R. Verani, and M. Lipsitch (2022). Identifying
386 and alleviating bias due to differential depletion of susceptible people in
387 postmarketing evaluations of covid-19 vaccines. *American journal of epi-*
388 *demiology* 191(5), 800–811.

389 Kucharski, A. J., V. Andreasen, and J. R. Gog (2016). Capturing the dynam-
390 ics of pathogens with many strains. *Journal of mathematical biology* 72(1),
391 1–24.

392 Langwig, K. E., A. R. Wargo, D. R. Jones, J. R. Viss, B. J. Rutan, N. A.
393 Egan, P. Sá-Guimarães, M. S. Kim, G. Kurath, M. G. M. Gomes, et al.
394 (2017). Vaccine effects on heterogeneity in susceptibility and implications
395 for population health management. *mbio* 8(6), 10–1128.

396 Lavine, J. S., A. A. King, and O. N. Bjørnstad (2011). Natural immune
397 boosting in pertussis dynamics and the potential for long-term vaccine
398 failure. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108(17), 7259–
399 7264.

400 Lewnard, J. A. and Y. H. Grad (2018). Vaccine waning and mumps re-
401 emergence in the United States. *Science translational medicine* 10(433),
402 eaao5945.

403 Lind, M. L., M. Dorion, A. J. Houde, M. Lansing, S. Lapidus, R. Thomas,
404 I. Yildirim, S. B. Omer, W. L. Schulz, J. R. Andrews, et al. (2023). Evi-
405 dence of leaky protection following COVID-19 vaccination and SARS-CoV-
406 2 infection in an incarcerated population. *Nature communications* 14(1),
407 5055.

408 Lipsitch, M. (2019). Challenges of vaccine effectiveness and waning studies.
409 *Clinical Infectious Diseases* 68(10), 1631–1633.

410 Lipsitch, M. and R. Kahn (2021). Interpreting vaccine efficacy trial results
411 for infection and transmission. *Vaccine* 39(30), 4082–4088.

412 Marziano, V., G. Guzzetta, A. Mammone, F. Riccardo, P. Poletti, F. Tren-
413 tini, M. Manica, A. Siddu, A. Bella, P. Stefanelli, P. Pezzotti, M. Ajelli,
414 S. Brusaferro, G. Rezza, and S. Merler (2021). The effect of COVID-19
415 vaccination in Italy and perspectives for living with the virus. *Nature*
416 *Communications* 12(1), 7272.

417 Matrajt, L., J. Eaton, T. Leung, and E. R. Brown (2021). Vaccine opti-
418 mization for COVID-19: Who to vaccinate first? *Science Advances* 7(6),
419 eabf1374.

420 Park, S. W., J. Dushoff, B. Grenfell, and J. S. Weitz (2022). Intermedi-
421 ate levels of asymptomatic transmission can lead to the highest levels of
422 epidemic fatalities. *medRxiv*.

423 Pérez-Alós, L., J. J. A. Armenteros, J. R. Madsen, C. B. Hansen, I. Jarlhelt,
424 S. R. Hamm, L. D. Heftdal, M. M. Pries-Heje, D. L. Møller, K. Fogh, R. B.
425 Hasselbalch, A. Rosbjerg, S. Brunak, E. Sørensen, M. A. H. Larsen, S. R.
426 Ostrowski, R. Frikk-Schmidt, R. Bayarri-Olmos, L. M. Hilsted, K. K.
427 Iversen, H. Bundgaard, S. D. Nielsen, and P. Garred (2022). Modeling of
428 waning immunity after SARS-CoV-2 vaccination and influencing factors.
429 *Nature Communications* 13(1), 1614.

430 Rinta-Kokko, H., R. Dagan, N. Givon-Lavi, and K. Auranen (2009). Esti-
431 mation of vaccine efficacy against acquisition of pneumococcal carriage.
432 *Vaccine* 27(29), 3831–3837.

- 433 Smith, P., L. Rodrigues, and P. Fine (1984). Assessment of the protective
434 efficacy of vaccines against common diseases using case-control and cohort
435 studies. *International journal of epidemiology* 13(1), 87–93.
- 436 Yang, L., B. T. Grenfell, and M. J. Mina (2020). Waning immunity and
437 re-emergence of measles and mumps in the vaccine era. *Current opinion*
438 *in virology* 40, 48–54.