Lab 1 – Set-UID

Task 1









Printenv command is used to print all the environment variables in the system whereas grep command is used to search for a particular environment variables. And that unset command is used to unset any environment variable.

Task 2





We compiled and ran the child process first and saw that it prints all the environment variables of both child process and as well as the parent



process.

When we use the diff command to child's and parent's environment variables we see that there is no difference because the child has inherited all of the parents environment.

Task 3




task3.c (~/Documents/SETUID) - gedit
11:28 PM
Open
Save
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
extern char **environ;
int main()
{
char *argv[2];
argv[0] = "/usr/bin/env";
argv[1] = NULL;
execve("/usr/bin/env", argv, environ);
return 0 ;
}
Saving file '/home/seed/Documents/SETUID/task3.c'...
C
Tab Width: 8
Ln 9, Col 37
INS


Terminal
11:39 PM
[09/07/19]seed@VM:~/.../SETUID$ gcc task3.c
task3.c: In function 'main':
task3.c:10:2: warning: implicit declaration of function 'execve' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
execve("/usr/bin/env", argv, environ);
^
[09/07/19]seed@VM:~/.../SETUID$ ls
a.out task2.c task2parent.c task3.c
[09/07/19]seed@VM:~/.../SETUID$ ./a.out
XDG_VTNR=7
XDG_SESSION_ID=c1
XDG_GREETER_DATA_DIR=/var/lib/lightdm-data/seed
CLUTTER_IM_MODULE=xim
SESSION=ubuntu
ANDROID_HOME=/home/seed/android/android-sdk-linux
GPG_AGENT_INFO=/home/seed/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent:0:1
TERM=xterm-256color
VTE_VERSION=4205
XDG_MENU_PREFIX=gnome-
SHELL=/bin/bash
DERBY_HOME=/usr/lib/jvm/java-8-oracle/db
QT_LINUX_ACCESSIBILITY_ALWAYS_ON=1
LD_PRELOAD=/home/seed/lib/boost/libboost_program_options.so.1.64.0:/home/seed/lib/boost/libboost_filesystem.so.1.64.0:/home/seed/lib/boost/libboost_system.so.1.64.0
WINDOWID=33554442
UPSTART_SESSION=unix:abstract=/com/ubuntu/upstart-session/1000/1187
GNOME_KEYRING_CONTROL=
GTK_MODULES=gail:atk-bridge:unity-gtk-module
USER=seed
LS_COLORS=rs=0:di=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:pi=40;33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd=40;33;01:or=40;31;01:mi=00:su=37;41:sg=30;43:ca=30;41:tw=30;42:ow=34;42:st=37;44:ex=01;32:*.tar=01;31:*.tgz=01;31:*.arc=01;31:*.arj=01;31:*.taz=01;31:*.lha=01;31:*.lz4=01;31:*.lzh=01;31:*.lzma=01;31:*.tlz=01;31:*.txz=01;31:*.tzo=01;31:*.t7z=01;31:*.zip=01;31:*.z=01;31:*.Z=01;31:*.dz=01;31:*.gz=01;31:*.lrz=01;31:*.lz=01;31:*.lzo=01;31:*.xz=01;31:*.bz2=01;31:*.bz=01;31:*.tbz=01;31:*.tbz2=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.deb=01;31:*.rpm=01;31:*.jar=01;31:*.war=01;31:*.ear=01;31:*.sar=01;31:*.rar=01;31:*.alz=01;31:*.ace=01;31:*.zoo=01;31:*.cpio=01;31:*.7z=01;31:*.rz=01;31:*.cab=01;31:*.jpg=01;35:*.jpeg=01;35:*.gif=01;35:*.bmp=01;35:*.pbm=01;35:*.pgm=01;35:*.ppm=01;35:*.tga=01;35:*.xbm=01;35:*.xpm=01;35:*.tif=01;35:*.tiff=01;35:*.png=01;35:*.svg=01;35:*.svgz=01;35:*.mng=01;35:*.pcx=01;35:*.mov=01;35:*.mpg=01;35:*.mpeg=01;35:*.m2v=01;35:*.mkv=01;35:*.webm=01;35:*.ogm=01;35:*.mp4=01;35:*.m4v=01;35:*.mp4v=01;35:*.v



When the 3rd argument of the execve() command was NULL we saw that it prints nothing since only shell is returned however, when we replace that with environ we can see that all the environment variables are printed.

Task 4





We can see from the above screenshot that when the program is executed it is not executed directly. First, it calls the shell which then executes the command. The environment variables are passed to the shell and then it is executed by the execve function.

Task 5



After compiling and running the program and changing its ownership to root and then making it a setuid program and then setting the 3 environment variable. And then after running the program we can see that all of the export command except LD_LIBRARY _PATH are inherited.

It is because there is some protection for this environment variable as it is used for shared libraries and therefore, preventing any malicious file from being placed into shared library.

Task 6


File Edit View Search Tools Documents Help
3:44 PM
Open
Save
int main()
{
printf("virus");
return 0;
}
Loading file '/home/seed/ls.c'...
C
Tab Width: 8
Ln 1, Col 1
INS


Terminal
3:43 PM
root@VM: /etc
Terminal
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~/.../SETUID$ cd ..
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~/Documents$ cd ..
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~$ ls
android Customization Documents examples.desktop lib Pictures source Videos
bin Desktop Downloads get-pip.py Music Public Templates
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~$ nano ls.c
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~$ pwd
/home/seed
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~$ ls
android Customization Documents examples.desktop lib Music Public Templates
bin Desktop Downloads get-pip.py ls.c Pictures source Videos
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc ls.c -o ls
ls.c: In function 'main':
ls.c:3:1: warning: implicit declaration of function 'system' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
system("virus");
^
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~$ nano ls.c
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc ls.c -o ls
ls.c: In function 'main':
ls.c:3:1: warning: implicit declaration of function 'printf' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
printf("virus");
^
ls.c:3:1: warning: incompatible implicit declaration of built-in function 'printf'
ls.c:3:1: note: include '<stdio.h>' or provide a declaration of 'printf'
[09/09/19]seed@VM:~$



We first created the program with name task6.c and then compiled and changed its ownership to root and made it a setuid program after which we change the PATH environment variable. And then we create a new program ls and compile it.

We can see from the above screenshot that when the ls command is being searched it runs that program instead of the shell ls command which means that SET-UID program may run malicious file if the PATH variable is changed.

Task 7





We can see from the above screenshot that after creating, compiling and then executing myprog program from the root account. Also, setting the LD_PRELOAD pointing to dll we can see that the program calls the mylib dll



Now, when we make the myprog a setuid program that is owned by a new user named 'parth' and then running the program from another account 'seed' we can see that myprog doesn't invoke the DLL.

LD_PRELOAD is ignored if SETUID program tries to access it acting as a protection.

In the 1st screenshot it was executed without a setuid program and therefore LD_PRELOAD is not ignored whereas, in the 2nd case myprog being a setuid and run by a normal user the LD_PRELOAD is

ignored and the file created by us isn't accessed. And that while executing the same with the root account both being accessible by root it can run the DLL that we created.

Task 8

i.





We first create a program compile it, change its owner to root and make it a set uid program after which we create another file named ‘ randomtext.txt’ and change its owner to root. Now we login to another user named ‘parth’ and try to remove the file. It states ‘No Such file or Directory’ which means that the file has been deleted.

When system() command is executed it doesn’t execute the command directly instead it calls the shell which then executes further therefore when the program has setuid the user gets the root privileges which is why it is then able to remove the files with root privileges.

ii.





We first uncommented the execve function and commented the system command and then compiled the program changed its ownership to root and made it a setuid program andthen ran the code from a another user named ‘parth’ we can see that we are not able to remove the file.

This is because as soon we put something after ‘;’ it is assumed to be a new command and the root privileges are gone and therefore the command is executed with the privileges that the user name parth has which is why it cannot delete the file.

Task 9





As seen from the above screenshot that we created a new file named task9.c which we compiled, changed its ownership to root and made it a set uid bit. After which we change the user to 'root' and in the /etc/ directory we create a new file named zzz with the content ' CSE643'. And now we again go back to the account 'seed' from where we execute the command .

This is because the parents privileges were not downgraded because of which the child process was also able to access the file. This is known as capability leaking. To avoid this kind of attacks the 'fd' has to be closed before the new fork call.