

# Browser Infrastructure Pattern

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## ABSTRACT

Currently a lot of software developments create systems that are connected to the Internet, which allows to add functionality within a system and facilities to their *Stakeholders*. This leads to depend in a *web client*, as the *Web Browser*, which allows access to services, data or operations that the system delivers. Nevertheless, the Internet influences the attack surface of the new system, and unfortunately many stakeholders and developers are not aware of the risks they are exposed. The lack of Security Education in Software developers of a project, the low and scattered documentation of each browser (and standardization), could become a great flaw in big architectural developments which depends on the browser to do their services. A Reference Architecture of the *Web Browser*, using Architectural Patterns, could be a base for understanding the security mechanisms and its architecture, which interacts with a bigger web system. This would give an unification of ideas and terminology, giving a holistic view regardless the implementation details for both the browser and the system it communicates to. We developed a Browser Infrastructure Pattern which describes the infrastructure to allow the communication between a Web Client and Server in the Internet. With this work we propose an Architectural Pattern as the first piece of our Reference Architecture for the Web Browser.

## Keywords

Web Browser, Web Client, Modular Architecture, Browser Architecture, Reference Architecture, Browser Infrastructure pattern

## Introduction

### Background

We present in this section patterns as well as their benefits. We also describe how to build more secure reference architectures by using security patterns

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WOODSTOCK '97 El Paso, Texas USA

© 2015 ACM. ISBN 123-4567-24-567/08/06.

DOI: 10.475/123\_4

Patterns are encapsulated solutions to recurrent problems and define a way to express requirements and solutions concisely, as well as providing a communication vocabulary for designers [11]. The description of architectures using patterns makes them easier to understand, provides guidelines for design and analysis, and can define a way of making their structure more secure.

Security patterns describe solutions to the problems of controlling (stopping or mitigating) a set of specific threats through some security mechanism, defined in a given context. The most common use of security patterns is to help application developers -who are not security experts- to add security in their designs. Patterns of this kind also are used to reinforce a legacy system.

The aim of a Reference Architecture is to provide a guide for developer, who are non security experts, in the development of Architectures for concrete versions of the system or to extend it. With the use of Architectural Patterns we describe the Browser Architecture as a Reference Architecture (RA). A RA is created by capturing the essentials of existing architectures and by taking into account future needs and opportunities, ranging from specific technologies, patterns and business models. It can also be derived from domain models.

A Secure Reference Architecture is a Reference Architecture where security services have been added in appropriate places to provide some degree of security for a system environment. The basic approach that we will use to build a Secure Reference Architecture is by applying a systematic methodology from [7, 9], which can be used as a guideline to build secure web browsers systems and/or to evaluate their security levels. We started to build a Reference Architecture as a first step, in a student work, and now we are trying to improve it using security patterns and misuse patterns. By checking if a threat, expressed as a misuse pattern, can be stopped or mitigated in the secure reference architecture, we can evaluate its level of security.

In this work, a Browser Infrastructure Pattern is presented as a first step in to the process of developing a Secure Reference Architecture for the Web Browser. Threat analysis and security patterns was done in our previous student work (graduation report), and we will improve it in the construction of the SRA.

## Related Work

### Reference Architecture of the Browser

We tried to find studies by searching relevant keywords in Scopus or doing a forward snowballing from a work [14] we

knew. Unfortunately to the date there are a few works related to the construction of a Reference Architecture for the Web Browser.

In the study made by Larrondo-Petrie et. at [15] a web browser analysis is done with the goal of obtaining a Domain Model, and Object Model and a Feature Tree which described the structure and functionality a browser had. The domain, explained in th paper, is a distintive set of objects which act according to rules and policies that characterize the Domain. The used methodology obtains the domain is called Object Oriented Analysis. To identify

In addition to identifying these domains they are classified according to their role in the system as: Application Domain, Service Domain, Architecture Domain and Implementation Domain. Object Model serves to provide further details, an overview of the entities in the *Web Browser* and their relationships. The *Feature Tree* provides details on the functional aspects of the application. The proposed model, according to the article, should be useful for software developers who build **Web-based applications** using the *Browser*. This study is quite far from what we want to do in this work, but it serves to get a background of what is happening in the *Web Browser*, even though the information is very outdated.

In the work of Grosskurth et al. [?, ?], a reverse engineering tool is used to obtain a reference architecture at a very high-level on two open-source browsers Mozilla and Konqueror. What it was obtained captured the fundamental subsystems to the same domain systems, as well as the relationships between these subsystems. In this architecture the following subcomponents are identified: User Interface, Data Persistence, Browser Engine, Rendering Engine, Networking, Interpreter of Javascript, XML Parser and Backend Display. It is mentioned that these components are tightly integrated (high coupling) with the Rendering Engine, which makes sense in the single-threaded (monoprocess) architecture that have Mozilla and Konqueror; It is a very common design decision in the *Browser* by that time.

By identifying these components, it is said that this would serve both the design and for the maintenance of a system, because it enhances the understanding to help analyze the trade-off between different design options; or it can also serve as a *template* for new designs. Once the conceptual architecture is extracted, an assessment was initiated to compare the specific architecture of each open-source browser, extracted from the source code, to see how much the conceptual model was closer to reality; Also, the constant comparison allowed to refine the Reference Architecture. Browsers used to validate were: Epiphany, Safari, Lynx, Mosaic and Firefox. While there is quite high-level information about the architecture presented, it does not develop more than the abstraction layer. Also, it seems to appear that it depends on the implementation used in the reverse engineering tool.

The paper [12] made in 2000, describes the experience gained by extending the work described in the TAXFORM project. By using PBS, a tool for reverse engineering, it was extracted the software architecture of the Mozilla browser. This was done in order to understand the structure of its components and create high-level architectural views of the system.

The architectural model obtained contains 11 high-level subsystems, from these those which stood out were the HTML Layout, the implementation of tools and the User Interface

code. Also, the study mentions that the architecture has deteriorated significantly in a short period of time (the study is from 2000), and it was not planned carefully from the beginning; part of the blame, the author believes, is a consequence from the *browser wars* in the 90s. While the work helps to understand a little the structure behind the browser, this work is very old and the latest version of the browser has changed considerably. Also, unfortunately the focus of this study does not concern about the internals of th system, but rather the implementation of the reverse engineering tool for the software architecture in a selected browser.

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In [?] proposes a *Browser* called Anfel SOFT, where through the use of Artificial Intelligence, creates agents that improve the user experience. The work ensures that the browser will be able to learn the user's browsing behavior, and guide the user while browsing as effective as possible. The paper obtained the subsystems that can be found in a browser in the same way is done in [?]. While the architecture obtained reflects some of what is seen in the 3 browsers chosen in this study, it does not give any details about the identified subsystem. Also, the Reference Architecture obtained is the same as [?, ?], despite identifying other possible components, it adds nothing new.

As we already saw in the above studies, some of them build a reference architecture based on reverse engineering techniques. In each work it has been at a very high-level and the description of subcomponents of the system is minimal. Even though they explain the relations between the subsystems, they do not give a better understanding of how they behave in certain situations. In this work is expected explain in more detail the obtained abstractions, including information of the *Browser* use cases as well as the activities carried out with other users. Unfortunately for this study, there is not much literature about the development of a Reference Architecture for *Browser*, and what we found, the most recent work is [16] in 2009.

Podemos ver en los trabajos que algunos construyen una Arquitectura de Referencia basada en técnicas de Ingeniería Inversa. En cada uno de ellos el trabajo ha sido a muy alto nivel y la descripción de los subcomponentes del sistema es mínima. Si bien explican las relaciones entre éstos, no dan un mayor entendimiento en cómo se comportan en ciertas situaciones. En este trabajo se espera profundizar un poco más en la abstracción obtenida, incluyendo información de tanto los casos de uso del *Browser* como las actividades que se realizan con otros usuarios. Desafortunadamente para esta memoria, no existe mucha literatura sobre el desarrollo de una Arquitectura de Referencia del *Browser*, y de lo que hay, el trabajo más actual es el realizado por [16] en el año 2009.

## Secure Software Development

La literatura que habla de la construcción de *Secure Software* o Software Seguro, indica que los practicantes de Desarrollo de Software deben entender, en gran medida, los problemas de seguridad que podrían llegar a ocurrir en sus sistemas. No basta con saber cómo unir las piezas, no basta con que cada pieza de por si sea segura, si los componentes del sistema no actúan de forma coordinada, probablemente éste no será seguro [10], dado que la seguridad es una Propiedad Sistémica que necesita ser vista de manera holística y al inicio del proceso.

## Browser Infrastructure Pattern

### Intent

The Browser Infrastructure Pattern allows the request of a web resource in the Internet to a **Browser User** (BU), which is a user who uses a Browser within a **Host**. The Pattern lets visualize the communication between the components that make the Web Browser and the Provider (i.e, a Server), to whom the request is made.

### Example

Within the Host it is possible a lack of resources that a Host user may need. The request of external services or resources is the main reason of the Internet existence. This kind of task it is possible to do in a lot of ways, it all depends on what the Provider wish to deliver to others.

### Context

Browser User is a Host user which uses a Browser, and the Provider is an entity which can be accessed in the Internet. The contact between each other is normally done by Web Applications or Servers which comunicats using the HTTP protocol. A Browser let the Browser User access and visualize the external resources a Provider has and a Browser User may need.

### Problem

Some Browser Users could need resources from a Providr, but the user maybe will need them in a special format o they should be presented in the screen of the computer to be visualized. In this case, if an appropriate tools is not used, the resource could not be helpful if it can not be used correctly. How can the Host and Provider be prepared to this situation? The solution to this problem must resolve the following problems:

- Transparency: the user behind the Host should not be worried of what it is done, while a request to a Provider has been issued.
- Stability: The *Browser* must be capable of working, evn if a web page had a problem to be seen or there is an internal problem.
- Isolation: Each *request* must not interrupt others.
- Heterogeneity: It does not matter the type of Provider to which the Browser comunicats, it should be possible to interact with whatever type is it, and also it should be capable to show adequately the content of the obtained resource.
- Availability: The user of the Host, should be capable to request at any time.

### Solution

A *Web Browser* can satisfy the request a user of the Host by the Browser User, either by one or more instances of the Browser User, which allows for a variety of options to browse in the internet. A Browser must be able to deliver a fast and stable navigation, without affecting each accesed sites.

### Structure

The Browser Client (BC) is an entity that represents the main process of a Web Browser and comprises the minimum number of componenets which constitute a Browser. A Host (H) houses and interacts with the BC. H is composed mainly by Hardware (HW) and a Oprative System (OS). At the same time, a Provider (P) has also HW and SO, but additionally has a Web Server (WS) which is responsable for receiving external requests. Browser Client (BC), Sandbox (S), GPU Instance (GPUI) y Plugin are instances of Process (Pr), which resides within a H. Most Browsers use a central component to do operations that need to affect the Host of the Browser. Figure 1 shows the Class diagram for the Browser Infrastructure Patter. For each resource a BC rquests, a Sandbox hosting each Web Content Renderer (WBR) instance created will allow the browsing and visualization of the resource obtained. The BC componenet acts as a broker for the requests comming from the Sandbox (which host a WBR), this allows a fine control over the sent messages (using PC/IPDL/COM) between communicating process. If there is a need for the H resources, a GPU Instance and Plugins are elements which need to communicate directly with the Sandbox, which in its instead will ask to the BC for resources. A user who makes a request to a Internet resources using a Web Browser, will be called Browser User (BU). BU uses BC to make requests to one o more Providers, where the latter uses a Web Server (WS) to receive requests and reply back (Figura 1).

### Dynamics

Some use cases are the following:

- Make Request (actor: Browser User)
- Cancel Request (actor: Browser User)
- Save Resoruce (actor: Browser User)
- Receive Request (actor: Provider)
- Ask for Resources (actor: Host)

We show in detail Make Request below. (Figura 2):

### Summary

A Browser User needs a URL resource which can be obtained by using the HTTP protocol, as required by the Provider. The Browser Client will be used by a User Browser to perform the display of the URL resource.

### Actor

Browser User

### Preconditions

The Host must have one or more Browser Client for the Host user. In addition to being connected to a network or the Internet. The Provider you want to contact must also be available.

### Description

Note: Messages between the Browser Client and Sandbox can be both synchronous and asynchronous [4, 2] . We not specify in great detail, because what matters in this work will be the origin and destination of the message (is not within the scope to see synchronization).





Figure 1: High-level Componentets of the *Browser*.

1. A Browser User requires a browser to access a URL for some resource in a Provider, this is done by using an already instanced Browser Client in the Host. Inside the Sandbox there is an instance of Web Content Renderer pattern.
2. The Sandbox requires the Host resources to obtain what is behind the URL. A request is made from the Sandbox to the Browser Client through a communication channel such as IPC, IPDL or COM (depending on the *Browser* used), using a limited API to communicate to a process of greater privilege.
3. The Browser Client receives the request, and verifies through its policy engine if the Sandbox action is allowed.
4. If the Sandbox action is permitted, the Network API within the Browser Client, to obtain a host resources (via system calls), it is used. The Browser Client communicates internally with the Host, and the latter must review its policies to ensure that the Browser Client has the privilege of making a request to the Host resources.
5. If access to the resource is allowed, the Browser Client may *request* through the Network API. If the *request* is not a *pre-flight*, the Provider will receive the *request* and work on it.
6. The Provider will send a *response* to the *request* received. Depending on how it is implemented the Browser Client, it may or not have to wait for the response (synchronous or asynchronous) of the Provider.
7. Once the response obtained it is stored in the cache, unless directed to do other way so.
8. The response to the *request* is sent by a communication channel to the Sandbox which originated and then the Web Content Renderer. If a response was received by the *request*, the Web Content Renderer is ready to prepare the parsing of the website or use a plugin or GPU to support the display of the resources obtained by the URL. Otherwise, the Web Content Renderer within the Sandbox will create an error page.
9. The *Renderer* obtains a bitmap to be sent to the Client Browser, so that the Host can present it. Before doing this, the BC should check that the Sandbox which host the Web Content Renderer possess the permissions to do so.
10. If the permissions are sufficient, the Browser Client sends the bitmap, as a parameter, in the system call made to the Host. Finally, H must check that the system call made by the Browser Client has the required permissions.

#### Alternative flow

- The Provider is not available.
- The resource pointed by the URL does not exists.
- The request is cancelled.



**Figure 2: Diagrama de Secuencia: Realizar Request.**

### Postconditions

The *Browser* receives the resource indicated by the URL and is displayed by the peripheral device output to the Host user.

### Implementation

- The sandbox may be implemented in various ways. Google Chrome [5] is based on not reinventing the wheel and use the protection mechanisms which offers the OS (e.g, Windows or Linux) Host to protect the user. This prevents to any process the access to the file system, and having an restrictive API in the web Content Renderer. Google Chrome, Firefox and Internet Explorer assume that Sandboxes are processes that should be governed by the principle of least privilege (least privilege). The minimum configuration for the Sandbox include 2 processes: The privileged process or Broker who is represented by the Browser Client, and the processes hosted by Sandboxes or targets.

- To enforce the Same Origin Policy, Google Chrome, Firefox and Internet Explorer use different schemes; for example: Google Chrome leaves his work to the Renderer (Web Content Renderer in this case) to leave isolated pages/resources from various sites.

### Consequences

The Browser Infrastructure pattern provides the following benefits:

- **Transparency:** The user navigation is done almost automatically, only in rare cases the user will have to make a decision on the resource asked.
- **Stability:** Because the Browser Client, Sandbox, and GPU Instance Plugin are independent Host processes, the failure of one will not generate problems in other (crash, memory corruption, etc.).
- **Isolation:** Depending on the type of isolation you can separate the different requests, so they do not interfere with each other, unless it is desired.

- Heterogeneity: Because each Browser Client tries to follow the standards of the W3C [?], every page that follows these guidelines can be viewed, as well as other resources.
- Availability: Each process is independent and has its own thread of execution, these were specifically created to help to maintain the User Interface smooth.

At the same time, this pattern has the following liabilities:

- Since independent processes are used to browse a resource (depending on the scheme using the browser), it is possible that a lot of resources of the Host are to be used to keep everything open.
- Provider who have not met the specifications of the W3C, their resource are displayed incorrectly by the Web Browser.

## Example Resolved

With the given pattern it is now possible to navigate smoothly to all resources on the Internet we want. It is possible to provide through the isolation of the components: speed, security and stability. The Browser User will only concern about the navigation, unless it is required for its explicit permission to enter certain Host resources that are privileged (e.g. the file system). Each Host user can use the Browser Client they want, because each one is isolated by using separate processes.

## Known Uses

- Currently, the separation of the components of the *Browser* in various processes, with different levels of access, is called as Modular Architecture [17]. This enables the separation of concerns in the browser, which gives greater stability, isolation, safety and speed.
- Google Chrome is based on the modular architecture, where each Renderer Process communicates with the Browser Kernel [3]. Internet Explorer, a proprietary browser, does not give much information about its structure or details of its implementation; [6] talks about Loosely-Coupled architecture [1] and its components, but without going into much detail. Firefox, meanwhile has two implementations: monprocess and multiprocess/modular. Electrolysis is the name of the modular architecture being implemented, but has not yet been fully completed.

## Related Patterns

- The Web Content Renderer pattern, which is under development, represents the subsystem hosted by a Sandbox that allows the parsing of a resource obtained through a request.
- The Browser Kernel pattern, also under development, represents the subsystem that represents the Web browser central component. This acts as a Reference Monitor [10] for all requests the Renderer does.
- The Sandbox is another name for the pattern Controlled Execution Domain [10].

## Conclusions

A Web browser appears to be a medium complexity software for users and developers without security experience, but unfortunately this piece of software allows a variety of attack vectors, to the user using it as well the system with which interacts. Therefore it is important to understand its structure and how it interacts with internal or/and external Stakeholders.

It is expected that in the future most *Web Browser* will take the form of a Modular Architecture. Therefore, it is important that developers know the internal processes of *browser* when developing a system that will interact with it. The Reference Architecture prepresented here, it is aimed at providing the basic knowledge of the components and interactions between *Web Browser* and external Provider for resources; as well as the threats that exist within it.

A part of our Reference Architecture has been built through the abstraction of found documentation, through the Browser Infrastructure pattern. We created our first architectural pattern for the infrastructure of *Web Browser*; to help others to understand holistically the components, interactions and relationships of this system. Furthermore it has been possible to characterize the Stakeholders and one of the most important use case. From what we have known, this is the second Reference Architecture for the *Browser* built.

The proposed work allows a better understanding of this system called Web Browser by using our partially Reference Architecture, this is also helpful to understand existing threats. Furthermore, as it is not subject to specific implementations, it is possible to generalize certain results in other browsers.

## Future Work

Future work will be related to the creation of a Security Reference Architecture for the *Web Browser* using the same methodology presented here. Other patterns related to Browser Infrastructure pattern will be obtained in order to complete the AR already begun, such as the Web Content Renderer pattern and Browser Kernel. An example of the type of work to be carried out can be seen in [8] where this study carries out activities to build secure software and evaluate the safety levels of a system already built.

We plan to build more Misuse patterns, for the Browser Infrastructure pattern, to continue the study of the possible threats in the *Browser*, as a way to educate Developers and Stakeholders. While at the same time these patterns will allow the construction of the Security Reference Architecture. In the same line, in addition to finding potential threats existing in the system, we need to find countermeasures or security defenses to prevent or foresee such threats through security patterns on the reference architecture built. This is possible to perform under the same exercise already conducted in this work, looking for threats at each action for each use case of the Browser.

As for *Web Browsers*, attacks based on social engineering does not seem to decrease at any good time, because there is no current technology that can detect a 100% without no false positives the potential threats they can bring. Technologies such as CAMP (Content-Agnostic Malware Protection) appear to be part of the solution, but are still far from perfect.

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