

Romain Thomas - rthomas@quarkslab.com

Static instrumentation based on executable file formats

**Quarkslab**  
SECURING EVERY BIT OF YOUR DATA

- ▶ Romain Thomas - Security engineer at Quarkslab
- ▶ Working on various topics: Android, (de)obfuscation, software protection and reverse engineering
- ▶ Author of LIEF



# Executable Formats

## Executable Formats: Overview

- ▶ First layer of information when analysing a binary

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<sup>1</sup>entrypoint, libraries, ...

- ▶ First layer of information when analysing a binary
- ▶ Provide metadata<sup>1</sup> used by the operating system to load the binary.


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<sup>1</sup>entrypoint, libraries, ...


- ▶ **OSX / iOS:** Mach-O
- ▶ **Linux:** ELF
- ▶ **Windows:** PE
- ▶ **Android:** ELF, OAT

Why modify formats ?


# Executable Formats




# Executable Formats




# Executable Formats





# Executable Formats







# Executable Formats












# Executable Formats

**LIEF**: Library to Instrument Executable Formats

- ▶ One library to deal with ELF, PE, Mach-O
- ▶ Core in C++
- ▶ Bindings for different languages: Python, C<sup>2</sup>, ...
- ▶ Enable modification on these formats
- ▶ User friendly API

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<sup>2</sup>C binding is not as mature as Python and C++



```
import lief

target = lief.parse("ELF/PE/Mach-O/OAT")

print(target.entrypoint)
```

```
import lief

target = lief.parse("ELF/PE/Mach-O/OAT")

for section in target.sections:
    print(section.virtual_address)
    process(section.content)
```



# Executable Formats

```
import lief

target = lief.parse("some.exe")

target.tls.callbacks.append(0x....)

target.write("new.exe")
```

```
import lief

target = lief.parse(...)

section = lief.ELF.Section(".text2")
section.content = [0x90] * 0x1000

target += section

target.write("new.elf")
```

Next parts introduce interesting modifications on formats:

- ▶ Hooking
- ▶ Exporting *hidden* functions
- ▶ Code injection through shared libraries

## PE Hooking

Regarding to PE files, LIEF enables to rebuild the import table **elsewhere** in the binary so that one can add new functions, new libraries or patch the Import Address Table.

```
.idata:00000000140002160 ;
idata:00000000140002160 ; Imports from api-ms-win-crt-stdio-l1-1-0.dll
idata:00000000140002160 ;
idata:00000000140002160         extrn __imp__p__commode:qword
idata:00000000140002160 ; DATA XREF: __p__commode+r
idata:00000000140002160 ; .rdata:00000000140002740+o
idata:00000000140002168         extrn __stdio_common_vfprintf:qword
idata:00000000140002168 ; CODE XREF: sub_140001030+47+r
idata:00000000140002168 ; DATA XREF: sub_140001030+47+r
idata:00000000140002170         extrn __acrt_iob_func:qword
idata:00000000140002170 ; CODE XREF: sub_140001030+28+r
idata:00000000140002170 ; DATA XREF: sub_140001030+28+r
idata:00000000140002178 : errno_t cdecl set_fmode(int Mode)
```

Figure – Original IAT

The following code patch the IAT entry of `__acrt_iob_func` with a trampoline to the function `0x140008000`

```
pe = lief.parse("some.exe")
pe.hook_function("__acrt_iob_func", 0x140008000)
```

```
builder = lief.PE.Builder(pe)
builder.build_imports(True).patch_imports(True)
builder.build()
builder.write("hooked.exe")
```



# Example


Export Directory RVA	0000017C	Dword	00000000	
Export Directory Size	00000180	Dword	00000000	
Import Directory RVA	00000180	Dword	0000A000	.I1
Import Directory Size	00000184	Dword	00000C00	
Resource Directory RVA	00000188	Dword	00006000	.rsrc
Resource Directory Size	0000018C	Dword	000001E0	

Bound Import Directory RVA	000001D0	Dword	00000000	
Bound Import Directory Size	000001D4	Dword	00000000	
Import Address Table Directory ...	000001D8	Dword	0000A3F4	.I1
Import Address Table Directory S...	000001DC	Dword	0000037B	
Delay Import Directory RVA	000001E0	Dword	00000000	

.htext	00000033	00008000	00000200	00002A00	00000000	00000000	0000	0000	60000020
.hdata	00000010	00009000	00000200	00002C00	00000000	00000000	0000	0000	40000040
.I1	00000C00	0000A000	00000C00	00002E00	00000000	00000000	0000	0000	E0000020

```
.rdata:0000000140002160 off_140002160 dq offset sub_14000A850 ; DATA XREF: sub_140001D48+r  
.rdata:0000000140002168 off_140002168 dq offset sub_14000A85C ; DATA XREF: sub_140001030+47+r  
.rdata:0000000140002170 off_140002170 dq offset sub_14000A868 ; DATA XREF: sub_140001030+28+r  
.rdata:0000000140002178 off_140002178 dq offset sub_14000A874 ; DATA XREF: sub_140001D18+r  
  
.rdata:0000000140002180 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002181 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002182 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002183 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002184 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002185 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002186 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002187 db 0
```


Figure – Original IAT patched with trampoline functions



The screenshot shows a debugger interface with a dark gray background. At the top, there are three small icons: a color palette, a magnifying glass, and a file folder. Below these icons is a horizontal white bar. The main area contains assembly code in a monospaced font:

```
sub_14000A85C proc near
mov     rax, ds:_stdio_common_vfprintf
jmp     rax
sub_14000A85C endp
```

**Figure – Trampoline for non-hooked function**



The screenshot shows a debugger interface with a dark gray background. At the top, there are three small icons: a color palette, a magnifying glass, and a file folder. Below these icons is a horizontal white bar. The main area contains assembly code in a monospaced font:

```
sub_14000A868 proc near
mov     rax, 140008000h
jmp     rax
sub_14000A868 endp
```

**Figure – Trampoline for hooked function**

### Limitations

This method only works if accesses to the IAT are performed with *call* instructions. Especially it doesn't if there is *lea* on the original IAT

Regarding to ELF files, hooking can be done with a patch of the plt/got.

`.text`

```
...  
400637: jmp 400480 <memcmp@plt>  
...
```


`.plt`


```
...  
400480: jmp 201028 <memcmp@got>  
400486: push 0x2  
40048b: jmp 400450 <.plt>  
...
```

`.got`

```
...  
201028: 0x400486  
...
```







```
Relocation section '.rela.plt' at offset 0x518 contains 3 entries:  
Offset           Info      Type            Sym. Value   Sym. Name + Addend  
0000000201018  000200000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000000000 puts@GLIBC_2.2.5 + 0  
0000000201020  000300000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000000000 printf@GLIBC_2.2.5 + 0  
0000000201028  000500000007 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000000000 memcmp@GLIBC_2.2.5 + 0
```

Figure – Relocations associated with plt/got

```
import lief
elf = lief.parse("some_elf")

elf.patch_pltgot("memcmp", 0xAAAAAAA)

elf.write("elf_modified")
```

`.text`

```
...  
400637: jmp 400480 <memcmp@plt>  
...
```

`.plt`

```
...  
400480: jmp 201028 <memcmp@got>  
400486: push 0x2  
40048b: jmp 400450 <.plt>  
...
```


`.got`


```
...  
201028: XXXXXX <memcmp@hook>  
...
```

`.hook`

```
...  
XXXXXX: memcmp hooked  
...
```












# Exporting Functions

Exporting Functions





```
int main(int argc, char argv[]) {  
  
    if (COMPLICATED CONDITION) {  
        fuzz_me(argv[1]);  
    }  
  
    return 0;  
}
```



```
→ fuzzing readelf -s ./target
```

Symbol table '.dynsym' contains 7 entries:

Num:	Value	Size	Type	Bind	Vis	Ndx	Name
0:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	UND	
1:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTab
2:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	printf@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
3:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
4:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	__gmon_start__
5:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
6:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	__cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)


```
→ fuzzing
```

Figure – Original Symbol Table

```
import lief
target = lief.parse("target")

target.add_exported_function(0x63A, "to_fuzz")

target.write("target_modified")
```



```
→ fuzzing readelf -s ./target_modified
```

Symbol table '.dynsym' contains 8 entries:

Num:	Value	Size	Type	Bind	Vis	Ndx	Name
0:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	UND	
1:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTab
2:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	printf@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
3:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
4:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_gmon_start_
5:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
6:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
7:	000000000000463a	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	13	to_fuzz

```
→ fuzzing
```

Figure – New Symbol Table

```
typedef void(*fnc_t)(const char*);  
  
// Access with dlopen / dlsym  
void* hdl = dlopen("./target_modified", RTLD_LAZY);  
fnc_t to_fuzz = (fnc_t)dlsym(hdl, "to_fuzz");  
  
to_fuzz(TO_FEED);
```

<https://lief.quarkslab.com/pts18/demo2>

Code injection through shared libraries


Different techniques exist to inject code:

- ▶ Using environment variables: `LD_PRELOAD`,  
`DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES`, ...
- ▶ Using operating system API: `WriteProcessMemory`, `ptrace`, ...
- ▶ Using custom kernel drivers
- ▶ Using executable formats

Depending on the scenario, methods can be suitable or not. Next part shows a method based on shared libraries and executable formats to leverage code injection.

# Linked Libraries - Loading

New library: LIBEXAMPLE.SO



## 1. Declare a constructor

```
--attribute__((constructor))
void my_constructor(void) {
    printf("Run payload\n");
}
```

```
gcc -fPIC -shared libexample.c -o libexample.so
gcc -fPIC -shared libexample.c -o libexample.dylib
```

## 2. Add a dependency

```
import lief
# ELF
elf = lief.parse("/usr/bin/ssh")
elf.add_library("libexample.so")
elf.write("ssh_modified")

# Mach-O
macho = lief.parse("/bin/ls")
macho.add_library("/Users/romain/libexample.dylib")
macho.write("ls_modified")

# PE: Not implemented yet
```

```
bash-3.2$ ls
com.apple.launchd.4GSpegudfm    com.apple.launchd.8MskoKf8RP    com.apple.launchd.E7vv3xpc77
    setuptools-33.1.1.zip
bash-3.2$ /Users/romain/ls_modified
Run payload
com.apple.launchd.4GSpegudfm    com.apple.launchd.8MskoKf8RP    com.apple.launchd.E7vv3xpc77
    setuptools-33.1.1.zip
bash-3.2$ otool -L /Users/romain/ls_modified
/Users/romain/ls_modified:
    /usr/lib/libutil.dylib (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 1.0.0)
    /usr/lib/libncurses.5.4.dylib (compatibility version 5.4.0, current version 5.4.0)
    /usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 1225.1.1)
    /Users/romain/libexample.dylib (compatibility version 0.0.0, current version 0.0.0)
bash-3.2$ %
```

<https://lief.quarkslab.com/pts18/demo3>

# Injection process

```
→ lib-injection readelf -d ./ssh_modified|grep NEEDED
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libexample.so]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libcrypto.so.1.1]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdl.so.2]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libz.so.1]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libldns.so.2]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libgssapi_krb5.so.2]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so.6]
→ lib-injection ./ssh_modified
Run payload
usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]
           [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]
           [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]
           [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]
           [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]
           [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]
           [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command]
```

<https://lief.quarkslab.com/pts18/demo3>

## Frida & LIEF: Frida injection in an Android application

Using the techniques previously described, we can use Frida on an APK having at least one native library without root privileges.

Archive tree	Filename	Original Size	Compressed	Saving	Date	Time	Permissions	Method	OS	Version
► assets ► fabric ▼ lib ► armeabi-v7a ► META-INF ► res	libtmessages.28.so	5827124	2404333	58.7%	80-000-00	00:00	-rw----	defN	fat	2.4

**Figure – Original APK**

Archive tree	Filename	Original Size	Compressed	Saving	Date	Time	Permissions	Method	OS	Version
► assets ► fabric ▼ lib ► armeabi-v7a ► META-INF ► res	libtmessages.28.so	5827124	2404333	58.7%	80-000-00	00:00	-rw----	defN	fat	2.4

Figure – Original APK

Archive tree	Filename	Original Size	Compressed	Saving	Date	Time	Permissions	Method	OS	Version
► assets ► fabric ▼ lib ► armeabi-v7a ► META-INF ► res	libgadget.config.so	119	92	22.7%	18-May-12	06:56	-rw----	defN	fat	2.0
	libgadget.so	11034392	4884387	55.7%	18-May-12	06:56	-rw----	defN	fat	2.0
	libtmessages.28.so	6878344	2554072	62.9%	18-May-12	06:56	-rw----	defN	fat	2.0

Figure – APK embedding Frida

```
→ armeabi-v7a readelf -d ./libtmessages.28.so|grep NEEDED
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libjnigraphics.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [liblog.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libz.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libOpenSLES.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libEGL.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libGLESv2.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdl.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libstdc++.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libm.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so]
```

Figure – Original native library

```
armeabi-v7a readelf -d ./libtmessages.28.so|grep NEEDED
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libgadget.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libjnigraphics.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [liblog.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libz.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libOpenSLES.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libEGL.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libGLESv2.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdl.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libstdc++.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libm.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so]
```

Figure – Modified native library

## libgadget.config.so

```
"interaction": {  
    "type": "script",  
    "path": "/data/local/tmp/myscript.js",  
    "on_change": "reload"  
}
```

/data/local/tmp/myscript.js

```
Java.perform(function () {  
    var Log = Java.use("android.util.Log");  
    var tag = "frida-lief";  
    Log.v(tag, "I'm in the process!");  
  
    Process.enumerateModules({  
        onMatch: function (module) {  
            Log.v(tag, "Module: " + module.name);  
        },  
        onComplete: function () {}  
    });});
```

## Demo

<https://lief.quarkslab.com/pts18/demo4>

Such modifications on formats are not new<sup>34</sup>.

However, it's implemented in LIEF with a new approach that doesn't rely on replacing existing entries, using padding, removing entries, . . .

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<sup>3</sup>Mayem Phrack #61

<sup>4</sup>[https://github.com/Tyilo/insert\\_dylib](https://github.com/Tyilo/insert_dylib)

Instead, it keeps a consistent state of the format:

- ▶ Export trie
- ▶ Symbol hash tables
- ▶ Relocations
- ▶ Symbol versions
- ▶ Rebase opcodes
- ▶ ...

LIEF 0.9 comes with new formats related to Android:

- ▶ OAT
- ▶ VDEX
- ▶ DEX
- ▶ ART

Modification of these formats is not available yet but further version will support it.

## Registration-Trick2



- Dm-verity is enabled, we can't change files on System partition;

Which are in fact ELF/OAT



- Files in dalvik-cache are also odex file;



- System will load dalvik-cache if odex not exist in app dir;



- Remove odex will NOT trigger dm-verity;



- NO integrity check for native code;



*How Samsung Secures Your Wallet & How To Break It - Black Hat 2017*

## ODEX Code Modification Attack: Overview (Generic)

- Actual code modification
  - Use apktool to unpack; MODIFY SMALI CODE; apktool to build APK; jarsigner to sign
    - Modified APK with wrong signature (but signature is not part of the ODEX file)
- Compile DEX code to ART code
  - Dex2oat --dex-file=sa.apk --oat-file=sa.odex
    - ODEX file based on modified APK
- Prevent the Android VM from re-compiling (aka patching the CRC32)
  - ODEX file contains CRC32 of DEX files it was generated from
  - Patch CRC32 in ODEX file to match the DEX code from the original DEX files in original APK
    - Made a tool for this!!!

Collin Mulliner ekoparty, Buenos Aires Sept 2017

*Inside Android's SafetyNet Attestation: Attack and Defense - Ekoparty  
2017*

Next version will also include support for Mach-O modifications:

- ▶ Add unlimited number of Load commands
- ▶ Add libraries
- ▶ Change signature
- ▶ ...



# Thank You



<https://lief.quarkslab.com>



<https://github.com/lief-project/LIEF>



@LIEF\_Project - @rh0main

# QuarksLab

SECURING EVERY BIT OF YOUR DATA