

Singapore August 25 - 26, 2022

S U B O R N E R A Windows Bribery for Invisible Persistence

Sebastián Castro @r4wd3r

R4WSEC.COM



WHOAMI

Username r4wd3r

Full User name Sebastián Castro

Comment Infosec nerd, stuff breaker ~10y

First logon 1993/05/03 23:56

User profile Ph. D. CSE Student <at> UCSC

PSO R&D Co-op <at> AMD

Presenter <at> BlackHat, BSides,

Derbycon, Romhack, SEC-T...






DISCLAIMER

I, Sebastian Castro, solely and exclusively own the property rights of the research "Suborner: A Windows Bribery for Invisible Persistence". I hereby do not concede any property rights to my previous, current and future employers unless I voluntarily choose to transfer such property, in total, or in part.

The opinions expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of my employers.





ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This is only possible thanks to:

- Family and friends
- · Research done before by great minds (Mimikatz, Impacket, etc.)
- · Microsoft Team
- · Stack Overflow & Infosec community. You all rock!





AGENDA





AGENDA





BACK IN THE DAY ...











BACK IN THE DAY ...











HOW ABOUT NOW?




About 439,000,000 results (0.37 seconds)

SUBORNER














Created on October 23, 2020



Created on October 23, 2020

Creating a hidden user

Hi everyone,

I'm running a PC w/ Windows 10 Pro (v.2004) and is not on a domain.

I want to make my administrator account hidden from the user account screen. Instead, I want an option that says ("Other User") where I can type in the account's Username if I ever need to log in. That way, the standard users can log into this computer without having to see my Admin account's name.


Does anyone know if this is possible? Thank you in advance for any help!

I want to make my administrator account hidden

http://woshub.com/how-to-show-all-users-account..


There is no other way I know to do this than the methods shown in the tutorials.





SUBORNER







Greg - Windows MVP 2010-2020

Replied on October 23, 2020

Independent Advisor

Hi Mason. I'm Greg, an installation specialist, 10 years awarded Windows MVP, and Volunteer Moderator, here to help you.

Here's how to hide a User account from the Sign-in Screen in WIndows 10:


https://www.windowscentral.com/how-hide-specifi...

http://woshub.com/how-to-show-all-users-account...

There is no other way I know to do this than the methods shown in the tutorials.

Hi Mar.
Here's https://http://
There is no other way I know to do this than the methods shown in the tutorials.







WHAT ABOUT ATTACKERS?

Identity Manipulation

MITRE | ATT&CK°

External **Implants**





Identity Manipulation Account Manipulation Create Account Valid accounts

MITRE | ATT&CK°

19 persistence techniques

Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/

External Implants

BITS Jobs

Boot or Logon Autostart Executior

Boot or Initialization Scripts

Browser Extensions

Compromise Client Software Binary

Create or Modify System Process

Event Triggered Execution

External Remote Services

Hijack Execution Flow

Implant Internal Image

Modify Authentication Process

Office Application Startup


Pre-OS Boot

Scheduled Task/Job

Server Software Components

Traffic Signaling







Identity Manipulation Account Manipulation Create Account Valid accounts

MITRE | ATT&CK°

19 persistence techniques

Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/

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
ldentity Manipulation Account Manipulation Create Account Valid accounts

MITRE | ATT&CK°

63 of the 85 unique procedures for persistence leverage Identity

Manipulation


Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/













AGENDA





THE SUBORNER WAY

Suborner is a new persistence attack to stealthily forge custom invisible accounts which can impersonate any identity on all Windows NT machines.





THE SUBORNER WAY


- Only who created the suborner account will easily know the username and password
- After authenticated, the suborner account will impersonate any existent (enabled/disabled) account








BRIBING WINDOWS




- [+] Suborner Account Data:
- Username: DSKTP-WIN11-872\$
- Password: Password.1
- RID: 1003
- Template Account RID: 500
- Account to hijack (RID): 500
- Machine account: True






BRIBING WINDOWS



- [+] Suborner Account Data:
- Username: <u>DSKTP-WIN11-872\$</u>
- Password: Password.1
- RID: 1003
- Template Account RID: 500
- Account to hijack (RID): 500
- Machine account: True
- [+] Crafted F key
- [-] Writing V account values
- [-] Encrypting password for V
- [-] NTLM Hash for password: 4D33231D834BE83976764DCAC18CCCD3
- [+] Crafted V key
- [-] Writing changes to registry
- [+] The suborner account DSKTP-WIN11-872\$ has been created!
- PS C:\Suborner>








GETTING US ACCESS

[user@LAPTOP-59898u]-[~] >>> psexec.py DSKTP-WIN11-872\\$:Password.1@192.168 Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation [*] Requesting shares on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Found writable share ADMIN\$ [*] Uploading file avTqSvIz.exe [*] Opening SVCManager on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Creating service aOCF on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Starting service aOCF..... [!] Press help for extra shell commands Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.22000.778] (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. C:\WINDOWS\system32> whoami nt authority\system C:\WINDOWS\system32> net users User accounts for \\ Administrator DefaultAccount Guest user WDAGUtilityAccount The command completed with one or more errors.

psexec.py DSKTP-WIN11-872\\$:Password.1@192.168.8.129








GETTING US ACCESS

[user@LAPTOP-59898u]-[~] >>> psexec.py DSKTP-WIN11-872\\$:Password.1@192.168 Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation [*] Requesting shares on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Found writable share ADMIN\$ [*] Uploading file avTqSvIz.exe [*] Opening SVCManager on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Creating service aOCF on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Starting service aOCF..... [!] Press help for extra shell commands Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.22000.778] (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. C:\WINDOWS\system32> whoami nt authority\system C:\WINDOWS\system32> net users User accounts for \\ DefaultAccount Guest WDAGUtilityAccount user The command completed with one or more errors.

psexec.py DSKTP-WIN11-872\\$:Password.1@192.168.8.129

C:\WINDOWS\system32> whoami
nt authority\system







GETTING US ACCESS

[user@LAPTOP-59898u]-[~] >>> psexec.py DSKTP-WIN11-872\\$:Password.1@192.168 Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation [*] Requesting shares on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Found writable share ADMIN\$ [*] Uploading file avTqSvIz.exe [*] Opening SVCManager on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Creating service aOCF on 192.168.8.129..... [*] Starting service aOCF..... [!] Press help for extra shell commands Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.22000.778] (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved C:\WINDOWS\system32> whoami nt authority\system C:\WINDOWS\system32> net users User accounts for \\ DefaultAccount WDAGUtilityAccount user The command completed with one or more errors.

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C:\WINDOWS\system32> whoami
nt authority\system


C:\WINDOWS\system32> net users

User accounts for \\

Administrator DefaultAccount Guest

user WDAGUtilityAccount







WAIT A MINUTE!







BEFORE...






ACCOUNT CREATION SCENARIOS

· Scenario 1: Add user

Scenario 2: Add user with \$

Scenario 3: Add machine account (netapi32)






ACCOUNT CREATION SCENARIOS

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
Scenario 3: Add machine account (netapi32)









































ACCOUNT CREATION SCENARIOS

- Scenario 1: Add user FAIL!

Scenario 2: Add user with \$

Scenario 3: Add machine account (netapi32)






ACCOUNT CREATION SCENARIOS

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

























ACCOUNT CREATION SCENARIOS

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ACCOUNT CREATION SCENARIOS


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

























WHAT IS WRONG?


- The baddie account is detected:
 - · When created (Windows Events, API Call Sequence Analysis)
 - After its creation (User Management Applications)





WHAT IS WRONG?

- The baddie account is detected:
 - When created (Windows Events, API Call Sequence)
 - After its creation (User Management Applications)
- The account needs to be added to an administrative group (e.g. Administrators)






WHAT IS WRONG?

- The baddie account is detected:
 - · When created (Windows Events, API Call Sequence)
 - After its creation (User Management Applications)
- The account needs to be added to an administrative group (e.g. Administrators)
- The Win32 API impedes to modify all account attributes freely



MHAT CAN WE DO ?








BRIBE IT!














































IDEA!












WRITE THE SAM DIRECTLY!





NO LOG!








SUBORNING? HOW?

Dynamically crafts a suborner account without calling the Win32 API functions designed to do so (e.g., netapi32::netuseradd)





SUBORNING? HOW?

- Dynamically crafts a suborner account without calling the Win32 API functions designed to do so (e.g., netapi32::netuseradd)
- · Adds extra stealth to the suborner appending the dollar sign to its username (\$)





SUBORNING? HOW?

- Dynamically crafts a suborner account without calling the Win32 API functions designed to do so (e.g., netapi32::netuseradd)
- Adds extra stealth to the suborner appending the dollar sign to its username
 (\$)
- Configures the account as a machine account through its Account Control Bits (ACB).



AGENDA






GOALS

- · Understand authentication/authorization for local accounts
- · Create a local account writing directly to the SAM
- · Make it invisible!




GOALS

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







SUBORNER






SUBORNER









AUTHENTICATION








































AUTHORIZATION






AUTHORIZATION





AUTHORIZATION






SUCCESS!









GOALS


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- · Create a local account writing directly to the SAM
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WHAT IS THE MINIMUM?







Password



Permissions



BUT WHERE?







Name	Туре
(Default)	REG_SZ
₩ F	REG_BINARY
ForcePasswordR	REG_BINARY
ResetData	REG_BINARY
SupplementalCre	REG_BINARY
W UserPasswordHint	REG_BINARY
UserTile	REG_BINARY
₩ V	REG_BINARY









TRAVEL BACK TO TIME















TRAVEL BACK TO TIME
















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	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07									
0000	00	00	00	00	f4	00	00	00	01B0	01	02	00	00	00	00	00	05
8000	03	00	01	00	f4	00	00	00	01B8	20	00	00	00	20	02	00	00
0010	12	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01C0	73	00	75	00	62	00	6f	00
0018	80	01	00	00	12	00	00	00	01C8	72	00	6e	00	65	00	72	00
0020	00	00	00	00	1c	01	00	00	01D0	1	00	00	00	73	00	75	00
0028	16	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01D8	1	00	6f	00	72	00	6e	00
0030	34	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01E0		00	72	00	24	00	b1	е7
0038	00	00	00	00	34	01	00	00	01E8	1	00	45	00	53	00	43	00
0040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01F0	1	00	49	00	50	00	54	00
0048	34	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01F8		0.0	4f	00	4e	00	87	f9
0050	00	00	00	00	34	01	00	00	0200	1	02	00	00	07	00	00	00
0058	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0208	1	00	02	00	00	0.0	00	00
0060	34	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	0210		c3	60	5f	3b	ab	d7	00
0068	00	00	00	00	34	01	00	00	0218		c0 00	96 02	0e 00	68 10	d9 00	ef 00	70 00
0070	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0220	1	6f	02 a0	e7	a9	6b	70	36
0078	34	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	0228		fb	а0 9b	05	4e	cd	09	c2
0800	00	00	00	00	34	01	00	00	0230	1	60	37	1b	5d	b1	2b	2b
0088	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0230	1	53	61	53	88	36	fc	01
0090	34	01	00	00	08	00	00	00	0248	1	29	a5	7c	18	83	f9	6f
0098	01	00	00	00	3с	01	00	00	0250	1	0e	16	fb	7c	8b	9d	22
00A0	18	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0258	1	0.0	02	00	00	0.0	00	00
00A8	54	01	00	00	38	00	00	00	0260	1	b3	84	ca	78	54	8c	be
00B0	00	00	00	00	8c	01	00	00	0268	62	33	20	5c	1a	eb	66	37
00B8	18	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0270	1	0.0	02	00	00	0.0	00	00
00C0	a4	01	00	00	18	00	00	00	0278	1	fa	d4	73	25	7f	00	b4
00C8	00	00	00	00	01	00	14	80	0280	59	ae	с2	57	0c	8d	d3	a1









Values



V size is dynamic!

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07
0000	00	00	00	00	f4	00	00	00
0008	03	00	01	00	f4	00	00	00
0010	12	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0018		01			12	00	00	00
0020	00	00	00	00	1c	01	00	00
0028	16	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0030	34	01	00	00	00	00	00	00
0038	00	00	00	00	34	01	00	00
0040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0048	34	01	00	00	00	00	00	00
0050	00	00	00	00	34	01	00	00
0058	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0060	34	01			0.0	00	00	00
0068	00	00	00	00	34	01	00	00
0070	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0078	34	01	00	00	00	00	00	00
0080	00	00	00	00	34	01	00	00
0088	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0090	34	01	00	00	08	00	00	00
0098	01	00	00	00	3с	01	00	00
00A0	18	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00A8	54	01	00	00	38	00	00	00
00B0	00	00	00	00	8c	01	00	00
00B8	18	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00C0	a4	01	00	00	18	00	00	00
00C8	00	00	00	00	01	00	14	80

Headers

01B0	01	02	00	00	00	00	00	05
01B8	20	00	00	00	20	02	00	00
01C0	73	00	75	00	62	00	6f	00
01C8	72	00	6e	00	65	00	72	00
01D0	24	00	00	00	73			
01D8	62		6f		72		6e	
01E0	65	00	72	00	24	00	b1	е7
01E8	44	00	45	00	53	00	43	00
01F0	52	00	49	00	50	00	54	00
01F8	49	00	4 f	00	4e	00	87	f9
0200	01	02	00	00	07	00	00	00
0208	02	00	02	00	00	00	00	00
0210	9d	с3	60	5f	3b	ab	d7	00
0218	9d	c0	96	0e	68	d9	ef	70
0220	02	00	02	00	10	00	00	00
0228	ba	6f	a0	e7	a9	6b	70	36
0230	b6	fb	9b	05	4e	cd	09	с2
0238	4f	60	37	1b	5d	b1	2b	2b
0240	С4	53	61	53	88	36	fc	01
0248	0c	29	a5	7с	18	83	f9	6f
0250	50	0e	16	fb	7с	8b	9d	22
0258	02	00	02	00	00	00	00	00
0260	4c	b3	84	ca	78	54	8c	be
0268	62	33	20	5с	1a	eb	66	37
0270	02	00	02	00	00	00	00	00
0278	d5	fa	d4	73	25	7f	00	b4
0280	59	ae	с2	57	0c	8d	d3	a1




V ENTRY HEADERS

Username 0008 03 00 01 00 f4 00 00 00 0010 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Headers

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07
0000	00	00	00	00	f4	00	00	00
0008	03	00	01	00	f4	00	00	00
0010	12	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

int offset = 244 (0xF4); from 0xCC int length = 18 (0x12); Unicode int unknown = 0;








VALUE ENTRY

	Username														
0008	03	00	01	00	f4	00	00	00							
0010	12	00	00	00	00	00	00	00							

int offset = 244 (0xF4); from 0xCC int length = 18 (0x12); *Unicode* int unknown = 0;






					•			
		02						
01B8	20	00	00	00	20	02	00	00
		00						
01C8	72	00	6e	00	65	00	72	00
01 D0	24	0.0	0.0	0.0				

Username: suborner\$

01C0	73	00	75	00	62	00	6f	00
01C8	72	00	6e	00	65	00	72	00
01D0	24	00	00	00				









Variable

User Permissions

Username

Full Name

Comment

User comment

Unkown entry

Home Dir

Home Dir Connect

User Logon Script Path

Profilepath

Workstations

Hours allowed

Unkown entry

LM Hash

NTLM Hash

NTLM History

LM History











Username













Username

NTLM Hash





Variable


User Permissions

Username

User comment Unkown entry

Unkown entry

NTLM Hash





REVERCEPTION!





0x01. Check if Windows 10 v1607 or greater







0x01. Check if Windows 10 v1607 or greater

0x02. Calculate NTLM Hash (and split it in 2 halves)









- 0x01. Check if Windows 10 v1607 or greater
- 0x02. Calculate NTLM Hash (and split it in 2 halves)
- 0x03. Calculate DES Key for each NTLM part







- 0x01. Check if Windows 10 v1607 or greater
- 0x02. Calculate NTLM Hash (and split it in 2 halves)
- 0x03. Calculate DES Key for each NTLM part
- 0x04. Encrypt & concat each NTLM part with DES keys





- 0x01. Check if Windows 10 v1607 or greater
- 0x02. Calculate NTLM Hash (and split it in 2 halves)
- 0x03. Calculate DES Key for each NTLM part
- 0x04. Encrypt & concat each NTLM part with DES keys
- 0x05. Calculate SAM Key





- 0x01. Check if Windows 10 v1607 or greater
- 0x02. Calculate NTLM Hash (and split it in 2 halves)
- 0x03. Calculate DES Key for each NTLM part
- 0x04. Encrypt & concat each NTLM part with DES keys
- 0x05. Calculate SAM Key
- 0x06. Calculate SAM Hash (AES or MD5)





- 0x01. Check if Windows 10 v1607 or greater
- 0x02. Calculate NTLM Hash (and split it in 2 halves)
- 0x03. Calculate DES Key for each NTLM part
- 0x04. Encrypt & concat each NTLM part with DES keys
- 0x05. Calculate SAM Key
- 0x06. Calculate SAM Hash (AES or MD5)
- 0x07. Write changes to V




























GOALS

- · Understand authentication/authorization for local accounts
- Create a local account writing directly to the SAM
- · Make it invisible!



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	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07
0000	02	00	01	00	00	00	00	00
0008	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0018	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0028	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0030	F4	01	00	00	01	02	00	00
0038	10	02	00	00	00	00	00	00
0040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
0048	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00






F IS EZ!



Variable		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07
Lockout time	0000	02	00	01	00	00	00	00	00
Last logon	0008	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Password last set	0010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Account expires	0018	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Last incorrect password	0020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
RID copy	0028	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Account Bits (ACB)	0030	F4	01	00	00	01	02	00	00
Country code	0038	10	02	00	00	00	00	00	00
Invalid password count	0040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Total logons since creation	0048	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00






F STRUCTURE

Variable
Lockaul time
Last logon
Password last set
Account expires
Last incorrect password
RID copy
Account Bits (ACB)








RID HIJACKING FTW!

RID copy									
0030	F4	01	00	00					
























F: A C B B I T S

Account Bits (ACB)						
0000	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
0038	\perp \cup	02	00	00		

Flag	Value
ACB_DISABLED	0x0001
ACB_HOMDIRREQ	0x0002
ACB_PWNOTREQ	0x0004
ACB_TEMPDUP	8000x0
ACB_NORMAL	0x0010
ACB_MNS	0x0020
ACB_DOMTRUST	0x0040
ACB_WSTRUST	0x0080
ACB_SVRTRUST	0x0100
ACB_PWNOEXP	0x0200
ACB_AUTOLOCK	0x0400



F: A C B BITS


```
Account Bits (ACB)
0038 10
                        00
            02
                  00
```


```
typedef struct _USER_INFO_1 {
 LPWSTR usri1_name;
 LPWSTR usri1_password;
 DWORD usri1_password_age;
        usri1_priv;
 DWORD
                                     usri1_priv;
 LPWSTR usri1_home_dir;
                         DWORD
 LPWSTR usri1 comment;
 DWORD usri1_flags;
 LPWSTR usri1_script_path;
} USER_INFO_1, *PUSER_INFO_1, *LPUSER_INFO_1;
```

	Flag	Value	
	ACB_DISABLED	0x0001	
	ACB_HOMDIRREQ	0x0002	
	ACB_PWNOTREQ	0x0004	
	ACB_TEMPDUP	0x0008	
	ACB_NORMAL	0x0010	
	ACB_MNS	0x0020	
	ACB DOMTRUST	0x0040	
A	CB_WSTRUST	0x008	0
	ACB_SVRTRUST	0x0100	
	ACB_PWNOEXP	0x0200	
	ACB_AUTOLOCK	0x0400	











































MHAT CAN WE DOS

- · Create a custom account without the Win32 API limitations (and without calling that noisy Event Logger)
- Modify account attributes that are unchangeable through the Win32 API (s.a. RID for Primary Access Token generation)





AGENDA






SUBORNER v1.0.1

- C# artifact to forge invisible accounts
- · Crafts account's SAM registry keys and values as the OS, without the limits of its API

Works on ALL Windows NT Machines

```
88
.d88888b. S U B O R N E R
d88P 88"88b
Y88b.88 The Invisible Account Forger
"Y88888b. by @r4wd3r
88"88b v1.0.1
Y88b 88.88P
"Y88888P" https://r4wsec.com
88
```








SUBORNER v1.0.1: PARAMETERS


- · /username: Suborner username
- · /password: Suborner password
- · /rid: Suborner RID
- · /ridhijack: Account to impersonate
- · /template: Account template for forging
- /machineaccount: Create as machine account

```
88
.d88888b. S U B O R N E R
d88P 88"88b
Y88b.88 The Invisible Account Forger
"Y88888b. by @r4wd3r
88"88b v1.0.1
Y88b 88.88P
"Y88888P" https://r4wsec.com
88
```





DEMO SCENARIO







AGENDA






MSFT RESPONSE



Microsoft Security Response Center







:

para Microsoft, mí 🔻

Hello,

Thank you for contacting the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC). We appreciate the time taken to submit this assessment.

This report appears to describe persistent attacks on a compromised machine running as SYSTEM. As such we have determined that this submission does not meet the definition of a security vulnerability for servicing.

As such, this thread is being closed and no longer monitored. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.



IT'S ALL BAD?

- · Although conceived as an attack, sysadmins could use this to hide privileged local accounts from unintended actors
- · Could be detected by inspection (Automated could be tricky in the future)
- · Not a domain account, but definitely could be used within AD domains



WHAT'S NEXT?

- Totally substitute the Win32 API for Windows Local account management!
- Discover new attack vectors of account attributes sanitized by the OS (fuzz? Bypass detection?)
- Hack Suborn the planet!




```
88
.d88888b.
d88P 88"88b
Y88b.88
"Y88888b.
88"88b
Y88b 88.88P
"Y88888P"
```



REFERENCES


- · B. Delpy, Mimikatz: Benjamin Delpy (gentilkiwi) https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/
- · P. Yosifovich, A. Ionescu. Windows Internals, Part 1: System architecture, processes, threads, memory management, and more (Developer Reference).
- S. Castro. RID Hijacking: Maintaining Access on Windows Machines https://r4wsec.com/notes/rid_hijacking/index.html
- · Ben0xa. DoucMe https://github.com/ben0xa/doucme



HITBSecConf 2022 Singapore

SUBORNER

A Windows Bribery for Invisible Persistence



Sebastián Castro



