(Failed) verification of the signature posted by Craig Wright on May 2, 2016
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README.md
bitcoin-address.txt
claimed-public-key.txt
sartre.txt
sig.asn1
signature.der
sn7-message.txt
verification.rb

README.md

Attempting (Failed) Verification of the Wright Signature

Craig Wright claims to be Satoshi, the pseudonymous creator of Bitcoin.

His proferred proof for this is a cryptographic signature. This gets complicated:

  1. A certain well-known transaction, Bitcoin's first, was between Satoshi and Hal Finney. We treat the provenance of this transaction as a settled question.

  2. Anyone controlling the private key corresponding either the input address or the change address from that transaction is, presumptively, associated with Satoshi.

  3. Craig claims that he can sign an arbitrary message with the private key corresponding to the input address, 12cbQLTFMXRnSzktFkuoG3eHoMeFtpTu3S

  4. Craig claims to have signed a passage about Sartre.

The Part Which Actually Works

Craig is successfully able to go from a Bitcoin address to the public key associated with it, and you can, too!

Here are the steps, with handy on-page execution of them.

We can see, via inputing Wright's claimed public key (transcribed in claimed-public-key.txt), that it does match the 12cbQLTF address which sent Finney Bitcoin.

The Part Which Doesn't Work

Let's review the proferred signature.

To review Public/Private Crypto 101, you sign with your private key. One verifies with the public key.

We don't possess Satoshi's private key. We do possess one public key presumptively belonging to him. We also possess a bag-of-bytes from Wright, which he claims signs the Sartre text.

First, we generate the sig. Wright has provided MEUCIQDBKn1Uly8m0UyzETObUSL4wYdBfd4ejvtoQfVcNCIK4AIgZmMsXNQWHvo6KDd2Tu6euEl1 3VTC3ihl6XUlhcU+fM4= for us, which is transcribed into signature.der in this repository.

We then use a Wright-blessed command to transform the signature into a form that our utilities can work with.

  # Base64 decode the signature into ASN1 form.
  $ base64 --decode signature.der > sig.asn1

We've got the public key, we've got the signature, now we just need the text which the signature claims to match. Dan Kaminsky generously transcribed the hash of the text, which Wright claims the signature corresponds to. I've included hash as sn7-message.txt. You can verify that it matches the claimed hash from Wright.

  # Verify signature of hash file.
  hexdump sn7-message.txt

  # You'll have to visually compare this against Wright's screenshots, but it matches.
  # If this sounds *fishy* to you, well, you're right.  Also fishy: making people hand-edit hex values
  # to verify trivial parts of this evidence chain.

(Psst, this is where magic happens.)

And now we try to validate the message, using Ruby's OpenSSL bindings.

  ruby verification.rb sn7-message.txt

Feel free to inspect the code and tell me if I'm misunderstanding those bindings, but I rather don't think I am.

You cannot validate this signature against the purported hash of the Sartre message. You can only validate it against the hash of the hash.

Why is that? Because Wright did not actually sign any derivative of the Sartre message.

Spoiler: It Isn't Random Bytes

The signature provided isn't actually a signature of any text of Sartre. It is actually a bag of bytes already taken from the blockchain, as discovered by /u/JoukeH on /r/Bitcoin.

Major credit to this explanation:

Ryan Castellucci did some legwork if you want to see how the scriptSig that Wright re-used corresponds to a transaction already on the blockchain, on the verifying-the-transaction level. This is apparently how Wright constructed the signature (from the published scriptSig).

You'll note that Bitcoin, for reasons known only to Satoshi, takes the signature of hash of a hash to generate the scriptSig. Quoting Ryan:

I mentioned that normally, when using ECDSA to sign or verify a file, it is unnecessary to hash it manually. This is where CW's slight-of-hand lies. ECDSA computes the signature operation on a 256 bit integer referred to as z. Normally this is computed as sha256(message), but Bitcoin does sha256(sha256(modtx)). CW showed the signature verification using OpenSSL's ECDSA on sha256(modtx). OpenSSL's does another sha256 on the data, which makes the z value match.

My Head Hurts. What Does This Mean?

Wright's post is flimflam and hokum which stands up to a few minutes of cursory scrutiny, and demonstrates a competent sysadmin's level of familiarity with cryptographic tools, but ultimately demonstrates no non-public information about Satoshi.

Do You Believe Wright Is Satoshi?

But for the endorsement of core developer Gavin Andresen, I would assume that Wright used amateur magician tactics to distract non-technical or non-expert staff of the BBC and the Economist during a stage-managed demonstration. I'm reasonably confident that I could have sold the same story, with approximately two hours of preparation. The non-experts did not ask to see things which would be hard for non-Satoshi to provide -- they were at the mercy of the charlatan (paging James Randi, James Randi to the courtesy phone please).

I'm mystified as to how this got past Andresen, though.

The entire protocol for the verification is suspect: you shouldn't ask the purported Satoshi to do a series of operations under his own control, on his own machine or anyone else's. You should simply give him an arbitrary message (e.g. "I, Wright, am Satoshi -- here's a random nonce: 4203234."), have him sign it and transfer you the signature, then you verify the signature on your own machine against a public key that you trust belonged to Satoshi.

One of the very few things that Bitcoin meaningfully has accomplished as an ecosystem is a world-readable repository of reasonably-well-attested-to-keys. Why was this demonstration so hard?! It's bleeping trivial to the real Satoshi (or anyone possessing his private key) and nigh-upon impossible for anyone else. (An acceptable alternative would have been "Move any Bitcoin from that same output, to anywhere, on command", but there are at least conceivable reasons why that would have been unwise.)

You Mentioned Magic Earlier, Twice

Yep. The magic is replacing the message we think was signed (here, Satre's text) with another message. The hash that is getting signed isn't getting calculated honestly from the Sartre text, as you can verify by spending an hour trying to coerce Sartre and SHA256 into telling you their secrets. Wright just asserts the hash, and if you don't bother checking it, you don't see that he's substituted a hash that he already has a matching signature for. For full details of this, read Ryan's writeup and about Bitcoin transaction structure.