Swiping Left and Right: Two-Sided Search in Swipe-Based Dating Platforms

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Abstract

In today's love market, swipe-based dating platforms (SBDPs) such as Tinder or Bumble have a well-established presence, but novel platform features can add significant complexities to the user's search problem in ways that have been largely under-studied in existing literature. This paper formulates a model of two-sided matching within SBDPs, where agents with heterogeneous preferences search for multiple romantic partners whilst facing intertemporal action constraints. Using numerical methods, I approximate equilibria at the steady-state and perform comparative statics on exogenous model parameters that help explain stylised empirical facts. Finally, agent-based simulations are used to asses the structure of steady-state equilibria as well as its attainability under myopic best-response dynamics.

Contents

1   Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that the search for love is a complex social phenomenon, but in today's world, swipe-based dating platforms (SBDPs) seem to only make it trickier. These platforms, exemplified by Tinder, Bumble, and Hinge, provide a gamified way of browsing through potential romantic partners by swiping through a stack of suggested candidates to indicate likes or dislikes for these, one profile at a time. In the search and matching literature, settings like these fall under the category of decentralised two-sided matching markets (Kanoria and Saban, 2021) and, despite broad differences with traditional dating sites that perform centralised static matching, SBDPs have come to dominate the modern love market, with Tinder alone boasting 75 million monthly active users and 9.6 million paid subscribers as of 2021 (Business of Apps, 2022).

From a theoretical standpoint, search within SBDPs induces several complexities stemming from platform-specific features, such as swiping caps, asynchronicity, and directed search algorithms. These impose non-trivial constraints on the way utility-maximising agents strategise their search, but they have been sparsely studied in the economics literature due to the relative novelty of these platforms. Overall, the prevalent role of SBDPs in shaping modern romantic interactions and their largely understudied nature motivates many different questions. Nevertheless, exploring these requires a fundamental understanding of how users make decisions in these platforms: to put it simply, *when should a utility-maximising user swipe right?*

This dissertation will explore the above within an SBDP setting, where agents with heterogeneous preferences on both sides of the market search simultaneously for multiple romantic partners. Crucially, I focus on explaining (what I refer to as) the 'Fast-Swiping Males' puzzle: that is, the empirical observation that men in SBDPs respond with significantly higher swipe rates and face considerably worse matching outcomes than women. This phenomenon has been both a subject of empirical research (Tyson et al., 2016) and a contentious discussion point within mainstream media (Vice News, 2016; The Washington Post, 2016), and yet a significant gap persists within the literature for an exploration of this through a theoretical lens [1]. Such analysis would add significant value since the potential causes of this phenomenon (user patience, differential preferences, and strategic dominance) are all systematically endogenous with one another, thus demanding a rigorous model that can isolate these individual effects and trace their propagation across the SBDP market. Fundamentally, I show how gender imbalances within the platform (which arise due to several exogenous factors) can explain the above disparities and, expanding on this, I model a possible intervention where the swiping cap ratio between sexes can be set in a socially-efficient manner.

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[1] Among the surveyed literature, perhaps the only partial examination of this phenomenon is provided by Kanoria and Saban (2021)

This work presents two main contributions to existing literature on the topic. Firstly, it constitutes one of a handful of attempts to model the market configurations arising within SBDPs, which is unsurprising due to the novelty of these platforms, but important given their current social relevance. Furthermore, it distinguishes itself from other similar works by directly considering the 'Fast-Swiping Males' puzzle as well as the impact of swiping caps both as a constraint in the agent's search problem and a potential market correction mechanism. Finally, this work provides an interesting case study for the use of computational methods within game theory, a field that has traditionally emphasised pure mathematical analysis. By pairing a rigorously-formulated model with numerical computations and agent-based simulations, this dissertation exemplifies how the two approaches, rather than being mutually exclusive, can be jointly applied to complicated questions, as computational methods provide quick explorations that can serve as an intuitive stepping stone towards formalising mathematical arguments.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I outline the theoretical framework for the model developed in this paper, and derive necessary conditions for both the platform steady state and agent best-responses. In Section 3, I present a refined definition for the steady-state equilibrium of the model and perform computational comparative statics on several parameters, with the aim of replicating stylised empirical facts and explaining the 'Fast-Swiping Males' phenomenon. In Section 4, I utilise agent-based simulations to analyse the convergence and dynamics of my model, and present a discussion on socially-efficient budget interventions. Finally, Section 5 presents concluding remarks and outlines potential avenues for future research.

1.1   Related Work

The present work draws inspiration from two key branches of economics literature: that of search and matching theory, which studies the decision-making process of agents who seek, for example, a job, a business partner, or a spouse, and that of mean-field game theory, which models complex dynamic games involving a large number of players. I discuss each of these in turn, and then contrast this work with the handful of papers that have focused on specifically analysing SBDP markets.

Despite the abundance of papers within the search and matching literature, which has been amply surveyed by Chade et al. (2017), I draw focus on works encapsulating the three defining features of SBDP markets: decentralised matching, two-sidedness, and non-transferable utility. A seminal paper at this intersection is that of Burdett and Coles (1997), which studies the marriage market for ex-ante heterogeneous agents under uniform random search, extending the work of Becker (1973) by showing that positive assortative matching can arise even in the absence of log-supermodularity. Several extensions follow from this, considering idiosyncratic preferences (Burdett and Wright, 1998),

noisy attractiveness observations (Chade, 2006), and even convergence onto the set of stable matchings (Adachi, 2003). The framework outlined in this dissertation is perhaps most similar to that of Burdett and Wright (1998), with three major differences between the two. Firstly, the model developed in this paper extends the above by allowing for multiple partners within an agent's lifetime, a feature which was probably not significant within the labour market context considered by Burdett and Wright (1998), but which is nevertheless quintessential of SBDPs given their role in fomenting casual relationships. Furthermore, I extend the work of Burdett and Wright by allowing for sex-specific mass differences in the platform, as well as exogenous agent arrival flows; a point that was of noted interest for the authors themselves, and which is fundamental when considering the effects of gender imbalances within the platform. Finally, the model in this dissertation adopts a discrete time framework, departing from Burdett and Wright (1998) and most of the recent matching literature. Although continuous-time models provide sharper analysis and more flexible empirical specifications (Burdett and Coles, 1999), this modelling choice lends itself naturally to the use of agent-based simulations, which are used to explore equilibria convergence and dynamics in a richer manner.

On the other hand, mean-field game theory focuses on dynamic games with a large number of agents, for which curses of dimensionality arise due to intractable state spaces. Mean-field models tackle this issue by conditioning gameplay on the *invariant state distribution*, rather than tracking the individual state of each opponent (Light and Weintraub, 2022). This simplifying assumption is cemented by a *consistency check*, such that equilibria arise when rational play conditional on an aggregate state maintains this same state as a fixed point. This approach, perhaps first considered by Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988) and Hopenhayn (1992), has been successfully applied to settings such as network routing (Calderone and Sastry, 2017), dynamic auctions with learning (Iyer et al., 2014) and, perhaps most relevantly, online matching platforms (Kanoria and Saban, 2021; Immorlica et al., 2021). In this paper, I rely on mean-field assumptions to abstract away from observability considerations: within SBDPs, the market history is unknown to players, therefore concepts such as Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium would require players to maintain and update beliefs over history spaces, and even beliefs over the beliefs of other players(a complication known as nested beliefs (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993)). This yields two central problems: first, that agent strategies and equilibria become virtually impossible to compute, and, by extension, that the model assumes an unreasonable level of rationality on behalf of agents (Iyer et al., 2014). Thus, by conditioning interactions on the stationary platform state only, the model in this paper characterises equilibria that are both insightful and representative of real-life behaviour and dynamics.

Among the few papers specifically considering SBDPs, Kanoria and Saban (2021) propose a dynamic two-sided model with vertically-differentiated agents, and show that platforms with unbalanced markets can improve welfare by forcing the short side to

'propose' in all interactions. Furthermore, Immorlica et al. (2021) focus on the problem of designing a directed search algorithm for SBDPs by endogenising type-contingent meeting rates for agents. Both of these papers present theoretical models with similar features, and these have largely influenced my work in several ways; for example, by exemplifying how a mean-field approach could greatly simplify the SBDP market from a game-theoretical perspective. Despite this, the above papers all model settings with one-to-one matchings only, thus differing fundamentally with my work in terms of the nature of endogeneity for agent departures. On one hand, this modelling choice makes their work and insights applicable to a wider variety of online matching platforms (such as AirBnb, TaskRabbit, etc.), but it also fails to capture an essential aspect specific to SBDPs that could have significant behavioural implications. Other than this, the main difference between my work and theirs is mostly one of perspective: whilst the above papers focus mostly on the optimal design of platform features (through mechanisms such as information constraints or directed search algorithms), I instead seek to explain, from first-principles, how empirically-observed phenomena arises in SBDPs.

2   Theoretical Model

2.1   Setup

In this section, I establish the theoretical framework for the model developed throughout this paper. Fix a non-atomic continuum of male and female agents and consider the dynamic two-sided market formed by the SBDP, which agents can join to search for potential romantic partners. For ease of exposition, I assume that this market is heteronormative such that male agents search exclusively for female agents and vice-versa. Time is discrete and indexed by $t = 0, 1, 2, ...$ over an infinite horizon. Each period, masses $\lambda_m, \lambda_w > 0$ of new men and women enter the platform, where agents are then paired and presented a candidate partner from the opposite side of the market.

We model agents with heterogeneous preferences (capturing the notion that 'beauty lies in the eye of the beholder') and thus, after being paired, each agent observes an *idiosyncratic attractiveness value* $\theta \in \Theta := [0, 1]$ for their candidate. These values are i.i.d according to a pair of absolutely continuous CDF's, F_m and F_w, with corresponding PDF's f_m, f_w. Female agents draw male candidate values from F_m and vice versa but, importantly, the value man i draws for woman j does not necessarily equal the value that j draws for i and, for simplicity, these are modelled as independent from one another.

After observing their candidate's attractiveness, agents then choose to swipe left (dislike) or right (like) on them, yielding an action space $\mathcal{A} = \{\text{Swipe Left}, \text{Swipe Right}\}$. If both agents swipe right on one another, they are said to have *matched* and both receive a matching payoff, however, if either agent swipes left, they both receive a payoff of zero.

Contingent on swiping right on a candidate with attractiveness θ, a user earns a matching payoff $u(\theta)$, where $u(\cdot)$ is a continuous, strictly increasing function that satisfies $u(0) = 0$. This last property stems from the fact that, in most SBDPs, users are allowed to unmatch with each other, and therefore matching with even the least attractive individual on the other side of the market is weakly preferred to not matching.

After payoffs have been received, agents are paired with different candidates and the stage interaction is repeated. Given the continuum of agents, I assume that interactions take place *anonymously* in the style of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988). Furthermore, to the agents' knowledge, pairings are determined in an unknown manner (since SBDPs are generally secretive regarding the algorithms they use), effectively making their problem one of uniform random search.

<p align="center">Figure 1: Sequence of events within each time period</p>

Perhaps trivially, swiping right in the above stage game is weakly dominant for all agents and also yields a Pareto-optimal outcome, thus implying that, in a repeated interaction, the market equilibrium would have all agents exclusively swiping right. This becomes problematic since the main selling point of SBDPs is a reduction in searching costs for individuals seeking romantic encounters, and this is only accomplished if matches have a high likelihood of resulting in real-life romantic attraction. Because of this, SBDPs like Tinder place a cap on the total number of right swipes for each user, thus enabling this as a form of costly signalling. I refer to the total number of right-swipes a user has left as its *budget*, b, which evolves dynamically according to the law of motion:

$$b_{t+1} = b_t - a_t$$

The budget sets for men and women are thus defined by $\mathcal{B}_s = \{b \in \mathbb{Z} : 1 \leq b \leq B_s\}$, for each sex $s = m, w$, with budget caps B_m and B_w determined exogenously. Importantly, agents depart from the platform in one of two ways: they can leave *endogenously*, if they expend their swiping budget, or *exogenously* with probability $(1 - \delta)$ in each time period. This admits to the interpretation of a geometrically distributed lifetime, parametrised by δ, and implies that agents use this as a discounting factor for future payments.

Due to the continuum of agents and the anonymity of interactions. This, along with the mean-field assumption established in subsection 2.2, simplifies gameplay significantly and restricts the focus of this paper to the set of (pure) stationary strategies, denoted by $\mu : \Theta \times \mathcal{B}_m \to \mathcal{A}_m$ for men and $\omega : \Theta \times \mathcal{B}_w \to \mathcal{A}_w$ for women.

<p align="center">5</p>

2.2   The Dating Market

Given the above framework, I now outline the platform state variables that make up the SBDP market. Let $N_{mt}(b), N_{wt}(b)$ denote the mass of male and female agents (respectively) with a budget of $b \in \mathcal{B}$ in a given time period t. Furthermore, since gender imbalances can leave some agents in the long side of the market unpaired, a pairings process must also be determined. Given fairness considerations, as well the automated nature of SBDPs, I assume an efficient matching technology and model pairings as a Bernoulli process parametrised by market tightness; thus, the probability of being paired with a candidate is defined for both sides as:

$$\tau_{mt} := \min\left\{\frac{\sum_{b\in\mathcal{B}_w} N_{wt}(b)}{\sum_{b\in\mathcal{B}_m} N_{mt}(b)}, 1\right\}, \quad \tau_{wt} := \left(\frac{\sum_{b\in\mathcal{B}_m} N_{mt}(b)}{\sum_{b\in\mathcal{B}_w} N_{wt}(b)}\right)\tau_{mt}$$

From the above, the platform state in time period t can be defined as $\Psi_t = (N_{mt}, N_{wt})$. For most of this paper, I focus on characterising user behaviour and its resulting implications in a stationary setting (which is denoted by omitted time subscripts), although some discussion of coupled strategy and market dynamics is provided in Section 4. As a necessary requirement, the market steady state $\Psi_t = \Psi_{t+1} = ... = \Psi$ must satisfy the balanced flow conditions [2] for our continuum model; these are presented below for the female agents, but they apply analogously to the male side of the market. Firstly, the entry flow of agents into the platform must equal the departure flow:

$$\lambda_w = \underbrace{(1-\delta)\sum_{b\in\mathcal{B}_w} N_w(b)}_{\text{Exogenous Outflow}} + \underbrace{N_w(1)\delta\tau_w \int_\Theta \omega(\theta,1)\,dF_m(\theta)}_{\text{Endogenous Outflow}} \tag{2.1}$$

Secondly, for both sides, the flow of agents into any particular budget level must equal the outflow of agents from that same level. Thus, for all $b \in \mathcal{B}_w$:

$$\underbrace{N_w(b+1)\delta\tau_w \int_\Theta \omega(\theta,b+1)\,dF_m(\theta)}_{\text{Inflow into } b} = \underbrace{N_w(b)\Big[(1-\delta) + \delta\tau_w \int_\Theta \omega(\theta,b)\,dF_m(\theta)\Big]}_{\text{Outflow from } b} \tag{2.2}$$

Finally, the entry flow of agents into the platform must equal the outflow from the top budget level, hence:

$$\lambda_w = \underbrace{N_w(B_w)\Big[(1-\delta) + \tau_w\delta \int_\Theta \omega(\theta,B_w)\,dF_m(\theta)\Big]}_{\text{Outflow from } B_w} \tag{2.3}$$

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[2]Formally, these conditions rely on the exact law of large numbers, which has been rigorously developed for discrete-time settings by Duffie et al. (2018), but a technical discussion of this lies outside the scope of this paper.

Importantly, the above conditions take the strategy profile (μ, ω) as exogenously fixed. Over the next section, these are endogenously derived from the agents' best-responses, which themselves depend on the market steady-state.

2.3   The Search Problem

With the model framework outlined above, I now present the decision problem faced by female agents in the market, with analogous results and implications for the male side. In the discussion below, I derive the female best-response function given some platform state Ψ and male strategy μ. Consider now a woman i who is paired with a man j in the platform. Given that j's action depends on his own budget, which is unknown to woman i, then, under strict rationality, woman i would have to compute her expected payoff conditional on her beliefs for the market history. This behaviour is both unreasonable and intractable in an SBDP setting, as explained in subsection 1.1; instead, given a continuum of agents and anonymous interactions, it is reasonable to conjecture that the average swiping rate for men is stationary, and any individual agent's actions has a negligible effect on the platform state dynamics. As such, the expected ex-interim payoff for woman i, given that she observes attractiveness θ for candidate j and chooses action a, is the following:

$$U(\theta, a) = \left(\overline{\mu}\, \mathbb{1}\{a = \text{Swipe Right}\} \right) u(\theta), \quad \text{where} \quad \overline{\mu} = \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}_m} \int_{\Theta} \frac{N_m(b)}{N_m}\, \mu(\theta', b)\, dF_w(\theta')$$

Here, $\overline{\mu}$ denotes the average swiping rate for men, thus imposing a mean-field assumption such that woman i conditions her expectation for j's action on the invariant distribution of male budgets in Ψ. This modelling choice, which has been employed by Immorlica et al. (2021) and Iyer et al. (2014) among others, simplifies the full dynamic game by collapsing it onto a pair of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), where strategy ω is a best response for female agents if, and only if, it is an optimal policy for the corresponding MDP. Furthermore, this simplification also reduces the state of payoff-dependent variables for i to just the value θ that she observes for j and her own budget b. Therefore, since all agents in the same side solve the same MDP, which encompasses only the above state variables, this restricts the paper's focus onto the set of (pure) symmetric stationary strategies, denoted by $\mu : \Theta \times \mathcal{B}_m \to \mathcal{A}_m$ for men and $\omega : \Theta \times \mathcal{B}_w \to \mathcal{A}_w$ for women. Let the jump times of the realised pairing process for woman i be index by k. Given that, at the time of pairing, this women has a budget of b right swipes left, she then solves the constrained MDP presented below, captured by the value function

$V_w(\theta, b)$:

$$V_w(\theta, b) = \max_{\{a_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k U(\theta_k, a_k) \mid \theta_0 = \theta, b_0 = b \right]$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad b_{k+1} = b_k - a_k$$

$$b_k \in \mathcal{B}_w \cup \{0\}$$

$$a_k \in \mathcal{A}$$

Importantly, the first two constraints, along with the exogenous departure process, make this problem non-trivial: by limiting woman i's right-swiping budget, the platform imposes an opportunity cost for swiping right on j and foregoing potential future matches with more attractive men, whilst the exogenous departure process removes the possibility of simply waiting around to swipe right on the top-B_w most attractive men in the platform. By standard dynamic programming arguments, this problem can be captured by two Bellman equations; one for when j is paired and another for when she isn't:

$$V_w^P(\theta, b) = \max \left\{ \overline{\mu}\, u(\theta) \;+\; \delta\tau_w \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w^P(\theta', b-1) \right] \;+\; \delta(1-\tau)V_w^{NP}(b-1), \right.$$
$$\left. \delta\tau_w \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w^P(\theta', b) \right] \;+\; \delta(1-\tau_w)V_w^{NP}(b) \right\} \tag{2.4}$$

$$V_w^{NP}(b) = \delta\tau_w \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w^P(\theta', b) \right] + \delta(1-\tau_w)V_w^{NP}(b) \tag{2.5}$$

With some straightforward algebra, the above two equations can be merged into the full Bellman equation below. Note that, by imposing the swiping budget constraint from the above MDP, it must be the case that $V_w(\theta, 0) = 0$ for all $\theta \in \Theta$, since agents who expend their budget must leave the platform and can't accumulate any additional payoffs:

$$V_w(\theta, b) \;=\; \max \left\{ \overline{\mu}\, u(\theta) + \alpha\, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w(\theta', b-1) \right], \; \alpha\, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w(\theta', b) \right] \right\} \tag{2.6}$$

Where α is the effective discount rate accounting for the exogenous possibilities of both departures and pairings, defined as:

$$\alpha := \frac{\tau_w \delta}{1 - \delta(1 - \tau_w)}$$

Upon inspection, it is clear that the value function is of a piecewise nature over Θ, in a similar manner to McCall (1970). This is formally stated below (with the corresponding derivation included in Appendix A):

Proposition 1. *Fix some $b \in \mathcal{B}_w$. Then the value function $V_w(\theta, b)$ for women admits*

the following piecewise form over Θ:

$$V_w(\theta, b) = \begin{cases} \overline{\mu}u(\theta) + \alpha\,\mathbb{E}_\theta\Big[V_w(\theta', b-1)\Big], & \theta > \widetilde{\omega}_b \\ \\ \alpha\,\mathbb{E}_\theta\Big[V_w(\theta', b)\Big], & \theta \leq \widetilde{\omega}_b \end{cases}$$

where $\widetilde{\omega}_b$ satisfies: $\quad \overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) = \alpha\,\mathbb{E}_\theta\Big[V_w(\theta', b) - V_w(\theta', b-1)\Big]$

In the above, the reservation attractiveness levels $\{\widetilde{\omega}\}_{b\in\mathcal{B}_w}$ must be such that woman i is indifferent between swiping left or right, thus creating the piecewise split in V_w. The above result therefore helps determine a functional form for the optimal policy, in which women j swipes right for partners who exceed the reservation level for her current budget:

Corollary 1. *The following policy $\widetilde{\omega}$, parametrised by $\{\widetilde{\omega}\}_{b\in\mathcal{B}_w}$, attains $V_w(\theta, b)$:*

$$\widetilde{\omega}(\theta, b) = \begin{cases} \text{Swipe Right}, & \theta \geq \widetilde{\omega}_b \\ \text{Swipe Left}, & \theta < \widetilde{\omega}_b \end{cases}$$

Using both of these results, I derive the following explicit characterisation for $\{\widetilde{\omega}_b\}_{b\in\mathcal{B}_w}$ (with a corresponding proof included in Appendix A):

Proposition 2. *The set of reservation attractiveness levels for women, $\{\widetilde{\omega}_b\}_{b\in\mathcal{B}_w}$, uniquely satisfies the recurrence relation and initial condition below, over the budget set $\mathcal{B}_w$:*

$$u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) \;=\; \alpha u(\widetilde{\omega}_b)F_m(\widetilde{\omega}_b) \;+\; \alpha u(\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1})\Big[1 - F_m(\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1})\Big] \;+\; \int_{\widetilde{\omega}_b}^{\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1}} \alpha u(\theta')\,dF_m(\theta') \quad (2.7)$$

$$u(\widetilde{\omega}_1) \;=\; \alpha u(\widetilde{\omega}_1)F(\widetilde{\omega}_1) \;+\; \alpha \int_{\widetilde{\omega}_1}^{1} u(\theta')dF(\theta') \quad\quad\quad (2.8)$$

By inspecting Proposition 2, it is evident that the averaged behaviour of the opposite side of the market ($\overline{\mu}$) has no direct influence over female best responses. Instead, this influence happens indirectly through the steady-state masses and their effect on agents' inter-temporal preferences. Using the recurrence relation in Proposition 2, the agent-best response was computed for an arbitrary set of exogenous parameters, with results shown in Figure 2. Here, the optimal policy for agents is marked by a clear cut-off rule for swiping right. These cut-off values are decreasing in the agent's budget, which captures the notion that an agent's current swipe is more valuable than all preceding ones given the increasing opportunity cost.

3 Equilibrium & Comparative Statics

Figure 2: The Optimal Swiping Rule

3.1   Steady State Equilibrium and Computation

Using the framework and results above, I now present a refined definition for the steady state equilibrium of the market:

Definition 1. *A Steady State Equilibrium (SSE) is a triplet $(\mu^*, \omega^*, \Psi^*)$ such that:*

1. *$\mu^*(\theta, b)$ attains $V_m(\theta, b)$, for all pairs $\theta, b \in \Theta \times \mathcal{B}_m$, given ω^*, Ψ^*.*

2. *$\omega^*(\theta, b)$ attains $V_w(\theta, b)$, for all pairs $\theta, b \in \Theta \times \mathcal{B}_w$, given μ^*, Ψ^*.*

3. *Ψ^* satisfies Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 given the strategy profile (μ^*, ω^*).*

   Intuitively, the above definition establishes two requirements that must be satisfied by an equilibrium market configuration. Firstly, it must be the case that μ^* and ω^* are mutual best responses given the platform state Ψ^* for which, as previously outlined, a necessary and sufficient condition would have them each solve the sex-specific MDP. These two conditions alone define the set of *partially rational expectations equilibria* (PREE), as per Burdett and Coles (1997), since they require agents to play optimally for some fixed steady state Ψ^*, imposing rationality on all game aspects other than the platform state dynamics. Furthermore, in line with mean-field game theory literature, a *consistency check* is imposed by the third condition, which requires that the platform steady state to which agents are best-responding with (μ^*, ω^*) is sustained as a fixed point, thus constraining the set of PREE to define full steady state equilibria.

Although formal proofs for the existence and uniqueness of SSE are outside the scope of this paper, I rely on numerical procedures[3] to approximate equilibria under various exogenous settings. This approach has been frequently employed by related works (see Iyer et al., 2014; Gummadi et al., 2011) as it can help uncover insights provided by mean-field models. To compute model equilibria, I frame the recurrence relation presented in Proposition 2, as well as Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, as a system of $2(|\mathcal{B}_m| + |\mathcal{B}_w| + 1)$ non-linear equations, and solve this using a modified version of the hybrid Powell method, as implemented by the MINPACK 1 routine (Moré et al., 1980).

3.2   Best Response Analysis

Using the computational procedures outlined above, a number of insights can be uncovered related to how exogenous parameters affect an agent's optimal swiping behaviour. The first parameter I analyse is the discount factor, which represents the probability of remaining inside the platform for an additional time period, but is often interpreted as the representative agent's patience level. To determine the effects of changes in the discount factor, I computed the best-response policy over a range of different values for δ (using an arbitrary set of exogenous parameters), with results shown in Figure 3. Evidently, as the agent becomes less patient, they 'lower their standards' for potential matches in the platform, shifting their swiping curve downwards.

Figure 3: Comparative Statics on the Discount Factor

Another interesting parameter to examine is the absolute risk aversion of agents,

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[3]The code required to reproduce all presented analysis is accessible under the GitHub repository `patohdzs/project-swipe`, with most dependencies covered by the SciPy Stack packages.

which I choose to interpret as their 'desperateness' for matching. In the platform, risk-averse agents prefer a greater likelihood of matching (even if this yields relatively lower payoffs), whilst risk-loving agents prefer to save their swipes for high-yield candidates. To perform comparative statics on this parameter, I fix a CARA utility function for agents, with parameter r corresponding to the Arrow-Pratt coefficient for absolute risk aversion. I then compute the optimal swiping rule for various different values of r, with results for this shown on Figure 4. From here, it is evident that as absolute risk aversion rises, agents become 'more desperate' for matches, inducing them to lower their standards for right-swiping on a candidate, and thus shifting their swiping curve downwards.

Figure 4: Comparative Statics on Absolute Risk Aversion

3.3   Market Configuration Analysis

Finally, I perform comparative statics at the platform level to explore how different exogenous factors affect market configurations. This is especially important as it considers not only the effects on best-responses for one sex, but also how these propagate across the market through its aggregate state. More specifically, I focus the aforementioned 'Fast-Swiping Males' puzzle, investigating the discrepancies in swiping rates and matching outcomes between men and women, and I present a possible explanation for which the above model can replicate these outcomes.

Fundamentally, the main scenario that could explain the 'Fast-Swiping Males' puzzle under my model involves differential arrival flows between men and women, which can occur exogenously for several reasons, but are in line with empirical findings, which place. To asses the market configurations arising from of this situation, I compute the model

equilibria under a 6:1 ratio between arrival rates λ_m and λ_w. The results for this are shown in Figure 5, highlighting three main insights for this scenario.

Figure 5: Market Configuration Under Differential Agent Inflows

Firstly, under the above scenario, the steady-state mass of men in the platform is around ten times greater than that of women (in line with empirical estimates), implying that male agents face a tight market and struggle to get paired with female candidates. This is further evidenced by the top-center plot within Figure 5, which shows that male agents are highly concentrated in the top budget levels. Due to the effect of market tightness on the effective discount rate, male agents become more impatient than women on the platform, and this effect is absorbed by their optimal swiping policy, which sits considerably lower than the female swiping curve, effectively showing how a tight market lowers male patience and by extension, their standards, leading them to swipe right on most women. Ultimately, this explains the 'Fast-Swiping Males' puzzle given that, under this particular equilibrium, men give out right-swipes with probability $\overline{\mu} = 0.988$, compared to $\overline{\omega} = 0.491$ for women, thus replicating the observed phenomenon.

4 Agent-Based Simulations

4.1 PREE Convergence

Given the lack of accessible SBDP user data, I developed on agent-based simulation environment to explore the evolution of both behavioural and market-level dynamics under the above theoretical foundation. Agent-based modelling (ABM) is used to study

how *"macro phenomena emerges from micro level behaviour among a heterogeneous set of interacting agents"* (Janssen, 2005), and it has been successfully applied by recent work on matching platforms (Immorlica et al., 2021) to help identify and understand the structure of equilibria, which can be computationally expensive to approximate (and in some cases even non-existent).

Figure 6: Agent-Based Simulation Convergence

To start, I explore the convergence and stability of the SBDP market under arbitrary exogenous settings. In particular, Figure 6 shows the simulated evolution of (sex-specific) agent masses over 300 time periods, with a 2:1 ratio between male and female arrival flows. This simulation was conducted under PREE conditions; that is, with agents using optimal policies for some fixed steady state even when this is not equal to the current platform state. As evident from these results, this process converges onto the SSE computed using the procedures in subsection 3.1. Furthermore, the ABM simulations show that the long side of the market (males) takes considerably longer to converge onto its steady-state level. One technical point worth noting is that the above simulations depict *agent stocks* as opposed to *agent masses*, as per our continuum model. Nevertheless, I examine the limiting case of these dynamics, with Figure 7 depicting how, by the law of large numbers, stationary deviations around the steady-state level become negligible as the number of agents in the platform tends to infinity.

4.2 Myopic Best-Response Dynamics

Finally, I simulate the SBDP market under myopic best-response dynamics to explore whether if SSE can be attained using a more robust process of gameplay. For this simulation, agents re-compute their optimal policies at the start of every time period given the current market state, unlike with PREE simulations where optimal policies are computed

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Figure 7: Agent-Based Simulation Convergence with Varying Sample Sizes

once with respect to the SSE for some given exogenous settings. This process is *myopic* in the sense that optimal policies are computed accounting only for the current state but not for its dynamic evolution; yet it is still more robust than PREE as constant feedback between policies and states could create outward-spiralling dynamics that prevent convergence onto SSE. The results of these simulations over 120 time periods are presented in Figure 8, showing that, both in the case of balanced and unbalanced markets, the SSE can be attained using myopic best response dynamics.

Figure 8: Agent-Based Simulation Under Myopic Best Response Dynamics

5   Conclusion

This paper studied the strategic behaviour of users in SBDP markets by formulating a model of two-sided search for agents with heterogeneous preferences and intertemporal action constraints. Using mean-field assumptions that hold for large markets, I provided an explicit characterisation of agent best-responses and used computational procedures to approximate SSE, exploring the effects of different exogenous parameters on both individual behaviour and the aggregate SBDP market. Finally, I used ABM techniques to asses the convergence properties of my model, as well as its robustness under myopic best-response dynamics, to better asses not only if equilibria can be accurately computed, but also if they can be attained under relaxed gameplay conditions. I focused particularly on explaining how the 'Fast-Swiping Males' phenomenon can arise in unbalanced markets thanks to the endogenous relationship between an agent's patience, their swiping behaviour, and the market steady-state. Crucially, I identified that this puzzle is most likely the result of sex-specific arrival flow differences, although an interesting avenue of future research could study why these differences occur in the first place, perhaps by considering a relation with competing SBDPs and non-SBDP romantic search alternatives.

5.1   Future Work

There are several interesting avenues for future research concerning SBDPs. Firstly, although I provide a closed form characterisation of optimal stationary policies and prove the existence and uniqueness of SSE under balanced markets, future work could extend this by formalising these arguments for imbalanced markets. Furthermore, numerous extensions could be made to study more focused aspects of SBDP markets. One modification of particular interest would involve a richer action set that allows for both casual and long-term matches (after which individuals leave the SBDP permanently), which could uncover interesting insights on the consequences of romantic goal incompatibility and how it could exacerbate inefficiencies in SBDPs. Finally, ABM could be used to test other properties of SSE, such as their stability under an evolutionary framework in a style similar to Kanoria and Saban (2021).

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A   Mathematical Appendix

To simplify notation for Appendix A, I denote the continuation value at budget b by:

$$K_b := \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w(\theta', b) \right]$$

A.1   Proof for Proposition 1 and Corollary 1

Proof. To prove Proposition 1, fix any $b \in \mathcal{B}_w$. First, note that the difference between any two consecutive continuation values K_b and K_{b-1} must lie between 0 and $\overline{\mu} u(1)$. This is true since the value function denotes the expected lifetime sum of payoffs, and an additional right-swipe can provide an agent with, at most, an additional payoff of $\overline{\mu} u(1)$ and, at least, a payoff of 0. Now consider:

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_w(\theta, b) &= \max \left\{ \overline{\mu} \, u(\theta) + \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w(\theta', b-1) \right], \; \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w(\theta', b) \right] \right\} \\
&= \max \left\{ \overline{\mu} \, u(\theta) + K_{b-1}, \; K_b \right\} \\
&= K_{b-1} + \max \left\{ \overline{\mu} \, u(\theta), \; K_b - K_{b-1} \right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $u(\theta)$ is, by assumption, continuous and increasing over Θ, then it must be that the second term on the RHS of the line above equals $K_b - K_{b-1}$ over $[0, \widetilde{\omega}_b]$, and $\overline{\mu} \, u(\theta)$ over $[\widetilde{\omega}_b, 1]$, where $\widetilde{\omega}_b$ satisfies:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\overline{\mu} u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) &= K_b - K_{b-1} \\
&= \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w(\theta', b) - V_w(\theta', b-1) \right]
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus, by considering the above function over the intervals $[0, \widetilde{\omega}_b]$ and $[\widetilde{\omega}_b, 1]$ separately, and substituting back the expressions for K_b, K_{b-1}, we conclude that:

$$
V_w(\theta, b) = \begin{cases} \overline{\mu} u(\theta) + \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w(\theta', b-1) \right], & \theta > \widetilde{\omega}_b \\ \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[V_w(\theta', b) \right], & \theta \leq \widetilde{\omega}_b \end{cases}
$$

Furthermore, Corollary 1 follows trivially from the above.   □

A.2   Proof for Proposition 2

Proof. To prove Proposition 2, we rely on the two equations established by Proposition 1; the first of which expresses the agent's value function in piecewise form, and the second

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of which describes the necessary condition for all reservation attractiveness values:

$$V_w(\theta, b) = \begin{cases} \overline{\mu}u(\theta) + \alpha\,\mathbb{E}_\theta\Big[V_w(\theta', b-1)\Big], & \theta > \widetilde{\omega}_b \\[2ex] \alpha\,\mathbb{E}_\theta\Big[V_w(\theta', b)\Big], & \theta \le \widetilde{\omega}_b \end{cases} \tag{A.1}$$

$$\overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) = \alpha\,\mathbb{E}_\theta\Big[V_w(\theta', b) - V_w(\theta', b-1)\Big] \tag{A.2}$$

Starting out with Equation A.2 and expanding out the expectation operator, we can use A.1 to substitute in the piecewise definitions of $V_w(\theta, b)$ over the appropriate intervals:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) &= \alpha\,\int_0^1 V_w(\theta', b) - V_w(\theta', b-1)\,dF_m(\theta') \\[2ex] &= \alpha\int_0^{\widetilde{\omega}_b} K_b\,dF_m(\theta') \;+\; \alpha\int_{\widetilde{\omega}_b}^1 \overline{\mu}u(\theta') + K_{b-1}\,dF_m(\theta') \\[2ex] &\quad - \alpha\int_0^{\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1}} K_{b-1}\,dF_m(\theta') \;-\; \alpha\int_{\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1}}^1 \overline{\mu}u(\theta') + K_{b-2}\,dF_m(\theta') \end{aligned} \tag{A.3}$$

Furthermore, Equation A.2 implies that:

$$\overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) + K_{b-1} = K_b$$

$$\overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1}) + K_{b-2} = K_{b-1}$$

Then, by substituting these expressions into A.3, we arrive at A.4:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) &= \alpha\int_0^{\widetilde{\omega}_b} \overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) + K_{b-1}\,dF_m(\theta') \;+\; \alpha\int_{\widetilde{\omega}_b}^1 \overline{\mu}u(\theta') + K_{b-1}\,dF_m(\theta') \\[2ex] &\quad - \alpha\int_0^{\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1}} K_{b-1}\,dF_m(\theta') \;-\; \alpha\int_{\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1}}^1 \overline{\mu}u(\theta') + K_{b-1} - \overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1})\,dF_m(\theta') \end{aligned} \tag{A.4}$$

With some algebra, this simplifies down to the recurrence relation in Equation 2.7:

$$u(\widetilde{\omega}_b) = \alpha u(\widetilde{\omega}_b)F_m(\widetilde{\omega}_b) \;+\; \alpha u(\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1})\Big[1 - F_m(\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1})\Big] \;+\; \alpha\int_{\widetilde{\omega}_b}^{\widetilde{\omega}_{b-1}} u(\theta')\,dF_m(\theta') \tag{A.5}$$

Furthermore, to obtain the initial condition for the above, note that the right-swiping

budget constraint imposes $V_w(\theta, 0) = 0, \forall b \in \mathcal{B}_w$. Then, A.1 and A.2 simplify to:

$$V_w(\theta, 1) = \begin{cases} \overline{\mu}u(\theta), & \theta > \widetilde{\omega}_1 \\ \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \Big[V_w(\theta', 1) \Big], & \theta \le \widetilde{\omega}_1 \end{cases} \tag{A.6}$$

$$\overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_1) = \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \Big[V_w(\theta', 1) \Big] \tag{A.7}$$

Beginning with A.7, we simplify until arriving at Equation 2.8:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_1) &= \alpha \, \mathbb{E}_\theta \Big[V_w(\theta', 1) \Big] \\ &= \alpha \int_0^{\widetilde{\omega}_1} K_1 \, dF_m(\theta') + \alpha \int_{\widetilde{\omega}_1}^1 \overline{\mu}u(\theta') \, dF_m(\theta') \\ &= \alpha \int_0^{\widetilde{\omega}_1} \overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_1) \, dF_m(\theta') + \alpha \int_{\widetilde{\omega}_1}^1 \overline{\mu}u(\theta') \, dF_m(\theta') \\ &= \alpha \overline{\mu}u(\widetilde{\omega}_1) F_m(\widetilde{\omega}_1) + \alpha \int_{\widetilde{\omega}_1}^1 \overline{\mu}u(\theta') \, dF_m(\theta') \\ \implies u(\widetilde{\omega}_1) &= \alpha u(\widetilde{\omega}_1) F_m(\widetilde{\omega}_1) + \alpha \int_{\widetilde{\omega}_1}^1 u(\theta') \, dF_m(\theta') \end{aligned}$$

To conclude the proof, note that the existence and uniqueness of some $\widetilde{\omega}_b$ that satisfies A.2 is guaranteed given the assumptions on $u(\theta)$ being continuous and strictly increasing. Since the difference between any two consecutive continuation values must lie strictly between 0 and $\overline{\mu}u(1)$, then, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists one and only one root $\widetilde{\omega}_b$ satisfying A.2 and, by extension the above reoccurrence relation. $\qquad\square$

B   Exogenous Model Specifications

Table 1: Exogenous Model Specifications

Model Reference	$\lambda_m : \lambda_w$	B_m, B_w	F_m, F_w	δ	$u(\theta)$
Figure 2	–	20	Uniform(0,1)	0.95	Linear
Figure 3	–	20	Uniform(0,1)	$\{0.87, , 1\}$	Linear
Figure 4	–	20	Uniform(0,1)	0.95	CARA
Figure 5	6:1	10	Beta(2,2)	0.97	Logarithmic
Figure 6	2:1	10	Beta(2,2)	0.97	Logarithmic
Figure 7	1:1	10	Beta(2,2)	0.97	Logarithmic
Figure 8	2:1, 1:1	10	Beta(2,2)	0.97	Logarithmic