

User Authentication Beyond Passwords (1)

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Based on slides by Shujun Li



- Recap and Context
 - Textual and Graphical Passwords
 - Usability Issues
- Knowledge-Based Authentication
- Password Recovery
- Beyond "What You Know":
 - "What You Possess/Have"
- Summary

Recap and Context



- Textual passwords are still the dominant way of authenticating users
- However, (weak) textual passwords can be easily compromised
 - Various password cracking attacks
- Graphical passwords are mooted as a possible way to address this issue
 - They provide an alternative, but they have their own issues
- We looked at these issues in the last lecture



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Usability Issues



- Trade-off: memorability vs. security
 - Often users are forced to choose a password that is "strong" but difficult to memorise
- Question: what could be the consequences of enforcing a complicated password policy?

Usability Issues (contd.)



- Sometimes experts got it wrong too!

The Man Who Wrote Those Password Rules Has a New Tip: N3v\$r M1^d!

Bill Burr's 2003 report recommended using numbers, obscure characters and capital letters and updating regularly—he regrets the error

By Robert McMillan

Aug. 7, 2017 12:41 p.m. ET

The man who wrote the book on password management has a confession to make: He blew it.

Back in 2003, as a midlevel manager at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Bill Burr was the author of "NIST Special Publication 800-63. Appendix A." The 8-page primer advised people to protect their accounts by inventing awkward new words rife with obscure characters, capital letters and numbers—and to change them regularly.

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What Latest Feuding Means for Trump and GOP





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Knowledge-Based Authentication



- There are ways (other than textual passwords) to authenticate users based on their knowledge
 - Keyboard patterns
 - Emojis
 - Other secrets
 - A real-world example: Pass∞

Passwords with keyboard patterns



- Keyboards have a "graphical" pattern!
 - → You can draw your "password" (or part of it) on the keyboard!
 - What you remember: a graphical pattern (or part of it)
 - What the server receives: a normal-looking textual password
- Are they more secure?
 - You can still build a dictionary!
 - Most password cracking tools have considered such patterns!
- Dino Schweitzer, Jeff Boleng, Colin Hughes and Louis Murphy, "Visualizing Keyboard Pattern Passwords," VizSec 2009, IEEE
- Makl Ndrix, "KeyWalking: pattern based passwords," blog article (GitHub)

Passwords with emojis



Emoji keyboard stickers

- Emoji stickers ⇒ Characters
- What you remember: a list of emojis
- What the server receives: a list of ASCII characters

Directly typing emojis

- Emoji keyboard layouts
- What you remember: a list of emojis
- What the server receives: a list of ASCII / Unicode characters or images

Using special software

- What you remember: a list of emojis
- What the server receives: a list of ASCII / Unicode characters or images





Much more secrets than textual (and graphical) passwords!



- Secret <u>attributes of characters</u>
- Secret gestures
- Secret <u>music / songs</u>
- Secret <u>files / objects</u>
- Secret knowledge of your activities
- Secret knowledge of apps installed
- How you interact with sensors
- Secret info on a map
- Click each of the blue links above for a research paper or a patent.




Musipass




Passwords as anything or accessorising your passwords: Pass∞ (PassInfinity)




- A new technology proposed by Shujun Li and his former
 PhD student Nouf Aljaffan at the University of Surrey
- It allows user-centric combinations of diverse authentication actions (across different factors), while keeping backward compatibility with textual passwords
- Early work has been published as part of <u>Nouf Aljaffan's</u>
 <u>PhD thesis</u> and as <u>a patent application</u>





A web-based prototype of Pass∞








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Fallback/recovery/emergency authentication



- What you know = What you (have to) remember
 - ⇒ You can forget it
 - ⇒ You will need a way to recover from forgetting it
 - ⇒ Password reset is necessary from time to time!
- Possible methods
 - Password reset via email
 - Secret questions and answers
 - Social authentication
 - Who you know
 - Physical authentication
 - Not always possible!





Password reset via email?



- Two common methods
 - Good: A password reset link sent to your registered email address



- Bad (why?): Sent your password **in clear** to your registered email address



- What is it really about?
 - User authentication of a system ⇒ User authentication of your email system
 - → If someone hacks into your email, he/she can reset all your passwords of other systems!
 - ⇒ A single point of failure!

Secret questions and answers?



- Questions can be chosen by you.
 - Not part of the actual secret (shown to anyone!)
 - They can be chosen to make answers harder to guess
- Normally more than one question-answer pair
- Are they more secure than passwords?
 - It depends! What is your pet's name?
- Can hashing and salting still be applied?
 - Yes for answers + No for questions (why no?)
- What user authentication factor?
 - What you know / What you (have to) remember!
 - ⇒ A "password" to recover another "password"!



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What can you possess?



- Secret paper
- Smart cards (+ card reader)
- Connected security tokens
 - USB-based
 - Optical channel based
- Disconnected security tokens
 - One-time password generators
 - Transaction signers
- Mobile phones
 - Software versions of all the above















How do they work?



One-time passwords



- Printed on a piece of paper (often with an index for each password)
- Generated by a dedicated hardware device
- Generated by a mobile app
- Digital certificates (for end users)







- Stored on a USB key or the user's mobile phone (normally protected by a password!)
- Challenge-response protocols
 - A dedicated security device (the prover) responds to a challenge from the server (the verifier)
 - Advanced crypto (e.g., digital signature) is normally used
- Industrial standards
 - <u>Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)</u> by FIDO Alliance



- ...

Drawbacks of security tokens





- You need to bring it with you!
- Additional costs (especially if you need to have many!)
- Loss and theft
 - Normally require a PIN to protect against such issues
 - ⇒ Security reduced to the first authentication factor ("what you know")!
- Man-in-the-middle attacks
 - Some security tokens are insecure against such attacks
- Insecure implementations
 - Predictable pseudo-randomness
 - Extraction of secret keys
 - Insecure mobile phones (e.g., mobile malware)

- ...





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Summary



- There are usability and security issues with textual and graphical passwords for authenticating users
- Researchers have been looking for ways to deal with these issues, for example:
 - Knowledge based password
 - Password reset
 - Other factors of "What You Know", e.g., secret questions
 - Using "What You Have", e.g., OTP, tokens, phone-based
- Next lecture:
 - We will continue with "Who You Are", i.e., biometrics