

ENSEMBLE LEARNING OF ASSET PRICES: ON THE BASIS OF SENTIMENTS

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From the past, the present acts prudently, lest it spoil future action.

Titian: Allegory of Prudence

Both classical and deep ensemble learning succeed by combining weak learners to form strong ones. We take sentiments (an ensemble of binary relations) as primitive and provide minimal requirements for the existence of a stable kernel representation. A kernel is stable if it generalizes to novel (out-of-distribution) examples without the need to re-evaluate current weights. In a multi-asset market, a pricing kernel is stable if, and only if, it is everywhere arbitrage-free, so that a groupoid condition holds across assets for every resampling. Stable pricing kernels preserve information and support the efficient markets hypothesis in the sense that proportional price increments are submodular in the data. US Treasury bond market data for 1961-2023 justifies our extension of the axiomatic framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) to the case of a partially diverse ensemble. In general, partial diversity allows more data to be allocated for testing. Our results shed light on the trade off between diversity and the extent to which the ensemble generalises to novel settings.

153 words

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1. INTRODUCTION

MEMORY AND THE IMAGINATION ARE COMPLEMENTS IN PREDICTION. Either the learner (prediction model) has access to a sufficiently diverse set of past examples, or it

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has the capacity to augment the data. To paraphrase ([Hume, 1896](#), pages 9 and 10): *the memory is tied down, by original impressions, without any power of variation; in contrast, the imagination is free to transpose and change its ideas*. Well-established neuroscientific evidence points to an important role for the imagination and the degrees of freedom or flexibility that allows us to improve on the past data. ([Bartlett, 1932](#), [Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007](#), [Mullally and Maguire, 2013](#)). In machine learning ([Hastie et al., 2009](#), [Murphy, 2022](#)), practices such as splitting the data into a training set and a test set, transferring learning from one domain to another, or augmenting the data are standard. Indeed, data augmentation by rotating or inverting the color of images are explicitly intended to increase the diversity of the data. Increasing diversity is one way to reduce over-fitting. Whereas examples in the training set resemble memories, augmented examples and test examples resemble instances of the imagination: they allow the learner to explore unseen and potentially novel data.

The goal of inductive inference and good predictions is generalization: the ability to grow the model to previously unseen data and objects of interest. Traditionally, the assumption is that new data is drawn from the same (unknown) probability space. But many modern applications go well beyond this assumption. For instance, in transfer learning, the goal is to generalize the learner to new domains and distributions without retraining the model from scratch: Generative Pre-trained Transformers (such as ChatGPT) are a case in point. The key to generalization is stability ([Bousquet and Elisseeff, 2002](#), [Poggio et al., 2004](#), [Mukherjee et al., 2006](#)). Loosely speaking, a learner is stable if small changes in the data yield small changes in predictions: continuity of the learning map from training sets to weighting functions (kernels). [McCloskey and Cohen \(1989\)](#) provides famous examples of unstable learning where training on new cases causes current kernels to unravel in what is called catastrophic interference.

As in [Gilboa and Schmeidler \(2003, henceforth, GS03\)](#), [Billot et al. \(2005\)](#), [Gilboa et al. \(2006\)](#), [Argenziano and Gilboa \(2019\)](#), the learner’s kernel is a subjective assessment of how similar past cases are to the current prediction problem. We derive the learner’s kernel on basis of *sentiments*: a mapping from samples of past cases to rankings of eventualities (objects of interest). To account for all kinds of intelligence, we provide a framework that captures the behaviour of learners with the ability to externally validate their model. The axioms we provide are agnostic in relation to the method of external validation. The goal

is instead to allow an observer to determine whether or not the learner is able to generalise to richer training sets of past cases in a consistent manner. Our framework adopts a within-sample perspective (Chervonenkis, 2015, page 7, experiment 1) and considers the potential for generalizing to richer samples of unseen cases.

Via three of the four basic axioms of GS03 (completeness, combination and archimeanity), all learners (stable or not) are characterised by a kernel that, *for every pair of eventualities*, gives rise to a linear function on samples of past cases. This restriction to linearity is not severe since one can appeal to the “kernel trick” (of machine learning) and embed sentiments and the kernel in a higher-dimensional vector space where the model is linear. Indeed, the key feature of GS03 is the endogeneity of the dimension (number of case types) of the model. The fourth basic axiom is of course transitivity.

Our derivation of the learner’s kernel introduces two new axioms: partial-3-diversity and stability. Partial-3-diversity requires that, for every subset of $k \leq 3$ eventualities, at least k distinct total orderings feature in sentiments. This is a substantial weakening of the diversity axiom (henceforth 4-diversity) axiom of GS03: for every subset of $k \leq 4$ eventualities, at least $k!$ distinct total orderings feature in sentiments. Stability encompasses the basic axioms and strengthens transitivity by requiring that learners generalize to new data (novel case types) without: (i) re-evaluating past rankings; (ii) generating intransitive rankings; or (iii) suppressing novel (transitive) rankings. A stable learner’s kernel is literally stable whilst also allowing for meaningful, unbiased generalisations.

By strengthening the basic axioms, we allow for data that is less than 4-diverse. We justify our extension by testing partial-3-diversity and 4-diversity on daily US nominal yield curve data for the period 1961-2023. To conduct the test, we count the number of days until we are certain a diversity axiom holds: under the null hypothesis of linear a pricing kernel. We find that, if one restricts the model to maturities of 1-8 years that trade since 1961, partial-3-diversity holds after the initial 1229 trading days (8% of days). For this restricted domain of maturities, 4-diversity holds after 20% of days. For the full set of 30 maturities that trade since 1985, the picture is rather different. Partial-3-diversity holds after the initial 785 trading days (8% of days). For 3-diversity (*a fortiori* 4-diversity) we still cannot prove it holds after 9292 days (100% of days). Moreover, the failure is substantial: there is an insufficient variety of rankings for over 20% of subsets of maturities with cardinality four.

We choose the market for zero-coupon bonds because of relatively mature and stable nature. It is a standard setting for exploring arbitrage conditions (Barillas and Nimark, 2019). The relationship between stability and arbitrage is fundamental to our model.¹

Diversity conditions measure the extent to which our current data is representative of the potential sample space. It is natural to expect a trade-off between diversity and the need for external validation in order to guarantee stable learning and hence generalization to new training sets. When 4-diversity holds, generalization is guaranteed via the main theorem of GS03: the data is sufficiently rich.² The threshold or emergent effects, where large language models suddenly acquire abilities that smaller models do not, is conceivably be due to 4-diversity conditions being satisfied, since this requires less “imagination”.

Stable learners stand in contrast to those that learn by doing. Children are encouraged to learn by making (noncatastrophic) mistakes. They are free to modify their beliefs and behaviour after the event: the intransitive rankings that novel case types may reveal are of little consequence (Bradbury and Ross, 1990). (See (Weinstein, 1968, Bradbury and Nelson, 1974) for more evidence of intransitive behaviour in children.) But what of a market maker that exposes their pricing kernel either directly or indirectly (by buying and selling securities) on a financial market? We show that a market maker is unstable if, and only if, the returns on investment that they offer provide a free lunch to other agents today (i.e. before any novel case types arrive and before they have a chance to re-evaluate).

The equivalence between stability (when novel data arrives tomorrow) and no-arbitrage (today) has a number of interesting implications. First, at the individual level, unstable learners are unlikely to survive in markets. Second, we can express the pricing kernel of a stable learner as an empirical (geometric) mean. This means that, in stable markets (i.e. those with only stable learners), prices are efficient stores of information. A stable market price formation process is modular in cases and separable in securities. This implies that, if we are also given the order that past cases arrived, we can identify the stable market pricing

¹The learner is stable if, and only if, the above pairwise kernel forms a groupoid over eventualities. In market settings, the groupoid property translates to (no-)arbitrage conditions.

²The present framework makes no measure theoretic or topological assumptions. Akin to exchangeability, we require that the cases themselves carry the necessary information determine the kernel, not their order of arrival. Past cases can then be resampled to form new training sets and new rankings of eventualities. (See section 4.)

kernel (i.e. the weighting function implied by market prices). Third, suitably sophisticated learners may “massage” their kernels to ensure they are arbitrage-free (and thus stable). This alternative method of external validation is reminiscent of De Finetti’s Dutch books argument for the formula of conditional probabilities: isn’t this what bookies do? Thus, in market settings, there is another form of external validation, one that does not rely on sentiments, but direct manipulation of numbers. In some market settings, we might expect such behaviour, in others, we might not.

The second implication speaks directly to the timeless topic of market efficiency [Fama \(1970\)](#), [Malkiel \(2003\)](#). Stable pricing kernels provide an explanation for why we might expect a passive (i.e. buy-and-hold) strategy to perform at least as well as any other strategy. (The semi-martingale hypothesis of [Fama \(1970\)](#).) This explanation is as follows. If the market pricing kernel is stable, then the success of an active strategy depends solely on its ability to predict the impact of the next case type. Whilst this does simplify the task, it also means that the impact of the next case is unlikely to be large. This is the nature of the empirical mean: the most likely cases are those that have occurred most frequently in the past. The impact of a new case is likely to be crowded out by the frequency of those that it resembles. On the flip side, unstable pricing kernels come with arbitrage opportunities and learners modifying their kernels. Moreover, by virtue of the fact that unstable market pricing kernels cannot be expressed as an empirical mean: price movements are likely to be larger; passive strategies are less attractive; active strategies may indeed be less volatile.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the following subsection, we present some examples one of which we shall develop empirically later in the paper. In [section 2](#) we present the model and key definitions. In [section 3](#) we present the axioms and main representation theorem. In [section 4](#) we develop [example 4](#) by deriving a representation result for a bond-market setting. In [section 4](#) we also discuss the implications for market efficiency identification of pricing kernels in more detail. In [section 5](#) we provide a more detailed comparison of our main theorem with that of GS03 as well as matters such as second-order induction ([Argenziano and Gilboa, 2019](#)).

1.1. Examples

EXAMPLE 1—Supervised learning: For suitable nonempty sets X and Y , we are given a training set $D^* \subset (X \times Y)^n$ consisting of n cases: each drawn from some unknown probability distribution ρ on $X \times Y$. On the basis of D^* , the goal of supervised learning is to “learn” a function $f_\rho : X \rightarrow Y$ such that, for any given x in X , $f_\rho(x)$ provides an accurate prediction of the associated value y in Y . For each x in X , $f_\rho(x)$ is the expectation $\int y \, d\rho_x$ where ρ_x is the conditional measure on $x \times Y$. One interpretation of the present class of model is that, for the current value $x = x_{n+1}$, we provide axioms that simplify the estimation of ρ_x based on sentiments generated by D^* : see [section 4](#) for a pseudo-algorithm. We establish minimal conditions under which it is possible to consistently generalize the model to the collection of training sets that include the new case $z_{n+1} = x_{n+1} \times y_{n+1}$.

The following examples feature two kinds of learner: one who only looks back at past cases (within-sample, Inny), and another who also considers the potential impact of novel types of case (the prudent, Pru). Here, and in most of sequel, we adopt the notation of GS03 and let X denote the nonempty set of *eventualities* with elements x, y, z, \dots .

EXAMPLE 2—A setting where IV-DIVERSITY holds: A die with unknown number of sides is “rolled” over and over again. So far, it has produced only ones, twos and threes. By resampling (with replacement), we obtain the empirical distribution conditional on potential samples of past cases. This conditional empirical distribution induces a single ranking of the set $X = \{1, 2, 3\}$ of eventualities (outcomes) for each sample. The resulting rankings map generates the arrangement of hyperplanes in [fig. 1](#). To each region of this arrangement, sentiments assigns a distinct total ranking. In dice-like problems, the inherent symmetry between outcomes and past cases ensures all $3! = 6$ total rankings of X arise.

Our learners, Inny and Pru, forecast the outcome of the next roll. Both reveal plausibility rankings that agree with [fig. 1](#). By virtue of IV-DIVERSITY, their ranking maps generalise to higher dimensions (four case types) without any need for external validation. The data is sufficiently rich for making predictions about X .

EXAMPLE 3—A non-market setting where IV-DIVERSITY fails to hold: Each month, the federal reserve announces its target overnight rate. Inny and Pru wish to forecast the next announcement. The consensus is that there will be a rate rise of 0, 25 or 50 basis




FIGURE 1.— Each rational point in this simplex corresponds to a sample of past case types: t_1, t_2 and t_3 . The total ranking $(1, 2, 3)$ arises at D (one is least likely and three is most likely). This reflects the relative frequencies of past cases in D . The inverse ranking $(3, 2, 1)$ arises at D' . Within each hyperplane $H^{\{x,y\}}$, faces x and y are equally plausible. The three hyperplanes form a centered arrangement.

points. Inny and Pru have observed the same past announcements. Current circumstances are such that they both find that past cases generate just three distinct case types t_1, t_2 and t_3 where the indices capture the (increasing) degree to which the fed is “behind the curve”.

Figure 2 shows some subtle differences between their current (bold) rankings maps. These subtle differences turn out to be substantial once we extend each learner’s rankings map to a hypothetical fourth case type. To test for stability, the observer assigns t_4 the novel ranking $(25, 0, 50)$ and then extends both learners’ current rankings maps to samples that include cases of type t_4 . Pru’s extended rankings map can be chosen to form a congruent arrangement with six regions. In contrast, Inny’s extended rankings map forms an incongruent arrangement with seven regions. Samples in the seventh region give rise to the intransitive ranking $(25, 0, 50, 25)$. We may not be able to observe Pru’s imagination (cross-validation method), but since incongruence is a generic property for triples of hyperplanes, we can prove that he is almost certainly using one.

EXAMPLE 4—a bond-market setting that we develop in section 4: Inny and Pru are now fair market makers of *Zeros* (zero-coupon treasury bonds).³ The compound-interest

³Similar to a fair insurer, a fair market maker sets the market spread to zero.




FIGURE 2.— In contrast with [fig. 1](#), the current (bold) rankings maps features four regions and the current hyperplane arrangement is uncentered.

formula for the accumulation process of such bonds is

$$a^{(x,y)} = \left(1 + r^{\{x,y\}}\right)^{-x+y},$$

where $r^{\{x,y\}}$ is the yield to maturity on a forward contract that accrues interest between dates x and y . Let $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$ index a suitable sequence of trading dates with $0 \in X$ being the spot date. The log-accumulation process has no arbitrage provided

$$\text{for every distinct } x, y, z \in X, \quad \log a^{(x,y)} = \log a^{(x,z)} + \log a^{(z,y)}.^4 \quad (1)$$

In [eq. \(1\)](#), reference to the data that drives the market-makers' prices is suppressed. When $\log a^{(x,y)}$ depends on past cases, it forms a vector that is normal (i.e. orthogonal) to a hyperplane such as those that separate regions in ranking maps such as [fig. 1](#) or [fig. 2](#). When the data is rich enough to generate the full diversity rankings (as in [example 2](#)), both Inny and Pru set prices that are currently arbitrage-free. Otherwise, generically, only Pru

⁴If for some $x = 0 < y < z$, Inny sets $a^{(x,y)} < a^{(x,z)} \cdot a^{(z,y)}$, then Pru would do well to sell the spot contract (x, y) , buy the spot contract (x, z) and buy the forward (z, y) . The risk-free profit is $a^{(x,z)} \cdot a^{(z,y)} - a^{(x,y)} > 0$.

satisfies this property. Only Pru sets prices according to the empirical (geometric) mean

$$B(x, D) = \prod_{c \in D} \left(1 + r_c^{\{0, x\}}\right)^{-x/n} \quad (2)$$

for every date x and finite sample D that we can generate by resampling past cases.

EXAMPLE 5—A multi-sectoral investment setting: Suppose Inny and Pru are potential representative agents in a multi-sectoral macroeconomy (Long and Plosser, 1983, Atalay, 2017). X is a variety of sectors with x_0 being the household (i.e. consumption sector). The following no-arbitrage equations may be derived from first-order conditions of the social planner’s constrained optimisation problem provided we specify an explicit functional form for the instantaneous flow of utility. Here we take a nonparametric approach: we avoid the specification of a utility function and proceed from past cases to beliefs and decisions.

For every pair of sectors x and y and nonempty set D of past cases, let $S_D^{(x,y)}$ denote a suitably normalised quantity of sector x inputs that the social planner invests in order to produce good y , conditional on D . For every sector z , the no-arbitrage equations are now

$$\log S_D^{(x,y)} = \log S_D^{(x,z)} + \log S_D^{(z,y)} .^5 \quad (3)$$

Such models may be used to model regional (subnational) economic transition. In such settings, the data is infamously poor: the modeller typically needs to regionalise national accounts. If 4-diversity fails on bond-market data, it will surely fail here too. For sectors x and samples D , let $R(x, D)$ denote the required return on investment (with $R(x_0, \cdot)$ normalized to one). Only Pru satisfies the inter-sectoral (and inter-temporal) Euler equations

$$\log S_D^{(x,y)} = \log R(y, D) - \log R(x, D). \quad (4)$$

2. MODEL

The *primitives* consist of the nonempty sets X and C^f . For the current prediction problem, we interpret members of X as *eventualities* and members of C^f as *current* cases. We depart from GS03 by allowing for two forms of current case: C^f denotes the union $C \cup [f]$ of a set C of constant, *past* cases and a set $[f]$ of copies of the variable, *free* case f .

⁵We can confirm that, for rather general model specifications, these equations hold in our traditional simulations with explicit utility functions.

REMARK: By way of analogy with computer memory, a natural implementation is as follows. Take any case $c \in \mathbf{C}^f$ to consist of a pair $p \times m$: a pointer p that references a memory location and the memory content m . For $c \in \mathbf{C}$, just as in the setting of GS03, content of m is meaningful. For $c \in [f]$, although m is empty (assigned a “garbage” value), the allocation is itself valuable. Pairs $c, d \in [f]$ are indistinguishable in terms of content and are in this sense copies of f . One is free to assign novel, imagined content to f .

With case *resampling* from the literature on bootstrapping in mind, let

$$\mathbf{D} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{D \subseteq \mathbf{C} : \#D < \infty\}$$

denote the set of (finite) *determinate or constant databases* or memories and let \mathbf{D}^f denote the set of all finite subsets of \mathbf{C}^f . \mathbf{C} will denote a member of $\{\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{C}^f\}$. Similarly,

$$\mathbb{D} = \begin{cases} \mathbf{D} & \text{if, and only if, } \mathbf{C} = \mathbf{C}, \text{ and} \\ \mathbf{D}^f & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Sentiments. We now take a first step towards formalising the ranking maps of [figs. 1](#) and [2](#). (The translation from databases to rational vectors appears in [appendix A](#).) For each D in \mathbf{D} , the learner is endowed with a well-defined plausibility ranking \leq_D in the set $\text{rel}(X)$ of binary relations on X . Denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of \leq_D by \simeq_D and $<_D$ respectively. *Sentiments* $D \mapsto \leq_D$ are thus a vector in $\text{rel}(X)^{\mathbf{D}}$ of the form

$$\leq_{\mathbf{D}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \leq_D : D \in \mathbf{D} \rangle.$$

This subtle departure from the form $\{\leq_D : D \in \mathbf{D}\}$ of GS03 is closer in structure to visual representations ([figs. 1](#) and [2](#)) and the graph $\{D \times \leq_D : D \in \mathbf{D}\}$.⁶

Case types. As in GS03, two past cases $c, d \in \mathbf{C}$ are of the same *case type* if, and only if, the marginal information of c is everywhere equal to the marginal information of d . Formally, $c \sim^* d$ if, and only if, for every $D \in \mathbf{D}$ such that $c, d \notin D$, $\leq_{D \cup \{c\}} = \leq_{D \cup \{d\}}$. By observation 1 of GS03, \sim^* is an equivalence relation on \mathbf{C} . The equivalence classes of \sim^* generate a partition \mathbf{T} of case types. We extend \sim^* to \mathbf{C}^f by taking $[f]$ to be an equivalence

⁶I thank Maxwell B. Stinchcombe for bringing this point to my attention.

class of its own, so that, for every $c \in \mathbf{C}$, $c \not\sim^* \mathbf{f}$. We let \mathbf{T}^f denote the corresponding partition of \mathbf{C}^f . Like GS03, we also extend \sim^* to \mathbf{D}^f by treating databases that contain the same number of each case type as equivalent. That is, $C \sim^* D$ if, and only if, for every $t \in \mathbf{T}^f$, the numbers $\#(C \cap t)$ and $\#(D \cap t)$ of that case type coincide. To enable a surjection $D \mapsto \langle \#(D \cap t) : t \in \mathbf{T}^f \rangle$ from databases to counting vectors, we impose

RICHNESS ASSUMPTION: *For every $t \in \mathbf{T}^f$, there are infinitely many cases in t .*

Generalizations of sentiments $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ to \mathbf{D}^f require a suitable structure. The following definition provides that structure. It also simplifies the exposition by accommodating generalizations that restrict attention to subsets Y of X .

DEFINITION 1: $\mathcal{R} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \mathcal{R}_D : D \in \mathbb{D} \rangle$ is a *generalization* (or Y -generalization) of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ if, for some nonempty $Y \subseteq X$, the following all hold:

1. for every $D \in \mathbb{D}$ and every $x, y \in Y$, $x \mathcal{R}_D y$ if, and only if, $x \leq_D y$,
2. for every $D \in \mathbb{D}$, \mathcal{R}_D belongs to $\text{rel}(Y)$,
3. for every $D \in \mathbb{D}$ and every $c, d \in \mathbf{C} - D$, if $c \sim^* d$ then $\mathcal{R}_{D \cup \{c\}} = \mathcal{R}_{D \cup \{d\}}$.

A generalization $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbb{D}}$ is *proper* if $\mathbb{D} = \mathbf{D}^f$ and improper otherwise.

Let \mathcal{R} be a Y -generalization. Part 1 of [definition 1](#) implies that, for every $D \in \mathbb{D}$, \mathcal{R} is simply the restriction $\leq_D \cap Y^2$ of \leq_D to Y . We refer to generalizations that satisfy part 1 as *stable*. We also refer to this condition as the *preservation* or *nonrevision* condition. Part 2 ensures that, for \mathcal{R} proper, \mathcal{R}_D is a well-defined binary relation on Y for every $D \in \mathbf{D}^f$. We let \mathcal{I}_D and \mathcal{P}_D respectively denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of \mathcal{R}_D . Via part 3, the partition \mathbf{T}^f of case types generated by \sim^* is at least as fine the partition generated by the equivalence relation generated by \mathcal{R} . Two cases $c, d \in \mathbf{C}^f$ are *equivalent with respect to* \mathcal{R} , written $c \sim^{\mathcal{R}} d$, if, for every $D \in \mathbf{D}$ such that $c, d \notin D$, $\mathcal{R}_{D \cup \{c\}} = \mathcal{R}_{D \cup \{d\}}$.

DEFINITION: A proper generalization \mathcal{R} is either *regular* or *novel*. It is novel whenever $[\mathbf{f}]$ is a distinct equivalence class of $\sim^{\mathcal{R}}$, so that, for every $c \in \mathbf{C}$, $c \not\sim^{\mathcal{R}} \mathbf{f}$.

For any given novel generalization \mathcal{R} , $[\mathbf{f}]$ is the unique novel case type that $\sim^{\mathcal{R}}$ generates. We impose this restriction, not because we think the imagination of learners is constrained in this way, or because the model would not work that way, but rather because one degree

of freedom is sufficient for our purposes: moreover, it may be that the dev set only has a single novel example/feature.

For every regular generalization \mathcal{R} , there exists $c \in \mathbf{C}$ such that $c \sim^{\mathcal{R}} \mathbf{f}$. Thus, there are $\#\mathbf{T}$ distinct regular generalizations. Yet every regular Y -generalization \mathcal{R} is *equivalent* to the unique improper Y -generalization $\hat{\mathcal{R}} = \langle \leq_D \cap Y^2 : D \in \mathbf{D} \rangle$ in the sense that, for every $C \in \mathbf{D}^{\mathbf{f}}$, there exists $D \in \mathbf{D}$ such that $C \sim^{\mathcal{R}} D$ and $\mathcal{R}_C = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_D$.⁷

3. AXIOMS AND MAIN RESULTS

We begin by rewriting the basic axioms of GS03 in terms of generalizations. We will only impose these basic axioms indirectly, via the stability axiom that follows.

THE BASIC AXIOMS: *Let \mathcal{R} be an arbitrary Y -generalization of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$.*

A0 — TRANSITIVITY AXIOM FOR \mathcal{R} — *for every $D \in \mathbf{D}$, \mathcal{R}_D is transitive.*

A1 — COMPLETENESS AXIOM FOR \mathcal{R} — *for every $D \in \mathbf{D}$, \mathcal{R}_D is complete.*

A2 — COMBINATION AXIOM FOR \mathcal{R} — *for every disjoint $C, D \in \mathbf{D}$ and every $x, y \in Y$, if $x \mathcal{R}_C y$ and $x \mathcal{R}_D y$, then $x \mathcal{R}_{C \cup D} y$; and if $x \mathcal{P}_C y$ and $x \mathcal{R}_D y$, then $x \mathcal{P}_{C \cup D} y$.*

A3 — ARCHIMEDEAN AXIOM FOR \mathcal{R} — *for every disjoint $C, D \in \mathbf{D}$ and every $x, y \in Y$, if $x \mathcal{P}_D y$, then there exists $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{++}$ such that, for every pairwise disjoint collection $\{D_j : D_j \sim^{\mathcal{R}} D \text{ and } C \cap D_j = \emptyset\}_1^k$ in \mathbf{D} , $x \mathcal{P}_{C \cup D_1 \cup \dots \cup D_k} y$.*

The diversity axioms apply to regular generalizations. They require that \mathbf{D} is sufficiently rich to support Y -generalizations \mathcal{R} with a variety of *total* orderings: i.e. complete, transitive and antisymmetric ($x \mathcal{R}_D y$ and $y \mathcal{R}_D x$ implies $x = y$). Let $\text{total}(\mathcal{R})$ denote the set $\{R : \text{for some } C \in \mathbf{D}, R = \mathcal{R}_C \text{ is total}\}$ of total orders that feature in \mathcal{R} . For $k = 4$, the following axiom is a restatement of the diversity axiom of GS03.

k -DIVERSITY AXIOM: *For every $Y \subseteq X$ of cardinality $n = 2, \dots, k$, every regular Y -generalization \mathcal{R} of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ is such that $\#\text{total}(\mathcal{R}) = n!$.*

A given diversity axiom *holds* (for $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$) on $Z \subseteq X$ if the axiom holds with Z in the place of X . We introduce the following axioms:

⁷There is a canonical embedding of $\{C \times \mathcal{R}_C : C \in \mathbf{D}^{\mathbf{f}}\}$ in $\{D \times \hat{\mathcal{R}}_D : D \in \mathbf{D}\}$. The converse embedding follows from the nonrevision condition of [definition 1](#). (See [observation 2](#) of [appendix E](#))

PARTIAL-3-DIVERSITY AXIOM — P3DIVERSITY: *For every $Y \subseteq X$ with cardinality $n = 2$ or 3 , every regular X -generalization \mathcal{R} of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ is such that $\#\text{total}(\mathcal{R}) \geq n$.*

CONDITIONAL-2-DIVERSITY AXIOM — C2DIVERSITY: *For every three distinct elements x, y and z in X , one of the sets $\{D' : x <_{D'} y\}$ and $\{D' : y <_{D'} x\}$ contains both C and D such that $z <_C x$ and $x <_D z$. If $\#X = 2$, then Π -diversity holds on X .*

OBSERVATION 1: *Let $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ satisfy A0–A3. Then P3DIVERSITY holds if, and only if, C2DIVERSITY does.*

PROOF: By virtue of proposition 2 and the translation of appendix A. Q.E.D.

The stability axiom is our second requirement. It is distinguished by the structure it imposes on novel generalizations. In the online appendix, we present an alternative derivation of the main theorem where stability is restricted to novel generalizations. Here we streamline the exposition and apply it to the testworthy class of proper generalizations:

DEFINITION: A proper generalization \mathcal{R} of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ is *testworthy* if it satisfies A1–A3 and, for some $D \in \mathbf{D}$ such that \mathcal{R}_D is total, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathfrak{f}}$ is the inverse of \mathcal{R}_D .⁸

Testworthy generalizations are distinguished by the ranking at \mathfrak{f} and the fact that they need not satisfy A0. Stability requires that any testworthy generalization can be suitably perturbed to satisfy A0. By suitable we mean

DEFINITION: Let \mathcal{R} and $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ be generalizations of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$. $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ is a *perturbation* of \mathcal{R} if $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathfrak{f}} = \mathcal{R}_{\mathfrak{f}}$ and, moreover, a *diverse* perturbation if $\#\text{total}(\hat{\mathcal{R}}) \geq \#\text{total}(\mathcal{R})$.

A diverse perturbation of \mathcal{R} does not suppress the novel, transitive rankings that \mathcal{R} generates. If we allowed for nondiverse (i.e. dogmatic) perturbations, the learner could continue to “hide” intransitive rankings. Our main axiom is then

STABILITY AXIOM — 4STABILITY: *For every $Y \subseteq X$ with cardinality 2, 3 or 4, every testworthy Y -generalization of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ has a diverse perturbation that satisfies A0–A3.*

⁸Recall that the inverse \mathcal{R}_D^{-1} of \mathcal{R}_D satisfies $x \mathcal{R}_D^{-1} y$ if, and only if, $y \mathcal{R}_D x$.

In our main theorem we derive a real-valued kernel function \mathbf{v} on the product $X \times \mathbf{C}$. We view \mathbf{v} as a matrix and $\mathbf{v}(x, \cdot)$ as one of its rows. \mathbf{v} represents sentiments $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ if

$$\begin{cases} \text{for every } x, y \in X \text{ and every } D \in \mathbf{D}, \\ x \leq_D y \text{ if, and only if, } \sum_{c \in D} \mathbf{v}(x, c) \leq \sum_{c \in D} \mathbf{v}(y, c). \end{cases}$$

The matrix \mathbf{v} respects case equivalence (with respect to $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$) if, for every $c, d \in \mathbf{C}$, $c \sim^* d$ if, and only if, the columns $\mathbf{v}(\cdot, c)$ and $\mathbf{v}(\cdot, d)$ are equal.

THEOREM 1—Part I, Existence: *Let there be given X , \mathbf{C}^f , $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ and generalizations, as above, such that the richness condition holds. Then (1.i) and (1.ii) are equivalent.*

(1.i) **P3DIVERSITY** and **4STABILITY** hold for $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$.

(1.ii) There exists a matrix $\mathbf{v} : X \times \mathbf{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfying (1.a) and (1.b):

(1.a) \mathbf{v} is a representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ that respects case equivalence;

(1.b) no row of \mathbf{v} is dominated by any other row, and for every three distinct elements

$$x, y, z \in X \text{ and } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}, \mathbf{v}(x, \cdot) \neq \lambda \mathbf{v}(y, \cdot) + (1 - \lambda) \mathbf{v}(z, \cdot).^9$$

Our uniqueness result is identical to that of GS03.

THEOREM 1—Part II, Uniqueness: *If (1.i) [or (1.ii)] holds, then the matrix \mathbf{v} is unique in the following sense: for every other matrix $\mathbf{u} : X \times \mathbf{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that represents $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$, there is a scalar $\lambda > 0$ and a matrix $\beta : X \times \mathbf{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ with identical rows (i.e. with constant columns) such that $\mathbf{u} = \lambda \mathbf{v} + \beta$.*

4. APPLICATIONS

Supervised learning. Building on [example 1](#), the following steps show how the axioms can be used to “complete” sentiments and the main theorem can be used to derive a kernel.

1. Derive a collection \mathcal{D}_n of training sets by resampling from D^* . (To start with, take n “basis” training sets each of which contains just a single copy of some case in D^* .)
2. Induce sentiments on \mathcal{D}_n . That is a plausibility ranking on Y for each D in \mathcal{D}_n .
3. Via **P3DIVERSITY** and **4STABILITY**, extend sentiments to the set \mathbf{D}_n of every finite resampling of D^* .

⁹The affine independence condition holds if, and only if, $\mathbf{v}(x, \cdot) - \mathbf{v}(z, \cdot)$ and $\mathbf{v}(y, \cdot) - \mathbf{v}(z, \cdot)$ are noncollinear.

- 1 4. Repeat steps (1)-(3) identify the hyperplane arrangement $\mathcal{H} = \{H^{\{y,y'\}} : y, y' \in Y\}$ in 1
2 $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}}$ for the set \mathbf{T} of case types (endogenous data bins or equivalence classes). 2
- 3 5. Derive a collection $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ of vectors that are orthogonal to the hyperplanes of (4) satisfy 3
4 the groupoid identity: for every $y, y', y'' \in Y$, $v^{(0,2)} = v^{(0,1)} + v^{(1,2)}$. 4
- 5 6. Via the groupoid identity, derive a kernel $\mathbf{v} : Y \times \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that satisfies [theorem 1](#). 5
- 6 7. Estimate ρ_x using $\hat{\rho} : Y \times \mathbf{D}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $y \times D \mapsto \hat{\rho}_D(y) = \sum_{c \in D} \mathbf{v}(y, c)$, where v satisfies 6
7 the properties of [theorem 1](#) (or 7

8 *Application to no-arbitrage asset pricing.* Fixed income securities (henceforth *bonds*) are 8
9 commonly traded over the counter with certain parties (typically investment banks) acting 9
10 as market makers. Similar to bookmakers in betting markets, market makers profit from the 10
11 bid-ask spread. Unlike bookmakers, however, they do sieze on perceived opportunities to 11
12 make money by trading with other market makers. To simplify the exposition, we assume 12
13 the market makers are *fair*, so that the bid-ask spread is zero. 13

14 Recall that a (fixed income) *forward* is a contract between two parties to exchange a 14
15 bond at a given date, price and amount in the future. Building on [example 4](#), let X denote 15
16 the set of settlement/maturity dates for forwards associated with given zero-coupon bond 16
17 (a *Zero*) issued by the same entity. In particular, take $X = \{x_0, x_1, \dots\}$ such that $x_0 = 0$ 17
18 and $x_k < x_{k+1}$ for all feasible k . 18

19
20 REMARK—on zero-coupon bonds: Although coupon-paying bonds are far more com- 20
21 mon, Zeros provide a natural asset for studying no-arbitrage pricing ([Barillas and Nimark,](#) 21
22 [2019](#)). Zeros are generated by “stripping” coupon-paying bonds of their coupons enroute to 22
23 deriving benchmark zero-coupon yield curves ([Brealey et al., 2020](#)). Since coupon stripping 23
24 is reversible, restricting attention to Zeros is without loss of generality. Modulo surmount- 24
25 able complications relating to the uncertainty of the cashflows, the arguments that follow 25
26 extend to dividend-paying stocks. 26

27
28 Let D^* denote the (unique) current history of time-series data that are relevant to this 28
29 market for Zeros. We generate the set \mathbf{C} of past cases by taking each case $c \in \mathbf{C}$ to consist 29
30 of market-relevant data from a given time interval (a block of time periods) in the past. 30
31 Block resampling of time series data was originally developed by [Kunsch \(1989\)](#), [Politis](#) 31
32 [and Romano \(1994\)](#). (For applications to finance problems see [White \(2000\)](#), [Harvey and](#) 32

Liu (2021).) For the present purposes, blocks need to be chosen so that, for any $k > 0$ and resampling $D = \{c_1, \dots, c_k\}$, what matters is the number of repetitions of a given case type, not the order of the cases that form the pseudo-time series. In other words, $D \sim^* D'$ for any permutation D' of the cases in D . It is straightforward to verify that this is indeed the case for the stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994, section 2).

The free case \mathfrak{f} has no additional structure beyond that of sections 2 and 3.

Before turning to the interpretation of \leq_D in the present setting, we introduce current market prices. From the market maker's perspective, current prices reflect the rest of the market's view on yields to maturity conditional on D^* . Since we take current market prices (and rates) to be fixed, we suppress reference to D^* . The market maker observes past cases, and current prices and forms a view about how prices might change when the information changes. The compound-interest formula for the *market accumulation process* (at current market rates) is then

$$a^{(x,y)} = \left(1 + r^{\{x,y\}}\right)^{-x+y},$$

where $r^{\{x,y\}}$ is the market's implied forward yield for the contract that accrues interest between dates x and y . If x is later than y , then the contract is to sell, and the market maker pays this yield, so that $r^{\{y,x\}} = r^{\{x,y\}}$. For each $x \in X$, the *market price* of a Zero that pays out one-dollar at date x is defined as $b(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} a^{(x,0)}$.

Let $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$ index a suitable sequence of trading dates with $0 \in X$ being the spot date. It is well known that a Zero that pays out one dollar at time $x > 0$ is arbitrage-free if, and only if, the log-accumulation process satisfies

$$\text{for every } x, y, z \in X, \quad \log a^{(x,y)} = \log a^{(x,z)} + \log a^{(z,y)}.^{10} \quad (5)$$

This no-arbitrage condition is a special case of the Jacobi identity.

We now explain how a market maker might infer her own subjective accumulation process from past cases. Our market maker thinks in terms of economic profits (relative to the market price). For every finite resampling D and every date x and y , let $x \leq_D y$ if, and only if, at D , the market maker finds y (weakly) more plausible than x in answer to the question

¹⁰To see this, w.l.o.g. suppose that, for some $x < y < z$, $a^{(x,z)} < a^{(x,y)}a^{(y,z)}$. The market maker would do well to sell the contract (x, z) and buy the contracts (x, y) and (y, z) . In the absence of counterparty risk, the difference between interest paid and received is risk-free.

“Hold current market prices fixed and consider a one-dollar investment today. Given D , which maturity will yield a higher return?”

REMARK—alternative interpretation: It is also possible to interpret $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ in terms of statements of the market maker’s intention to buy or sell forwards. Let (x, y) be shorthand for the forward contract where the buyer accumulates interest between dates x and y . For $x < y$, accumulating interest over (y, x) simply means selling (x, y) . Holding current prices fixed, for each D in \mathbf{D} , we have $x \leq_D y$ if, and only if, given D , the market maker would buy (x, y) . Under this interpretation, if at D^* the market maker agrees with the market, then $x \simeq_{D^*} y$ for every $x, y \in X$. Thus, if the market maker agrees with the market, then her sentiments are centered as in [fig. 1](#). Our point is that the market maker may not agree with the market and thus the rankings map may be uncentered as in [fig. 2](#). To operationalise this interpretation, simply suppress reference to $a^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ in what follows.

Next, we introduce the market maker’s (possibly negative and subjective) markup function. This is a markup relative to current rates $r^{\{\cdot, \cdot\}}$. A *markup function* $\mu : X^2 \times \mathbf{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, is characterised by three conditions: for time intervals of length zero, the yield is zero; fair pricing; and case equivalence. These are, respectively, formalised as follows: for every $x, y \in X$ and every $c, d \in \mathbf{C}$, $\mu_c^{\{x, x\}} = 0$; $\mu_c^{\{y, x\}} = \mu_c^{\{x, y\}}$; and $c \sim^* d$ if, and only if, $\mu_c^{\{x, y\}} = \mu_d^{\{x, y\}}$. We extend to \mathbf{D} by taking $\mu_D^{\{x, y\}}$ to be the (geometric) *mean markup conditional on D*

$$1 + \mu_D^{\{x, y\}} = \prod_{c \in D} \left(1 + \mu_c^{\{x, y\}}\right)^{\frac{1}{|D|}}.$$

The market maker’s subjective forward yield conditional on D is then the following modification of the market yield $r^{\{\cdot, \cdot\}}$: for every $x, y \in X$ and $D \in \mathbf{D}$

$$1 + \rho_D^{\{x, y\}} = \left(1 + r^{\{x, y\}}\right) \cdot \left(1 + \mu_D^{\{x, y\}}\right).$$

In turn, the market maker’s subjective accumulation process $A^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : X^2 \times \mathbf{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ modifies the market accumulation process $a^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$. For every $x, y \in X$ and $D \in \mathbf{D}$,

$$A_D^{(x, y)} := \left(1 + \rho_D^{\{x, y\}}\right)^{-x+y} = a^{(x, y)} \cdot \left(1 + \mu_D^{\{x, y\}}\right)^{-x+y}.$$

Note that the market maker agrees with the current market accumulation process whenever the cases in D^\star are such that the positive markups countervail those that are negative. That is, for every $x, y \in X$, $\mu_{D^\star}^{(x,y)} = 0$.

The market maker's (subjective) empirical bond price function $B : X \times \mathbf{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ modifies the market price $b : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Thus, for a Zero with a one-dollar face value the price at time x , conditional on D is

$$B(x, D) := A_D^{(x,0)} = b(x) \cdot \left(1 + \mu_D^{\{0,x\}}\right)^{-x}.$$

This reflects the inverse relationship between bond prices and yields.

When D^\star belongs to \mathbf{D} , the number of case types is finite, the following corollary of [theorem 1](#) characterises [4STABILITY](#) in the Zero-market setting.

COROLLARY 1.1: *For X , \mathbf{C}^f , $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ and generalizations as in the present section, $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ satisfies [C2DIVERSITY](#) and [4STABILITY](#) if, and only if, there exists empirical implied yield and empirical bond price functions, such that*

$$\begin{cases} \text{for every } x, y \in X \text{ and every } D \in \mathbf{D}, \\ x \leq_D y \quad \text{if, and only if,} \quad B(x, D) \geq B(y, D). \end{cases} \quad (*)$$

Moreover, for every other empirical bond price function \hat{B} that satisfies $(*)$, there exists a scalar $\lambda > 0$ such that $\log \hat{B} = \lambda \log B$; and, for every $D \in \mathbf{D}$, the associated accumulation process $A_D^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ is arbitrage-free.

PROOF OF COROLLARY 1.1: Via \mathbf{C}^f , $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ satisfies [4STABILITY](#) if, and only if, there exists a pairwise Jacobi representation $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : X^2 \times \mathbf{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Recalling that $0 \in X$, for every $x \in X$ and $D \in \mathbf{D}$, let

$$B(x, D) = \exp \left(-\frac{1}{|D|} \sum_{c \in D} v_c^{(0,x)} \right). \quad (6)$$

For the proof of $(*)$, suppose that w.l.o.g., $x \leq_D y$, so that $\sum_{c \in D} v_c^{(y,x)} \leq 0$. Via the Jacobi identity we have $\sum_{c \in D} \{v^{(y,0)} + v^{(0,x)}\} \leq 0$. Via the representation property $v^{(y,y)} = 0$. Another application of the Jacobi identity yields $v^{(y,0)} = -v^{(0,y)}$. Thus,

$$-\log B(x, D) + \log B(y, D) = \frac{1}{|D|} \sum_{c \in D} \{v_c^{(0,x)} - v_c^{(0,y)}\} \leq 0.$$

We now show that the bond price is a suitable function of the empirical yield function. For every $x, y \in X$ and $D \in \mathbf{D}$, take $\log A_D^{(x,y)} = \frac{1}{|D|} \sum_{c \in D} v_c^{(x,y)}$. That is,

$$\log a^{(x,y)} + \frac{y-x}{|D|} \sum_{c \in D} \log \left(1 + \mu_c^{\{x,y\}} \right) = \frac{1}{|D|} \sum_{c \in D} v_c^{(x,y)}.$$

Take $D = \{c\}$ and note that the Jacobi identity implies $v_c^{(x,y)} = -v_c^{(y,x)}$. Thus

$$\log a^{(x,y)} + (y-x) \log \left(1 + \mu_c^{\{x,y\}} \right) = -\log a^{(y,x)} - (x-y) \log \left(1 + \mu_c^{\{y,x\}} \right).$$

Moreover, note that $\log a^{(x,y)} = -\log a^{(y,x)}$, so that, by cancelling terms, we obtain

$$\log \left(1 + \mu_c^{\{x,y\}} \right) = \log \left(1 + \mu_c^{\{y,x\}} \right), \quad (7)$$

so that $\mu_c^{\{x,y\}} = \mu_c^{\{y,x\}}$. Then $v_c^{(x,x)} = 0 = \log a_c^{(x,x)}$ implies that $\mu_c^{\{x,x\}} = 0$. Finally, note that for $c \sim^* d$, the property $\mu_c^{\{x,y\}} = \mu_d^{\{x,y\}}$ is inherited from $v_c^{(x,y)} = v_d^{(x,y)}$, so that we have an empirical implied yield function. All of the above arguments are reversible, so that, given the existence of such empirical yield and bond price functions satisfying (*), it follows that $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ satisfies 4STABILITY.

If \hat{B} is another empirical bond price function that satisfies (*), then via eq. (6) and ??, for some $\lambda > 0$, $\log \hat{B} = \lambda \log B$. The fact that, for every D , $A_D^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ is arbitrage-free follows by virtue of the fact that the Jacobi identity holds element-wise for $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$. In particular, since, for every $x, y, z \in X$ and $c \in D$, $\log A_c^{(x,y)} = v_c^{(x,y)}$,

$$\log A_D^{(x,y)} = \frac{1}{|D|} \sum_{c \in D} \log A_c^{(x,y)} = \frac{1}{|D|} \sum_{c \in D} \left\{ \log A_c^{(x,z)} + \log A_c^{(z,y)} \right\}.$$

Taking exponents, we obtain the no-arbitrage condition $A_D^{(x,y)} = A_D^{(x,z)} \cdot A_D^{(z,y)}$. *Q.E.D.*

prop-fourdiv-empty here

The uniqueness result in corollary 1.1 is stronger than in the general setting of part II of theorem 1. This is a consequence of the fact that our empirical bond yield satisfies the property $r^{(x,x)} = 0 = \mu^{(x,x)}$, for every $x \in X$.

Our diversity axiom, C2DIVERSITY, has a straightforward interpretation in the present setting. Given 4STABILITY, II-diversity implies that, for every distinct x and y , there exist c and d such that $v_c^{(x,y)} < 0 < v_d^{(x,y)}$. This, via the arguments that lead to eq. (7), is equivalent

to both $\mu_d^{\{x,y\}} < 0 < \mu_c^{\{x,y\}}$ and $\rho_c^{\{x,y\}} < r^{\{x,y\}} < \rho_d^{\{x,y\}}$. In words, II-diversity requires that the market maker's data is rich enough to contain at least one case where her markup between date x and y is positive, and at least one where it is negative. C2D generalizes this notion to require that for every distinct x, y, z , $\mu_C^{\{x,y\}} < 0 < \mu_D^{\{x,y\}}$ for some C and D such that $\mu_C^{\{x,z\}} \cdot \mu_D^{\{x,z\}} > 0$. An equivalent characterisation is also available in terms of the affine independence condition (1.b) of theorem 1 for the matrix $\beta : X \times \mathbf{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $x \times c \mapsto \beta(x, c) = B(x, \{c\})$.

The considerably stronger conditional-III-diversity arises (implicitly) in the final step of our proof of theorem 3. When it holds for $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$, stability is unnecessary (provided A0–A3 hold). In terms of mark ups, we may characterise conditional-III-diversity as, for every distinct x, y, z and w , one of the half spaces $\{D : \mu_D^{\{x,w\}} > 0\}$ or $\{D : \mu_D^{\{x,w\}} < 0\}$ contains D_1, \dots, D_6 and permutations π_1, \dots, π_6 of x, y and z such that for $i = 1, \dots, 6$,

$$\mu_{D_i}^{\{\pi_i(x), 0\}} < \mu_{D_i}^{\{\pi_i(y), 0\}} < \mu_{D_i}^{\{\pi_i(z), 0\}}.$$

Yet IV-DIVERSITY is stronger still, requiring the above to hold on both half spaces.

This disparity between C2DIVERSITY and IV-DIVERSITY reflects the value of experience or of rich data. It also reflects the value of a prudent imagination when the data fails to be rich. Outside of market settings, this may be as far as we can go, but in the present context we can say more.

Market efficiency We begin with a proposition that justifies our claim that when 4STABILITY holds, so will the efficient markets hypothesis in the usual (Fama, 1970) sense: passive (buy-and-hold) strategies outperform active ones. To this end, let $\beta : X \times \mathbf{D}^f \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ be an empirical bond price function such that its restriction to $X \times \mathbf{D}$ coincides with B of corollary 1.1 and let

$$g_c(x, D) := \frac{\beta(x, D \cup \{c\}) - \beta(x, D)}{\beta(x, D)}$$

denote the *proportional price increment* for the maturity date x given the data D , following the arrival of a new case c . By new case, we mean that c can be regular or novel. Under stable pricing, the proportional price increment converges to zero exponentially.

PROPOSITION 1: For every $x \in X$, $D \in \mathbf{D}$ of cardinality n and $c \in \mathbf{C}^f - D$,

$$1 + g_c(x, D) = \left(\left(1 + \rho_c^{\{0, x\}} \right)^{-x} / B(x, D) \right)^{\frac{1}{n+1}} \leq (1 + \rho)^{\frac{2x}{n+1}}$$

where $\rho = \operatorname{argmax} \left\{ \left(1 + \rho_d^{\{0, x\}} \right)^{-x} : d \in D \cup \{c\} \right\}$.

PROOF: Let $1, \dots, n$ be an enumeration of D and identify c with $n + 1$. Moreover, let us suppress reference to $\{0, x\}$, so that $\rho_{n+1} = \rho_c^{\{0, x\}}$. We first derive the equality. By [corollary 1.1](#), and the fact that β agrees with B on $X \times \mathbf{D}$, we obtain

$$\beta(x, D) = B(x, D) = \prod_i^n (1 + \rho_i)^{\frac{-x}{n}}.$$

and, by manipulating exponents, we obtain

$$\beta(x, D \cup \{c\}) = \left(\prod_i^{n+1} (1 + \rho_i)^{\frac{-x}{n}} \right)^{\frac{n}{n+1}}.$$

Substituting for $B(x, D)$ and noting that $\frac{n}{n+1} = 1 - \frac{1}{n+1}$, we arrive at the expression

$$1 + g_c(x, D) = \frac{B(x, D)^{1 - \frac{1}{n+1}} \cdot (1 + \rho_{n+1})^{\frac{-x}{n+1}}}{B(x, D)}.$$

For the inequality, note that $B(x, D)^{-1} = \exp(\frac{1}{n} \sum_1^n \nu_i)$ where $\nu_i = x \log(1 + \rho_i)$. Let $\nu_{n+1} = x \log(1 + \rho_{n+1})$. Then, for $\nu := \max\{|\nu_i| : i = 1, \dots, n + 1\}$, we have

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_1^n \nu_i \leq \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_1^n \nu_i \right| \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_1^n |\nu_i| \leq \nu = x \log(1 + \rho).$$

Then, since \exp is an increasing function,

$$B(x, D)^{-1} \leq \exp(\nu) = (1 + \rho)^x$$

Mutatis mutandis, the same argument yields $(1 + \rho_{n+1})^{-x} \leq (1 + \rho)^x$. Extending this pair of bounds extend to the product brings us to the desired inequality. *Q.E.D.*

Key to the proof of [proposition 1](#) is that the new pricing kernel β coincides with the old one B on $X \times \mathbf{D}$. [Proposition 1](#) thus demonstrates that [4STABILITY](#) implies the usual notion

of stability of statistical learning (Poggio et al., 2004, Mukherjee et al., 2006, Bousquet and Elisseeff, 2002). That is to say it implies continuity of the learning map (here induced by the ranking map) $L : \bigsqcup_{i \geq 1} Z^n \rightarrow \mathcal{H}$ from the sample space to the hypothesis space (Mukherjee et al., 2006).

The following corollary of proposition 1 confirms that, for stable pricing kernels, the impact of the arrival of a given case type is decreasing in its frequency. This is a decreasing marginal impact of information property: the information carried by a common case type is already baked into the price. We discuss the impact of this result on market efficiency following the statement and proof.

COROLLARY 1.2: *For $D \in \mathbf{D}$ of cardinality n , let \mathbf{T}_D be the set of case types that feature in D and let $c, d \in \mathbf{C} - D$ be cases of type $s \in \mathbf{T}_D$. Then, for every $x \in X$,*

$$|g_d(x, D \cup \{c\})| < |g_c(x, D)|$$

and, moreover, if n_s is the frequency of s in D , then $g_c(x, D)$ tends to 0 as $n_s \rightarrow n$.

PROOF: Take $\gamma_c = g_c(x, D)$ and $\gamma_d = g_d(x, D \cup \{c\})$. For any c' of type t , let $\rho_t = \rho_{c'}^{\{0, x\}}$. We claim that

$$1 + \gamma_c = \left((1 + \rho_s)^{n - n_s} / \prod_{t \neq s} (1 + \rho_t)^{n_t} \right)^{\frac{-x}{n(n+1)}}. \quad (8)$$

First note that, since, for each $t \in \mathbf{T}_D$, D contains $n_t > 0$ cases of type t , we have

$$B(x, D) = \left(\prod_{t \in \mathbf{T}_D} (1 + \rho_t)^{n_t} \right)^{\frac{-x}{n}} = \left(\prod_{t \neq s} (1 + \rho_t)^{n_t} \cdot (1 + \rho_s)^{n_s} \right)^{\frac{-x}{n}}$$

Then a substitution for $B(x, D)$ in the expression for $1 + \gamma_c$ of proposition 1 followed by a straightforward manipulation of exponents yields eq. (8).

Let θ denote the main ratio (inside the brackets) of eq. (8). For convergence of γ_c to 0 note that $n_s \rightarrow n$ implies that, for every $t \neq s$, $n_t \rightarrow 0$. Thus both the numerator and the denominator of θ tend to one and $\gamma_c \rightarrow 0$.

For monotonicity, since d also belongs to s , we extend [eq. \(8\)](#) to obtain

$$1 + \gamma_d = \left((1 + \rho_s)^{(n+1)-(n_s+1)} / \prod_{t \neq s} (1 + \rho_t)^{n_t} \right)^{\frac{-x}{(n+1)(n+2)}}. \quad (9)$$

Note that the exponent of the main numerator in [eq. \(9\)](#) simplifies to $n - n_s$. Thus, the main ratio in [eq. \(9\)](#) is also equal to θ . In both [eq. \(8\)](#) and [eq. \(9\)](#), the exponent involving x is negative, so that, via the connection with θ ,

$$\gamma_c < 0 \quad \text{iff} \quad \theta > 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad \gamma_d < 0. \quad (10)$$

Combining [eq. \(8\)](#) and [eq. \(9\)](#), substituting θ and simplifying the exponent:

$$\frac{1 + \gamma_d}{1 + \gamma_c} = \theta^{2x \cdot \frac{n+1}{k}}, \quad (11)$$

where $k = n(n+1)^2(n+2)$. Since the exponent here is positive, we arrive at

$$\frac{1 + \gamma_d}{1 + \gamma_c} < 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad \theta < 1. \quad (12)$$

Via [eq. \(10\)](#), there are two cases to consider. The most obvious is $\gamma_d, \gamma_c > 0$, for then $\theta < 1$ and $\gamma_d < \gamma_c$ follows from [eq. \(12\)](#). The remaining case is $\gamma_c, \gamma_d < 0$ so that, via [eq. \(10\)](#), $\theta > 1$. Then, since $1 + \gamma_d = 1 - |\gamma_d|$ (and, mutatis mutandis, the same is true of γ_c), via [eq. \(12\)](#), we arrive at

$$\frac{1 - |\gamma_d|}{1 - |\gamma_c|} > 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad \theta > 1.$$

A simple rearrangement then yields the desired inequality.

Q.E.D.

In terms of market efficiency, implies that, if we assume that, more often than not, the future resembles the past in the sense that past cases with a higher frequency are more likely to continue to arrive more frequently, [corollary 1.2](#) means that the most likely cases are crowded out by the volume other cases of the same type. When the pricing kernel is stable, the only way an active strategy can exploit the information in past cases is to more accurately predict the type of the case. But, since the marginal return to the most frequent cases is diminishing, this will be an uphill struggle.

Yet [corollary 1.2](#) goes further. It tells us that there is value in diversity, value to the information discovery process, for novel case types are more rewarding. This explains why

financial institutions spend vast resources on research. When the price kernel is stable, the largest price movements come out of “left field”. This frequentist idea of market efficiency allows research and active strategies to co-exist with passive buy-and-hold. Most of the time buy-and-hold is likely to be better, but if one can also discover the nature of less frequent, novel cases prior to their arrival, one can improve by actively researching the novel case generation process. In this way, an active imagination and hard work can help an entrepreneurial market maker to go beyond prudence. (And also beyond the formal scope of this paper.)

With unstable pricing kernels, the story is very different, whilst the yield accumulation process $A = \{A_D^{(x,y)} : x, y \in X, D \in \mathbf{D}\}$ is well-defined, since the groupoid property fails to hold, the pricing kernel is not. Whilst it is mathematically possible to derive equivalent statements to [proposition 1](#) and [corollary 1.2](#) for A , it is meaningless in the presence of the resulting arbitrage opportunities that are present and likely to cause instability to A . Instead, the value of A is that we can study out-of-equilibrium market activity in the absence of a well-defined pricing kernel (in the sense of [corollary 1.1](#)). To our knowledge, this feature is absent in the literature.

[Malkiel \(2003, p.60\)](#) points out that “Markets can be efficient even if many market participants are quite irrational.” Here, we can show that markets can be efficient, in the sense that the pricing kernel is stable (and thus acting as if it were guided by a prudent market maker), even if no agent is prudent. Given the above discussion, this possibility should be clear when the data is rich. But what if the data fails to be 4-diverse?

Throughout the following, we suppose that [C2DIVERSITY](#) holds. For in its absence, uniqueness and existence are not guaranteed.

Recall that in our derivation above, we only assumed the market’s accumulation and bond price were available conditional on the current set D^* . Suppose the analyst is able to extend the market accumulation process and condition on any finite sample and, moreover, is able to identify an arbitrage-free bond price $b : X \times \mathbf{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. (Below we provide a rudimentary algorithm for this generalization.) Then our results say that the market bond price induces a rankings map $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ that satisfies [4STABILITY](#). Prudent pricing emerges from market activity even in the absence of prudent agents.

This inductive notion of market efficiency differs from the more Bayesian and forward-looking definitions of [Fama \(1970\)](#) and [Malkiel \(2003\)](#). It is not a form of weak efficiency,

for we may define cases to include more than historical data on prices. We may include features such as firm size or price-earnings data or indeed any of the many other factors that are extensively discussed in the literature (Fama and French, 2015, Harvey and Liu, 2021, Gu et al., 2020).

In our view, the fact that, in market settings, stable pricing can arise even in the absence of both rich data (IV-DIVERSITY) and prudent agents is a tribute to the power of markets: it is an instance of Adam Smith’s invisible hand at its best. While the threat of arbitrage may supplant the imagination and provide an alternative form of external validation, stability also provides a way to identify or “memorize” past cases. This is a more operational, non-behavioural form of efficiency.

Structural breaks and second-order induction. Of course some new types of cases might for good reason require a re-evaluation of past ones. Such cases lead to the formation of a new rankings map $\preceq_{\mathbf{D}}$. We would expect such cases to be less common than other forms of novel case since they represent structural breaks or regime changes. Agents that are sufficiently imaginative or privately informed about such cases may be able to profit from the associated upheaval once they arrive. But novel cases that are “independent” of past cases (in the sense that they do not cause a re-evaluation) should not generate arbitrage opportunities. This is the essence of stability.

Algorithm for identifying the pricing kernel from past cases Under stable pricing, cases combine in a modular way, markets assimilate the information in new types of cases without re-pricing the information of old case. This is the role of the nonrevision property of generalizations (see definition 1). Price movements reflect the marginal information of new cases.

We now describe a classification method for deciding the nature of a new case and the implications for market maker(s) who themselves act as analysts. Consider the arrival of j new cases c_1, \dots, c_j . Under stable pricing, the analyst takes new price movements to reflect the market view on the information value of new cases. That is, for each $i = 1, \dots, j$, the analyst estimates the markup associated with case c_i to be $\hat{\mu}^{\{x,y\}} = b(x, D^* \cup \{c_i\}) - b(x, D^*)$. This is reasonable provided she already has used the history of prices to estimate $b : X \times \mathbf{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Moreover suppose that, for each $i = 1, \dots, k-1$, there exists $d \in D^*$ such that for every $x, y \in X$, $\hat{\mu}_{c_i}^{\{x,y\}} = \mu_d^{\{x,y\}}$. She concludes that each of the cases c_1, \dots, c_{k-1} is a “copy” of some past case type. Then $D^* \cup \{c_1, \dots, c_{k-1}\}$ belongs to \mathbf{D} and the analyst’s

market model is unchanged: all that has changed is the location of the current sample D^* in \mathbf{D} .

Case c_k is different. The analyst finds that price movements are such that, for every $d \in D^*$ (and hence every case in \mathbf{C}), $\hat{\mu}_{c_k}^{\{\cdot, \cdot\}} \neq \mu_d^{\{\cdot, \cdot\}}$. This reveals c_k to be a new type of case. The analyst then generalizes her model of the market to let $\hat{\mathbf{C}}$ and $\hat{\mathbf{D}}$ to respectively be the new sets of all cases and finite resamplings that she can generate from $\hat{\mathbf{D}} = D^* \cup \{c_k\}$. Assuming no-arbitrage/prudent pricing, there no need for her to update $\mu_d^{\{\cdot, \cdot\}}$ for $d \in D^*$. That is, the new market pricing function $\hat{b} : X \times \hat{\mathbf{D}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfies $\hat{b}(\cdot, D) = b(\cdot, D)$ for every $D \in \mathbf{D}$. It is in this sense that markets deliver efficiency via prudent pricing.

Now consider two possibilities for c_{k+1}, \dots, c_j . The first is that the price movements associated with all of these cases are similar to cases in $\hat{\mathbf{D}}$. That is, for each $i = k+1, \dots, j$, there exists $d \in \hat{\mathbf{D}}$ such that $\hat{\mu}_{c_i}^{\{\cdot, \cdot\}} = \mu_d^{\{\cdot, \cdot\}}$. This is what we would expect if new case types arrive infrequently. It would represent a consolidation of her updated model \hat{b} and $\preceq_{\hat{\mathbf{D}}}$.

The second possibility is where many of the cases c_k, \dots, c_j turn out to be novel. If new case types do indeed arrive infrequently, then it is likely to reflect a re-evaluation of cases in D^* and a structural break from the past. In this scenario, it may well be worth checking to see if a re-evaluation or even re-specification of past cases reduces the number of case types: thus generating a more parsimonious model.

5. DISCUSSION OF THE AXIOMS AND ??

We begin by restating the existence part of the main theorem of GS03.

THEOREM—GS03, existence: *Let there be given X , \mathbf{C} and $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$, as above, such that the richness condition holds. Then (i) and (ii) are equivalent.*

(i) **A0–A3** and IV-DIVERSITY hold for $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$.

(ii) *There exists a matrix $\mathbf{v} : X \times \mathbf{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfying (a) and (b):*

(a) \mathbf{v} is a representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ that respects case equivalence;

(b) *For every four distinct elements $x, y, z, w \in X$ and every $\lambda, \mu, \theta \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $\lambda + \mu + \theta = 1$, $\mathbf{v}(x, \cdot) \not\leq \lambda \mathbf{v}(y, \cdot) + \mu \mathbf{v}(z, \cdot) + \theta \mathbf{v}(w, \cdot)$. For $\#X < 4$, no row is dominated by an affine combination of other rows.*

Although diversity axioms play an important technical role, they are not obviously behavioral. Instead, diversity axioms impose restrictions on what is beyond the learner's con-

1 trol and on what is central to inductive inference: experience. We contend that D^* may 1
 2 not be so rich as to support $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ satisfying IV-DIVERSITY. That is to say, there may exist 2
 3 $Y \subseteq X$ such that $\#Y = 4$, and such that the data is insufficiently rich to support all $4! = 24$ 3
 4 strict rankings. 4

5 It is natural to ask whether 4STABILITY is simply requiring that, on Y such that $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ 5
 6 fails to satisfy IV-DIVERSITY, there exists a testworthy Y -generalization that is novel and 6
 7 satisfies IV-DIVERSITY. This is not the case. When the basic axioms hold, IV-DIVERSITY 7
 8 implies that the current ranking map features a centered arrangement of hyperplanes (for 8
 9 every $Y \subseteq X$ of cardinality four). In contrast, the axioms of theorem 1 do not even imply 9
 10 the existence of a centered generalization. (See for instance fig. C.1 of appendix E.) It is 10
 11 well-known in the literature on hyperplane arrangements that numerous complexities arise 11
 12 when the arrangement is uncentered. 12

13 A casual comparison of condition (1.b) and (b) confirms that the present framework ac- 13
 14 commodates the less experienced or equivalently those settings where the data is not rich. 14
 15 By doing so, we have identified an important role for the imagination and in particular, a 15
 16 prudent imagination. Our results show how inexperienced learners that are prudent can sur- 16
 17 vive the initial phase before going on to become experienced learners in their own right. We 17
 18 have established that there is more than one kind of stable learner. That is to say, whereas 18
 19 experienced (IV-DIVERSITY) learners are stable, so are those that prudently appeal to ex- 19
 20 ternal validation: either via their imagination or via leave-one-type-out cross validation. 20

21 We have shown that, even in the absence of prudent learners, provided the market struc- 21
 22 ture allows agents to exploit arbitrage opportunities, market pricing is prudent. By this we 22
 23 mean that it is as if a prudent market maker were guiding the price formation process. This 23
 24 novel form of efficiency is grounded in inductive inference. Moreover, it implies a modular 24
 25 nature to the way information is built into market prices. It implies stability in the value of 25
 26 information in past cases. 26

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APPENDIX A. THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1

25 Similar to GS03, we translate the model into one where databases are represented by 25

26 vectors, the dimensions of which are case types. To allow us to focus on aspects of the 26

27 present model, proceed directly to rational vectors and present the axioms and a corre- 27

28 sponding theorem (theorem 2) which, as we confirm, holds if, and only if, theorem 1 does. 28

29 The proof of theorem 2 can be found in appendix B. 29

30 *Case types as dimensions.* From our definition of case types in section 2, $\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{C}_{/\sim\star}$ and 30

31 $\mathbf{T}^f \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{T} \cup [f]$. Let \mathbf{T} be a free variable in $\{\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{T}^f\}$. When no possible confusion should arise, 31

32 we use f as shorthand for $[f]$. It is straightforward to show that the following construction 32

would work if instead we were to work with any partition \mathbf{T} of \mathbf{C} that is at least as fine as \mathbf{T} . The present construction is the one with the lowest feasible number $\#\mathbf{T}$ of dimensions.

Translation to counting vectors. Let \mathbb{Z}_+ denote the set of nonnegative integers and \mathbb{Z}_{++} those that are (strictly) positive. Let $\mathbf{L} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_+^{\mathbf{T}}$ denote the set of counting vectors $L : \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_+$ such that $\{t : L(t) \neq 0\}$ is finite and let \mathbf{L}^f denote the corresponding subset of $\mathbb{Z}_+^{\mathbf{T}^f}$. Then let

$$\mathbb{L} = \begin{cases} \mathbf{L} & \text{if, and only if, } \mathbf{T} = \mathbf{T}, \text{ and} \\ \mathbf{L}^f & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Modulo notation, the following construction is identical to GS03. For every $D \in \mathbf{D}$, let $L_D : \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_+$ denote the function $t \mapsto L_D(t) = \#(D \cap t)$. For each $D \in \mathbf{D}$, let $\leq_{L_D} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \leq_D$. We need to establish that $\leq_{\mathbf{L}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \leq_L : L \in \mathbf{L} \rangle$ is well-defined. For every $L \in \mathbf{L}$, the richness assumption (on \mathbf{T}^f) guarantees the existence of $D \in \mathbf{D}$ such that $L_D = L$. By definition, \sim^* is such that, for every $C, D \in \mathbf{D}$, $C \sim^* D$ if, and only if, $L_C = L_D$. Straightforward mathematical induction on the cardinality of C shows that $C \sim^* D$ implies $\leq_C = \leq_D$. This construction of $\leq_{\mathbf{L}}$ ensures that the same notion of equivalence that we introduced in [observation 2](#) also applies here. Thus, $\leq_{\mathbf{L}} \equiv \leq_{\mathbf{D}}$.

Translation to rational vectors. Similarly, let \mathbb{Q}_+ denote the nonnegative rationals and \mathbb{Q}_{++} those that are (strictly) positive. Take $\mathbf{J} \subseteq \mathbb{Q}_+^{\mathbf{T}}$ to be the set of rational vectors with $\{t \in \mathbf{T} : J(t) \neq 0\}$ finite and take \mathbf{J}^f to denote the corresponding subset of $\mathbb{Q}_+^{\mathbf{T}^f}$. For each $J \in \mathbf{J}$, by virtue of the fact that \mathbb{Z}_{++} is well-ordered and J has finite support, there exists (unique) minimal $k_J \in \mathbb{Z}_{++}$ such that $L_J \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} k_J J$ belongs to \mathbf{L} . Let $\leq_J \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \leq_{L_J}$. (This definition acquires meaning below once we translate and apply the combination axiom.) In this way, $\leq_{\mathbf{J}} = \langle \leq_J : J \in \mathbf{J} \rangle$ is well-defined, and we may introduce axioms for $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ directly: i.e. without first introducing axioms for $\leq_{\mathbf{L}}$. We first demonstrate that $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ and $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ are equivalent. First note that, for every $I, J \in \mathbf{J}$ such that $L_I = L_J$, $\leq_I = \leq_J$. Then, let $L' = L_J$ and take any D such that $L_D = L'$. Then $\leq_J = \leq_D$. The reverse embedding follows by virtue of the fact that $\mathbf{L} \subset \mathbf{J}$. Thus, $\leq_{\mathbf{J}} \equiv \leq_{\mathbf{D}}$.

Construction of generalizations of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$. We follow common practice by letting 2^X denote the collection of nonempty subsets $Y \subseteq X$. For each $Y \in 2^X$, we will denote the set of regular, novel and testworthy Y -generalizations (of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ or $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$) by $\text{reg}(Y, \cdot)$, $\text{nov}(Y, \cdot)$ and $\text{test}(Y, \cdot)$ respectively. Recalling that every Y -generalization is either regular or novel, let

$\text{gen}(Y, \cdot)$ denote the set of all Y -generalizations. We now clarify what it means to be a generalization of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$.

For each $t \in \mathbb{T}$, we take $\delta_t : \mathbb{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ to be the function satisfying $\delta_t(s) = 1$ if $s = t$ and $\delta_t(s) = 0$ otherwise. (When \mathbb{T} is finite, these are simply the basis vectors for $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{T}}$.) When we wish to emphasise that the vectors belong to in $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{T}^{\mathbf{f}}}$, then, for each $\mathbb{T}^{\mathbf{f}}$, we will write $\delta_t^{\mathbf{f}}$.

Let

$$\mathbb{J} = \begin{cases} \mathbf{J} & \text{if, and only if, } \mathbb{T} = \mathbf{T}, \text{ and} \\ \mathbf{J}^{\mathbf{f}} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For every $I \in \mathbf{J}$ and $J \in \mathbb{J}$, we write $I \equiv J$ whenever $I = J$ or $J = I \times 0$. (In the latter case, $J(t) = I(t)$ for every $t \in \mathbf{T}$ and $J(\mathbf{f}) = 0$.) This notion reflects the fact that, for the purposes of the present model, such I and J are equivalent.

DEFINITION 2: $\mathcal{R} = \langle \mathcal{R}_J : J \in \mathbb{J} \rangle$ is a *generalization* or a *Y -generalization* of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ if, and only if, for some nonempty $Y \subseteq X$ both the following hold

1. for every $J \in \mathbb{J}$, $\mathcal{R}_J \in \text{rel}(Y)$, $\mathcal{I}_J \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{R}_J \cap \mathcal{R}_J^{-1}$ and $\mathcal{P}_J \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{R}_J - \mathcal{R}_J^{-1}$;
2. for every $J \in \mathbf{J}$ and $L \in \mathbb{J}$ such that $J \equiv L$, $\mathcal{R}_L = \leq_J \cap (Y^2)$.

A generalization $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbb{J}}$ (of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$) is *proper* if $\mathbb{J} = \mathbf{J}^{\mathbf{f}}$ and *improper* otherwise. A proper generalization is either *regular* or *novel*. \mathcal{R} is *novel* if, for every $s \in \mathbf{T}$, there exists I in \mathbf{J} such that, for $J = I \times 0$ (in $\mathbf{J}^{\mathbf{f}}$), we have $\mathcal{R}_{J+\delta_s^{\mathbf{f}}} \neq \mathcal{R}_{J+\delta_{\mathbf{f}}^{\mathbf{f}}}$.

For every regular Y -generalization \mathcal{R} of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ such that $Y = X$, [observation 2](#) implies $\mathcal{R} \equiv \leq_{\mathbf{D}}$. And, via $\leq_{\mathbf{J}} \equiv \leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ and transitivity of equivalence, we conclude that \mathcal{R} is equivalent to $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$. Two sets of generalizations are isomorphic if there exists a canonical isomorphism between equivalent generalizations.

LEMMA 1.1—proof on [page 46](#): For every $Y \in 2^X$, $\text{reg}(Y, \leq_{\mathbf{J}})$ is isomorphic to $\text{reg}(Y, \leq_{\mathbf{D}})$ and $\text{nov}(Y, \leq_{\mathbf{J}})$ is isomorphic to $\text{nov}(Y, \leq_{\mathbf{D}})$.

Axioms and theorem. We restate the axioms for Y -generalizations \mathcal{R} of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$.

A0^b For every $J \in \mathbb{J}$, \mathcal{R}_J is transitive on Y .

A1^b For every $J \in \mathbb{J}$, \mathcal{R}_J complete on Y .

A2^b For every $I, J \in \mathbb{J}$, every $x, y \in Y$ and every $\lambda, \mu \in \mathbb{Q}_{++}$, if $x \mathcal{R}_I y$ and $x \mathcal{R}_J y$, then $x \mathcal{R}_{\lambda I + \mu J} y$; moreover, if $x \mathcal{P}_I y$ and $x \mathcal{R}_J y$, then $x \mathcal{P}_{\lambda I + \mu J} y$.

A3^b For every $I, J \in \mathbb{J}$ and every $x, y \in Y$ if $x \mathcal{P}_J y$, then there exists $0 < \lambda < 1$ such that,
for every $\mu \in \mathbb{Q} \cap (\lambda, 1)$, $x \mathcal{P}_{(1-\mu)I + \mu J} y$.

For $k = 2, 3, 4$, k -diversity is defined for generalizations of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ in exactly the same way.
We continue to use the term k -diversity in this setting. The following are C2DIVERSITY
and P3DIVERSITY respectively.

CONDITIONAL-2-DIVERSITY^b AXIOM: For every three distinct elements $x, y, z \in Y$,
one of the two subsets $\{J' : x <_{J'} y\}$ and $\{J' : y <_{J'} x\}$ of \mathbf{J} contains both I and J such
that $z <_I x$ and $x <_J z$. If $\#Y = 2$, then II-diversity holds on Y .

PARTIAL-3-DIVERSITY^b AXIOM: For every $Y' \subseteq Y$ with cardinality $n = 2$ or 3 , every
 Y' -generalization \mathcal{R} of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ is such that $\#\text{total}(\mathcal{R}) \geq n$.

A proper generalization \mathcal{R} of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ is *testworthy* if it satisfies A1^b–A3^b and, for some $J \in \mathbf{J}$
such that $\mathcal{R}_{J \times 0}$ is total, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{f}} = \mathcal{R}_{J \times 0}^{-1}$. Thus, for each $Y \in 2^X$, $\text{test}(Y, \leq_{\mathbf{D}}) \simeq \text{test}(Y, \leq_{\mathbf{J}})$.
For any pair of generalizations \mathcal{R} and $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ is a perturbation of \mathcal{R} if $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{f}} = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathbf{f}}$. Moreover,
 $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ is a diverse perturbation if $\#\text{total}(\hat{\mathcal{R}}) \leq \#\text{total}(\mathcal{R})$.

IV-S^b For every $Y \subseteq X$ of cardinality 3 or 4, every testworthy Y -generalization of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ that
is novel has a diverse perturbation that satisfies A0^b–A3^b.

The following result corresponds to claim 2 of GS03. Its proof is a consequence of
mathematical induction and the combination axiom.

LEMMA 1.2: If $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{J}}$ satisfies A2, then for every $J \in \mathbf{J}$ and every rational number $q > 0$,
we have $\mathcal{R}_{qJ} = \mathcal{R}_J$.

The fact that $\leq_{\mathbf{J}} \equiv \leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ immediately implies that $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ satisfies A0^b, A1^b and if, and only
if, the corresponding axiom holds for $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$. In general, we have the following result, which
then also yields the equivalence for the stability axiom.

LEMMA 1.3—proof on page 46: For $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{J}} \equiv \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathbf{D}}$, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{J}}$ satisfies A2^b–A3^b if, and only if,
 $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathbf{D}}$ satisfies A2–A3.

The matrix $\mathbf{v} : X \times \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a *representation* of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ whenever it satisfies

$$\begin{cases} \text{for every } x, y \in X \text{ and every } J \in \mathbf{J}, \\ x \leq_J y \quad \text{if, and only if,} \quad \sum_{t \in \mathbf{T}} \mathbf{v}(x, t) J(t) \leq \sum_{t \in \mathbf{T}} \mathbf{v}(y, t) J(t). \end{cases} \quad (\text{b})$$

We observe that, via the definition of case types, there exists a representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{D}}$ that respects case equivalence if, and only if there exists a representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$. The above translation and results imply that [theorem 1](#) is equivalent to

THEOREM 2: *Let there be given X , \mathbf{T}^f , $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ and associated generalizations, as above. Then (2.i) and (2.ii) are equivalent.*

(2.i) P3D^b and STABILITY^b hold for $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ on X .

(2.ii) *There exists a matrix $\mathbf{v} : X \times \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that satisfies both :*

(2.a) \mathbf{v} is a representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$; and

(2.b) *no row of \mathbf{v} is dominated by any other row, and, for every three distinct elements $x, y, z \in X$, $\mathbf{v}(x, \cdot) - \mathbf{v}(z, \cdot)$ and $\mathbf{v}(y, \cdot) - \mathbf{v}(z, \cdot)$ are noncollinear (i.e. linearly independent).*

Moreover, mutatis mutandis, \mathbf{v} is unique in the sense of [theorem 1](#) part II.

APPENDIX B. THE PROOF OF [THEOREM 2](#)

In [step B.2](#) we show that [A1^b](#)– hold if, and only if, $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ has a conditionally 2-diverse pairwise representation. In [step B.3](#), we show that, when $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ satisfies [A0^b](#)–, a necessary and sufficient condition for a *** is [??](#). In [step B.4](#), via (mathematical) induction, we show that conditionally 2-diverse Jacobi representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ (on all of X , regardless of cardinality). The fact that [A0^b](#) is necessary for a Jacobi representation follows from GS03. As a consequence, [A0^b](#)– and [??](#) are necessary and sufficient for a conditionally 2-diverse Jacobi representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$.

STEP B.1—characterisation of [A1^b](#)–[A3^b](#), II-diversity and novel generalizations: For any pair of vectors $\acute{v}, J : \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $J \in \mathbb{J}$, the linear operator

$$J \mapsto \langle \acute{v}, J \rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{\{t: J(t) > 0\}} v(t) \cdot J(t).$$

is well-defined and real-valued by virtue of the fact that J has finite support.

In our proof, we build on GS03 to directly prove all results regardless of the cardinality of X and \mathbf{T} . To facilitate this approach, we first introduce the notion of an essentialization.

Let $\mathbb{R}^{\oplus \mathbf{T}}$ denote the vectors in $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbf{T}}$ that have finite support and observe that $\mathbb{J} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{\oplus \mathbf{T}}$ is the dense subset of rational vectors. Given a vector $\acute{v} : \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we associate the following

subsets of $\mathbb{R}^{\oplus \mathbb{T}}$: $\dot{H} = \{J : \langle \dot{v}, J \rangle = 0\}$, $\dot{G} = \{J : \langle \dot{v}, J \rangle > 0\}$, and $\dot{F} = \{J : \langle \dot{v}, J \rangle \geq 0\}$. For any finite collection $\dot{\mathcal{V}} = \{\dot{v}_1, \dots, \dot{v}_n\}$ of such vectors, let $\dot{\mathcal{H}}$ denote the associated collection or *arrangement* of hyperplanes in $\mathbb{R}^{\oplus \mathbb{T}}$. let $\dot{S} = \text{span } \dot{\mathcal{V}}$ denote the \dot{r} -dimensional linear span of $\dot{\mathcal{V}}$. Then \dot{S} is a well-defined inner-product space in its own right and let $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle_{\dot{S}} : \dot{S}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ denote the inner product. Let $\dot{p} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} p_{\dot{S}} : \mathbb{R}^{\oplus \mathbb{T}} \rightarrow \dot{S}$ denote the orthogonal projection. Then observe that, for every $i = 1, \dots, n$, and $J \in \mathbb{R}^{\oplus \mathbb{T}}$, $\langle \dot{v}_i, J \rangle = \langle \dot{v}_i, \dot{p}(J) \rangle$. Moreover, note that, since $\dot{v}_i \in \dot{S}$, $\langle \dot{v}_i, J \rangle = \langle \dot{v}_i, \dot{p}(J) \rangle_{\dot{S}}$. The *essentialization* $\mathcal{H}_{\dot{S}}$ of the arrangement $\dot{\mathcal{H}}$ is the arrangement we obtain by orthogonally projecting $\dot{\mathcal{H}}$ onto \dot{S} . That is, for every $H_{\dot{S}} \in \mathcal{H}_{\dot{S}}$, there exists $\dot{H} \in \dot{\mathcal{H}}$ such that $\dot{H} = \dot{p}^{-1}(H_{\dot{S}})$. In the literature on arrangements of hyperplanes, it is common to work with the essentialization of an arrangement by default. We therefore identify $\dot{\mathcal{H}}$ and $\mathcal{H}_{\dot{S}}$ and suppress reference to the latter subscript whenever no possible confusion may arise. The main benefit of essentializations is that they will allow us to work in finite dimensions whenever we consider a finite subset $Y \subseteq X$: regardless of the cardinality of \mathbb{T} .

Our domain of interest is $\mathbb{R}_+^{\oplus \mathbb{T}}$ and not the whole of $\mathbb{R}^{\oplus \mathbb{T}}$. In order to be able to apply results from the literature on hyperplane arrangements without adjusting for boundaries, we find it useful to work within the relative interior \dot{S}_{++} of $\dot{S}_+ = \dot{p}(\mathbb{R}_+^{\oplus \mathbb{T}})$. Observe \dot{S}_{++} is an open subset of the \dot{r} -dimensional linear space \dot{S} . For $\dot{H} \in \mathcal{H}$, take $\dot{H}_{++} = \dot{H} \cap \dot{S}_{++}$ to be the (strictly) *positive* null-space of $\langle \dot{v}, \cdot \rangle_{\dot{S}}$ and, for $0 \not\leq \dot{v} \not\leq 0$, \dot{G}_{++} and \dot{F}_{++} are, respectively, the open and closed half-spaces of \dot{S}_{++} associated with \dot{v} . (For such \dot{v} , we also refer to \dot{H}_{++} as a hyperplane in \dot{S}_{++} .) We refer to the non-negative counterpart of these sets as \dot{H}_+ , \dot{G}_+ and \dot{F}_+ . For any finite $Y \in 2^X$ consider the matrix $\dot{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : Y^2 \times \mathbb{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. For a given $x, y \in Y$ and row $\dot{v}^{(x, y)} : \mathbb{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ of $\dot{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$, the associated sets are $\dot{H}_{++}^{(x, y)}$, $\dot{G}_{++}^{(x, y)}$ and $\dot{F}_{++}^{(x, y)}$ respectively.

The present proof relies heavily on the mathematics of hyperplane arrangements and in particular Zaslavsky's theorem. We provide a brief introduction and exposition of this literature in [appendix E](#). The standard references for this literature are [Orlik and Terao \(1992\)](#), [Stanley \(2007\)](#), [Dimca \(2017\)](#). The following proposition corresponds to lemma 1 of GS03 and gives meaning to the statement “the arrangement generated by a generalization”.

LEMMA 2.1: For every $Y \in 2^X$, [A1^b–A3^b](#) and Π -diversity hold for the Y -generalization $\dot{\mathcal{R}}$ if, and only if, there exists $\dot{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : Y^2 \times \mathbb{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that,

(i) for every distinct $x, y \in Y$ and $J \in \mathbb{J}$, $x \dot{\mathcal{R}}_J y$ if, and only if, $\langle \dot{v}^{(x, y)}, J \rangle > 0$; and

(ii) for every $x, y \in Y$, there exists $s, t \in \mathbf{T}$ such that $\dot{v}^{(x,y)}(s) < 0 < \dot{v}^{(x,y)}(t)$.
 Moreover, $\dot{v}^{(x,y)}$ is unique upto multiplication by a positive scalar, $v^{(y,x)} = -v^{(x,y)}$. Finally,
 $\dot{\mathcal{R}}$ is novel if, and only if, for every $t \neq \mathbf{f}$, $\dot{v}^{(\cdot,\cdot)}(t) \neq \dot{v}^{(\cdot,\cdot)}(\mathbf{f})$.

See proof on page 47. We refer to a matrix $\dot{v}^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ that satisfies condition (ii) of lemma 2.1 as a 2-diverse matrix. We refer to a matrix $\dot{v}^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ that satisfies lemma 2.1 as a 2-diverse pairwise (matrix) representation of \mathcal{R} .

STEP B.2—characterisations of : A matrix $v^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ that satisfies the conditions of the next lemma is a conditionally-2-diverse (pairwise) representation.

LEMMA 2.2—proof on page 48: Let \mathcal{R} be a Y -generalization of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ with 2-diverse matrix representation $v^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$. Then holds on Y if, and only if, for every three distinct elements $x, y, z \in Y$, $v^{(x,z)}$ and $v^{(y,z)}$ are noncollinear.

PROPOSITION 2—proof on page 48: Let \mathcal{R} be a Y -generalization \mathcal{R} satisfying $\mathbf{A0}^b$ – $\mathbf{A3}^b$. Then holds for \mathcal{R} if, and only if does. Moreover, $\#\text{total}(\mathcal{R}) \geq 4$.

STEP B.3—a characterisation of 4STABILITY: The following Jacobi identity plays a central role in the proof of GS03.

DEFINITION: For $Y \in 2^X$, the matrix $v^{(\cdot,\cdot)} : Y^2 \times \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfies the Jacobi identity whenever, for every $x, y, z \in Y$, $v^{(x,z)} = v^{(x,y)} + v^{(y,z)}$.

For any given Y -generalization \mathcal{R} , the Jacobi identity holds for \mathcal{R} whenever it holds for some pairwise representation $v^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ of \mathcal{R} . Moreover, in this case, $v^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ is a Jacobi representation. Finally, if the Y -generalization \mathcal{R} is improper and the Jacobi identity holds for \mathcal{R} , we simply say that the Jacobi identity holds on Y . Consider

k -JAC: For every $Y \subseteq X$ with $3 \leq \#Y \leq k$, the Jacobi identity holds on Y .

THEOREM 3: For $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ satisfying $\mathbf{A0}^b$ –, 4STABILITY holds if, and only if, IV-Jac holds.

STEP B.4—the induction argument: The present step corresponds to lemma 3 and claim 9 of GS03. There the authors establish that, when IV-DIVERSITY holds, 3-Jac is a necessary

and sufficient condition for the (global) Jacobi identity to hold on X . GS03 relies on the fact that IV-DIVERSITY implies linear independence of $\{v^{(x,y)}, v^{(y,z)}, v^{(z,w)}\}$ for every four distinct elements $x, y, z, w \in X$. In the present setting, where C2DIVERSITY only implies linear independence of pairs $\{v^{(x,y)}, v^{(y,z)}\}$, the Jacobi identity requires IV-Jac.

LEMMA 3.1—proof on page 49: Let $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ have a conditionally-2-diverse representation $u^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$. Then IV-Jac holds if, and only if, $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ has a Jacobi representation $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$. Moreover, for every Jacobi representation $\mathbf{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ there exists $\lambda > 0$ satisfying $\mathbf{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)} = \lambda v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$.

STEP B.5—the concluding arguments in the proof of theorem 2: Let $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ be a (conditionally 2-diverse) Jacobi representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ and define $\mathbf{v} : X \times \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ as follows. Fix arbitrary $w \in X$, and let $\mathbf{v}(w, \cdot) = 0$. Then, for every $x \in X$, let $\mathbf{v}(x, \cdot) = v^{(w, x)}$. Since $v^{(w, x)} = -v^{(x, w)}$ and $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ satisfies the Jacobi identity, for every $x, y \in X$, we have $v^{(x, y)} = -\mathbf{v}(x, \cdot) + \mathbf{v}(y, \cdot)$. To see that (2.a) holds note that, for every $J \in \mathbf{J}$, we have $x \leq_J y$, if, and only if, $0 \leq \langle v^{(x, y)}, J \rangle$, if, and only if, $\langle v(x, \cdot), J \rangle \leq \langle \mathbf{v}(y, \cdot), J \rangle$.

For (2.b), since $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ is a conditionally 2-diverse pairwise representation, for every distinct $x, y \in X$ we have $0 \not\leq v^{(x, y)}$ if, and only if, $\mathbf{v}(x, \cdot) \not\leq \mathbf{v}(y, \cdot)$. Finally, for every $z \in X$, we have, for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$, $v^{(z, x)} \neq \lambda v^{(z, y)}$ if, and only if, $v(x, \cdot) \neq (1 - \lambda)\mathbf{v}(z, \cdot) + \lambda\mathbf{v}(y, \cdot)$.

Theorem 1 part II, on uniqueness, follows from lemma 3.1 and, without modification, part 3 of the proof of theorem 2 of GS03 (see page 23).

APPENDIX C. RESTATEMENT AND PROOF OF THEOREM 3

THEOREM 3: For $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ satisfying A0^b–, 4STABILITY holds if, and only if, the Jacobi identity holds (for some pairwise representation of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$).

Via lemma 3.1, it suffices to show that 4STABILITY is equivalent to IV-Jac. Throughout the present section, take $Y \subseteq X$ to be of cardinality 3 or 4 and take \mathcal{R} to be the improper Y -generalization of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$. Since A1^b– hold, the pairwise representation $u^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : Y^2 \times \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ of \mathcal{R} is conditionally 2-diverse. Lemma 2.2 implies that $u^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ has row rank $\mathbf{r} \geq 2$.

PROPOSITION 3: For every ranking $R \in \text{total}(\mathcal{R})$, there exists a (testworthy) generalization $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ with $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathbf{f}} = R^{-1}$. Moreover, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ has a central arrangement with rank $\hat{\mathbf{r}} = \mathbf{r}$. Finally, IV-Jac holds for $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ if, and only if, it holds for \mathcal{R} .

PROOF: Let $J \in \mathbf{J}$ such that \mathcal{R}_J is total. Since Y is finite, so is the dimension of S_{++} .
 Take $L \in S_{++}$ such that $\mathcal{R}_L = \mathcal{R}_J$ and, for some rational $0 < \iota < 1$, let $\hat{J} = (1 - \iota)J \times \iota$.
 Now, for every x, y in Y , let

$$\dot{\eta}^{(x,y)} := -\frac{1 - \iota}{\iota} \langle u^{(x,y)}, J \rangle,$$

and let $\dot{u}^{(x,y)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} u^{(x,y)} \times \dot{\eta}^{(x,y)}$, so that $\langle \dot{u}^{(x,y)}, \hat{J} \rangle = 0$. Let $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ be the associated Y -generalization, so that by construction $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathfrak{f}} = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_J^{-1}$. Since $\hat{J} \in \dot{H}_{++}^{\{x,y\}}$ for every distinct $x, y \in Y$, $\hat{\mathcal{H}}_{++}$ is central. This construction together with linearity of the inner product ensures that the Jacobi equations (25)–(27) hold for $u^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ if, and only if, they hold for $\dot{\eta}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ and hence $\dot{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$. Indeed, $\mathbf{r} = \dot{\mathbf{r}}$ holds for the same reasons. Q.E.D.

STEP C.1—The case where 4STABILITY holds vacuously on Y : When every testworthy Y -generalization is regular, 4STABILITY holds vacuously on Y . Via the following lemma, IV-DIVERSITY holds and theorem 2 of GS03 applies, so that IV-Jac holds on Y .

LEMMA 3.1: *If every testworthy Y -generalization of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ is regular, then $|\mathbf{T}| = \infty$ and IV-DIVERSITY holds on Y .*

PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1: Via proposition 3, the set of testworthy Y -generalizations is nonempty. Let $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ be a testworthy Y -generalization, so that for some J in \mathbf{J} that $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathfrak{f}} = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{J \times 0}^{-1}$ is total. Let $P \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \hat{\mathcal{P}}_{\mathfrak{f}}$ so that $P \subsetneq Y^2$. Via A0^b–, lemma 2.1 applies, let $\hat{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ be the matrix representation of $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ and let \hat{v}^P denote the restriction of $\hat{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ to $P \times \mathbf{T}^{\mathfrak{f}}$.

CLAIM 3.1.1: *For every vector $\eta^P = \langle \eta^{(x,y)} \in \mathbb{R}_{++} : (x, y) \in P \rangle$, there exist $s, t \in \mathbf{T}$ such that $\hat{v}^P(s) = \eta^P$ and $\hat{v}^P(t) = -\eta^P$.*

PROOF OF CLAIM 3.1.1: By way of contradiction, suppose there exists $\dot{\eta}^P \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^P$ such that, for every s in \mathbf{T} , $\hat{v}^P(s) \neq \dot{\eta}^P$. That is $\dot{\eta}^P$ such that, for every s in \mathbf{T} , there exists (x, y) in P such that $\hat{v}^{(x,y)}(s) \neq \dot{\eta}^{(x,y)}$. Now define $\dot{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : X^2 \times \mathbf{T}^{\mathfrak{f}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. For each (x, y) in P , let

$$\dot{v}^{(x,y)}(s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \dot{\eta}^{(x,y)} & \text{if } s = \mathfrak{f}, \\ \hat{v}^{(x,y)}(s) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For every (x, y) in P^{-1} , take $\dot{v}^{(x,y)} = -\dot{v}^{(y,x)}$. For every remaining (x, y) in Y^2 , $x = y$, so let $\dot{v}^{(x,y)} = 0$. By construction, for every s in \mathbf{T} , $\dot{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}(s) \neq \dot{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}(\mathfrak{f})$. This allows us to

appeal to [lemma 2.1](#) and take $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ to be the associated novel generalization. Moreover, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ is testworthy by virtue of $\hat{\eta}^P \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^P$, so that $\hat{\mathcal{P}}_{\mathfrak{f}} = P$ and $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathfrak{f}} = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathfrak{f}} = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{J \times 0}^{-1}$.

Finally, for the existence of $t \in \mathbf{T}$ such that $\hat{v}^P(t) = -\eta^P$, observe that Π -diversity suffices for the existence of $L \in \mathbf{J}$ such that $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{L \times 0} = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{J \times 0}^{-1}$. *Q.E.D.*

[Claim 3.1.1](#) implies that, when every testworthy Y -generalization is regular, the cardinality of \mathbf{T} is equal to the cardinality of \mathbb{R}^P . We now show that IV-DIVERSITY holds on Y . Let R denote an arbitrary total ordering of Y . We show that, for some K in \mathbf{J} , $\langle \hat{v}^{(x,y)}, K \rangle \geq 0$ if, and only if, (x, y) belongs to R . [Claim 3.1.1](#) ensures that we can choose s in \mathbf{T} such that, for some $0 < \epsilon < 1$

$$\hat{v}^{(x,y)}(s) = \begin{cases} 1 + \epsilon & \text{if } (x, y) \text{ in } R \cap P, \\ 1 - \epsilon & \text{if } (x, y) \text{ in } R^{-1} \cap P. \end{cases}$$

Via [claim 3.1.1](#), take t in \mathbf{T} such that, for every (x, y) in P , $\hat{v}^{(x,y)}(t) = -1$. Let $K := \delta_s + \delta_t$ in $\mathbf{J}^{\mathfrak{f}}$, so that $\langle \hat{v}^{(x,y)}, K \rangle = \hat{v}^{(x,y)}(s) + \hat{v}^{(x,y)}(t)$. By evaluating terms and observing that $\epsilon > 0$ we obtain

$$\langle \hat{v}^{(x,y)}, K \rangle = \begin{cases} (1 + \epsilon) - 1 > 0 & \text{if } (x, y) \text{ in } R \cap P, \\ (1 - \epsilon) - 1 < 0 & \text{if } (x, y) \text{ in } R^{-1} \cap P. \end{cases}$$

Since (x, y) in $R^{-1} \cap P^{-1}$ if, and only if, (y, x) in $R \cap P$ (and, similarly, (x, y) in $R \cap P^{-1}$ if, and only if (y, x) in $R^{-1} \cap P$), we appeal to $\hat{v}^{(x,y)} = -\hat{v}^{(y,x)}$ and obtain

$$\langle \hat{v}^{(x,y)}, K \rangle = \begin{cases} -(1 + \epsilon) + 1 < 0 & \text{if } (x, y) \text{ in } R^{-1} \cap P^{-1}, \\ -(1 - \epsilon) + 1 > 0 & \text{if } (x, y) \text{ in } R \cap P^{-1}. \end{cases}$$

Since P is the asymmetric part of a total ordering we conclude that, for every $x \neq y$, $\langle \hat{v}^{(x,y)}, K \rangle$ has the right sign. Finally, for $x = y$, $\langle \hat{v}^{(x,y)}, K \rangle = 0$. *Q.E.D.*

STEP C.2—The case where Y has cardinality 3:

LEMMA 3.2: *If $Y = \{x, y, z\}$ and $\mathbf{r} = 2$, then IV-Jac and [4STABILITY](#) hold on Y .*

PROOF OF LEMMA 3.2: Fix arbitrary $J \in \mathbf{J}$ such that \mathcal{R}_J is total. We first apply Zaslavski's theorem to prove that the Y -generalization $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ of [proposition 3](#) (which, recall, is testworthy relative to J) satisfies $|\hat{\mathcal{G}}_{++}| = 6$.

Via [proposition 3](#) the arrangement \mathcal{H}_{++} is central. Thus $\mathcal{H}_{++} \equiv \mathcal{H}$ and we may drop reference to the subscript $++$. Via [lemma 2.2](#), $\#\mathcal{H} = 3$. Moreover, since every subarrangement of \mathcal{H} is central, for every $k = 0, 1, 2, 3$ there are $\binom{3}{k}$ ways to choose $|\mathcal{A}| = k$ hyperplanes from \mathcal{H} . For $k < 3$, the rank of every subarrangement is k . For $k = 3$, the rank of the arrangement is \acute{r} . Via [proposition 3](#) $\acute{r} = \mathbf{r} = 2$. Thus

$$|\mathcal{G}| = \binom{3}{3}(-1)^{3-\acute{r}} + \binom{3}{2}(-1)^{2-2} + \binom{3}{1}(-1)^{1-1} + \binom{3}{0}(-1)^{0-0} = 6. \quad (13)$$

For both IV-Jac and [4STABILITY](#), we require that every member of \mathcal{G} is associated with a total ordering. III-Jac then holds because we have the conditions ([A0^b](#)-[A3^b](#) and [III-DIVERSITY](#)) to apply lemma 2 of GS03. [4STABILITY](#) then holds since, for every testworthy $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ that is novel and satisfies $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathfrak{f}} = \mathcal{R}_J^{-1}$ and [A1^b](#)-[A3^b](#), $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ is a diverse perturbation of $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ that satisfies [A0^b](#)-[A3^b](#).

It remains for us to show that every member of \mathcal{G} is associated with a total ranking of Y . In particular, since every associated ranking is CAR (see [appendix E](#)) it suffices to prove transitivity. For this, note that, via [2](#) four of the six members of \mathcal{G} intersect $S_{++} \times 0$ and are therefore associated with transitive rankings. Note that, since S_{++} is connected, the remaining two members are adjacent (separated by a single member of the arrangement). Take G to be one of the remaining members of \mathcal{G} and take $L \in G$. Define the affine path $\lambda \mapsto \phi(\lambda) = (1 - \lambda)\acute{L} + \lambda\acute{J}$, where \acute{J} belongs to the center $H^{\{x,y,z\}}$ of \mathcal{H} . For λ sufficiently close but greater than one, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_L = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\phi(\lambda)}^{-1}$ because $\phi(1) = \acute{J}$ belongs to the center. Thus, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_L$ is transitive. *Q.E.D.*

LEMMA 3.3: *If $Y = \{x, y, z\}$ and $\mathbf{r} = 3$, then neither [4STABILITY](#) nor IV-Jac hold.*

PROOF OF LEMMA 3.3: When $\mathbf{r} = 3$, $u^{(x,y)}$, $u^{(y,z)}$ and $u^{(x,z)}$ are linearly independent, so that III-Jac fails to hold. We now confirm that III-stability also fails to hold. Via [proposition 3](#), $\acute{r} = \mathbf{r}$. We now apply [eq. \(13\)](#) with $\mathbf{r} = 3$:

$$|\mathcal{G}| = (-1)^0 + 3(-1)^0 + 3(-1)^0 + (-1)^0 = 8.$$

Then there are $3! = 6$ members of $\text{total}(\hat{\mathcal{R}})$, and the two additional regions of \mathcal{G} are associated with intransitive CAR rankings. It remains for us to show that every Y -generalization $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ with $\#\text{total}(\hat{\mathcal{R}}) = 6$ fails to satisfy [A0^b](#).

Recall [fig. 2b](#). If $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ are the sentiments corresponding to this arrangement, then $|\hat{\mathcal{G}}| = 7$. This value is achieved by dropping the first term in [eq. \(13\)](#). That is, since $\hat{A}^{\{x,y,z\}}$ is the only member of $\hat{\mathcal{L}} - \hat{\mathcal{L}}_{++}$. We may reduce $|\hat{\mathcal{G}}|$ further by excluding one of the intersections of two hyperplanes such as $\hat{H}^{\{x,y\}} \cap \hat{H}^{\{y,z\}}$. That is $\hat{A}^{\{x,y\},\{y,z\}}$. In terms of [eq. \(13\)](#), this amounts to excluding one of the $\binom{3}{2} = 3$ central subarrangements. This would reduce $|\hat{\mathcal{G}}_{++}|$ to 6. To obtain $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ satisfying [A0^b](#), we would need to remove all $\binom{3}{2}$ central subarrangements of two hyperplanes. But this would reduce $|\hat{\mathcal{G}}_{++}|$ to 4. *Q.E.D.*

STEP C.3—The case where Y has cardinality 4: Note that a failure of III-Jac on $Z \subset Y$ such that $|Z| = 3$ implies a failure of IV-Jac on Y . And since the arguments for the case where $|Y| = 3$ account for the case where III-Jac fails, we henceforth assume that III-Jac holds on Y . That is, our conditionally 2-diverse representation $u^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ will now satisfy equations (25)–(27) with $\hat{\beta} = \beta$ if, and only if, IV-Jac holds on Y .

First some useful results that exploit III-Jac.

PROPOSITION 4: *If $Y = \{x, y, z, w\}$ and III-Jac holds for $u^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$, then, for every $\hat{v}^{(\cdot,\cdot)} = u^{(\cdot,\cdot)} \times \hat{\eta}^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ with rank \hat{r} , that satisfies III-Jac, $2 \leq \hat{r} \leq 3$.*

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Via [proposition 2](#) and [lemma 3.2](#), $r \geq 2$. Indeed the span of $\{u^{(x,w)}, u^{(y,w)}\}$ is two. Let S denote the span of $\{u^{(x,w)}, u^{(y,w)}, u^{(z,w)}\}$. Since $u^{(y,w)} = -u^{(w,y)}$ and $u^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ satisfies III-Jac, equations (25)–(27) hold for $u^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$. (If IV-Jac fails to hold, then $\beta \neq \hat{\beta}$, but the equations still hold.) Thus $u^{(x,y)}$, $u^{(y,z)}$ and $u^{(x,z)}$ all belong to S and $r \leq 3$. Now note that above argument does not depend on the cardinality of \mathbf{T} , thus take $\hat{\eta}^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ to satisfy III-Jac: indeed with the same parameters that feature in equations (25)–(27) for $u^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$. The preceding argument then generalizes *mutatis mutandis* to $\hat{v}^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ and $2 \leq \hat{r} \leq 3$. *Q.E.D.*

PROPOSITION 5: *If $Y = \{x, y, z, w\}$, then $4 \leq |\mathcal{H}| \leq 6$ and these bounds are tight. If, moreover, III-Jac holds for $u^{(\cdot,\cdot)}$ and $|\mathcal{H}| < 6$, then $r = 2$.*

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: The upper bound $|\mathcal{H}| \leq 6$ follows because there are $\binom{4}{2} = 6$ ways to choose distinct pairs of elements from Y . Via [lemma 2.2](#) at most the following equalities are feasible: $H^{\{x,y\}} = H^{\{z,w\}}$, $H^{\{x,z\}} = H^{\{y,w\}}$ and $H^{\{y,z\}} = H^{\{x,w\}}$. *Ad absurdum* suppose all three equalities hold, so that $|\mathcal{H}| = 3$. Via II-diversity, all six hyperplanes

partition S_{++} , so w.l.o.g. suppose that $R = (x, y, z, w)$ and its inverse R^{-1} both feature in \mathcal{R} . Consider a convex path in S_{++} from G^R to $G^{R^{-1}}$. Since $H^{\{x,y\}} = H^{\{z,w\}}$, it follows that both support G^R . Thus, for $R' = (y, x, z, w)$, $G^{R'}$ is adjacent to G^R . Continuing along the convex path we find that $H^{\{x,z\}}$ supports $G^{R'}$. But then $H^{\{x,z\}} = H^{\{y,w\}}$ yields a contradiction of [A0^b](#).

We now prove that III-Jac and $H^{\{x,y\}} = H^{\{z,w\}}$ together imply $\mathbf{r} = 2$. Consider equations (25)–(27) (so III-Jac holds, but IV-Jac need not). Via (25), $S = \{u^{(x,w)}, u^{(y,w)}, u^{(x,y)}\}$ is 2-dimensional. Since $u^{(x,y)}$ and $u^{(z,w)}$ are collinear, $u^{(z,w)}$ belongs to S . Finally, equations (26) and (27) yield $u^{yz}, u^{(x,z)} \in S$. Q.E.D.

LEMMA 3.4: *If $Y = \{x, y, z, w\}$, $\mathbf{r} = 3$ and III-Jac holds on Y , then [4STABILITY](#) and IV-Jac both hold on Y .*

PROOF OF LEMMA 3.4: To see that IV-Jac holds, appeal to the proof of lemma 3 of GS03: if III-Jac holds and IV-Jac does not, then $\{u^{(x,w)}, u^{(y,w)}, u^{(z,w)}\}$ is linearly dependent. This is in contradiction of $\mathbf{r} = 3$.

We now verify that [4STABILITY](#) also holds. Since $\mathbf{r} = 3$, the contrapositive of [proposition 5](#) implies that $|\mathcal{H}_{++}| = 6$. Via [proposition 3](#), there exists a testworthy Y -generalization $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ with an arrangement $\hat{\mathcal{H}}_{++}$ that is central and rank $\hat{\mathbf{r}} = \mathbf{r}$. Since $\hat{\mathcal{L}}_{++} = \hat{\mathcal{L}}$, we drop reference to $_{++}$. The rank of subarrangements with cardinality 4 or more is $\hat{\mathbf{r}}$. Let $\acute{\tau}$ denote the number of subarrangements \mathcal{A} that have cardinality 3 and rank 2. Each of the other $\binom{6}{3} - \acute{\tau}$ subarrangements with cardinality 3 have rank $\hat{\mathbf{r}}$. All other subarrangements have rank equal to their cardinality.

$$\begin{aligned}
 |\mathcal{G}| &= \binom{6}{6}(-1)^{6-\hat{\mathbf{r}}} + \binom{6}{5}(-1)^{5-\hat{\mathbf{r}}} + \binom{6}{4}(-1)^{4-\hat{\mathbf{r}}} \\
 &\quad + \binom{6}{3}(-1)^{3-\hat{\mathbf{r}}} - \acute{\tau}(-1)^{3-\hat{\mathbf{r}}} + \acute{\tau}(-1)^{3-2} \\
 &\quad + \binom{6}{2}(-1)^{2-2} + \binom{6}{1}(-1)^{1-1} + \binom{6}{0}(-1)^{0-0}
 \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

We claim that $\acute{\tau} = 4$. Each of the $\binom{4}{3} = 4$ subsets of Y that have cardinality 3 generates a subarrangement of cardinality $\binom{3}{2} = 3$. (For instance, $\mathcal{A}^{\{x,y,z\}} = \{\hat{H}^{\{x,y\}}, \hat{H}^{\{y,z\}}, \hat{H}^{\{x,z\}}\}$.) For such subarrangements, IV-Jac implies a rank of 2. Arguments from the final step in the

proof of [proposition 5](#) confirm that every other subarrangement with cardinality 3 has rank 3. [Equation \(14\)](#) then implies

$$|\mathcal{G}| = -1 + 6 - 15 + 20 - 4 - 4 + 15 + 6 + 1 = 24 = 4!.$$

The fact that $\check{\mathcal{R}}$ satisfies [A0^b](#) is an immediate consequence of IV-Jac. [4STABILITY](#) then follows, for, if $\check{\mathcal{R}}$ is any novel, testworthy generalization that satisfies $\check{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathfrak{f}} = \mathcal{R}_J^{-1}$, then $\check{\mathcal{R}}$ is a diverse perturbation of $\check{\mathcal{R}}$ that satisfies [A0^b-A3^b](#). *Q.E.D.*

In the remaining case, where $Y = \{x, y, z, w\}$ and $\mathbf{r} = 2$, the proof is complicated by the fact that maximally-diverse generalizations have centerless arrangements. We begin by choosing $\check{\eta}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ so as to construct $\check{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)} = u^{(\cdot, \cdot)} \times \check{\eta}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ with $\mathbf{r} = 3$.

Since $\mathbf{r} = 2$, it follows that $u^{(x,z)}, u^{(y,z)}$ and $u^{(w,z)}$ form a linearly dependent set. Thus, for some $\pi, \rho \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$\pi u^{(x,z)} + \rho u^{(y,z)} = u^{(w,z)}. \quad (15)$$

Fix arbitrary $J \in \mathbf{J}$ such that \mathcal{R}_J is total, and, as in [proposition 3](#), w.l.o.g., we take $J \in G_{++}^{(x,y,z,w)}$. Then, for $\iota = \frac{1}{2}$ and $\check{J} = (1 - \iota)J \times \iota$, let

$$\check{\eta}^{(i,j)} = -\frac{1-\iota}{\iota} \langle u^{(i,j)}, J \rangle = -\langle u^{(i,j)}, \check{J} \rangle, \quad \text{for every } i, j \in \{x, y, z\}. \quad (16)$$

In the case where $\#Y = 3$, [eq. \(16\)](#) implies that the associated arrangement of hyperplanes $\check{\mathcal{H}}_{++}$ is central. That is, recalling [example 6](#), the associated positive intersection semilattice $\check{\mathcal{L}}_{++}$ is isomorphic to $\check{\mathcal{L}}$. The structure of $\check{\mathcal{L}}_{++}$ is determined by the rank \mathbf{r} of $\check{\mathcal{U}} = \{\check{u}^{(x,y)}, \check{u}^{(x,z)}, \check{u}^{(y,z)}\}$. Via [lemma 2.2](#), the rank of $\check{\mathcal{U}}$ satisfies $2 \leq \mathbf{r} \leq 3$.

IV-Jac holds for the associated generalisation $\check{\mathcal{R}}$ if, and only if, $\mathbf{r} = 2$. Observe that, by construction, $\check{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ satisfies the Jacobi identity if, and only if,

such that $\check{\mathcal{G}}$ is maximal. This is because e Let $f : G_{++}^{(x,y,z,w)} \rightarrow \check{G}_{++}^{(x,y,z,w)}$ be the mapping $L \rightarrow (1 - \lambda)L \times \lambda$, where λ is the solution to $\check{\eta}^{(y,z)} = -\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda} \langle u^{(y,z)}, L \rangle$. In particular, substituting for $\check{\eta}^{(y,z)}$ using [eq. \(16\)](#), we obtain $\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda} = \frac{\langle u^{(y,z)}, J \rangle}{\langle u^{(y,z)}, L \rangle}$ and $\lambda = \frac{\langle u^{(y,z)}, L \rangle}{\langle u^{(y,z)}, J \rangle + \langle u^{(y,z)}, L \rangle}$.

Since $J, L \in G^{(y,z)}$, all terms in the expression for λ are positive, so that $0 < \lambda < 1$ and, via convexity of $\check{G}_{++}^{(x,y,z,w)}$, f is well-defined. As the quotient of continuous functions of L (with the denominator $\langle u^{(y,z)}, J \rangle + \langle u^{(y,z)}, L \rangle$ bounded away from zero) f is continuous.

Finally, $\lim_{L \rightarrow J} f(L) = \check{J}$.

Via $\langle u^{(y,z)}, J \rangle \neq \langle u^{(z,w)}, J \rangle$ and both numbers are positive. Via $u^{(w,z)} = -u^{(z,w)}$, it follows that $\zeta = \frac{\langle u^{(w,z)}, J \rangle}{\langle u^{(y,z)}, J \rangle} < 0$ is the unique solution to

$$\langle \zeta u^{(y,z)} - u^{(w,z)}, J \rangle = 0.$$

Continuity of the map $L \mapsto \frac{\langle u^{(w,z)}, L \rangle}{\langle u^{(y,z)}, L \rangle}$ on $G_{++}^{(x,y,z,w)}$ and the fact that the latter set is open suffices for the existence of a sequence $(L_n : n = 1, 2, \dots)$, converging to J , such that, for every n , $L_n \mapsto \xi_n = \frac{\langle u^{(w,z)}, L_n \rangle}{\langle u^{(y,z)}, L_n \rangle}$ satisfies $\xi_n \neq \zeta$.

Next, take $(\epsilon_n : n = 1, 2, \dots)$ be the following non-zero real-valued sequence that converges to zero as $L_n \rightarrow J$:

$$\epsilon_n := \langle \xi_n u^{(y,z)} - u^{(w,z)}, J \rangle = \langle u^{(w,z)}, \frac{1-\lambda_n'}{\lambda_n} L_n - J \rangle, \quad (17)$$

where $\frac{1-\lambda_n'}{\lambda_n} = \frac{\langle u^{(y,z)}, J \rangle}{\langle u^{(y,z)}, L_n \rangle}$ is defined as in the definition of f above.

For every $(i, j) \in \{y, z, w\}^2 - \{(y, z), (z, y)\}$, let $\dot{\eta}^{(i,j)} = -\frac{1-\lambda'}{\lambda} \langle u^{(i,j)}, L \rangle$. For $(i, j) \in \{x, y, z, w\}^2 - \{(x, w), (w, x)\}$, let $\dot{u}^{(i,j)} := u^{(i,j)} \times \dot{\eta}^{(i,j)}$. To complete the definition of $\dot{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$, we appeal to the fact that, via III-Jac, $u^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ satisfies equations (25)–(27). In particular, from these equations, take parameters α , β , and γ and let $\dot{\eta}^{(x,w)}$ be the (unique) solution to the Jacobi identity

$$\alpha \dot{\eta}^{(x,w)} = \gamma \dot{\eta}^{(x,y)} + \beta \dot{\eta}^{(y,w)} = -\langle \gamma u^{(x,y)}, J \rangle - \frac{1-\lambda'}{\lambda} \langle \beta u^{(y,w)}, L \rangle. \quad (18)$$

For these parameter values, $\dot{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ also satisfies (25)–(27) of the proof of lemma 3.1. That is, for $\{x, y, z\}$, via eq. (16) and (27), $\gamma \dot{\eta}^{(x,y)} + \tau \dot{\eta}^{(y,z)} = \phi \dot{\eta}^{(x,z)}$, so that $\dot{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ satisfies (27). For $\{y, z, w\}$, Via ?? and (26), $\hat{\beta} \dot{\eta}^{(y,w)} + \sigma \dot{\eta}^{(w,z)} = \tau \dot{\eta}^{(y,z)}$, so that $\dot{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ satisfies (26). For $\{x, y, w\}$, via eq. (18), $\dot{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ satisfies (25).

Now note that, for every $L \neq J$,

$$\pi \dot{\eta}^{(x,z)} + \rho \dot{\eta}^{(y,z)} = \dot{\eta}^{(w,z)} + \epsilon \neq \dot{\eta}^{(w,z)}. \quad (19)$$

Then, via (19), for every $\epsilon \neq 0$, $\{\dot{u}^{(x,y)}, \dot{u}^{(y,z)}, \dot{u}^{(w,z)}\}$ forms a linearly independent set.

We now demonstrate that for the final triple $\{x, z, w\}$, the Jacobi identity holds if $\hat{\beta} = \beta$, and $\{\dot{u}^{(x,w)}, \dot{u}^{(w,z)}, \dot{u}^{(x,z)}\}$ has rank 3 otherwise.

First extract the parameters from equations (25)–(27) to obtain the matrix form

$$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccccc} (x, w) & (y, w) & (x, y) & (w, z) & (y, z) & (x, z) \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc|ccc} \alpha & -\beta & -\gamma & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \hat{\beta} & 0 & \sigma & -\tau & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \gamma & 0 & \tau & -\phi \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} (25) \\ (26) \\ (27) \end{array} \end{array} \quad (20)$$

Since the triple $\{\dot{u}^{(i,z)} : i = x, y, w\}$ provides a basis for $\text{span}(\dot{u}^{(\cdot,\cdot)})$, we will write all vectors in terms of this basis. To this end, we derive the reduced row echelon form of eq. (20). In particular, letting r_i denote the rows of the matrix, we perform the operation $r_1 \mapsto r_1 + \frac{\beta}{\hat{\beta}}r_2 + r_3$ to obtain

$$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccccc} (x, w) & (y, w) & (x, y) & (w, z) & (y, z) & (x, z) \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc|ccc} \alpha & 0 & 0 & \frac{\beta}{\hat{\beta}}\sigma & (1 - \frac{\beta}{\hat{\beta}})\tau & -\phi \\ 0 & \hat{\beta} & 0 & \sigma & -\tau & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \gamma & 0 & \tau & -\phi \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} (25) \\ (26) \\ (27) \end{array} \end{array} \cdot \quad (21)$$

In eq. (21), the fact that $\hat{\beta}$ (instead of β) that appears as a pivot in column 2, is a consequence of the fact that, in this derivation, we are choosing $\dot{v}^{(y,w)} = \hat{\beta}\dot{u}^{(y,w)}$. The other (relevant) rows of $\dot{v}^{(\cdot,\cdot)} : Y^2 \times \mathbf{T}^f \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ are $\dot{v}^{(x,w)} = \alpha\dot{u}^{(x,w)}$, $\dot{v}^{(x,y)} = \gamma\dot{u}^{(x,y)}$, $\dot{v}^{(z,w)} = \sigma\dot{u}^{(z,w)}$, $\dot{v}^{(y,z)} = \tau\dot{u}^{(y,z)}$ and $\dot{v}^{(x,z)} = \phi\dot{u}^{(x,z)}$. The matrix of the equation that now follows, is invertible if, and only if, $(1 - \frac{\beta}{\hat{\beta}}) \neq 0$.

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{v}^{(x,w)} \\ \dot{v}^{(x,z)} \\ \dot{v}^{(z,w)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{\beta}{\hat{\beta}} & -(1 - \frac{\beta}{\hat{\beta}}) & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \dot{v}^{(w,z)} \\ \dot{v}^{(y,z)} \\ \dot{v}^{(x,z)} \end{bmatrix} \quad (22)$$

Thus, unless $\hat{\beta} = \beta$, we conclude that $\{\dot{v}^{(x,w)}, \dot{v}^{(x,z)}, \dot{v}^{(z,w)}\}$ has the same rank as $\{\dot{v}^{(w,z)}, \dot{v}^{(y,z)}, \dot{v}^{(x,z)}\}$ which, by construction, has rank 3 for every choice of $\epsilon \neq 0$.

Since $\hat{\beta} = \beta$ if, and only if, IV-Jac holds for \mathcal{R} , we conclude that IV-Jac holds for \mathcal{R} if, and only if, it holds for $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$. It remains for us to show that, for ϵ sufficiently small $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$ is




FIGURE C.1.— The intersection semilattices $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{++} = \tilde{\mathcal{L}} - \{A^Y, \hat{A}^{\{x,z\}\{y,w\}}\}$ when $\#\mathbf{T} = 2$, $\hat{\beta} = \beta$ and ϵ is sufficiently small but distinct from zero.

maximal. For if $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$ is maximal, then via lemma 3.2 and lemma 3.3, $A0^b$ holds if, and only if, $\text{rank}\{\hat{v}^{(x,w)}, \hat{v}^{(x,z)}, \hat{v}^{(z,w)}\} = 2$.

By Zaslavski's theorem, it suffices to show that every member of the intersection lattice $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$, other than the center $\hat{A}^{\{x,y,z,w\}}$, has nonempty intersection with $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}^f}$. We now make explicit the dependence of the generalization $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ on our choice of $L \in N_J$, though we do so indirectly via ϵ . Let $d^\epsilon = \max\{d(\hat{J}, \hat{A}) : \hat{A} \in \tilde{\mathcal{L}}^\epsilon\}$, where $d(\hat{J}, \hat{A})$ is the minimum (Euclidean) distance between \hat{J} and the (closed) linear subspace \hat{A} of $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbf{T}^f}$. Note that for $\epsilon = 0$, we obtain a central arrangement of the form of proposition 3 with $d^\epsilon = 0$. Moreover, since the Euclidean metric is continuous in its arguments, and, for every ϵ , $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}^\epsilon$ is finite, the map $\epsilon \mapsto d^\epsilon$ is continuous and $\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} d^\epsilon = 0$. Thus, for sufficiently small $\epsilon \neq 0$, every $\hat{A} \in \tilde{\mathcal{L}}^\epsilon$ intersects $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}^f}$.

REMARK: We note that the above arguments apply without modification to the case where $\#\mathcal{H} = 4, 5$. Consider, for example, the Hasse diagram of fig. C.1. That case arises when $u^{(x,z)}$ and $u^{(y,w)}$ are collinear, so that $A^{\{xz\}\{y,w\}}$ is a hyperplane of dimension $\#\mathbf{T} - 1$. Assuming the same construction, with $\epsilon \neq 0$, so that $\hat{u}^{(\cdot)}$ has rank 3 and, via proposition 5, $\hat{u}^{(x,z)}$ and $\hat{u}^{(y,w)}$ are linearly independent. Thus $\hat{A}^{\{xz\}\{y,w\}}$ is of dimension $\#\mathbf{T}^f - 2 = \#\mathbf{T} - 1$. Thus, $\hat{A}^{\{xz\}\{y,w\}} = A^{\{xz\}\{y,w\}} \times \{0\}$ which belongs to the boundary of $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}^f}$. At $\epsilon = 0$, $\hat{A}^{\{xz\}\{y,w\}}$ increases by one dimension and the upper two levels of the Hasse diagram collapse to equal $A^{\{x,y,z,w\}}$.

APPENDIX D. PROOFS OF LEMMAS, OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSITIONS

PROOF OF LEMMA 1.1: We show that there exists a canonical embedding (a structure preserving injection) of $\text{nov}(Y, \leq_J)$ into $\text{nov}(Y, \leq_D)$. The fact that this map is also surjective follows from the fact that $\text{nov}(Y, \leq_D)$ can be embedded in $\text{nov}(Y, \leq_J)$ in precisely the same way. The proof that the two sets of regular generalizations are isomorphic follows via a similar argument plus the observation that every Y -generalization is either regular or novel.

Take $\mathcal{R} \in \text{nov}(Y, \leq_J)$ and define $\hat{\mathcal{R}} = \langle \hat{\mathcal{R}}_C : C \in \mathbf{D}^f \rangle$ via the property: for each $C \in \mathbf{D}^f$, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_C \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{R}_J$ if, and only if, $L_C = L_J$, where, as before, $t \mapsto L_C(t)$ counts the number of cases of type t in C and $L_J = \kappa_J J \in \mathbf{L}^f$ for some minimal $\kappa_J \in \mathbb{Z}_+$. Now, for any $\mathcal{R}' \neq \mathcal{R}$ in $\text{nov}(Y, \leq_J)$, there exists $J \in \mathbf{J}^f$ such that $\mathcal{R}'_J \neq \mathcal{R}_J$. If we define $\hat{\mathcal{R}}'$ analogously, so that it is equivalent to \mathcal{R}' , then $\hat{\mathcal{R}}' \neq \hat{\mathcal{R}}$. As a consequence, the canonical mapping $\mathcal{R} \mapsto \hat{\mathcal{R}}$ is injective. If we can show that $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ does in fact belong to $\text{nov}(Y, \leq_D)$, then we have constructed the required embedding. The fact that $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ satisfies 2 and 1 of definition 1 follows immediately from definition 2. The proof that item 3 of definition 1 holds is as follows. Take any $c, c' \in \mathbf{C}^f$ and $D \in \mathbf{D}^f$ such that $c \sim^* c'$ and $c, c' \notin D$. First, observe that $D \cup \{c\} \sim^* D \cup \{c'\}$, and moreover, for some $t \in \mathbf{T}^f$ we have $c, c' \in t$. Then, for every $t \in \mathbf{T}^f$, $|D \cup \{c\}| = |D \cup \{c'\}| = L$ for some $L \in \mathbf{L}^f \cap \mathbf{J}^f$. Thus $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{D \cup \{c\}} = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{D \cup \{c'\}}$, as required for $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ to be a generalization of \leq_D . Finally, via definition 2, the definition of a novel generalization ensures that the induced equivalence relation $\sim^{\mathcal{R}}$ on \mathbf{C}^f satisfies $c \not\sim^{\mathcal{R}} c'$ for every $c \in \mathbf{C}$. Since $\sim^{\hat{\mathcal{R}}}$ inherits this property, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ is novel. Q.E.D.

PROOF OF LEMMA 1.3: Fix $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbb{J}} \equiv \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathbb{D}}$ and assume that $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathbb{D}}$ satisfies A2. We show that $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbb{J}}$ satisfies A2^b. Fix $x, y \in Y$ and $J \in \mathbb{J}$ such that $x \mathcal{R}_J y$ and $x \mathcal{R}_{J'} y$. Fix $\lambda, \mu \in \mathbb{Q}_{++}$ and let κ be the smallest positive integer such that both $L \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \kappa \lambda J$ and $L' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \kappa \mu J'$ belong to \mathbb{L} . Then, by lemma 1.2, we have both $x \mathcal{R}_L y$ and $x \mathcal{R}_{L'} y$. Moreover, for D, D' such that $L_D = L$ and $L_{D'} = L'$, we have $x \hat{\mathcal{R}}_D y$ and $x \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{D'} y$ and, by A2, $x \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{D \cup D'} y$. Finally, since $L_D + L_{D'} = \kappa(\lambda J + \mu J')$, one further application of lemma 1.2 yields $x \mathcal{P}_{\lambda J + \mu J'} y$, as required for A2^b.

The proof that “A2 implies A2^b” is *mutatis mutandis* a special case of the above argument and omitted. We now assume $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{\mathbb{D}}$ satisfies A2 and A3 and prove that $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbb{J}}$ satisfies A3^b. Fix $x, y \in X$ such that $x \mathcal{P}_J y$ for some $J \in \mathbb{J}$ and take any $J' \in \mathbb{J}$. Then, by the con-

struction of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbb{J}}$, there exists $L, L' \in \mathbf{L}$ such that $jJ = L$ and $j'J' = L'$ for some $j, j' \in \mathbb{Z}_{++}$. By lemma 1.2, $\mathcal{R}_L = \mathcal{R}_J$ and $\mathcal{R}_{L'} = \mathcal{R}_{J'}$. Moreover, by construction, for some D and D' such that $L_D = L$ and $L_{D'} = L'$, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_D = \mathcal{R}_J$ and $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{D'} = \mathcal{R}_{J'}$. We therefore conclude that $x \hat{\mathcal{P}}_D y$, so that A3 implies the existence of $\kappa \in \mathbb{Z}_{++}$ and $\{D_l : D_l \sim^{\hat{\mathcal{R}}} D\}_1^{\kappa}$ such that $x \hat{\mathcal{P}}_{D_1 \cup \dots \cup D_{\kappa} \cup D'} y$. Then, by the construction of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbb{J}}$, $x \mathcal{P}_{\kappa L_D + L_{D'}} y$. Let $\nu \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{\kappa j + j'}$ and take $\lambda = \nu j'$, so that $0 < \lambda < 1$ and $1 - \lambda = \nu \kappa j$. By virtue of the fact that $\lambda \in \mathbb{Q}$, we have $K \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (1 - \lambda)J + \lambda J' \in \mathbb{J}$. Simplifying, we obtain $K = \nu(\kappa L + L')$. Since $\nu \in \mathbb{Q}_{++}$ and $\kappa L + L' \in \mathbb{J}$, lemma 1.2 implies $\mathcal{R}_K = \mathcal{R}_{\kappa L + L'}$. This allows us to conclude that $x \mathcal{P}_K y$. Take any $\mu \in \mathbb{Q} \cap (0, \lambda)$. From basic properties of the real numbers, there exists $\xi < 1$ such that $\mu = \xi \lambda$ and, moreover, ξ is rational. The definition of K implies $\xi(K - J) = \xi \lambda(J' - J)$. Adding J to each side of the latter and applying the definition of μ yields $(1 - \xi)J + \xi K = (1 - \mu)J + \mu J'$. Then, since $x \mathcal{P}_J y$ and $x \mathcal{P}_K y$, A2^b implies $x \mathcal{P}_{(1-\mu)J + \mu J'} y$, as required for A3^b.

Conversely, we now assume that $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbb{J}}$ satisfies A2^b and A3^b and prove that A3 holds. Take $D, D' \in \mathbf{D}$ such that $x \hat{\mathcal{P}}_D y$ and any other $D' \in \mathbf{D}$. Let $L = L_D$ and $L' = L_{D'}$. Then, by construction, $x \mathcal{P}_L y$ and, by A3^b, there exists $\lambda \in \mathbb{Q} \cap (0, 1)$ such that $x \mathcal{P}_{(1-\mu)L + \mu L'} y$. Then, since μ is rational, $\mu = j/k$ for some $j, k \in \mathbb{Z}_{++}$. Let $q := (1 - \mu)/\mu = (k - j)/j$ and let $\kappa = jq$, so that $\kappa = k - j$. The fact that $0 < \mu < 1$ ensures that $\kappa \in \mathbb{Z}_{++}$. To complete the proof, we show that $x \mathcal{P}_{\kappa L + L'} y$, for then the existence of D_1, \dots, D_{κ} such that $x \hat{\mathcal{P}}_{D_1 \cup \dots \cup D_{\kappa} \cup D'} y$ follows. Together $x \mathcal{P}_{(1-\mu)L + \mu L'} y$ and lemma 1.2 imply $x \mathcal{P}_{qL + L'} y$. Similarly, together $x \mathcal{P}_L y$ and lemma 1.2 imply $x \mathcal{P}_{(j-1)qL} y$. Then, since $(j - 1)qL + (qL + L') = jqL + L'$ and $\kappa = jq$, an application of A2^b yields $x \mathcal{P}_{\kappa L + L'} y$, as required. Q.E.D.

PROOF OF LEMMA 2.1: Let $\mathcal{Y} = \{Y_{\alpha} \subseteq Y : \#Y_{\alpha} = 2\}$ be the collection of distinct (unordered) pairs in Y . For every $Y_{\alpha} \in \mathcal{Y}$, A0 holds simply because Y_{α} is of cardinality two; moreover, on Y_{α} , IV-DIVERSITY is equivalent to II-diversity. This allows us to apply theorem 2 of GS03.¹¹ In particular, GS03 yields a matrix representation $v_{\alpha} : Y_{\alpha} \times \mathbb{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. For $x, y \in Y_{\alpha}$, take $v_{\alpha}^{(x,y)} = -v_{\alpha}(x, \cdot) + v_{\alpha}(y, \cdot)$. For condition (ii), via theorem 2 of GS03, II-

¹¹Gilboa and Schmeidler explicitly prove their theorem 1 holds for the case of arbitrary X and \mathbf{T} . But although their theorem 2 is stated and proved in the first step (the case where $X, \mathbf{T} < \infty$) of the proof of their theorem 1, steps 2 and 3 of that proof apply equally to their theorem 2.

diversity holds for $\dot{\mathcal{R}}$ on Y_α if, and only if, the matrix v_α is *2-diversified*. That is, whenever, for $x \neq y$, and every $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$, $v_\alpha(x) \not\leq \lambda v_\alpha(y)$. Take $\lambda = 1$ and observe that this is equivalent to $v_\alpha^{(x,y)}(s) < 0 < v_\alpha^{(x,y)}(t)$ for some $s, t \in \mathbb{T}$.

To extend this to arbitrary $Y \subseteq X$, note that, for some A' , $\bigcup \{\mathcal{Y}_\alpha : \alpha \in A'\} = Y$. For an arbitrary function f , let $\text{gr } f$ denote the graph of that function. To obtain the desired matrix $\dot{v}(\cdot, \cdot) : Y^2 \times \mathbb{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, take $\text{gr } \dot{v}(\cdot, \cdot) = \bigcup \{\text{gr } v_\alpha^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : \alpha \in A'\}$.

It remains for us to prove the characterisation of novel generalizations. Fix arbitrary $t \neq f$. Then [definition 2](#) implies the existence of $J \in \mathbf{J}$ and $L = J \times 0 \in \mathbf{J}^f$ such that $\dot{\mathcal{R}}_{L+\delta_t} \neq \dot{\mathcal{R}}_{L+\delta_f}$. W.l.o.g., consider the case where, for some $x, y \in Y$, it holds that both $y \dot{\mathcal{R}}_{L+\delta_t} x$ and $x \dot{\mathcal{P}}_{L+\delta_f} y$. Equivalently, $\langle \dot{v}^{(x,y)}, L + \delta_t \rangle \leq 0 < \langle \dot{v}^{(x,y)}, L + \delta_f \rangle$ which, via linearity of $\langle \dot{v}^{(x,y)}, \cdot \rangle$, we may rearrange to obtain

$$\dot{v}^{(x,y)}(t) \leq -\langle \dot{v}^{(x,y)}, L \rangle < \dot{v}^{(x,y)}(f). \quad (23)$$

Thus, $\dot{v}^{(x,y)}(t) \neq v^{(x,y)}(f)$, as required for the lemma. *Q.E.D.*

PROOF OF LEMMA 2.2: Let \mathcal{R} hold for \mathcal{R} on Y . Since $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ is a 2-diverse pairwise representation, $v^{(x,z)}, v^{(y,z)} \not\leq 0$. By , w.l.o.g., take $L, J \in G_+^{(x,z)}$ such that

$$\langle v^{(y,z)}, L \rangle < 0 < \langle v^{(y,z)}, J \rangle.$$

Then, since $\langle v^{(x,z)}, \cdot \rangle$ is positive on $\{L, J\}$, for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$, $v^{(x,z)} \neq \lambda v^{(y,z)}$, as required.

Conversely, let $x, y, z \in Y$ be such that $v^{(x,z)}$ and $v^{(y,z)}$ are noncollinear. Then $H_{++}^{\{x,z\}} \neq H_{++}^{\{y,z\}}$, and there exists $L \in H_{++}^{\{x,z\}} - H_{++}^{\{y,z\}}$. W.l.o.g., therefore, take $L \in H_{++}^{\{x,z\}} \cap G_{++}^{(y,z)}$ so that $L \in S_{++}$. W.l.o.g., take L such that $p_S^{-1}(L)$ is rational-valued and thus in \mathbb{J} . Since $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ is 2-diverse, there exists $s, t \in \mathbb{T}$ such that $v^{(x,z)}(s) < 0 < v^{(x,z)}(t)$. Let ψ_s and ψ_t be the convex paths from L to δ_s and δ_t respectively. For sufficiently small $\lambda \in \mathbb{Q}_{++}$, $\langle v^{(y,z)}, \psi_{s'}(\lambda) \rangle$ remains positive for $s' = s, t$ and, moreover, since $L \in H_{++}^{\{x,z\}}$, as required for , we have $\langle v^{(x,z)}, \psi_s(\lambda) \rangle < 0 < \langle v^{(x,z)}, \psi_t(\lambda) \rangle$. *Q.E.D.*

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: When $X = 2$, and are identical to Π -diversity. Let $Y = \{x, y, z\} \subseteq X$ and let \mathcal{R} denote the improper Y -generalization of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$. We begin by assuming and showing that $\#Y + 1 = 4 \leq \# \text{total}(\mathcal{R})$. Via [lemma 2.2](#), there are three distinct hyperplanes $H_{++}^{\{x,y\}}$, $H_{++}^{\{y,z\}}$ and $H_{++}^{\{x,z\}}$ in the associated arrangement \mathcal{H}_{++} . Then, as in [ex-](#)

ample 6, S_{++} is the unique element of the intersection semilattice \mathcal{L}_{++} that lies below each member of \mathcal{H}_{++} . Thus, via eq. (31), $\mu(S_{++}) = 1$ and $\mu(H) = -\mu(S_{++})$ for all three hyperplanes $H \in \mathcal{H}_{++}$. Thus, via Zaslavski's theorem, $\#\mathcal{G}_{++} = \sum\{\mu(A) : A \in \mathcal{L}_{++}\}$ is bounded below by 4. Via A0^b-A1^b, $\text{total}(\mathcal{R}) \geq 4$ and holds for \mathcal{R} .

Conversely, suppose holds for \mathcal{R} . Via lemma 2.1, there exists a 2-diverse matrix representation with associated arrangement \mathcal{H}_{++} . implies that $|\mathcal{H}_{++}| > 1$. W.l.o.g., suppose $H_{++}^{\{x,y\}} \neq H_{++}^{\{y,z\}}$. A0^b then implies $H_{++}^{\{x,z\}} \neq H_{++}^{\{x,y\}}$ and $H_{++}^{\{x,z\}} \neq H_{++}^{\{y,z\}}$ so that $v^{(x,y)}, v^{(y,z)}$ and $v^{(x,z)}$ are pairwise noncollinear. Lemma 2.2 then yields . *Q.E.D.*

PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1: Note that, when $1 \leq |X| \leq 2$, IV-Jac holds vacuously and \leq_J has a Jacobi representation via lemma 2.1. For general X , the fact that IV-Jac is necessary for \leq_J to have a Jacobi representation follows simply because if the Jacobi identity holds on X , then it holds on every $Y \subseteq X$. For the sufficiency of IV-Jac, we proceed by induction. As in lemma 3 and claim 9 of GS03, we assume that X is well-ordered.

In the case that $|X| \leq 4$, we only need to show that $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ is unique. W.l.o.g., we take the initial step in our induction argument to satisfy $|X| = 4$. Let $\mathbf{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ denote any other Jacobi representation of \leq_J . By lemma 2.1, for every distinct $x, y \in Y^2$, there exists $\lambda^{\{x,y\}} > 0$ such that $\mathbf{v}^{(x,y)} = \lambda^{\{x,y\}} v^{(x,y)}$. We need to show that $\lambda^{\{x,y\}} = \lambda$ for every distinct $x, y \in Y$. Let $Y = \{x, y, z, w\}$. By lemma 2.2, the set $\{v^{(x,y)}, v^{(x,z)}, v^{(x,w)}\}$ is pairwise noncollinear. Then, since the Jacobi identity holds for both $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ and $\mathbf{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$, we derive the equation

$$(1 - \lambda^{\{x,y\}})v^{(x,y)} + (1 - \lambda^{\{y,z\}})v^{(y,z)} = (1 - \lambda^{\{x,z\}})v^{(x,z)} \quad (24)$$

Suppose that $1 - \lambda^{\{y,z\}} = 0$. Then, either the other coefficients in eq. (24) are both equal to zero (and our proof is complete), or we obtain a contradiction of lemma 2.2. Thus, $1 - \lambda^{\{y,z\}}$ is nonzero and we may divide through by this term and solve for $v^{(y,z)}$. First note that, since $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ is a Jacobi representation, $v^{(y,x)} + v^{(x,y)} = v^{(y,y)} = 0$. Then, since $v^{(y,x)} = -v^{(x,y)}$,

$$v^{(y,z)} = \frac{1 - \lambda^{xy}}{1 - \lambda^{yz}} v^{(y,x)} + \frac{1 - \lambda^{xy}}{1 - \lambda^{yz}} v^{(x,z)}.$$

We then conclude that both of the coefficients in the latter equation are equal to one. (This follows from linear independence of $v^{(y,x)}$ and $v^{(x,z)}$ together with the Jacobi identity $v^{(y,z)} = v^{(y,x)} + v^{(x,z)}$.) Thus, $\lambda^{\{x,y\}} = \lambda^{\{y,z\}} = \lambda^{\{x,z\}}$, as required. Repeated application of the same argument to the remaining Jacobi identities yields the desired $\mathbf{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)} = \lambda v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$.

For the inductive step, take Y to be an initial segment of X . By the induction hypothesis, there exists a Jacobi representation $\mathbf{v}^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : Y^2 \times \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ of the improper Y -generalization $\mathcal{R} = \leq_{\mathbf{J}} \cap Y^2$ that is suitably unique.

CLAIM 3.4.1: *For every $w \in X - Y$ and $W \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Y \cup \{w\}$, there exists a Jacobi representation $\hat{\mathbf{v}}^{(\cdot, \cdot)} : W^2 \times \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ of the improper W -generalization $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$.*

PROOF OF CLAIM 3.4.1: Via lemma 2.2, there exists a conditionally 2-diverse pairwise representation $u^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ of $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$. Fix any four distinct elements x, x', y, z in Y . Lemma 2.1 implies the existence of $\phi, \phi' \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ such that $\phi u^{(x, z)} = \mathbf{v}^{(x, z)}$ and $\phi' u^{(x', z)} = \mathbf{v}^{(x', z)}$. Let $Z = \{x, y, z, w\}$ and $Z' = \{x', y, z, w\}$. Since III-Jac holds, there exist positive scalars $\alpha, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \gamma, \sigma$ and τ such that

$$\alpha u^{(x, w)} + \beta u^{(w, y)} = \gamma u^{(x, y)}, \quad (25)$$

$$\hat{\beta} u^{(y, w)} + \sigma u^{(w, z)} = \tau u^{(y, z)}, \text{ and} \quad (26)$$

$$\gamma u^{(x, y)} + \tau u^{(y, z)} = \mathbf{v}^{(x, z)}. \quad (27)$$

Moreover, IV-Jac ensures that we may take $\beta = \hat{\beta}$. Since $u^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ is conditionally 2-diverse, $\{u^{(x, y)}, u^{(y, z)}\}$ is linearly independent, and the linear system eq. (27) in the unknowns γ and τ has a unique solution. This, together with the induction hypothesis (which yields $\mathbf{v}^{(x, y)} + \mathbf{v}^{(y, z)} = \mathbf{v}^{(x, z)}$) implies that $\gamma u^{(x, y)} = \mathbf{v}^{(x, y)}$ and $\tau u^{(y, z)} = \mathbf{v}^{(y, z)}$. Similarly, for Z' , IV-Jac yields $\alpha', \beta', \sigma', \gamma', \tau' > 0$ such that

$$\alpha' u^{(x', w)} + \beta' u^{(w, y)} = \gamma' u^{(x', y)}, \quad (28)$$

$$\beta' u^{(y, w)} + \sigma' u^{(w, z)} = \tau' u^{(y, z)}, \text{ and} \quad (29)$$

$$\gamma' u^{(x', y)} + \tau' u^{(y, z)} = \mathbf{v}^{(x', z)}. \quad (30)$$

As in the arguments involving γ and τ , the induction hypothesis yields $\gamma' u^{(x', y)} = \mathbf{v}^{(x', y)}$ and $\tau' u^{(y, z)} = \mathbf{v}^{(y, z)}$. We conclude that $\tau = \tau'$. Substituting for τ' in eq. (29) and appealing to linear independence of $\{u^{(y, w)}, u^{(w, z)}\}$ then yields the desired equalities $\beta = \beta'$ and $\sigma = \sigma'$.

As a consequence of the above argument, for every $y, z \in Y$, take $\hat{\mathbf{v}}^{(y, w)}$ and $\hat{\mathbf{v}}^{(w, z)}$ to be the unique vectors in $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbf{T}}$ that solve the equation $\hat{\mathbf{v}}^{(y, w)} + \hat{\mathbf{v}}^{(w, z)} = \mathbf{v}^{(y, z)}$. For every $y, z \in Y$,

let $\hat{v}(y,z) = \mathbf{v}(y,z)$ and $\hat{v}(w,w) = 0$. Then the matrix $\hat{v}(\cdot, \cdot)$ with row vectors $\{\hat{v}(x,y) : x, y \in W\}$ is a Jacobi representation of $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$. *Q.E.D.*

Our proof of [claim 3.4.1](#) shows that the generalization to W holds for any initial subsegment of Y consisting of four elements. Our proof thereby accounts for the case where X is infinite and w is a limit ordinal. *Q.E.D.*

APPENDIX E. ONLINE APPENDIX

Appendix E.1. First some observations and ancillary results

OBSERVATION 2: Let \mathcal{R} and $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ respectively be regular and improper Y -generalizations. For every $C \in \mathbf{D}^f$, there exists $D \in \mathbf{D}$ such that $C \sim^{\mathcal{R}} D$ and $\mathcal{R}_C = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_D$.¹²

PROOF: Fix $Y \subseteq X$ nonempty and $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ regular. W.l.o.g., take $C \in \mathbf{D}^f - \mathbf{D}$, so that C contains at least one copy of f . For any $c \in C \cap [f]$, the fact that $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ is regular implies that $c \sim^{\hat{\mathcal{R}}} c_1$ for some $c_1 \in C$. The richness assumption ensures that we may choose c_1 from the complement of C . Then, since neither c nor c_1 belong to $C_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C - \{c\}$, $c \sim^{\hat{\mathcal{R}}} c_1$ implies $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_C = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{C_1 \cup \{c_1\}}$. If c is the unique member of $C \cap [f]$, then the proof is complete. Otherwise, using the fact that C is finite, we may proceed by induction until we obtain a set C_n such that $C_n \cap [f]$ is empty and $D \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C_n \cup \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$ belongs to \mathbf{D} . Part 1 of [definition 1](#) then implies $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_D = \leq_D \cap Y^2$, so that, since \mathcal{R} is improper, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_D = \mathcal{R}_D$. Finally, since $C \sim^{\hat{\mathcal{R}}} D$, $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_C = \hat{\mathcal{R}}_D$, as required. *Q.E.D.*

Appendix E.2. Arrangements of hyperplanes

From the mathematics of hyperplane arrangements, the main result to which we extensively appeal is Zaslavsky's theorem. For any given generalization \mathcal{R} , Zaslavsky's theorem allows us to use information about the intersections of hyperplanes in the arrangement to identify $\#\text{total}(\mathcal{R})$. It does so by counting the collection \mathcal{G}_{++} of open and connected subsets of $\mathbb{R}^T - \bigcup\{H_{++} : H_{++} \in \mathcal{A}\}$ are called the *chambers* or *regions* of the arrangement. In

¹²This means that there is a canonical embedding of $\{C \times \mathcal{R}_C : C \in \mathbf{D}^f\}$ in $\{D \times \hat{\mathcal{R}}_D : D \in \mathbf{D}\}$. The converse embedding follows from the nonrevision condition of [definition 1](#).

the present setting, each chamber corresponds to a complete, antisymmetric and reflexive, but possibly intransitive, *CAR ranking* of the elements of Y . Every CAR ranking R can be succinctly represented as an ordered tuple as in [examples 2 and 3](#). For instance, take $Y = \{x, y, z\}$ and $x R y R z$, then the corresponding tuple

$$l = \begin{cases} (x, y, z) & \text{if } R \text{ is transitive} \\ (x, y, z, x) & \text{if } R \text{ is intransitive.}^{13} \end{cases}$$


The notation generalizes without exception to sets of cardinality 4. For example (x, y, z, x, w) represents the CAR ranking that is intransitive over $\{x, y, z\}$ and such that w dominates every other member.

The intersection semilattice of any arrangement \mathcal{A} is the partially ordered (by reverse inclusion) set \mathcal{L} of intersections of members of \mathcal{A} . The unique minimal element is obtained by taking the intersection A^\emptyset over the empty subarrangement \mathcal{A}^\emptyset of \mathcal{A} to obtain the ambient space itself. That is $A^\emptyset = \mathbb{R}^T$ or \mathbb{R}_{++}^T , depending on whether we are considering the lattice \mathcal{L} or the lattice \mathcal{L}_{++} respectively. In GS03, as a consequence of IV-DIVERSITY, \mathcal{H}_{++} is always central. In our setting, it is only \mathcal{H} that is guaranteed to be central. In general an arrangement is central, if, and only if, its intersection semilattice has a unique maximal element ([Stanley, 2007](#), proposition 2.3). Thus, if \mathcal{H}_{++} is *centerless*, then \mathcal{L}_{++} is a meet semilattice with multiple maxima: as in [example 6](#). Extending our notation: if $Y = \{x, y, z, w\}$, then the unique intersection A^Y is the (nonempty) *center* of $\mathcal{A}^Y = \mathcal{H}$. By $A^{\{x, y, z\}}$, we mean the intersection over $\mathcal{A}^{\{x, y, z\}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{H^{\{i, j\}} : i \neq j \text{ in } \{x, y, z\}\}$. Finally, by $A^{\{x, y\}\{z, w\}}$, we mean the intersection over $\mathcal{A}^{\{x, y\}\{z, w\}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{H^{\{x, y\}}, H^{\{z, w\}}\}$.

Zaslavski's theorem provides two distinct methods for counting the number of regions in an arrangement. The first states that $\#\mathcal{G}$ is equal to the sum of the absolute values of the Möbius function $\mu : \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ which is defined recursively via

$$\mu(A) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } A = A^\emptyset \\ -\sum \{\mu(B) : A \subsetneq B\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (31)$$

The above definition of Zaslavski's theorem is explicitly provided by [Sagan \(1999\)](#). Specialised to the present setting, the more common (see [Orlik and Terao, 1992](#), [Dimca, 2017](#),

FIGURE E.1.— The intersection semilattice $\mathcal{L}_{++} = \mathcal{L} - A^{\{x,y,z\}}$.

Stanley, 2007) “rank” version of Zaslavski’s theorem is

$$\#\mathcal{G} = \sum_{\substack{\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{H} \\ \mathcal{A} \text{ central}}} (-1)^{|\mathcal{A}| - \text{rank}(\mathcal{A})},$$

where *central* means that $\bigcap \{H : H \in \mathcal{A}\}$ is nonempty, and $\text{rank}(\mathcal{A})$ is the dimension of the space spanned by the normals to the hyperplanes in \mathcal{A} .

EXAMPLE 6—a comparison of \mathcal{L} and \mathcal{L}_{++} : Let $X = \{x, y, z\}$, $\mathbf{T} = \{s, t\}$, and $u^{(x,y)} = 1 \times -1$ and $u^{(y,z)} = 2 \times -1$ denote vectors in $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbf{T}}$. Note that in this case $S = \text{span}\{u^{(x,y)}, u^{(y,z)}\}$ coincides with $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbf{T}}$. We now apply the Jacobi identity and take $u^{(x,z)} = u^{(x,y)} + u^{(y,z)} = 3 \times -2$ and extend to the remaining pairs in X^2 using lemma 2.1. Since these vectors are pairwise noncollinear and $\#\mathbf{T} = 2$, the associated arrangement $\mathcal{H}_{++} = \{H_{++}^{\{x,y\}}, H_{++}^{\{y,z\}}, H_{++}^{\{x,z\}}\}$ consists of three pairwise disjoint lines that partition $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}}$ and \mathcal{G}_{++} has cardinality 4. We now confirm this using Zaslavski’s theorem.

In the present setting, $A_{++}^{\emptyset} = \mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}}$, and, via eq. (31), $\mu(A_{++}^{\emptyset}) = 1$. Then, since $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}}$ is the unique element in \mathcal{L}_{++} that (strictly) contains each hyperplane in \mathcal{H}_{++} , eq. (31) yields $\mu(A) = -\mu(A_{++}^{\emptyset})$ for each $A \in \mathcal{H}_{++}$. Now since the hyperplanes in \mathcal{H}_{++} are pairwise disjoint, there are no further elements in \mathcal{L}_{++} . Thus

$$|\mathcal{G}_{++}| = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{L}_{++}} |\mu(A)| = 4.$$

In contrast, although the structure of \mathcal{L} is otherwise isomorphic to \mathcal{L}_{++} , since $\{0\} \subset \mathbb{R}^{\mathbf{T}}$ is a subset of every hyperplane in \mathcal{H} , $\{0\}$ is the center $A^{\{x,y,z\}}$ of \mathcal{H} and the maximal element of \mathcal{L} . Via eq. (31) and the calculations of the previous paragraph, we obtain $\mu(A^{\{x,y,z\}}) =$

1 $-(\mu(A^\emptyset) - 3\mu(A^\emptyset)) = 2$. Thus,

$$\# \mathcal{G} = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{L}} |\mu(A)| = 6 = 3!.$$

4 REMARK 1—The relationship between \mathcal{L} and \mathcal{L}_{++} : Let $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ be a Y -generalization with
 5 2-diverse representation $\hat{u}^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$. Since, for every distinct x and y in Y , $\hat{H}^{\{x, y\}}$ contains the
 6 origin, $\hat{\mathcal{H}}$ is centered. As we see in [example 6](#), this is not the case for $\hat{\mathcal{H}}_{++}$ where $\hat{\mathcal{H}}_{++}$ is
 7 centerless and each of its members is maximal in $\hat{\mathcal{L}}_{++}$.

8 In GS03, IV-DIVERSITY guarantees that, for every $Y \subseteq X$ of cardinality 2, 3 or 4, the
 9 improper Y -generalization generates a centered arrangement in $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}}$. The fact that $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}}$ is
 10 open in $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbf{T}}$ ensures that the dimension of any $L \in \hat{\mathcal{L}}$ is equal to its counterpart $L_{++} \in \hat{\mathcal{L}}_{++}$
 11 provided the latter exists. Thus, $\hat{\mathcal{L}}_{++}$ and $\hat{\mathcal{L}}$ are isomorphic if, and only if, $\hat{\mathcal{H}}_{++}$ is centered.
 12 For the same reason, $\hat{\mathcal{G}}_{++}$ and $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$ are isomorphic if, and only if, $\hat{\mathcal{H}}_{++}$ is centered.

13 We now abstract a useful property from [example 6](#).

14 PROPOSITION 6: *If $\leq_{\mathbf{J}}$ satisfies [A1^b](#)–[A3^b](#) and Π -diversity, then, for every $Y \subseteq X$ of
 15 cardinality 3 or 4, the improper Y -generalization \mathcal{R} is such that, for some $J, L \in \mathbf{J}$, $\mathcal{R}_J =$
 16 \mathcal{R}_L^{-1} belongs to $\text{total}(\mathcal{R})$.*

17 PROOF: Fix $\#Y = 3$ or 4, via [lemma 2.1](#), let $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$ denote the 2-diverse matrix repre-
 18 sentation of the improper Y -generalization \mathcal{R} . Let \mathcal{H}_{++} denote the associated arrangement
 19 of hyperplanes. For every distinct $x, y \in X$, [lemma 2.1](#) implies that $H_{++}^{\{x, y\}}$ intersects $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}}$.
 20 Then, similar to [example 6](#), the $1 \leq n \leq \binom{\#Y}{2}$ distinct hyperplanes of \mathcal{H}_{++} cut $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}}$ into
 21 at least $n + 1$ regions. At least one pair G and G^* in \mathcal{G}_{++} are therefore separated by all n
 22 distinct members of \mathcal{H}_{++} . Take $J \in G$, so that, for every distinct $x, y \in Y$, $\langle u^{(x, y)}, J \rangle \neq 0$.
 23 Thus \mathcal{R}_J is antisymmetric, complete and, via [A0^b](#), total. Next, take $L \in G^*$, so that since J
 24 and L are separated by every hyperplane in \mathcal{H}_{++} , $\mathcal{R}_J = \mathcal{R}_L^{-1}$. *Q.E.D.*

25 EXAMPLE 7—insufficiency of Π -diversity: Let $X = [0, 1]^2$ and let \leq^{lex} denote the lex-
 26 icographic ordering on X . Let $\mathbf{T} = \{s, t\}$, and, for each $J \in \mathbf{J}$, let

$$\leq_J = \begin{cases} X^2 & \text{if } J(s) = J(t); \\ \leq^{\text{lex}} & \text{if } J(s) < J(t); \\ (\leq^{\text{lex}})^{-1} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$




FIGURE E.2.— The intersection semilattice of a central arrangement for $\#Y = 3$ and $r = 3$.

Recall that if $\leq_J = X^2$, then \leq_J is symmetric and hence equal to \simeq_J . Thus, for every distinct $x, y \in X$, $H_{++}^{\{x,y\}} = \{J \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}} : J(s) = J(t)\}$. Via lemma 2.1, \leq_J has a two-diverse matrix representation $v^{(\cdot, \cdot)}$. But via lemma 2.2, below, C2DIVERSITY fails to hold. The fact that \leq_J fails to satisfy part (2.a) of theorem 2 follows from the fact that \leq_J is lexicographic for every J outside H .

We now present the canonical intersection semilattices for the variety of cases that we consider in the proofs of the main paper.

In the intersection semilattice of fig. E.2, an increase in level corresponds to a decrease in dimension: since $\dot{A}^{\{x,y,z\}}$ is nonempty, it is of dimension at least zero. Since \dot{J} belongs to the interior of $\mathbb{R}_{++}^{\mathbf{T}^f}$ and $\dot{A}^{\{x,y\}\{y,z\}}$ is at least one-dimensional, $\dot{A}_{++}^{\{x,y\}\{y,z\}}$ is one-dimensional. Since $\dot{A}^{\{x,y,z\}} \subset \dot{A}^{\{x,y\}\{y,z\}}$, the latter set is nonempty whenever $\dot{\mathcal{H}}_{++}$ is central. The same, of course, applies to other members at the same level. Conversely, if $\dot{A}^{\{x,y\}\{y,z\}}$ is empty, then so is $\dot{A}^{\{x,y,z\}}$. We now use this to show that there is a unique form of Y -generalization $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ such that $\#\hat{\mathcal{G}}_{++} = 6$ and, moreover, that any such $\hat{\mathcal{R}}$ fails to satisfy A0^b.