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The Effect of Group Identity on Hiring Decisions with Incomplete Information

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Abstract. We investigate the effects of group identity on hiring decisions with adverse selection problems. We run a laboratory experiment in which employers cannot observe a worker's ability or verify the veracity of the ability the worker claims to have. We evaluate whether sharing an identity results in employers discriminating in favor of ingroup workers and whether it helps workers and employers overcome the adverse selection problem. We induce identities using the minimal group paradigm and study two settings: one in which workers cannot change their identity and one in which they can. Although sharing a common identity does not make the worker's claims more honest, employers strongly discriminate in favor of ingroup workers when identities are fixed. Discrimination cannot be explained by employers' beliefs and, hence, seems to be taste-based. When possible, few workers change their identity. However, the mere possibility of changing identities erodes the employers' trust toward ingroup workers and eliminates discrimination.

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1. Introduction

A large stream of research provides consistent evidence of discrimination in hiring decisions.[1] Recently, scholars show that employers tend to favor workers similar to themselves in terms of tastes, leisure pursuits, and experiences (e.g., Rivera 2012). Among other explanations, these findings are consistent with ingroup favoritism: the tendency displayed by individuals to treat members of their identity group more favorably than those from different identities. Whereas ingroup favoritism is commonly associated with unfavorable consequences, it could also help organizations overcome problems arising from individuals' self-interest. After all, many studies show that sharing a common identity increases cooperation (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2005), coordination (e.g., Chen and Chen 2011), and trust (e.g., Falk and Zehnder 2013).[2]

This study investigates the role of ingroup favoritism in overcoming adverse selection problems in hiring decisions. The hiring process is of interest because employers often do not know workers' abilities before hiring them and evidence provided by workers is typically unverifiable. If there is a large share of low-ability workers, an adverse selection problem arises as it is suboptimal for employers to hire at all. The combination of unverifiable communication with visible group identities turns the hiring decision into a strategic game in which both *taste-based* and *statistical* discrimination can occur.[3] In this setting, if sharing a common identity decreases workers' willingness to lie and employers' belief about the workers' truthfulness, then it can help them overcome the adverse selection problem. Whereas there are numerous studies on ingroup favoritism, to our knowledge, ours is the first to investigate the interaction of group identity and truthfulness in hiring decisions with adverse selection problems.

We run a laboratory experiment using an adverse selection hiring game (Charness and Dufwenberg 2011). In the game, an employer decides whether to hire a worker or not. The worker can be of low or high ability, but the worker's ability is private information and, hence, unknown to the employer. Before the hiring decision, the worker sends a message to the employer in which the worker can claim to be of either ability. The prediction with the standard assumption of own-payoff maximization is for the worker to send the high-ability message and for the employer not to hire. However, as

Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) show, the adverse selection problem is alleviated if a substantial fraction of workers is unwilling to lie about their ability, making it profitable for the employer to hire.

We introduce minimal group identities before participants play the game (Tajfel 1970). Thereafter, we randomly assign participants to roles (employer or worker) and workers to abilities (high or low) and employers are matched with either an ingroup or an outgroup worker. We ensured that participants know that abilities are randomly assigned, which rules out an association between ability and group identity by design. Based on insights from the literature, we conjecture that group identities can affect hiring outcomes. First, workers might lie less to ingroup than to outgroup employers. Second, employers might discriminate in favor of ingroup workers because they expect ingroup workers to be more truthful (statistical discrimination) or because they exhibit altruism toward ingroup members (taste-based discrimination). We elicit the employer's expectations about the workers' truthfulness to distinguish between these two forms of discrimination.

Empirical and anecdotal evidence shows that workers respond to discrimination by adapting aspects of their identity. For instance, job seekers might change their name, disguise their accent, or opt for gender-free applications (Arai and Thoursie 2009, Biavaschi et al. 2017).[4] In fact, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that choosing one's identity may be one of the most important economic decisions people make.[5] Inspired by these papers, we implement two treatments: one with fixed identities and one with flexible identities in which workers can choose to keep their initial identity or adopt the employer's identity. We investigate not only whether workers change their identity, but also how the option to change identity affects the lying and hiring decisions of ingroup and outgroup employer–worker pairs.

We find that identity does not affect lying because workers lie equally often to ingroup and outgroup employers. However, employers exhibit ingroup favoritism by hiring ingroup workers significantly more often than outgroup workers. Interestingly, employers do not believe messages from ingroup workers more than those of outgroup workers. In other words, discrimination in favor of ingroup workers does not emerge because of statistical discrimination, suggesting that it is driven by tastes. With flexible identities, we find that few workers change their identity. Nevertheless, the possibility of changing identity eliminates discrimination in favor of ingroup workers but also reduces overall hiring rates.

2. The Experiment

2.1. Adverse Selection Hiring Game

We implement a variation of the game used by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). In the game, an employer is matched with a worker of *low* or *high* ability. The employer knows that the probability of being matched with a high-ability worker is $\frac{1}{2}$, but only the worker knows the realized ability. After learning the ability, the worker sends a cheap-talk message to the employer. Workers choose between the message "I am in the low-ability group" and "I am in the high-ability group." After receiving the message, the employer decides whether to hire the worker or not. The game tree is depicted in Figure 1. If the employer does not hire, the employer and the worker get €7 irrespective of the worker's ability. If the employer does hire, the worker gets €10, and the employer's earnings depend on the worker's ability. If the worker is low ability, the employer gets €0. If the worker is high ability, the employer receives €12 with a probability of $\frac{5}{6}$ and €0 otherwise. As in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), this feature guarantees that false messages by low-ability workers are contractually nonverifiable.[6]

2.2. Experimental Design

The experiment consists of two parts. Participants are informed that they will receive the corresponding instructions at the beginning of each part.

2.2.1. Part 1: Group Identity. In part 1, we induce group identity using the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel 1970). As in many studies, we use the participants' revealed preferences to induce identities.[7] We ask the participants to choose one of two smartphones: an iPhone 6 or a Samsung S6 Edge. Both smartphones have similar functionality, features, and price (around €750 when the study was conducted). To incentivize their decision, we conduct a lottery with a 1-in-750 chance of winning the chosen smartphone.[8]

2.2.2. Part 2: Adverse Selection Hiring Game and Belief Elicitation. Part 2 consists of two stages. One stage is randomly drawn at the end of the session to determine everyone's payment. In the first stage, participants learn their role (employer or worker), observe each other's identity, and play the one-shot adverse selection hiring game described. In the second stage, we elicit beliefs. Specifically, immediately after the hiring decision, we ask employers to indicate the probability that they are matched with a low-ability worker. We use the incentive-compatible belief elicitation mechanism proposed by Karni (2009), which is robust to varying levels of risk aversion and deviations from expected utility maximization.[9]

2.2.3. Treatments. We run two treatments. In treatment *Fixed*, the identity chosen in part 1 cannot be changed. In treatment *Flexible*, workers can revise their identity choice after observing their employer's identity but before sending their message. Employers

Figure 1. Game Tree of the Adverse Selection Hiring Game



know that workers can change identity, but they do not know whether the identity they observe is the worker's initially chosen identity.

2.3. Conjectures

If all players are rational own-payoff maximizers, the adverse selection hiring game is easily solved. Intuitively, if the employer conditions hiring on the worker's message, then high- and low-ability workers have an incentive to always send the message that results in a higher probability of being hired. However, if workers always send the same message, then messages are uninformative of the worker's ability. In this case, the employer's expected earnings from not hiring (i.e., €7) exceed those from hiring (i.e., $\frac{1}{2}\times\frac{5}{6}\times$ €12 = €5). Hence, in equilibrium, employers do not condition their hiring on the message and never hire, making workers indifferent to what message to send.

Next, we consider how these predictions change if we assume some workers are unwilling to lie. Our goal is to provide a straightforward benchmark describing the conditions under which employers have an incentive to hire. For simplicity, we describe the case in which players are risk-neutral, but the general intuition applies to other risk preferences. Over the past decades, substantial evidence has accumulated that some individuals have a preference for truth-telling (e.g., see Abeler et al. 2019). Here, we simply assume that a fraction θ of low-ability workers maximize their monetary earnings, whereas the remaining $(1-\theta)$ are truthful and send the low-ability message. Under this assumption, if we denote the employer's updated belief of being matched with a high-ability worker as b_H, then the employer prefers to hire as long as the earnings from hiring ($b_H\times\frac{5}{6}\times$ €12) exceed those from not hiring (i.e., €7). In other words, employers hire if their updated belief is above the threshold $b_H^* = \frac{7}{10}$. If employers hire workers who send a high-ability message, then earnings-maximizing high- and low-ability workers have a dominant strategy to send the high-ability message. Consequently, because the initial probability of a high-ability worker is $\frac{1}{2}$, the probability that a worker is high-ability conditional on observing a high-ability message boils down to $1/(1+\theta)$. Combining this with b_H^* gives us the threshold fraction of low-ability workers who lie below which employers are willing to hire: $\theta^* = \frac{3}{7}$.

2.3.1. The Role of Identity.

Here, we discuss the role of group identity, starting with the case in which identities are fixed. There is considerable evidence that people favor ingroup over outgroup members in numerous domains from simple allocation decisions to cooperation and trust games (e.g., see Eckel and Grossman 2005, Chen and Li 2009, Chen and Chen 2011, Falk and Zehnder 2013). A few studies report that ingroup favoritism applies to lying behavior. Rong et al. (2016) find that a shared identity decreases lying in guessing games preceded by a communication stage. Using natural identities, Maximiano and

Chakravarty (2016) find that senders in a sender–receiver game lie less to ingroup (i.e., friends) than to outgroup receivers (i.e., strangers). Butler (2014) finds less lying in ingroup matches in a repeated lemons market game.[10] Given this evidence, we propose the following conjecture: fewer workers lie to ingroup than to outgroup employers.

One reason for workers to lie less to ingroup employers is altruism toward ingroup members (Chen and Li 2009). In this case, workers lie less to ingroup employers to increase their earnings. Alternatively, it is plausible that it is psychologically costlier to lie to an ingroup than an outgroup member. After all, lying is often seen as immoral, and moral decisions depend on the closeness between the decision maker and the potential victim (Bénabou et al. 2020). Although these are distinct reasons, in this simple model, they boil down to a lower fraction of workers lying in ingroup than in outgroup pairs.[11]

As with workers, there are two straightforward reasons for employers to discriminate in favor of their ingroup. The first reason is discrimination based on taste—that is, altruism toward ingroup members. Employers increase workers' earnings by hiring them. Hence, altruism toward ingroup members can lead to a higher likelihood of hiring an ingroup worker if the employers' belief b_H is not too extreme.[12] The second reason is statistical discrimination. In other words, employers favor ingroup workers because they believe they are less likely to lie (anticipating conjecture 1), which is consistent with the evidence showing that individuals expect others to lie less to ingroup members (Benistant and Villeval 2019). These arguments give us a second conjecture: employers are more likely to hire an ingroup than an outgroup worker.

Because we elicit the employers' beliefs, we can further disentangle empirically taste-based and statistical discrimination. Because ability is randomly assigned, we can rule out differences in prior beliefs about the ability of ingroup versus outgroup workers. However, statistical discrimination can arise after employers receive a high-ability message. Namely, if employers expect that ingroup workers are more truthful than outgroup workers, then their updated belief that a worker is a high type conditional on receiving a high-ability message is higher for ingroup workers than outgroup workers. In other words, assuming that employers correctly anticipate conjecture 1, we can formulate our third conjecture: Employers' belief of being matched with a high-ability worker after a high-ability message is higher for ingroup than for outgroup workers, resulting in statistical discrimination.

To conclude, we discuss the flexible treatment. In this treatment, workers can switch their initial identity before revealing it to employers. Because research on changing minimal identities is rare,[13] it is unclear whether individuals use initial or final identities to treat others as an ingroup or an outgroup member. If final identities are used and there is ingroup favoritism (conjectures 1–3), then workers have a strong incentive to match the identity of the employer, resulting in overall less lying and more hiring. If initial identities are used, then employers want to hire workers with whom they share an initial identity, but they cannot tell by observing the final identity whether their initial identities match. This introduces a second adverse selection problem, which could result in the breakdown of the effect of group identity on hiring. Hence, the effect of flexible identities is ambiguous. Finally, research on natural identities shows that switching one's identity is psychologically costly (Burke 2006, Chandra 2006). We use minimal group identities, but even a small psychological cost might be enough to deter workers from switching in the experiment.

2.4. Procedures

We conducted the experiment at BEElab in Maastricht University in 2015. Participants were undergraduate students recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 2015). We ran 10 sessions (five per treatment) with a total of 240 participants (120 per treatment). Each session took one hour, and participants earned, on average, €12, including a €5 show-up fee. Instructions were written in neutral language. The replication materials include samples of the instructions, the z-Tree software programs (Fischbacher 2007), and the data.

3. Results

We collected 60 independent observations (i.e., employer–worker pairs) per treatment. In *Fixed*, we have 35 outgroup and 25 ingroup pairs, whereas in *Flexible*, we have 28 outgroup and 32 ingroup pairs. Throughout the analysis, we use two-sided tests and power calculations based on $\alpha = 0.10$. We use the worker's initial identity in *Flexible* to determine whether workers and employers form an ingroup or an outgroup pair. The results are unaffected if we use the workers' assumed identity.

Only 10.0% of workers change their identity (6 out of 60). Why is this the case? Intriguingly, the identity change seems unaffected by the employer–worker pairing as workers in ingroup and outgroup pairs change their identity similarly often (3 out of 28 versus 3 out of 32; χ^2 test, $p = 0.863$). Moreover, the strength of preferences for the chosen smartphone does not seem to play a role as it is similar for workers who change identity and those who do not (Mann–Whitney U test, $p = 0.669$). A compelling reason for this behavior is that workers do not expect to benefit from changing identity, which we show later is the correct belief.[14]

3.1. Workers' Lying Behavior

As expected, low-ability workers lie significantly more often than high-ability workers. Across both treatments, 46.7% of low-ability workers lie (28 out of 60), whereas only 1.7% of high-ability workers do so (1 out of 60; χ^2 test, $p < 0.001$). Henceforth, we focus on the behavior of low-ability workers.

Figure 2 depicts how frequently low-ability workers lie. In *Fixed*, 38.5% of low-ability workers lie in ingroup pairs (5 out of 13), which is slightly less often than the 52.9% who lie in outgroup pairs (9 out of 17). In *Flexible*, it is the other way around: 53.5% of low-ability workers lie in ingroup pairs (8 out of 15), and 40.0% lie in outgroup pairs (6 out of 15). These differences are not statistically significant (χ^2 tests, $p = 0.431$ in *Fixed* and $p = 0.464$ in *Flexible*). Note that these fractions are close to the threshold below which employers are willing to hire ($\theta^* \approx 42.9\%$). We also do not find evidence that being in the *Fixed* or *Flexible* treatment affects lying (χ^2 tests, $p = 0.464$ for outgroup pairs and $p = 0.431$ for ingroup pairs). Overall, we do not find support for conjecture 1.[15]

Result 1. *With both fixed and flexible identities, low-ability workers lie similarly irrespective of whether the employer is an ingroup or an outgroup.*

3.2. Employers' Beliefs and Hiring Behavior

A substantial number of employers hire the worker, and their decision is highly dependent on the worker's message. Overall, 60.9% of the employers who received the high-ability message hire the worker (53 out of 87), whereas only 3.0% of the employers who received the low-ability message do (1 out of 33; χ^2 test, $p < 0.001$). Thus, we focus on the hiring decisions and beliefs of employers who receive the high-ability message from here on.

Figure 2. (Color online) Fraction of Low-Ability Workers Who Lie to the Employer in *Fixed* and *Flexible*



Notes. Error bars depict 90% confidence intervals. Ingroup and outgroup pairs are determined by the workers' initial identity.

Figure 3. (Color online) Fraction of Employers Who Hire and Their Average Belief That the Worker Is of High Ability in *Fixed*



Notes. Only for employers who receive the high-ability message. Error bars depict 90% confidence intervals. Ingroup and outgroup pairs are determined by the workers' initial identity.

In *Fixed*, 74.4% of employers hire workers after receiving the high-ability message (32 out of 43). Notably, the employers' average belief of being matched with a high-ability worker equals 69.3%, which is very close to the threshold above which hiring is profitable ($b_H^* = 70\%$). It is also close to the observed fraction of high-ability workers among those who send the high-ability message, namely 67.4%.

Figure 3 depicts the fraction of employers who hire the worker and their mean belief that the worker is of high ability. It shows that 93.8% of employers who receive the high-ability message hire ingroup workers (15 out of 16), but only 63.0% hire outgroup workers (17 out of 27; χ^2 test, $p = 0.025$).[16] Hence, we find evidence of discrimination against outgroup workers, supporting conjecture 2. Interestingly, employers' beliefs of being matched with a high-ability worker are not significantly different between ingroup and outgroup pairs (72.9% versus 67.1%; Mann–Whitney U test, $p = 0.575$), which suggests that employers' discrimination is taste-based rather than statistical (see conjecture 3).[17] Later, in Table 1, we present further evidence of the importance of taste-based discrimination.

Result 2. *With fixed identities, employers are equally likely to believe the message of ingroup and outgroup workers. However, employers are more likely to hire ingroup than outgroup workers, providing evidence for taste-based rather than statistical discrimination.*

Next, we look at the *Flexible* treatment. In this treatment, only 47.7% of the workers who send the high-ability message are hired (21 out of 44). The fraction of employers who hire is significantly lower in *Flexible*

Table 1. Determinants of the Employers' Hiring Decision

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Ingroup pairs in *Fixed*	0.308***	0.276**	0.301***	0.299**	0.290**	0.327***
	(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.130)	(0.122)	(0.118)
Outgroup pairs in *Flexible*	−0.209	−0.133	−0.130	−0.194	−0.126	−0.124
	(0.150)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.144)
Ingroup pairs in *Flexible*	−0.110	−0.048	−0.009	−0.133	−0.073	−0.026
	(0.140)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.130)	(0.129)
Belief of high ability		0.547***			0.507***	
		(0.180)			(0.176)	
Belief of high ability ≥ 70%			0.359***			0.358***
			(0.096)			(0.096)
Demographic controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	87	87	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.126	0.212	0.240	0.204	0.272	0.304

Notes. Linear probability regressions. The dependent variable equals one if the employer hires the worker and zero otherwise. Indicator variables for treatment (*Fixed* or *Flexible*) × pair type (ingroup or outgroup) with outgroup pairs in *Fixed* as the reference category. Controls include the employers' self-reported risk aversion, age, nationality, gender, and field of study. Only data from employers who receive a high-ability message. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

than in *Fixed* (χ^2 test, $p = 0.011$). In line with the lower hiring rate, the employers' belief of being matched with a high-ability worker is significantly lower in *Flexible* than in *Fixed* (54.8% versus 69.3%; Mann–Whitney U test, $p = 0.020$) and is close to 50%, the belief one would hold if the high-ability message is uninformative of the worker's ability.[18]

For employers in *Flexible* who receive the high-ability message, Figure 4 depicts the fraction of them who hire the worker and their mean belief that the worker is of high ability. Overall, 52.0% (13 out of 25) of ingroup workers and 42.1% of outgroup workers are hired (8 out of 19; χ^2 test, $p = 0.515$). Hence, the difference in hiring between *Fixed* and *Flexible* is mainly driven by a difference in the fraction of hired ingroup workers. The hiring rate in ingroup pairs is significantly higher in *Fixed* than in *Flexible* (χ^2 test, $p = 0.005$). At the same time, there is no significant difference for outgroup pairs (χ^2 test, $p = 0.162$). As in *Fixed*, in *Flexible*, we do not find that the employers' belief about the workers' ability differs significantly between ingroup and outgroup pairs (55.8% versus 53.4%; Mann–Whitney U test, $p = 0.595$). Compared with *Fixed*, employers in *Flexible* are more pessimistic of being matched with a high-ability worker in ingroup pairs (72.9% in *Fixed* versus 55.8% in *Flexible*; Mann–Whitney U test, $p = 0.049$) and outgroup pairs (67.1% in *Fixed* versus 53.4% in *Flexible*; Mann–Whitney U test, $p = 0.147$).

In Table 1, we analyze the employers' hiring decisions, controlling for their beliefs. Specifically, we run linear probability regressions with the employers' hiring decision as the dependent variable. As before, we restrict the sample to employers who received the high-ability message. In column (1), as independent variables, we add indicator variables for the treatment × pair-type combinations (the reference category being outgroup pairs in *Fixed*). This regression simply reproduces the results reported using nonparametric tests—namely, a significantly higher hiring rate by employers in ingroup pairs in *Fixed*. In columns (2) and (3), we add the employers' belief of being matched with a high-ability worker. In column (2), we add beliefs as point predictions. In column (3), we add beliefs as a dummy variable that equals one if the employer's belief is above or equal to the threshold at which hiring is profitable (i.e., $b_H^* = 70\%$). In both regressions, the coefficient of beliefs is large and statistically significant, confirming the importance of beliefs in the employers' decision.[19]

Interestingly, the introduction of beliefs has two effects on the coefficients of the indicator variables. First, it reduces the magnitude of coefficients of ingroup

Figure 4. (Color online) Fraction of Employers Who Hire and Their Average Belief That the Worker Is of High Ability in *Flexible*

Notes. Only for employers who received the high-ability message. Error bars depict 90% confidence intervals. Ingroup and outgroup pairs are determined by the workers' initial identity.

and outgroup pairs in *Flexible*, making these pairs even more similar to outgroup pairs in *Fixed*. Second, the introduction of beliefs has little effect on the coefficient of ingroup pairs in *Fixed* (postestimation Wald tests comparing these coefficients across columns (1)–(3), $p > 0.372$). If we interpret this coefficient as the impact of taste-based discrimination, these regressions suggest that employers discriminate because of taste when identities are fixed but not when they are flexible. Columns (4)–(6) show that these conclusions are robust to controlling for the employers' self-reported tolerance for risk and demographic characteristics (age, gender, nationality, and economics major).

Result 3. *With flexible identities, employers are equally likely to hire and believe the message of ingroup and outgroup workers. Compared with fixed identities, flexible identities reduce the hiring of ingroup members, suggesting that employers no longer discriminate based on taste.*

There are two caveats worth noting concerning Result 3. First, we elicit the employers' average belief, which is a sufficient statistic to measure the impact of beliefs on a binary hiring decision if employers are expected utility maximizers. However, we cannot rule out employers holding more uncertain beliefs for outgroup than for ingroup workers, which, combined with nonstandard preferences, could potentially lead to lower hiring rates. Second, we cannot entirely differentiate whether the ingroup bias differs between majority (iPhone) and minority (Samsung) ingroup pairs or whether there are unobservable differences between these groups that could affect hiring. In the appendix, we provide a supplementary analysis that suggests these potential differences do not affect the validity of our results.

3.3. Efficiency

Given the differences in the employers' hiring behavior, it is interesting to investigate the efficiency consequences of ingroup favoritism. We consider two measures of efficiency: the players' earnings and the fraction of pairs in which the employer either hires a high-ability worker or does not hire a low-ability worker, which we call allocation efficiency. To not be constrained by the specific matching of the experiment, we calculated these statistics by considering the employers' mean hiring rate conditional on the message they receive and the workers' lying rate conditional on their ability and then simulating all possible pairings. Table 2 presents the allocation efficiency and average expected earnings by treatment and pair type. It reports the average expected earnings of workers and employers separately.

In all conditions, allocation efficiency and overall earnings are above the no-hiring benchmark obtained with traditional assumptions (i.e., 50% allocation efficiency and €7 in earnings). Comparing across conditions, we see that allocation efficiency and earnings are noticeably higher for ingroup pairs in *Fixed*. This pattern is a direct consequence of there being truthful low-ability workers in all conditions but a significantly higher hiring rate of workers who send the high-ability message in ingroup pairs in *Fixed*.

Looking at earnings by role, we see that workers earn considerably more than in the no-hiring benchmark (i.e., €7).[20] By contrast, the earnings of employers are close to €7. Looking at the employers' earnings conditional on hiring (last column in Table 2) shows that their expected earnings when they hire are not far from the €7 they earn if they do not hire, especially in ingroup pairs in *Fixed*.[21] This lack of difference might be an important reason we observe taste-based discrimination. Namely, discriminating against outgroup workers is not costly.

4. Conclusions

We examine the effects of group identity on hiring decisions when employers cannot observe the workers' abilities but workers can communicate their abilities through cheap-talk messages. We ask whether sharing an identity helps workers and employers overcome the adverse selection problem inherent in these decisions

Table 2. Allocation Efficiency and Average Expected Earnings by Treatment and Pair Type

		Expected earnings, €			
Condition	Allocation efficiency, %	Overall	Workers	Employers	Employers who hire
Outgroup pairs in *Fixed*	61.9	7.55	8.53	6.57	6.16
	(48.6)	(2.21)	(1.50)	(4.31)	(6.00)
Ingroup pairs in *Fixed*	74.9	7.93	8.83	7.03	7.05
	(43.3)	(2.42)	(1.46)	(4.61)	(5.91)
Outgroup pairs in *Flexible*	62.6	7.46	7.88	7.04	7.14
	(48.4)	(1.75)	(1.37)	(3.20)	(5.89)
Ingroup pairs in *Flexible*	62.1	7.50	8.20	6.81	6.52
	(48.5)	(1.99)	(1.47)	(3.78)	(5.98)

Notes. Allocation efficiency is the fraction of pairs in which the employer hires a high-ability worker or does not hire a low-ability worker. Statistics are calculated by simulating all possible pairings considering the employers' hiring rate (conditioning on the message received) and the workers' lying rate (conditioning on their ability). Standard deviations in parenthesis.

and whether the resulting discrimination is statistical or taste-based. We investigate these questions in settings in which identities are fixed and flexible.

We find that employers discriminate in favor of ingroup workers when identities are fixed. Notably, employers do not hold differing beliefs about the ability or truthfulness of ingroup and outgroup workers. This leads us to conclude that the observed discrimination is taste-based. In this respect, it is important to note that the workers' truthfulness and the employers' beliefs are such that the average cost of exercising ingroup favoritism is very low, which might be why we observe taste-based discrimination. The literature on identity reports mixed results from null effects to significant ingroup favoritism (Pechar and Kranton 2017). The expected cost of discrimination is a plausible explanation for these diverse findings. Another notable result is the effect of group identity on efficiency. Since hiring rates are low because of adverse selection, the increased rate at which employers hire ingroup workers increases overall efficiency. However, because workers are not more honest toward ingroup employers, the benefits of the higher hiring rate are accrued solely by ingroup workers.

Introducing the possibility to change identity reduces the employers' trust in the workers' truthfulness. Workers are equally likely to lie about their ability, but the employers' belief of being matched with a high-ability worker after seeing a high-ability message is noticeably lower, resulting in a lower hiring rate. This is the case even though the actual number of workers changing identity is extremely low. Flexible identities also eliminate the differential hiring rates between ingroup and outgroup pairs. However, it is unclear why. On the one hand, flexible identities might dampen the taste-based component of ingroup favoritism. On the other hand, the change in the employers' beliefs implies that their expected cost of exercising ingroup favoritism is higher than with fixed identities. Further research is needed to determine the precise reason for the change.

Overall, our findings in this paper suggest that ingroup favoritism can help alleviate adverse selection problems in hiring decisions. This is a potential explanation for why discrimination in labor markets persists even if it is taste-based and there is market competition (Becker 1971). Our findings also suggest that, in hiring decisions when adverse selection is a problem, discrimination ought to be more common for less flexible identities, such as gender and race, than for identities that are easier to change or disguise, such as political and regional identities.

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Appendix. Robustness Checks

Here, we provide evidence that potential differences between participants who prefer the iPhone or the Samsung smartphones as well as majority/minority group dynamics do not affect the results reported in the main text. In total, 90 (of 120) employers

Table A.1. Robustness Checks: Determinants of the Employer's Hiring Decision

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Ingroup pairs in *Fixed*	0.345**	0.298**	0.322***			
	(0.140)	(0.121)	(0.121)			
Outgroup pairs in *Flexible*	−0.188	−0.058	−0.057			
	(0.202)	(0.189)	(0.184)			
Ingroup pairs in *Flexible*	−0.068	−0.019	0.021			
	(0.161)	(0.142)	(0.144)			
Flexible				−0.256	−0.200	−0.183
				(0.230)	(0.236)	(0.240)
iPhone in *Fixed*				−0.112	−0.044	−0.024
				(0.196)	(0.169)	(0.173)
iPhone in *Flexible*				−0.044	0.139	0.117
				(0.237)	(0.240)	(0.241)
Belief of high ability		0.606***			0.794***	
		(0.202)			(0.208)	
Belief of high ability ≥ 70%			0.419***			0.467***
			(0.100)			(0.139)
Observations	67	67	67	46	46	46
R^2	0.139	0.238	0.281	0.050	0.238	0.235

Notes. Linear probability regressions. The dependent variable equals one if the employer hires the worker and zero otherwise, conditional on receiving a high-ability message. Indicator variables for treatment (*Fixed* or *Flexible*) × pair type (ingroup or outgroup) in models (1)–(3) with outgroup pairs in *Fixed* as the reference category. Sample in models (1)–(3) are iPhone employers only. Dummy variable for treatment (*Flexible*) and interaction term of treatment dummy (*Flexible*) × employer's identity (iPhone or Samsung) in models (4)–(6). Sample in models (4)–(6) are outgroup employers only. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

and 83 (of 120) workers chose the iPhone. This stronger preference for the iPhone and the need to have a sufficient number of outgroup pairs resulted in noticeably more iPhone than Samsung ingroup pairs.

For lying behavior of low-ability workers, we did the following robustness checks. First, we compared the lying behavior of ingroup iPhone workers with that of outgroup iPhone workers. Second, to check for majority/minority group dynamics, we compared the lying behavior of Samsung outgroup workers with iPhone outgroup workers. We do not have enough observations for comparisons with Samsung ingroup pairs. Neither comparison resulted in significant or qualitative differences compared with the pooled analysis presented in the main text.

For the hiring behavior in treatment *Fixed*, we checked whether there are differences in the behavior of iPhone versus Samsung employers that could explain the results reported in the main text. To do so, we first ran the regressions (1)–(3) from Table 1 with iPhone employers only. Unfortunately, there are too few observations to run these regressions for the Samsung employers only and evaluate the impact of ingroup pairs. The regression results are shown in columns (1)–(3) in Table A.1. Comparing the coefficient estimates and the significance levels in Tables 1 and A.1 show that the behavior of iPhone employers is very similar to the hiring behavior of employers in the pooled analysis. This is particularly important for the (highly) significant coefficient estimates of the indicator variable "Ingroup pairs in *Fixed*." The same ingroup favoritism in treatment *Fixed* can be observed among iPhone employers only even after controlling for their beliefs. We, therefore, conclude that differences among participants who prefer iPhone versus Samsung phones do not explain the observed ingroup favoritism.

To check for majority/minority group dynamics, we compare the hiring behavior of Samsung outgroup employers with iPhone outgroup employers. As in the pooled analysis, we condition on employers who receive a high-ability message. Specifically, we ran a series of regressions with the hiring decision as the dependent variable. In all regressions, the independent variables include a dummy variable for treatment *Flexible* and indicator variables for the employer's smartphone choice (iPhone) interacted with treatment dummies (*Fixed* or *Flexible*). The interaction variables allow us to test whether the hiring behavior of iPhone and Samsung employers differs significantly (in each treatment). A significant negative coefficient estimate for "iPhone in *Fixed*" would provide evidence for majority/minority group dynamics in the form of favoritism for majority (iPhone) workers in treatment *Fixed*. The results are shown in columns (4)–(6) in Table A.1. We do not find evidence for this alternative explanation. Thus, we conclude that majority/minority dynamics do not play a role in our experiment.

Endnotes

[1] A lot of the literature studies discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities as well as women in the likelihood of being interviewed or hired. In addition, individuals with lower social status, proxied by their names or region, are found to experience discrimination in many (high-status) professions (e.g., Riach and Rich 2002, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, Oreopoulos 2011, Edo et al. 2019). Some research even shows that common accents are more hirable, whereas regional accents are discriminated against (Rakić et al. 2011).

[2] We concentrate on situations in which identities are observable and, therefore, a no-identity condition cannot exist. In other words, we focus on differences in the hiring of ingroup and outgroup workers without distinguishing between ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility. See Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) for evidence in situations without identities.

[3] This paper focuses on taste-based discrimination that arises from ingroup favoritism. There can be other types of taste-based discrimination that do not depend on a shared group identity (e.g., animus toward individuals) that we do not study here.

[4] In these studies, identity and individual traits are potentially correlated. An advantage of our experiment is that we can rule out an association between identity and a worker's ability.

[5] Other research considers identity choice in the context of multidimensional identities. Shayo (2009) analyzes how identification affects support for redistribution. Bernard et al. (2016) study the role of identity choice in shaping social structures. Muñoz-Herrera (2021) studies how changing identity can facilitate the social integration of minority groups.

[6] As in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), there is a final decision, not depicted in Figure 1, by which the worker chooses between "accept" and "reject" after learning the employer's decision. Figure 1 shows the payoffs if the worker accepts. Rejecting is a dominated action because it gives both players a payoff of €5. Not surprisingly, 97.5% (117 out of 120) of the workers accept. Because this decision does not affect the theoretical predictions or results, we omit it from our analysis. This decision is interesting in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) because it is relevant in their other treatments. In our case, it is not, but we decided to keep it for our results to be comparable to theirs.

[7] A commonly used approach asks participants for their preference over paintings by Klee and Kandinsky and then assigns them to groups according to their stated tastes (e.g., Chen and Li 2009, Gioia 2017, Kranton and Sanders 2017). Others use preferences over movie genres (Dickinson et al. 2018), colors (Charness et al. 2007), and poetry (Kranton and Sanders 2017).

[8] Participants know that their choice is anonymous and will be used in the second part of the experiment. They also indicate the strength of their preference for the chosen smartphone on a Likert scale.

[9] The mechanism is implemented through a two-step die throw procedure described in the instructions (see the replication materials). We also ask workers to predict their employer's expectation of being matched with a low-ability worker.

[10] Not all studies find evidence of ingroup favoritism in lying. Feldhaus and Mans (2014) find no effect of social identity on lying in a sender–receiver game, whereas Benistant and Villeval (2019) find the same result in a Tullock contest with communication.

[11] One can differentiate between these two reasons with the workers' expectations of each message's impact on the hiring decision. Altruism toward the ingroup predicts a positive association between the relative impact of sending the high-ability message and the likelihood of sending the truthful message. We refrained from measuring these beliefs because incentivized belief elicitation of counterfactual actions is inordinately complicated.

[12] If we define the utility of an employer as $u = \pi + \alpha$, where π is the employer's pecuniary payoff and α is the utility of increasing the worker's earnings by €2, then the employer hires if the employer's updated belief is above $b_H^* = \frac{7-\alpha}{10}$. If altruism is higher toward ingroup than outgroup members (i.e., $\alpha^I > \alpha^O$), then there is discrimination in favor of the ingroup for beliefs $b_H \in \left(\frac{7-\alpha^I}{10}, \frac{7-\alpha^O}{10}\right)$.

[13] A few researchers explore settings in which individuals can change their affiliation to identity groups. Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009)

allow participants to trade group affiliations to play trust games. In Charness and Shmidov (2014), participants playing a public goods game can exit, exclude, and add others to their identity group. Hett et al. (2020) measure group identification preferences and their effect on distributional choices. Robin et al. (2014) find that participants strategically change their opinion to match those of principals, who, in turn, reward like-minded people.

[14] Changing identity is costly because it implies giving up the chance to win one's preferred smartphone. Thus, if workers do not expect a monetary benefit from changing, there is no reason to change.

[15] Overall, we can detect differences above 28.9 percentage points with a power of 0.75. In other words, whereas we cannot exclude the possibility of small differences in lying rates, our evidence is consistent with the findings of Feldhaus and Mans (2014) and Benistant and Villeval (2019) that a shared identity does not have a large impact on lying behavior.

[16] The statistical power of this test is 0.769.

[17] As with any null result, we cannot exclude the possibility that there is a small but real difference in beliefs. Given the observed data, the minimal detectable treatment difference with a power of 0.75 is 19.3 percentage points. The observed difference in beliefs of 5.8 percentage points is below this value and is far smaller than the 30.8 percentage point difference in hiring behavior.

[18] The tests of treatment differences in hiring rates and beliefs have statistical power above 0.80.

[19] We also ran regressions using dummy variables to divide beliefs into 10 equally spaced categories. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged in this more flexible specification.

[20] Because the workers' earnings depend solely on whether they are hired, their earnings mirror the employers' behavior. Namely, workers who send the high-ability message earn more if they are in an ingroup pair in *Fixed*.

[21] Given the previous results, this is an expected finding. The fraction of low-ability workers who lie is close to $\theta^* \approx 42.9\%$ in all conditions (see Figure 2). In fact, the fraction of lying low-ability workers is not significantly different from this threshold in any treatment × pair-type combination (binomial probability tests, $p > 0.443$).

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