Lenstra's Elliptic Curve Factorization Algorithm







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• Recall that Pollard's p-1 factorization method finds factors of N=pq by searching for a power a^L with the property that

$$a^L \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$
 and $a^L \not\equiv 1 \pmod{q}$

- What is it about the quantity p-1 that makes it so important for Pollard's method?
- The answer lies in Fermat's little theorem

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- Intrinsically, p=1 is important because there are p=1 elements in \mathbb{F}_p^* ; so every element α of \mathbb{F}_p^* satisfies α^{p-1}
- The points and the addition law for an elliptic curve $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ are very much analogous to the elements and the multiplication law for \mathbb{F}_p^*
- Hendrik Lenstra made this analogy precise by devising a factorization algorithm that uses the group law on an elliptic curve

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- To describe Lenstra's algorithm, we need to work with an elliptic curve modulo N, where the integer N is not prime, so the ring $\mathbb{Z}/_{N\mathbb{Z}}$ is not a field
- 1. Start with an equation 110 10001010 00111110 10101010 00111110

and suppose that
$$P=(a,b)$$
 is a point on E

 $\mathbf{modulo}^{0}N_{10}$ that \mathbf{is}_{100}^{000}

$$b^2 \equiv a^3 + A \cdot a + B \pmod{N}$$



• Then we can apply the elliptic curve addition formula to compute 2P, 3P, 4P, ..., since the only operations required by that algorithm are addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division (by numbers relatively prime to N)

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• Example. Let $N_0 = 187$ and consider the elliptic

$$_{0}^{1000}$$
 $_{0}^{10000010}$ $_{0}^{1001010}$ $_{1}^{1101110}$ $_{0}^{1101110}$ $_{0}^{1101110}$ $_{0}^{1101110}$ $_{0}^{1101110}$ $_{0}^{1101110}$ $_{0}^{1101110}$ $_{0}^{1101110}$ $_{0}^{1101110}$

- modulo 187
- Let P = (38, 112) on $E \mod 187$
- In order to compute 2*P* mod 187, we follow the elliptic curve addition formula and compute

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- 2y(P)
- $\begin{array}{c} {}^{1} {}^{10001011} {}^{110011} {}^{11001} {}^{11011} {}^{1101100} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{111001} {}^{1111011} {}^{1111001}$
- $x(2P) = \lambda^2 2x(P) = 10328 \equiv 43 \pmod{187}$
- $\lambda(x(P)) = \lambda(x(P)) x(2P)) y(P)$
- Thus 2P = (43, 126) as a point on the curve E modulo 187

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- We can compute 3P = 2P + P in a similar fashion and obtain 3P = (54, 105)
- Also, 4P = (93, 64) can be computed by using either 3P + P or 2P + 2P
- Now we attempt to compute 5P = 3P + 2P on the elliptic curve $\frac{1}{1}$



• The first step in computing 5P = 3P + 2P is to compute the reciprocal of 10000 10000111 011000 1000111 1011001

$$x(3P) - x(2P) = 54 - 43 = 11 \mod 187.$$

- So 11 does not have a reciprocal modulo 187

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- It seems that we have hit a dead end, but in fact, we have struck it rich!
- Notice that since the quantity gcd(11, 187) is greater than 1, it gives us a divisor of 187
- So our failure to compute 5P also tells us that 11 divides 187, which allows us to factor 187 as $187 = 11 \cdot 17$
- This idea underlies Lenstra's elliptic curve

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If we instead look at the elliptic curve E modulo
 11, then a quick computation shows that the point

- This means that at some stage of the calculation we have tried to divide by zero
- That is, we are actually trying to find the reciprocal modulo 11 of some integer that is divisible by 11 in the control of the

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- We replace multiplication modulo *N* in Pollard's factorization method with addition modulo *N* on an elliptic curve
- We start with an elliptic curve *E* and a point *P* on *E* modulo *N* and we compute
 - $2! \cdot P, \ 3! \cdot P, \ 4! \cdot P, \ 5! \cdot P, \dots \pmod{N}.$
- Notice that once we have computed $Q_{0000001} = Q_{000001} = Q_{00$

- At each stage, there are three things may happen
- 1. 100 We are able to compute n!: P_{101110} 011110010 10001110
- We need to find the reciprocal of a number d that is a multiple of N, which would not be helpful, but luckily this situation is quite unlikely to occur
- We need to find the reciprocal of a number d that satisfies $1 < \gcd(d, N) < N$, where $\gcd(d, N)$ is a nontrivial factor of N, so we are happy

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- The solution to this dilemma is to first choose the point P = (a, b) at random of the point P = (a, b) at random
- Second, choose a random value for A
- Third, set

$$B \equiv b^2 - a^3 - A \cdot a \pmod{N}$$

• Then the point P is automatically on the curve



- ullet A minor problem is to find an initial point P on the problem is the find an initial point P on the problem is the find an initial point P on the problem is the find and the problem in t
- The obvious method is to fix an equation for the curve E, plug in values of X, and check whether the quantity $X^3 + AX + B$ is a square modulo N
- Unfortunately, this is difficult to do unless we know how to factor N

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Input. Integer N to be factored.

- 1. Choose random values A, a, and b modulo N.
- **2.** Set P = (a, b) and $B \equiv b^2 a^3 A \cdot a \pmod{N}$. Let E be the elliptic curve $E: Y^2 = X^3 + AX + B$.
- **3.** Loop $j = 2, 3, 4, \ldots$ up to a specified bound.
 - **4.** Compute $Q \equiv jP \pmod{N}$ and set P = Q.
 - **5.** If computation in Step 4 fails, then we have found a d > 1 with $d \mid N$.
 - **6.** If d < N, then success, return d.
 - 7. If d = N, go to Step 1 and choose a new curve and point.
- 8. Increment j and loop again at Step 2.

- We begin by randomly selecting a point

$$B \equiv 3166^2 - 1512^3 - 14 \cdot 1512 \equiv 19 \pmod{6887}.$$



• 1 Now we start computing multiples of P modulo 00101110 11010101 01101101 011001001 1011001 01000111

1Eirst we find that 000 01100000 10000101 11110000 11001010 01000001 01111001 00011000

Next we compute

$$3!P = 3(2P) \equiv (3067, 396) \pmod{6887}$$



\overline{n}	$n! \cdot P \bmod 6887$		
1	P	=	(1512, 3166)
2	$2! \cdot P$	=	(3466, 2996)
3	$3! \cdot P$	=	(3067, 396)
4	$4! \cdot P$	=	(6507, 2654)
5	$5! \cdot P$	=	(2783, 6278)
6	$6! \cdot P$	=	(6141, 5581)



- $\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \text{10111010} \\ \text{1011000} \end{array} \\ \text{11t1s} \\ \text{0nly when we try o and fail to compute } \\ \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10110} \\ \text{11t10110} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10110} \end{array} \\ \text{11t10110} \\ \text{11t10110} \\ \text{11t10110} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10110} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10110} \end{array} \\ \text{11t10110} \\ \text{11t10110} \\ \text{11t10110} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t101000} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text{11t10100} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{11t10100} \\ \text$
- Let $Q = 6! \cdot P = (6141, 5581)$, and we want to
- ${}^{\tiny{111001}} \bullet {}^{\tiny{1}} First we compute {}^{\tiny{11}}$

$$\frac{10110100}{01111100} \frac{11001100}{011110010} 2Q \equiv (5380, 174) \pmod{6887},$$

$$4Q \equiv 2 \cdot 2Q \equiv (203, 2038) \pmod{6887}$$



• Then we compute 7Q as

$$Q \equiv (Q + 2Q) + 4Q$$

$$\equiv ((6141, 5581) + (5380, 174)) + (203, 2038)$$

$$\equiv (984, 589) + (203, 2038) \pmod{6887}$$

- When we attempt to perform the final step, we
 need to compute the reciprocal of 203 984
 modulo 6887
- But we find that gcd(203 984, 6887) = 71

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- Thus we have discovered a nontrivial divisor of 6887, namely 71, which gives the factorization 6887 = 71.97
- In $E(\mathbb{F}_{71})$, the point P satisfies $63P \equiv \mathcal{O}$, while in $E(\mathbb{F}_{97})$, the point P satisfies $107P \equiv \mathcal{O}$
- The reason that we succeeded in factoring 6887 using $7! \cdot P$ is precisely because 7! is the smallest factorial that is divisible by 63

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- Remark. It is an interesting and useful property of the elliptic curve factorization algorithm that its expected running time depends on the smallest prime factor of N, rather than on N itself
- More precisely, if p is the smallest factor of N, then the elliptic curve factorization algorithm has average running time approximately

$$O\left(e^{\sqrt{2(\log p)(\log\log p)}}\right)$$
 steps

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- If N = pq is a product of two primes with $p \approx q$, the running times of ECM and QS are approximately equal, and then the fact that a sieve step is much faster than an elliptic curve step makes sieve methods faster in practice
- However, the elliptic curve method is quite
 useful for finding moderately large factors of
 extremely large numbers, because its running
 time depends on the smallest prime factor





101 **2** Selecting a kilobit SNFS target number

Once the decision had been reached to attempt a kilobit SNFS factorization by a 100 old joint effort, it remained to find a suitable target number to factor. In this section we describe the process that led to our choice of $2^{1039} - 1$.

Regular RSA moduli were ruled out, since in general they will not have the ⁰¹¹ special form required for SNFS. Special form numbers, however, are not especially ¹⁰¹ special form required for SiVI's: Special form humbers, however, are not especially $_{100}^{100}$ concocted to have two factors of approximately the same size, and have factors of a $_{110}^{100}$ 011 priori unknown sizes. In particular, they may have factors that could relatively easily 110 ¹⁰¹ be found using factoring methods different from SNFS, such as Pollard's p-1 or ρ ¹¹¹ method, or the elliptic curve method (ECM, cf. [11]). Thus, for all kilobit special form numbers under consideration, we first spent a considerable ECM effort to increase 100 our confidence that the number we would eventually settle for would not turn out 100 $\frac{011}{011}$ to have an undesirably small factor, i.e., a factor that could have been found easier $\frac{111}{100}$ out using, for instance, ECM.

00101110 00001011 01000100 10000thttp://eprint.iacr.org/2007/205:100 01101001 11001000 11110000 01001010