

# CSIT 495/595 - Introduction to Cryptography

## Digital Signatures

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# Course Performance Statistics

- Average and Highest scores so far (out of 38%)

	Quiz 1 (4%)	Quiz 2 (4%)	Assign 1 (15%)	Midterm (15%)
Average	2.64	2.08	10.36	10.80
Highest	4	3.75	15	14.6

- What is remaining? (62%)
  - Active Class Participation Credit (2%)
  - Assignment 2 (15%) → *Due on December 1*
  - Project Demo (20%) → *TBD*
  - Final Exam (25%) → *Scheduled on December 8*

# Public-Key Encryption: Recap

**Def:** a public-key encryption system is a triple of algs.  $(G, E, D)$

- $G()$ : randomized alg. outputs a key pair  $(pk, sk)$
- $E(pk, m)$ : randomized alg. that takes  $m \in M$  and outputs  $c \in C$
- $D(sk, c)$ : det. alg. that takes  $c \in C$  and outputs  $m \in M$  or  $\perp$

Consistency:  $\forall (pk, sk)$  output by  $G$  :

$$\forall m \in M: D(sk, E(pk, m)) = m$$

# Private-Key vs. Public-Key: Recap

	Private-Key Setting	Public-Key Setting
Secrecy	Private-key encryption	Public-key encryption
Integrity	MACs	Digital Signatures

- In public-key setting, Integrity/authenticity is achieved using **digital signatures**
- Digital Signatures can be considered as the public-key analogue to MACs (with some differences)

# Digital Signatures: Basic Idea

- Consider a user Alice (often called *signer* in this context) owns a public-private key pair
- Suppose Alice wants to send a message  $m$  to Bob
- Assume that Bob knows the public key of Alice (this can be achieved using techniques discussed earlier)
- **Key Goal of Signature Schemes:**
  - 1 Alice signs the message and sends it to Bob
  - 2 Bob should verify that  $m$  was originated from Alice and was not modified in transit
- In general, anyone with Alice's public key should be able to verify  $m$
- **Observation:** In the context of digital signatures, the owner of the public-key is the sender (note that this is not the case in a typical public-key encryption)

# Digital Signature: Real-World Example

- Consider a company who wants to release software update/patches to its clients in an authenticated manner (what does this mean?)
- The company can generate a public-private key pair  $pk, sk$  and distribute  $pk$  to all its clients (**Example**:  $pk$  can be incorporated with the original software purchased)
- When releasing a software update  $m$ :
  - 1 The company can compute a digital signature  $S$  on  $m$  using  $sk$
  - 2 Company sends  $(m, S)$  to all its clients
  - 3 Each client can verify whether  $S$  is a valid signature on  $m$  using  $pk$

# MACs vs. Digital Signatures (DS in short)

- **MAC**: sender need to compute a separate MAC for each receiver
- **DS**: compute only a single signature for each message sent to multiple receivers
- **MAC**: only the intended receiver with the corresponding secret key can validate the message
- **DS**: Publicly Verifiable (implies that signatures are transferable)

# MACs vs. Digital Signatures (DS)

- **MAC**: cannot provide non-repudiation
- **DS**: provide non-repudiation
- **Key Observation 1**: MACs are shorter and roughly 2-3 orders of magnitude faster than digital signatures
- **Key Observation 2**: If the sender is sending a message only to a single party and if **public verifiability**, **transferability**, and/or **non-repudiation** is required, **MAC should be used**



# Digital Signatures: Definition

Consists of three algorithms

- **Key Generation**: takes a security parameter (usually key length) and outputs public key  $pk$  and private key  $sk$
- **Signing**: takes a message  $m$  and private key  $sk$  and generates a signature  $S$
- **Verification**: takes public key  $pk$ , message  $m$  and a signature  $S$  as inputs and outputs 1 if valid, and 0 otherwise

**Security**: the adversary should not be able to generate a forgery with a probability better than a negligible function


# Hash-and-Sign Approach (1)

Message is first hashed and then signed due to the following reasons:

- It is not every efficient to sign longer messages (say a 1 GB file)
- To save bandwidth

# Hash-and-Sign Approach (2)

## Creating and verifying a digital signature



If the calculated hashcode does not match the result of the decrypted signature, either the document was changed after signing, or the signature was not generated with the private key of the alleged sender.

# RSA-Based Digital Signatures (1)

## Key generation (as in RSA encryption):

- Select 2 large prime numbers of about the same size,  $p$  and  $q$
- Compute  $n = pq$ , and  $\Phi = (q - 1)(p - 1)$
- Select a random integer  $e$ ,  $1 < e < \Phi$ , s.t.  $\gcd(e, \Phi) = 1$
- Compute  $d$ ,  $1 < d < \Phi$  s.t.  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\Phi}$

**Public key:**  $(e, n)$

**Secret key:**  $d, p$  and  $q$  must also remain secret

# RSA-Based Digital Signatures (2)

## Signing message M

- M must verify  $0 < M < n$
- Use private key (d)
- compute  $S = M^d \bmod n$

## Verifying signature S

- Use public key (e, n)
- Compute  $S^e \bmod n = (M^d \bmod n)^e \bmod n = M$

Note: in practice, a hash of the message is signed and not the message itself.

# RSA-Based Digital Signatures: Security

## Example of forging

- Attack based on the multiplicative property of property of RSA.

$$y_1 = \text{sig}_K(x_1)$$

$$y_2 = \text{sig}_K(x_2), \text{ then}$$

$$\text{ver}_K(x_1 x_2 \bmod n, y_1 y_2 \bmod n) = \text{true}$$

- So adversary can create the valid signature  $y_1 y_2 \bmod n$  on the message  $x_1 x_2 \bmod n$
- This is an existential forgery using a known message attack.

Methods based on DLP: ElGamal and Schnorr signature schemes

# Digital Certificates

- Important application of digital signatures
- Use public-key cryptography to securely distribute public keys
- A single public-key of a trusted-party, called *certificate authority*, is first distributed in a secure fashion. Then this key can be used to distribute many other public keys
- **Digital certificate**: signature binding an entity to some public key

# Digital Certificates: Basic Idea

- Consider two users Charlie and Alice with  $(pk_C, sk_C)$  and  $(pk_A, sk_A)$
- Assume that Charlie knows Alice's public key  $pk_A$
- Charlie Computes:

$$Cert_{C \rightarrow A} = \text{Sign}_{sk_C}(\text{Alice's public key is } pk_A)$$

We call  $Cert_{C \rightarrow A}$  a certificate for Alice's public key  $pk_A$  issued by Charlie (**trusted or certificate authority**)

- In general, other details are used in the certificate generation, such as Alice's
  - full name
  - email address
  - URL of personal website



# Digital Certificates: Basic Idea

- Suppose Bob wants to communicate with Alice
- Assume Bob knows  $pk_C$
- Alice sends  $(pk_A, Cert_{C \rightarrow A})$  to Bob
- Bob verifies whether  $Cert_{C \rightarrow A}$  is a valid signature on the message *Alice's public key is  $pk_A$*  with respect to  $pk_C$
- If the verification succeeds, Alice and Bob can communicate over an insecure and authenticated channel

# Digital Certificates: Key Factors

- To what extent Bob can trust Charlie? (usually only well-established companies play the role of CA)
- How Bob learns the public key of CA?
  - many operating systems/web browsers typically come pre-configured with many CA's public keys
- Single or Multiple CAs
- Expiration of certificates (include expiration date as part of the message before generating the signature)

# Useful References

- Chapter 12, Introduction to Modern Cryptography by Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell, 2nd Edition, CRC Press, 2015.
- [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hk8wx38z\(v=vs.110\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hk8wx38z(v=vs.110).aspx)
- <https://www.entrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/cryptointro.pdf>
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