



Layer 2 Security

Overview of Switch Security




Why Worry About Layer 2 Security?



OSI was built to allow different layers to work without knowledge of each other.

Domino Effect


- If one layer is hacked, communications are compromised without the other layers being aware of the problem.
- Security is only as strong as your weakest link.
- When it comes to networking, Layer 2 can be a very weak link.




Switch Attack Categories

- STP attacks
- CAM table (MAC address table) overflows
- DHCP spoofing
- ARP spoofing
- Address spoofing

CAM Table Overflow Attack



Port Security



Secure MAC Addresses

- Static
- Dynamic
- Sticky

Default Settings

Feature

Port security
Maximum MAC addresses
Violation mode
Sticky address learning
Port security aging

Default Setting

Disabled
1
Shutdown
Disabled
Disabled. Aging time is 0. When enabled, the default type is absolute.

Configuration Guidelines

- Only on static access ports
- Not on trunk or dynamic access ports
- Not on SPAN port
- Not on EtherChannel port
- Not configurable on per-VLAN basis
- No aging of sticky addresses
- No simultaneous enabling of protect and restrict options

Configuring Port Security

```
switch(config-if)#
```

switchport mode access

Set the interface mode as access

```
switch(config-if)#
```

switchport port-security

Enable port security on the interface

```
switch(config-if)#
```

switchport port-security maximum value

 Set the maximum number of secure MAC addresses for the interface (optional)

Configuring Port Security (Cont.)

```
switch(config-if)#
switchport port-security violation {protect | restrict |
```

Set the violation mode (optional)

```
switch(config-if)#
```

shutdown }

```
switchport port-security mac-address mac-address
```

Enter a static secure MAC address for the interface (optional)

```
switch(config-if)#
```

```
switchport port-security mac-address sticky
```

Enable sticky learning on the interface (optional)


Configuring Port Security Aging

{absolute | inactivity}}

```
switch(config-if)#
switchport port-security aging {static | time time | type
```

 Enable or disable static aging for the secure port, or set the aging time or type

Verifying Port Security



Verifying Port Security (Cont.)

```
sw-class# show port-security interface fa0/12
Port Security : Enabled
                   : Secure-down
Port Status
Violation Mode : Shutdown
          : 0 mins
Aging Time
          : Absolute
Aging Type
SecureStatic Address Aging : Disabled
Maximum MAC Addresses : 1
Total MAC Addresses : 1
Configured MAC Addresses : 1
Sticky MAC Addresses : 0
Last Source Address : 0000.0000.0000
Security Violation Count : 0
```

Verifying Port Security (Cont.)

```
sw-class# show port-security address

Secure Mac Address Table

Vlan Mac Address Type Ports Remaining Age

(mins)

1 0000.ffff.aaaa SecureConfigured Fa0/12 -

Total Addresses in System (excluding one mac per port) : 0

Max Addresses limit in System (excluding one mac per port) : 1024
```

Auto recovery from err-disable state


- If the port security feature has shutdown a port, the port can be restored to an operational state using the errordisable recovery procedure.
- Enable recovery cause is port security:

Switch (config) #errdisable recovery cause psecure-violation

Set a global recovery timeout by using the command:

Switch (config) #errdisable recovery interval seconds

VLAN Hopping




Mitigating VLAN Hopping

switch(config-if)#

switchport mode access

Configure port as an access port

Spanning Tree Manipulation



Mitigating Spanning Tree Manipulation

```
Switch(config)#spanning-tree portfast bpduguard
or
Switch(config-if)#spanning-tree bpduguard enable
```

 The BPDU – guard feature shuts down ports when ports receive BPDU.

Auto recovery from err-disable state


- If the BPDU guard feature has shutdown a port, the port can be restored to an operational state using the errordisable recovery procedure.
- Enable recovery cause is BPDU guard :

Switch (config) #errdisable recovery cause bpduguard

Set a global recovery timeout by using the command:


Switch (config) #errdisable recovery interval seconds

DHCP Attacks



DHCP Snooping

- DHCP snooping allows the configuration of ports as trusted or untrusted.
- Untrusted ports cannot process DHCP replies.
- Configure DHCP snooping on uplinks to a DHCP server.
- Do not configure DHCP snooping on client ports.




Mitigating DHCP Attacks

Here are two ways to mitigate DHCP spoofing and starvation attacks:


- Port security
- DHCP snooping

ARP Spoofing



Dynamic ARP Inspection

- DAI associates each interface with a trusted state or an untrusted state.
- Trusted interfaces bypass all DAI.
- Untrusted interfaces undergo DAI validation.



DHCP snooping can build MAC-to-IP bindings for DAI validation.

Configuring DAI

```
Switch(config) #ip arp inspection vlan vlan_id[,vlan_id]
```

Enables DAI on a VLAN or range of VLANs

```
Switch(config-if)#ip arp inspection trust
```

Enables DAI on an interface and sets the interface as a trusted interface


```
Switch(config-if)#ip arp inspection validate {[src-mac]
[dst-mac] [ip]}
```

Configures DAI to drop ARP packets when the IP addresses are invalid

Protection from ARP Spoofing

Legitimate

- Configure to protect against rogue DHCP servers.
- Configure for dynamic ARP inspection.



Layer 2 Security Best Practices

- Manage switches in as secure a manner as possible (SSH, OOB, permit lists, etc.).
- Do not use VLAN 1 for anything.
- Set all user ports to nontrunking (unless you are using Cisco VoIP).
- Use port security where possible for access ports.
- Enable STP attack mitigation (BPDU guard, root guard).
- Use Cisco Discovery Protocol only where necessary—it is useful with phones.
- Disable all unused ports and put them in an unused VLAN.

#