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# Saving, Investment and the Financial System

The World of Finance and its Macroeconomic Significance

# Outline

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1. Financial System
  2. Determinants of Borrowing Costs
  3. Loanable Funds Model
- Textbook Readings: Ch. 6 pp. 186-191, Ch. 10 pp. 329-337

# Introduction

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- In a capitalist economy, the **financial structure** that facilitates economic activity is a **dominant force**
- **Linking** financial market dynamics to real economy trajectories is important

# What is Finance?

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- The management, creation and study of:
  - Money
  - Banking
  - Credit
  - Investments
  - Assets and Liabilities

# Finance

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
- Matching those with **cash** to those with **ideas** on how to use it

Lender → Gives up cash today → Collects cash in the future

Borrower → Collects cash today → Pays back in the future

- Lenders want to get back **more** than what they lent:
  - **Compensation** for temporarily foregoing use of the funds

# The Financial System in a Nutshell



- A financial system operating efficiently improves economic welfare of everyone in society

# Some Key Players in Finance

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- **Banks**
  - Borrow from depositors, lend to homebuyers and businesses
- **Bonds**
  - Bond buyers provide loans for businesses and governments
  - Bond buyers are promised a guaranteed interest payment
- **Stocks**
  - When firms issue new equity, they receive funds from share buyers
  - Share buyers are **not** promised a guaranteed interest payment
  - They own a piece of the gain in good times but they can lose everything if things go awry

# The World of Finance: 4 Key Functions

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

- Matching Savers and Borrowers
  - Financial **intermediaries** and financial **markets**
- Risk-sharing
  - Investors can **spread** their money over different assets, **reducing** their risk
- Liquidity
  - Allows savers to **convert** their investments **into cash**
- Information
  - Prices of financial securities represent **beliefs about future**

# The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)

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- An efficient financial market is one in which security **prices always reflect all available information**
  - Investors buy/sell assets as the news flow changes opinion about future
  - Nearly instantly → hard to profit from trading on emerging news
- Assumptions:
  1. Investors are assumed to be **rational** (e.g. 3% vs 8%)
  2. If some are irrational, their actions are **random** and **cancel**
  3. If irrational in similar ways, **rational speculators** reverse effects on prices

# Arbitrage Eliminates Any Riskless Wagers



# Arbitrage and Efficient Markets in Action

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Efficient Markets In Action					
	Statistics for 03/15/07				
Date Of Issuance	Years Remaining For Instrument	Coupon Rate	Date Of Maturity	Bond Price Secondary Market	Yield-to- Maturity
2/15/2007	10	4 5/8	2/15/2017	100	4.57
5/15/1987	10	8 3/4	5/15/2017	132	4.64

# What Forces Drive Asset Prices?

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- What forces drive stock, bond and all other asset prices?
- Changing expectations!
- Expectations about real growth rates and inflation rate
- Example: U.S. share prices (S&P500)
  - **Confidence** in a growing economy: **800 to 1450**, 2002 through 2007
  - **Panic** about collapsing economy: **1450 to 666**, 2007 through early 2009

# S&P 500




# But Rational Expectations Swim Against Uncertainty

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- We assume **instantaneous, rational** absorption of economic news
- Rational investors want to pick higher paying assets
- But for many investment decisions, it is **not obvious** which will deliver the better payoff
- ‘**Nobody Knows, But Everybody Has to Guess**’

# How the Consensus Opinion About the Future Evolve?



- Consensus opinion about the **outlook** for overall trends
- Implied forecasts **embedded** in financial market asset prices

# 2013 Nobel Prize in Economics: E. Fama vs R. Shiller

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- Two competing schools of thought concerning the collective insights of the many
- Eugene Fama, University of Chicago:
  - Markets are **efficient**, most of the time
  - The centerpiece of ‘freshwater economics’
- Robert Shiller, Yale University:
  - Markets can be **irrational**, over long periods
  - Acceptable commentary at ‘saltwater schools’

# Credit Market: Types of Instruments

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- Simple loan
  - Borrower repays the **principal** amount plus an **interest payment**
- Fixed-payment loan
  - Car loan, home mortgage
- Coupon bond
  - **Periodic** interest payments until the **maturity**, face value repaid at maturity
- Discount bond
  - Bought at a price below its **face value**, face value repaid at maturity

# Treasury Securities

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- Discount bond
  - **T-Bills** (matures in **a year or less**)
- Coupon bonds
  - **T-Notes** (matures between **two to ten years**)
  - **T-Bonds** ( matures between **ten to thirty years**)

# Basics of Bond Valuation

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- Coupon bonds make payments **at different times** in the future
- How to value future cash flow payments?
- **Price of a bond:** Present value of all future cash flows
- **Yield to maturity:** Interest rate that equates the present value of future cash flows to its value today

# Relationship Between Prices and Yields

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- Imagine you pay \$200 for a bond that pays **\$15** per year **forever**
- The yield to maturity on your bond is 7.5%
- Imagine that later:
  - Interest rates in other bonds have increased to 10%
  - You want to sell your bond
- How do you sell a bond that pays 7.5% when others pay 10%?
- What if interest rates would have gone down to 5%?
- Key: **Negative** relationship between prices and yields!

# What Is the Effect of Inflation on the Cost of Borrowing?

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- Instead of buying a \$1,000 computer today, Ernie lends the money to Bert for 1 year at a 5% interest rate
- After 1 year, Ernie receives \$1,050 from Bert but realize that the computer now costs \$1,100
  - I got less than nothing for lending to Bert!
- Inflation can destroy **purchasing power**
- **The moral:** When you lend money, you want to be paid the **real interest!**



# Fisher Equation

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
Nominal Interest Rate = Real Interest Rate + Inflation Rate

$$i = r + \pi$$

- Bond yields driven by inflation and real growth expectations

# The Great Disinflation, 1980-2000

- As inflation expectations fell, long rates fell



# Real Interest Rate: Ex-Ante vs Ex-Post

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- **Ex-ante** real interest rate: adjusted for **expected** inflation ( $\pi = \pi^e$ )
  - Very important and what economists typically mean by  $r$
- **Ex-post** real interest rate: adjusted for **actual** inflation ( $\pi = \pi^{past}$ )
  - How well the lender/borrower did in real terms *after the fact*
  - Real purchasing power of a loan
- Low real interest rate → greater incentives to borrow, fewer to lend

# What Do People Expect Inflation Will Be?

- One possibility is to assume inflation will behave as in the past
  - $\pi^e = \pi_{t-1}$

	10yr Yield	12-month Core CPI	Actual 10yr Rate of Inflation	Ex-ante Real 10yr Rate	Ex-post Real 10yr Rate
1970	6.4	4.6	7.9	1.8	-1.5
1980	12.8	9.6	4.8	3.2	8.0
2017	2.4	1.7	??	0.7	??

# What Do People Expect Inflation Will Be?

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- U.S. Treasury offer inflation ‘protected’ bonds
- TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Security) bonds tell us just that
  - Alternative to  $\pi^e = \pi_{t-1}$
- The bond will pay you its YIELD + the year-on-year change for the CPI, over the life of the bond
- Provide information about **market expectations for inflation**
  - Spread between the Treasury rate and the TIPS rate

# The 10-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate



# Breakeven Inflation

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- By subtracting the TIPS yield from the regular bond yield, we derive **break-even inflation rates**

	Dec-99	6-Dec	16-Dec
10 year Tips Yield	4.30%	2.40%	0.16%
10-year T-note Yield	6.40%	4.70%	1.79%
10-year breakeven inflation	2.10%	2.30%	1.63%

- Why does this hold?

# A Menu of Borrowing Costs: Governments and Firms

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- Most macro models focus on **the** interest rate
- In reality, there are **many** interest rates

U.S. 3-month:	0.25%
U.S. 2-year:	0.90%
U.S. 10-year:	1.80%
Portuguese 10-year:	3.40%
High-grade company:	3.60%
Risky company:	4.35%
Junk company:	5.50%

- Patterns? Why do they differ?

# A Theory of Interest, John R. Hicks

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- The interest rate a lender charges depends on:
- **DURATION**
  - How **long** the loan lasts
- **DEFAULT**
  - How much **risk of bankruptcy** exists
- Duration and default drive borrowing costs

# Borrowing Rates As a Window on Future Rates

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- You can lend to the federal government for 2 by buying 2-year notes
- Do that every **2 years 5 times**, and you have lent to the federal government for 10 years
- Alternatively, buy a 10-year note, and lend for **10 years in one step**
- But if **EXPECTATIONS** are that 2 year rates will be rising, you want a higher rate to lend for 10 years

# Duration

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- Bonds with **same default risk** (same issuer) may have different yields because their times to maturity are different

	<u>10/12/16</u>	<u>10/12/17</u>
U.S. 3-month:	0.25% (annualized)	1.05% (annualized)
U.S. 2-year:	0.90% per year	1.50% per year
U.S. 10-year:	1.80% per year	2.35% per year

- **Yield curve:** Plot of yields on bonds with different maturities by the same issuer

# Default Risk

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- We can also look at *promised* interest payments on bonds of the **same duration** with different risk levels


**Risk-free:** U.S. government 10-year: 1.8% per year

**Risky:** 10-year note from Sears: 5.8% per year

- Risky rates are higher
  - You are promised a much higher interest if you lend to Sears for 10 years
- But risky bonds are riskier
  - If you lend to Sears, they may go bankrupt → You may not get your money back

# Bond Spreads

- Risky/risk-free **spread**: The interest rate on risky bonds minus the interest rate on risk-free bonds



- Risky/r-f spreads leap in recessions, recede as economy improves

# Spreads as Collective Opinion About the Future

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- Investors' collective opinion about the **future**
- Spreads between **long-term** bonds and **short-term** notes:
  - Tell us whether investors think short-term rates are *going up or down*
- Spreads between **corporate** bonds and **government** bonds:
  - Tell us how much *risk of bankruptcy* investors see in the world

# What Drives Bond Prices Up and Down (and Bond Yields Down and Up) ?

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- In 1962, 10-year T-note yields were 4%
- In 1980, 10-year T-note yields were 13%
- In 1993, 10-year T-note yields were 5.5%
- In 1999, 10-year T-note yields were 6.5%

# Drivers of Borrowing Costs

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- Our macroeconomic understanding requires us to study **several** interest rates
- We need to understand the effects of **inflation** (expectations):
  - Real vs nominal interest rates
- We need to understand **duration**:
  - Short-term vs long-term interest rates
- We need to understand **default**:
  - Risk-free vs risky interest rates

# The Macroeconomics of Saving and Investment

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- Begin with the GDP identity:

$$Y = C + I + G + NX$$

- Assume a closed economy:

$$Y = C + I + G$$

- Rearrange terms:

$$I = Y - C - G$$

- Define two terms:

$$S_{private} = Y - C - T \quad S_{public} = T - G$$

# Our Flow Model: $S = I$

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- Total (domestic) saving:

$$S = S_{private} + S_{public}$$

- Substitute:

$$S = (Y - C - T) + (T - G)$$

- Simplify:

$$S = Y - C - G$$

$$S = I$$


- Therefore, total saving must equal total investment

# The Market for Loanable Funds


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- Households **supply** funds
  - They lend to firms and the government
- Firms and the government **demand** funds
  - They borrow from households
  - **Note:** Through its saving and dissaving, the government affects quantity of funds that “pass through” to firms
- The interaction of borrowers and lenders determines the **market interest rate** and the **quantity of loanable funds** exchanged

# The Loanable Funds Model




# Shock: Real Activity Jumps (Technological Change)




# Shock: Real Activity Jumps

- In 1983-1984, real growth soared. In reaction, T-note yields leapt



# Shock: Increase in Government Purchases (G)

- Suppose the government runs a budget deficit
- To fund the deficit, it sells bonds to households, decreasing the supply of funds available to firms




- **Crowding out:** Decline in investment spending as a result of increases in G

# Shock: Savings Up

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- The loanable funds model predicts that:
  - ‘An **increase in saving**, by increasing the supply of loanable funds, should **lower the real interest rate** and **increase the level of investment spending**’
  - ‘This increase in investment spending might offset some or all of the decline in consumption’
- According to this model, the surge in saving in 2009 did not play a big role in the recession. Do you agree?

# Investment in 2009



- A collapse reflecting **soaring** interest rates

# Company Borrowing Costs Were At Record Highs In 2009

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	1997	2006	2009
10-Year Treasury	5.5	5	2.5
Junk Bond	8.0	7	17.5
Spread (Junk – 10-Year)	2.5	2	15


# Keynes and the Paradox of Thrift

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- Saving = Investment
- But if everyone tries to **save more**
  - Demand plunges (later we'll see why)
  - Slashed jobs = Sharp declines in income
  - Sharp fall for output and income so **SAVING FALL**
  - Investment fall
- As everyone tries to save more, saving actually goes down!
- That is Keynes's **paradox of thrift**

# Shock: Savings Up (cont.)

- Loanable funds model:  $r \downarrow, I \uparrow$



- In 2009, T-note rates plunged but investment plunged as well! Why?

# What Happens In This Case?

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- The model points to ‘falling real interest rates’, as saving increases
- But **did the right interest rates fall?**
  - Absolutely not!
  - Government borrowing rate **plunges** as savers bought safe bonds
  - Company borrowing rates **soared!**
- Our more detailed look at the world of finance allows us to **reject** the simplistic loanable funds model!

# We Need to Understand Household Investment Choices

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
- Investors violently change their demand for risky assets vs risk-free assets
- That means risky interest rates leap → Investment plunges
- Therefore, we can **extend** the loanable funds model by incorporating **risk**

# Definitions

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- $r_c$  = real, long-term, corporate borrowing rate
  - Inflation-adjusted interest rate risky borrowers pay for 10-year money
- $r_g$  = real, long-term, government borrowing rate
  - Inflation-adjusted interest rate the government pays for 10-year money
- $S_c$  = households' supply of funds to corporations
- $S_g$  = households' supply of funds to the government

# Expanded Loanable Funds Model




# Why is $D_c$ Downward Sloping and $D_g$ a Vertical Line?


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- $D_c$ , the corporate demand for loanable funds, is quite **sensitive to interest rates**
  - If interest rate jumps company costs go up and can do less
- $D_g$ , the government demand for loanable funds, **ignores the level of interest rates**
  - Government borrows to pay for social security, defense, pay its bills, etc. **irrespective of the interest rate**

# Expanding on Crowding Out




Loanable Funds: Government




# What Happens in an Economic Crisis?

- HH saving leaps. But the increased savings supply goes to **safe** government debt:  **$S_g$  soars**. Amid panic, HH radically reduce their willingness to fund corporations:  **$S_c$  plunges**




# What Happens in an Economic Crisis?

- The corporate borrowing rate,  $r_c$ , **soars**, and lending to corporations,  $Q_c$ , **plunges**. Government borrowing,  $Q_g$ , **soars**, as tax collections plunge and transfers leap as a result of higher unemployment. Nonetheless, the government borrowing rate,  $r_g$ , **plunges**



# Equilibrium in 2009

- $r_c$  much higher,  $Q_c$  much lower;  $r_g$  much lower,  $Q_g$  much higher



- The spread between risky and risk-free bonds increased significantly

# We Now Have a Model in Line with the Great Recession

