

Household Production, Markets, and Separation¹

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Agenda

- ▶ Motivation: incomplete markets and household-producer separation
- ▶ Modeling separation
- ▶ Testing separation: Benjamin (1992)
- ▶ BREAK
- ▶ Later separation tests
- ▶ Incomplete markets
- ▶ Markets, separation, and technology adoption

Outline

Motivation

Modeling separation

Benjamin (1992)

Later separation tests

Incomplete markets

Markets, separation, and technology adoption

Motivation: Incomplete markets

Frequent market failures in developing contexts

- ▶ Consequence for firms: optimization not possible
 - ▶ No/constrained land market \Rightarrow cannot optimize land use
 - ▶ No/constrained labor market \Rightarrow cannot optimize labor supply
 - ▶ No/constrained credit market \Rightarrow cannot optimize either input
- ▶ Economic implications:
 - ▶ Different types of behaviors become rational, e.g., low investment, technology adoption
 - ▶ Low investment and misallocation: lower productivity

Motivation: Labor supply across activities

TABLE 5.1 • Participation in Labour Activities During the Past 7 days (% of persons >5 years old)

Region	By Activity									
	Agriculture		Nonfarm Enterprise		Wage		Apprenticeship		No Activity	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Post-planting (July–Aug)										
North Central	61.4	48.2	10.4	17.7	6.7	5.1	1.9	2.4	28.6	33.8
North East	57.0	35.4	21.3	24.3	8.0	1.1	2.8	0.6	30.1	47.6
North West	53.2	17.3	24.9	33.3	5.4	1.2	1.1	1.2	34.8	54.5
South East	40.1	48.8	23.2	20.2	7.6	7.7	1.8	2.2	40.2	35.5
South South	40.6	42.9	23.1	26.0	8.9	6.3	3.5	2.3	37.9	36.1
South West	26.6	16.2	26.8	36.1	12.7	8.1	5.6	4.2	38.4	42.5
Urban	20.0	14.4	29.4	31.7	12.0	7.8	3.3	2.5	45.9	50.6
Rural	59.8	40.4	18.6	25.0	5.9	2.8	2.1	1.7	30.2	40.6
NGA	48.6	33.1	21.6	26.9	7.6	4.2	2.5	1.9	34.6	43.4
Post-harvest (Jan–Feb)										
North Central	37.0	23.9	9.5	13.0	8.1	4.7	1.7	1.6	48.0	58.8
North East	23.8	14.7	15.1	11.8	6.4	1.6	3.7	2.2	57.3	71.8
North West	28.3	9.0	22.1	22.6	4.9	1.2	0.9	0.3	54.3	69.0
South East	20.2	27.9	18.7	16.8	8.7	7.5	3.0	2.8	53.8	51.0
South South	26.8	28.7	15.9	18.3	12.9	7.0	2.8	3.5	49.5	50.2
South West	21.5	12.2	20.3	30.5	16.2	7.8	4.3	2.6	43.9	50.7
Urban	11.1	7.0	24.0	25.8	13.5	7.5	2.9	2.2	53.8	59.6
Rural	33.4	22.4	14.8	16.1	6.6	3.0	2.2	1.8	51.1	60.9
NGA	27.1	18.1	17.4	18.8	8.5	4.2	2.4	1.9	51.9	60.6

Source: Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, GHSP 2018-19 Survey Report

Motivation: Household-Producers

- ▶ Many of the global poor are entrepreneurs
 - ▶ Smallholder farmers
 - ▶ Small business owners
- ▶ How is decision-making different for entrepreneurs?
- ▶ Today's question: how do market failures affect separation of consumption and production problems?

The Separability Property

In the "Agricultural Household Model" with perfect markets:

1. **Production First:** The household chooses L and K to maximize profit π^* .
2. **Consumption Second:** The household maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint $pc \leq \pi^* + w(T - l) + E$ where T is total time.

The Separation Result: Production decisions are **independent** of household preferences (u) and endowment (L).

What if markets are missing (e.g., no hired labor, no insurance)?

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The Separation Result: Production decisions are **independent** of household preferences (u) and endowment (L).

What if markets are missing (e.g., no hired labor, no insurance)?
Separability breaks down, and household size/preferences start to dictate production

Separation failures

- ▶ Suppose we have friction in one market or another
- ▶ The challenge - developed in Benjamin (1992) - is that then production and consumption decisions are linked
- ▶ Labor market failures: if you have to use your own labor to produce, then you consider both the **marginal product** and the demands for **leisure** and **consumption**
- ▶ Why does this matter?

Outline

Motivation

Modeling separation

Benjamin (1992)

Later separation tests

Incomplete markets

Markets, separation, and technology adoption

Extreme situation: Autarchic household producers

Households maximize

$$u_h = u(c, l; a)$$

and produce

$$q = F(L; A)$$

- ▶ c is consumption
- ▶ l is leisure
- ▶ a are household characteristics which shift utility
- ▶ L is labor allocated to production
- ▶ A are household characteristics which shift production

Autarchic household producer static one-period problem

Suppose

- ▶ Total household labor availability $T(a) = L + l$
- ▶ $F(L; A)$ and $u(c, l)$ behave normally, no further restrictions
- ▶ Price of the production/consumption good normalized to 1
- ▶ Household has y additional income and no savings
- ▶ Households consumes all income and production

Household-producer optimizes

Autarchic household producer static one-period problem

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Household-producer optimizes

$$\max_L u(y + F(L; A), T(a) - L; a)$$

$$\text{FOC } u_1 F_1 - u_2 = 0 \Rightarrow F_1 = \frac{u_2}{u_1}$$

Autarchic household producer static problem

$$\max_L u(y + F(L; A), T(a) - L; a)$$

$$\text{FOC: } u_1 F_1 - u_2 = 0 \Rightarrow F_1 = \frac{u_2}{u_1}$$

- ▶ Marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption determines labor allocation
 - ▶ *Not* price of labor
- ▶ What would happen to business/farm production if households got (exogenously) richer? If they got larger?
 - ▶ No separation

What if there is a functioning labor market?

- ▶ Households allocate labor to their business/farm (L^F), wage work (L^O), and leisure l with total time $T(a) = L^F + L^O + l$
- ▶ Households can hire L^H units of labor
- ▶ Same wage w of hired labor and wage work
- ▶ Households have exogenous income y

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Household-producer optimizes

$$\max_{L^O, L^F, L^H} u(c, l; a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } c = F(L^F + L^H; A) - wL^H + wL^O + y$$

$$\text{and } l + L^F + L^O = T(a)$$

Solving the problem

$$\max_{L^O, L^F, L^H} u(F(L^F + L^H; A) - wL^H + wL^O + y, T - L^F - L^O; a)$$

FOCs:

Solving the problem

$$\max_{L^O, L^F, L^H} u(F(L^F + L^H; A) - wL^H + wL^O + y, T - L^F - L^O; a)$$

FOCs:

$$L^O : \quad u_1 w - u_2 = 0$$

$$L^F : \quad u_1 F' - u_2 = 0$$

$$L^H : \quad u_1 (F' - w) = 0$$

Implications of optimization

FOCs:

$$L^O : u_1 w - u_2 = 0$$

$$L^F : u_1 F' - u_2 = 0$$

$$L^H : u_1 (F' - w) = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow F' = w, \quad \frac{u_2}{u_1} = w$$

- ▶ What does this imply for labor supply decisions?
 - ▶ Recall $F(L^F + L^H; A)$ is the business production function, w is the wage

Implications of optimization

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$$L^O : u_1 w - u_2 = 0$$

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- ▶ What does this imply for labor supply decisions?
 - ▶ Recall $F(L^F + L^H; A)$ is the business production function, w is the wage
- ▶ Use labor until the marginal product equals the wage
 - ▶ Separation: maximize profits, regardless of a
- ▶ $\frac{u_2}{u_1} = w$: Production decisions only enter household labor-leisure decision through the budget constraint

Evaluating household consumption and leisure decisions

Let the net value of production

$$\rho(w; A) \equiv F(L; A) - wL^H - wL^F$$

- ▶ We just saw that with separation, household-producers will first maximize $\rho(w; A)$
- ▶ Call this maximized function $\pi(w; A)$

Now let the total value of utility consumption

$$M \equiv c + wl = y + \rho(w; A) + wT(a)$$

Simplify the household problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{c, L^O, L^F, L^H, l} u(c, l; a) \\ & \max_l u(y + \pi(w; A) + wT(a) - wl, l; a) \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Under separation, households only choose the optimal l

Illustrating separation in production decision

Constraint

- ▶ Total household labor supply $L^S = L^F + L^O$
- ▶ Total production labor $L^D = L^F + L^H$




FIGURE 1.—Separation.

Summarizing role of labor markets in separation

- ▶ Without a labor market
 - ▶ Production decisions depend on trade-offs between consumption and leisure
 - ▶ These will be different for different household-producers ⇒ production will depend on household characteristics
- ▶ With a labor market
 - ▶ Production decisions will equate marginal costs and benefits
 - ▶ **Separation** result: profit maximization is *separable* from utility maximization

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How to more reasonably model labor markets?

Benjamin (1992) considers several possible frictions

1. Constraint on how much labor can be hired in (L^H) - can lead to marginal product of $L^F >$ wage rate (why?)
2. Constraint on how much labor can be sold (L^O) - can lead to marginal product of $L^F <$ wage rate (why?)
3. Wedges in wages between labor hired and labor sold
 - ▶ Ex: farmer preferences for working on their farms, family and hired labor not perfect substitutes in production

Let's focus on the second one: $L^O \leq H$ where H is the max hours HH members may work outside of home

Excess off-farm labor supply ($L^O = H$)

Household-farm's optimal labor supply

$$L^{D*}(w, A) \equiv (L^{F*} + L^{H*})|w, A$$

$$L^S(w, M; a) = T(a) - l(w, y + \pi(w; A) + wT(a); a)$$

If the constraint binds and $L^O = H$, we have

$$T(a) - l^* > L^{D*} + L^O = L^{D*}(w, A) + H$$

In this case, households will apply more household labor to their farm than seems optimal given wages:

$$L^D = L^F + L^H > L^{D*}(w, A)$$

Shadow wage

- ▶ For any L^D , Define the shadow wage w^* as the wage where *it would be optimal* to work that much on your farm
- ▶ If the farm expands to absorb extra labor supply we have $L^D > L^{D*}(w; A), w^* < w$
- ▶ We can then define optimized profits if the wage was the shadow wage

$$\pi(w^*; A) = \max_{L^D} F(L^D, A) - w^* L^D = F(L^{D*}; A) - w^* L^{D*}(w^*, A)$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial w^*} = F_1 \frac{\partial L^{D*}}{\partial w^*} - [L^{D*} + w^* \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial w^*}] = -L^{D*}$$

Interpreting the algebra

$$\pi(w^*; A) = \max_{L^D} F(L^D, A) - w^* L^D = F(L^{D*}; A) - w^* L^{D*}(w^*, A)$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial w^*} = F_1 \frac{\partial L^{D*}}{\partial w^*} - [L^{D*} + w^* \frac{\partial L^{D*}}{\partial w^*}] = -L^{D*}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial L^{D*}}{\partial a} = -\pi_{11}(w^*; A) \frac{\partial w^*}{\partial a}$$

- ▶ In other words, the change in on-farm labor demand L^D when household characteristics (a) change is equivalent to
 - ▶ The change in the shadow wage with a
 - ▶ Multiplied by the curvature of the profit function (>0 by the envelope theorem)
- ▶ The constraint creates a separation failure
- ▶ Without the constraint, $w^* = w$ and $\partial L^D / \partial a = 0$

Ag households model

No constraint




FIGURE 2.—Case 1 constraint H on off-farm labor supply.

Benjamin empirical strategy to test for separation failure

Model suggests

$$\log(L_i^D) = \alpha + \beta \log(w_i^*) + \gamma \log(A_i) \quad (1)$$

$$\log(L_i^D) = \alpha + \beta \sum_{j=1}^G \delta_j a_{ij} + \gamma \log(A_i) + u_i \quad (2)$$

- ▶ If there is separation, $\delta_j = 0$
- ▶ Specific test: consider as household characteristics counts of household members by age and sex
 - ▶ Household size and composition should not affect farm labor allocation unless there is a violation of the separation hypothesis
- ▶ Concerns?

Context: Indonesia 1980 SUSENAS HH survey

TABLE II
LABOR USE ON RICE FARMS

	Percent Use ^a	Person Days ^b	Percent Hire ^c	Average Hired Person Days ^d	Average Family Person Days	Labor Days per Hectare ^e	Average Daily Wage ^f
Labor Type:							
Plowing	49	4.1	37	3.1	1.0	8.5	900
Hoeing	99	20.6	73	13.6	7.0	46.6	475
Planting	99	20.9	86	18.1	2.9	43.0	270
Weeding	96	23.7	68	17.3	6.4	45.0	293
Harvesting	100	29.4	79	23.5	6.0	64.8	625
Other Labor	52	5.7	27	2.5	3.2	13.7	622
Total Labor	100	104.5	95	78.2	26.3	221.7	

^a Percent Use is the percentage of farmers who report employing that type of labor.

^b Person Days is the average annual person days of labor per farm for that task.

^c Percent Hire is the percentage of farmers who hire some of their labor for that task.

^d Average Hired/Family Person Days are average annual person days of each type of labor used.

^e Labor per Hectare is the annual average person days of labor per hectare of rice land harvested.

^f Average Wage is the average daily wage for that task (in Rp.).

Separation?

TABLE V
IMPLIED DEMOGRAPHIC ELASTICITIES FROM TABLE IV
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Specification:	Elasticity of Labor Demand with respect to additional Household Members:						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Type of member:							
Prime age male	0.012 (0.024)	0.028 (0.025)	0.010 (0.018)	0.027 (0.024)	0.032 (0.026)	0.007 (0.031)	0.010 (0.030)
Prime age female	-0.016 (0.025)	0.013 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.019)	0.022 (0.025)	0.027 (0.028)	0.005 (0.003)	0.006 (0.032)
Elderly male	0.008 (0.005)	0.017 (0.006)	0.013 (0.005)	0.010 (0.005)	0.017 (0.006)	0.012 (0.006)	0.013 (0.007)
Elderly female	0.001 (0.005)	0.010 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)
Child (< 15 yrs)	0.038 (0.018)	0.011 (0.017)		-0.007 (0.016)	0.012 (0.018)	0.005 (0.020)	0.006 (0.021)

Specifications: (1) Parsimonious OLS. (2) OLS with full set of control variables. (3) OLS with full set of control variables, but children under 15 yrs. excluded from household size. (4) Within cluster estimation. (5) 2SLS for correction of measurement error of wage. (6) 2SLS for correction for potential simultaneity of wage. (7) 2SLS for correction for potential simultaneity of wage and adjustment of area harvested.

Separation?

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"Together, the evidence is not consistent with surplus labor or constraints on farm labor supply."

BREAK

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Reconsidering Benjamin (1992): LaFave & Thomas (2016)

- ▶ Benjamin (1992) result influential, but some concerns about data and econometrics
- ▶ LaFave & Thomas (2016) update original test with better panel data from Indonesia
 - ▶ Larger sample (≈ 4000 HHs),
 - ▶ 11 waves \Rightarrow can introduce farm fixed effects
 - ▶ Have power to identify household composition off changes in age profile of members \Rightarrow avoid endogenous composition concerns
 - ▶ Can address wages as determinant of labor supply: use community \times time FEs (also picks up other input and output prices)

Panel C Farm Labor in the Last 4 Months	
	Mean (4)
<i>Person days of [...]</i>	
Total labor demand	72.45 (0.30)
Family supplied labor	54.38 (0.22)
Hired labor	18.07 (0.19)
<i>Family labor supplied by [...]</i>	
Male household members	40.33 (0.18)
Female household members	14.05 (0.10)
<i>Person days hired for [...]</i>	
Planting	6.39 (0.07)
Harvesting	4.86 (0.07)
Weeding	4.10 (0.08)
Other farm tasks	2.72 (0.08)

LaFave and Thomas (2016) empirical strategy

Regression specification

$$\ln L_{hjt} = \alpha + \beta N_{hjt} + \delta X_{hjt} + \mu_h + \eta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{hjt}$$

- ▶ L_{hjt} total person days used on farm h in period t
- ▶ N_{hjt} household demographics ($H_0 : \beta = 0$)
- ▶ X_{hjt} other farm and household characteristics
- ▶ μ_h farm FE
- ▶ η_{jt} community \times time FEs

Results

Household Demographic Composition	A. Pooled Cross-Sections				B. Includ				<i>Number of females in farm HH</i>	A. Pooled Cross-Sections				B. Includi				
	N. Household Members		Household Size and Shares		N. Household Members		Variation From Aging Only			N. Household Members		Household Size and Shares		N. Household Members		Variation From Aging Only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
<i>Number of males in farm HH</i>																		
0 to 14 years	0.02 (0.01)	—	−0.001 (0.016)	—	0.11 (0.02)	0.40 (0.08)	0.09 (0.02)	0.09 (0.05)	0.17 (0.01)	0.59 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.11)	0.23 (0.02)	0.65 (0.09)	0.16 (0.03)	0.15 (0.12)		
15 to 19	0.11 (0.02)	0.40 (0.08)	0.09 (0.02)	0.09 (0.05)	0.32 (0.03)	0.76 (0.09)	0.22 (0.03)	0.24 (0.12)	0.32 (0.03)	0.76 (0.09)	0.22 (0.03)	0.24 (0.12)	0.32 (0.03)	0.76 (0.09)	0.22 (0.03)	0.24 (0.12)		
20 to 34	0.17 (0.01)	0.59 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.11)	0.15 (0.01)	0.59 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.11)	0.15 (0.01)	0.59 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.11)	0.15 (0.01)	0.59 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.11)		
35 to 49	0.23 (0.02)	0.65 (0.09)	0.16 (0.03)	0.15 (0.12)	0.17 (0.01)	0.59 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.11)	0.17 (0.01)	0.59 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.11)	0.17 (0.01)	0.59 (0.07)	0.13 (0.02)	0.15 (0.11)		
50 to 64	0.32 (0.03)	0.76 (0.09)	0.22 (0.03)	0.24 (0.12)	0.21 (0.03)	0.45 (0.10)	0.20 (0.04)	0.24 (0.14)	0.21 (0.03)	0.45 (0.10)	0.20 (0.04)	0.24 (0.14)	0.21 (0.03)	0.45 (0.10)	0.20 (0.04)	0.24 (0.14)		
65 and older	0.21 (0.03)	0.45 (0.10)	0.20 (0.04)	0.24 (0.14)														

Joint tests of $H_0 : \beta = 0$

	A. Pooled Cross-Sections		B. Includit	
	N.	Household	N.	Variation
	Household Members	Size and Shares	Household Members	From Aging Only
Household Demographic Composition	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Tests for joint significance of demographic composition</i>				
All groups	37.27	33.65	13.13	2.53
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.005
Males	49.88	21.67	18.27	1.90
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09
Females	10.58	10.99	7.70	2.78
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
Prime age adults	45.13	14.55	22.52	2.18
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04
C-test—1 and 2 period lags (χ^2)				
p-value				
Observations	38,189	38,189	38,189	11,594
N. Households	4,452	4,452	4,452	1,584

Separation?

- ▶ Sound rejection of separation in every test
 - ▶ Households with more members supply more household farm labor
- ▶ Test of monitoring mechanism
 - ▶ Hypothesis: HH members easier to monitor, more valuable
 - ▶ Find similar effects for labor to harvest (easy to monitor) and other operations
- ▶ Tests of heterogeneity across HHs
 - ▶ No differences by education of household head
 - ▶ Effects of household composition are smaller for HHs with more resources (higher expenditure)
 - ▶ No effects in top 15% of HHs in per capita expenditure
 - ▶ Suggests variation in labor constraints

What if households are not unitary?

- ▶ Benjamin (1992) assumes a *unitary* HH with central decision-maker making labor and consumption decisions for all HH members
 - ▶ Efficient (if not necessarily equal) if consumption and production decisions are separate
- ▶ Udry (1996) observes that efficient aggregate production requires efficient production of crops across plots
 - ▶ Often managed by different members
- ▶ Separation may fail if HHs do not respond to labor markets as joint decision-makers
- ▶ Separation test: are production inputs distributed efficiently across different HH plots?
 - ▶ Context: HH plots in Burkina Faso managed by particular HH members

Udry: Gender and agricultural production in Burkina Faso

Empirical test of separation

$$Q_{htci} = \beta X_{htci} + \gamma G_{htci} + \lambda_{htc} + \varepsilon_{htci}$$

- ▶ Plot i , crop c , HH h , time t
- ▶ Up to plot characteristics X , gender of manager G should be excludable from input/yield equations
- ▶ Have rich plot-level panel data
 - ▶ λ Household-year-crop FE

Differences by gender of plot manager

TABLE 1
MEAN YIELD, AREA, AND LABOR INPUTS PER PLOT BY GENDER OF CULTIVATOR
(N = 4,655)

	Crop Output per Hectare (1,000 FCFA)*	Area (Hectare)	Male Labor (Hours/Hectare)	Female Labor (Hours/Hectare)	Nonfamily Labor (Hours/Hectare)	Child Labor (Hours/Hectare)	Manure Weight (kg/Hectare)
Men's plots	79.9 (186)	.740 (1.19)	593 (1,065)	248 (501)	106 (407)	104 (325)	2,993 (11,155)
Women's plots	105.4 (286)	.100 (.16)	128 (324)	859 (1,106)	46 (185)	53 (164)	764 (5,237)
T-statistic	-3.27	29.03	22.16	-21.31	6.89	7.08	7.68
$H_0: \mu_m = \mu_w$							

- ▶ Significant differences in yield by gender across multiple specifications
- ▶ Suggests effects driven by lower inputs to women, even controlling for plot characteristics
 - ▶ Fertilizer allocated much more to men, despite well-established declining marginal product
- ▶ Doesn't answer what causes the inefficiency
 - ▶ Potential factors: labor and financial market failures

Outline

Motivation

Modeling separation

Benjamin (1992)

Later separation tests

Incomplete markets

Markets, separation, and technology adoption

Incomplete markets

- ▶ Benjamin (1992), Lafave & Thomas (2016) focus on labor market frictions
- ▶ Could still restore separation with incomplete labor markets but functional land markets:
 - ▶ Redistribute land (through rental or sales) to larger HHs to equalize shadow wages across farms
- ▶ Separation failures typically require incompleteness in *more than one market*
 - ▶ LaFave and Thomas (2016) fail to reject separation for richest HHs
 - ▶ Other markets (e.g., credit, insurance) may be more complete for them

Other market failures: incomplete financial markets

Suppose that:

- ▶ Production is risky, with θ a mean 1 TFP shock, meaning ag income $y = \theta F(L)$
- ▶ Households are risk averse, u' is convex
- ▶ Incomplete insurance market (non-existent)
- ▶ Incomplete credit market (non-existent)
- ▶ HHs inelastically supply labor endowment T , with L to the farm and $T - L$ to the market for wage w
- ▶ Labor market resolves before θ is known

Can this generate a separation failure?

Financial markets and separation failures?

Farm household solves

$$\max_L E_\theta[u(c)]$$

$$\text{s.t. } c = wT + \theta F(L) - wL$$

$$\text{FOC: } E[u'(c)(\theta F'(L) - w)] = 0$$

What does this imply?

Financial markets and separation failures?

Farm household solves

$$\max_L E_\theta[u(c)]$$

$$\text{s.t. } c = wT + \theta F(L) - wL$$

$$\text{FOC: } E[u'(c)(\theta F'(L) - w)] = 0$$

What does this imply?

Separation fails! L will be a function of preferences (risk aversion)

- ▶ Can show that failure of insurance market (resolve uncertainty about θ) generates underinvestment in labor relative to complete markets setting

So what?

- ▶ Need better applied theory, dynamic models
 - ▶ LaFave and Thomas: "Developing empirically tractable models of farm households when markets are incomplete remains an important challenge."
 - ▶ Creates challenges for studying and supporting farm HHs
- ▶ How to identify market failures?
 - ▶ LaFave and Thomas: "It is not possible with a portmanteau test for complete markets to identify the sources of market failure."
 - ▶ Diagnosing specific market failures is especially hard given one market might substitute for another
- ▶ What are the impacts of non-separation?
 - ▶ Misallocation
 - ▶ Investment, technology adoption

Outline

Motivation

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Market failures and technology adoption?

Input or capital market distortions may lead to inefficient allocations of land, labor

- ▶ If efficient households and separation holds \Rightarrow optimal decisions *on every plot*, AND productive decisions uncorrelated across plots, conditional on productivity
 - ▶ Saw this fail in Udry (1996)
- ▶ Separation failures may induce within-HH dependencies across plots
- ▶ May further lead to distortions in technology adoption

Jones et al (2022) explore the case of adoption of irrigation, typically for cash crops, in Rwanda

Context: Rwanda Jones et al (2022) study

2 agricultural seasons: rainy and dry

- ▶ Rainy season: produce staple crops – maize and beans; irrigation not very useful
- ▶ Dry season: too short for staple crop cycle, can produce horticulture (eggplant, tomatoes,...) only with irrigation
- ▶ Alternative: year-round perennial banana plants, activity does not require irrigation

Rwandan government irrigation projects to ↑ agricultural productivity

- ▶ Irrigation channels cut on hillside from water source
- ▶ Command Area (CA): all plots downhill from channel
 - ▶ No pumping infrastructure: uphill plots cannot benefit
- ▶ ≈40% adoption of irrigation in CA
- ▶ Jones et al (2022): is this too low?


Irrigation in Rwanda



Part 1: Impacts of irrigation in dry season

Empirical approach: Regression discontinuity above and below channel

Panel A. Plots inside and outside command area



Panel B. Sharp increase in irrigation at boundary




FIGURE 2. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF IRRIGATION EXPLOITING SPATIAL DISCONTINUITY IN ACCESS

Part 1: Impacts of irrigation in dry season

- ▶ Substantial increase in irrigation, though far from universal
- ▶ Increase in horticulture, decrease in banana
- ▶ Increase in HH and hired labor (mainly for irrigation, upkeep)
- ▶ Increase in yields and sales
- ▶ Hard to calculate profits under separation failures
 - ▶ What is the relevant wage for HH farm labor?
 - ▶ Profits often negative if HH labor valued at market wage
 - ▶ Recall from Benjamin (1992): under excess labor supply, shadow wage of HH *lower* than market wage

Part 2: Cross-plot spillovers

Under efficient HHs/separation \Rightarrow optimal decisions *on each plot*




FIGURE 4. SEPARATION FAILS, AS ACCESS TO IRRIGATION ON THE SAMPLE PLOT CAUSES SUBSTITUTION OF IRRIGATION USE AWAY FROM THE LARGEST OTHER PLOT

- ▶ Black is RD sample, Pink is largest other plot for HHs in discontinuity sample
- ▶ Substantial substitution across plots \Rightarrow inefficiency

Part 3: Cause of separation failure?

- ▶ Results consistent with separation failure: HH labor diverted from largest plot to sample plot
 - ▶ Potential inefficiencies in **land markets**: reallocation could increase adoption/yields
 - ▶ Back of the envelope exercise shows that having only 1 plot in the CA (rather than 2) would increase adoption by 5.5pp
- ▶ For separation failure, a **second market** also needs to fail. 3 possibilities:
 - ▶ Incompleteness in insurance market: irrigated crops may be riskier
 - ▶ Incompleteness in credit markets: may lack access to credit for input purchases
 - ▶ Incompleteness in labor market: excess labor supply or hiring constraints

Part 3: How to identify market failures?

- ▶ Idea: Different market failures have different profile of heterogeneous treatment effects with wealth and HH labor endowment on largest other plot (LOP)
- ▶ Incompleteness in financial markets (insurance, credit)
 - ▶ Wealthier households should be less responsive
 - ▶ Larger households should be less responsive (larger incomes)
- ▶ Incompleteness in labor market
 - ▶ Relationship with wealth unsigned: If poor households have more elastic on-farm labor supply, poorer households should look less responsive
 - ▶ Larger households should look less responsive (also assuming larger households are more elastic)

Part 3: Market failure tests

TABLE 9—LARGER AND POORER HOUSEHOLDS DO NOT SUBSTITUTE AWAY FROM LARGEST OTHER PLOT IN RESPONSE TO SAMPLE PLOT SHOCK

	LOP, dry season, discontinuity sample						
	Cultivated (1)	Irrigated (2)	Horticulture (3)	Banana (4)	HH labor/ha (5)	Input exp./ha (6)	Hired labor exp./ha (7)
<i>SFE (spatial FE, specification (5))</i>							
SP CA	-0.183 (0.099) [0.065]	-0.117 (0.051) [0.021]	-0.130 (0.046) [0.005]	-0.058 (0.084) [0.489]	-83.6 (39.9) [0.036]	-9.3 (4.2) [0.026]	-4.8 (3.2) [0.138]
SP CA × No. of HH members	0.038 (0.015) [0.010]	0.016 (0.008) [0.049]	0.018 (0.008) [0.016]	0.025 (0.015) [0.088]	10.0 (4.7) [0.032]	0.6 (0.5) [0.269]	0.9 (0.4) [0.019]
SP CA × asset index	-0.038 (0.032) [0.232]	-0.037 (0.018) [0.044]	-0.030 (0.020) [0.139]	-0.009 (0.027) [0.737]	-22.6 (12.3) [0.067]	-4.0 (1.6) [0.016]	-0.5 (1.4) [0.734]
Joint F-stat [<i>p</i>]	3.0 [0.031]	2.4 [0.069]	2.7 [0.045]	2.3 [0.072]	2.0 [0.110]	2.5 [0.055]	2.0 [0.115]
Average effect	0.002	-0.041	-0.042	0.067	-36.2	-6.6	-0.1
Observations	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,091	2,094	2,094
Clusters	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Control mean	0.368	0.114	0.107	0.201	68.1	5.4	3.7

- ▶ Labor endowment (HH size) attenuates reallocation from LOP
- ▶ HH wealth aggravates reallocation
- ▶ “Strong evidence for the existence of labor market failures that generate separation failures, which in turn cause inefficient adoption of irrigation”

Jones et al 2022 Takeaways

- ▶ Quasi-experimental evidence consistent with separation failures
- ▶ Positive technology shock on one plot draws resources away from others
- ▶ So having 2 suitable plots for adoption leads to less per-plot adoption than having only 1 suitable plot
 - ▶ Incomplete land markets prevent land reallocation
 - ▶ Incomplete labor markets prevent labor reallocation
- ▶ ⇒ Market failures can lead on net to under-adoption of new, otherwise profitable technologies
- ▶ Policy implications: more adoption makes original investment more justifiable, sustainable

Conclusions

- ▶ Incomplete markets common in many developing contexts
- ▶ These lead to separation failures for household-producers and misallocation of resources both within and across producers
 - ▶ Policy implication: resource are not allocated productively across society ⇒ too many low-productivity producers, most productive producers constrained in growth
- ▶ Market frictions also cause inefficient adoption of profitable technologies
 - ▶ Policy implication: Providing technologies may not be sustainable due to below-optimal adoption