

# SOC Playbook: LOLBin and Masquerading Detection (T1218 + T1036)

## 1. Objective

Detect and respond to the abuse of **LOLBins** (legitimate OS tools used for malicious purposes) and **masquerading techniques** like renamed executables, deceptive paths, or forged metadata — common stealth techniques used by malware and red teams.

## 2. Scope

- Detect LOLBins used in suspicious or abnormal contexts.
- Detect renamed system utilities or spoofed file names.
- Identify execution from abnormal directories or with unusual parent processes.
- Validate metadata and behavior inconsistencies.

## 3. Log Sources

Platform	Log Source	Description
Windows	Security Logs (4688)	Command-line logging and process creation
Windows	Sysmon (Event IDs 1, 7, 11, 13)	Process creation, image loads, registry access
All	EDR/XDR	Advanced telemetry and alerts
All	File Integrity Monitoring	Detects binary changes or unauthorized copies
All	Threat Intelligence Feeds	Known LOLBin abuse patterns and hashes

## 4. Detection Rules / Alerts

Alert Name	Description	Triggers / Examples
Suspicious Use of LOLBins	Legitimate binaries used for execution, download, or persistence	mshta.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe
LOLBin from Unusual Location	Execution of known LOLBins from %TEMP%, %APPDATA%	rundll32.exe from non-system directory
Script Execution via LOLBin	Scripting engines invoked via LOLBins	mshta.exe http://malicious.url
Signed Binary Abused	Signed Microsoft or system tools performing malicious action	InstallUtil.exe, certutil.exe, wmic.exe used with suspicious args

Renamed LOLBin or System Utility	Binary name spoofed or copied	File named svch0st.exe or explorer_.exe
Discrepant File Metadata	File version, signer, or description doesn't match known version	powershell.exe with unsigned metadata
Process Running from Temp or Download Folders	Legitimate-looking binary executed from unusual path	powershell.exe in C:\Users\John\Downloads\
File Extension Masquerading	Scripts or executables with misleading extensions	.jpg.exe, .pdf.vbs, .cmd.txt


## 5. Automated Enrichment

Enrichment Task	Description
Parent Process Analysis	Was the LOLBin spawned by Office, browser, or script engine?
Command-Line Inspection	Check for malicious parameters like - EncodedCommand, http://, etc.
File Metadata Extraction	Pull signer, version, and compare with known-good binaries
User Attribution	Who launched the process? Admin, service, remote user?
Reputation Lookup	VT or internal hash reputation for the binary or script
Process Tree Correlation	Review related process launches and timelines

## 6. Automated Response Play

Step	Action
1. Kill Suspicious Process	Especially LOLBins launched by unauthorized processes
2. Quarantine Binary	Move suspicious file to containment for analysis
3. Isolate Endpoint	Stop further propagation or data theft
4. Block LOLBin Path Globally	Add to blocklist or application control policy
5. Disable User Account	If compromised or attacker-controlled
6. Create Incident Ticket	Auto-generate for SOC/IR review
7. Initiate IOC Hunt	Search for same hash, behavior, or command-line across endpoints
8. Notify Stakeholders	Alert IR, Threat Hunting, and Endpoint teams
9. Trigger Forensic Capture	Memory and disk artifacts collection


## Comprehensive Incident Response Timeline



## 7. Investigation Checklist

Step	Description
1. Review Alert Metadata	Time, user, binary path, command-line
2. Validate Binary Identity	Check hash, metadata, digital signature
3. Parent/Child Process Tree Analysis	Was it launched by Office doc, email client, or browser?
4. Check File Location	Should a system binary be running from this directory?
5. Decode Command Lines	Base64, obfuscation, long strings
6. Inspect Network Activity	Outbound connections, beaconing behavior
7. Correlate With Historical Behavior	Is this normal for this user/system?
8. Search for Similar Activity Across Hosts	Use hunting queries in EDR/SIEM
9. Scan for Persistence Mechanisms	Scheduled tasks, registry autoruns
10. Document IOCs and Findings	For reporting and intelligence sharing

## Comprehensive Threat Analysis Workflow



## 8. Playbook Notes

- Focus on **behavior**, not just binary names — LOLBins are often renamed.
- Use **application control policies** (e.g., Applocker, WDAC) to block unsigned or misplaced LOLBins.
- Maintain a list of known abused LOLBins and update detection rules regularly.
- Common LOLBins:
  - `mshta.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `rundll32.exe`
  - `certutil.exe`, `wmic.exe`, `forfiles.exe`, `installutil.exe`, `powershell.exe`, `cmd.exe`, `bitsadmin.exe`