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
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Vol. 1

ADDRESSES
ON
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY

J. J. PUTNAM, M.D.

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF NEUROLOGY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

WITH A CONVERSATION

SIGMUND FREUD, M.D., LL.D.




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No. 1

ADDRESSES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY
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HARVARD UNIVERSITY

WITH A PREFACE BY
SIGM. FREUD, M.D., LL.D.



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PREFACE

The Editor of this series must feel a special satisfaction in being able to issue as its opening volume this collection of the psycho-analytical writings of Professor James J. Putnam, the distinguished neurologist of Harvard University. Professor Putnam, who died in 1918 at the age of seventy-two, was not only the first American to interest himself in psycho-analysis, but soon became its most decided supporter and its most influential representative in America. In consequence of the established reputation which he had gained through his activities as a teacher, as well as through his important work in the domain of organic nervous disease, and thanks to the universal respect which his personality enjoyed, he was able to do perhaps more than anyone for the spread of psycho-analysis in his own country, and was able to protect it from aspersions which, on the other side of the Atlantic no less than this, would inevitably have been cast upon it. But all such reproaches were bound to be silenced when a man of Putnam's lofty ethical standards and moral rectitude had ranged himself among the supporters of the new science and of the therapeutics based upon it.

The papers here collected into a single volume, which were written by Putnam between 1909 and the end of his life, give a good picture of his relations to psycho-analysis. They show how he was at first occupied in correcting a provisional judgement which was based on insufficient knowledge; how he then accepted the essence of analysis, recognized its capacity for throwing a clear light upon the origin of human imperfections and failings,

and how he was struck by the prospect of contributing towards the improvement of humanity along analytical lines; how he then became convinced by his own activities as a physician as to the truth of most of the psycho-analytical conclusions and postulates, and then in his turn bore witness to the fact that the physician who makes use of analysis understands far more about the sufferings of his patients and can do far more for them than was possible with the earlier methods of treatment; and finally how he began to extend beyond the limits of analysis, demanding that as a science it should be linked on to a particular philosophical system, and that its practice should be openly associated with a particular set of ethical doctrines.

So it is not to be wondered at that a mind with such pre-eminently ethical and philosophical tendencies as Putnam's should have desired, after he had plunged deep into psycho-analysis, to establish the closest relation between it and the aims which lay nearest his heart. But his enthusiasm, so admirable in a man of his advanced age, did not succeed in carrying others along with him. Younger people remained cooler. It was especially Ferenczi who expressed the opposite view. The decisive reason for the rejection of Putnam's proposals was the doubt as to which of the countless philosophical systems should be accepted, since they all seemed to rest on an equally insecure basis, and since everything had up till then been sacrificed for the sake of the relative certainty of the results of psycho-analysis. It seemed more prudent to wait, and to discover whether a particular attitude towards life might be forced upon us with all the weight of necessity by analytical investigation itself.

It is our duty to express our thanks to the author's widow, Mrs. Putnam, for her assistance with the manuscripts, with the copyrights, and with financial support,

without all of which the publication of this volume would have been impossible. No English manuscripts were forthcoming in the case of the papers numbered VI, VII, and X. They have been translated into English by Dr. Katherine Jones from the German text which originated from Putnam himself.

This volume will keep fresh in analytical circles the memory of the friend whose loss we so profoundly deplore. May it be the first of a series of publications which shall serve the end of furthering the understanding and application of psycho-analysis among those who speak the English tongue—an end to which James J. Putnam dedicated the last ten years of his fruitful life.

Jan. 1921

SIGM. FREUD

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Chapter I.

PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF SIGMUND FREUD AND HIS WORK.

With Special Reference to his Recent Lectures at Clark University*.

I wish to call the attention of the readers of this journal to a recent occurrence of which perhaps few persons save a handful of psychologists, neurologists, and social workers took definite cognizance, yet which might well attract the notice of a far wider circle¹.

Within a few years we have had two visits and two sets of lectures from the well-known Pierre Janet², of Paris,

*Published in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, December, 1909.

¹ The essential principles of Freud's treatment have been admirably described in an article by Dr. Ernest Jones, of Toronto, a pupil and friend of Freud, and a thorough student of his writings. This article was published as one part of a symposium on Psychotherapy, in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology* for June, 1909. The whole series has been recently reprinted in book form, by Richard G. Badger, under the title, *Psychotherapy*. A number of Freud's papers have been translated into English by Dr. Brill, of New York, and published in a volume entitled "Selected Papers on Hysteria and other Psychoneuroses", as No. 4 in the Monograph Series of the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*. Ed. Jour. Ab. Psych.

² Freud has never claimed and no one of his adherents need claim for him more than is his due. Janet has been working from the first on lines more or less parallel with his, and if I do not attempt here to adjust the claims of these two observers and of the other who have followed them, it is because to do this lies outside my present aim. In general terms, Janet's work has been *descriptive* of the mental "dissociation" which takes place in hysteria and the "reassociation" through which the mind seeks to establish a new equilibrium. Freud's observations have gone further in the line of

one of the great pioneer leaders of the generation that is now passing, in the investigation of a series of phenomena of the highest importance alike for medicine and psychology. This summer we have had a similar visit from another great leader, Professor Sigmund Freud, of Vienna, of whose work the same statement can, with warmth, be made. Though little known among us, Freud is no longer a young man, and indeed he outlined his life work and "laid his course" so many years ago that it is a reflection on our energy and intelligence that we have not gained a closer knowledge of the claims and merits of his doctrines.

With Freud came two younger friends and colleagues, who are devoting themselves with vigor to the same cause with him, Dr. C. G. Jung, of Zürich, and Dr. Sandor Ferenczi, of Budapest.

Dr. Jung's observations, full of personality, fire, and life, have already excited much comment and — like the work of Freud — much criticism, from the neurologists of Europe. Dr. Ferenczi has written a number of admirable papers, partly in Hungarian, which are bound soon to bring him prominently into notice.

We owe their visit, and the gathering of the intelligent audience who came to hear them, to the energy of the officers of Clark University in Worcester, which recently celebrated, with intellectual sumptuousness, the twentieth anniversary of its founding. Some of your readers will recall that on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of this institution, two other eminent students of the nervous system and its disorders, Professor August Forel, formerly of Zürich, and the distinguished Spaniard, Ramon-y-Cajal, came over and lectured as its guests.

pointing out the *causative influences* here at work and have proved themselves to be of great practical value in indicating, with remarkable sharpness, the immense part played by *education*, taken in both general and special senses, in producing the results.

The doctrines of Freud and his colleagues have been made known to us here more through the gossip of prejudice and misconception¹ than by the testimony of those who have really tested them, and this, in itself, is an interesting fact. For these doctrines involve at every point the belief that the hidden motives which help to rule our lives, and which frequently show themselves as prejudices, are made up of "attraction", "desire", "acceptance", on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of "repulsion", "repression", "denial", mixed in equal parts. A strong prejudice often means a strong, instinctive attempt to set aside as false an influence which we feel that, if differently presented, we might be forced to accept, at least in part, as true, and the strength of the prejudice usually measures the importance of the half-felt but perhaps wholly suppressed truth. To say the least, our prejudices express feelings that at the moment we cannot or will not put to the test of reason.

Let me now attempt the task of modifying this prejudice — shared formerly by myself.

In brief, the history of Freud's investigations and opinions is the following: In 1881, an older colleague, Dr. J. Breuer, of Vienna, had occasion to treat an intelligent young woman suffering from hysteria in a serious form for which he tried the usual means in vain. At length, after long and tireless searching, he found that the facts offered by the patient in explanation of her illness, although they were freely furnished and represented her entire history so far as she consciously could furnish it, constituted only a tithe of the story which, in the end, her memory succeeded in drawing from its depths. Under the influence of a special method of inquiry, many hidden facts, representing painful experiences long ago forgotten, came one by one to light

¹ On account of their insistence on the importance of the sexual life in the etiology of the psycho-neuroses.

and were as if lived over, attended by the emotions that originally formed a part of them. And just in proportion as this happened, in proportion as the dense barriers were overcome that separated this hidden portion of the patient's past from that of which she had remained consciously aware, one and another of her distressing symptoms dropped away and disappeared forever. The details of the long and significant history of this case cannot be given here. Let it suffice to say that although no further investigations based on it were undertaken for ten years, yet the facts observed had made a deep impression upon Dr. Freud and were meditated on by him during this decade, a part of which he passed as a student of Charcot's in Paris, and that on his return he begged Breuer to take the matter up again. After this, for a considerable length of time, they worked together; later, Freud alone. It became gradually more and more clear to them that the childhood of this patient had been in an unsuspected degree and sense the parent of her later years¹.

For not only had it been found that many of the events which counted for so much in the production of her illness dated back to days of early youth, but the later experiences which had come upon her, one after another, and which were the ostensible and apparently sufficient causes of her illness, were discovered to owe a large portion of their power for harm to the fact that they reproduced in a new shape old emotions of childish form

¹ I make no attempt, in this hasty sketch, either to separate the principles developed through the study of this first case from those of subsequent development, or to state these principles in the historical order of their discovery. Neither does this communication claim to furnish an authorized or systematic record of the Worcester lectures. My purpose is solely to reproduce the more prominent of my own impressions, obtained through reading, private conversations and the lectures, and reinforced through personal observation in my own practice.

and substance, of which, before her treatment, she would truthfully have professed herself to be entirely unaware. Only when these emotions were reached and the experiences corresponding to them lived over, in memory and in speech, was the recovery complete.

There is little in the bare outlines of this proposition that a psychologist need count as wholly novel. Everyone has heard the claim that no experience is ever wholly lost, that our present acts are the outcome of all our antecedent acts; that our perceptions, even when apparently new, are in reality nine parts memory¹, and that disclosing and talking over old troubles clears the mind and relieves the feelings of distress. But this dictum of the psychologists has now received a practical confirmation of an unexpected sort. The number and character of the revelations eventually made; the demonstration that memories apparently so wholly lost could with sufficient effort be recovered; the discovery that symptoms of illness and old forgotten emotional states were not only connected by a certain bond, but by a bond so subtle and yet so strong that this patient, through living her experiences over again in words, could succeed in freeing herself from the signs — physical as well as mental — of her present illness; the discovery, finally, that the nature of some of these experiences was what it proved to be; these were the surprising facts².

The physical signs of the hysteria in this case consi-

¹ Cf. especially Bergson; *Matière et Mémoire*.

² At first, the aid of hypnotism, later of "hypnoid" states, was invoked to secure this enlargement of the memory. Later it was found that quiet and relaxation, with the encouragement of the physician and the opportunity of talking and reminiscing, rather in his presence than under his scrutiny, were sufficient. This is in accordance with the observations of Bernheim that the amnesia of the hypnotic state, profound as it at first sight seems, may be invaded and over come by the power of the subject's memory, if sufficiently urged thereto.

sted partly in a paralysis and contracture of the arm and a peculiar affection of the speech. Such signs are of very common occurrence, and the fact of their mental origin had been clearly pointed out by Janet. But the study of their specific relationship to this patient's mental experiences was utilized by Breuer and Freud as the basis of an elaborate theory of "conversion", or substitution, which has proved to be of wide bearing. It would be an instance of such conversion if a person wishing to exclude from his mind an unpleasant thought or memory should strive instinctively to aid himself by closure of the eyes and then should find that an actual and uncontrollable closure of the eyes had remained as a persistent memorial of the misjudged attempt at self-concealment. We can „convert" or we can neutralize the effect of our experiences, but we cannot kill them. Every experience retains the right and need to express its influence in our later history. We can accept it, work it out, assimilate it to the remainder of our conscious lives, or we can repress it. If we adopt (instinctively or consciously) the repressive policy, we may give birth to a sort of evil genius, who keeps himself concealed only on condition that we yield up to him some physical or mental evidence of the hold that, until exorcised, he will have on us. The physical symptoms of hysteria are thus analogous, to use Freud's simile, to the monuments which people set up to commemorate important events in history. It became clear to Breuer and Freud, further, and in harmony with the principle just expressed, that this patient's painful memories of the past, which at first had seemed as dead to her as if the experiences which they stood for had never occurred, represented in reality living and acting forces¹. And not only this but that the very barriers which had to be

¹ Cf. Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire*; also Janet, *État Mental des Hystériques*, etc., and the works of other writers.

overcome in reproducing them represented living and active forces too, all vibrating with significance for the present moment and for the details of the illness. In other words, the term "barrier" as used for the "forgetting" of the hysterical patient was shown to be a misnomer. Indeed, the forgetting of persons in normal health is largely repression, an active process of lending oneself to the task of learning how *not* to dwell upon a subject now painful but which perhaps had once a powerful interest. It has often been remarked that the conscious memory picks out the pleasant items of life and rejects the rest. We remember the charms and novelty of an ocean trip, of foreign travel, and conveniently "forget" — in reality turn away from — the seasickness, the dirty inns, the sleepless nights. It was the significance of this species of forgetting and its relation to sickness and to health that Freud was led to study, and to which he has devoted all the powers of a keen and well-trained mind for twenty years. In the course of these investigations Freud and Jung and their followers have dived more deeply than any one before into the mysteries of the unconscious life. These investigations were inspired primarily, not by theory but by the recitals of patients who had been helped to search out their memories and their motives to a degree that never before had been made possible. New evidence has thus been brought to show that this hidden life, if technically "unconscious", is anything but inactive.¹ On the contrary, it is the living

¹ Eminent psychologists sometimes deny the propriety of using the term "consciousness" for a mental state of which we are not at the moment given consciously aware. This criticism has been expressed and met in a discussion on the Subconscious, published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* for June-July 1907. It is there satisfactorily shown, as I think, by Dr. Prince, that "awareness" is not necessary for "consciousness", and that the suppressed mental states of hypnotized and hysterical patients, for example, are properly designated as conscious states.

supplement of our conscious and willed existences, the dwelling-place and working-place of emotions which we could not utilize in the construction of the personality that we had shaped and rounded and that we longed to think of as standing completely for "ourselves." It is the study of this portion of our lives, repressed yet active, and not the attempt to push forward the sexual element in our experiences, that has constituted the main feature of Freud's work, looked at broadly and as a whole. The sexual element has indeed been pushed forward, but this has been due to two causes. In the first place, Freud's patients themselves, one after another, when urged to analyze the motives and influences that had prompted them to this or that act of repression or self-reproach, uniformly referred to one or another manifestation of this great passion as the ultimate source from which these motives sprang; and no wonder, for it is the basis of most of what we care for in this world. In the next place, the frequent references to the sexual life have been seized upon by Freud's critics as the basis for attack against the remarkable and truth-seeking observations of a remarkable man. I shall try, in the second instalment of this paper, to explain in more detail just what influences it is that, in Freud's view, the sexual life does introduce into the composition of our characters. What I wish to do here is to make a plea for open-mindedness in this matter. There are many subjects intensely disagreeable for discussion, from the social standpoint, which nevertheless the trained man of science studies eagerly and without a trace of unpleasant feeling. This is true, for example, of the bodily excretions. The study of sexual problems in all their manifold bearings is being taken up in this same spirit by an increasing number of persons of fine feeling and scientific instinct and a desire to work for the remedy of great practical evils. Each one of these persons has



had to overcome an intense sense of aversion to this task of dwelling on details, of odious social connotation, but he has overcome it, at least to the extent of setting his intelligence moderately free to act. Most physicians are still in the grasp of this aversion and strive to justify themselves by denying the importance of the inquiry and the significance of the facts adduced. Meantime, the aversion means something more than it seems at first sight to mean. It indicates that the topic has or has had a sort of hold on us or a right to demand our interest and attention, and that we fain would persuade ourselves that this was not the case. This hold on our attention which we instinctively feel this subject has the right to claim even when we repudiate this right, constitutes one instance of the "desire", which is made to play such a large part in Freud's doctrines. What once was an instinctive desire, the expression of a perfectly natural craving, the basis of the natural curiosity, of an infant or young child, becomes, next, something to be repressed, as incompatible with the social life which the child grown older plans to lead. Either one of several consequences is liable to flow from this repression. First, it may be adequate and successful. The craving, the curiosity, the desire may find some sufficient outlet, may be assimilated or neutralized, and disappear permanently from view. Next, instead of this, the process of repression may go too far, may become too manifest, may impress the character too strongly with its own features. Then the "desire" utterly disappears from memory, but the eventual outcome is an individual of so-called over-sensitiveness and refinement, overwatchful of himself. Or, again, the "desire" or "craving" element may be too strong, or the mechanism whereby it should have been assimilated or neutralized may have been inadequate. Then the patient — for such we may now call him — becomes conscious of a lack of

harmony with himself. He is one person who wishes and strives, consciously, to lead a certain life, but is also another person with an unsatisfied craving. As the result of this tendency he becomes predisposed to undergo a still more complete and definite cleavage, and this may, through "conversion", on the occasion of some new mental strain or trauma, earn for him the title of "hysteric" (a portion of the symptoms becoming *physical*) or may cause him to adopt some "phobia" (through a process of substitution) in accordance with a principle to be described later. Thus fear and repressed desire are shown to have an intimate kinship.

The cravings based on the sexual instincts of infancy and childhood take their place, in this scheme, along with those of adolescence and adult life, and along, too, with a great number of other cravings and ambitions, emotional interests and desires, of manifold character and force. It should be recognized that the doctrines and methods of Freud are full of interest as throwing light upon the mode in which the mind works, independently of the particular nature of the emotions that are involved. The life of every one, even the most commonplace person, even the most harmonious and best balanced, is complex enough to furnish the material for many a romance, for many a study of the conflicting tides of feeling. Every one acts from motives, many of which he does not clearly grasp; if it were not so no novels would be written, wars would have been few, and the great tragedians and mythmakers would never have existed. And yet, although we do not clearly grasp our motives, either as regards their nature or their origin; and although, if set to the task of describing ourselves and the history of our development we should leave out much that was important, yet the very fact that we understand novels and tragedies and character studies, and find them so

entrancing, is an indication that we have felt, in some measure, the sentiments they are based on, and that we have passed through something corresponding in type with all the situations pictured. It may not be necessary that every one should become intimately acquainted with all these crooked byways and obscure corners of himself, or that each person should force himself to recognize his kinship with others whose qualities he deplores or whose acts he regards as criminal. But there are times when such knowledge becomes necessary for the preservation of the mental health, and the physician should fit himself to be the guide to its attainment.

I propose, in the rest of this communication, to consider a little further some of these psychological principles which Freud's observations have brought out in a new light, and to show their bearing on his therapeutic methods. The principles which I select as examples are embodied in the following propositions:

A. Desire, or craving, furnishes the motive for many thoughts and acts that seem actuated by sentiments of a different and even of an opposite character.

B. The principle of "conversion" in accordance with which the physical symptoms of hysteria are produced, is one manifestation of the wider principle of "substitution". Other manifestations of the same general tendency are: (1) the attributing to other persons, without adequate reason, qualities whose interest for us lies in the fact that we ourselves possess or have possessed and have, likewise, sought instinctively to repress them; (2) the harboring of prejudices for or against certain persons, on similar grounds; (3) the identification of ourselves with others, as in the assumption of ailments similar to theirs; (4) the transference to one person of interest originally centered on another; (5) the substitution of fear or of some morbid impulsion, for desires which cannot be adequately gratified.

C. The "forgetting" considered typical of hysteria and kindred forms of mental disharmony and disturbance is a feature of every one's mental growth.

D. Dreams are closely related, psychologically, to psychoses, and, like them, are classifiable, from certain points of view, as "compromises". Dreams likewise furnish valuable information of the unconscious life and are analyzable to a hitherto unsuspected degree, in the interests of therapeutics.

E. Finally, I wish to add a few more words on the principles involved in Freud's treatment.

A. Desire and craving are generally admitted to be powerful if only partial motives to conduct. One need not accept the doctrine of "hedonism" as alone binding in order to admit that we all have instincts and passions which press for gratification, and that ungratified or imperfectly gratified desires remain as unwelcome comrades to our thoughts. The point which mainly calls for comment is that even concealed and partial desires and cravings play an immensely important part in health and in disease. A few illustrations may take the place of argument. The partial wishes or cravings of young children are familiar to every one. Accustomed to deal with fairy tales, living in a world of fancy, and subjected to but slight censorship in his fancies, the child gives his desires free rein. It is often felt as a fine thing by a child to be in the eye of friends and comrades, even when the cause for distinction is really a cause for grief. A partial hostility towards a parent is entirely compatible with warm affection, but it is not recognised that when the child in question is of hysterical tendency, that is, when he is a person whose unconscious life plays too large a part in controlling his acts and thoughts, making him fitful, moody, and capricious, the affection may stand for an infantile passion, and the

hostility which develops out of it may reach a high grade. The fable of the sour grapes hints at such a mixture of half-hidden and half-felt sentiments. The mental operations of older children and adults are not exempt from the working of these principles. The craving for recognition and sympathy flames in the eye and thrills in the voice of many a person who would deny that he was subject to these motives; disappointed hopes, the necessity for sacrifice and renunciation tinge a sincere grief with unwelcome and perhaps scarcely recognized longings. In these and in kindred ways mental conflicts arise, although the actual battle may be concealed from view.

The curiosity and emulation of children, as also of adolescents and adults, are other species of desire. They may be of manifold sorts, and in certain of their forms they represent cravings that are instinctively concealed. Out of such materials as these, in the manner thus indicated, and in the same ratio as we build the conscious personality, we form and feed and organize the unconscious life.

B. It will be recognized by every close observer that in entertaining a series of conflicting emotions, such as that typified by the sour-grapes illustration, for example, the instinctive effort is to escape from one distressing situation by grasping at another, which if in some respects worse is in some respects also better. This process is characteristic of the nervous invalid's mental life and, unsatisfactory as it is, it is often justified by the fact that it leads to the substitution of a definite evil for an indefinite. The operation of the principle under the form of "conversion" has been alluded to, but there are many other kinds of substitution, of analogous sort, and one of these is the substitution of a specific fear for a sense of humiliation or self-reproach. It is sometimes possible for a patient to witness the actual occurrence of this process of substitution. Certain forms of stage fright are of this order. In analogous

fashion the personal relationship between two individuals, as a pupil and a teacher, may be felt to have in it an element of excess or wrong, and this feeling may tinge the next friendship, not in itself objectionable, with a sense of fear which may spread by unconscious paths to a general sense of apprehension, but finally concentrate itself in some one direction. Similarly, the strong ambition to gain a social success and the dread of failure are said by Freud to account for some of the fears of appearing in public places (as in agoraphobia), or where people must be met, or even of travelling in trains. In other words, this fear is the accepted substitute for an exaggerated form of self-consciousness attended by a sense of shame or guilt. Thus "self-consciousness" means the consciousness of oneself as seen by others in an unfavorable light.

Of course I indicate here only the bare outlines of a transformation which might be accepted only when delineated in detail. Usually, the process of transformation is hidden, even from the patient. He finds himself with a fear — the fear of open windows, or of the railroad train, or with one or another of the morbid impulses enumerated by Janet or by Loewenfeld — but it may be only with difficulty and after overcoming reluctance that he can be led to see the full force of the desires which he represses or the fact that it was to escape from them that he grasped the fear, to justify, as it were, the perturbation of his mind, as a drowning man catches at a straw. Janet has indicated, in an interesting paper, published in this journal, other modes of unsatisfactory substitution through which psychopathic patients instinctively seek relief.¹

C. It has been strongly urged by Freud that in the

¹ Fits of anger, and the commoner forms of depression, as I have elsewhere pointed out, are species of substitution whereby a person seeks to escape from the necessity of showing courage and clear thought. Unpleasant as those states are they really represent a sort of self-indulgence.

amnesia of hysteria, which every close student of the subject, since Janet, would admit to be a sort of active process, a contrivance for the obliteration of the memories of the unhappy and the disagreeable, we have an exaggerated form, a type of much of the forgetting of ordinary life. This principle is indeed admitted and widely acted on, but, as in the other cases, it is in the detail, in the fulness of illustration and in pointing out that the principle applies when we feel unwilling to apply it, that Freud's main service lies.

Every one agrees that "hell is paved with good intentions", which means that we sooth our consciences with words, satisfy ourselves by calling ourselves bad names, and then proceed to actively forget our duties and to close our eyes to the real images of ourselves. But it takes a truly scientific conscience, or the conscience of a person who is sick and sees a real chance of getting well, to recognize the complexity, the elaborate exactness of the machinery which, through this forgetting, we construct for the torment of our lives.

D. The laying down of the theory and mode of analysis of dreams is one of the most remarkable, and in principle the most original of Freud's contributions.

Accustomed as we are to see in dreams only phantas-magorias of the fancy, sparks leaping to and fro on burnt-out paper, to use William James's simile, it is hard for us to believe the explanations and constructions of this analyst, who shows, as one or two others have done in part, that they occupy a definite and useful place in the economy of life.

In our dreams as in our illnesses our unconscious and repressed thoughts and emotions find expression. But, as in our illnesses, again, the revelations are not straightforward, the instinct for compromise and concealment makes itself everywhere apparent. In the night

dream as in the day dream, wishes are fulfilled, but they are often partial wishes, and such as in our waking moments we do not admit even to ourselves. Symbolisms and innuendoes take the place of direct statement, and the possession of a treasury of dramatic power is revealed by the sleeper, of which his waking moments may indicate no trace, so deadening, even though useful, is the repression of education and convention. The volume devoted to the interpretation of dreams indicates the method of analysis which underlies all Freud's work, and it must be studied carefully by any one who would be either a critic or an investigator working on his lines. Let it be, if one will, that there is exaggeration, too much ingenuity of interpolation and explanation. That criticism is nothing. No student need accept, in his own interpretations, more than he believes true. The fact remains that — in my view at least — Freud has offered us a master-key to many of the mysteries of life, and we need not reject this because we find ourselves inclined contemptuously to deny the reports brought back by this or that explorer of the dark realms of the unconscious.

E. Freud's therapeutic method is his method of analysis into the structure and working of the whole mind, the whole man, carried out with a searching and merciless vigor that is in the end fully justified by the fact that it brings at least a sense of freedom and of manhood.

A critical or rather a hostile feeling invariably raises itself in the mind of each new listener to these and kindred statements¹, and it is one that every earnest student of the subject, including the pioneers themselves, has had to deal with in himself before he could proceed. This critical sentiment favors the view that such inquiries as those here sketched out are unwholesome, unhealthy, morbid. The pretended cure is worse, it is said, than the

¹ Cf. *Boston Med. and Surg. Jour.*

disease. Introspection is of the devil. Why show us that we once were little animals, having no touch with the things that now make life so sacred and showing propensities our riper interests have no use for? Let us rather press constantly forward into the free air and more abundant light, and let those who have had a dark history forget it. Look forward and not back.

This is a fine cry, but unfortunately it has served the cause of ignorance, narrowness, and prejudice as well as that of progress. It was the cry of the church against Darwin, when he sought to "introspect" the history of life, and its echoes have drowned the voices of those who have sought to talk about the problems of sex, no matter with what earnestness. The cause of formal modesty and reticence has indeed had many noble martyrs, both before the days of Paul and Virginia and since. But there is such a thing as paying too dear for this niceness, especially when, through the opposite course, we can have all that we should gain by this, and more besides. Strikingly enough, this outcry against one or another sort of investigation is never raised except with regard to our neighbors' efforts to find the truth; the purity of our own motives, the value of our own inquiries, provided they are genuine, rarely come in question. We may kill animals for food and put them to pain for our convenience, but may not inflict any pain on them as physiologists, even for the sake of preventing infinitely more. The detective novel is welcome at every fireside, but the scientific student of human acts and motives is considered a disseminator of morbid tendencies. We are ready enough to say "why worry" when the answer is only to show that it is unphilosophical to anticipate trouble, but we may not ask "why *do we* worry" if there is danger of finding out that we worry because we are unwilling to see ourselves as we are, or to

recognize that we are what we are partly because we were what we were.

All this is wrong. A fool's paradise is a poor paradise. If our spiritual life is good for anything it can afford to see the truth. No investigation is wrong if it is earnest. Knowledge knows nothing as essentially and invariably dirty. It is a piece of narrow intolerance, cruel in its outcome, to raise the cry of "introspection" in order to prevent an unfortunate invalid, whose every moment is already spent in introspection of the worst sort, forced on him by the bigotry, however well meant, of social conventions, from searching, even to the death, the causes of his misery, and learning to substitute the freedom, liberality, tolerance, and purity that comes from knowledge for the tyranny of ignorance and prejudice.

This outcry against intolerance may seem overdone and out of place, but it is not so, and one evidence of the fact is that these remarkable researches of Freud and Jung, and their small band of followers, have met with such bitter opposition, even among physicians.

It is a delightful task to lead our invalids to the mountain top and urge them to look out over the splendid fields around them, waiting for them to till. But it is cruel to attempt this when they must drag thither a heavy burden under which they are forced to stagger, pale and panting, to find themselves, at the summit, unable to proceed further. The real mountain top is always within the mind, and outward activity, which is so much prized, is of little value unless it is the symbol of an inward harmony and peace. At every feast Truth should have the first place.

To sum up the essential facts, let me say that Freud's main thesis, as I apprehend it, may be stated somewhat as follows: (1) Whereas, hitherto, the most important cause of the functional psycho-neuroses has usually been considered to be a constitutional and in general an inherited taint, and

the influence of environment and education has been rated as of secondary significance, the facts point to a different conclusion. Our inheritance varies indeed within wide limits, but that which makes us sick or well (so far as the symptoms of these psycho-neuroses are concerned) is the influences to which we are subjected after birth. This is not to depreciate the importance of what we bring with us to the world, but to exalt the significance of education taken in a wide sense. (2) But if the influence of education, whether for good or ill, is to be exalted, it must be shown that these influences are to be given a broader meaning than that usually accorded to them; and (3) in so far as it is held that adult invalids are susceptible of cure through re-education, to a greater extent than others have believed, it must be proved that there are educational influences hitherto unrecognized or insufficiently recognized, which can be called to aid in this work.

In support of both these propositions Freud brings forward a remarkable array of evidence, based on the actual recitals of his patients. Some of these have been published by him or by his colleagues, while many others, for obvious reasons, have been withheld. These recitals are held to justify a number of subpropositions, such as those which follow, and as the result of my reading of the published communications, from personal conversations with Freud, and with his colleagues, and from my personal observations, I believe these claims to be well founded.

(a) From birth onward our lives are builded on a double principle. We have ostensible personalities and concealed personalities, and though the two may harmonize fairly well they are never fully in accord. Society and our own choice and effort make us what *ostensibly* we are, — artists, merchants, honorable citizens, persons following an aim. But in order to fit ourselves to moulds of such a sort we must, of course, at every moment

discard temptations and repress emotions out of harmony with this or that set purpose.

(b) These emotions and temptations, in spite of being discarded and repressed, not only were but continue to be important portions of ourselves. They may never come to light again individually and in their own form, but at the least they contribute something, if only a note of seriousness, to our perceptions and our thoughts. When they do not help us to remember they may be forcing us to forget, and in reality these two results are often one. Even our discarded, repressed, forgotten childhood lives actively in our adult years, helping to form that variously named portion of our mental lives, of which we are not consciously aware, and *cannot make ourselves entirely aware except with special aid*, never, perhaps, completely.

(c) These repressed emotions and thoughts organize themselves¹ more or less definitely into groups, and there is a constant interplay between them and the thoughts and emotions of our conscious lives. Thus, the repression of a desire gives rise to a vague sense of disquiet; and this feeling attaching itself to a definite object may be felt as a morbid impulse or a defined fear. The desire and repression may never, at best, have been more than half-conscious processes, and finally become wholly forgotten, in the sense above described.

The vague distress (*flottierende Angst*) is consciously felt as something unendurable, and is at once attached to a special object, as in obedience to an impulse which counts as "protective", although the relief afforded may be anything but complete. The fears of water, of the dark, of certain animals, of meeting people, of crowds, of church and theatre, and so on through all their multitudi-

¹ The organization of hell, as figured by Milton, may fairly be taken as representing a part, though only a part, of this unconscious realm of suppressed thoughts.

nous forms, are made up in part, according to this view, of *fears of ourselves*, *i. e.* fears engendered in the course of the effort to set aside a situation felt to be unbearable. Sometimes the whole process can be witnessed, as when a morbid fear of meeting people, or even a so-called misanthropy, arises out of the half-awareness that one has been living under conditions that were socially compromising. Often, however, the links of this chain pass wholly out of sight, and a person finds himself fearing or hating a person or set of persons without knowing why, when in fact it is because these persons stand as representing certain aspects of our past selves.

It is a little harder to explain the common fears of open windows, bridges, and the like, than fears of less external sorts, but there can be little doubt that these also are at least partly due to a similar substitution. We would shine, we would be virtuous and recognized as such, consequently we fear to fall. "Natural" fear and symbolism do the rest.

* * *

In the foregoing pages I have given, in broad outlines, some of the main principles of the doctrine of mental analysis introduced by Breuer and Freud, and the conclusions to which they led¹. In what follows I propose to call attention to certain points in more detail.

It is an interesting fact that the unfavorable criticisms which these researches have called forth, whether directed against their validity or against their value, have been of

¹ An excellent account of Freud's doctrine of dreams and their analysis was read by Dr. Ernest Jones at the recent meeting of the American Psychological Association, and will be published in the *American Journal of Psychology*. A valuable paper on the subject of dreams was also read by Dr. Morton Prince. In view of these publications I feel myself absolved from the obligation of saying anything further on this important topic.

strikingly contradictory sorts. Most of these criticisms have centered really, whether the fact was admitted or concealed, on the prominence given by Freud to the sexual element in the causation of the psychoneuroses. This was considered as a disagreeable topic on which we had closed our eyes so long that we thought we might permit ourselves to regard it as legitimately outlawed. Its vast literature — well known to be of great importance — was repulsive, and should not be seen upon our shelves. It counted for but little that this immense subject was daily and hourly thrusting itself upon our notice, whether as the cause of terrible sufferings, of terrible crimes, of terrible misunderstandings and misjudgments, and that it has played a huge part in the history of religion and of civic progress; those who have ventured to study it scientifically have been, nevertheless, regarded widely as disturbers of the peace. There can be no doubt that prejudices of these sorts have warped the reasoning of students, otherwise of fair judgment, and have led to contradictory kinds of depreciation of Freud's work. Some able men claim to have thoroughly tested his opinions by methods which they regard as entirely equivalent to his, and declare his conclusions to be unverifiable and absurd. They believe that Freud mischievously introduces sexual notions into his patients' minds, and a mistaken conception of their importance into a medical doctrine. Other men believe, on the contrary, that just because sexual influences, even morbid influences, are so widely prevalent, so much more so than the more serious forms of the psychoneuroses, they cannot play the important part in pathology which Freud assigns to them.

Without undertaking to discuss these conflicting differences of opinions it is clear that they suggest the prevalence, not only of serious prejudices, but also of real misunderstandings. Meantime, one good reason for hesit-

ating to take up afresh the study of the sexual aspects of psychopathology has been for many persons the instinctive feeling that nothing practically satisfactory could come of it, either because of their belief that the wall of social repugnance is too strong, or because of doubt whether any new arguments could be more convincing than the old. Neither of these reasons seems to me applicable in the present case. There is an audience, small, perhaps, but constantly increasing, to which the researches of a band of workers, of whom Freud is one, strikingly appeal. Freud's particular contribution is of unquestionable importance, and yet there are so many investigators working on lines parallel with his that the conclusions of each one are sure to be both supplemented and controlled.

One other point needs special emphasis which, if understood, should place this whole matter, for intelligent students, on a better footing. The principal objection to the discussion of sex questions, or the prejudice against it, rests on the assumption that "sexual" means "sensual", and that to speak of sexual influences as of fundamental importance for psychopathology is equivalent to imputing immorality to the fine, intelligent men and women whose experiences might be at stake. But this hasty prejudice needs correction. In the first place, Freud's whole doctrine is permeated with the belief that much of the later neuropathic history of the adult patient was practically determined in his infancy, *i. e.* at a period which indeed needs watching, but when "sensuality" is not in question. In the second place, it is an essential feature of his thesis that "repression" is one of the main agencies in the production of nervous symptoms, and also that much of what goes on lies for the most part outside the patient's conscious knowledge. The possession of the finest, the noblest qualities of thought and sentiment is thus not incompatible with nervous invalidisms of every sort, and certain types of

invalidism are the outgrowths of both early and late repression of sexual instincts under personal effort or parental discipline, *„Die Tugend ist der vollendete Kampf.”* Every one has sexual instincts, if the word be correctly understood. Their possession is one of the universal properties and glories of all living things, and to assume that this is not so would be a piece of false and narrow pride. Here, again, it is the “sensuality” connotations that confuse the issue. As a corollary to this proposition it should be recognized that with regard to this, as with regard to many other matters, no line is to be sharply drawn between disease and health. Stronger efforts to attain our own ideal of virtue always are in place, but so, too, is a deep recognition of the old sentiment, *“nil humanum a me alienum puto”* and a consequent willingness to arrest judgment, except when some practical decision is at stake. In place of moral judgments the physician may well substitute a wider knowledge. Morbid sexual tendencies are, indeed, extremely common, but the physician may and should study them with these sentiments in mind.

So true is this, that the argument ought to be recognised as properly applying to the medical estimate even of persons and acts classifiable as “abnormal”, “criminal”, or “perverted”. For it is true, however those who have not looked into the matter may think otherwise, that, in the eye of science, perverted instincts — such, for example, as an excessive passion for a person of the same sex, carried from the realm of thought into that of act — finds its analogue in many overdone or even quasi-normal relationships of daily life. It is a question of degree that is at stake, and although for purposes of punishment, prevention, public self-protection and social standards, we must draw sharp lines, yet knowledge should make us prudent in passing scientific judgments. Furthermore, it is one of the propositions of the writer

whom we are here reviewing, that from certain points of view, as, for example, in the production of symptoms and of dreams, thoughts count as acts, and if this dictum is accepted society would have to recast its estimates of the criminal and the abnormal. Let it not be imagined that it is in the annals of criminology alone that we should look for these analogies. The literature of the great myths and great tragedies call to mind the existence of tendencies in human nature which prove that conventional morals, important as they are, as indicating standards towards which every one should, for certain reasons, strive, are often, in a wider view, extremely narrow.

The course followed by Freud in classifying as "sexual" many common emotions, as of affection, and their opposites¹, as well as a great variety of apparently indifferent sentiments, longings, and "physiological" habits, having no obvious connection with the reproductive functions is, from the medical and scientific standpoints, useful and indeed essential. He and his colleagues have sought conscientiously for some wider term which might include the idea "sexual" yet without making that word so prominent, but they have come to the conclusion that the attempt was useless and, perhaps, not worth making. Dr. Jung discusses this point in a footnote to his valuable paper on the influence of the father on the evolution of the child. (*Die Bedeutung des Vaters für das Schicksal des Einzelnen. Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und Psychopathologische Forschungen. I. Hälfte*, p. 155), saying, in reference to the word "Libido", which they widely use, that this term corresponds to the "Longing and Striving" (*Wollen und Streben*) of the older psychiatrists, but, as employed by Freud, is a *denominatio a potiori*.

The English word "craving" seems to me perhaps the most significant for general uses; but the main thing is that we

¹ Cf. the sexual significance of violence inflicted or received.

should strive to comprehend the truth and not miss the important analogies, inferences, and symbolisms which are here at stake. The burden of proof lies with those who are willing to let their ignorance of the facts obscure their judgment.

Freud's position as to this question of sexuality, or of unsatisfied craving for which equally unsatisfactory outlets are instinctively being sought, and their significance for social evolution, is expressed in many places, but nowhere in a more significant and comprehensive form¹ than in an article entitled *Die „kulturelle“ Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität*, published in his *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre: Zweite Folge, 1909*.

Without trying literally to summarize this article, I shall strive to give in my own words some of the principles there laid down, together with certain others brought forward in his earlier papers. The task which the human race finds itself called upon to meet is one of twofold character. We must seek to build up a civilization corresponding to our higher needs, yet are forced to recall that we are under sacred obligation to see that our species is perpetuated, and that, too, under the best conditions. These two sets of obligations often come, broadly speaking and narrowly speaking, into striking conflict. The pressure which all of us are under to make individual interests subservient to community interests finds its strongest, its most fundamental expression at the point where the problem is in question, how to raise to what may be called a higher level, the intense and varied emotions and tendencies that cluster round the great instinct and function of reproduction. This process of transforming our instincts into what may be called by courtesy nobler forms is designated by Freud as one of "sublimation", and he is surely right in saying that in it, that is,

¹ In this paper the evolution, normal and morbid, of the individual is traced out in relation to the evolution of society.

in the repression of our instincts in the interests of other sorts of gain, the march of culture towards a higher culture virtually consists. But the special form of instinct repression which is here in question and which is the most fundamental one of all, is not accomplished without a corresponding sacrifice, a sacrifice which falls partly on the individual and partly on the community as well.

It is true that this sacrifice is often unattended by a marked sense of personal loss, but this is because of the immense power of the influences which social imitation and convention, religion, and the obligations under which we instinctively place ourselves in the interest of common happiness and stability, exert upon our emotions, our habits, and our thoughts. Every watchful observer, nevertheless, can trace, from infancy onwards, the working and the conflict of these two great influences, natural instinct and the repression of this instinct for the sake of society as a whole. This conflict complicates and underlies all the great movements by which the emotions, the hopes, the fears of men are stirred, and those investigators who claim not to trace its influence in psychopathology are either blind or do not know of what they speak. The greatest problem for the psychopathology of the future is to learn how to detect the subtle working of this conflict and the principles which it implies.

When the symptoms and history described by an adult nervous invalid are scrutinized it may be that we obtain at first no obvious trace of the sexual emotions and tendencies which played so important a part in the conflict from which his symptoms sprang. Least of all is he himself able to recognize these tendencies. He appears to himself a puzzle and a problem, and his symptoms seem as irrational as if he were possessed by some parasitic demon. Like the balking horse, who through repeated vain attempts to draw his load has learned to expect failure,

he often stands as if paralyzed before the problems of his life, or he may have learned to exchange his uncertainty for fear; or, as if in cramplike attempts to gain relief, he may have constrained himself to convert his fears into some impulsive act of useless outcome. Or, again, if he would make a strong fight against his troubles, he is likely to feel himself, like Braddock's army in the Virginia Wilderness, helpless against an unseen foe. It is only after a long and patient analysis of motives, instincts, and desires, that the real enemy from whose attacks he suffers is found to consist in the above described discarded elements that went to make up the secondary and hidden stream of life, described in the earlier portion of this paper. It is needless to refer here to these elements in so far as they form a portion of his adult experiences alone, because these are reasonably well known to all. I would only repeat that, as I have said elsewhere, if the process of gaining the knowledge of them is to be compared in any sense, as it has been compared, to the confessional of the Catholic Church, it should be understood that the real analysis begins where the confessional leaves off.¹

The remarkable fact, however, is that the nervous invalid is always discovered at least to be still partially under the sway of the influences of childhood. Few persons remember much of their infantile existence, but the researches of able men have made it clear that the sexual life of infancy, and the conflicts involved in childish forms

¹ This comparison and contrast are introduced for the sake of calling attention again to the fact that the thoughts, memories and emotions which the physician seeks to set free are not simply with regard to matters which are "on the mind" of the patient. They form, indeed, a supplementary complex of vast amount, and one which is unified by one thread, running from infancy to later years, and reappearing again and again in moments of abstraction and in dream-life; but neither thread nor complex are to be discovered except by long and patient searching.

of "sublimation", are of remarkable complexity and force. The child has many desires, complex sensations, and interests besides those which might be classed as intellectual or emotional in a higher sense. One series of his deeper feelings are related, of course, to hunger, but it has become certain that others form a large connected group, of which the most important members are those which later go to subserve the functions of reproduction. In the period of infancy he does not by any means distinguish clearly between the different members of this latter group, — which comprise, amongst others, the various sensations referable to all the orifices of the body, the nose and mouth as well as the vagina, the urethra, and the anus, — but only knows that through them all he can obtain analogous sorts of gratification. Thus equipped, the child is launched upon the task of evolution and repression. He is expected to follow a stated pathway, to retain and nourish the great function of transmitting his inheritance, but to do so under conventional and often highly artificial limitations. What wonder if, in the attempt to accomplish this, he so often goes at least partly wrong even when seeming to go most right. Why is it that sensitive, refined children are so prone to grow timid, shy, self-conscious, over-conscientious, morbidly dependent on a parent or a teacher? These questions and others which they suggest have been variously answered and there are doubtless various influences at work; but it is certain that every answer must be false which denies the action of the subconscious and unconscious mental repressions and conflicts of the sexual period of infancy and childhood; and that every answer must be inadequate that is not based on an intimate knowledge of the real contents of the child life from which we emerge, and which, in the sense in which forgetting has been above described, we so soon forgot. It is, of course, true that we know as yet little of the exact part

played by hereditary influences in the production of the neuropathic invalid. What we do, however, know, is that we can inherit what may be called a predisposition only. The tuberculous adult was not tuberculous as a newborn infant, and there are many who through care and prudence escape the destiny to which many another less careful falls a victim. The same thing is true of nervous invalidism, and of some, at least, of the severer forms of mental illness. These new researches open a distinctly new door for hope. I find myself believing more strongly in the reasonableness of this hope; in this opportunity — furnished by a better self-knowledge — to work out our possibilities and to escape from our temptations. I cannot pretend to have verified as yet all the many inferences and conclusions of Freud and his companions, reaching as they do infinitely further than I have here been able even to suggest. But I have learned to believe fully in the theory and in the value of their methods of analysis and of treatment, and I am the more ready to accept their views for having made the personal acquaintance of the three men mentioned at the beginning of this paper, and for having found them so kindly, unassuming, tolerant, earnest and sincere. I believe there is still a good deal to be said on the psychological side of the discussion, and believe also that the intimate knowledge of ourselves, which is so essential, needs to be supplemented by more or less distinct study of motives of a social and ideal sort. But these considerations do not detract from the importance of the ideas here referred to. However strongly we may believe in the importance of character and its relationship to social, philosophical, and religious training, it is not to be forgotten that one deep root of character lies in the influences brought to bear during the remote period and by the remote conflicts of infancy and childhood.

Chapter II.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH FREUD'S PSYCHO-ANALYTIC METHOD*.

I venture to believe that there are many neurologists in our association whose attitude towards Freud's method of investigation and treatment of a large, serious and relatively neglected group of illnesses, a method to which the name of "psychoanalysis" has been attached, is very much what my own was previous to about a year ago. I had been repelled, long before, by certain of his assertions, and although I had read several of his papers yet I gave no adequate study to the subjects of which he wrote, until a few months previous to last September, during which month Freud and Jung came to America to deliver short courses of lectures at Clark University, in Worcester. Since then I have treated, more or less thoroughly, sometimes quite imperfectly, about twenty patients, suffering from anxiety-neuroses, hysteria, neurasthenia, fears, impulsions. There has also been one case of impotence and one of stammering, both of which have interested me greatly.

These groups of cases have seemed to me of peculiar importance for the purposes of this communication, because of the fact that many of the patients had been treated by me earlier—some of them, off and on, for several years—and I could therefore fairly compare the new results with those previously obtained.

* Read at the thirty-sixth annual meeting of the American Neurological Association, May 2, 3 and 4, 1910. Published in the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, November 1910.

In almost every instance the new results have been materially better than the old, and when the histories which were secured after this treatment was begun are compared with those which had been secured previously, either as regards detail or completeness, the difference between them is immense.

I soon became convinced that my earlier acquaintance with these patients' lives, characters, capabilities and needs had been utterly superficial. The morbid conditions which are here at stake are practically psychiatric.

If the psychogenetic element in mental disorders is ever to be made out, it is here that it is to be sought and studied. It is true that under the influence of rest and improvement of the bodily health, a better mental and physical environment, or such measures as occupations of favorable sorts, neurotic symptoms may be temporarily side-tracked. Even in severe cases there are periods of relative relief. But these improvements are either of short duration or else they usually mean that these patients remain mutilated hangers-on of life, contributing little of real value, dependent on artificial conditions of living such as it is difficult to create or to maintain. Sometimes, indeed, a better result is seen. The entrance on a new phase of life in youth, exposure to new and strong influences which appeal to some undeveloped trait or taste, a strong friend, a strong and skilful physician using methods of his own development (careful dissociation and reassociation, hypnoid methods, re-educational methods, etc.) may induce remarkable results in favorable cases. The cures reported by such men as Janet and Prince and Sidis are a warrant for this statement. But large numbers of unfortunate persons go untreated or unrelieved whom a thorough psycho-analysis would place on the high-road to a substantial degree of mental health. And this for an obvious reason, namely, because these illnesses rest upon deep-seated twists of

character and temperament which this method is especially adapted to discover and relieve. Every successful method must work through a process of reeducation and the kind of reeducation that deals most fully with the causes of the illness gives the best promise of a broad success. These untreated, unrelieved, unfathomed cases play but little part in the estimates of those physicians who conceive that our present means of treatment are sufficient. But the keen and able Janet, in the chapters on therapeutics and prognosis of his monograph on "Psychasthenia," admits a gloominess of outlook for these patients, and a relative helplessness of treatment, such as Freud would not accept. The modes of treatment which Janet recommends are admirable and judicious, but at many points gaps are visible which psycho-analysis could fill.

The statement has been made that there seems sometimes to be a somewhat tide-like ebb and flow of the tendency to fears, impulsions and the like, with psycho-neurotic patients, independent of all treatment, and the inference has been drawn that we are dealing with deep-seated degenerative and hereditary tendencies in the face of which no treatment could be permanently of avail.¹

But to say this is to beg the question. One of the most hopeful outcomes of this psycho-analytic method is the prospect of its ability to cope with conditions hitherto believed to be beyond relief. There are obvious limits to its usefulness but nevertheless it strikes deeper than any other method now known to psychiatry, and reaches some of these very cases to which the terms degenerative and incurable have been applied, forcing us to recast our conceptions of these states.

¹ In speaking of this point I have in mind some remarks made by a speaker (Dr. Barker) during the discussions of this paper as first read, and I take the liberty of adding these few words with reference to his statement.

It is often maintained that the results of the psychoanalytic treatments are incommensurate with the time expended on them, and indeed it is obvious that the method is not applicable in its complete form to hospital practice or even to large numbers of private patients. So fundamental a reeducation as is here attempted undoubtedly takes time. But although these considerations might well deter many a physician from undertaking any adequate treatment of psychoneurotic patients — *for no other treatment accomplishes so much in so short a time* — the argument is meaningless as a scientific criticism of the value of Freud's method, while from the practical standpoint it need only be said that it is fortunate that there are so many persons of marked ability whom the need of spending the needed amount of time does not deter. It would be a great loss for psychology¹ and practical medicine and for education if this was not the case. No one, hereafter, can make studies of human character or of the psychology of childhood without constantly referring to these researches. The men who are conducting them are not mere therapists; they are scientific investigators of high grade; investigators into the anatomy and physiology of the mind, which is a far more important and now a more promising research than that into the anatomy and physiology of the brain, so far as the laws of thinking are concerned, and they deserve sympathy and support. Even in hospital practice, the facts that these men are collecting and the principles which they are establishing will prove of the highest value, and the men who now criticize this method

¹ The study of psychology is largely a study of the unconscious mental life and there is no means of investigating this through actual observation, which at all compares with the psychoanalytic study of dreams and repressed thoughts. Cf. Freud's *Der Witz*, *Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*, and the many *Schriften zur Angewandten Seelenkunde*. Indeed the whole great literature which Freud's researches have stimulated has a well-defined psychological interest.

will use their data without knowing it, perhaps indeed are using them already.

My own observation has led me to see at once the value of the method and the difficulty of getting the best effects from it. Not only has my experience been brief but I have not been able to secure the daily visits over a period of three months or more that Freud advises. Three visits a week, and sometimes less, or daily interviews during one to four weeks and then infrequent visits for a longer time is the best that I have been able to obtain. I do not recommend such departures from the rule and can clearly see that they have impaired my own success. We should observe the same conscientiousness in this matter that is shown by the followers of Wassermann in the selection of blood-tests for syphilis. The best that can be said for the half-way measures is that they have demonstrated success to be a matter of degree and have shown that even partial results may be of great practical value. But these partial results, with which one is tempted to rest satisfied are rarely satisfactory in direct proportion to the length of treatment. After a certain point the improvement becomes much more rapid, in some instances, while in others a climax seems to be reached, perhaps fairly early, beyond which it is hard to go. One reason for this arrest of progress obviously is that the mental and moral capacity of a certain proportion of these patients is not only inhibited but inherently limited in power and scope, while others are unusually intelligent. Temperamental differences between patient and physician likewise come in, as well as inertness and lack of knowledge and experience on the latter's part. The task demands a man's best powers. It is therefore impossible to give a definite answer to the question how long these treatments should be continued, just as it would be impossible to say how long a violinist should continue studying with an able master, or how long any man should

continue trying to develop his own character. Some intelligent persons gain a great deal in a few interviews, others find it of service to go on indefinitely; but, in the latter cases, physician and patient usually get to be students of the subject on almost equal terms. If the physician begins by being a psychologist the patient often ends by becoming one.

This question as to the length of treatment links itself naturally with another, namely, how far should the analysis be pushed with regard to any given point, as, for example, in the study of a dream. Theoretically, there is no limit to the process of passing from one thought to another by the method of association. Every thought, every image has some relation, either of resemblance or of contrast, with every other image. One might start with a chipmunk and wind up with the French Revolution or Buckle's History of Civilization, and it must be a matter of judgment to decide how much of the possible material which the method of association could be made to furnish was actually in the patient's mind as a material portion of his latent dream thought. In practice, no one need fear that he will carry the dream-analysis too far. It often happens that the associations which seem the furthest fetched are of the greatest service. What is true of the associations suggested by dreams is true also of those suggested by words or thoughts. A "common-sense" person would say that each of his words meant one thing and no more. But every thoughtful student is aware, especially since Jung's remarkable researches, that many words have a richness of meaning which was acquired only through a long series of significant personal experiences on our part, experiences which our memories once recorded, consciously or unconsciously, and could still, perhaps, reveal. A word may be made to furnish the epitome of a lifetime. And so, too, when we say of an object that it has this or that

characteristic we do so by virtue of an infinite number of memories of similar objects which guide our judgments although not present to our conscious thoughts. But while, in theory, all our past experiences are living factors in the decisions of each moment, the experiences which we mainly need to seek for therapeutic purposes are grouped around a relatively few centers, with which they form emotional complexes of important sorts; and these come to the front in any searching analysis, when the internal resistances have been dispelled.

It is usually possible to tell when the patient's thoughts get wandering into useless channels but strangely enough it rarely happens that they do so, and the physician is far more likely to be satisfied with too little than to obtain too much. A large group of thoughts, acts, and memories may have a single emotional nucleus for its center or may all be related to the same trait of character, the instinctive tendency to make one's self a center of interest and sympathy, for example. Therefore the patient's associations are more likely to lead him to give more and more illustrations of one trend than to wander in too many trends. Certain trends or complexes are far more important than the rest and this is especially true of those which keep alive in the grown person the traits of infancy and childhood. Freud's service and that of his followers and colleagues, in dwelling on the tendency to this survival is certainly immense,¹ and although there are certain of his statements that I have thus far found it hard to verify with anything like constancy yet I have been so amazed at the accuracy of others that I expect to re-affirm them all.

It is well known that Freud's method of procedure is to let the patient lie down in a recumbent or semi-recumbent position, under the real but not the apparent inspection of the physician, so that what he says and

¹ Cf. Freud's study of Leonardo da Vinci.

does may be devoid of constraint, a species of soliloquizing rather than a conversation with another person. Instead of this I have let the patients assume what attitude they liked, often moving about the room, myself, and seeking to give them the opportunity to talk into the air if they desired, or to converse if this pleased them better. I believe that individual license should be allowed in these respects, but it becomes soon obvious that the best results are only to be obtained through great thoroughness, insistence and persistence.

The best means of indicating the sorts of results which a person of no more experience and training than my own may hope to reach will be to outline a few of my observations.

The first case to which I will refer is that of a studious and high-minded woman, now 41 years old, of the conscientious, somewhat neurotic type so common in New England, who filled a sedentary and literary position in a country town. She came to me first in January, 1907, *i. e.*, two and a half years before the psychoanalytic treatment in its latest form was undertaken,¹ though from the beginning I had kept some of its principles in mind. The case was one of universal doubt, with the usual Wandering-Jew inability to find rest in any proof. In the beginning she announced timidly that she could not rid herself of the idea, the history of which she could in a measure trace, that plants and trees suffered like men, so that cutting and breaking them caused them pain. Later, she disclosed that similar doubts extended to all evidence, even about her own identity, her own name.

¹ If the physicians who feel that these treatments run along indefinitely will consult their record-books, they will find that, as in this case before the psychoanalytic treatment was begun, their patients keep returning to them through years, no matter what sort of treatment they had used.

Argument, as is usual in such cases, proved of no permanent avail; abundant encouragement, and directions how to sidetrack her painful doubts helped more, but secured only temporary gains. She did her work with care and interest but was never, even for a moment, free from a painful sense of nervous strain, a haunting dread of insanity and sometimes even suicide.

A year ago I began a systematic investigation of the facts, and this has gone on ever since, with steadily increasing interest on both sides, although very slowly because I could rarely see the patient more than once a week. I must pass over the whole picturesque history as finally developed, important bits of which are even now coming to the light and the evidences of gradual but steady and I believe durable improvement. Suffice it to say that the case fully bears out the view that these obsessions of doubt, although of course implying the existence of a certain something which is inherited, are virtually due to an inability on the patient's part to arrive at a judgment satisfactory to themselves with reference to certain particular moral questions involving a sense of personal mortification; *i. e.*, to a series of particular doubts and misgivings, inadequately faced, inadequately understood. It may indeed be true that if we possessed the power to investigate accurately the psycho-physical or even the physiological reactions of such patients¹ we should find, from the moment of their birth, something which might count as a predisposing tendency, not indeed to "doubt" as such but to a psychopathic disorder of some sort. This probability is borne out here by the fact that this patient's sister suffers from morbid fears of certain sorts but not from doubts. The general tendency to doubt, however, to doubt about everything, although eventually it exists as such and remains hovering in the air, as it were, waiting to attach

¹ Cf. Adler, *Studie über Minderwertigkeit von Organen*, Berlin, 1907.

itself to some or any special problem is probably always, in large part, the outcome of particular doubts.

This patient had had a happy childhood, but the father died when she was very young so that the children came wholly under the mother's influence, and while this was very good in most respects and the traditions in the household were of wholesomeness and refinement, yet the very fact that this was so played its part in intensifying certain of the patient's morbid traits. In looking back she realizes not only that she was imaginative and given to day-dreams, but that her temperament was very ardent and filled her with desires which had the sexual instinct as their central point. This led her to certain acts and thoughts which eventually brought a sense of mortification, and then the contrast, in her mind, between her assumed backsliding and her mother's standards, intensified by the fact that she felt that her mother could never understand her and that she could not claim her confidence or give her own. She thus suffered silently from mortifications and doubts about sexual faults and unanswered curiosity about sexual facts, a curiosity too strong to master but acknowledged with humiliation. When a very small child she was induced, as a bit of fairy-story play, to make a mock marriage with a small-boy playmate, and this was attended with certain ceremonies¹ that seemed at first trivial but at once introduced a sense of guilt. Then there came a period of masturbation, with sexual visions, and although this experience, like the other, was overcome after a time, and for a time, almost forgotten, yet subsequent events brought both to active life. Later, there came a few trifling indiscretions, not of act but thought, that no outsider would have thought twice about but which to the patient, then a grown woman, seemed to imply an unendurable contradiction of her moral training

¹ Passing water in common, the patient being in a tree overhead.

and traditions. The intensifying conditions were several in number. A book, accidentally glanced over, said or seemed to say that masturbation led to insanity, and the mental picture of insanity was brought near by a number of incidents (the observation of insane persons, the discovery that certain acquaintances had "gone wrong" and had had a tragic history) such as everyone experiences and most persons without harm. One other fundamental fact must here be mentioned. This lady, refined, sensitive, modest to a fault, had, as has been noted and as she recognized with terror, an emotional nature which consciously and unconsciously, she was constantly striving to repress. Certain personal experiences, subconscious emotions illustrated by certain dreams, brought a series of ideas connected with the brute-animal creation into the circle of these emotional thoughts, and a passage from the Old Testament, relating to this matter, induced a new sense of guilt vaguely mixing itself with the memories of the early habits, memories which became rekindled through a vaginal examination conducted by a physician of a stern manner who for her inflamed imagination figured as a detective. I have indicated only a portion of the facts that slowly came into the light of the patient's conscious memory, but enough to show that here was a tangle, made up of natural desires gone astray, needless self-reproaches, fears of discovery, fears of insanity, the assumed condemnation of science and the Scriptures, the assumed abandonment of her maternal standards.

In the midst of this network struggled the patient like a fly in a spider's web, feeling her life a contradiction, her mind diseased and so unworthy of her trust, and yet unable to see and face the causes of her distress. What wonder, that, as the result, she reasoned herself to be incapable of reason. What wonder that she could not extricate herself unaided, when she could not even recognize

the facts, not to speak of working out the reasoning. What wonder that the earlier encouragement and the explanation, playing with a few facts that only covered over and concealed so many more, benefited her so little. The question is often asked, not only by patients but physicians, to what good is one's past life raked over in this fashion? How can the mere conscious recognition of such experiences annul their influence? This case was one that materially helped me to conclusions on these points. Although her revelations were a cause of obvious and peculiar suffering, yet she has felt what everyone who seriously works by this method comes to feel, that it is a great relief to understand one's enemy; to exchange an emotion of terror for a knowledge of the facts and for problems that can be intellectually faced.

I have elsewhere used the illustration of Gen. Braddock's brave, well-equipped and well-drilled army, gasping in the Virginia wilderness, shot at by unseen foes, whom, if they had been wise enough, they might have prepared themselves to meet on equal terms.

If it is at first mortifying to reveal and come to the knowledge of one's weaknesses, this feeling fades gradually away; first, in the light of the discovery that the personal weakness illustrates an important fact in the psychological and physiological history of all men; next, before an increasing respect for knowledge and a growing hesitation to pass judgments or to listen to them, tendencies which the physician, whose education also is at stake, soon learns to share. The general outcome, in this case, has been an immense gain in confidence and comfort.

I have observed several cases analogous to this with the same ending of false reasoning, and one of them deserves mention because the evolution of the symptom was acute and almost under observation. The patient—whom I never saw but for a few times—was a bright,

intelligent young girl who during a marriage engagement with a young man of good business standing was tempted by him into sexual indulgences, not of an extreme sort, but such as to plunge her into a considerable mortification. At the time I saw her, which was directly after these events, everything she did was, in her estimation, wrong. She herself saw and avowed the genesis of this tendency to generalize her special self-condemnation and after some further explanation she seemed in a fair way to recover her lost balance. But the correcting knowledge was none too soon received.

The next case concerns a patient in early middle life, married and with several children. He had become a torment to his family from a habit of unreasonableness and exaction, carried to the point of being a thoroughly morbid impulse, a species of sadism as it later seemed, not unmixed with a readiness to receive blame for which the designation masochism would be equally in place. This habit was combined with excellent health and great charm, on the one hand, and a tendency to certain childish-seeming ceremonial observances, upon the other. Without a little prompting from partially informed friends or an ability to guess based on the marvelous array of data collected by Freud and his colleagues, I might perhaps have treated this patient forever without reading the riddle of his life. Nor would the mystery have been lessened by the occurrence of furious attack of maniacal delirium which necessitated the isolation of the patient for a period of several months. In the end all became fairly clear. It was a case of aberrant emotionalism of childhood prolonged into adult life; and with a strongly marked but eccentrically developed, erotic nucleus. From beginning to end there had been a series of painful conflicts between desire, taking the form of (mutual) masturbation, then of an instinct to show power and to inflict pain, all, mixed in and followed by periods of intense

self-condemnation, expiation, propitiation. The expiation took at one time a religious turn, at another that of hand-washing,¹ at again another, of confessions in and out of season. The maniacal seizure was, I believe, a prolonged hysterical attack or dream-complex; for the delirium, every detail of which was eventually recalled, was a duplication of lesser dreams and fancies from which Dante might have found fruitful suggestions for his *Inferno*. Fortunately, a steady improvement has set in, as the result of psycho-analytic treatment, and there is an excellent outlook for a bright future.

In looking back upon the treatment of this case I can see, here also, that in my mistaken efforts to save the patient's feelings I frequently attempted to explain too much, at the risk of failing to ensure that the sequences of thoughts and acts, the reverersions to childhood-traits, the significance of sexual dreams, should be recognized at their full values through being worked out piecemeal by the patient. Certain of the masters of this method have noted that the patients, after the conclusion of a successful treatment, show a desire to cut loose from their physician and to attribute their improvement to other causes, and that they seem to feel no sense of gratitude. This is unfortunate and, I believe, usually unnecessary, but in so far as it means that the doctor has done his full duty in insisting on a recognition of the facts it may be a useful sign.

In both of the above instances the attempt was necessarily made to modify tendencies which had been operative from childhood to well into middle life. The next case concerns a somewhat younger person and the problem was correspondingly easier.

¹ The patient had soiled his hands by passing urine on them as an erotic ceremony, and the washing was, as is usual, a species of instinctive acknowledgment of guilt and attempt at expiation or reparation.

This patient is a young lady of 33 years who came to me first in 1908, *i. e.*, about ten months before I was able to institute a thorough treatment by the psycho-analytic method. She was in excellent physical health and her symptoms consisted in a morbid shyness accompanied with a frequent tendency to tears, and in a fear of the need of passing urine which made visits to strangers—especially to a physician or to a dentist—or even short train-journeys or boat-journeys a source of extreme misery. Some portions of her history, including the fact that she had recently made and broken an engagement to be married, were told to me at once. It was a relief to have established this bond of confidence and the explanations and encouragements given during the period before the psycho-analytic treatment was begun resulted in a gradual gain, so that the patient became able, though not without distress, to conduct an occupation involving initiation and slight publicity, and to make a long journey with some friends. The later analysis showed a very interesting personal and family history. She had been a child with a passionate temper and strong desires, and had been brought up strictly and injudiciously by well-meaning but narrow and bigoted parents, of but few social advantages and many foolish prejudices. The mother was an uncontrolled neurotic, the father hard and aged. Her entire childhood and adolescence had been marked outwardly by repression and outbreaks against repressions and inwardly by mental conflicts of analogous sorts. Through it all there had been a constant surging of desires and cravings which if properly sympathized with and directed from the outset would readily have made the patient a warm-hearted and affectionate person, even if impulsive. Unfortunately, besides being unlucky in her home surroundings she was unlucky also in her school companions. At least it must be said that the tone of morals among many

of them was low and that sexual topics were discussed freely and in unsavory terms. The subjects of discussion included naturally the nature of marriage and the birth of children, and the girl was given a picture of brutality on the part of husbands and informed that child-birth was accomplished by the aid of a "butcher's knife" with which the abdomen was laid open. The nervous disorder of micturition obviously resulted from unwise parental toilet-rules *plus* a variety of sexual associations. Her instincts led her into various slight excesses resulting in a sense of humiliation and reproach. It is easy to imagine how on this soil the signs of a morbid shyness and self-consciousness should have grown rank, and it is satisfactory to be able to note that marked improvement has taken place in all respects. The excellent plans for reeducation so carefully laid down by Janet as applicable to such cases was immensely re-inforced by the complete knowledge of the facts obtained through the psycho-analytic method. The study of the patient's dreams was an indispensable means of embracing in this knowledge the working of the unconscious mental life and the half-recognized desires of the conscious life.

The next case is of special interest, because the patient, an unmarried business man of middle life (46) and of excellent physical health, had had his distressing mental symptoms (self-consciousness, embarrassment, doubts, sense of depreciation, etc.) since early childhood, and because he had for a long time been under the care of other persons, one of whom—a neurologist of the first rank—had tried for a short time to study and treat him with the aid of hypnotism, but without effect. The outlook did not seem promising for the removal of symptoms so fixed that they were woven into his character and temperament. He had been under my care off and on for about a year before I attempted this more searching study of his life, but I was nevertheless amazed to find how much there was still to

learn about him and the intimate causes of his illness. So ready was he, at first, to reiterate, at each visit, what seemed only the tiresome complaints of a hypochondriac that I should have been glad to abandon the new effort and indeed suggested doing so. But, fortunately, he was intelligent enough to see the merits of the plan and desired me to keep on. I soon came to have a deep knowledge of his history from the age of four, at which period a strongly emotional (erotic) tendency began to show itself, and also of his relations to his parents and his friends, and was able to trace the evidences of his temperament in his business-dealings. In proportion as this insight was gained improvement in his self-control and mental bearing began to show itself, and this has steadily increased. One of the marked features of his early life was, as in the second case reported, an obsession of morbid conscientiousness and of expiation, and even when he was entering on manhood this childhood, fairy-story trait retained a ludicrously powerful hold on him. In this respect he had improved before he came under my care,¹ at least so far as the grosser features of the tendency were concerned. But the endless conflict of motives, the self-conscious torturing of himself, went on in lesser forms. As matters now stand he is able to take a far more rational position before himself and before the world, and can see, and more readily check, the working out of his infantile passions and repressions, of his parental domination and his early training, much as one sees at one glance in a transparent microscopic-section construction of the brain the whole course of a great neuronetract.

In such a picture of a life the element of time seems to be abolished and childhood and age are seen as if now present and coalescing, in an effective form.

¹ It is certainly true, as Janet indicates, that spontaneous improvement sometimes occurs, in these cases.

It is idle to make the claim that where one is conscientiously attempting to aid a patient thus hampered with long-standing morbid habits, the aid obtained through this intimate knowledge of his past, this power of seizing the lifetime in one grasp, this unraveling of the unconscious mental life obtained through dreams and other means are not worth having. Such a claim is the contention of ignorance. The whole task may be abandoned if one chooses but if it is to be undertaken at all no aids can be dispensed with, and the advent of still another Freud, with still further insights, should be welcomed if he came.

The next case is of considerable clinical and scientific, as well as of therapeutic interest. The patient was a lady, fifty-three years of age, and so beyond the period when marked improvements are relatively easy to obtain.

The case was one of a hysterical petit mal, the attacks being so severe that the diagnosis long remained in doubt. Many of them have occurred under my observation, once under that of my colleague Dr. G. A. Watermann likewise, and I can therefore positively assert that the knee-jerks regularly disappeared and remained absent for from one to several minutes, then returning gradually, and that the same statement can be made as regards the light-reaction of the pupils. This observation stands among a very few of equal value.

I cannot give, at present, the details of the interesting history which was gradually obtained, or of the improvements and discouraging relapses. Suffice it to say that the patient had had two long series of emotional strains, lasting through many years, both of which tended, in different ways, to induce the idea and habit of muscular abandonment, of giving way and the letting go of all control. In other words, the sign was fairly to be taken as symbolizing this mental state, a conclusion reinforced by the analysis of her dreams. The particular exciting

causes of the seizures were various excitements and surprises such as would naturally excite a relaxation of attention even in slight degree.

After a time I discovered that I could bring on attacks by talking about them and thus getting the patient into an attitude of expectation.

Attempts to induce the hypnotic sleep or a suitable hypnoid state were not successful in my hands.

The therapeutic outcome has been, at last, not recovery, but a marked relief from symptoms which for a dozen years had been a very serious handicap to the happiness and activity of a very intelligent and useful person.

The next case of which I wish to speak is one of importance, being that of a well balanced, intelligent middle-aged, business-man, who had never, in his married life of five years, been able to have satisfactory coitus, a cause of mortification and regret. I had treated him carefully and energetically for a long period, with electricity in various forms, stimulant perineal douches combined with other hydrotherapeutic measures, full doses of johambin,—long continued,—strychnia and other tonics, and had done my best to help him by encouragement and explanation and with attempts at hypnotic influence, but absolutely without avail.

In spite of these discouragements the patient was willing to do his part in carrying out a psycho-analytic investigation and, although it was impossible to secure daily treatments yet the result has been so great improvement as to substantially mean recovery. The three influences which this investigation brought out, as possible causes of the impotence, were, first, a sense of mortification attending the memory (half-conscious and perhaps, still more, unconscious) of a masturbation-habit prolonged into late adolescence;¹ a rather strong maternal influence which may

¹ Cf. a paper by Ferenczi, where this same origin was made out.

have interfered somewhat with conjugal feelings in spite of the fact that he was a devoted husband; and, possibly, some unfavorable conditions on the part of his wife who, though devoted to his interests and herself desirous of seeing his impotence overcome, was nevertheless a nervous invalid and may well have had exercised the repressions which attend that state. Somehow or other, at any rate, the successful outcome gradually emerged and still persists.

The next case is one of stammering, the patient being a young man of 19, of ability and fine character. The speech-difficulty had begun in early childhood and various attempts had been made to relieve it, of the usual sorts, including a long treatment in the school for stammerers at Detroit.

As the result of these measures he was able to speak fairly well so long as he talked very slowly and rhythmically, but as for the most part this was impossible the net practical improvement was not great. My treatment consisted partly in suggestions and exercises calculated to mitigate some of the more specific difficulties of enunciation (including certain exercises advised by Scripture), but mainly in an attempt to discover all possible past and present causes of embarrassment, in which I believed the essential origin of his trouble lay.¹

The outcome has fully justified my hopes and a recent communication shows that the improvement, both in self-confidence and in speech, is still maintained.

It cannot be justly claimed that all other patients treated by this method have made equally satisfactory progress. But while I have had reason to be distinctly disappointed at the outcome in perhaps three cases, there is hardly a

¹ Adler (*Studie über die Minderwertigkeit von Organen*, Berlin, 1907, later papers) believes that there is also an innate defect in the speech-mechanisms in these cases.

single patient who would be disinclined to pursue the treatment further.¹

The conditions which I have found most resistant have been (1) those classifiable as neurasthenic, of long-standing and disabling sorts; (2) distressing mental depressions and phobias related to causal circumstances that still persisted, and (3) anxiety-neuroses where it was impossible to secure the conditions of the sexual life favorable to improvement, or where a strong admixture of neurasthenia was present. Here, the resources of "sublimation" should be fully utilized, and this subject needs more working out.

In a second case of stammering the patient felt unwilling, in spite of some signs of gain, to pursue the investigation to the needed limit.

I have found it of great service to gain a practical familiarity with the true meaning of typical symptoms, typical dreams, the related symbolism of dream-life and waking life.

I could almost point to the moments when I first learned clearly what was meant by the conversion of desire to fear; the relationship of death and pain to the sexual instinct; the significance of the parents for the mental development of the child; the tendency of the neuropathic patient unconsciously to seek ever new objects of desire, etc.

The power to recognize promptly the presence, under ever new forms, of the tendencies here at stake, gives a chance for shortening and systematizing the analysis and treatment.

It is a cardinal point of Freud's doctrine, as everyone is aware, that it is to the experiences and repressions

¹ I will say again, as I have said before, that a treatment of this sort should not be undertaken unless it can be carried out in a fairly thorough manner. Unless this rule is followed the consequences may be disastrous.

of the period of childhood, when fact and fancy, untaught emotion and newly arisen moral sense, yield strange conglomerations of motives and emotions—gladly escaped from, gladly forgotten—to which we are to look mainly for the origin of the mental twists which terminate in neurotic illness.

The law of least resistance tersely explains how it happens that this great drama of childhood, played largely within the unconscious mental life, gets to be repeated over and over again in adult years, but this principle needs to be supplemented by a great deal of detailed information respecting the remarkable tendencies which are at work during the period of transition from infancy to childhood. The recent study by Freud of the mental characteristics of Leonardo da Vinci,¹ Dr. Ernest Jones' study of Hamlet² and Jung's Clark University lectures³ hint at some of the forces here at work. A year ago I should have regarded these observations and conclusions as fantastic. But here, also, my personal experience has led me to an entire change of attitude and I look confidently for more and more practical results in education and prophylaxis, based on researches such as these. The subject is too large to enter on in this place.

In conclusion, I wish to say that while I have referred, throughout this paper, to Freud's work and doctrines as if he was their only exponent, yet I fully recognize that this is not the case. Not only is the literature which has grown up of late years, under the influence of these researches, already very large, but it is also true that the related literature of an earlier period, both lay and medical, is eminently corroborative of the principles and conclusions which Freud has with such marvellous skill

¹ *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde.*

² *American Journal of Psychology*, January, 1910.

³ *American Journal of Psychology*, April, 1910.

made systematic and thus available for further progress. I have not undertaken even to say a word of my debt to Jung's important observations in the finer use of word-association tests. I have here no new contributions to offer but, so far as my observation goes, can express verification and acknowledgment of his investigations.

It should be realized by every fair-minded person that in judging of the work of this growing school of able men, a separate estimate should be made; first, of the method which they use, next, of the conclusions which they reach. The former, at least, is of immense value for the ascertaining of a sort of truth hitherto concealed. Let the method be conscientiously followed and the conclusions will need no special advocacy.

Chapter III.

ON THE ETIOLOGY AND TREATMENT OF THE PSYCHONEUROSES.*

The subject with which I have undertaken to deal is such a vast one that I can obviously only touch on a few great mountain peaks of a vast country.

The various maladies classified as "psychoneuroses" cause perhaps more misery than any other single group with which the community is afflicted. Not only is this true, but the study of their etiology, their treatment and their prevention, on which you have honored me with an invitation to address you, has an importance far transcending the question of the comfort and happiness of those persons who come to physicians for advice. Without understanding the nature of nervous invalidism in the individual it is impossible to understand the true nature of many traits which count as normal, and of many great social problems which are constantly pressing themselves upon our notice.

There is an additional reason why an intelligent company of physicians should think this subject worthy of being taken up afresh. As matters now stand, some of the graver varieties of these psychoneuroses pass practically untreated, not because physicians fail to recognize them as serious, but because they are thought too serious, too nearly incurable, to be fit subjects for time-absorbing treatment. I have in mind, as examples, two patients, of excellent intelligence and warm affection, who live

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practically exiled from their homes because they have the obsession that they shall kill some member of their families. I know how hard the successful treatment of such cases is, but I believe that the method of treatment which I shall here mainly advocate holds out good hopes for unfortunate patients of these sorts.

The next point for which I beg your attention is with regard to the therapeutics of these affections. Have we reason to be satisfied with the means of treatment commonly employed? There is a tendency, even among neurologists, to answer this question substantially in the affirmative. It is widely felt that the various familiar measures,—such as seclusion in private and public sanatoriums, engrossing occupation, treatment by hydrotherapy, electricity, hygiene, rest, change, suggestion, persuasion and suitable drugs,—give us, when properly administered, all that we really need to supplement the healing powers of nature. This view I do not share. These modes of treatment are indeed of immense value. They should be cultivated and studied as frequently representing the best means at our command, and the fact should be recognized that when they are used with the confidence, skill and devotion that characterizes the work of the few best men, the results obtained are far better than those which follow their employment in a simply routine fashion. If time allowed I should describe and praise also the team-work of the neurologist and the internist, the surgeon, the orthopedist or the gynecologist. Nevertheless there are some forms of the psychoneuroses that these various measures do not touch and others where their use is often really mischievous because in securing temporary improvements they blind the patient and the doctor to the real diagnosis and the really needed treatment. The justice of this criticism becomes clearer when the question is no longer one of treatment by a neurologist with the aid of some skillful colleague, but of treatment

by an orthopedist or a gynecologist or a specialist for the digestion, acting by himself. A good share of the practice of such specialists is among patients with strictly neurological affections. The practical outcome of their treatment is often very good and in many a given case, taken by itself, there is no room for anything but congratulation. But, often, too, patients are treated in these ways, perhaps with temporary or partial gains, who ought to have their illnesses studied on far different lines. The sentiments which one often hears that "neurasthenia is a surgical affection" or that "mental treatment should not be resorted to until other means have failed" imply a misconception of the facts. Surgical measures are sometimes of great service and mental measures may be ignorantly used, but it is not an indication of advance in the general comprehension of these disorders that views like these should seriously be held. Good neurology may be rare, but it would be for the benefit of all physicians and of medical theory and practice as a whole if the responsibility and the confidence should be thrown at once where they ought to lie and eventually must lie. So, too, the immense importance attached in some quarters to "eyestrain" as a real cause of fundamental defects of character and of grave psycho-neurotic symptoms may be characterized as a truly child-like hypothesis, in view of what we now know to be the facts. I fully appreciate the favorable practical outcome, in some cases, of the eyestrain treatment. But far too much importance has been attached to this argument from therapeutic success in the assignment of real causes. When a patient gets better under a certain treatment it is natural to think that the difficulty which the treatment removed was the essential cause of his illness. But in fact we all know that this is false reasoning and we all know it to be such.

There are two classes of physicians who are very prone, from somewhat contrary reasons, to reach warped

judgments in these matters. The first class comprises those who fail to note the relapses from which psycho-neurotic patients often suffer who have been relieved by treatments other than the really causal, and so overrate the value of some radically insufficient method. The other class is composed of those who note these relapses, but observe that they occur under various modes of treatment and then conclude that the relapses belong to the natural history of the disease (a severe form of hysteria or impulsion for example) and that, therefore, the disorder is hereditary and a sign of "degeneration," and that no treatment whatever can be of permanent value. But the former conclusion is a fallacy which any one's observation can correct, and the latter is an unverified assumption which no one has the right to adopt until he has thoroughly acquainted himself with the therapeutic results which can be obtained by the most radical mode of treatment.

The most distinctive feature of neurologic therapeutics has been its effort to utilize mental influences in the cause of health, and I wish to characterize this feature because it is here that important changes for the better are in prospect. You can all recall the stir made by the rehabilitation of hypnotism and what a flood of literature has been published upon "suggestion." You are familiar with the therapeutic work of Dubois and others of his type, and remember also the recent revival of the attempt to find a more scientific bond between medicine and religion.

The great bulk of all this therapeutic endeavor has been an attempt to cure the patient by leading him to dwell on the possibilities of the future and to forget the miseries of the past. He has been urged to "look forward and not back"; to abandon worry as illogical and useless; to see the world at its best; to project his vision beyond

the obvious darkness into a region of imagined light. The slogan has been "Do not get discouraged; you can do better if you try," and many a kindly, devoted, ambitious and confident physician has stood ready to play the part of the inspiring leader, the friend toward whom the patient could gaze with veneration and on whom he could lean. In all these efforts there has been much skill and great devotion, but the results have not been wholly satisfactory. Too often the symptoms have been simply quieted for the moment; the disease veneered.

I have outlined the reasons for thinking the study of the psychoneuroses important, the familiar modes of treatment insufficient, and the descriptions of the natural history and course of these disorders often incorrect, because based on an underestimate of what the best treatment can accomplish. Let us now turn to scrutinize the commonly adopted causes.

In the minds of most persons the *hereditary or innate tendencies* take the first place as causes of these psychoneurotic illnesses. It is not remarkable that this is so, when we consider that the signs of nervous weakness in the child — usually taking the form of shyness, timidity, sensitiveness, self-consciousness or of excitability, jealousy and passion — are recognizable so early that they seem to be inborn. Something which prepares the way for these symptoms doubtless *is* inborn, but evidence has been rapidly accumulating of late years which tends to show that experiences after birth are more significant as causes than we have hitherto supposed. The first few years of a child's life are rich in emotions and vague thoughts. These years have never been adequately chronicled, but there are grounds for thinking that traits of character are founded or accentuated at that period which tend strongly to remain through life. In view of those facts, the old phrase "the boy is father of the man" gains

a fuller and a richer meaning. A considerable portion of the evidence bearing on this point is associated with the name of Freud, a name to which I shall have frequent occasion to revert. It is obvious also that nervous children have often had nervous parents, and equally so that certain sorts of bodily weaknesses or delicacy which are apparently hereditary predispose to lack of nervous strength. The boy that can play hard and work hard and who comes of sound stock starts life with an obvious advantage, although it may be pointed out at once, as showing how difficult it is to arrive at positive conclusions in these matters, that some of the most striking forms of the psychoneuroses are found among professional and amateur athletes and that seriously nervous patients seem sometimes to have had healthy parents. Finally, common sense seems to demand an acquiescence with the view that the characteristics of the bodies and brains and physiological mechanism with which we are born *must determine* our actions to the strains of life, at least by establishing predispositions of important sorts.

But even though the hereditary or innate influences are fundamentally important as giving a *predisposition* to the psychoneuroses, it is extremely difficult to define with fairness in what this predisposition really consists. The anatomical study of the brains of psychoneurotic patients has thus far taught us nothing. The chemical studies of their excretions have been equally without fruit. We may surmise that if we had the power to make careful physiological tests upon all the nervous functions of the new-born infant we might discover differences in his responses which would foreshadow mental excitability or mental weakness; but the proofs of this are lacking.¹ Towards

¹ A very important series of observations bearing on the innate differences in functional vitality between the various mechanisms of the body and their significance for the subsequent evolution of

the close of the last century much evidence was adduced to prove that *physical marks of imperfect local bodily development* (the so-called stigmata)—as lack of facial symmetry, malformation of the ears or eyes—were to be found with such frequency among these patients as to indicate that processes of “degeneration” were silently at work, in psychoneurotic families, tending towards still graver disorders, such as idiocy and sterility, as their final outcome. Even when no obvious physical stigmata were present it was assumed that the nervous systems of such patients might be in some way defective, and many mental peculiarities were enumerated which were supposed to be the outcome of these states. As a portion of this doctrine it was sought to bring every form of eccentricity and even genius into the baleful circle of the degenerative tendencies. But to take such an attitude as this was to assign to stolidity and commonplaceness a position of prominence in a way that mocked at progress, and the credit of the whole scheme suffered severely in consequence. Sterility and idiocy are not characteristic of psychoneurotic families. The creative genius of the artist and the imaginative writer does indeed rest on a similar basis with the symptoms of the psychoneuroses, but neither of these tendencies points necessarily or regularly to “degeneration” as their cause. The main thing to be said in this connection is that there is a real correlation between mental and bodily conditions such as is deserving of careful study. But it is essential that this should be made in a very liberal spirit.

character and temperament has been published by Adler *Über neurotische Disposition. Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyt. u. Psychopath. Forschungen*, Bd. I, p. 526. See also earlier papers by the same author); this work is entirely in line with that of Freud and others of his school, but the principle involved is too important and complex to be discussed in a general summary of this sort.

It is true that defects of bodily nutrition are found among these patients which serve both as indications or consequences and also as intensifying causes of their impaired nervous states. The enteroptoses, the dry hair and skin, the impaired digestion, weak muscles, poorly acting hearts and feeble eye-muscles, which are observed so often amongst a certain class of neurasthenics, belong in this category of physical signs. But, important as these conditions are and much as they call for local treatment (which is too well known to need re-statement here), neither their clinical nor their biological significance is clear. Their own etiology is indeed in doubt. They certainly cannot be considered as essential causes of the psychoneurotic illnesses, and on the other hand there is much question whether they are not, to some extent, products rather than antecedents of the disordered nervous and mental states. Disorders of the bodily functions do certainly arise from disordered emotions and may lead in their turn to organic changes on a large scale. Indeed, between the "organic" and the "functional" it is impossible to draw sharp lines. Bodily processes are a sounding-board for mental processes, and *vice versa*. On the whole, the effect of thus seeking to shift the responsibility for these nervous illnesses on to the shoulders of our ancestors has been to make physicians pessimistic as to their power to help toward a cure. The hereditary tendency is conceived of too strongly as "biological" and therefore not to be materially modified in any given individual, and too great emphasis laid upon this point has tended to a gross sort of materialism and fatalism. The belief that a patient's mental sufferings are a reproduction of tendencies which his father or his mother showed before him is too often accepted as an excuse for doing nothing to relieve him. Meantime, another set of facts has been coming more and more prominently forward. The "something" that we

inherit is, in most cases, a "tendency" indeed, but nothing more, and—as in the instance of tuberculosis—the actual disease may never show itself provided the patient can be suitably protected against causes operative after birth. So true is this that even where the disease "runs true" through several generations, as in those cases of hysteria or obsessional disorders, for example, where parent and child exhibit the same symptoms, it can often be shown to have been the influence of the ignorant, nervous mother, driven by a fatal impulse to strive toward reproducing herself in her child and the fatalistic impulse of the child to imitate the mother, rather than any real hereditary tendency, that brought the result to pass. This line of thought is so important that we must leave it now only to take it up again.

The *strain of modern living* is the next influence on which stress is often laid, but its consideration need not detain us long. The telephone, the morning paper, the noise of crowded streets, the seething competition and the pressure for a narrow and exclusive individualism such as everywhere makes itself manifest, seem foes of tranquility and health.

But it is probable that these strains appear to be greater than they are and, on the other hand, they bring, in a measure, their own remedies. The pace set is set, after all, by men for men, and while it is too fast for some it is not certain that on the whole it increases faster than the power of adaptation of the majority. At the worst the strains of modern living are mostly obvious and open enemies, whereas the enemies which we have most to fear are those which, in our ignorance, we do not see. If we could but secure all the power of meeting hard conditions that belongs to us by birthright we should not have to strive so hard to make these conditions easier. It is not so much overwork as worry and appre-

hension that really sap the nervous vigor, and while worry and apprehension doubtless accompany necessary competition and well-founded anxiety and doubt, yet it is a piece of common knowledge that the most harrassing worries are those which are without external provocation but which imply internal tumults of the emotions, the hidden causes of which it now becomes our duty to study at close range.

What are the influences, brought to bear within the lifetime of the individual, that lead to these emotional tumults? How can we best explain the conversion of the emotions into the symptoms of disease? Where shall we best find an adequate treatment? I beg you to take notice of the fact that the actual evolution of our knowledge in respect to these matters has not followed the lines indicated by the questions which I thus ask. On the contrary, the controlling factors in this evolution have been, partly, the scientific tendencies obtaining at the particular periods when the various advances were first made; partly, the qualifications, temperament and training of the particular investigators. It has long been plain to every one that emotional influences were important causes of disease, and various modes of combating these influences have been described, but it is only rather recently that the origin of these emotions and the mode of production of the symptoms have been measureably understood. The physicians who have been the leading workers in this great field of study may be classified in three groups: (1) The group of the accurate observers, descriptive analysts, natural historians; (2) the group of the therapeutists; (3) the group of the constructive analysts, inductive reasoners, philosophic thinkers. It is possible to describe the symptoms of a disease and to observe many facts in the natural history if its development, as a naturalist studies the characters of an animal or

a species, without being greatly drawn to see its real place in the great scheme of nature; it is eminently possible for men of practical instincts—the "nurturing instincts" perhaps they might be called—to treat patients with great success, up to a certain point, without having any adequate conception of the causes of their illnesses.

Consult your own memories and you will see the parts which men of these different types have played. For examples of the *observers and describers* we might go back to Falret and Briquet, who gave us such excellent accounts of *folie de doute* and of hysteria, even in the middle of the last century. The French have always been prominent in these lines, and I will next mention that truly great pioneer in descriptive clinical analyses, Pierre Janet, the pupil of the great Charcot, without pausing to mention those who with such brilliant success have followed similar lines. Janet's remarkable contributions marked the beginning of a new era of knowledge, and the data which they have furnished will be of enduring value. If they do not represent a movement capable of indefinite expansion it is because they have been of the nature of studies into this or that special problem of medical psychology rather than recognitions of typical facts lending themselves readily to great philosophic and sociological generalizations.

As examples of the *therapeutists*, the men of practical instincts, I need only mention Charcot, Weir Mitchell and his followers, and such men as Liébault, Bernheim, Van Eeden, Forel and Dubois. These names stand only for a few men out of hundreds and of course those who bore and bear them were not exclusively *therapeutists*.

Finally, we come to the third group of investigators, whom I have designated as *analysts, inductive reasoners and broad thinkers*. The foremost representative of this

group,¹ at the present day, is unquestionably Sigmund Freud, a remarkable personage, whose observations and whose method² have opened for us avenues of inquiry into which men of the best minds are pressing forward in ever increasing number. No future student of human character and motives, whether these be called normal or morbid, will ever make studies deserving serious recognition without familiarizing himself with the researches of the school of thinkers and observers of which Freud was the leader and is still the central figure. Janet's work and that of men following similar lines (Morton Prince, Sidis, etc.) have made a revolution in the field of scientific psychology; Freud's work has extended this scientific revolution and has set on foot an equal revolution in character-study, educational psychology, race-psychology, child-study and folk-lore.

The Freud method (to which the name of "psycho-analytic" has been given) does not depend for its therapeutic success upon the ability of the physician to hypnotize his patient or of the patient to subject himself to the hypnotic influence. It is not an effort to spread the healing mantle of any "suggestive" influence over the painful details of the case. It is an attempt to enable the patient to penetrate with tireless zeal, increasing skill and fearless honesty, upon the details of his own emotions, life and thought, in the belief that nothing becomes less sacred or fails to become less painful, through being clearly seen. Such being its purpose it is hard to see why this method can justly challenge the hostility of any conscientious person, though easy to see why many physicians should shrink from the difficulties attending its successful application.

¹ It will of course be understood that I am speaking of leaders in psychoneurology alone.

² Strictly speaking the originator of the psycho-analytic method was Joseph Breuer, Freud's older colleague and co-worker.

"Suggestion," "isolation," improvement of the bodily nutrition, persuasion, explanation, all of which have their valued place, leave many of the great springs of emotion and of motive entirely untouched. They make no adequate effort to base themselves on any deep knowledge of human nature. Their influence, however important it may be, is bound to be limited in its scope.

The psycho-analytic method does not indeed necessarily give us all that we may need for spiritual progress, but it prepares the way and opens a long path. It does not exclude the other modes of treatment, but supplements some of them and often renders all of them unnecessary. If the slogan of the suggestive psychotherapeutics has been, "You can do better if you *try*," the distinctive slogan of this method is "You can do better when you *know*."

But when you know what? The answer has been already given, "When you know yourself." The symptoms of the psychoneuroses,—morbid fears, irresistible impulses to thoughts and acts, distressing doubts, nameless apprehensions,—and not these symptoms of illness alone, but also their congeners, selfishness, envy, suspicion, and temptations to cruelty and prejudice such as have filled the world with misery, have been largely the outcome of self-ignorance, in the sense that in this ignorance, the deeper sources of which have been, until now, imperfectly defined and largely unsuspected, lies the secret of the occurrence of these evils. It is the removal of this ignorance and the implantation of the desire as well as the ability to see things as they are that constitutes the best and only radical treatment.¹ This treatment, too, has its practical limitations, but these are rather incidental to the difficulties of application of the method than inherent

¹ Each person may be conceived of as representing the community in microcosm and the social sins of himself, etc., represent conflicts between different aspects of our past and present selves.

in its nature. It is a necessary condition for the therapeutic success of this method of radical re-education that the patients should be reasonably intelligent, not too old and inelastic, absolutely honest, absolutely unreserved in dealing with their physician, ready to join him in the inquiry, prepared to confide absolutely in his reliability and good faith. It is necessary, likewise, that the physician should be confident in his own motives and that he should have had a special training and special interest in this sort of psychological research. In other words, this kind of investigation, which seeks at once to discover the causes of the disorder and by that very fact to apply the remedy, implies a high degree of skill and training, or of natural aptitude. It is not, therefore, well adapted for the general practitioner or for the run of hospital patients, and no one should enter on such a course of treatment in any given case without being prepared to carry it to the end. If he does so he may find himself standing aghast at the task before him, as Faust stood before the Earth Spirit which his magic arts had summoned. But even though the general practitioner does not use this method, every physician should understand its scope and meaning, just as every physician should know the principles of many bacteriological procedures which he can never use.

It is important to note that the generalizations of which I shall now speak were worked out laboriously through the direct and prolonged questioning of many patients and the combined observations of many men, partly pupils and followers of Freud, partly independent workers in a much-neglected field. (Havelock Ellis, Krafft-Ebing, Moll, Fliess, etc.)

I spoke a few moments ago of the "tumults of conflicting emotions" and also of "self-ignorance" as being the causes of the psychoneurotic symptoms. Both of these terms need amplification and explanation.

Before any one could be said to really know himself it would be necessary for him to know all the experiences, thoughts and emotions which he had had since birth. Of course this is impossible, but he might at least know them, or be able to summon them into the focus of his consciousness, by groups and samples, and every one would admit that a person did not know himself even tolerably well who had, either deliberately or in obedience to some blind impulse, selected certain groups of experiences, thoughts and emotions which he chose to take as standing for himself, and turned his eyes away from other groups, in spite of the fact that the rejected knowledge was of obvious importance. And yet this species of selection and rejection is continually going on with every one of us. It takes place also, and on a large scale, with communities and nations, and one of the chief functions of education and civilization is to obtain their rights for important groups of experiences, thoughts and emotions which had been repressed and rejected from the light of conscious knowledge.

We say we "cannot bear to think of"—and so strive not to think of—one or another matter, when in fact it is self-interest, or laziness, or blind obedience to an artificial code of social rules that really impels our choice.

Magna Charta, the abolition of slavery, the change of sentiment as to promiscuous almsgiving,—every true reform,—were all wrung from persons possessed of a certain power to maintain their views against the Cromwells and Washingtons and Wilberforces that rose up vigorously against them. The Cromwells are often narrow, too; they also are but partial knowers of themselves. But one great reason for their success is that they represent arguments the truth of which upholders of the established order already have divined but will not formulate to themselves or listen to when adduced by others.

And so it is with our own conscious attention in its dealing with rejected thoughts. We prefer to accept the established, traditional opinion rather than to investigate and think; we prefer, if need be, to show anger and bigotry rather than investigate and think; and yet we, too, divine the truth. For, be it clearly understood, the experiences, thoughts and emotions which we reject because they do not fit into the scheme of life which we select are not so far out of our minds as we suppose. We do not like to think of them, we do not dare perhaps to think of them, we say we do not think of them. But they are in our memories and in our minds, and they influence our acts; and it is the half-consciousness of their presence, and the fact that they represent deep instinctive cravings of our natures, in spite of our assumed hatred of them and our shrinking from them, that induce such emotions in us as anger and depression and envy and prejudice and jealousy and fear, and the impulse to adopt ceremonies and observances which are practically analogous to pagan ceremonies of propitiation and expiation. Indeed, the whole fabric of mythology is built on the projection outward of the sense of war and tumult and revolt and victory going on within ourselves between the thoughts and emotions which we clearly formulate and those which we only half or a quarter formulate and those which we do not formulate at all and affect not to know, yet which in reality influence our acts and thoughts.

Now, the leaders of the psycho-analytic movement have shown that these attempts to conceal ourselves from ourselves lead to mental conflicts and to illness and to false standards of civilization. They are insisting that those who wish not to be invalids shall not be encouraged to hedge themselves behind their lack of knowledge or their unwillingness to think or the divine right of some conventional code of morals, without its being made clear to

them that these artificial rights are waging war within their minds with instincts older than morals and standing in no necessary antagonism to morals.

There is a sacredness in traditional customs, the filtered wisdom of the ages, but there is also a sacred right to revolt against them and a sacred obligation in either case not to act or think without a reasonable knowledge of the facts. The typical signs and symptoms of nervous invalidism of the type that is now before us are really covers and substitutes instinctively adopted for the purpose of putting aside (concealing) thoughts, emotions, cravings and longings of forbidden sorts, or of sorts that it hurts one's sense of pride to face. They are all symbolisms, analogous to the symbolisms of dreams, and like them they point, for those who can read their hieroglyphic language, at the desires and repressions which are the real facts at stake. These thoughts and desires, half-formulated or unformulated, cause a sense of deep distress, for which the patient instinctively seeks reasons to account. Led by this instinct he adopts the figment of a fear of bridges or open windows or of railroad trains or of an impulsion to do injury to some one. In these symptoms, distressing though they are, the patient expresses in a rough fashion the cravings in which they had their birth; and for that reason he clings to his fears as to something which has the sacred fascination of a relic, though not realizing that he does so. If he would get well he must learn to see this, and for this purpose *his entire life*, and not merely the latest phase of it, must be made as transparent as glass, so that he may be able to see the whole of it at one glance. It will then appear that it is his own thoughts of which he is afraid and that his present fear has been preceded by other fears, the outcome of the same and other sets of mental conflicts, dating back, many of them, to days of childhood. To state the

facts again in other words, his present fear represents a state of mental distress which arose as an expression of the fact that his thoughts or emotions relating to some important subject or subjects had become intolerable to him, and the open window, the bridge, the railroad train serve simply as so many molds into which the patient instinctively seeks to compress his vague and apparently causeless distress and so to explain it, even though erroneously, to himself. Every one recognizes that a bridge is a place from which people sometimes jump or fall, that a train journey is a common cause of accidents, that to be "shut in," whether actually or morally, has a certain element of the unpleasant. For reasons such as these, and perhaps many more, the situations indicated are really seized upon as excuses for the fears, simply because some excuse must be found. The patient, recognizing that he must find some way of accounting for his distress, instinctively grasps at causes which his neighbors would recognize as reasonable. This method of explaining the genesis of morbid fears is not a piece of *a priori* argument, but a mode of reasoning arrived at by questioning the patient's own experience and emotions. At first the patients do not see its logic, but gradually the truth enforces itself upon them and makes them able and willing to see themselves in a new light and to learn to substitute an intelligent scrutiny for an endless chain of morbid introspection. The physician who helps to make this scrutiny soon comes to realize that no symptom or trait of character can be adequately understood except on the basis of a relatively complete knowledge of the patient's whole environmental and emotional life since infancy. As this knowledge grows gradually wider and more accurate the element of time seems gradually to be eliminated from the history; infancy and age become approximated; the cause and the result are seen at one glance and as if coalescing; the present

act, which one might have felt tempted to characterize roughly as selfish or cowardly or criminal, is seen as the logical expression of a repressed but natural instinct or of a misconception, formed in childhood but witnessed as if now living and active.

The immense significance of that rapid but hidden transition from babyhood with its animal instincts and emotions¹ to the later periods with their artificial morals and conventions is now for the first time clearly recognizable, through this process of rendering the whole life transparent, and its intensely dramatic features are susceptible of being clearly understood.

Then, as the research goes further, several other principles gradually get developed. The occasions on which these intolerable mental conflicts arose for which the fears were substituted are found to have been not one or two alone, but many and of various sorts. The recognition of this multiplicity of emotional traumata is an important supplement to the commonly accepted principle. A patient has a railroad accident, for example, or some severe emotional excitement, and these events (which in themselves involve considerable mental conflict) are considered as the sole and sufficient cause of the symptoms that result. But when his history is well analyzed many other events are found, different in appearance from the last, but psychologically of like import. "To fall," "to be overpowered," "to suffer loss," "to be in danger" are terms which apply to many emotional as well as physical situations of

¹ This transition from the non-social period of infancy to the more and more social states of normal childhood and adult life, a transition in which the moral sense is first developed and when, therefore, an unfavorable judgment must be passed (of course unconsciously) on many antecedent acts and feelings, is of great importance for the whole theory of character formation and symptom-production. It hints, likewise, at a sort of biological basis for the doctrine of "original sin."

the most varied sorts, and such as every one has been exposed to not once alone, but many times, and the unconscious memories of these rush in, impelled by the force of mental association, to lend a new fulness of meaning to the railroad accident and to receive a new fulness of meaning for themselves from it.

But is there no difference in significance and standing between these various related and associated memories? Are there not some that have more power for harm as centers of emotional stress? The inevitable answer is (however gradually it may come to the surface in a given case) that those emotional conflicts have the greatest power to give a tone or color to the rest into which we originally put the deepest essence of ourselves, our strongest hopes, our most personal and secret and, therefore, most strongly repressed longings, the feelings in which not only the prudent wishes of adult life, but the deep, uncensored cravings of infancy and youth could find expression. In other words, it is the emotions related to the great functions of reproduction, the sexual functions, that hold this position of prominence as giving color to the rest. It is in the conflicting tides of feelings of sexual origin, at which all romances, almost all imaginative and dramatic literature, love to hint, some prompting to intense expression, others to equally intense repression, all of which meet in fierce antagonism around the sexual instinct, that the real cause of nervous symptoms should be sought. But this should be understood with reference to the principle just stated, namely, that a vast number of emotions take their tone and value from the strongest or most fundamental one among them, just as a large school of artists may get its name from that of their greatest representative. It is only when this point is grasped that we can meet the objection of those who urge a host of other motives and emotions as of equal rank with those

of sexual nature. So far as our conscious awareness is concerned, they may be of even higher rank. For the time when the sexual craving was so strong may have been in the forgotten period of infancy, and even then these cravings may not have been recognized as sexual at all. It may be only through our reasoning that their true nature is revealed. And yet they may have been intense enough to have founded the emotional traits of character which came, later, to be represented in the mental struggles from which, first the distress, later the specific fears and illnesses emerged.

It is not, then, necessary that every nervous invalid should accuse himself of having been "sexually inclined" in any objectionable sense, although it ought to be interjected here that the germs of the sexual perversions and inversions which when developed into an exaggerated form we characterize as criminal or morbid, are found in normal infancy and even in normal adult life. All these psychoneurotic illnesses, it cannot too often be repeated, are caricatures of normal tendencies. It is this which justifies the designation of them as "functional." This point is not brought forward as a mere bit of academic quibbling, but as a matter of the most practical importance. The infant is at first sexless, or, rather, both sexes are equally represented in his emotional life. It is often as natural to him to love *and love intensely* persons of his own sex as those of the opposite sex, his parents as those not standing in this relationship to him. Such intense love may reappear later in an exaggerated form and may lead to exaggerated expression of various morbid sorts. Children often exhibit a passion of objectionable intensity for teachers of their own sex, or for older children, and teachers for their pupils, and the exaggerated passion of children for parents may lead to relations of dependence, of instinctive imitation, of "identification," which dwarfs and limits their own

development, or helps to foster the seeds of nervous invalidism in them, to a remarkable degree. It is interesting to recall, in this connection, that young children when passing through the period of transition from their "sexless" state to that of girlhood and boyhood, and, still more, when impelled by vague memory of that period, sometimes dream of themselves as of the opposite sex or as uncertain to which sex they now belong.

Two questions naturally present themselves to one who hears the merits of this psycho-analitic method described for the first time; first, Does not all this questioning about past matters lead to morbid introspection? then, supposing all these hidden facts have been obtained, What next? Where does the therapeutic influence come in?

To one who has become practically familiar with the working of this method these questions present no great difficulty. So far from morbid introspection being caused by this treatment it is prevented by it. Every patient is forced by the very terms of his illness to dwell upon his symptoms; he rolls them continually over in his mind like the tunes of a barrel-organ and without ever arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. The method of investigation which is here described substitutes an interested search, an intellectual inquiry, for this emotional treadmill of false reasoning.

As regards the therapeutic value of the method, much the same answer will suffice. The mental conflict to which I have referred, and which results in all the morbid symptoms, goes on without the patient's knowledge—although half-divined. The cure consists in bringing these unconscious processes to the light of reason. In their own nature they are imps of darkness and lose their power for harm when brought into the light. To be sure, it is not enough that this knowledge should be mere lip and ear information. Even this is something, but for the best

result the knowledge of the truth should soak into the mind and express itself in the acts and become an integral portion of a new and reformed personality. In proportion as this is accomplished, the person in question approaches towards the desired knowledge of himself. He may still feel, and should still feel a craving for some further self-expression, a desire to take others, in increasing number, into the circle of his thoughts and interests and affections. But this craving will no longer tend so strongly to clothe itself in infantile, utterly personal and sensuous forms, which excite a feeling of mortification and the need of repression and suppression and expiation. The obsession of killing some person whom one really loves, of throwing oneself dramatically from an open window, are pretty certain to be recognized as ludicrously caricatured survivals from the days and phantasies of childhood; a railroad train takes its proper shape as a convenient means of locomotion.

It is, of course, clear, and clearer far to me than you, that this address is anything but complete. For one thing, I should have been glad to discuss further the important fact that much of the explanation for our mental conflicts, in which the symptoms of these maladies originate, takes place wholly or partly within the bounds of that limbo which we call our unconscious mental life. Volumes might be written, also, with reference to the great struggle between instinct and social culture which, while it is responsible for civilization and progress, is responsible also for repression, bigotry, illness, misunderstanding and misjudgment of others and ourselves. Our cultural life with all its virtues is far narrower and more narrowing than most of us conceive. To broaden some of its tendencies should be our earnest effort, and to this great aim the art of psycho-analysis is partly consecrated. We should learn to deal less in moral judgments and more in knowledge. Moral judgments are, to be sure, needful for the

rough exigencies of social life, as precursors of the jail and as affording protection against obvious practical evils. But for the scientific thinker they are out of place. The phrase "*tout comprendre est tout pardonner*" is not indeed applicable to the whole situation, especially in the case of the person mainly concerned. No one should wish to deny moral responsibility for his acts and thoughts. But it is nevertheless true that to "know all" is often justly to modify our judgment and our means of progress.

The familiar sins of "incontinence, violence and malice" which Dante punishes in his Inferno as attacks upon social stability and progress might justly be described in medical terms as equivalent to psychoneurotic symptoms; and in the sufferings and joys of those whom this great student of human nature sets toiling up the hill of Purgatory it is possible to read the symbolized history of that typical and desirable sort of convalescence from the miseries of nervous illness which leads not only to a better personal health, but to a wider sense of social opportunity and obligation. The community is the individual written large, and the so-called normal individual resembles the psychoneurotic invalid, but with the difference that he has learned, either instinctively or consciously, in infancy or in childhood or in later years, to establish a harmonious cooperation amongst the dominant tendencies of his mental life, or—what is the same thing transferred to another field of action—to adjust himself to some workable conception of community life. The invalid is he who is roughly studying this important lesson and within whose mind the struggle is still going on between native instincts, on the one side, and the forces arrayed to establish and maintain a series of moral and social standards imposed by the traditions of a conventional community, upon the other side.

If this thesis is correct, the physician's task broadens into that of reviewing these moral and social standards

themselves and studying into the question of their justice, their desirability, their real origin. The sociological significance of the physician's task, as he studies nervous invalidism, is seen to take on a new importance in view of these considerations. The mischief which may be done by the ill-regulated emotions and prejudices of a "normal" person is always painful to contemplate. But there are many narrow and cruel social codes and customs, not only of the middle ages, but of the present day, which are of the same origin with these private prejudices, sins and symptoms. To labor against both sets of ills and for a better private and public status, is a worthy aim, and if the method of investigation here advocated can contribute towards this end it should be warmly welcomed and the labor which its application involves in any given case should be considered well-rewarded.

Furthermore, what applies to the neurologist applies almost equally to the patient. Nervous invalids should regard themselves not solely as persons in misfortune, but also as persons in position of opportunity and trust; they should feel themselves members of a band of investigators working in a great field, and as in a position to utilize their individual experiences, even though painful, as data towards the solution of a problem of universal interest.

Chapter IV.

A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHIC METHODS IN PREPARATION FOR PSYCHOANALYTIC WORK*

Lest this communication may seem critical of the psychoanalytic method and its founders, I will begin by saying that my feeling with reference to the movement, of which this method is the basis, as well as toward Sigmund Freud himself and his colleagues, is one of deep and grateful appreciation. What I am here offering should not be regarded as in any proper sense a criticism of their position, but rather as the suggestion of a supplement to it. The new insight into human nature made possible through the industry of these men seems to me of extraordinary value, and susceptible of verification to a remarkable extent. More than once during the study of some obscure case, after almost concluding that here, at last, I had found a manifest exception to the rules which the observations of Freud and his colleagues seemed to have established, a still deeper search, a still deeper probing of the patient's consciousness and buried memories have shown me that I was wrong. It is truly remarkable what a touchstone has been put into our hands wherewith to recognize the real motives which underlie apparent motives,

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and, underneath the faults and failings, the fears and habits of adult life, to see the workings out of the instinctive cravings of imaginative, pleasure-seeking, and pain-shunning infancy, dragging back the adult from the fulfilment of his higher destiny. The enumeration of the gains that have already been secured, of the paths of promise that have been opened to us through these fruitful investigations and these applications of the biogenetic principle in the study of human personality, would be a recital of imposing character. It is not only for medicine that these advances have been won. It has been clearly shown that the great pieces of imaginative and creative literature of the world, especially the great world poems, such as the marvelous tragedies and epics of Greece, the fairy stories and the myths which have stood so long the test of time, and so, too, the manifestations of wit and humor and the many other modes of naive expression in which the soul of man instinctively lays open its hidden treasure house, are all permeated by the same tendency that underlies the signs and symptoms of the hysterias, the phobias, the compulsions. The symbolisms used in them, like the symbolisms of language, of dreams, and of life itself is to a considerable extent a sex symbolism.

I believe, also, that one may admit, with Freud, that the principle of the "conservation of energy" can be applied as profitably with reference to mental phenomena as it has been with reference to physical phenomena. An experience is a fact to be reckoned with just as much as is a certain quantity of heat. One of Freud's greatest services has lain in his demonstration of the fact that every thought and action counts for some result. If it disappears in one form it will surely reappear under some new and unexpected guise, like Proteus under the grasp of Hercules, in the great fable.

But, although I am fully convinced that the applications here referred to, both of the biogenetic principle and

of the principle of the "conservation of energy," afford illuminating partial explanations of individual and racial evolution, I am equally convinced that we are in danger of utilizing these principles to the tacit exclusion of others which are still more significant. Even in the domain of physics, the statement "no energy is ever lost," if true in a certain sense, that is, true with reference to special groups of artificially selected conditions, is false if taken as justifying all the inferences and implications which are often drawn from it, and is therefore dangerous as a working principle in applied psychology. This is a very important distinction; for, as we all know, and as psychoanalytic studies have freshly demonstrated by striking illustrations, the human mind is keener in its dim intuitions and in its power of reasoning by implication and inference, than its feeble power of conscious, accurate expression would lead one to suppose. Education is largely a process of self-discovery. You bend yourself to teach the child and find, to your surprise, that he is already a wise man in disguise.

I have paused to dwell upon this principle, because the whole object of the present paper is to show that any one who carries his psychoanalysis far enough, and who makes himself the first object of his investigation, as every psychoanalyst ought to do, will find evidence of dim reasonings of great importance that underlie the conflicts of the childish instincts and modify these conflicts at each moment. It is for us to see, so far as it is practicable and necessary, that these crude inferential reasonings are duly scrutinized and utilized for good and not for evil. The main service of the psychoanalytic investigations which have been made thus far, under the impulse of Freud's genius, has been that of forcing us to recognize the repressed devils that lurk within us. It is obvious, however, that we should never have felt these tendencies as "devils" and repressed them unless we had had a standard of the good. It is usually assumed

that this standard of the good is only something imposed on us by society. But if we trace the matter back, we find that it rests ultimately on far more personal grounds; that it implies nothing less than a dim recognition on our part that this belief in "the good" is one of the most real of all our intuitions; that we cannot help thinking in these and kindred terms, and comparing our present "bad" with our possible "good," any more than we can help thinking in terms of time and space and yet dimly recognizing that these terms are, in fact, only symbolic representations of a real but unpicturable existence not limited by time or space.

To return, then, to the principle of the conservation of energy, I would positively assert that we have absolutely no right to draw therefrom, as is very often, though tacitly, done, the implication that as no energy is ever lost, so no energy is ever gained, and that we live in a world of determinism, where the same old forces, coming no one knows from where, are shuffled to and fro, like the bits of glass in a kaleidoscope. In such a world as this, thought and will would have, of course, no power to create anything new, and the process of adaptation would not be, as it now is, a process of intelligent modification wrought by each individual on both his environment and himself, but a simple moulding of man on the world of nature, as wax is moulded on a stamp. No one really accepts such a world as this, not even those who claim to do so; it is, however, the kind of world to which natural science points, and the kind of world which should be logically accepted by those who, following too closely the demands of the law of the conservation of energy, seek a strictly monistic universe founded on these supposed laws¹. If we would give our allegiance to a better world than this, we must begin by recognizing that the formulas of natural

¹ Cf. *Traum und Mythus*, von Dr. Karl Abraham. *Schriften zur Angewandten Seelenkunde*; herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Sigm. Freud, *Viertes Heft*, pp. 71, 72.

science express only a portion of the truth. Of course, where the specific aims which these sciences serve are alone at stake, it is convenient to speak of the "conservation of energy" as if it were one of the deep underlying principles of life and not merely the description of sequences of phenomena. It does not signify that a student of chemistry or physics works only with the external appearances under which real, self-active energy is cloaked, or that he talks freely of "atoms" or "invariable laws" as if these terms really stood for the deepest facts that the human mind can reach. He knows well, if he is wise, that these formulas are but modes of speech, and that his studies contribute nothing to our knowledge of real causes. But this complacent habit of neglecting the study of the "real," needful as it is in physics, is bad in psychology, and becomes intolerable when the object to be studied is a human being, thrilling with hopes and fears, dimly conscious of a destiny, dimly aware of the fact that in so far as he is intelligent, in so far as he possesses the gift of intuition and a will, in so far, in short, as he is "real", he is a participant in the primal energy of the universe and must be studied as such.

That a thorough student of psychoanalysis, earnestly desiring to learn all that can be learned about the nature of mental phenomena, should be contented to assume that he can neglect that portion of the knowledge of the mind which he can get only by philosophic methods, would be equivalent to his assuming that from observing the symptoms of a psychoneurosis he could learn to understand the real conditions of which these symptoms are but symbols. The mind contains a real, permanently abiding element which partakes of the nature of the real, permanently abiding energy of which the life of the universe itself is made. From the standpoint of the nature of his mind, a man belongs to the eternal and immortal realities of the universe. In order to realize this, he must learn to believe that he

speaks the truth when he talks of the world of spirit, and says that the things which are unseen are eternal. Ultimate truth, like motion, hope, love, and the sense of beauty, are unpicturable. But the picturable life is temporal and a symbolic representation of the unpicturable life, which for us is the only true life. To this real, creative element of the mental life, on which all our striving, all our power of will and renewal of thought depends, I venture to give the name of *psyche generatrix* or *mens creativa*. Because one is compelled to see in a man a creature with a history that points back to a motionless mass of lime and phosphorus, and to admit that at each meal he does obeisance to that portion of his genesis, one is not therefore debarred from realizing that organic life and the history of organic evolution would be unintelligible; that the sight of so much human misery and sin would be intolerable, if we did not dimly recognize that with organic life comes the power and the necessity of reaching out continually toward the unseen world of real existence which we are constantly striving to express in this finite and symbolic world, but can never thoroughly express except in a life of infinite duration.

We must regard the facts collected by natural science as of limited and partial value, and not to be taken as furnishing the basis for a complete explanation of the phenomena of life, and by the same token we ought to feel ourselves obliged to make the same assertion with regard to the genetic explanation of human personality which the psychoanalytic method has done so much to establish. Through the use of this method we have come to know so many influences hitherto unknown to us which play a large part in the evolution of the adult human being, that the temptation is a strong one to push this principle further than is justifiable. The way of escape from this is that of making a more thorough study of the workings of the human mind as determined by the great students of philosophy,

who, although now often discredited, represent perhaps the best outcome of human evolution. The genetic principle has been of immense service, but as usually understood, it leads us, if followed too closely, to a deadlock. The evolution suggested by this principle is evolution on a straight line, which, as far as we can see, begins nowhere and ends nowhere. In fact, evolution should rather be expressed as a circular process¹. It begins in the unseen, but real and infinite world of the spirit, the *psyche generatrix*, and consists in a series of attempts to express the life of the spirit in finite form, followed at each moment by an ever-renewed recognition that this expression is imperfect. These recognitions of imperfection imply an equal number of returns, in thought, of the self-expressing mind toward its infinite source, and this circular movement of the mind characterizes both evolution regarded as a whole and every act of life. In everything that we do or feel we realize that we are more than we can now express, and in thus recognizing our finite incapacity to express ourselves and the symbolic nature of the attempt to do so, we are forced dimly to perceive that we have an infinite and real though unpicturable existence as a background for our finite strivings.

It is not alone, then, the phenomena of a man's *earthly genesis* that we must study if we would understand the

¹I offer this simple diagram without attempting adequately to explain it, as that would be impossible in this connection:

A ∞
B |.-|.-|.-|...|.

A is the mathematical symbol of infinity, and may be used for hinting at the fact that the mind, in itself, is logically independent of space and time, and of its attempts at finite expression. It is the inexhaustible source of renewing effort.

B hints at the fact that the mind is continually attempting to express its total nature in finite acts (symbols), then denying that these attempts are adequate, and returning (as by the dotted lines) to a recognition of its inexhaustible power of accomplishing more and better things.

subtle tides and tumults of his life; the workings of his *psyche generatrix* itself must also be the object of our investigation. Kant has said, "Humanity must never be treated as a *thing*." Real existence is a self-active, causal energy, and not a "thing." It is only by virtue of our possessing this causal energy, this *psyche generatrix*, that we become aware of the existence of real causality at all. In the succession of natural phenomena there is no causality; causality comes only with the vital efforts of living, and so conscious, beings, and finds its best expression in the will, acting at its best; that is, acting in accordance with the highest principles of spiritual progress.

I object to the explanation given, in accordance with psychogenetic principles, of the evolution of the instincts of the infant into the conduct of the grown man, when the genetic principle is treated as if it were the only one at stake, whereas, in fact, the influence of the will, even though feeble and wrongly guided, and the influence of the recognition on the part of the mind, in each of its acts, that it has infinite possibilities which it cannot now express, never can be ruled out of court. In the admirable monograph¹ by Abraham, above referred to, the assertion is made that the men of the primitive, uncultured world had no philosophic or religious ideas which were afterwards symbolized in myths; but this assertion is surely in need of modification. In the technical sense, of course, primitive human beings had, and newborn children have, no philosophy or religion. It must, however, be believed that they did have a vague recognition of their own creative power, a vague sense of *being* more than they could express, a vague sense that their own finiteness implies an infinite existence of some sort as a background. These feelings, shadowy though they doubtless were, took necessarily a logical precedence even of the personal cravings and wishes in which the sexual

¹ *Traum und Mythos*. I. c.

and other primitive instincts sought expression. If we would really get to the bottom of the mental conflicts of our patients and ourselves, we positively must learn, through philosophic studies, to take cognizance of this primary schism between the sense of our infinite origin and the necessity which we are under of attempting to express ourselves at each moment in a finite form, for it is the existence of this schism with all that it implies that, in my opinion and in that of many others much wiser than myself, gives the first impulse to the creation of myths and to the conflicts out of which nervous symptoms spring. The struggles between our infantile instincts and the influences tending toward a conventional life do indeed contribute the picturesque, symbolic basis of this conflict, and give ever-renewed reasons for its persistence; but the original cause of the conflict itself lies farther back.

I do not feel quite sure how much positive use psychoanalysts can make of these philosophic principles in the actual treatment or training of their patients. It is my belief that some use can be made of them, just as use has been made of them for the teaching of children in the kindergarten. The primary requisite, however, is that we, as physicians, should, ourselves, have these principles in our minds, for without them we cannot do adequate justice, in thought, to our patients' deepest cravings and intuitions. Without them we cannot even explain our own cravings and intuitions.

It is also a mistake to suppose that the "unconscious" contains only the sense of the bad, the "shady" side of our natures. The recognition of the bad implies the recognition of the good. A struggle implies a sense of a possible goal better than that which now draws us, and these better elements of the mental life are represented in our unconscious and subconscious minds. They are unconscious because they cannot be expressed in words.

Civilization is said to depend on the transference to higher and more broadly social aims, of the energy hitherto spent in obedience to the simpler, the dominant instincts, especially the sexual instinct with its great mission of race perpetuation. But though this statement perhaps covers the case of the animals, who see only what is before them, and of plants that see nothing, it is very far from covering the case of man. For every man, so I contend, has a sense of being able to effect something through his "will," and also dim, subconscious visions in which the logical formulas of philosophic reasoning are foreshadowed and the scheme of the universe is intuitively perceived; and with these feelings comes a deep sense of obligation.

He may learn to neglect or to deny these visions, but he has them all the same, and may be encouraged to realize the fact. If he does so, he will learn to see the truth of the seeming paradox that the mind is conscious of its own acts, so that the "recognition," which occurs at every moment of our lives, is not merely the rediscovery of a familiar object, but the rediscovery of ourselves.

The person who arrives consciously at this stage of thought becomes not merely something of a metaphysician; he becomes also a more serious and reflective man; a person better prepared to become aware of his spiritual origin, his spiritual destiny, and of the obligations that go with this knowledge.

Believe me, I am not disposed to waste time in regretting that those who have thus far had the psychoanalytic movement in their charge have followed the scientific method thus exclusively; if they had not done so they would probably have failed to accomplish what they have accomplished, and we should still be urging our patients to get well solely by dint of will and conscience, and with insufficient knowledge of themselves.

But the time has come to make a long step forward.

The aim to which we are practically, if not avowedly committed, is that of making a complete study of our patients' mental lives, and it is simply impossible for any one to do this at all thoroughly without having had a thorough training in the methods of philosophical as well as of scientific research and some recognition of the moral, social, and intellectual conclusions to which these researches have already led.

Fortunately, even those who care but little for philosophy, and are content to take for earnest Voltaire's scoffing jest, "*Quand on parle de ce qu'on ne comprend pas et que ceux qui entendent ne comprennent pas non plus, on fait de la metaphysique,*" — even those accept and utilize many philosophic and metaphysical conclusions without knowing it.

The law of the conservation of energy knows no conscience, no moral obligation, and no will, in any real sense; but we all recognize conscience, will, and obligation, even without intending it.

When I first began tentatively to use the powerful weapons which the psychoanalytic method has put into our hands, I endeavored to rely wholly on the analysis itself for the therapeutic outcome. I accepted, not indeed explicitly, but implicitly, the view that the physician's part in this treatment was solely that of urging the patient onward, deeper and deeper, into his own complexes, only seeing to it that he should not deceive himself, that he should not too soon believe that the end of his voyage of discovery was at hand.

I took it for granted that the physician's function ended when he had helped the patient to remove certain sorts of handicaps to progress, by forcing him to see the real facts at stake, and that he was under no obligation to assume any responsibility for the character of the progress itself.

Furthermore, the handicaps to be removed, so I believed, were of a specific sort. They were not handicaps due to ignorance, but those due to the existence of unfavorable emotional complexes of the kinds so much discussed. In other words, I thought that it was not our business to instruct the patient, to supply the positive side of the re-education which he needed to undergo, but only to place him in a better position to obtain his education elsewhere.

I still believe that the main portion of our work should be of the sort that I have indicated. But, little by little, I have arrived at the conviction that there is a subtle influence of sympathy and appreciation, — often expressible even in words, though sometimes difficult of expression — which makes the work of the physician who believes in the truths which I have hinted at as having become established by philosophic study and religious insight, of more value than that of the man who does not hold this attitude.

It might be thought that any considerable interest on the physician's part in philosophy (and in religion, which is philosophy expressed in symbolic and poetic form) would impair his ability to carry on his psychoanalytic investigations with due vigor. I think, however, that this danger is chimerical. Psychoanalysis is and should be recognized as being an instrument, not a doctrine. It binds us to no particular faith; it does not prevent us from holding any conviction as to universal truths.

I doubt, however, whether psychoanalysis by itself gives us all we need. It almost always happens that there are some features in the patient's case which can be best defined in moral terms. The patient "ought" or "ought not" to do this or that. The grounds on which this moral status of the patient rests can be approached through psychoanalytic investigation, but can be better understood, as I believe, if the patient is willing to make

that kind of mental analysis which will lead him to see his obligations in the light of a recognition of his origin and destiny. I will not assert that we are bound to force every patient to conclusions such as these. It might sometimes be unnecessary, sometimes impossible, to do so. What we can and ought to do, however, is to feel ourselves wholly sympathetic towards all, even the crudest, subconscious leanings of the patient in the direction of the truths that we hold to be important and philosophically sound. We can and should help him to unravel that portion of his unconscious yearnings which point, not alone towards his earthly genesis, but also towards his spiritual genesis. Every man, however ignorant, has a claim to a moral balance, a broad sense of obligation, a sense of moral values independent of earthly success, as a sort of birthright. The "normal" man is a moral person, or one who has the capacity for becoming so. To have failed to become developed in this direction is to have "symptoms" that need attention. The significance of this proposition is not weakened by the obvious fact that the reverse is also true; that an emotional or verbal over-accentuation of these moral ideas may become a symptom of disease.

The great poem in which Dante represents his descent into hell under the leadership of Virgil, his ascent of the hill of purgatory, and his flight through paradise, typifies the journey into the depths of one's own soul and memory, which psychoanalysis makes possible in a new and intensified form. It is not desirable to enter on such a journey, which begins with the "dark wood" of introspection, unless there is a good prospect of continuing it until the logical end of it is within sight. The physician, at least, should have a clear vision of the best outcome.

I may restate my argument in the following form: The psychoanalytic method, to which we owe so much,

is not simply a means of teaching the patient to become intimately acquainted with his own history and motives. Most patients learn through their treatment to reason on the facts which they observe and may be led to make this reasoning more or less profound. Every reasoning process may be ranged, broadly speaking, under one or another of three heads. The simplest form of reasoning is that in which individual objects are noted and discriminated. This is the ordinary reasoning of so-called "common sense." A man is a man, a cow a cow, "the falling apple suggests not a universal law of nature, but a means of gratifying an individual appetite.¹" It is, however, an interesting fact that the persons technically untrained in science or philosophy, who take the facts of observation largely in this fashion, have often a more philosophic insight than those of the next class, the "scientific" persons who have taught themselves to deny their intuitions. The men who have taken life simply have had crude but partially correct insight into the significance of dreams, as Freud has pointed out, and so, too, the insight furnished by their religion and their faith contains presentiments that are deeply scientific. The unpicturable world of the spirit is accepted by them without argument, and while they are not logical and thoroughgoing in their convictions, they do recognize, when at their best, that evil and illness are something more than meaningless calamities.

The next form of reasoning is that in which objects are noted with reference to their relations to each other. This is the reasoning of science and of those persons who rely upon the genetic principle to explain the evolution of the individual and of the race. For such persons the universe is bound together in such fashion that nothing can happen in any portion of the physical or the mental

¹ Cf. *Address on Philosophy*, by Nicholas Murray Butler, Columbia University, 1908.

world without inducing some change in every other portion.

It is assumed that no new energy can be either lost or created, although it is admitted that the forces which we see in operation are all interchangeable and finally reducible to some one force, which, however, no effort is made to account for. The evolution conceived of under this form of reasoning is absolutely deterministic. Consciousness, obligation, will, are terms used simply to describe events, not to designate real causes. They are creations, not creators. This is the scheme which most psychoanalysts seem thus far to have accepted as final. It is, of course, admitted that the mere fact of using the psychoanalytic method does not, strictly speaking, oblige any one to adopt the form of reasoning of which I am now speaking, but I have looked in vain for evidence that the leaders in our movement hold beliefs which would imply the use of any other form of reasoning than this "scientific" form. As I have said above, the curve of evolution at which this reasoning points is a straight line, which begins nowhere in particular and ends nowhere in particular; for surely the production of a "superman," like ourselves, except for being a few shades better, cannot be regarded as a logical goal for all our strivings and our sorrow.

The third form of the reasoning process is that which sees the universe, not merely as a collection of individuals, not merely as a series of impersonal, related objects or forces, but as a partial expression of the personal life of conscious beings, and therefore always to be thought of as a unified totality. This "totality" can be seen as underlying every act and as capable of giving new dignity and meaning to every thoughtful, reasoned act, even of imperfect beings like ourselves.

The "relativity" of science is here transformed into a unification expressive of the conscious volition of in-

telligent beings. Whatever a man does is done with a dim consciousness that his acts are, inferentially, based on a recognition of the bonds that connect him, as a moral being, with every other man, and with the source of energy which underlies the universe. The third form of reasoning makes this dim consciousness a clear consciousness; it takes it out of the subconscious and brings it into the focal point of knowledge and recognition. It would be useless to attempt, in this brief space, to give a further description of the presuppositions and conclusions which this form of reasoning involves. Those who wish to study them can find ample opportunity, and without this study it is impossible really to know the human mind. We can, indeed, see many of the handicaps from which our patients suffer, but we cannot adequately sympathize with the strivings through which they seek to raise themselves to a better plane.

The hard battle which the leaders of the psycho-analytic movement have fought has been a battle of accurate observation, concerning itself, as I think, with a single phase of evolution. They have worked as students of natural history rather than as philosophic thinkers, and, in fact, the likeness of Freud's attitude to that of Darwin has often been present to my mind. But Darwin, great leader though he was, did not succeed in stating all the influences that lead to the modification of the species; and there have been thinkers of high merit who have maintained that one significant weakness of his doctrine lies in its scant recognition of the influence of the human consciousness and will, unpicturable as these are. The group of those whose beliefs and arguments, if logically carried out, would bring them into harmony on this point is larger than it seems. It contains not only men like Bergson, who makes his *poussée vitale* the controlling influence in biological evolution of every grade, and Judd, the able psychologist of Chicago, who has recently written on the influence of consciousness

and will in the evolution of the mind and of human institutions, but also the best representatives of present-day political economy, who have definitely broken with the *laissez-faire* doctrines of Ricardo and Adam Smith, and have learned to recognize that the conflicts of the will and the moral sense of living men, conscious of a higher destiny, cannot be treated as equivalent to the conflicts of self-interest. Finally, and most important of all, the advocates of the validity of the will include the followers of Plato and Aristotle, of Kant and Hegel, and all the deepest thinkers of the world.

I have already said that the plea which I have urged is rather for a more thorough study of philosophic methods and results by those who practise psychoanalysis in the interest of a broader outlook on their part, than for a systematic utilization of the knowledge thus acquired in our routine dealings with our patients. But while ready to make this admission, I do so only under a certain protest. One feels inclined to say that, inasmuch as every improvement takes place gradually, it is enough that the patient should see or feel the existence of a goal a short distance ahead of him. So long as he has something to strive for, it is thought he does not need to see the ultimate and distant goal, even if a nobler one. An obligation lying near at hand, which he can grasp, and has a good prospect of being able to meet, is assumed to supply as much real motive as a more shadowy obligation which he cannot fully understand. In fact, however, I do not believe that this principle is sound. The biblical sentiment that "the people who do not see visions shall perish from the face of the earth" is a more nearly accurate expression of the truth. If I am right in my belief that every man has a dim intuition that there is something in him which makes him akin to the creative energy of the universe, and that his sense of obligation is one element in that something,

and if this intuition can be deepened by a process of self-analysis, then, surely, we can do him a service if we help him to make such an analysis.

Finally, I believe that there are deeper causes at work in the making of myths than even the conflicts between the infantile instincts and emotions based on bodily experiences and desires. These deeper causes reside in the very constitution of the mind, which makes its influence felt even at the very dawn of life and from then on in every mental act.

No act, no attempt at expression, no experience, can occur without giving rise to the sense of incompleteness through which the mind recognizes on the one hand that it *is* more than it can now define itself as being ; and, on the other hand, that it must go on, without ceasing, trying to define itself afresh. In each act the mind goes out, as it were, from itself, only to return to itself and rediscover itself. The dim realization of this outgoing and returning finds its symbolic expression in the constant phenomenon of recurrence in the sun myths, and of endeavor and failure and re-endeavor in many myths of gods and heroes. Not only are the myths themselves symbolic ; the very instincts of infancy through which it has recently been sought to explain them are themselves symbolic of these deeper mental processes that lie behind.

We who practise psychoanalysis learn well to know what symbolism means. We should, then, more than any others, succeed in realizing that these primal fundamental elements, the inevitable constituents of every mental act, must have symbols which are bound to be deeper than any others.

Chapter V.

ON FREUD'S PSYCHO-ANALYTIC METHOD AND ITS EVOLUTION*.

The subject of psycho-analysis, on which your long-honored president has invited me to speak, is one that deals with serious and difficult problems. I shall be glad if I can throw a flashlight on them here and there, and in so doing I shall try to answer some of the questions which have most frequently been asked me concerning the subjects in hand. Do not suppose that I shall pretend to give directions such as could enable any physician to put this method into practice. On the contrary, I beg you to regard it as a matter for congratulation that the leaders in this movement have a strong sense of the need of careful training and high standards on the part of those who desire to join their ranks. I have recently returned from a trip abroad, where I made the personal acquaintance of quite a number of the more prominent psycho-analysts, attended their congress and was able to learn a great deal about the details of their mode of work. I came away strongly impressed with the fact of the recognition on their part of the importance of their task and that this recognition had had a good effect on the mental attitude of the workers, many of whom are still young and full of promise.

These men seemed to me, for the most part, strikingly eager, earnest and sincere. "Sie haben gelernt, ein Stück

* Address before the Harvey Society of New York, November, 1911. Published in the *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, January 25, 1912.

Wahrheit zu ertragen," said Freud to some of us when these facts were under comment. I learned to my surprise and interest that the greater number of the investigators had subjected themselves, more or less systematically, to the same sort of searching character-analysis to which their patients were being subjected at their hands. It is fast getting to be felt that an initiation of this sort is an almost indispensable condition of good work; and for this important reason: The main thesis of the supporters of these new doctrines, — which are at bottom old doctrines, rearranged and re-emphasized, for psycho-analysis is largely an accentuated phase of education, — is that most of the emotional disorders to which we give the name of psychoneuroses arise largely from an instinctive self-concealment, and concealment of one's self from others; that is, from an unwillingness or an inability to see or look at all the facts that should be seen, respecting one's own tendencies and motives, as the basis for the control of feeling, thought and action. Recognizing this principle, these physicians have seen that so long as their own lives, too, are partially on a false basis, so long as they also are self-concealed, they cannot do justice to their patients, either in the way of appreciation or of criticism. Obviously, a person ridden by prejudices that he does not recognize cannot do justice to another person in a like state; one is reminded of the simile of the "beam" and the "mote". It is, therefore, I repeat, a matter for congratulation that the need of preparation for these tasks is being taken seriously, and the assertion is justifiable that the introduction of this specialty is likely to make better men, in every sense, as well of the physicians who practice it as of the patients whom they treat.

But while no man, however able, can without long study master the details of this method, every man who would be liberal or scientific can and should master its



principles and give the movement his generous sympathy and support.

What is psycho-analysis, and what, in general, are its aims? Psycho-analysis is a method of investigating and treating nervous invalidism and (incidentally) faults of character, which owes its strength to the fact that it searches and studies in detail, so far as this is practicable, all the significant experiences through which the patient to be treated has passed, and the motives and impulses which have animated him at psychologically important moments of his life, even since his earliest childhood. In doing this it discovers, not, indeed, all the causes of the disorder from which he suffers, but a large number of important partial causes, and thus prepares the way for the influences tending toward recovery. This definition is, I think, substantially correct, but it needs some explanation, amplification and qualification.

First, it is not strictly true to say that the attempt is made, during a psycho-analytic treatment, to pass in review all of the important motives and impulses, or even all of the kinds of motives and impulses, which had animated the mind of the person who subjects himself to this treatment, but, strictly speaking, only a certain class of them, — those, namely, that were originally based on emotions which had been repressed because they were painful or seemed out of harmony with the chosen plan of life, but which, in spite of all repression, had remained as active causes of serious mischief. It does not systematically deal with those motives and impulses which may be designated as aspirations and ideals, derived, as I believe, from the essential endowment of the spiritual nature by which every man is animated and which is to be regarded as an independent, primary, creative force. Psycho-analysis does not, in other words, pretend to take the place of philosophic teaching; but it

does help, even without claiming to do so, to give such teaching a better chance to make itself effective.

On the other hand, it is not just to characterize psycho-analysis solely as a therapeutic measure. In proportion as the psycho-analytic movement has developed toward maturity, it has shown itself able to make scientific contributions of great value to psychiatry¹, psychology, mythology, philology, sociology, as well as to education and to prophylaxis. In other words, these investigations bring support to every research which deals with the inward and the outward manifestations of human effort and mental evolution, while at the same time they draw important aid from all these inquiries into the psychology of the human race, for the benefit of the single human life.

The practical aim of this method is to enable persons who are hampered by nervous symptoms and faults of character to make themselves more efficient members of society, by teaching them to shake themselves free from the subtle web of delusive, misleading, half-unconscious ideas and feelings by which they are bound and blinded as if through the influence of an evil spell. Such persons — and in some measure the statement is true of all persons — have to learn that they are responsible, not only for the visible, but also for the hidden portions of themselves, and that, hard as the task may be, they should learn to know themselves thoroughly in this sense. For it is the whole of ourselves that acts, and we are responsible for the supervision of the unseen as well as for the obvious factors that are at work. The moon may be only half illuminated and half visible, but the invisible half goes on, none the less, exerting its full share of influence on the motion of the tides and earth.

¹ The value of Jung's argument for ranging Kräpelin's dementia precox, together with many symptom-complexes classified by Janet as psychasthenia, under the psychological category of the introversions, is now generally conceded.



Some patients may learn to override or sidetrack their troubles and can be helped by various means to do so. These other means are, however, not to be compared, for power of accomplishment or permanency of result, with that of which I now speak to you.

It is difficult to see why any broad-minded person should refuse to recognize, on theoretic grounds at least, the value of the self-knowledge here alluded to, especially when the treatment of the more serious forms of psychoneurotic illnesses is at stake. These more serious forms are very numerous and the causes of enormous suffering. Difficult and doubtful of issue as the treatment of them is, the method here discussed holds out a new hope of great promise.

It would obviously be impossible to offer you anything approaching to an adequate account of the means by which it is sought to discover, for each individual case, the particular facts and tendencies from which the particular symptoms that are present may have sprung. It must be enough to assert the fact which Freud established, that each person's memory, if allowed and encouraged to wander, uninhibited by resistances and repressions, may usually be counted upon to furnish the information that is needed. Where this is insufficient, two other plans may be adopted, one of which, indeed, comes largely into play in every case. These two methods are, first, the use of word-associations, the value of which Dr. Jung, of Zurich, has done so much to establish, and, next, the study of dreams.

The significance of the word-association method, stated in briefest terms, is that it serves as a sort of concentrated conversation. The patient, answering at random as he should do, instinctively lets go, for the time being, of the reins which he ordinarily holds tight over his inmost thoughts, and allows glimpses into the mental processes which it is of the utmost importance that he should know

yet which constantly tend to elude his attempt to seize them. Further inquiries and associations may, then, if necessary, proceed from such beginnings.

The elucidation of the means by which the interpretation of dreams may be successfully carried on, and a path thereby opened into the inner chambers of the mental life, is one of Freud's contributions which well deserves being designated as a mark of genius. Whatever differences there may be between the conscious lives of different individuals, in our repressed and unconscious lives we are all very much alike — not, indeed, in detail, but as regards the principles in accordance with which we are constructed.

Just as we speak the same verbal language, so we speak, at bottom, the same dream language, and can learn to make the meaning of our dreams clear to others and to ourselves. It cannot be too often represented that the disharmony between the conscious and the unconscious portions of our lives, which is sometimes productive of so much misery, ought not to exist. Every one recognizes this after a fashion, and tries instinctively, but, as a rule, without success, to overcome the disharmony by finding some sort of outlet for the repressed — and usually childish — feelings which his conscious intelligence will not tolerate. But this is not enough. If he would really overcome the disharmony, he must meet the situation face to face, and the study of his dreams, in which his repressed thoughts are represented in caricature and in picture language, is perhaps the best means of obtaining clues to the information which he seeks.

These hidden portions of our lives must be thought of as seeking to make themselves felt in action though not in words. Ordinarily, we keep them, like the evil spirits in Pandora's box, under pretty strong lock and key. At night, however, the locks are loosened, and our

repressed emotions succeed in finding their way to the theatre-stage of consciousness. Even then, the thoughts which arise are not allowed to become too evident, but are concealed beneath picturesque symbolisms and disguises.

It is a very interesting fact that, as each new person comes into the world and begins his life of dreams, he adopts forms of symbolism analogous to those which have been in use since even semi-civilized life began. The various animals with which our childhood was familiar come forward to play the rôle of animal-passions; the rapidly moving trains typify our hurrying emotions. And so, too, still or moving water, the rooms or buildings in which we like to place ourselves, the bare or varied landscapes, and many a symbol more, are all utilized as elements of a picture-language which is almost as well defined as that indicated by the rebuses of the child, or the hieroglyphs of the Egyptians, or the mythology of the ancient Greeks.

So full of meaning are these signs that no dream carries its true, much less its whole, significance on its face; no item, no obvious omission even, is without its bearing; hardly a feature or character is to be found that is not of even multiple value. The general proposition has been laid down — and certainly with good reason — that every dream represents the fulfillment of an unconscious wish. No one would doubt that this statement is true of the day-dreams of childhood, and when for "wishes" we read "partial" or "temporary" wishes, and learn by self-study what these partial wishes are, it is found in the dreams which appear so terrifying, the wish is concealed behind an attempt to repress it, just as the partial wishes of our waking moments are often concealed behind the disguise of fears, a phenomenon very characteristic of the phobias of neurotic patients. Persons unfamiliar with the interpretation of dreams often deny this tendency, and

point out that their dreams are nothing but jumbled representations of some trivial happenings of the day before. It is true that every dream takes the happenings of the day before as materials out of which to construct its apparent story. These trivial experiences are utilizable, partly because of their analogical bearings, partly because they are still conveniently available by the memory and yet not fully woven into any other of the various complexes of which our emotions tend to weave themselves. In utilizing these experiences the dreamer does what any person might do who wished to tell a story while sitting at the dinner-table with his friends. Assuming that he desired to describe a journey he had taken, he might select a salt-cellar to stand for a castle that he had seen, a fork for one road, a spoon for another road, a plate for a pond or lake, etc. But behind these hastily chosen symbols, there would be a connected story; and in the same way, behind the trivial details which make the outward framework of the dream there is a connected story, which, indeed, reaches, in layer after layer, back into the dreamer's earlier life and even into his childhood. For in every mental act the whole personality of the individual comes into play, although in each act certain elements of the personality are illustrated far more than all the rest. Of course, it need hardly be said that the analogy between the forks and spoons and the apparently trivial incidents of the day previous to the dream-night is by no means a complete one. Unimportant as the real incidents may seem, they are often full of meaning, which, however, only an expert analysis can reveal. Each dream, then, furnishes, to the expert, and to the patient, a path into the inmost recesses of the patient's life, better than any other means could furnish.

As regards the therapeutic value of the psycho-analytic method, it is almost needless to say that there

are many cases that baffle every treatment, not excepting that by psycho-analysis, and that this method has its special limitations. The patient, to be treated with success, must be reasonably young, reasonably intelligent, and able to give a large amount of continuous time to the investigation. His outlook as regards conditions of life must be reasonably favorable, or else he must have the capacity for idealization such as will enable him to override outward misfortunes, and to face existing conditions cheerfully. He must want to get well, and not count on his illness as giving him gratifications or advantages which he is unwilling to sacrifice, even for better health. Then, of course, some sorts of symptoms are less curable than others.

The length of time sometimes required for successful treatments has often been the subject of comment. But in fact it is a great gain to have a method capable, even in a long time, of producing fairly good results. Any one who thinks about the matter must realize that it is extremely difficult to make any considerable change in one's own character or habits. Our good qualities, as well as our faults, are deeply founded. Both have their roots in the experiences of infancy or in the reactions of childhood, and if we would help ourselves to the best purpose we must get back, in knowledge, feeling and imagination, to the conditions under which the deviations from the normal first began. To accomplish this takes time and patience, though the task is full of interest.

It would not be justifiable to assert that the psycho-analytic treatment can accomplish such results as are claimed for it if we could not assert at the same time that the investigations based on psycho-analytic studies have thrown new and important light on the *nature of the disorders* with which the method deals. Without this light, a rational, causal treatment of these affections would be as far out of our reach to-day as it was in the last century,

and we should still be throwing ourselves against the rocks and reefs of this great problem, chipping off a bit of stone here and there, but making no consistent progress.

The splendid insights of Charcot, and the remarkable researches of Pierre Janet with regard to the phenomena of automatism and the mental state of hysterical patients, brought the first real illumination into this obscurity, — an obscurity greater than we then could realize. The lines on which Freud began to work were somewhat parallel to Janet's in that both of these great leaders quickly learned to recognize the importance of the apparently forgotten and seemingly dead experiences of the invalid, and showed that they might still be acting as motive forces in the affairs of the present moment. Freud soon arrived, however, at the important conclusion that it is not enough to know single incidents of the past life, let them be ever so grave, but that the whole life must be drawn upon and made to yield its entire history, and he proved that when the whole life is exhaustively studied on this plan it is possible to explain the symptoms of illness as largely referable to demonstrable influences operating since birth, and thus to get on without making such large drafts on "inherited tendencies," of which we know so little, as the principal causal factor. Then it gradually became clearer that the gaze of the investigator must be directed with ever greater insistence towards the very earliest years of life as the time when the seeds of mischief are sown, — that marvelous period when tendencies are established and paths of least resistance are laid down, which may give a set or bias to all the years to come, and cause the child's mind to become sensitized, as if through a process of anaphylaxis, to special influences which may be brought to bear later, though perhaps not strongly until a much later period. The life-history of the normal child became, naturally, the next object of these

ever-widening studies, and then the attention of a special group of investigators was turned upon the childhood-history of the races of men, as described in sagas and in myths. Even the history of criminology and of sexual perversion, — already mapped out in part through the studies of many men, but now for the first time made to yield its true lessons, — has been largely drawn upon, for the sake of discovering and illustrating the nature of the dangers with which the early years of every child are more or less beset.

One instructive method of getting an idea of what passes in the child's mind, of the difficulties which he encounters and the means that he takes to meet them, is to observe carefully how we ourselves deal with corresponding situations: Every one who is accustomed to scrutinize his own thoughts and conduct must realize that he is often tempted to put out of sight what he does not like to think of; to seek enjoyment instead of doing work, and, in general terms, to live on a mental plane lower than his best.

Most of the temptations by which we are beset might be classified under one or the other of two headings; namely, the desire for gratifications or undue self-indulgences of a relatively personal sort, and the desire for gratifications implying the approbation, admiration or the attention of others, if only through subserviency or domination. I am not now concerned to prove the prevalence of these temptations or to deny that we may utilize them to our profit, but only to call attention to the fact that a more or less universal and sometimes irresistible tendency exists, which impels us, on the one hand, to secure these gratifications, and, on the other hand, to protect ourselves from self-reproach for so doing. In the interest of these two motives, which are, of course, comparatively rarely conscious motives, we cloak our cravings under forms which tend to make them seem justifiable and even admirable.

Every thoughtful person is more or less aware, — though it is only the well-trained or unusually discriminating observer who can thoroughly appreciate the fact, — that an element of craving for self-gratification may lie hidden under the guise of anger, prejudice, fear, jealousy, depression, desire for self-destruction, "over-consciousness," and the wish to inflict or to suffer pain. It is equally true that under the form of restlessness, or that of a sense of incompetency, we symbolize the hidden conflicts which cover our desire to escape from ourselves, or our incapacity to understand or unwillingness to face the full meaning of our emotional desires.

Those of us who call ourselves "well" owe it to those who are forced to call themselves "sick" to study the true nature of these innumerable faults of character. When this is done, it is discovered that these faults deserve the name of "symptoms," and that, like symptoms, they are disguises and compromises, concealing painful conflicts that may date back to the experiences of infancy.

It must be remembered that between the period of birth and the later years of childhood each individual recapitulates in a measure the history of civilization. The parent and the community who see in the infant not so much what he is as the promise to what he is to be, make little of those qualities in him which would be considered as intolerable if judged by our adult standards. But these qualities exist, nevertheless, and the growing child to whom they are transmitted must deal with them as he is best able, whether by gradually modifying them for the better, or by shrinking from them in disgust, or by continuing to indulge himself in them in concealed forms. One fact must never be forgotten, namely, that each child comes into the world with one mission which he cannot overlook or delegate and which he shares in common with every living thing, — the mission of preparing

to do his part in the perpetuation of his race. For the sake of the establishment of the great function on which this depends, he is provided, in infancy, with a considerable number of capacities in the way of sense-gratification and with ample means of indulging them, which, however, he must eliminate as he grows older or preserve at his risk. But this risk the infant does not see, and before the time comes when he can see it he may have found himself drawn into paths of least resistance, leading both to pleasure and to pain, from which it will be difficult for him to escape. There is, then, no easy course left open for him but to repress his desires for these indulgences, just so far as may be necessary for concealing them from himself, while at the same time he invents substitutes and compromises in which the indulgences are continued under a new form. Yet, unfortunately, the adoption of such compromises is equivalent to laying a foundation for defects of character or for symptoms of obstinate forms of nervous illness, as the case may be.

Clear memories of these earliest years of childhood rarely are retained. Yet some individuals retain very much more than others, and this fact, taken in connection with the evidence furnished by dreams, by a few careful observations of young children, and by the memories of patients trained under the psycho-analytic treatment, leads to the conclusion that a large part of the apparent forgetting is based really on repression.

From the standpoint of the next later period many of the details of infancy are unpleasant to recall. One is reminded of the Mohammedan cadi who, when asked about the early (Christian) history of his town, replied: "God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it¹."

¹ Cited in James's "Psychology," vol. ii.

The period of childhood, though it contains many elements of happiness, which are usually accentuated and continued by the child's delightful power of grief-compensating fancy as exhibited in day-dreams, contains also many elements of suffering. The child's fears — of the dark, of storms, of mystery and power in a thousand forms — have been explained¹ as due to the organic memories of his pre-human ancestry; to the recognition of the contrast between his weakness and the bigness and strength of those about him; or (in a religious and philosophic sense) the vastness of his own inexhaustible possibilities. There is nothing to urge against these explanations, but they cannot be regarded as covering the ground. The young child is at least partly like the older child and the adult, and fear, with them, cannot be studied as apart from the desire which so often underlies it. Like Scott's aged harper, we all "wish, yet fear," and frequently the wish becomes gradually repressed, and the fear alone remains. We all "fear" those most whose approbation we most "wish," and fear the tests in which we most long to succeed. The child, with his splendid fancy and his intensified training in the symbolism of fairy-tales, loves to play with these fears and wishes. The dark stands for delicious, as well as alarming, mysteries, and beyond these there is almost always the longed-for chance of the pleasure of re-discovering himself in his mother's arms².

The strength of the child's tendency to follow pleasurable paths of least resistance may be vastly diminished, or, on the other hand, vastly increased, by the fact that the immense forces of social custom, by

¹ Cf. Pres. G. Stanley Hall's paper: *Study of Fears*. *Am. Jour. Psychol.*, January, 1897, vol. viii, pp. 147-249.

² This pleasure has a philosophic bearing to which I cannot here allude.

prescribing what should be done, help to deprive the child of his own sense of responsibility, while at the same time they seem to relieve the parent from the necessity of seeking to discover what is really passing in the child's mind. We talk of independence, but, in fact, the community is almost fanatic in its demand for conformity. The key to the solution of these difficulties must be sought, not primarily in the education of the younger generation, but in that of the older. It is with the lack of knowledge on the part of the parents, and the disregard by physicians of the need of acquiring and imparting adequate information on these subjects, that the reform must deal. There can be no doubt but that our social and ethical customs, which represent the filtered experience and wisdom of the race, are of immense value. But the ends which they mainly seek and the methods which they follow are not chosen with reference to the needs of the neurotic child. These points are of such importance that an attempt must be made to state them somewhat more fully, even at the risk of exciting misunderstandings.

The family influences under which most healthy-minded children grow up are, of course, eminently beneficial, and this is no place for discussing their shortcomings.

But the fact remains that nervous invalidism is extremely common; that it is closely bound up with social relationships of varied sorts; and that the school in which the child gets his first introduction to these relationships is the home.

One cause of unhappiness in married life, for example, is the inability on the part of the husband or the wife to adopt the new duties with a whole heart. This inhibition is often due, in part, to the craving, established in childhood, for an undue continuance of the parental ties, with all that they imply; an unconquerable

homesickness, which often cannot be put into words or recognized in its own form, overrules the new interests which ought to be supreme.

These are facts of common knowledge, but under the light of this new movement they have been studied with a thoroughness previously impossible, and have been correlated with others of a kindred sort, with the result of immensely increasing their significance.

It should not be forgotten that father and mother are not only objects of admiration, imitation and veneration to the growing child, but that they stand likewise to him as man and woman, and that, as such, they are in a position of peculiar responsibility and may be centers of peculiar harm.

I am not undertaking here to lay down rules for conduct, nor even to assert that although, on the whole, frankness and a wellguarded, thoroughly wholesome intimacy between parents and children is eminently desirable, it is very undesirable to break down all barriers of restraint between them. The evolution of modesty and of a certain amount of personal reserve needs to be safeguarded, even at some risk.

Real knowledge with respect to these complex matters should be sought, but it is hard to get and its advent is not to be awaited with impatience, or its acquisition as the basis of judgment and conduct assumed on insufficient grounds.

Another point of importance is that the dawning self-consciousness of the infant represents him to himself, not definitely and distinctively as "boy" or "girl," but as a being standing in relations of dependence to other and more powerful beings, whose characteristics he does not classify from the sex-standpoint. The significance of this statement will be understood without difficulty by any one who will consult carefully even his own experience and

observation. Every one must be aware that we all have some traits which are commonly designated as masculine, and others designated as feminine, and that the evolution which best marks social progress is based on the working out, in the case of each person, of capacities related to both of these sorts of traits. The attraction which persons of our own sex have for us is of great value as leading to friendships which may become exceedingly warm without ceasing to be eminently desirable. It is, however, well-known that such friendships may develop into relationships which are eminently undesirable and a-social, and even, in the case of men, of a kind that would be called criminal. Between these two extremes, tendencies are to be observed, or are to be detected through careful study in a given case, which may lead to hidden conflicts and to distressing nervous symptoms. Good observers have shown it to be true that just as, to a certain degree, many men prefer the society of their fellows at the club to that of their wives and families at home, so, in a much deeper sense, nervous invalids often waver between attractions which would lead them in the direction of the most wholesome and useful relationships, either of marriage or friendship, and those which have an unwholesome tendency. The objectionable forms of these tendencies, if not created, are, at least, accentuated, by the over-strong, or, rather, by the slightly abnormal attachment of the infant to the father on the one hand or to the mother on the other. It is true, at the same time, that there are probably also deeper influences at work, dependent on some tendency which each person brings into the world, but of the exact nature of these latter influences it would be premature to speak. The subtlety of the danger here noted is what gives it its effective power, for what could seem to be freer from danger than parental love? Obviously nothing, when this love is fortified by wisdom and knowledge. In fact,

however, it happens but too often that, either because the child is too immature in his manifestations of affection or because the parents retain too much of their own childishness, that which should be a source of infinite happiness and should lead the child towards independence and self-reliance becomes, instead, an opportunity for the growth of unwise emotion and a weakening tendency to imitation and dependence.

A careful study of the child's personal gratifications has shown that a portion of the earliest and strongest of them, which, for the most part, have to be repressed later, are related, first, to the satisfying of hunger, then to the securing of certain specific pleasures, such as the massive feelings of warm contact (during the diaper period), and those due to the excitation of the orifices of the body, especially the mouth, the urethra and the anus. To the child these sources of gratification stand at first, both morally and from the social standpoint, on an equal footing. He is unaware that he is likely to be subjected to serious temptations with reference to some of them; he does not know that his reaction to them may decide whether he is to become a being capable of recognizing that his best freedom is to be found in a willingness to devote himself to the welfare of the social whole, or whether self-indulgence is to be his ruling motive. The child who continues too long to suck his thumb, or wet his bed, or who finds undue fascination in the emptying of the bladder and the rectum, or detects a mysterious significance in these events, may be acquiring a tendency to prolong bodily indulgences which ought to be outgrown, and laying the foundations for other personal gratifications of more subtle, more distinctively mental, and, socially, of more disastrous sorts. Masturbation, of course, although accused of dangers which do not belong to it, stands high among these over-indulgences of a purely personal, auto-erotic sort.

Freud has been criticised for making too much of the sexual element in these problems; for seeing sexuality where it does not exist. But is this criticism just? The number of those who think so is growing daily less, as sober judgment and knowledge of the facts come better into play. Think with what inconceivable, with what seemingly unwarrantable tenacity, nature, bent on the perpetuation of the life, both of the individual and the race, has safeguarded the function on which this depends. Many plants if starving will flower all the more abundantly, as if in order that their descendants at least may live. Think how every novel, every drama, is founded on some aspect of the sex problem. Is not the truth rather that these problems are felt to be of such enormous importance that we ought perhaps to shrink from touching them just as we might shrink from handling bombs charged with dynamite of high explosive power? And yet, is this true? Is not the dynamite to a great extent the figment of our imaginations, filled with repressed memories which we have not known how to study, but whose rumblings we have all vaguely felt within us?

This, or something like it, was, at any rate, the feeling which led Professor Freud long ago to enlist for his campaign, and determined him to risk everything for the laying bare of these long-neglected facts. He might have said to himself, whether he did or not, that he would take the great studies of human character, like those by George Eliot or by Meredith, and would go on where these writers stopped, striving, in the spirit of the novelist turned man of science, to discover the processes of childhood through which the strong, deep tendencies which they describe came into being. Those who oppose this movement out of unwillingness to discuss the sexual life are not only declining to be scientific and impartial (since to the scientific person nothing is in itself disgusting or

unworthy of consideration), but also are rendering it harder for patients to get well, by stamping as indecent their attempts to gain a true knowledge of themselves.

I should like to call your attention to the fact that in the beginning it may be only a slight over-accentuation of an infantile tendency that makes the difference between the promise of health and the promise of invalidism. But when the lines which enclose the angle of deviation have become extended, as the child grows up to manhood, the actual distance becomes immense. One is reminded, here, of Jean Ingelow's poem, "Divided", and, still more, of George Eliot's great study of Tito, in "Romola". Charming, handsome, kindly, scholarly, Tito seemed, as a youth, to have all possible good qualities, save that he possessed, or was possessed by, an apparently trifling tendency to self-indulgence, or selfishness, of the concealed, insistent, infantile type. This was never very prominent, but it was always present and always irresistible, and it made him in the end a fiend. And yet, from the psycho-analytic standpoint, Tito's was a curable case. At any moment, up to the very last, if he could have been aided to penetrate the history of his own life, and thereby to see at one glance the system of interlocking forces representing his still active tendencies of childhood and their logical outcome in his present acts, — as one looks through a transparent model of the brain-tracts, — he might perhaps have undone the mischief. For a man's emotional and mental past, even if of his infancy, never dies; it is always present and active, and represents a force which is always susceptible, theoretically at least, of modification or neutralization, in the interest of progress¹.

¹ Strictly speaking, we never obliterate the memories of our past experiences, and even to wish to do so would be in accord with the spirit of an Oriental rather than of a Christian philosophy. The new growth to which we should aspire diverges at a certain

There are several advantages in classifying, as Freud has been criticised for doing, the many and varied tendencies of which novelists write, as sex-tendencies. But perhaps the most important advantage is the practical one that it enables the physician, on suitable occasions, to point out the direction in which a given act or thought, conceivably innocent in itself, may lead.

It would be worth while to know whether, when you lay your hand on a man's shoulder, you are to be taken for a friend or arrested for assault and battery. The strongest term which points to the possible practical outcome of your act is oftentimes the best. A bit of self-indulgence, if it represents a force which had its rise in infancy, may not be as harmless as it seems. The child must, at every cross-road, select and accentuate on the one hand, repress on the other. But this power of selection and repression, which stands so high among our attributes, is itself a source of danger. The adoption of this or that *principle* of accentuation or repression may become habitual and some of them are harmful. The child is like a merchant who cannot oversee all his affairs in detail and so indicates to his subordinates the general trend of his policy and then lets them work it out alone. But let him look out lest he become narrow-visioned and get hoodwinked. The really wise merchant does not often leave his subordinates to work out his plans indefinitely by themselves, whereas the indication of policy made in early childhood is often a decision, in one or another particular, made once for all and for a lifetime. Truly, the child is the father, — indeed, the master, — of the man, to a degree hard to appreciate except for those who have taken the great amount of pains required for following the literature of point from the old but gains a certain richness from the memories of the latter, and these memories cease to be painful, in the old sense at least.

these researches of which I speak to-night¹. Not only is the policy of the lifetime often dictated once for all in childhood, but this fact itself is often erased from memory, that is, it is repressed, and the results of an early misjudgment are then accepted as if assumed to be governed by an intelligence cognizant of facts and tendencies of which in reality it knows nothing.

To summarize once more what I have said: Nervous invalidism, in the sense in which I now mean that term, is not only a source of suffering: it is also a sign that those who suffer from it cling, — unwittingly but under the pressure of strong instincts, — to modes of thought and feeling which should be recognized as belonging to childish stages of development. The mode of action of this tendency is subtle, but a crude illustration of the principle indicated is given in the obvious fact that depression and feelings of weakness and incapacity, painful though they are, are often made to serve as self-indulgent and childish self-excuses from effort, and as means of exciting self-pity and the attention from others which almost all children so much crave. The simple recognition of this tendency is, however, not competent to banish it from the mental life of the adult; the whole chain of experiences and shifting emotions which led to the habit must be laid bare and scrutinized. It is, then, found that men sometimes allow themselves even to fall sick, or to suffer pain, or to adopt some species of asceticism or of morbid self-depreciation, for the reason that behind these symptoms and tendencies there lurks often a desire for self-gratification of a childish type the real root of which can usually be revealed in detail, and must

¹ It would be obviously impossible even to indicate here the mischances which often come with the later years of childhood, when curiosity and fantasy become active; still less those which attend the oncoming and course of adolescence.

be revealed if a radical cure is to be obtained. In the case of neurotic phobias, it is, essentially, himself, not the supposed source of terror, that the patient mainly fears. So, too, morbid introspection is largely a search for emotional excitement, the desire for which only disappears when its true nature is clearly exhibited by the aid of a deep-going introspection of a totally different, a more wholesome and more rational sort, through which we see ourselves, no longer as unfortunate individuals, but as companions in arms in the great march of social progress; as akin, perhaps, with those whom we had called sinners, and had pitied at long range, but akin also with men of devotion and force, whose characteristics we can discover to have been won by conflicts like our own.

Broadly speaking, it may be said that every man has had, theoretically, at his birth, the capacity of developing, under favorable conditions, in such a way that he could have become possessed of a fairly well-balanced character, and that this capacity was the best element of his birthright. The conditions required for this development may have been such as it would have been extremely hard, even impossible, to secure at the outset, but in the psycho-analytic method we have a means of readjustment, difficult of application, it is true, but through the aid of which at least a certain number of those who have gone seriously astray may be restored to reasonable health. But for this purpose they must teach themselves to review their adolescence, their childhood, and their infancy, and thereby to strip off the veils by means of which their ease and pleasure-seeking instincts had sought to conceal them from themselves.

The game is worth the candle for, in my estimation, no disease with which men suffer causes, in the aggregate, so much misery as the fears, the obsessions, the compulsions, the needless weaknesses, the innumerable

faults and vices of character, by which we see ourselves surrounded. All these ills spring virtually from three sources, — inherited tendencies, the failure duly to recognize our spiritual origin and destiny and the obligations which this recognition should impose on us, and the absence, during our development, of the conditions necessary for the successful making of the journey from infancy to adult life.

It is very important to note that the infant starts on his journey of life with a series of instincts, motives and inhibitions which are less strongly unified than are those of the adult. He does not at once feel the intense repression and directive force of public opinion which is to be reflected later by his mother and his nurse. Each sensation, each inclination to seek the renewal of a gratification once felt, he must take at first, at least relatively, in or for itself and at its face value. Until the necessity is felt for the subordination of some impulses, and the emphasis of others (those which are necessary for reproduction), as entitled to a relative primacy, the infant's tendencies might be compared to a set of loose threads of differently colored worsteds, lying side by side or crossing each other more or less at random, but not yet woven into a chosen, much less a beautiful pattern. The accomplishment of this latter task would mean health.

Nervous illnesses and faults of character thus arise largely as the primary or secondary results of the failure of the forces of civilization, as brought to bear on this or that individual child, to set the intricate machinery in action which should weave his threads into a good pattern. We need not now inquire where the fault lies; the main question is as to the effect. Let it be assumed that some special sort of gratification is too strong to be lightly abandoned in the child's mind in favor of the sort of subordination and co-operation offered by the oncoming

years; or, to make the facts and argument seem more familiar, let it be assumed that the individual is drawn by some instinct to remain a child, with a child's egotism, longings, whims, propensities and a child's world of dreams and fancies.

I hardly know, though I might guess, how strongly this audience feels sympathetic to these Freudian doctrines. I do know, however, how I once felt myself. I well remember my own first attempt and failure — perhaps fifteen years ago — to grasp the real thought of Sigmund Freud, then a little-known physician, now deserving to be ranked as a great leader, and honored as we honor such men as Charcot, Hughlings Jackson and Pierre Janet.

I was glancing over a copy of the *Neurologisches Centralblatt* at a friend's house, when my eye was attracted by a bold claim concerning an asserted common origin for all the psychoneuroses. The paragraph stated that these neuroses never arose except on the [partial] basis of some disturbance of the sexual life and that the differences in the character of the symptoms, as, for example, between hysteria and neurasthenia, were determined largely by the period of life at which this or that disorder of the sexual life set in. I was impressed by the boldness and confidence of the statements, but rashly attributed these qualities to eccentricity and perhaps notoriety-seeking on the part of the writer, and laid the paper down with a distinct feeling of disgust: the reasoning, I thought, could not be correct.

How different are my sentiments at present, now that through three years' hard work I have learned what these statements really mean; have made the personal acquaintance of the author of them and his supporters, and have discovered what a treasurehouse of facts respecting the deep currents of human life they have amassed. I have come to believe that if we had the power

and the will to turn inward the searchlight of self-knowledge on a large scale, there would be far less prejudice and cruelty in the world than there is at present; far less envy, jealousy and suspicion; far less terror, disappointment, depression of spirits and suicide; far less disorders of the nervous system; far less inability to realize our best destinies. The whole great drama of life is played — in embryo as one might say — within the mind and heart of each and every individual, before he sees it played, — for the first time as he thinks, — on the larger stage of social world around him; and this fact is worth our knowing.

To bring about an advance in these directions, an advance in the prophylactic education of the child, an advance in the better understanding and treatment of neurotic invalids, would be well worth all the vast labor expended, or to be expended, on these investigations. It is not for the purpose of humbling ourselves that we need to scrutinize our repressed thoughts. There is little need of judgment but much need of freeing ourselves through wider knowledge from the unseen chains that restrain the utilization of the will.

We do not even need, in Oriental fashion, to forget. Every experience, if properly assimilated, may be made a stepping-stone towards higher things.

Chapter VI.

FROM THE ANALYSIS OF TWO STAIRCASE DREAMS*.

(1) A single lady, very refined, 37 years of age, suffering from anxiety, with distinct homosexual tendencies, had the following short dream: She was going to climb up a ladder, which ascended spirally inside a kind of tower. The walls of this tower were quite open, i. e. like a scaffolding. While doing this she could survey a wide landscape in every direction (?pleasure in looking). Just in front of her there was a big dog which after a short time seemed to be afraid to go on farther, and, without turning round, i. e. with his back turned towards her, began to climb down. He was soon so low down that he stood beneath the upper part of her body and pressed himself against her knees. She did not feel any anxiety or excitement—so she said—but only saw in the dog an enormous obstacle which made it impossible for her to reach the aim longed for, that is to say, the climbing up to a certain platform from where she would have a beautiful view.

As to the aim the dreamer remarked that she would like to make use of her talents in favour of some elderly ladies she was fond of, but that she was hindered from doing so by her illness. Only a small selection will be communicated out of the rich findings of the analysis. When a little girl she was fond of playing with boys,

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and should have liked to be a boy herself. Her mother, whom on the whole she had loved very much, died many years ago after a long illness; after her death the daughter reproached herself at having somewhat neglected her. When about 16 years old, she tried to effect coitus with a girl friend, which was followed by exceptionally strong self-reproaches. Her fondness for elderly ladies began at the age of twenty. But when in the presence of such a lady, she usually begins to tremble so violently as to make every advance impossible; she never manages to play the part of the intimate friend, which she would like to.

There are complicated circumstances in this case which are not to be explained without going into further facts from her life. But it seems to me certain at least that the dream is representing the attempt at coitus and that it points to repressed feelings of pleasure with which the great hindrances of her life are connected.

(2) A man, who in the previous night, i. e. 24 hours before the dream, had performed a coitus, and was feeling excited during the following day, dreamed in the course of his analysis that he saw a man, in whom he thought he recognised himself, climbing up a steep ladder which one could see clearly against an indistinct background. On the very top of this ladder there was a strange object, something like a vessel, hollow, dark, with a thick round brim—perhaps a pail made of papier maché—which was inverted over the top of the ladder, though its outlines disappeared in the dark, indistinct background. It seemed to the dreamer that the climbing man at last pushed his head against the pail, and that his head seemed to fit well in the cavity of the bucket. The man was carrying in his left hand a can with a wire handle, in his right a large brush, just as a house painter does, and the dreamer found it natural that he painted the side parts of the ladder up to the cavity of the pail, and perhaps also the

inner part of the ladder with a yellowish liquid. Then the dreamer awoke.

In the short analysis he stated that he had smeared his organ with vaselin before the above-mentioned coitus. This may partly explain the painting of the ladder, and allow us to interpret this dream, too, as a coitus dream.

Chapter VII.

A CHARACTERISTIC CHILD'S DREAM*.

A medical student about 26 years old related me the following dream from his childhood the interest of which lies in the point that it represents the unconscious thoughts and lively sentiments of a healthy, although rather excitable child at the important age of about three or four years.

The little boy was—in his dream—in a big empty hall; he was feeling lonely, as lost, and was looking for his parents. Suddenly a big man came towards him, wearing a uniform with metal buttons and whom he described—when telling his dream—as a police-official.

The man led him into the next room where there were two coffins. He was told that these two coffins contained the corpses of his two aunts. The aunts actually were very much like his mother (being her sisters); he was very fond of them, as also of his mother (at least later). Then one of these coffins was opened, and the boy saw that it was quite full of blood; at the same time he was told that the body of his aunt was lying in it.—He did not remember any further details of the dream.

I can only say a little about the personal life of the dreamer, as there was no opportunity to explore the secrets of his life; he told me the dream only out of scientific interest. He only stated that, *as far as he knew*, it was the mother who had been from the very beginning the preferred parent. He loved her very much, and remained more or less dependent on her later.

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But even without knowing further details one may infer that the boy, when only three or four years old, must have felt passionately towards his father or his mother, sentiments so strong that they could only be expressed in the dream through the symbolism of fierce death-wishes. The aunts, who were so like the mother, we may identify with the mother, while the big man in the military uniform must be regarded as being the father.

Whether the whole dream can be traced to a reversed Oedipus-complex—in favour of his early love for his father—whether the death-wish has been the sadistic expression of strong love passion, or whether finally the large hall can be interpreted as the mother's womb, his being saved by the father as his birth—this I do not venture to decide. Perhaps many opposed feelings were concerned.

The interest of the matter lies in the circumstance that the dream seems in many respects typical, and that it made such a deep impression on the small child that he always remembered it.

As to the external cause of the manifest dream it may be remarked that the boy on the day before the dream had been taken by his parents, on the occasion of a journey, through an unusually large railway station of a great American town, where he had to wait perhaps some time for the train. The child might have been told this fact later on by his parents; but the dream he must have actually dreamed, even if its clearness might partly be due to his having several times related it subsequently.

Chapter VIII.

COMMENTS ON SEX ISSUES FROM THE FREUDIAN STANDPOINT*

"When half gods go the gods arrive."

To those physicians who have made themselves familiar with the difficult conceptions of the Freudian school, still more to those who have endeavored conscientiously to put them into practice, the attitude of the leaders of this movement toward the various sex problems at issue, usually appears, in the main, so well founded and of such extraordinary interest, that the opposition to it, formerly so bitter, now becoming greatly modified, seems a needless prejudice which a temperate reconsideration of the facts and arguments should remove. It is to such a reconsideration that I ask your attention in this paper. The subject is a difficult one to handle, and I shall begin by endeavoring to correct what I believe to be a common and unfortunate misapprehension, namely, that the prime objective point of a psychoanalytic investigation is the dragging to light of the patient's sexual experiences and misdemeanors. This is not the case. There is but one objective point in such an inquiry, and that is to find means to enable the patient to know the whole of the forces which are ruling his destiny, instead of only a part of them. The patient presents himself with various nervous symptoms and various traits of character which hamper his progress, and cause him great distress. The psychoanalyst seeks to

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understand these mental peculiarities better, and, for this purpose, to discover, not indeed their ultimate cause, but the conditions existing since birth which have prepared the way for them, best exemplified them, and most strongly accentuated them, and also the protean changes of form which the traits themselves have undergone.

The psychological phenomena which most definitely absorb the attention in such a search as this, are those which have to do with the evidences of strong, imperative passions; of the dissociation of apparently single emotions into opposing elements; of the repression of a portion of these elements, and of the subsequent reappearance of the repressed emotions under a new form.

The investigation of such phenomena as these necessarily brings out a full history of the patient's sexual life, even in forms of which the patient himself had been wholly unaware, and he must learn to break down the internal resistances by which he had made sure his concealment from himself.

But this history is not dragged out as if in and for itself; it comes out as indicating the partial causes of symptoms or of hampering traits of character, for which the patient seeks relief.

It is as much a right and a duty to investigate the results of sex hunger, and the workings out of the instinct of reproduction, as it would be to investigate food hunger and the function of digestion, if the disturbances of the latter gave rise—as they do not to any considerable extent—to repressed passions and complex nervous symptoms. These investigations should invariably be made in such a way that the patient's sympathies become widened, and that he learns to interpret the psychology of his fellow men through his own experiences, and his own psychology through a better knowledge of the experiences of his fellow men.

Men differ in endowments of all sorts, and thus, too, in the relative strength and relative inhibition of their sex instincts. It is partly on this account that it becomes much harder for some men than for others to make the best choices, in the face of the difficult and constantly recurring necessity for deciding between the path which leads to the broader life of unselfish devotion and that which leads to the narrow life of personal gratification.

In spite of these differences and these difficulties, however, every man has the capacity for acquiring a suitable balance of mental functions and the happiness and efficiency which go with it, provided only the conditions for the best development can be made favorable. If he misses this opportunity in the years of his early development he can still make the loss good, in some measure, during his later years; but to do this is so hard that he needs all the help that he can get toward its accomplishment, and one important kind of help is a clearer, a more intelligent recognition of the obstacles in his way. Some of these obstacles are external, others consist in the lack of adequate ideals; but after these are dealt with there usually remains a vast and subtle group of difficulties, peculiarly difficult to grapple with because peculiarly hard to see, namely, the internal difficulties established by strong, insistent, partially repressed passions and emotions; and the chief among these emotions are those which relate to the sex life.

Shall we let ourselves be led by prejudice and a false prudery to restrain our patients from investigating these passions and their results, and thus, even though unwittingly, lend our aid to the success of the cruel "confidence" game, through which the self indulgent instincts of every neurotic invalid, brought over from his days of childhood, seek to outwit his nobler powers and intuitions?

The public and the profession have indeed the right to demand that those physicians who ask their patients to lay bare the details of their lives, of whatever sort even if the request is made solely for the patients' good, should do this with understanding, sympathetic consideration, and skill. But when the demand is made that the sexual life should be excluded from such an investigation, or the criticism advanced that morbid introspection will thereby be increased, it is forgotten that every psycho-neurotic patient is already, in the depths of his unconscious mind, suffering from the abnormal working of his sexual instincts, and indulging perpetually in morbid introspection, and that the very object of the treatment is to overcome these real defects, to which hitherto he had been a blinded victim.

It is indeed true that a psychoanalytic treatment *imperfectly carried out* may bring with it certain dangers. Of what treatment that attempts any considerable modification of character cannot such a statement be made? But it should be remembered that this treatment aims at results which cannot be gained equally well in any other way, and that objectionable results are, practically, very rare.

To state the matter in other words, we neurologists, as students of the psychoneuroses, are pledged to the thorough investigation of the disorders involving a disturbed action of the emotions. How shall we redeem this pledge? Obviously, by studying the emotional life in the very widest sense. But sex issues, of one or another sort, lie at the very heart of the emotional life. Every child knows that; and if Freud, instead of asserting that where any one of the psychoneuroses is seen, there some primary or secondary abnormality of the sexual life is discoverable also, as a partial causal factor, had declared the opposite to be true; had said, namely, that there is no causal relationship between this portion of the emotional life and

the remaining portions, the statement would have been considered as too ridiculous for notice. An index of the importance of the part played by the reproductive functions is furnished through the universal recognition of the part played by the emotion of love, taking the word in a wide sense. One need not, and could not go so far as to maintain that the complex mental state that one calls love—which Dante avers to be, when normally developed, at the root of all that is good, and, when abnormally developed, of all that is bad in the world—is wholly describable in sex terms. But one can with confidence maintain that it is impossible to give form and color to this philosophical conception of the office of love—that is, one cannot show *how* and *why* this sentiment is at the root of happiness and misery, of courage, cunning and crime, of war and conquest, of poetry and romance, of the home and the community; of civilization itself—without using sex terms (or at least having them in one's mind) on a large scale.

The questions at stake, then, are not whether the consideration of sex issues is important as a preparation for the study of the psychoneuroses, but solely as to the degree of this importance, as to how these issues can most profitably be studied, and whether the particular way in which Professor Freud and his colleagues have approached this great problem is a good way.

With these ends in view, I beg leave to ask your approval of the following propositions:

A rigidly scientific attitude is an absolutely essential prerequisite for anything like a fair discussion of sex problems. One must be able to look squarely and without loathing at the facts, or one must say farewell to honest judgment. But no sooner do I ask for this fairness than I am forced to grant that it is hard to give. The details of that portion of one's life which has to do directly or

indirectly with the function of reproduction are usually guarded either as something too sacred or too unpleasant, to be talked about. And the worst part of the business is that the persons whose interests are most at stake, namely, the neuropathic patients, must inevitably, in the present state of public opinion and public ignorance, pass through a period of severe self humiliation, if they consent to lift the veil from their own memories, or to study the psychological mysteries of their own childhood. Even within a few days I have had occasion to hear a sensitive and refined woman, fortunately recovering from the traces of a compulsion neurosis, torture herself with verses from the Bible, because of intrusive thoughts, common I suppose to nearly every one, which she felt herself obliged to interpret morally as acts. Another patient, within the same period, an able, intelligent young man, struggling in the network of subtle sexual temptations and led to adopt the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer as the only one congenial to his present mood, denounced, this time not himself but the universe, as "disgraceful".

These false and dark views are held, largely because we all tacitly agree to draw a veil over one of the most important aspects of our emotional life, and yet try to cheat ourselves into the belief that we do not do so. But in the interest of whom or what is this veil drawn? Certainly not in the interest of science, for science tolerates no ignorance. Multitudes of men who have good claim to be designated as scientific in some sense would indeed say that Freud is wrong, or but half right; but only a small number of these men are scientific in the sense of having really studied deeply the problems of development, especially along the lines of sex.

The real agency that demands silence and secrecy for the psychology of the reproductive function is social prejudice; and society, in taking this attitude, is untrue

to the philosophic principles of our Western civilization, which favor the facing out of temptations and dangers and learning to utilize them, instead of closing the eyes to them, as the Oriental philosophy has long advised, in obedience to the mistaken theory that the war between the spiritual and the carnal is an essential, and not merely, as we think, an incidental war. This silence compelling attitude of social prejudice should not be tolerated, much less approved, by scientific men. It is not enough that society should base its laws on the *intention* to make men cultivate their higher traits, which on the whole tend toward inhibition and the restraint of passion and self indulgence; it must also help to enable them to do so by paying regard to all the needs of physiological and psychological development in the widest sense. The violent reactions of puritanism and quakerism have played, without question, a useful and necessary part, and our civilization should strive to keep all that was essential in their teaching; but the attempt permanently to banish music and painting from the church and from the home, was a blunder and an offence against the freedom of individual development, because it did injustice to deep demands of human nature, and confounded the needs of regulation with the needs of exclusion.

Allow not Nature more than Nature needs,
Man's life were cheap as beasts'.

And so, too, it is a blunder and an offence against the freedom of individual development, for society, still more for the medical profession, to draw the dense veil of silence and mystery over the history of the sexual life, as if there was something wrong, or essentially disgusting about the details of this great function on which so much depends. Self reproduction is the law of life, and biological self reproduction, whether of an individual or a cell, does

but mirror, or is but a reexpression of the attempt at the more primal form of self reproduction which is seen when through every mental act, conscious or unconscious, we strive to make the external world a copy of ourselves, by bending it to serve our personal or corporate needs.

It is another offense against freedom, and another well meant but injurious attempt to cast a slur of shame over what should be pure, for society to step into the home, and, in the name of continence, to attempt to impose the principle that sexual relations between man and wife are in themselves self indulgent and wrong, and something to be tolerated only in so far as they subserve the strict needs of race perpetuation. Here, again, is a case where we should learn to recognize that men may agree as to their ideals and yet differ widely in their judgments as to principles of conduct. The wealth of beauty with which Nature surrounds and graces the reproductive functions of plants of animals; the voluminousness of preparation for reproduction in man and the length of time used therefor, which begins even with birth; the fact that a large share of everything that we most prize in life is related to the sex instinct; the fact also that men's needs and temperaments differ so widely in detail; all these considerations should impel to caution and liberality in laying down rules of personal observance. Those physicians who have had occasion to study carefully the widespread "anxiety neuroses," and to witness the severe suffering of those who are afflicted with them, are in a good position to realize the magnitude and complexity of these questions, even as regards the so called normal person. One may sympathize warmly with anyone and everyone who voluntarily makes the renunciations and sacrifices, be they what they may, that special reasons call for, and one may believe heartily in the noble principles of moderation and self restraint; but one person should be slow to interpret

the needs of another, or to assert just what he should or should not do. The only universal needs are for more knowledge, more wisdom, better ideals, greater enthusiasm for progress, and also for broader sympathy with those who in detail are different from ourselves. Much is nowadays being said of the desirability of the sexual enlightenment of children, and it is indeed important that this difficult question should be approached. But it is more important still that physicians should understand the sexual history of infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adult life, not only in the narrower sense, but with reference to the great penumbra of tendencies by which at each stage they are surrounded.

The best proof that it is extremely difficult to drop one's prejudices with regard to sex questions is furnished by the fact that the majority of physicians have not yet succeeded in doing so, and that in spite of the importance of the subject, the extensive literature embodying the views and observations even of investigators who preceded Freud, or who are now working independently of his movement, is little read and instinctively shunned. I shall not dwell upon this point at length; still less do I intend to do so in any spirit of hostile criticism. I am well aware that it has taken, not simply one moment of resolution, but months and even years, for some of those who are now deeply identified with this movement, to gain a position of real scientific openness, to such a degree, for example, that they could read without disgust the details of that remarkable and fundamentally important history of the "little Hans," in the first volume of the *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse*. Indeed, one of the best and most experienced workers in this field¹ admits, in his thoroughly scientific article on obscene terms and their practical connotations, that even to-day he cannot without

¹ *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, etc.* i. Ferenczi.

an effort put himself into the attitude with regard to the subjects there at issue in which he knows that he himself was as a child, and that the patients with whom he is dealing were as children.

This being so, it is not remarkable that physicians at large should take a shy or distant stand. What I wish to bring out is, however, that they often fail to see the principle which is here at stake. Many of the most fair minded of them think that it is an extra amount of broad mindedness which leads them to say that "although there is a good deal of value in this movement, yet the importance of the sexual element is overrated, etc."; whereas, in my opinion, it is not broad mindedness, but a series of internal resistances that keep them, and all of us, from looking squarely at this particular class of facts, and that the force of these resistances is a measure of the importance of the subject, and of the insistence with which thoughts and emotions of which their holders are unconscious are lording it over those of which they are conscious. In other words, the internal resistances on the part of physicians [and I class here believers and nonbelievers in the same category] point to still greater resistances on the part of patients, and inasmuch as it is the conflicts which these resistances connote that keep up these neurotic illnesses, it is fair to say that the bitterness of the opposition to this movement confirms its importance, and constitutes a reason why those who believe in it should push forward with energy and courage.

The most important groups of facts to which Freud and his followers have called the attention of students of human development seem to me the following:

The first group relates to the psychology of infancy and early childhood. It is in this period that the traits are mainly laid down which are to prevail in adult life. Those who in their later years come out well, owe their

success in part not only to their outgrowing the customs of their babyhood but also to their reacting against them, as if with an instinctive reprobation, even when not consciously aware that they are doing so, and then guiding their streams of vital energy into new and more social channels; while those who come out less well, or badly, do so either because they react overmuch against their infantile habits and pleasures, or else because they react imperfectly, remaining, in one or another respect "fixed" at some special stage of childhood. But it is dangerous to be forced, by some inward compulsion, to go on playing a child's part with the weapons of a man, and the person of whom this is true is incapacitated from giving himself with whole heart to the interests of progress and of freedom.

Finally, it is noteworthy that when any man's system of progression on sound, social lines breaks down under some special stress, he tends to retrograde, and to show afresh but in abnormal forms, some tendency of infantile or childish type, as representing a path of less resistance which remains still open.

Every individual, each child, finds himself, in other words, confronted with two general alternatives of development, which, however, although mutually exclusive at certain points, are by no means mutually exclusive at every point, in the same case. These two alternatives, or the two lines of development to which they correspond, tend respectively in the direction of personal interests, on the one hand (the narrower or partial self expression of his personality), and, on the other hand, toward an increasing usefulness of the individual to the community (the more nearly complete self expression of his entire personality). The criminals, the perverts, the selfish, the introverted, the vain, the self indulgent, the too strongly homosexual persons, and those in whom the

hidden grasp of their parental influence is still too great, are individuals who, in obedience to blind cravings of one or another special sort, have remained relatively infantile or childlike, or have reverted in some measure toward one or another special phase of childhood; while an analogous statement could be made with regard to those who are in the grip of early and excessive reactions from childhood tendencies, such as the morbidly conscientious, the sentimentalists, the penurious, the overnice, the prejudiced, and narrow.

But even if this roughly outlined scheme is true, it might be asked, is anything gained for scientific medicine by classifying all these manifold traits under the heading of sex cravings?

The main reasons for this classification are the following: Inasmuch as the traits of the adult hark back in great measure to the period of childhood, and still present features which students of the subject can interpret as characteristic of their infantile or childish form, it is desirable to range these traits under headings which are chosen with the purpose of indicating this history and parentage, and other things being equal, the strongest, plainest, most distinctive designation is the best. For example, in the period of childhood a clear relationship is recognizable between the sex instincts and the craving to do violence or to cause pain, whether to others, or to one's self, as well as, also, between the former instincts and the craving to expose oneself to suffer pain, a relationship which stands out still more clearly in the case of certain perverts. Inasmuch as it often proves possible to trace back to this same origin the far milder forms of these pain giving or pain suffering cravings, which show themselves among many adult persons, and to demonstrate a like partial origin even for the oversensitiveness which may arise by a way of too strong reaction from these

infantile tendencies, it is important to have some term which shall cover the whole group, and shall indicate the nature of the transformations which have taken place.

The adults whose characters are defective in one of the foregoing respects, even if otherwise fine, must, if they would get well, learn to understand that their sadistic or masochistic tendencies, even though slight, are not to be taken at their face value, that is, are not to be taken as being so superficial as they seem, but that, on the contrary, they have a deep root which can be got rid of only through being followed to its ultimate radicles, which penetrate to infancy and childhood or beyond.

The benefit derivable from tracing out these tendencies is not confined to increasing the possibility of their elimination, but lies also in the fact that through discovering the origin of these traits one may be able to discover also the origin of one or another far more important set of symptoms—perhaps a manic depressive syndrome, or a compulsion psychosis, with which they are genetically related.

It is so necessary, for securing anything like an adequate comprehension of the psychoanalytic doctrines, to have a fairly clear picture of the conditions obtaining during infancy and early childhood, that even in this short sketch something further must be said upon these points, although I can do little more than to collate a few known facts.

In the period of life before clear thought begins, clear ideals are entertained and verbal language is habitually used, every child is necessarily occupied mainly with obtaining sense gratifications, either through concentrating his attention on the sensations which he can awaken by and through himself alone, or on those for which the aid of others, primarily his nurse or parents, is required as well. He makes, obviously, no adequate conscious classi-

fication of these sensations; but we, from watching him, know that they range themselves largely with reference to those among them which have the most insistent and the strongest vitality, and thus especially with reference to those which have to do directly with the function of reproduction and race perpetuation; for the duty of preparing to play a possible part in the perpetuation of the race is foreshadowed even in the instincts of the new born infant. The relative intensity and supremacy of the sensations related to this function of race perpetuation constitutes the reason for our classification of many apparently nonsexual traits as sexual, just as it constitutes also the reason why the various toilet operations, especially urination and defecation, as well as nursing and its substitute thumb sucking, all of which give rise to sensations analogous to those derived from genital excitations, have such an intense fascination for some children, while for others they come very soon to be the starting point of reactions classifiable as shame, modesty, and perhaps disgust or even horror. The infant takes his sensations, and every tangible object whatsoever which connects itself with them, even the sensations of pain and those related to the causing of pain in others, as so many blocks with which to build the universe which his intuitions are rapidly mapping out for him. Even very young children delight to supplement their experience and satisfy their cravings by living among the constructions of their vivid imaginations, and just as they can take rags, sticks, and stones, to represent gods, animals, and men, so they can and do use their excretions, and the feelings attending the excretory acts¹, their massive sensations of warmth

¹ It would be impossible to indicate here the evidence showing that these statements apply to normal as well as to abnormal children. Reference may be had to Freud's *Drei Abhandlungen* and to the *Jahrbücher für Psychoanalyse*.

and broad contacts, their sense of smell; all forms of sensation, in fact, which have not been drafted to the service of some other very obvious purpose, as the basis of an imagined world to which they feel themselves in many ways related. To the young child, at first, the sensations connected, let us say, with toilet operations, are not loathsome, but are full of magic interest, vague but strong, and even the first creeping in of the loathing attitude does but intensify a portion of their charm. If we think it is worth while to know human nature deeply, we must have the imagination, courage, and intelligence to put ourselves honestly and fully into the spirit of this child world¹, and must learn to interpret in its terms the dreams and uncensored acts and expressions through which the adult testifies that he is still a child.

Just as the child takes the mysterious operations of his nursery life, from which he derives a certain vague but powerful series of sense pleasures that lend themselves to a classification based on their relation to the most intense among them, and use these gratifications as materials for building a world of fancy, so, also, there is good reason to believe, does sense gratification enter largely into the infant's relations to his parents and the other members of his family. We are prone to think, but truly without reason and from an ignorance of his point of view, that the social world in which the infant likes to revel in imagination is essentially similar to our own. We should like to assume that the child feels toward his parents just as they feel toward him. We should like to believe that the pleasant drawing room into which he is carried, the open fire, the companionship which is offered

¹ Most children, like most adults, reveal but little of their subconscious life, but use means of communication that they have in common with adults. The knowledge of the rest has been arrived at bit by bit.

him, is not only made up of the same elements with the mental states of the adult, but that these elements are mixed in similar proportions; that the connotations are of the same sort. But this does not represent the facts. Even the parents' feelings toward their children are far more complex¹ than most of them can realize, and while the feelings of infants and young children toward their parents may contain many of the same elements that characterize the sentiments of the latter, these elements are very differently organized and emphasized. As every child must creep before he walks, and as creeping is a mode of locomotion not to be defined as an immature sort of walking but as something *sui generis*, so every infant must construct his conceived universe out of such materials as he has at hand. Even though he may be intuitively working toward ideals of a high sort, it is still his own sensations, and perhaps his vague sense of an ability to draw forever on resources of power that he does not exhaust, from which at each moment he must take his start. Every child surely begins his studies into human nature with himself, and the fact that he contains within himself tendencies which are to work out, not only into specialized sense cravings, but also into bisexual or ambisexual leanings, brings it to pass that his father and his mother must appeal to him at first (although later he will usually have forgotten the fact), not only as persons occupying a position of special privilege and power but also as offering special means of extending and gratifying these various and complex tendencies, which in the beginning he satisfies without feelings of reluctance or of self reproach. If then it is true that the traits of the adult are, in large measure, outgrowths or modifications of the traits of childhood, and if we classify them, as we should, partly with reference to their infantile origin, we must

¹ *I. e.*, more strongly "sexualized."

classify them as related to the infant's sense cravings; for his life of sensation is the main body of his life. And if it is on the basis of the infant's sense cravings that we are to make our classification, then it is only just to do so preeminently with reference to his sex cravings, and to recognize, in doing this, that these sex cravings are, primarily, of double nature¹. For these sex cravings, as has been said, share with the feelings of food hunger the position of preeminence in the child's vaguely defined, but intensely absorbing, perpetual and conceptual world.

These sensations, and the emotions and mysterious concepts which connect themselves therewith, constitute, as no others do in like measure, the Rome toward which the many roads of sense craving tend to run; they form, of necessity, the principal "sacred flame" which all infantile pleasures unite in feeding, whatever other flame they may individually feed. But this classification is not the child's own. Neither does the pleasure and pain classification of the child coincide with that of the man; nor the fantasy world of the child with the fantasy world of the adult. Much more nearly does the fantasy world of the child correspond to the dream world of the adult. For in our dreams we are still children, and still ever occupied with fairly gross sense interests, in a large sense. If we were to classify these interests of the child from our standpoint, that is, as if in accordance with the assumption that his acts had for him the same meaning that similar acts would have for us, we might justly call him (besides other more attractive names) an egotist, a sensualist, even a criminal, or a pervert. But it is preferable to reverse this plan, and to classify, for scientific purposes at least, the tendencies

¹ I have in mind here the increasing and already extensive literature, due especially to the labors of Freud, Stekel, and Ferenczi, on the significance of *homosexuality*, in paranoia, compulsion psychoneuroses, etc.

which lead adults to become criminals and egotists, by designations which shall indicate their infantile origin and help to explain their biological and psychological tenacity, as well as their social significance. Such a classification makes it clearer how and why it is that the sense gratification tendencies of childhood, after undergoing an incomplete repression, which is again partly neutralized by their strength of imperative insistence, become the basis of the conflicts which emerge at last as psychoneurotic symptoms. One is shocked, when a refined woman on becoming mentally unbalanced, shows a remarkable acquaintance with the facts and language commonly called obscene; but the full significance of the symptom is overlooked. The friends of such a patient would usually reject the suggestion that thoughts corresponding to this delirious language¹ had played a part all through the patient's life from early childhood, never, perhaps, rising to full consciousness, but exerting their main influence through causing utterly misinterpreted symptoms of illness and vague feelings of excitement or depression, dimly reechoing experiences of infancy.

Another point of practical importance with reference to this matter of classification is that we should make a clear distinction between "acts" and "tendencies"². Even so slight an event as a handshake may be suitable or neutral as an act, but of considerable psychological significance as marking a tendency—progressive, or regressive, as the case might be. In other words, there are handshakes and handshakes, of very varying connotations. Again, it seems, and is, a small matter to walk in the country with one's hat off, or without one's coat or col-

¹ Confer Ferenczi: Über obscene Worte. *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, i, Heft 9, 1911.

² " 'Judge the people by their actions,' is a rule we often get; 'Judge the actions by the people' is a better maxim yet."

lar, but a similar, or even more trifling insufficiency of costume, if occurring in a dream, may be a circumstance of far wider meaning, and well worthy of one's attention.

Suppose it were possible to take a photograph of a cannon ball in mid air. The plate would show us a round object harmless in itself, and nothing more. But how differently would this sight appeal to our imagination according to whether we believed that the photographed ball was a shell fired with hostile intent from the camp of an attacking enemy and that it presently would explode in the midst of a populous city; or knew, on the other hand, that it indicated that a piece of harmless target practice was going on, and that a sand bank was the ultimate destination of the missile. So it is with many psychological events and acts. In the case of one man a given act might indicate the existence of passions which he gladly would conceal from himself, but ought to force himself to recognize; while in the case of another the same act might mean that the person who performed it was on the march of progress toward civilization of a higher sort. The context alone—and in our case that means the detailed history of a man's life, picked out, perhaps, bit by bit—can decide as to the justice of a given classification of an act, in itself indifferent.

The real danger, in the presence of which every psychoneurotic patient constantly lives, is that he may be drawn back, in the selection of his ruling motives, to the immature and sensual days—*sit venia verbo*—of his infancy and childhood¹, and to avoid this he must learn to see the danger clearly and in detail. If he does not get this clear vision, he must win his good qualities through

¹ This sort of reversion is sometimes technically called "sexualization." It implies the slipping back of a man's waking life toward the life hinted at in his dreams—*i. e.* his interpreted dreams—and actual in his childhood.

repression and reaction; and the outcome is more than likely to exhibit the signs of self deception and imperfection on the one hand, and of excess and narrowness upon the other.

The gaining of a clear vision of his underlying tendencies brings a man a better chance of real freedom through a real assimilation of these tendencies. The infant, strictly speaking, may be on the road to sublimation as truly as the adult. His acts, also, could be classified either as indicating progress toward a high and distant goal, or as indicating that he is concerned too much with the gratification of his own senses. One should not classify his acts, any more than those of the adult, by taking them at their face value; the question is not one of acts, but of *tendencies*. It is, therefore, unjust to speak of him as a sensualist, an egotist, a criminal, unless one uses these terms with a clear recognition of what one means by them, in general and in particular, just as it was unjust for our theological forefathers to use, indiscriminately, the term "original sin" as characteristic of infancy.

On the other hand, it is foolish to quibble about names, if by so doing we blind our eyes to the recognition of important facts. We must learn that the best virtue does not come by inheritance, but is won by struggle. *Die Tugend ist der vollendete Kampf*¹, and although a favorable inheritance tends enormously to smooth the path, and may seem, when found in company with favorable environment, to render any struggle almost needless, yet the virtue which is born of this struggleless existence may be of but little worth as a sign of real power of resistance.

Suppose, now,—to speak again of the conditions which obtain during the life of later childhood, of adolescence, and of adult years,—that the difficult, steep, and stony path of progress toward the higher forms of civilization

¹ Hegel.

becomes so arduous that progress gives place for a time to retrogression; or, what is more common, suppose a continual tendency to retrogression shows itself, so that each effort of the supposed wayfarer is docked of a certain percentage, which must become a gradually increasing percentage, of its value; and that he becomes more and more strongly tempted to seek the refreshment of paths of less resistance, tending toward one or another form of personal gratification. Is it not plain that under these circumstances—that is, during this slowly retrogressive process—acts and thoughts and emotions which might, if regarded in and for themselves, be unexceptionable and even desirable, may become of considerable importance provided that they can be read as meaning that the apparently long past sensuous period of infancy is really close at hand? I use the expression "close at hand" not without reason; for from the psychological standpoint the interval which separates a man from his childhood is not to be measured in terms of years, but of functional significance. No atom of our past is ever really lost, and the only question is how vitally it is still active. It is, therefore, in my opinion, entirely justifiable and even necessary, that the retrograding individual should learn to hold up before himself, every now and then, a stern *memento mori*, to show him the real nature of the influences to which he tends to yield. No fact in a person's history can be considered as standing by itself, alone; each one should be interpreted, if carefully studied, as if it was a finger post, pointing upward or downward, forward or backward, to the right or to the left. A fact in a given person's history is an imaginary point on the curve of motion of an idea, and may be the centre of intersection of many diverse and even contrary ideas.

It is one of the great merits of Freud and his followers that they have discovered means of interpreting a large

number of facts in the terms of the whole history of these various curves. We all object to having it shown that some of these curves indicate, in our own case, the continued presence of some trait that was derived from our self indulgent childhood. But we ought not to be thus sensitive, and we should not be so were it not that we either were not trained, or are unwilling to be trained, to pursue to a logical end the study and the meaning of our own lives and the lives of our fellow men. It is in the overcoming of the "resistances" to these revelations of ourselves to ourselves that the benefit of the psychoanalytic treatment largely lies. We all naturally wish to be left comfortably in a condition of blissful ignorance, even at the cost of being in an unstable equilibrium or assume that it is inevitable that we should so remain. Every one likes to feel himself as if on a safe plateau, even if he must dimly suspect that it is surrounded by high precipices, some rising upward, some falling downward. We all have climbed up to this plateau, and should go higher; but most of us were conducted over the dangerous passage so early that we preserve but dim memories of its dangers (as dim as Mignon's memories of the marble halls of her infancy and only know that we shrink from having these memories revived. We prefer to close our eyes to them, and do not realize that it is sometimes impossible to do this and at the same time to open them with unprejudiced gaze on other topics¹. Neither can we do so and yet keep alive our sympathy with other sufferers who are painfully toiling way up the precipices which we have passed, or with those who have gone wholly astray on this journey; nor can we go on ourselves to climb with satisfaction to the plateaux which lie higher and higher above us, guarded by new dangers in their turn.

It is a mistake to assume that Freud believes abnor-

¹ "Where one man is a slave, no man can be free."

mities of sex to be the sole basis, the final, underlying cause, of the psychoneuroses. In the first place to find this really final cause, one would have to investigate the very beginnings and meaning of life itself. And this task, interesting though it is, is one rather for philosophy than for medicine. Freud's chosen problem was solely to consider in what aspect or department of the *life of experience*, beginning with birth the action of the real underlying causes, whatever these may be, find themselves most strongly expressed, most strongly accentuated, best illustrated, and brought most definitely into coordination with the rest of the drama of experiential life. He has always admitted and asserted that each child brings other sources of weakness and danger into the world beside those which attend the necessity of grappling with the terrible but weighty problem of his sex instincts. There are other instincts also, such as the food getting instinct, the play instinct, the fighting instinct, and many more, which must have more or less to say in the final account of a man's life; and if the influence of these factors has not been much discussed, it is simply because, from the point of view of neurotic symptomatology, it seems to be, not absolutely, but relatively, of slight importance.

The task with which Freud and his immediate followers found themselves confronted, however, was a clearly defined and very practical task. They saw men struggling, as all men must, along the steep paths of the Hill of Difficulty. They observed that these men were held back by certain handicaps, as if obliged to drag a ball and chain; and they were able, with the insight of genius and by the aid of scientific methods, to make these handicaps visible, first to themselves, then to the victims of them, and to suggest methods of relief.

It appeared that the strength and essence of these handicaps, not merely as abstractions, but in due relation

to other elements of the personality, was their very invisibility, and that to make them clearly seen (no easy matter), was what was mainly needed. It was found that these handicaps, these balls and chains, were more or less fictitious; that the patients—for such we may now call them—were not so much essentially sick or degenerate, as they were self deluded, or as if under an evil spell; or, at least, that self delusion had played a large part in placing them where they were, and that, in every case, the essence of the delusion was the attitude of the victim toward the subtle conflicts centering on the sexual life and expressing the disharmony between social ideals and imperative, misunderstood desires, based on the instinct of race perpetuation.

It will be obvious from the foregoing that the term *sexual*, as defined in the psychoanalytic vocabulary, is of far wider meaning than is ordinarily conceived. It is by no means to be taken as equivalent to *sensual*, and is to be considered as carrying connotations which bring out its relationship to almost every aspect of the emotional life. The history of evolution is the history of a series of movements and reactions due to the expansive energy of a vital principle of energy. This principle of energy is always of one sort, but seems to vary according as the modes through which it is able and is compelled to express itself vary, in complexity and in excellence.

This ostensible variation is, however, so great that it is convenient to study the apparently different streams of energy that go to create the phenomena of life as if they were really different, and to speak thus of the conflicts between the consciousness and will on the one side, the instincts on the other, as if the energies underlying them were in fact dissimilar.

Thus reasoning, we may use the term tropisms for the simplest vital reactions, instincts for a higher, and

consciousness, will, intellect, feeling, and intuition for those of the highest sort. We like to think of an adult man as regulating his life by his consciousness and will, practically alone, although obviously every one knows that this is not the case. In reality each person strives to weave his life elements into a unity, but does not realize against what active obstacles he is working, obstacles which depend upon attempts analogous to his own, to create unities, but of inferior sorts. For picturesqueness, one might say that the organized complexes of the various animals from which we inherit represent special unities of these sorts which tend, in a certain sense, to perpetuate themselves. It is, however, better and more scientific to take functional tendencies, as represented by the different organized instincts, as standing for the somewhat antagonistic unities of which I speak.

We do not step, as if across a definite barrier, from the state of the animal to that of man, or from infancy to childhood; but we make the passage through learning to deal with various organized unities, each complex within itself, and each struggling to maintain its own supremacy.

To that portion of the vital energy on which the reproductive function rests, the name of *libido*¹ has been given. As the cell (or the primary cells) must reproduce itself, so the child must love, or yearn for, somebody or something—himself, his parents, or whatever object seems appropriate. This craving dates from far back, and is, therefore, as difficult to deal with as was the ocean which was magically connected with the horn of wine that Odin tried to drain, and its influence is antagonistic in some measure to the newly forming ideal unity, dependent on the consciousness and will.

¹ *Confer inter alia, Jung's Wandlungen der Libido, in the Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse, etc., iii.*

This antagonism is, moreover, accentuated by the fact that the sex cravings of man, even in infancy, are deprived, to some extent, of the automatic control which keeps the corresponding instincts of the animal within bounds. It is a case of Phaeton assuming to drive the chariot of an organism which, from the standpoint of excellence of mechanism, is more powerful than he.

I have said that the sex instinct, even of the young child, is complex. This complexity is indeed greater than could be here stated, but the point on which I would here insist is that each infant contains within himself, naturally in crude and immature form, the qualities of the different members of a whole community. He is, as it were, not only male and female, but father, mother, and child; and the tendencies corresponding to these different personalities are by no means entirely harmonious. In the interests of the new unity which his consciousness and will endeavor to sketch out, these different qualities must be harmonized by assimilation, or else one or another must be suppressed. But in the latter case not health and efficiency, but compromises and nervous symptoms—which are a form of compromise—will result, taking the shape of fear (primarily self distrust), compulsions (expiation or propitiation), suspicion, introversion, delusions of reference, and many more.

Truly, the army which the consciousness and will aspire to rule is, indeed, an army of Highland clans, and if such an army is strong when well organized, its tendency to fall apart when badly organized is measured by the same strength. It is clearly the sex instincts intensified into human sex cravings, to which are traceable many of the elements of force, mutiny, and discord.

Since writing the foregoing I have read an interesting paper by Dr. Boris Sidis¹ (one of a series of which I

¹ *Monthly Cyclopedia and Medical Bulletin*, March and April 1912.

believe I have read the whole), in which the writer gives it as his view that "fear", regarded as "apprehension", without relation to any particular object, lies at the basis of all psychoneurotic illnesses; and this view he seems to oppose, as he has done also in other places, to the views of Freud, such as are defended in my address.

I wish to refer to this argument with some care, for the reason that Doctor Sidis, if one may judge by the whole series of his writings, appears to feel that if it were possible to establish the fact that "fear" is a primal and hereditary mental attribute, having its root perhaps far back in our animal ancestry, the views concerning the cause of the phobias and the psychoneuroses asserted by the majority of the psychoanalytic writers, would be thereby contravened. I beg leave to call attention to the fact, however, that it would not be just to draw a conclusion of this sort. Neither Freud, nor any of his followers, has denied that the psychoses are partly due to hereditary tendencies; nor have they denied that one root of "fear" strikes back into prehuman days. On the contrary, Freud and others have repeatedly asserted the possibility that the fear of snakes, for example, may have such an origin as this. For my own part, I think there is a good deal to be said from the philosophical standpoint about "fear", which could not be gone into in this place.

The main point is that the psychoanalytical movement is essentially a practical movement, and that all those who support it recognize the fact that it is, to say the least, convenient, and perhaps scientifically admissible, to speak of "*frei flottierende Angst*" as a factor to be treated as a quantity, and to be regarded in and for itself.

These writers have, nevertheless, been rendering a great service to medicine in pointing out that this tendency to "apprehension", even if the germ of it, or, so to speak, the predisposition to it, is already in the mind, becomes

intensified, and more capable of acting specifically as a partial cause of special symptoms, when it attaches itself, as it always tends to do, to some particular object, that is, mental state. To attempt to explain over again just why this sense of apprehension becomes particularly effective as a partial cause for emotional distress, and why it is that the patient, under the pressure of this distress, seeks to substitute some other object of fear for that which has become so intolerable to him, would be to review the whole Freudian movement. I repeat that the question is not an academic one as to the cause of fear, but a practical one as to the conditions under which "fear" becomes converted into harmful "fears".

Chapter IX.

A CLINICAL STUDY OF A CASE OF PHOBIA*.

This paper attempts a brief study of the case of a lady, now about forty years of age, mainly characterized by phobias and compulsions, differing from one another, I believe, less in principle than in detail, and, at any rate, closely interwoven with one another.

The main object of the discussion is to bring into relief the difference between Dr. Prince's views and mine, with regard to the general principles here at stake, and for that purpose this history, used as a text and illustration, will serve sufficiently well. I wish it to be understood, however, that the doctrines here advanced rest on evidence furnished bit by bit through the prolonged studies of many different observers, and depend but little on the necessarily meager array of facts furnished by this difficult and imperfectly worked out case. The interpretation which I offer is substantially that of Freud and his eminent followers, with one important difference, namely, that in estimating internal mental conflicts I attach great importance to an intuitive recognition, which I believe to be bound up with the very nature of every mental act, of the contrast between the capacity of the mind for infinitely varied self-expression and the somewhat painfully felt inadequacy of each partial attempt at self-expression.

The main symptoms from which this patient suffers may be briefly characterized as follows:

* Report at a Symposium held by the American Psychopathological Association, May 29, 1912. Published, into the Discussion, in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Oct. 1912, Vol. VII.

1. An intense sense of unreality, which she refers to the universe, which she declares herself unable to make seem right.

2. A horrible feeling of the "stoppage of air" coming on in attacks, not attended by real difficulty in getting breath, but giving rise to a sense of living death, or isolation from everything existent. If such an attack occurs when she is on the street she can hardly induce herself to take a farther step, and is impelled to seek the nearest cover for protection. When asked what she fears under these circumstances she usually says, "convulsions," though her great underlying fear is of insanity.

3. This desire for protection, which amounts to a craving, is very characteristic of her case, and dates back to early childhood. In her search for it she will frequently ring the bell of a friend's house, making some pretense of an errand that calls her there, and wait until she gathers courage to pursue her way¹.

4. It seems to me doubtful whether one should attempt to draw a sharp line between this particular form of distress, or "Angst," that she describes as the "stoppage of air," and that may come over her at any time, day or night, and a kind of nightmare-like horror with which she sometimes awakes suddenly from sleep, and which is characterized by the necessity of struggling, as if for life, against some nameless and vague, but terrible and

¹ This strong desire for protection and sympathy showed itself in many ways, though it was often masked by her conspicuously frank and independent manner and speech. Thus, in the course of the discussion of Dr. Prince's and my papers, it came out that (in my opinion) as a part of her desire to feel herself in complete touch with the physician who was temporarily caring for her, she had said to each in turn, with unquestionable sincerity, that "now for the first time she began to understand her case," that "this treatment she believed in, while the others had been inadequate," etc., etc. In fact it is evident to me that it was the personality of the physician, not his wisdom, that made the deepest imprint upon her.

portentous influence that she refers mainly to her left side, sometimes dwelling especially on the left side of the head, sometimes on the left side of the body. Let me here say that her father first, later her mother¹, became hemiplegic on the left side a number of years before their death, and that the father suffered from left-sided convulsions. These parental illnesses, as I shall point out later, played an important part in the accentuation and modeling of her own.

5. An overpowering dread of traveling alone and crossing streets alone (especially certain streets) and, indeed, an almost unconquerable dread of crossing any Rubicon, of making any decision.

6. A fear of "parting," even from things of little worth, which is symbolized by her unwillingness to part with a letter by dropping it into the letter box, to part with a nickel by paying her fare to the car conductor. The analysis showed that at one period it was exceedingly distressing for her to part with her feces, at the toilet, and this may have a special significance, to which I shall call attention.

7. These phobias are associated with compulsions and impulsions that oblige her, for example, to wear certain clothes, clothes that she had previously been wearing; to return once more to a house that she has just left, so that she sometimes occupies two hours in getting finally away; to pick up pins and papers; to carry amulets in her bag, against possible mischances.

It is easy to see that in these compulsive tendencies the idea of taking precautions against possible harm to come², and of unwillingness to meet the possible dangers

¹ She is uncertain about the side of the mother's hemiplegia, but thinks it was the left.

² In part, these compulsions, like all others of their kind, may be classified as "ceremonials of propitiation and expiation."

of change, are the prevailing motives, and that these characteristics connect symptoms here in question with the craving for protection and the fear of change. It will appear later that these same motives have shown themselves at various critical periods throughout her life.

The fact that this patient still remains uncured, or imperfectly cured, makes the causes of her illness a fit subject for speculation; and since our present purpose is to compare and contrast explanations founded on far wider studies than the case itself would furnish the materials for making, a brief discussion of the reasons for the failure of all the many treatments that have been employed may serve a useful purpose. Whatever other causes may be assigned for this failure, it must be remembered that the patient herself is no longer young, and that no treatment is able to give her the outlet for her emotions which both her conscious and, still more, her unconscious nature have been craving. Sick she is protected, and leads an endurable, even though an unsatisfactory existence, made more tolerable by subconscious visions of greater happiness; well (that is, relieved of her worst symptoms), she would have to face a sort of struggle for which her temperament has unfitted her. She longs for some one to lean upon, for an assured income, for marriage, for congenial society and occupation, and for a home. Her symptoms illustrate these longings, while cold facts prevent their consummation.

It is noteworthy that, a year ago, while I was studying her with some thoroughness, and while she herself was pleasantly occupied, she improved greatly, lost a large share of her symptoms, expressed great confidence in the psychoanalytic method¹, and up to a certain point seemed to comprehend her situation from the psychoanalytic standpoint. Then came the necessity for actual tests of her power of standing alone, made necessary by the

¹ Cf. footnote 2, p. 158.

approach of summer, with its absences from home, and its separations from protecting persons, and she rapidly backslid. An interesting dream of this period, which, with others, I obtained an opinion on from Dr. Freud and Dr. Jung, seemed to show a strong sense of leaning upon me for protection and affection, as earlier dreams had shown still greater leanings towards others in a like relationship.

The patient's personal and family history is, in general terms, as follows:

She was born in a large city, where her grandfather and father were for many years successful and eventually wealthy merchants. This fact is of importance, because just about the time of the patient's birth the father lost his money, in consequence of an indiscreet investment which must be regarded as partly of neurotic origin, and the family life became one of struggle and sacrifice, diversified by recurrent hopes of better things, which arose only to end in disappointment.

Several other members of the father's family had presented neurotic traits to a marked degree, and had exhibited also—what is more important—special phobias which were apparently analogous to those from which our patient suffered.

When the patient was a small child the father became involved in a public transaction which, although in no way dishonorable, brought him and his family into a notoriety which was at once unpleasant and exciting.

In view of the facts accumulated through great numbers of psychoanalytic studies, it is fair to suspect, even though it cannot be entirely proved, that these various misfortunes to the father of our patient, and the fact that he did not react to them in an adequate manner, but became, as it were, benumbed, paralyzed, helpless, and apathetic, even before the onset of the actual hemiplegia (which occurred

when the patient was two years old), had a serious effect on the mind of this sensitive child. She must, with her affectionate and dependent nature, have begun by adoring and leaning on him, at a time when he was substantially her only heterosexual companion; but she learned, through a long series of influences of which a few have been just hinted at, to have a certain horror of him, and to look upon him as her evil genius, and yet as a personality with which her own had become strongly identified, as shown by her almost everpresent dread of his left-sided paralysis and convulsions, sinister in both senses.

The other members of the patient's family consisted of the mother, who seems to have been in many ways a fine, though unpractical woman, and three sisters, one of whom was a half-sister, through a former marriage of the father. All of these sisters were in various ways neurotic. The oldest — the paternal half-sister — had and has marked phobias, and almost delusions of suspicion. The second sister, somewhat older than the patient, in several respects peculiar and dependent, used to sit alone, as a child, for hours, cross-legged on the floor of her room, with the door closed, crooning stories to herself, while she waved her handkerchief to and fro with a mysterious and stereotyped motion. If interrupted at this pastime she would get very angry.

Finally, another person should be mentioned, who was virtually, though not technically, a member of the family, and an important one, namely, the nurse, to whose care the children were almost wholly delegated by the mother, whom a lack of practical instinct and preoccupation with the duties entailed by the stringent limitation of the family income rendered incapable of filling properly the mother's place. This nurse, although devoted, and a woman of strong character and fixed purpose, was ignorant and superstitious, incapable of really understanding her charges,

and sometimes unwise in her punishments and precautions, yet able to dominate the children by her strong will, and inclined to teach them stern lessons of repression, some of which were very unfortunate in their results. This nurse had the current fears about starting enterprises on Friday, passing under ladders, etc., etc., and kept alive as a rod of fear the belief that goblins lurked behind a certain door, who stood ready to spring out and capture the misbehaving and the disobedient. The superstitions and fears thus inculcated easily took firm hold, though in a vague form, on the mind of the naturally gay, mischievous, and gentle but highly impressionable child, endowed with a fancy for and love of the mysterious, but not with a strength of intelligence and will capable of counteracting these emotions.

In spite, then, of the fact that our patient's life was surrounded by many happy influences, it is certain that she grew up in an atmosphere charged with restriction, mystery, and fear, and with increasing feelings of criticism and suspicion towards her father, with reference to whom, like every other child, she must have felt originally sentiments of affectionateness as object of her first heterosexual desires.

I think it also of great importance that two distinct trends were present in her disposition as a child, and have been present ever since, which were antagonistic to each other and formed a part of the basis of her illness. On the one hand she was exceedingly gay, light-hearted, affectionate, trustful, inclined to assume the world simple and her conditions desirable, and inclined, also, within narrow limits, to be enterprising and a leader among her companions. On the other hand she was timid, superstitious, eminently dependent, and often unhappy; but these latter qualities were repressed in the interests of care-freeness and pleasure-seeking, and hence, in part, arose the conflict, which she would give voice to by saying at one time

that her childhood was happy, at another that it was unhappy.

Her principal phobia as a child was with reference to death, and this became, even at a very early period, exceedingly strong. She connected this fear with the death of this or that person among her relatives; but I believe, on evidence furnished by many other cases, its main root was a very deep one (having to do with vague ideas of the origin of life), and that so far as superficial roots were concerned, the principal one was a fear of the death of her mother, who, in consequence of the father's apathy and subsequent paralysis, became very early the mainstay of the family. Whatever other connotations it may have had — and I believe there were several of importance — the death of her mother meant separation, parting, coming to an end, like that symbolized by the posting of her letters and the paying of her fares. This phobia of parting had two other roots, one symbolic, the other real. The former or symbolic parting was that involved in the movements of the bowels — the parting with the feces, *i. e.*, with the most useless thing — and its meaning is perhaps made clearest if one draws a ratio, imagining her to say, "If parting even from this utterly worthless thing seems serious, then how much more other sorts of parting the possibility of which I dimly feel" ¹.

The second fear of parting which seemed to me (and to her) significant was the parting from her own childhood. This was a prolonged and constant dread; and if her childhood itself, as now remembered, was partly happy, it was partly also very unhappy, and this very unhappiness became an element of intensification of the distress of the idea of parting — important because illogical. The old dictum of Thomas Aquino, "*Credo quia impossibile*", which has

¹ I say nothing of the possibility of an infantile rectal birth-fantasy.

so often been derided by persons who did not grasp its psychological significance, is applicable here. That which we cannot justify ourselves for feeling strongly about, but which nevertheless we do feel strongly about, has a peculiar influence on us which only a deep-going analysis can explain.

This fear of parting from her childhood was further strengthened, some years later, by an influence drawn from her strong maternal complex. It is, namely, highly probable that just as her fear of parting with the feces doubtless connected itself with other elements of an anal complex, so the additional fear of what would happen to them when her mother should die must have woven itself into her death-fear-complex, and into her superstitious dread and love of mystery in every form, as indicated by her love of fairy stories and her dread of the malicious goblin behind the entry door.

But, I repeat, these dreads, and many more, were largely repressed in the interest of her love of gayety and of light-heartedness.

When the patient was about ten years old these fears became complicated with another which is of peculiar significance, and which, although it passed away after a year or so, formed one element in an unbroken chain or network of phobias that stretches from her infancy to the present day. This was a fear that she should get up in the night and, without realizing it, should swallow pins. The interpretation of this fear as a coitus-fear, at least in part, which is of so well recognized a sort that it has received the name of "Spitzenfurcht", becomes clearer through a consideration of other facts.

In the first place, she had already been in the stage of sexual curiosity, and had asked her mother with reference to certain statements which another girl had made to her. Her mother did not treat her curiosity with contempt, but

gave her very little information. She thinks that this little satisfied her, just as she thinks that the whole subject of the sexual life had very little interest for her, — a belief with regard to herself in which it became clear later that she was wrong, as she was with regard to the belief which she at first entertained that her childhood was uninterrupted happy.

The significance of the "Spitzenfurcht" as a sexual symbol is further brought out by the fact that she well remembers herself and her sister being chased, on more than one occasion, by a dirty-minded boy of their acquaintance, who ran after them, with his genitals exposed, partly trying, partly threatening to try to pass water over them, an experience which must, in my judgment, have been strongly intensified, a number of years later, by a sudden apparition of an exhibitionist, who exposed himself before her on a lonely hillside. This latter experience had, of course, no relation to the "Spitzenfurcht" of her early youth, but both sets of events worked together, as I believe, toward the formation of her later fears. Certain pranks that she played with her sisters, in which the passing of urine figured as a sport, should also be mentioned in this connection.

It is of further interest to note that at this same period of childhood the patient suffered greatly through several successive years, especially in the springtime, from pinworms, a form of irritation which she learned greatly to dread, the more so that the stern disciplinary methods of her nurse kept her, to some extent, from getting the relief which might have been afforded her, though in the end she usually had rectal injections, which did much good.

The fear of the pin-swallowing followed immediately on the pinworm period; but whether it was due to it, or whether the rectal irritation was communicated to the vagina, and then, by links of association such as have

been clearly made out for other cases, a mysterious and vague, but strong emotional grouping of the two sets of experiences occurred, I cannot positively say. My surmises are affirmatory, and those who have become familiar with the educational effectiveness of the child's fancy, those who have learned to know to what an extent a child builds his unseen world of materials which are absolutely discarded at a later period, will admit the value of the inference.

I would say also that I have rarely, if ever, seen a patient who was so successful as this one in cloaking from herself the rich and abundant subconscious fancies of her now repressed life, under the peculiarly effective disguise of an apparently complete frankness. The comprehension of this fact, which, of course, accounts largely for her continued illness, is so important to the theory of her symptoms that I will anticipate the later portion of the story to the extent of referring to two dreams of many years afterwards.

This was one of the so-called "insufficiently dressed" dreams which in one or another form are so extremely common. It may be that the lapse from propriety consists only in the absence of a collar or a tie; or it may be that the dreamer finds himself in a ball-room attired in a nightdress. The meaning is, up to a certain point, the same; that is, the dream represents a reversion to the pleasures of one's nursery days, when running about with insufficient clothing was in order, and at the same time a hint that those pleasures, innocent as they were, depended partly for their charm on exhibiting one's self and gazing curiously at others. In other words, such dreams show, what we ought in the interests of human sympathy to recognize, that between ourselves and those whom we stigmatize as "exhibitionists," and, therefore, criminals, the difference, important as it is, is one of degree alone.

Sometimes these "insufficiently dressed" dreams go much beyond a simple hinting at the nursery period of childhood, and give evidence of the existence of emotions and feelings on the dreamer's part, which, although still unconscious, demonstrate the presence of real exhibitional instincts of a well-marked type.

Such was the case with this patient, in spite of the fact that in her self-deceiving frankness she denied, at first, all interest in such matters. She dreamed, in brief, that she, then a woman grown, was taking a bath in a public street, in a tub which was placed not only in the view of all beholders, but, suggestively enough, in the gutter of the street. I talked this dream over with Professor Freud, and he asserted confidently that it could have but one meaning, namely, that the patient's unconscious, repressed sexual cravings were so strong that she was, as it were, whispering to herself that she would go any length to gratify them. In other words, this dream was a so-called prostitute-dream. I could mention several of her dreams, of like character, but this example may suffice to indicate how widely the unconscious portion of her life differed from the conscious portion, and to justify us in inferring the same origin for her symptoms with that which the accumulation of evidence has made probable for all such symptoms as she presents.

It will have become obvious that the thesis which I am defending is that the fears from which this patient suffered in her childhood (of which the fear of death, the fear of pin-swallowing, the fear represented by her superstitious dread of the goblins, and the fear of parting with her youth were samples), and also the many distresses with reference to her father, who was bound to her by the ties of a first love, were essentially fears of herself, fears of her own emotions—felt, but misunderstood and repressed—which already made it vaguely evident to her

that she was in the grip of a set of strong tendencies of thought and action, the origin of which was beyond her ken.

I have intended, furthermore, to make it clear that, in my opinion, these tendencies were really based on the stirring within her of her sexual nature, which I believe to be and to have been, not slightly developed, as she at first thought, but strongly developed, as indicated by the dream alluded to. I believe also that all her fears have, in general terms, a common partial basis, and are interwoven with one another. It is now well known to those who have studied into such symptoms from this standpoint, that one of the causes of the fear of going about alone, from which this patient suffers, is typified by the conscious fear of a person exposing himself to a temptation—say a drunkard—namely, a fear of yielding. This is closely related to a morbid tendency to cling for protection to one's nest, one's home, to familiar surroundings,—in a last analysis, to one's mother. "How shall I reach my decisions alone? How shall I arrive alone at the hardest of decisions, that, namely, which implies the resisting of strong temptations, temptations not manifest and acknowledged, but felt only as emotional distress?" But temptations are imposed really by ourselves, and the dream referred to hints at the general character of some of these.

I have no desire to deny any well-grounded evidence that there may be other causes of morbid fear than those which I have mentioned. Fear may be primitive and natural; it may point back even to ante-human ancestral experiences. I would only emphasize the necessity of great caution in asserting the "primitive" nature, even of instincts, and would call attention to the fact that just as a chicken has, after all, to learn to peck for food¹, so each

¹ I refer to certain experiments indicating that chickens, if carefully fed from the very outset, do not necessarily peck; in other words, that even instincts are in a sense acquired.

child, in one sense, may have to learn through experience to fear, and learns this largely through grappling with repressed emotions of desire, which is, I believe, to be understood as corresponding to a vital impulse of expansion, more fundamental than fear, though ready to express itself as fear.

One other, seemingly trivial, experience of her early childhood may also be referred to, because it bears out this view and helps to illustrate the important contrast between this patient's repressed inner life and her ostensibly unified outward life, which the inner life was systematically deceiving by a sort of elaborate confidence game. Among a number of obnoxious regulations imposed upon her by her devoted but unpractical mother and her stern, repressive nurse, one of the most obnoxious was that of wearing certain rough, heavy woolen underclothes which she detested, and found hot and uncomfortable. Her objection to these garments, which at first seemed of this purely superficial sort, was, however, as I found on close inquiry, based on something more than the reasons given. It amounted to a horror, and the admission was finally made that this was due partly to the fact that they gave rise to sexual irritation, of a vague sort. In other words they excited a species of masturbatory craving which was too strong to be agreeable.

I have dwelt on these half-forgotten incidents of childhood because of their value as at once illustrating the nature of the forces that were at work, and as accentuating on specific lines the action of these forces.

The remainder of the history, although more dramatic, can be passed over much more rapidly. What may be called her second period, that of pre-adolescence, was passed quietly in Europe, with congenial studies and simple sociability, and with more or less of admiration, which she loved. The principal drawbacks were a long

illness of the father, who had become paralytic on the left side and was a great care, and the strain on the mother which this and their relative poverty involved, and finally the anxiety lest the mother's health would fail. During this period she suffered from a prolonged diarrhoea, for which I suggest an emotional origin.

The first "train-fear" occurred at the time of parting from this pleasant life, made necessary by the mother's illness, — a parting like that from her first childhood.

The third period was a very significant and important one. Social life was over, but not the longing for its repetition, and the deeper cravings underlying this longing. A limited income made it necessary for them to accept the chance of occupying a house on a relatively remote hilltop, just near enough to the city to enable them to see opportunities of which they could not take advantage. The father's hemiplegia had become complicated by the epileptic seizures, involving mainly the left side, and these the patient witnessed, and dreaded for herself, the more so for seeing in herself her father's child, and in him one of the first objects of her intense subconscious love; later, of antipathy and scorn. For seven years he slowly moved towards the final parting of death, and his death was longed for by his family as the only solution possible.

This situation, in which the dread induced by her father's long-standing paralysis and recurrent convulsions, and the vision of his slowly approaching death (which at the very last came so slowly that he seemed for days alive in death) was mingled with her own longing for freedom and a wider life, was intensified during this same period by two similar events.

In the first place, two paternal aunts who had lived with them, and towards whom the patient had entertained feelings of very mixed sorts, likewise died very lingering and distressing deaths; and much the same was true of

the mother, who had finally become paralyzed like the father.

With the death of all these relatives, what might be called a third period opened for our patient. She and her sister were now somewhat more free to follow their inclinations, and somewhat better off financially, though still a little pinched. Psychologically, however, the situation did not improve, but, on the contrary, tended to grow worse. The patient had never been a mentally unified person. She did not know herself, but was torn by cravings which she could not understand, and every new opportunity or responsibility only accentuated the breach between the conscious and the unconscious portions of her life. The phobias, which from now on gradually increased, and the compulsions which became associated with them, symbolized the conflict between her craving — some elements of which had been long and carefully repressed — for protection, for marriage, for a home, for social success, and for social intercourse suited to her kindly and peace-loving disposition, and the necessity of adjusting herself to quite a different state of things. She felt herself moving towards an age when marriage would be impossible, and yet her dreams demonstrated clearly that marriage was biologically, as well as socially, a strong need. She saw herself parting from her adolescence and early middle life as she had parted from her childhood.

The images of life which many painful experiences, here only hinted at, had raised before her, as if in mockery of her imagined pleasures and activities, were those of disappointment, passivity, renunciation, and slow death, affecting primarily her father, with whom she, psychologically, was identified. She had not the moral and mental force (which is little to be wondered at) to make for herself a new world suited to her best and real powers, and went on making unconscious, cramp-like

attempts to substitute a world of fancy for a world of reality.

Her dependence, illustrated later by remarkably intense unconscious and instinctive grasping for the protection and affection for her physicians, had its root in early parental fixations, and was fostered by the necessity of helpless struggling against many and various adversities.

All these conflicts were typified in her dream-like phobias and compulsions. The streets that she longed to cross, but could not; the papers and pins which she accumulated; the failure of air which overwhelmed her; her inability to travel by herself; her fear of parting even with a letter or a fare; — all serve as so many pictures of longings and cravings, of a shrinking from instincts too strong to be assimilated, of the dread of the future foreshadowed in her father's life. The left-sidedness of her nightmare terrors symbolizes, in probability, not alone her memory of her father's hemiplegia and the convulsions which she so dreaded to witness, but also the *sinister* tendency of her own fancy of evil.

Certain of her most striking symptoms were ushered in, about eight years ago, by a prolonged attack of jaundice. It is easy to assert that this was the cause of nervous symptoms, but my observation in a number of striking cases leads me to believe that it is of less importance as a cause than as a result of these conditions.

There is one point to which I have referred in the above remarks which I think cannot too strongly be accentuated, namely, that in my view, however primitive the emotion of fear may seem, it is, nevertheless, probably secondary to desire; and if we assume, as I positively do, that evolution, whether of the individual or of the race, depends upon the tension of a vital impulse, it is obvious that this tension is, in general terms, making for progress. If we express it in the terms of consciousness, it is

equivalent to desire¹. Of course, as every one knows who has studied the gradual formation of any given fear, the secondary element of distress comes more and more into the foreground as time goes on, while the element of desire is liable to recede into the background.

A case illustrative of these points, in a form previously somewhat new to me, has very recently come to my attention.

A lady who in her youth suffered terribly from compulsions of certain sorts—related to so-called over-consciousness—used to fear continually that some harm would come to her mother, and used to ask her mother twenty times a day if she thought she would live until the morrow, and to follow her in the street with the same anxiety. The asking of these questions was a delicious torment to herself, and an unmitigated torment to her mother. For some time the patient was unable to recognize the fact that this torment on her part could be expressible in terms of wish. After a while, however, she said that she well remembered an older friend saying to her on one of these occasions, "I verily believe that it would be a great relief to you if you could know that your mother had died." This she herself admitted, and then on further thinking of the matter it became apparent that what really was at stake, and had been at stake since the beginning, was her own inward tension, expressible in terms of a craving with relation to her mother, which could not find sufficiently strong expression except in some terms that should picture her mother in a condition of suffering. This intense craving was obviously at first pleasurable, if one grasps the full meaning of the word "pleasure"; but it became gradually an intense pain.

The patient herself furnished several other instances illustrating the same principle. Thus, looking at a work-

¹ Or the two may have polar relationship, as Dr. Van Teslaar has suggested.

man on the upper part of a building opposite to where we stood, she said that she was aware of a painful tension lest he should fall, and added that if he should fall the relief of that tension would bring her a certain satisfaction, a satisfaction in which, obviously, the workman himself could hardly share.

In brief, then, I believe that this case is one of mixed psychoneurotic tendencies which is best explained in accordance with the doctrines first clearly enunciated by Sigmund Freud, taken in conjunction with certain philosophic reasonings which I believe to accompany instinctively every mental act. So far as the former doctrines are concerned, I believe that she acquired in early childhood certain longings or cravings, misunderstood and soon repressed, which reflected a number of autoerotic sensations, classifiable in general terms as sexual or erotic, and leanings towards her parents, for which the same classification is applicable. In the fears and attempts at adaptation of her later life, these deep, unsatisfied, and unconscious cravings formed an element too strong to be overlooked or mastered, yet never thoroughly assimilated. She "feared" her own misunderstood desires, inherited from infancy, and adopted imperfect means of compensation for the internal conflicts to which these fears gave rise.

The inner cravings, rooted in infancy, which make some persons criminals or perverts, made her an invalid.

Chapter X.

REMARKS ON A CASE WITH GRIELDA PHANTASIES*.

Among the manifold problems of last winter I was especially interested in the question of auto-erotism. It goes without saying that this subject is much too large to enter into details in a short article. I merely wish to illustrate by means of a case-study the aspect of the problem which has been particularly dealt with by Abraham in his detailed communication, by Brill in a study, and by Sadger in a lecture delivered before the Weimar Congress in 1911. It is purely a question of the phantasies which often accompany auto-erotic acts, and only of one kind of them. Sadger, as well as probably all who have specially occupied themselves with the examination of this problem, sees in these phantasies the most important psychological feature of this habit; Abraham's and Brill's researches testify how far from the apparently sexual sphere these phantasies can lead the patient.

The case I am about to describe is that of a man of 55, a barrister, of good family, and belonging to the best society; he was a very well educated, altruistic, and strong man, with exceptionally refined family traditions. He was reckoned to be perfectly healthy both mentally and physically; when I saw him first he complained only of depression, especially in the morning, and of a difficulty in ridding himself of painful memories. But in the course of the conversation he repeatedly complained of a curious estrangement

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that had arisen between him and his eighteen-year-old daughter during the past year, although they were very attached to each other. Last summer he had been abroad with this daughter. He had started tired and depressed, and had hoped to recover entirely through this daughter's careful nursing. She played her part gladly, but the hoped-for effect did not arrive; it had, indeed, a harmful effect on the father. He was nearly always depressed and irritable, so that he could neither content her nor win her confidence. Both came back without having got any pleasure from their travel. Each felt an indescribable sensitiveness towards the other, which they found impossible to discuss. Till the moment of going home the father had thought that he alone was responsible for this want of confidence. But when his daughter, on being freed from the duty of nursing her father, devoted herself entirely to what interested her, then he began to blame her for her faults and negligence, at first only to himself, but later also in conversations with his wife. He accused her of neglecting and despising him, and of treating him with indifference; according to him, she was developing independently and was following her own inclinations without letting him share in them. The slight feeling of estrangement had given place — and this within a short time — to a fairly strong love-hate complex, of which he now could not get rid. His devoted love for her, which showed various nuances at the same time, struggled against the feeling of hostility. The latter feeling impelled him to wish her some slight, though nevertheless genuine, pain or trouble. This wish, to punish his only and devotedly loved daughter, had two sources, which gradually became clear in the course of the analysis. Both, in my judgement, were merely different forms of self-gratification. On the one hand the patient sought to exploit the idea of being offended, and thus to reinforce the narcissistic

tendencies which, in spite of his good and altruistic disposition, had always been very pronounced. On the other hand he sought to gratify the strong sadistic and masochistic desires of which he had been acutely conscious throughout his life. An imperfect sublimation had partly concealed these tendencies, but they were constantly present and played a prominent part in his onanistic phantasies as well as in his dreams.

The patient had been a masturbator from his earliest youth; even yet, although he had been married for thirty years, he had not yet quite overcome this strong impulse. From the very beginning, even in his tenderest years, the habit owed its strength to the sadistic-masochistic phantasies.

The preceding interpretation of the case provides us with a problem of real interest. The patient, who was a good self-observer, considered that the concentration of thoughts on the daughter was not really the cause, but merely the exciting factor, of his abnormal wishes and of his depression. He held rather that the gratification of his morbid instinct was the root of the trouble. It is true that his daughter apparently stood at the centre of his feeling-conflict, but he believed that anyone else with the power to stir his love and hate could have taken her place.

Nevertheless one strongly suspects that the incestuous instinct, to which I shall return later, was the essential impulse concerned. The forcibly suppressed feeling for his daughter dominated him perhaps to a greater extent than he imagined. As he said himself, from early morning on, and especially in idle hours, his daughter was in his mind with thoughts of yearning, blame, anger, and depression. In the course of various conversations he occasionally admitted that even the rustling of her dress when she chanced to touch the door in passing, or the casual sight of the light in her room, made his heart beat faster;

different dreams also bore witness to the influence she exercised over him. The family was rich enough to be able to satisfy all their wishes, but he realised that, while his daughter spent money lightheartedly and with enjoyment, as her mother did, he was inhibited by a certain tendency to economy, which demonstrably dated in part from childhood experiences. He related the following example of an attempt to compensate himself for this feeling: His daughter recently begged for a light motor-car for her own use; but, rather than give her this pleasure ungrudgingly and thus grant her a certain advantage over himself, he bought a car for himself — a thing he would not have done otherwise — and told her she could drive in it. In spite of all his capacity for generosity and self-sacrifice he had a pronounced feeling of competition with his daughter. He could not endure her being more energetic and enterprising than himself. The question is whether these manifestations are to be regarded as primary or secondary. Without dwelling further on the patient's history and feelings, about which much more could be said, I will select only the facts of interest to us, above all certain events of childhood.

The patient's parents were well-educated people, who in his early days lived in a small village in the neighbourhood of one of the larger American towns. There he had only a few friends of his own age; as a matter of fact he could recall only two. Now it may be psychologically true that all young children, or most of them, model themselves almost entirely on their parents and relatives. At all events this was strikingly so with our patient. Timid, shy and unsociable by nature he should have had the opportunity of free, mutual intercourse so as to counteract his renounced tendency to loneliness and his alternating feelings of revenge and fear. He revered those nearest to him, who naturally were very much

older. These, however, were so fully occupied with their own affairs that they hardly showed a right understanding of his disposition, so he was perhaps led to create in his phantasy a less ideal companionship. The friends mentioned above with whom he was very intimate were two children related to him, a boy of rather haughty temperament and a girl, somewhat younger, who put up with everything from the two boys and so confirmed them in their masterfulness.

For the most part it is difficult adequately to explore the first three or four years in the life of a man, just as it is to appreciate exactly the obscure influence of the hereditary predisposition. There were certainly noble traits and indications of a very good capacity for education, but with all that he became, according to his present account, timid, dependent, self-willed, masterful and revengeful. All these qualities stood in striking contrast to his outer behaviour, as they did to the generous and noble ways of his elder brothers and sisters, whom he so adored and to whom he was so close.

The tendency which is the theme of the present paper also manifested itself as early as the third year of life. His sadistic and masochistic inclinations, so amply demonstrated in the details of everyday life, came to full expression in his phantasies, in this way enabling him to compensate for the feeling of inferiority which throughout his life tortured him.

The patient took great pleasure in picturing to himself dramatic situations in which imaginary people, mostly women, had to endure lasting pain or grief, like Griselda in the fairy tale. They were often condemned to carry burdens beyond their strength, to work in an inhuman and ceaseless way for hours at a time, or to endure similar distressing miseries. To begin with he did not invent acute pain for them, although later on, as we shall

see, pain played an essential part in these constructions of the phantasy. One form of humiliation to which his imaginary figures were subjected consisted in a princess being compelled to change clothes with a servant and to take over her position. In connection with the Griselda idea, and to show better the sexual nature of the humiliations described, it may be mentioned that in his case also the punishments were devised originally as tests of fidelity; later, however, he looked for pain on account of the excitement it evoked.

Sometimes the creatures of his imagination were strictly forbidden to void urine, even though in considerable distress, a feature which reminds us of an attempt at sterilisation (Cp. Ernest Jones, *Der Alpträum*, etc.). It is noteworthy that these sadistic ideas, which always evoked a certain self-gratification and were made use of for this purpose, made their appearance, according to the patient, already in the fourth or fifth year of life. The following occurrence will show how analogous these phantasies were to the patient's actual relations with his daughter: He had been with her to a matinée which they had both enjoyed. They then joined the other children at a meal, where he noticed how his youngest son, a very lively boy, played with his daughter, poking his nose through the back of her chair and making her press back with some force. The father, watching this game, could not refrain from wanting to replace the child's nose by some sharp or pointed object, as for instance a pen-knife "though with the blade closed", so that the daughter would in the course of the game be compelled to feel real pain.

From this time these imaginings remained the only means used by him to practise masturbation. The patient had, of course, procured pleasure by such phantasies long before he knew anything of actual masturbation. It is true that the phantasies assumed another phase at the onset

of puberty. Till then there had been no ejaculations, but when they made their appearance, in conjunction with the phantasies, he noticed that they took place only when there was the illusion of acute pain in the punishment phantasy. As soon as the pain appeared the ejaculation immediately followed. This discovery provided him with the method of prolonging his pleasure and at the same time to prevent the unwelcome result of this process¹.

He spurred himself to test how near he could come to the critical moment without having to give himself up to it; that is to say, how long he could prolong the pleasure comprising the first stage of the masturbation without bringing it to an end by inducing the second stage. As a rule he then gave free rein to the orgasm after he had delayed it long enough. At times the course of events was as follows: he recalled any recently read book in which painful, though not actually cruel, scenes occurred, the outcome of which was uncertain. Even now, at a time when he was proud of having almost entirely overcome masturbation, he could not read any accounts of suffering without feeling in danger. In most cases the conditions of this danger were fairly easy to establish. He could, for example, read about Chinese cruelties if they were casually mentioned; but he dared not expose himself to the temptation of glancing through the book only looking for accounts of cruelties.

The patient also suffered from urinary disturbances, for which he had once got a specialist to examine his prostate; no organic signs, however, could be detected. As far back as he could remember he had wakened up at least once every night with a desire to urinate, but he never willingly satisfied this and postponed doing so as

¹ I well recall a patient whose first impulse to masturbation emanated, so she said, from the sight of a picture of the bound Mazeppa on his prairie steed.

long as possible. (Cp. Sadger, "Urethralerotik", *Jahrbüch.*, Bd. III.) His own opinion was that this tendency to postpone urination was not to be accounted for by laziness or by the disinclination to expose himself to a chill at night, but was a part of his general fondness for procrastination, which, in spite of his energy in other directions, betrayed itself in so many ways and constituted a distinctive trait in his character.

It is possible that this auto-erotic tendency to procrastination, just as the psychical impotence already mentioned, had been determined, or at least reinforced, by an experience, or a series of experiences, in the patient's earliest youth, in his third or fourth year. About that time he was accustomed to get into his grandparents' bed every morning, they being exceedingly fond of him. He lay between the two old people and amused himself with all sorts of games, at least one of which he could recollect even to-day. The patient was not sure, but it seemed to him that he had on some occasion indulged in erotic activities that had provoked the displeasure of his grandparents, so that they admonished him to give up such things.

At all events it is not without interest that the patient himself was inclined to assume a connection between suppression of his (incestuous) eroticism dating from that time and the subsequent creation of his phantasies as an outlet for his libido. He also associated the gratification he obtained from his attitude towards urine with this turningpoint in his sexual life.

The main interest in cases such as the one here described lies for us less in the obvious facts than in the slight indications that such facts contain as to the source of the patient's personal and lasting character traits.

Before I attempt to explain these traits more nearly I should like to lay stress on two further peculiarities of

the earlier phase of these onanistic visions, namely, the distinct graduation of the punishments which the patient used to allot to his imaginary slaves, and the markedly dramatic character of the stories which mirrored the conflict of his own pugnacious character. It seems that there was rarely or never only one person afflicted; there were at least four or five, and these were with great care subjected to as many grades of chastisement. Besides the principal actors, however, there was a great number of relatively insignificant people whose parts formed a sort of contrast or background for those of the others. In fairness to his sense of justice it should further be mentioned that the person most severely afflicted finally emerged as victorious and was exalted over the others, as in the case of Cinderella or Griselda.

It needed only a few more inquiries to recognise in the mental conflict that characterised the patient's present attitude towards his daughter the re-appearance of all these features of his early reveries. From this point of view it is of special interest that he himself (though not to begin with) had chosen the story of the suffering Griselda as the model for his day-dreams. The excellence of this comparison is still more striking when one recalls the latest and admirable discussion of the psychological significance of this legend which Otto Rank published in the first number of "Imago". It is there shown that the aristocratic husband of Griselda was led to banish his wife by his more or less unconscious longing to marry his own daughter. This statement is naturally only a rough presentation of the situation.

My patient could not recollect any such incestuous desires in his phantasies: with the rehabilitation of the injured heroine—the *quasi* Griselda—the drama came regularly to an end, and this heroine was often pictured as being older than the dreamer, that is to say, as though

she represented a mother rather than a daughter, a form of incestuous imagination better suited in fact to the patient's age at the time of the earliest phantasies. Nevertheless, when one examines the later occurrences, namely, the patient's sadistic and erotic feelings for his daughter and the double part played by the latter as injured wife and rehabilitated heroine, the psychological parallelism becomes plain enough.

He freely admitted that above his altruistic love for his daughter there stood the wish to heighten his importance in his own eyes by making her in a sense to his slave and condemning her to suffer, like all slaves, in sharp contrast to the unafflicted Lord and Master. Several interesting dreams, as well as the patient's behaviour when under observation, threw a sharp light on this tendency, for he was a brilliant example of these people who display docility and subordination at the same time as obstinate arrogance, especially in trifles.

This fondness for detail was in our patient's case evidently a reflexion of the pleasure he felt when he was the imaginary witness of the protracted woes of his woman-kind. He was a lawyer and mathematician, enjoyed long, quibbling arguments, and knew how to split the finest hairs. He was a friendly person, but longed for recognition and was very dependent on expressions of affection and respect. His daughter's brusque and independent manner, which did not adapt itself to these half-unconscious and deeply rooted character traits, especially irritated him.

Although these masturbation phantasies, emphasized up to the present, which correspond with the immature phase of the patient's sexual life, clearly mirrored his attitude towards his daughter, and although, as was the case, the tendency to self-depreciatory moods presented itself as the end result of the struggle between his sadistic and masochistic traits, it is none the less true that the

phantasies of the next period played a highly important practical part in his later married life.

For when the patient, who was of a rather lonely disposition in childhood despite his always having several near friends, entered on a very happy marriage he found himself to be completely impotent. The presence of his wife evoked no erection whatever, nor did contact with her. He consulted a physician, whose advice, however, brought no benefit.

He then came on the idea of calling to his help his earlier phantasies and, finding that he could immediately produce an erection and emission by thinking of painful occurrences, he began to use this means as an indispensable aid to normal coitus, a custom he had retained up to the present time. Nothing else was able to serve this aim. He had never practised any manipulations apart from coitus: normal coitus had subsequently no effect and became of subordinate importance in the process of sexual gratification. The patient's wife was quite ignorant of these facts and their marriage was, as has been said, an extremely happy one. At present the patient was practically past the need for sexual gratification and had, not without effort, given up the habit of masturbation, although the circumstances described above as to the danger to which he was exposed through reading or hearing of cruelties had not yet disappeared.

In conclusion I may say that the psycho-analytic investigation, which I have here only incompletely described, was extremely helpful to him, in respect both to his feelings regarding his daughter and his tendency to depression, not to mention his general attitude towards life.

I append a short description of some dreams which illustrate with special clearness the previously mentioned attributes of the patient:

First Dream.

"I was sitting at table, not in my present address, but in a house similar to the country-house in which I spent my childhood. I was passed a plate of rolls. I took one, spat on it, and put it back again on the plate; then, however, I took it again".

Asked for associations, the patient admitted that the spittle probably signified semen and that the roll was intended for his daughter, who was present, if not actually, nevertheless in his thoughts. I drew his attention to the further sadistic signification of his treatment of his daughter (cp. the insulting use of the word "lickspittle") and asked him whether there was in his boyhood anything similar characteristic of his behaviour towards his mother, whom he had loved warmly then as now. He affirmed this and said that there used to be times when, if he was cross to her for any reason, "he could have done anything to her", "he could have taken hold of her and shaken her", and so on.

This readiness to offend his daughter, also in dreams, agrees with the patient's own opinion as to his neurosis; according to him, he missed the excitement of masturbation and had given way as compensation to a strong love-hate complex in respect to his daughter. He also confessed that this signified not only a reappearance of his earlier feelings towards his mother, but also of those towards the girl cousin with whom he had played in his childhood. In the latter case, as well as in the phantasies, the main idea was that the persons concerned "should have to work hard for what they got and should never get more than they had earned".

Second Dream.

"I was on a paddle-steamer. My children, notably my daughter and one of her brothers, sat in a cabin

playing cards. There were perhaps others present as well. I joined them and, annoyed that they were all amusing themselves so well without me, I called my son and bad him help me to make up a party for shuffleboard on deck. I persuaded him, but the game did not come off. On the contrary, one of the pieces with which one plays fell into a paddle in such a way as somehow to stop the machinery and in consequence also the ship. I climbed below while the others stayed on deck, and so found myself alone near the "centre of power" (? onanistic pleasure). Then the wheels began to move and the dream ceased."

The patient's wife was present as a bystander and would have liked to soothe her husband. In other words, the patient had amused himself by disturbing his children and then went off to show that he could also make his own powers function in another way alone.

Third Dream.

"I was watching a piece at the theatre, though I also seemed to be playing in it; it felt as if it were real life. A girl (doubtless the daughter) and I seemed to be the principals. Without any visible reason I got into a temper with the girl, tore off a ring from her finger and one from my own hand as well, threw them on the floor and stamped on them. Then we were all poor and needed money for some purpose. I ran out to fetch money and came back as though I had pawned my watch for the general weal. There were also other people on the stage. I was called Robert (the name of his son, whom the patient loved greatly and who was, like him, very attached to his sister). I had a small pistol in my hand which I handed to the girl whose ring I had torn off, with these words "They cannot marry me with this. Take it!" At this moment the pistol went off and shot her.

Other people on the stage were also wounded. I was about to run out to give myself up to the police with remorse. The girl declared me to be a criminal, but then an elderly woman, apparently my wife or mother, interfered and took steps to suppress the whole affair (one of these steps being an order to cut all the women's hair off); this apparently calmed down everybody's feelings".

Without going into the details of this dream, one sees at once, however, that it is dominated by mutually contradictory feelings analogous to those mentioned above. The tearing off of the rings, the altruistic sentiments represented by the pawning of the watch, the pistol scene, the remorse, the girl's anger, the unselfish behaviour of the mother (or wife), the cutting of the hair: all these unmistakably point to an inter-play of feelings which illustrates in detail the patient's onanistic visions and his life story.

I wish now to add a few remarks which, in my opinion, lend themselves to a continuation in a new direction of what we have already learned from this case.

The whole life story of this man was characterized and pervaded by masochistic mortifications leading to a feeling of inferiority. The sadistic tendency could be viewed as a protest against these traits, or else, following the ambivalency theory, as the reverse of the masochistic trend. One of these views would doubtless be the correct one from the standpoint of accepted scientific opinion. But I want to draw attention to the fact that both these ways of regarding the problem are merely descriptive, and not explanatory.

According to them, such a man has either been born with his masochism or the two opposed impulses or else he has acquired a feeling of inferiority through comparing himself with other men.

Those who are curious to explore further the origin of these impulses or tendencies will be drawn to investigate biogenetically the ancestral or even pre-human history. But such a research could never attain to a final and generally satisfying result. Behind the discovered would always lie further history.

What one strives for surely is to discover the *nature* of such a feeling of inferiority, and not to lose oneself on an historical path which leads to no logical goal. Thus, for instance, one will never find out the nature of space by always adding new space in the hope of finally comprehending the whole. Really to discover the nature of anything can only be done by finding in it attributes, or rather manifestations of energy, which correspond with the deepest movements of our nature. To penetrate deeper into anything would indeed be impossible. Now I believe that we all begin to discover inferiority tendencies in ourselves, as also opposite ones, as soon as we make the effort, even if only half-consciously, to express ourselves in any way. And we do this not only because we compare ourselves with our parents, but because we compare each individual effort with the feeling innate in us that we can make better and more complete efforts.

This statement, it is true, assumes that every being is born with fundamental feelings anchored in the depth of his soul, feelings which (from the adult point of view) could be designated as philosophical. Each such being has a kind of intuition, which always contains elements of fear, and which we, as the result of our superior knowledge, may regard as a feeling of conviction, that it belongs to the deepest primordial forces of the universe. After such a being follows its impulse to express itself in the outer world as completely as possible, or to duplicate itself, there arises, simultaneously with this feeling, the opposite one of not being able to attain, only, however,

once more to give way to the other. This feeling is thus at the same time productive of courage and of fear. In this process one finds the earliest signs both of the feeling of strength and of that of inferiority, of conflict and of the impulse to create.

Just as the problem of "evil" in the world is to be regarded as the final basis of all philosophy, so one could regard the masochistic feeling of inferiority as the lever with which one can (by suitable reaction) arrive at sublimation. One must therefore allow a certain measure of feeling of inferiority as normal (for the simple reason that no human being can attain to his best possible), but the "more" that characterises this or that person (*e. g.* King Amenhotep, for the analysis of whom we are indebted to Dr. Abraham¹) comes about merely through later experience. Nor is there any doubt that by the sublimation of this "more" very much can be gained for the well-being and intellectual progress of mankind.

Through the mode of conception here indicated the problem of the real origin of the impulses in question as well as that of the "libido" (which is nothing but a part of the automatic energetic processes of the universe) finds a more complete explanation than can be reached in any other way. The circle of our investigation may thus be

¹ "Stress must be laid on the fact that Echnaton did not worship the sun as divine, but that he personified in Aton the warmth of the sun, as a life-giving power... Echnaton did not picture him physically—like the old gods—but mentally and personally. For this reason he forbade any image of the god, being in this a precursor of the Mosaic law! Aton is the life-giving power to which all life owes its existence... The nucleus of this product of phantasy is seen to be the wish to have begotten oneself, to be one's own father. And in the hymn that has been handed down to us it says that Aton, who for us is only a portrait of Echnaton endowed with paternal omnipotence and raised to a divine level, begat himself!" "Abraham. Amenhotep IV. (Echnaton)", *Imago I*, Heft 4.

regarded as closed if it turns out that the various special problems assume the same form as the main problem, that of universal life which ever renews itself.

Now is it correct to ascribe these primordial attributes to the "libido" or, if one does that, should one not find another term to express it? I do not believe it is correct, and hope to expound later my reasons for thinking so. In any case the libido, just as other forms of energy, is to be regarded as self-creative and life-giving. But one should not regard it as the most fundamental human form of this energy, unless one be prepared to identify it completely with the automatic power that seems to pervade the universe. The discovery of this power is perhaps the deepest truth that Science has as yet brought to light. Jung's conception points, in my opinion, to that view as a necessary consequence¹.

The first real step in the solution of these difficult riddles of the How and Whence of the universe, of existence, of life etc., would certainly be taken if we could get accustomed to reducing all phenomena to a single principle, to one single form of activity. At first sight it is true that just this step seems to entangle us in the greatest of all riddles, namely, in the question of how one single principle or form of activity can develop into such multiform phenomena, *e. g.* the multiplicity of personalities we feel ourselves to be. For this to happen, one would apparently have to assume that a unitary form of energy had the power to act on itself, *i. e.* that it could function at the same time as object and subject. Such an idea, however,

¹ Dr. Jung's lengthy article on the "Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido" (Second Part) also contains many quotations and opinions to be noted in this connection. By widening the libido idea he tries to raise this form of energy to a height where it would have to be recognised as the most fundamental of all forms of force (See Sec. I, especially S. 170—171). Libido is, according to him, self-creative and self-renewing etc., just as one formerly believed of the sun.

is antipathetic to the "scientific" spirit, despite the fact that it now looks as if to do just this is the first and most important function of the life-essence, no matter whether it be called *Libido* or *poussée vitale* or "self-activity" (of the metaphysicians). The attributes that Jung ascribes to the libido (power to renew itself etc.), are completely equivalent to the attributes ascribed by Plato and Hegel to autonomous energy. One may not ignore demonstrative arguments of this kind.

One cannot go any deeper, for this process of self-division (after the prototype of the biological self-fission of cells, the division into male and female; in other words, therefore, just what was comprised in the self-division of the primordial beings, the Atma of the East Indian sagas)¹ is the most fundamental fact of all nature. Without "comprehending" this fundamental fact, *i. e.* without feeling or recognising its identity with the deepest in us, we cannot really comprehend anything at all — or, otherwise expressed, without recognising this background for our speech and our concepts, we can only go on speaking in metaphors and symbols, without being conscious that we are only using metaphors and symbols.

But when, on the other hand, we come to comprehend this most fundamental truth and become ever more and more aware of the reality underlying the symbolism of our life, we gain the power of understanding everything from the deepest and purest essence of our nature. We then discover that, whereas the form of every mental process is the same (namely, a striving to manifest itself), its result varies endlessly, according to its completeness or incompleteness. The manifold phenomena of our life express symbolically the varieties and graduations of this process. Our feeling of power, our joy in success or disappointment at failure, indicate that we are continually

¹ Cp. Jung, "Wandlungen der Libido", II.

measuring ourselves by a fairly definite, although not always definable, norm of perfection. Following the same principle we recognise a common norm (of rhythm and "fitness") that enables us to translate the pleasure which we get from one sense organ (music) into another, obtained from another sense organ¹.

¹ I refer to the autobiography of the deaf-blind Helen Keller, who has expressed herself on this general basis for the different sense perceptions very beautifully and convincingly.

Chapter XI.

ON SOME OF THE BROADER ISSUES OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MOVEMENT*.

In bringing forward for discussion some of the more important practical considerations and scientific principles underlying the psychoanalytic movement, I have been moved by the belief that this movement marks one of the most important advances of modern medicine. It may need modification, supplementation and safeguarding, and its limitations will surely need recognition, but it cannot be ignored and it must be fostered, not by neurologists alone, but by physicians of all sorts, to whom patients with psychoneurotic symptoms constantly apply for relief, and whose advice is sought with reference to the education of children who might readily become patients at a future day. It should be seen to be wrong, now that the causal mechanism of these disabling illnesses is so much better understood, that physicians should go on laying the chief emphasis, in explanation and treatment, on incidental disorders of some special organ, or on some abnormality of nutrition, or on the need of rest, or of suggestion or persuasion, provided the chance is at hand of getting nearer to causal influences which are far more fundamental. Various circumstances may compel the ignoring of these conditions, it is true, in given cases, but this should be done with the eyes open, and will become less often necessary when more men of high standing have been encouraged to fit themselves as experts for this work.

* Modified from a paper of the same title presented at the meeting of the Association of American Physicians, May, 1913. Published in the *American Journal of the Medical Sciences*, March, 1914

The psychoanalytic method of treatment is not simply one more means of palliation. It is based on a recognition of the fact that these patients are suffering from emotional conflicts the nature of which they cannot understand unaided, and is an attempt to make it possible for them to extricate themselves, through self-study and self-education, from the effects of these conflicts. It is not, furthermore, in its essence, a method which is dependent for its success on some unmeasured and subtle personal magnetism emanating from the physician. On the contrary, it is a system which anyone can learn who is willing to take the pains needed for this task. As a part of this system, the personal reactions of patient and physician on each other are made the subject of careful scrutiny, and subjected to constant control. The constant aim of every well-trained psychoanalyst is to encourage the patient to assume the responsibility for the success of the investigation, and to see that it shall result in a sense of complete independence on his part.

Care should be taken to distinguish sharply between the merits of the psychoanalytic method as such, and the mode of its application in particular cases. Many physicians approve of the former, who think there is reason to criticize the latter, and such physicians owe it to their patients to test the correctness of this attitude by conscientiously studying the method, making it the basis of their practice, and applying to it such tests as they desire. No one can question the importance of a thorough anamnesis¹ as the foundation of a thorough treatment, and every student of human nature is aware that a man who is struggling with internal problems and false reasoning is in no shape to meet and solve external

¹ I use the word anamnesis only in the most general possible sense, and am well aware that it does not appropriately describe the outcome of a psychoanalytic investigation.

problems. But the aim and object of this method is just the securing of an anamnesis, of a thoroughness such as has never before been attained or even tried for, and the bringing home to each patient, in a form which admits of no misunderstanding (not only of reason but of feeling) the real nature of the conflicts through which he passed in childhood and is still passing. These internal conflicts form the natural problems in terms of which every growing child ought to build his rational and moral character, and a psychoanalytic treatment is simply one phase of a concentrated rational and moral education.

The results of the conflicts of our childhood do not die and disappear. On the contrary, they live forever, in an active form, and continue to produce effects, as integral forces, interwoven with the living fabric of our temperaments and characters, as determinants of our thoughts and conduct. It is, therefore, difficult to see why any student of education should fail to welcome this new means of rendering these conflicts clear and bringing them face to face with the intelligence and the moral sense.

It is often asked, "Of what benefit is it to make the patient intellectually aware of his long since repressed and forgotten emotions and temptations, and the frailties of his youth? Simply to see the terms and bearings of even a present temptation or perplexity is not equivalent to overcoming the one or solving the other; and as for bygone temptations and perplexities, once inadequately met, to be forced to rediscover them is to be made painfully aware of weaknesses which would better be forgotten and ignored. Repression is useful as well as harmful; it is a means of progress which was instinctively arrived at and found practically useful." Such is the general character of the argument.

But, in fact, although the intellectual presentation to one's self of the bearings and nature of a present perplexity

or temptation is not equivalent to a moral or a rational victory, yet to arrive at such a presentation is the first step toward the victory, if the person tempted or in doubt really intends to make it such. And what is true in this respect of present conflicts is true also of old conflicts. For the latter still exist, and form, in reality, the main basis of the former; and arguments to the contrary, of the kind just cited, are apt to be only one of the many instinctive resistances that are built up as defences to preserve a *status quo* of invalidism, which is maintained by virtually the same influences that originally gave rise to it, and that made of it a means of compromise. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the final purpose of a psychoanalytic treatment is to conduct the patient's memory and insight back to that distant period of childhood when it was a question, not of being false to an obvious moral obligation but rather of slipping, half unwittingly, under the dominion of a strong craving, which then continued to make its power felt, by virtue of assuming ever new disguises. The patient—every person—must assume, later, it is true, the moral responsibility for the deeds and thoughts of this period of childhood, but if he is fortunate he may do so under the guidance of knowledge and of reason, and in doing this he may often work off his cravings, by stripping off their disguises, one by one, until it becomes clear just what it is that is leading him astray.

As for the assumed usefulness of "repression", it should be remembered that this is a word, like many more, of double meaning. It is a good thing to repress, on rational or moral grounds, and in the interests of sublimation, the desire to yield to a temptation which one clearly sees; it is a poor thing to close one's eyes to a temptation to which one really yields. One cannot, at one and the same time, cultivate real progress and likewise

indulge in immature modes of thought and conduct which are hostile to progress in the best sense. The attempt to do this, even though unconsciously made, results in one or another form of compromise, which takes the shape of nervous symptoms or defects of character, both of which are often clearly traceable to the mechanism outlined.

It is well known that there has been a strong feeling of hostility to this movement on the part of some physicians, side by side with a strong confidence in its promise on the part of others, and that among its best adherents eminent psychologists and laymen of broad culture are to be found. An association largely made up of men whose work lies sufficiently outside of neurology and psychiatry to enable them to look at the matter with unprejudiced eyes should form a fair court of appeal, so far as this is possible where expert training is lacking. It would be impossible to discuss here all the grounds of the hostility to which I have referred. I shall have something to say later on the one point which really lies at the root of all the opposition, namely, the sex question; but I pause here to consider briefly one argument of another sort. It is not infrequently urged that patients are made worse by this treatment, and individual cases are cited in verification of this statement. It is true that the very influences—partly innate, partly incidental, and largely of the sort here indicated—which induce the serious illnesses here in question, tend to weaken these patients' powers of co-operation and will to coöperate, so that the physician's mind must be made up for many relative disappointments; and it is easy to see how the hostile opinions to which I have alluded have arisen. If, however, adequate care is taken in the choice of patients, if the physician is well trained, and if the patient is in earnest, some good is almost certain to attend their combined efforts, even when complete recovery is impossible. Good results are not obtainable

with equal ease in the case of all varieties of the illnesses for which this treatment has been used. It is generally conceded that the phobias and anxiety-neuroses are the most curable forms, while the compulsion-neuroses are less amenable, and the well-marked hypochondriacal cases still less so¹. But even the compulsion-neuroses yield more readily to this mode of treatment than to any other. That some patients do cling instinctively to their illnesses, and are ready enough to assume a hostile attitude toward the physician, or to minimize his part in bringing about improvements, is well known to everyone who has to deal, through any method, with psychoneurotic patients. An illness, unpleasant though it be, is sometimes instinctively felt to secure a better equilibrium and greater freedom from discomfort and from the necessity of struggle, than any substitute which appears to be in sight. This reasoning is, of course, unconscious on the patient's part, but it may affect his attitude, none the less, and he must learn to recognize this fact if he wishes to get well.

These statements may serve as an introduction to the next proposition, which has reference to the difficulties which the physician must encounter in fitting himself for adequately carrying out the psychoanalytic treatment. Except for these—very real—difficulties, the records of more frequent and thorough tests of the method and a greater number of critical comments based on personal experience, would doubtless have appeared.

While the first point that needs ever renewed emphasis is that through this treatment, as through no other to anything like the same extent, patients suffering from obsessions, morbid fears, and kindred symptoms can usually be enabled to see, and often to overcome,

¹ See a review of extensive experience by Dr. W. Stekel, *Zentralblatt f. Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie*, II. Jahrgang, Heft 6—7, 1913.

their troubles, the next point is, then, that this task, though full of interest for both patient and physician, is not a light one. Any intelligent, careful person may utilize to some extent the principles worked out by the leaders of this movement, and may, through prudence and caution, avoid exciting in the patient, in any serious degree, the sense of dependence on the physician ("Uebertragung") which has so often proved a formidable objection to every kind of mental therapy; yet it is a very different affair to carry through really difficult cases to a successful issue.

Fortunately, the student of the future will have the great help of a comprehensive literature, and of the papers of practical advice which Freud and others have published during the past few years, and will, it is to be hoped, continue to publish. A careful reading of these admirable commentaries would make it clear to anyone that it is not alone a theoretical knowledge on the physician's part of the psychology of the "unconscious", and not alone technical skill, that is necessary for success, but that there is need also of self-restraint, patience, sincerity, and inflexible confidence in the ability of the patient to reveal himself, to his own advantage, if his will to do so goes deep enough, and the thorough-going adoption of the principle that no considerations of temporary satisfaction, on the part of patient or physician, should be allowed to override the main issues of the treatment, but that, on the contrary, both patient and physician should recognize from the outset that the task before them may call for material sacrifices on both sides.

It has, indeed, come to be recognized more and more by the leaders of this remarkable movement that one prominent cause of disappointment is the existence of defects or peculiarities of character and temperament on the physician's part, which blur the mental image that

he seeks to form of the real patient, and unfit him for developing the patient's own powers as he might otherwise have been able to do. Few persons are so well endowed by nature as to be free from the liability to get these distorted images, and it is now looked upon as very important, indeed almost essential, that the psychoanalyst should himself have been through the same sort of self-examination, under the supervision of some expert, that he proposes to make use of for his patients. With such thoroughness in preparation presupposed, this field of work is certain to become more and more attractive to men of the best stamp.

The psychoanalytic movement, at its best, so far from tending to encourage lower ethical standards on the part of the physician, the patient, or the community, is certain to exert the opposite tendency. For every conflict implies an antagonistic action of two interests, one of which is certain to be more in the line of the best progress than the other. It is true that the progress which a patient makes in getting well is not necessarily of a very high sort, since the forces represented in some of our human conflicts may be between tendencies both of which might be characterized as relatively selfish. But, on the other hand, issues necessarily present themselves in the course of every psychoanalytic treatment, which have to be met through the exercise of qualities of a better kind than those that had previously been most prominently in play, and frequently the moral influence of the treatment goes very much beyond this minimum. Psychoanalysis was primarily introduced, it is true, solely as a means of ascertaining the contents and influence of those tendencies in our lives of which it can be said, not only that they lie outside of consciousness, but that they are under the ban of "repression," and yet remain as objects of unconscious desire or craving. To render a person clearly

aware of such tendencies as these is the first step toward making it possible for him to modify them and to utilize his knowledge for the evolution of his character. The task of the psychoanalyst has usually been considered to cease with the accomplishment of this first step. If he goes farther and helps the patient to study not alone the repressions of the sort thus far considered—that is the repressions of sensuous cravings—but also the dimly felt and crudely symbolized longings, intuitions, and aspirations, such as every person experiences but often regards with suspicion, incredulity, and even dread, and, in a sense, may be said to repress, yet which, if scrutinized and encouraged, may form the basis of fine character; if the psychoanalyst helps to the evolution of these *quasi* repressed tendencies, he becomes an educator in a far wider sense¹ and thus enters on a line of work which entails new responsibilities and new necessities of preparation. Psychoanalysis is based on no system of ethics, and is committed to no special philosophy of life, though it does inculcate in an intensive form the sincerity and honesty which lay a good foundation, in one respect, for further development on these lines. In itself it represents a phase of education which corresponds mainly to the analytic element in the first two portions of Dante's pilgrimage into the life of the soul. The reasons for not going farther, and working definitely for sublimation in the widest sense have been reasons of a practical and cogent sort. In the first place, few psychoanalysts—few physicians, indeed, of any stamp—have had the training needful for this purpose. They have felt, with some reason, that to give

¹ Froebel's remarkable scheme of education, thus far utilized almost exclusively for the Kindergarten, contains a provision for rational retrospection and introspection which involves the principle of psychoanalysis. Consult Miss Susan E. Blow's recent and interesting Report on the Kindergarten.

moral education is not the function of the physician. In the next place the distinctive task of the psychoanalyst is so difficult, and calls for an expert training and a scientific attitude of such special sorts, that no one could do his profession or his patients justice, it has been felt, without devoting himself exclusively to the problems coming before him as scientific expert. If he attempted more, even if qualified to do so, he might perhaps accomplish less.

I regard these views as sound, but do not think they altogether meet the point at issue.

Psychoanalysis is, after all, a phase of education, and has been characterized as such by Freud himself. Education is of different sorts, but the goal of every kind of education is in a measure determined by the nature, origin, and destiny of the human mind, and the psychoanalyst of the future is likely to profit greatly through the recognition of this fact. This great movement cannot steer its difficult course or accomplish its whole mission under the exclusive guidance either of biogenetic methods or of those principles which the students of the processes of inorganic nature have worked out for their particular needs, and have so often and so erroneously assumed to be final statements of the truth. For these principles do not by any means fully explain the working of the mind, nor account *for the origin* of the instincts or tropisms which are supposed to foreshadow mental action; and, moreover, the too exclusive study of these principles is liable to turn aside the attention from others, of still greater value, which refer mind, instincts, and chemical processes alike, to the influence of a self-renewing, self-active energy, seeking fuller and fuller opportunities for self-expression.

I cannot pursue this argument further here, but assert as my opinion that the study of the vitally important

relationship between the life of the individual and the total life of the universe, and the adequate study of the laws of mental action, will afford a basis, of a much needed sort, for the understanding of the true place of the psychoanalytic phase of education on a more comprehensive educational scheme. It may well be that among the qualifications considered essential for the psychoanalyst of the future, certain sorts of training which are now thought little of will be included. Certainly the only logical stopping place of a complete psychoanalytic treatment is a complete "sublimation".

The psychoanalyst must indeed be a scientific expert, eager to see his special art advanced, and this need must be considered paramount to every other. But in every department of learning there are men whose powers best fit them for the exclusive study of some special problem, and others who do better service, even in detail, if they see each special problem on the background of a comprehensive scheme.

It will have been made evident by the trend of the foregoing statements, even if not already known, that the main emphasis of psychoanalytic investigation and treatment has gradually been shifting more and more toward the apparently forgotten years of infancy and early childhood—that mysterious and eventful period which is more significant than any other for the formation of character and temperament, and for the establishment of tendencies of mental reaction from which it is exceedingly difficult, afterward, to depart¹. No more important task lies before the psychiatrist, the psychologist, or the educator, than the

¹ The most important data for a psychology of childhood based on psychoanalytic research are furnished by Dr. von Hug-Hellmuth's recent monograph, *Aus dem Seelenleben des Kindes*. See also review by the same author, under the title *Kinderseele*, in the *"Imago"* for February, 1913, Bd. II, H. 1.

study of these tendencies—both those which help toward the realization of the best possibilities of development, and those which act to turn aside or turn backward the forces through which these results might have been attained.

It is needless to say that the facts and inferences thus brought together are not wholly new; they are all the more significant for not being so. Neither can the results of psychoanalytic studies, which are of necessity made largely on persons who were preëminently handicapped at the outset, in the race toward the higher goals of life, be substituted at every point for observations made on those who have, from the beginning, been inspired by a clearer vision of these goals; nor can the experiences of the child be said to foreshadow in every respect the experiences of the adult. The adult can form and follow ideals and motives which he could not have appreciated as a child, but he must reckon, consciously and voluntarily or instinctively, with his childhood tendencies in so doing, at the cost of carrying a constant handicap if he neglects this obligation.

We are so used to seeing the greater number of our children develop rapidly on fairly satisfactory lines, so habituated to seek in them for signs of mental characteristics familiar to us and into possession of which they are to come, later, and so little used to referring the evidences of their later troubles to tendencies first emphasized in infancy and early childhood, or to form any adequate conception of what passes in their unconscious minds, that only the close observer learns to recognize the extent and number of the chances of going wrong, to which all children are exposed, and in meeting which they react in such a fashion as to establish models for the reactions of their later years.

It would seem that the infant's mind is a more complex instrument than has usually been supposed. There is

reason to believe¹ that the newborn child brings into the world a certain familiarity with various feelings and sensations with which there must go a dim consciousness of himself as experiencing them. Not only this, but there is a possibility, which we probably underrate, that not only isolated perceptions, but complex, though vague, emotional states, capable of being dimly recorded in memory, may be present before and during birth². Be this as it may, it is certain that the infant begins quickly to classify the masses of new sensations that are poured in upon him, in accordance with principles of emphasis which are quite different from those that are characteristic of the adult, or even of the older child, who has learned to shrink with a disgust that often overshoots its proper mark, from many of the sources of personal gratification congenial to the period from which he has escaped. To the infant, it would seem that every experience, partly in virtue of its novelty, is capable of yielding a special charm; and if fear soon enters to complicate the situation, even this has a certain fascination of its own to offer. From the standpoint of the emotions based on the cutaneous and muscular sensibility, it is certain that the act of nursing, the rubbings, caressings, dandlings, batheings, the warm contacts applied to large surfaces of the body, the processes of digestion, the acts of defecation and urination (that is, especially the orifice stimulations), the chance excitation of the genital organs, the movements of the limbs, often give rise—over and above the sensations and other reactions which are usually accredited to these sources, as accompaniments of normal development—to

¹ See F. Peterson, *The Beginning of Life in the New Born*, New York; also, Ferenczi, *Internat. Zeitsch. f. Arztliche Psychoanalyse*, B. I. H. 2.

² Dreams and reminiscences hinting at vague but impressive birth-memories have now been reported in considerable number.

pleasurable feelings such as every adult knows and has perhaps learned to deprecate, and to classify as "sensuous," though he may have long since dissociated them from these special causes and is unaware of the purpose which they once served. To the child these sensuous feelings are, at first, natural, acceptable, and free from connotations of depreciation. To the adult, the very thought of what might be called the nursing and diaper period of infancy is displeasing, at least in many of its details, which savor of dirt, humiliation, and dependence; and he fails to do justice to the physiological and psychological value of all these attributes of this portion of his childhood as preparing him for the important functions of his later years.

In fact, however, it is not harmful or reprehensible, but necessary and desirable, that the infant and the child should devote much attention to their own personalities and powers—that is, that they should be duly egoistic—and necessary and desirable, also, that they should find their attention engrossed, up to a certain point, by that special element in the various experiences just referred to (and their number could be indefinitely extended) to which, later, the name of sensuousness is given, with its adult connotations of reprehension. The objection is not to these emotional states as such, but only to their being allowed to play too large and too engrossing a part, that is, to their being too long cultivated, in and for themselves alone, that is, simply as a means for the intensifying of personal excitement and self-indulgence, instead of as a stepping-stone to something better. The intense egoism of childhood, which is led up to by the discovery, on the part of the infant, of his power of obtaining these sensuous forms of gratification, is of great value as a means to a normal self-assertiveness and individualism¹. But egoism

¹ Closer students of this subject are aware that there is a group of psychoanalysts, whose main representative is Dr. Alfred Adler,

has its strongly sensuous aspects, and may lead to a too literal self-love (narcissism), properly classifiable as a species of sex-craving, or, like all forms of sensuous pleasure, may induce an excessive revolt (over-sensitiveness, morbid self-consciousness or self-reprehension, etc.), which is equally objectionable and on exactly similar grounds. The child who takes the middle course of safety, and who at the same time, preserves and assimilates something of good from the contemplation of the dangers by which he is surrounded, is a child of superior order, though, fortunately, the outcome which we designate as normal admits of many and considerable variations, within a wide margin. The dangers and the liability to go wrong would doubtless be more apparent, were it not that the tendencies toward the better forms of evolution have developed an instinctive power of surmounting these dangers with relative success.

of Vienna, who think that the main, fundamental craving against which the young child is compelled instinctively to strive is this very need of self-assertion, the need of feeling that he is taking his place as an individual "against all comers," and that he must at least fortify himself with a feeling that he is doing so, even at the cost of self-deceit (*Sicherungstendenz*). Dr. Adler takes the view that the sensuousness, or sexuality, of the child is, for the most part, only the form in which this self-assertion strives to find expression. The facts and arguments adduced by him and others are exceedingly interesting, but cannot be done justice to in this place. In general terms my own opinion is that the excessive self-assertion and the sensuousness, self-indulgences, and egoisms are, all, imperfect attempts at self-expression which has a deeper root, and in view of the fact that even in self-assertion, feelings of personal relationship are present, either toward oneself or toward others who stand in intimate connection with oneself, the sex element cannot be excluded, and will continue to represent at bottom the principal repressed element in human life, in a relative sense, at least. To say this is not to deny, of course, that self-assertion, with the "*Sicherungstendenz*," may be the goal for which most persons mainly strive. See Adler, *Über den nervösen Charakter*.

In other words, the child must be sensuous (in the best sense) up to a certain point, but not beyond. Furthermore, he must not revolt too strongly against an assumed excess of sensuousness in any particular respect; for this revolt will then become a source of danger—practically a craving—in its turn. Through his first dealings with this difficult problem of sense-pleasure, to which every month and every year adds some new element of complexity, the child forms or emphasizes a series of tendencies which are likely to characterize his acts and thoughts throughout his life. He cannot be expected to exert effectively a power of control and a sense of obligation which as yet are hardly born, and the result is that, to a greater or less extent, he is bound to develop on a double plan and to prepare himself to lead a more or less double life—the life of conscious and obvious acquiescence and social relationship and the life of private and concealed fancy and emotion. This latter life he must, moreover, lead, for the most part, alone, for there is no one who can thoroughly understand the symbolic language in which he is defining to himself his new world.

Even under the best conditions the particular kinds of pleasurable sensation that first engrossed him are likely to establish goals toward which, in unguarded moments (as in dreams and fantasies) and in times of stress, he will be likely to revert, just as we all gladly revert, in minor degrees and ways, to simpler conditions of living, for compensation or refreshment. The strength of the tendency to this reversion is measured by two factors, the intensity of the original engrossment and the degree to which it was instinctively put out of sight ("repressed"), in the first instance, so that its presence as a temptation could no longer be directly seen. For an instinctively repressed temptation is one that continues to exert its action, but in a concealed form and under new names

and forms. It is this quality of engrossment, combined with this fact of its early repression, that gives the sensuous element in the life of childhood its great significance, over and above its importance as preparing for the functionally sexual life of adolescence. On these grounds the life of infancy and childhood is properly described as strongly (though, of course, only partially) "sexual": (1) because of the sensuous elements in it which actually pave the way for a normal or an abnormal (inverted or perverted) sexual development; (2) because the child tends to take himself (self-love, narcissism) and those about him (mirror-love in a new form; premature and overstrong homo-sexual or heterosexual attachments) as objects of a too passionate engrossment.

Infants and children evidently differ enormously as regards their liability to be engrossed by these peculiar sense seductions, on the one hand, and in the degree to which, on the other hand, they feel, in its infantile form, the inspiration and the spirit which is to show itself later as a noble sense of disinterestedness and obligation, commensurate with the best possibilities of the future. But the existence, in a certain degree, of egoism and sensuousness (*sit venia verbo*) in the period of infancy is not to be taken as a sign of recreancy to natural trust and duty.

One great task lies before every child—to make himself a useful member of the community in the widest sense¹. But a vastly important portion of this obligation lies in learning to play his part, suitably, in the perpetuation of the race. The incitement to this task is provided for by nature with the most jealous care, as indicated by the vast multitude of seeds that must perish in order that one may germinate. Not during adolescence alone are the incitements to the accentuation of the sex-emotions infini-

¹ See Froebel's *Education of Man*, and other literature on the theory of the *Kindergarten*.

tely numerous and infinitely subtle; not in adult life alone is the temptation a serious one to the cultivation of pleasures, which though capable of being eminently useful, are often not only negative, but harmful, in their relation to the best possibilities of development. The incitements and the temptations to abuse of such incitements present during infancy and childhood, are equally numerous and all the more difficult of avoidance because unrecognized. The child who is "sensitive" or "precocious", or whose fancy is unregulated, is on the danger-line, and that child is fortunate whom, from the outset, a dim vision of his best possibilities, a dim sense of obligation to a cause greater than his own—represented by the sense of obligation to parents, nation, or to an assumed universal personality more vast and significant than these—so inspires and guides that he is able to make the sensuous pleasures of his infancy his servants and not his masters. That this result fails, with tragic frequency, to occur, is testified to by the frequency with which lives which seem to be surrounded by all the outward conditions for great happiness become the battle-ground of miseries, tempered only by longings for a better fate and also by the commonness of the occurrence of the serious neuroses and psychoneuroses, which represent the compromises of tempted childhood, half aware of its better possibilities. Fortunately, even a belated enlightenment and the chance to discuss one's inner conflicts with some one who has been trained to see them in the clearest light may still be helpful. For in proportion as knowledge, reason, and insight prevail, unreasoning and passionate emotion is apt to fade away. To give the best chance for the reinstatement of knowledge, reason, and insight is the function of the psychoanalytic treatment.

What is true of the sensuous element in the period of infancy is quite equally true of various more complex

groups of emotions, which are closely related, in genesis, to those just mentioned, but are more characteristic, though only relatively so, of later periods of life. I have reference especially to the sense of power¹ or superiority or self-assertion, with its accompanying opposite², the sense of inferiority and submissiveness—both of which may contain a truly sensuous element—or to the excitement of causing or submitting to pain. The complex fascination from these sources lasts, as a rule, the lifetime of every individual, and plays an important part in the determination of his conduct.

I am, however, not undertaking to describe at length the life of childhood. To do this would take us far into the nursery and the kindergarten and the playground, and make necessary a deep study of the extraordinary character of the life of fancy of even the youngest child³. My only purpose here has been to bring into relief the character of the problem with which psychoanalysis, as a therapeutic agent, seeks to deal. With this aim in view, I have desired to intimate that, on the one hand, and as if in the far distance, there stands a goal of possibility of individual development, to which, fortunately, every child is strongly drawn by bonds which he could not himself define and does not even realize the existence of; while, on the other hand, he must work his way along, like Ulysses passing the Sirens, like Christian passing through the Valley of the Shadow of Death, in the presence of only dimly appreciated dangers, which we are now beginning, for the first time, clearly to understand. The

¹ Cf. the exceedingly interesting discussion by Ferenczi (*Internationale Zeitschrift f. Ärztliche Psychoanalyse*, vol. i, H. 2) of the sense of power developed in the mind of the newborn child by the conditions of his life and care.

² Often appearing under the form of sadism and masochism.

³ Cf. the very important study by Bleuler (*Jahrb. f. Psychoanalyse*, etc., vol. iv) entitled *Autistisches Denken*.

ordinary forms of failure in this enterprise lead to the ordinary forms of nervous invalidism, or to one or another familiar defect of character; and in every such case, at every period of development, signs are to be detected through appropriate tests, unless the process has terminated in recovery, which indicate that the original temptations to make too much of particular sense-pleasures in and for themselves, have given place to new forms of temptation, in which the same emotional tone is present¹. It is not necessary, that these new and ever changing signs should point to gross sensualities of any sort. One and the same act or thought may serve to indicate, at the same moment, something of a man's spiritual nature and something of his sensual nature, and in every act or thought something of both of these elements may find opportunity for expression². The more serious forms of

¹ I believe that it would be of more psychological value, instead of using the expression "emotional tone", to choose some term which should be equivalent to "generic or creative energy", using this term as it has been used technically to express an idea underlying a series of manifestations. The generic energy of a tree, for example, covers the whole series of forms comprising the cycle of growth of the tree. In other words, it would be profitable to bear in mind, as I have hinted in another part of this paper, that in dealing with these phenomena of immaturity, under the different forms in which they manifest themselves, we are dealing with forces and tendencies which might be compared analogically to other process groups with which observation has already made us familiar, as classifiable under one or another heading.

² It is important for the rational interpretation of the symbolism of dreams and conduct, that this point should be clearly understood. It is often urged that those who use the psycho-analytic method are too prone to read sexual meanings into trivial and harmless thoughts. But, however, this may be in a given case, it is certain, that the ingenuousness of psychoanalysts in this respect does not equal the ingenuousness of persons of emotional temperament (patients, poets, and artists) in finding means to express the sensuous elements of their nature which they have brought over from their

failure lead to inversions, to perversions, and to criminality¹. The extreme outcomes, of success on the one hand and failure on the other, in the development of the child, are determined, obviously, by strong influences which are not to be classified in any single category. These extreme outcomes are, moreover, so different in aspect and apparently so opposed in nature that when either set of them predominates, the ordinary observer may fail to appreciate that in every case both are really active. Any child may *play* criminal almost to his heart's content; and perhaps every child, as a necessity of biological and psychological development, shows tendencies which, if they persisted and grew stronger, would mark him as an invert or a pervert. But so powerfully does the current ordinarily set, in the one direction or the other, that we feel entirely safe, as a rule, as regards the future of the greater number of our children, and consider that those who go right and those who go wrong are separated by differences almost as great as those that distinguish from one another the different animal species. It is only when the chance is offered for getting at the real facts, and especially for clearly facing the repressed tendencies and experiences of the life of childhood, that these differences are seen to be of degree only, and that we learn to appreciate that all children grow up in a broad borderland between the evil (as we classify it later, not as it appears definitely

childhoods. Any symbol can be made use of by the lover to intensify his passion and find new outlet for it. But that does not prevent the employment of the same symbol for some other end or ends. These facts and their bearing would be recognized were it not that the very hint at the possibility of sex-meanings gives rise, unjustly, to opposition and resentment.

¹ It is, I trust, needless to say that I am now dealing with the psychogenetic factors alone, and that I realize fully the existence, likewise, of somatic factors.

to the child) and the good. Many an adult, every individual in some measure, is more or less under the spell of this or that tendency which harks back directly to one or another special craving or sense-fascination of childhood or infancy, which was then, though perhaps only for a brief period, felt in full intensity, but promptly repressed and relegated to the unconscious¹. But by this "repression" these special cravings or fascinations are placed in a position of advantage for continuing to exert their influence, always in covert ways and in constantly changing ways, without ever, perhaps, coming under the full light of conscious, rational inspection, though constantly giving rise to emotional distresses and nameless fears, and an ill defined sense of something wrong. Strangely enough, these distresses and apprehensions are bound to the fascinations which preceded them by bonds which show them to be of common nature, and are instinctively clung to as representing, in terms of the patient's unconscious logic, the once legitimate though soon repressed pleasures of the age of childhood.

Just what the original fascinations of childhood are I have been able here only distantly to hint. Every observer will admit, however, that such fascinations exist; that they are very numerous; that every child's vivid fancy² is fertile in inventing them; that they might be classed primarily and broadly as egoistic; that they are of a kind that it is easier to acquire a taste for than for those

¹ The tendency of persons of extreme refinement to show, in the deliria of mania or the ramblings of dementia praecox, a familiarity with subjects and language assumed to have been wholly foreign to their thoughts, has always been a matter of painful comment and surprise. In fact, such patients thus disclose a very important chapter in their development.

² Reproduced in the delirious but really consistent utterances of many insane patients, especially in dementia praecox. See Bleuler, loc. cit.

which are to be useful for the higher spiritual development of the individual, and that for this reason they are constantly reverted to in times of even moderate stress. If it is just to classify as "sensuous" these vague, voluminous, personal, egoistic, mirror-love sorts of pleasures, which are ill-defined, but intense, and full of captivating thrills, it is just also to recognize that the quality which is most characteristic of them is most strongly present in those special sensations and emotions which are particularly and specifically related to the sexual functions, and which, as such, enjoy a special primacy as regards psychological and physiological significance. But these sensations, acts, and emotions—both those which are frankly sexual and those which contain the sensuous characteristics of the sexual feelings as a constituent element or are readily drawn into the great vortex of which the sexual feelings and emotions form the centre—are largely repressed, in deference, partly to the child's fastidiousness, partly to his conscience (both of which have a social root), and partly to the spoken or unspoken wishes of a social environment in which the interests of individual members are subordinated to the assumed interests of the social group, regarded as a whole.

The situation of the young child is a difficult one; and so, too, is that of the adult who is the child grown large and who is tempted to play the child's game with the grown-up weapons of the man. A man is filled with dread¹ lest he may injure some member of his family whom in fact he loves, and perhaps isolates himself in consequence. But psychoanalytic study shows that in reality he is reverting to his childhood and is playing the old childhood game of love, hate, desire, fear, anger, sorrow, jealousy, and remorse, —each emotion acting at

¹ I have, of course, specific histories in mind.

once as the parent and the child of its opposite and each capable of passing into the other or suggesting its opposite or of intensifying itself through inducing a thrilling sense of contrast with an undefined opposite. In childhood, the first and strongest of these emotions is desire, especially, desire of the sort that is particularly characteristic of the sex-feelings and emotions, which, instead of being absent, in infancy and childhood, are both present and engrossing. And so it is that when the conscience and the will relax, and the longings hark back to less strenuous and more immature and infantile interests, the emotions which come to the front are necessarily those which it is proper to denominate as sexual, since it is round the—biologically and socially—enormously significant sex-instinct that these interests and emotions cluster, and from it that they gain their color, and their emotional tone. Having learned all these and many other kindred facts, we can no longer wonder at Freud's dictum, that no psychoneurotic (emotional) illness can possibly occur without a concomitant, and partly causal, ruffling of the vast waters of the sex-life.

In searching for a simile through which to illustrate to myself the strength of the bond by which the development of the child is restrained in this or that respect, through influences of varying sorts, I have been able to find none so useful as that of the massive "fixation"¹ or "arrest" that brings about the formation of the various animal species as an alternative to the continuance of the line of progress toward higher types. It is needless to say that I attach little or no biological importance to the comparison.

When the case presents itself of helping to recovery a patient in whom these tendencies to arrest have become established, it is of great service to him, not

¹ Freud's term.

alone to be shown clearly the path toward a better evolution of his personality and powers, but to be helped to put himself back again, in memory and imagination, at the point where the partial arrest occurred, in order that he may see clearly what a different choice, at that point, would have accomplished for him, and that he may even now make it, as if for the first time, and thus rid himself of a craving which had gained a strong and yet fictitious power over him. But these processes must be conceived in psychological terms. Each individual must learn to see himself and the physician must learn to see him, as a collection of interwoven forces, all still living and still active, even though many of them came into existence in the early days of childhood. And the physician who does not possess by nature, or cannot acquire, the power of thus reading the lives of his patients in the terms of these living forces, is not at all likely to find satisfaction or success in psychoanalytic practice.

No one can make the best use of his powers, either for his personal happiness and guidance or in the interests of the community, who is the victim of his own immature passions, prejudices and superstitions, and who continues through adult life to use his imagination for inventing an unreal world of which he is the centre and the hero. Such a person should be aided to destroy this great structure of a misguided fancy and self-love, by learning to see that from its foundations upward, it misrepresents his best desires. A sound moral education should not tend to stifle emotion but to see that it is directed toward the best goal. The child's danger is that he will misuse the great forces which are placed within his grasp, for his own personal gratification, and one form, not yet clearly alluded to, in which he does this, is in playing with his own heated emotions, under the

guise of imaginary danger. Every child, even if at bottom cowardly, loves to play at the game of Phaeton, assuming, in ignorance and folly, to drive the wagon of the sun. He loves to dally with himself and to create mock dangers and mock fears, in ways that by no means necessarily fit him to meet the real dangers of the coming world. He loves to excite himself with fire and the dark, and with fancies of death and life, not realizing with what deep, emotional interests he is dealing. But this emotional fire must not be too hot. When that point is reached the fear becomes a real sense of terror, and then the child, ignorant that the cause of his putting himself into the dangerous situation was his (covert) love of what the adult calls sensuous pleasures, finds himself forced to explain or "rationalize"¹ his fears. The fascinating flame becomes a "cross" to him, and he begins to refer his distress to one or another common cause of dangers. One may represent this situation by drawing a flame and a cross, side by side, on a sheet of paper, with a line between them to indicate, so to speak, that though in reality mutually dependent, each is unconscious of the other. If, now, the patient would recover, and cannot do so through the interest of work, or by the attempt to get into a spiritual atmosphere above the fear, he must learn to turn his attention wholly aside from his symptoms (his "cross"), the contemplation of which he is certain to have followed too long, and to too little purpose, and must study the flame, that is, he must study the history of his emotional life. An intimate acquaintance with this history, by teaching him the real nature and origin of his fears, and showing them to be fears of himself, puts him in a far better position for attaining that development of character through which he may get well. Then the cross, in the old sense, dis-

¹ Dr. Ernest Jones.

appears, but may still be voluntarily accepted as symbolizing the willingness to endure sufferings, not indeed of the sort formerly endured, but of a sort which will make the patient better able to take his place as a useful member of the community. The person who has attained this development has learned, in Emerson's words that "when half-gods go the gods arrive," the half-gods being his own immature desires. What every person wants is happiness and content. But these are to be gained, as a rule, not by the cultivation of pleasures of the kind that exist in and for themselves, but rather through disregarding them in the interests of a broader life.

It is one of the remarkable signs of the far-reaching significance of the freedom with which we are endowed that we can use it to destroy our freedom; and a striking illustration of this is seen in the subtle, instinctive keenness with which the young child, when not sufficiently impelled by his own natural resources and not sufficiently aided by education, instead of taking each stage in his development as a stepping stone to the next, grows old indeed in years, but clings nevertheless, in secret, and without fully realizing the fact, to childish forms of thought and emotion which should have been outgrown and of which, even as a child, he was perhaps secretly ashamed. Clear sighted educators have long known the importance of this principle in the case of children somewhat older than those that I have now in mind. But it has remained for this group of investigators and those who have gradually affiliated themselves with them, to discover, point by point, the influences, which lead to the formation, in the hidden depths of the child's mind, of emotional modes of thought and feeling (Autistisches Denken, Bleuler) destined thereafter to play a large part in the determinations of his conduct. The emotions and excitements of this autistic life exist largely, not as transitions to some-

thing better and more permanent, but in and for themselves alone. Even though not consciously perceived they act to draw the desires away from the disinterested forms of love which constitute the natural goal of progress, and tend instead to the cultivation of egoistic forms of love, which may indeed have an object, but use that object as a mirror by means of which self-love may be intensified. The fantasy-life of young children may serve as the basis of wholesome forms of religion and art, but sometimes, instead of this, it serves as the basis of morbid tendencies and morbid fears.

The evidence is very strong for the view that the appearance of the human mind among the evolutionary forces¹ introduces a new factor of enormous import. Even the infant and young child, by reason of the endowment of their mental structure, have powers and obligations which they, however, cannot easily or fully recognize. With their consciousness of themselves they acquire also the germs of consciousness of the scheme of the universe. They acquire the sense of power, responsibility, and personality, and also of weakness and dependence upon others and the subtle pleasure that goes with dependence. With their unbridled fancy they people the world and they utilize not only sticks and stones but everything, even their own sensations, as terms in which to express their passions and desires and longings. Then come reactions, loathings, self-deprecations, and forgetting in the form of repression, which means really not forgetting but setting aside for further use. The child who is living externally a life of eminent self-satisfaction and propriety may be indulging himself, without knowing it,

¹ Attention has been called by Bergson and many others, to the significance of "life" (*pousse vitale*, etc.) as a factor in evolution. The doctrine of which I now speak includes this, but goes beyond it.

in the aroma of pleasures and excitements which he had banished to the "unconscious", but to which he still keeps many secret avenues open.

How can a treatment through which the patient is enabled to see what is going on and to unmask the "confidence game" played by his lower nature on his higher nature, fail to commend itself as worthy of support? The method which attempts this should, moreover, be judged with reference to its possibilities, and not to its present achievements only. Its aim, in general terms, is to help toward the solution of the external problems of human beings, by helping them, in specific ways, to solve their internal problems.

And this is a reasonable task. For the drama of the external world is played over, beforehand, in the minds and hearts of the personalities by which it is peopled. Let those who believe in the value of the method, but object to the way they think it used, test it out themselves. They owe it to their patients to attempt this task.

Chapter XII.

DREAM INTERPRETATION AND THE THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS*.

In spite of all that has been written on the subject, there is still much misconception about the true aim of a psychoanalytic investigation, and the particular sort of help which the analysis of dreams may furnish. Furthermore, too much is made of the assumed defects of the method, or of alleged eccentricities (doubtless sometimes real) in interpretation, or of occasional mischances in treatment, which, in fact, are usually due to unavoidable and unexpectedly difficult conditions, or to avoidable errors of judgment on the physician's part.

In his paper entitled, "The Analysis and Interpretation of Dreams Based on Various Motives", and published in the June-July, 1913, number of this Journal, Dr. Meyer Solomon develops in an interesting manner the view that many other emotional surgings besides those based on the sexual instinct underlie our dream-life. After referring to another article, also by himself, in which the motive of self-preservation is specifically brought out, Dr. Solomon says :

"These additional cases are further proof of the error of Freudism in over-emphasizing the sexual element in dream-content. Indeed, the Freudians maintain that sexuality, and sexuality alone, is at the bottom of all dream life¹. I use the word sexuality here in the same

* Published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, April 1914.

¹ The most that Freud says in support of this proposition is that: "The greater one's experience with the interpretation of dreams,

broad sense as the Freudians do, thus including man's original and primitive bisexual and polymorphous perverse sexual predisposition."

Of the cases themselves I shall have but little to say, and, indeed, the materials for an adequate discussion are not given, since but little is told of the patients' symptoms—that is, of the reasons for undertaking the treatment, or of subjecting either the dreams or the character and temperament to any sort of thorough analysis at all. That the motives recorded and argued for were present, and that the discovery of them gave the analyst all the information he desired for the purposes (not stated) which he had in view, I am entirely ready to admit; but that "nothing further could have been gained by these methods" (*i. e.*, by psychoanalysis¹, association-tests, etc.) "in the cases here reported" is a personal judgment to which, of course, no psychoanalyst could assent.

The writer expresses himself as "very much in sympathy with Freudism"¹; and I believe this to be not only true but truer than he now believes. Dr. Solomon thinks, to be sure, that psychoanalysts must come around to his way of thinking (see page 100), but in my opinion the opposite result is far more likely to occur. He regards it as an "inevitable conclusion" that the reasoning which he applies to dream-analysis [including, one must assume, the more inclined does one find one's self to admit that in the greater part (*Mehrzahl*) of the dreams of adults, sexual materials are made use of and erotic desires find expression." (*Die Traumdeutung, dritte Auflage*, p. 205.)

It is worth remembering that it I have been rightly informed Freud analyzed one thousand dreams before he began to draw conclusions.

¹ This word is here used in the technical sense in which it was first used by Freud, and which courtesy and the practical convenience of scientific intercommunication have now accorded to it.

the view that his very imperfect method of inquiry may profitably be substituted for the more complete method now in use) will be applied also in the end to the analysis of "all other fields of human activity which Freudians have attempted to explain." Time alone can decide, and meanwhile we must agree to differ on that point. So far as his paper is concerned with the desirability of emphasizing certain dream motives other than the sexual one, his arguments are interesting and his opinions quite in line with those of a number of other eminent writers; and all that I might care to do would be to indicate that in certain important particulars his characterization of the attitude of the "Freudians" is misleading. But, in fact, Dr. Solomon goes much farther than this, and—by implication at least — calls in question the value of the psychoanalytic *methods*, through which such a vast amount of information has been gained with reference to the rôle of childhood in adult life, and the rôle of the hidden motives and self-deceptions, which, to a greater or less degree, falsify the lives of every man and every group of men. The writer makes this statement categorically, to be sure, only with reference to the cases which he reports, and only with relation to the analysis of dreams. But no one who is thoroughly familiar with the details of psychoanalytic work and with the relation of dream-life to waking-life, and who has patiently gone through the tedious labor necessary for getting all the facts required for the understanding of difficult cases, can read such statements as that above quoted, even about the cases here reported, and then the details of the dreams themselves with the writer's comments on them, without feeling that Dr. Solomon is, at this moment, in danger of setting himself and others on a wrong road. I am unwilling that the readers of this Journal should think that the method here advised, which relies on the testimony of the patient's

primary memories and judgments and primary associations, can be accepted as a substitute for a real psychoanalytic investigation. How can Dr. Solomon possibly be certain, without further investigation, whether the personal ambitions or maternal instincts of his patients, which represented such strong tendencies that their dreams thought it worth while to deal with them, did not owe even a large portion of their strength to the infantile equivalents of ambition and of the maternal instinct? The "Republic" of Plato would never have been written if Socrates had relied on the primary judgments of his interlocutors, nor the many character-novels and problem-plays of the present day if their authors had not assumed motives on the part of their fictitious personages that the latter could never have revealed themselves, unless with psychoanalytic help.

One need not claim that the psychoanalytic methods are above criticism in order to defend the broad principle that their main value rests on the thoroughness of their application. Neither need one doubt, just because dreams are shown to deal mainly with repressed and infantile motives, that the analysis of them is undertaken with the motive of setting free, so far as may be, the spiritual forces of the patient's life, his ideals and his aspirations.

A book has just been published by an exceedingly high-minded and impartial writer, Pfarrer Pfister of Zürich¹, in which, although some of the views of Freud are freely criticised, the sentiment that I have just expressed is emphasized convincingly, with especial reference to the analysis of dreams. On page 309, he says:

"Da der Traum verdichtet, symbolisiert, durch das Gegenteil repräsentiert und sublimiert, ist mit einer einzigen Deutung der latente Inhalt des Traumes nicht

¹ Paedagogium: Band I. Die Psychoanalytische Methode (the first volume of an educational series).

erschöpft. Man kann nie sagen, daß man die tiefste Lösung gefunden habe. Manche Träume können überhaupt nicht gedeutet werden."

Then, quoting Freud, he adds:

"Die vollständige Deutung eines solchen Traumes fällt eben zusammen mit der Analyse."

In what follows I propose to give my opinion with regard to certain of the sources of these misconceptions which are referred to in Dr. Solomon's interesting paper, and shall speak first of the argument that the value of the testimony of patients with reference to their past lives, and especially to their dreams, is likely to be greatly impaired by memory-falsifications, resembling, but perhaps sometimes exceeding, those so often seen, for example, in all courts of law.

It might be supposed that this source of error would necessarily be a very important one; yet, in fact, experience shows it to be of trifling consequence.

Memory-falsifications do, undoubtedly and obviously, occur; but this matters comparatively little, for the reason that what the physician mainly seeks to learn about the patient, or to help the patient to discover for his own benefit, is not so much actual experiences in and for themselves, as trends of character and tendencies to emotional reaction, which such experiences illustrate and symbolize. And for acquiring this knowledge, even very vague memories; even the recollection of a fantasy of childhood, or a fantasy-habit; even an inference through which the patient may *be led to see that he must have entertained* a certain kind of thought or feeling, if only by contrast, may be of real service.

If it is true that every patient carries within his mind strong emotions, the offspring alike of strong and vague

instinctive desires and equally strong and vague aspirations;— emotions which are striving at once to make themselves felt and yet to conceal themselves, just as a vain but self-conscious child, desiring yet fearing to be noticed by his father's guests, alternately thrusts himself forward and shrinks into a corner:— if this is true, then even half-memories may serve to make clear the motive power ("generic energy") by which these emotional tendencies were animated at one or another period, and may serve, too, to call other half-memories to mind.

What is needed is that the patient should write his emotional autobiography, and that, in order to do this truly, he should yield up the pen to the *alter ego* which is within him, and is always more or less at variance with his conscious self. From such yielding he instinctively shrinks back, but if he can bring himself to overcome this shrinking he can at least write a romance about himself, and this romance may answer very well in place of distinct memories. Dreams may furnish ample materials for such an autobiography of the *alter ego*, but only on the condition that they are used as a means for evoking copious, and thus self-correcting, hints for the interpretation of early tendencies and motives, and that the patient is willing to see the repressed portions of himself revealed by them.

Another and kindred consideration should be mentioned in this same connection: Some of the materials which the patient must learn to utilize for reconstrucing this history of his emotional life may never have been actual experiences at all, and yet may possess, in a certain degree and sense, the form and the value of experiences.

Let one imagine a bird kept in close captivity until after the time when he should have learned to fly and to mate. Can any one well trained in psychological thinking and observation doubt that in such a case, coincidently with the development of organs and functions that were

never adequately used, emotional surgings would have occurred through which these never fully-realized powers and longings would have attained to some measure of self-expression; and, if birds have dreams, can any one doubt that corresponding elements would have occurred in them? Can one doubt, further, that this same process goes on in the marvelous bird-cage or prison-house of childhood and adolescence, in which organ after organ; and function after function, comes into development, just far enough, perhaps, to foreshadow their possibilities of activity, but not enough to cause these various possibilities to be realized at their full value.

“. . . Alas for those who never sing,
But die with all their music in them.”

Bergson has compared these possibilities, only a portion of which become realized, to a sheaf of wheat stalks.

In other words, I believe that besides speaking of “organic memories” we have the right to speak of “organic aspirations,” as corresponding to the appearance in subconscious, but not conscious life, of the dim fore-shadowings of functional activities that never fully attain their birthright. There is surely a form of energy (described by Bergson as “*poussée vitale*,” or “*élan vitale*”) which transcends in its activity the structure of the body and the brain. The abortive efforts of this vital impulse are to be included in what we want to learn of an individual life-history, and the most trivial memory may help the imagination to reconstruct some portions of it, although, strictly speaking, this history is one which must often be created and half imagined, rather than reconstructed from facts of clearly recalled experience.

The next question to which I desire to call attention is that which relates to the assumed over-emphasis on the

sexual life, in dream-analysis and psychoanalysis in general, and as an assumed cause of the psychoneuroses, on the part of Professor Freud and of those who, through following the method of searching thoroughness proposed by him, have arrived at substantially similar conclusions on this point.

Let me repeat that I believe Dr. Solomon to be more nearly in agreement with Professor Freud's views than the critical tone of his article might easily lead such of his readers to believe as have not had the chance or willingness to study these questions carefully; and that it is to them that these arguments are addressed.

It should never be forgotten by those who wish to look at this matter fairly, that when Freud and his colleagues speak of "sexuality" they mean something which reaches far beyond the "bisexual and polymorphous perverse sexual predisposition," which Dr. Solomon several times cites as if it were a full statement of the accepted psychoanalytic definition. This part of the definition is indeed important, and does perhaps apply to the infantile and repressed elements of the sex life, the existence of which is always assumed by implication. But these terms should be read in connection with the published opinion at which Freud arrived finally, after many years of study. A recent statement of this opinion is as follows¹:

¹ *Zbl. für Psychoan.* I, 92. I venture to give a free, but, I trust, an accurate rendering of this important passage, but subjoin also the original text.

"Es kann dem Arzt nicht unbekannt geblieben sein, daß man der Psychoanalyse den Vorwurf zu machen pflegt, sie dehne den Begriff des Sexuellen weit über den gebräuchlichen Umfang aus. Die Tatsache ist richtig; ob sie als Vorwurf verwendet werden darf, soll hier nicht erörtert werden. Der Begriff des Sexuellen umfaßt in der Psychoanalyse weit mehr; er geht nach unten wie nach oben über den populären Sinn hinaus. Diese Erweiterung rechtfertigt sich genetisch; wir rechnen zum 'Sexualleben' auch alle Betätigungen

"It is well known that psychoanalysts have been criticised by their medical colleagues for stretching the conception of the 'sexual' far beyond the limits ordinarily assigned to it. It is true that they have done this, but whether they are blameworthy for so doing is quite another question. The psychoanalytic conception of the sexual does transcend the limits of the popular conception in both directions, *i. e.*, upward as well as downward; and the reasons for this widening of meaning become clear enough if one studies the sex life of man from the standpoint of its genesis. If, namely, the first stirrings or manifestations of the sexual instinct are taken as the point of departure, it seems justifiable to classify¹ as belonging to and characteristic of the sex life, the entire series of tender emotions (*zärtliche Gefühle*) which come into being as outgrowths of these early impulses. This mode of classification is applicable even where, in the course of further development, the original goal of these impulses has ceased to exist as such, or has been exchanged for a wholly new one.

"Having learned to look at the matter in this way, we now like to use the term 'psychosexual' in preference to 'sexual,' in order to emphasize our belief that the higher mental constituents (*seelischen Faktor*) of the sex life should be taken cognizance of, and their significance fully recognized. In short, we now use the term 'sexuality' in

zärtlicher Gefühle, die aus der Quelle der primitiven sexuellen Regungen hervorgegangen sind, auch wenn diese Regungen eine Hemmung ihres ursprünglich sexuellen Ziels erfahren, oder dieses Ziel gegen ein anderes, nicht mehr sexuelles, vertauscht haben. Wir sprechen darum auch lieber von Psychosexualität, legen so Wert darauf, daß man den seelischen Faktor des Sexuallebens nicht übersehe und nicht unterschätze. Wir gebrauchen das Wort Sexualität in demselben umfassenden Sinne, wie die deutsche Sprache das Wort 'lieben'."

¹ Obviously for reasons such as those above stated.

the same broad sense in which the German word *lieben* is employed¹."

Defined in this way, the term "sexual" obviously might apply to a vast number of acts, experiences and thoughts which belong to ordinary social and domestic life, and characterize many of the relationships of each individual even to himself (*i. e.*, as pointing toward auto-eroticism and narcissism). But it should be remembered that the nature of an act or fact is determined largely by its context, and that although the sexual impulses characteristic of primitive forms of civilization, and characteristic also of the more obviously sexual life of all persons, are connected to the higher and highest spiritual emotions of love by an unbroken line, yet one would hardly be tempted to use the term sexual for these latter manifestations, except under special conditions; then, namely, when, for one or another reason, their genetic relationship to the phenomena typical of the other end of this line needed to be dwelt upon.

Although this definition of "sexuality", as equivalent under certain conditions to "love", opens widely certain doors which had been closed, it must not be thought to imply an attempt to describe all the phenomena of civilization as outgrowths of the sex life. Such attempts have been made and may, from some standpoints, be of interest.

¹ See also "Zur Dynamik der Übertragung," *Zbl. für Psychoan.* II, 171.

"Alle unsere im Leben verwertbaren Gefühlsbeziehungen von Sympathie, Freundschaft, Zutrauen u. dgl. seien genetisch mit der Sexualität verknüpft und haben sich durch Abschwächung des Sexualziels aus rein sexuellen Begehrungen entwickelt, so rein und unsinnlich sie sich auch unsrer bewußten Selbstwahrnehmung darstellen mögen. Ursprünglich haben wir nur Sexualobjekte gekannt; die Psychoanalyse zeigt uns, daß die bloß geschätzten oder verehrten Personen unserer Realität für das unbewußte in uns immer noch Sexualobjekte sein können."

But Professor Freud's purpose, as I understand it, is one based for the most part on practical considerations and on clinical observation. The practical need, in the study of a patient's motives, or of human motives in general, is to discover what *tendencies* they represent. It is not through observation of his *acts*, in themselves, that one judges of a man's character, temperament and temptations, so much as through his acts as expressive of his (often deeply hidden) intentions and desires. One wants to know not so much where he stands, on the above-mentioned line which stretches without break from the obviously sexual to the apparently spiritual, but from what source the emotions, tendencies and motives that underlie his (perhaps unexceptional) acts are deriving their force and nourishment.

The adoption of this broader conception of the sexual has been criticised as misleading by various persons, and amongst others by Professor Janet, in his recent address before the International Congress at London. But I trust that the reasons above indicated may be considered amply to justify the course taken.

The bearing of these considerations upon the interpretation of dreams is particularly important. Men come before one another as persons doing specific acts, and the problem which presents itself is how to argue from these acts to the tendencies ("generic energies") which underlie them. A given act of social sort, which in ordinary life might pass unnoticed, or be taken as an indication of civility or refinement (that is, of "sublimation"), is likely, when it occurs in dreams, to have a different meaning, and to be the symbol of far cruder desires. And one cannot fully understand these desires without being thoroughly familiar with the history of childhood in general, and—so far as practicable—with the childhood of the individual person with whom one is dealing, in particular.

One may say, as Dr. Solomon says, that this need not necessarily be so, and that psychoanalysts very often go astray in their interpretations of dream-symbolisms. Let us grant that this is true, but let us remember that in the end it is the patient who decides, both what the symbols mean, and whether the interpretations are applicable to him; and that it is to his advantage to learn also what the dream *may* mean. The change of temperament and character which should be the outcome of a psychoanalytic treatment is extremely hard to bring about. If a man's desires tend in inferior directions; if he is inclined to think of himself first, and to make or wish himself prominent, when he should be thinking first of his obligations to the community, this tendency is one which he can eradicate only by holding the better and the worse ideals constantly before his eyes. If he is earnest in his desire to do this, the discovery that some apparently harmless act, classifiable in ordinary parlance as a wholly justifiable form of "tender emotion", is in reality a sign that his thoughts are tending in objectionable directions, may be a discovery which he should be glad to make, and he may find reason to be grateful to the physician who helps him to utilize some association which his dream suggests, as a means of making it. Even if we assume that it is stretching a point to say that the meaning which is arrived at was not contained in the dream, this does not really matter. A man's dreams are in his own hands, to be made use of for his own benefit, and he will surely find that *all* the thoughts and memories which they bring up are related, directly or indirectly, to those which form the hidden strata of his emotional life. A person's adult life is richer, it is true, than his infantile life. But it contains the infantile tendencies as ever present and ever active elements, and the time spent in ascertaining these will not be spent in vain. Dreams call attention, of course,

not only to the weaker side of one's nature, but (at least by inference) to the stronger side. These latter indications should be acknowledged and sought out as one portion of the dream's meaning, but the other portion has also its profound significance.

It is possible that if no large and serious problem of practical therapeutics had been at stake, even the keen insight and the thorough, unbiased, Darwin-like, observational genius of a Freud would have failed to see the importance of seeking for a (partial) common denominator for all dreams, or common element in all dreams¹; or, in other words, of recognizing that the reverersions toward simpler types of longing which characterize all off-guard movements of our thought, *tend finally* (if only in part) *toward one common goal characteristic of our early years*², which for special reasons is of especial significance.

But, in fact, Freud's study of dreams came close upon his earlier observations with regard to the nature of the psychoneuroses and his discovery of the far-reachingness of "repression", and the force of the powerful influences


¹ In view of the very marked divergencies of opinion of late years, and especially during the past year or two, with reference to these complex matters, it would not be safe to assume that this view is held by all those psychoanalysts who formerly entertained it. Even the standing of the sexual tendency has itself become a subject for discussion and difference of opinion (Adler, Jung and others).

² I should be inclined here, were it not for extending these remarks too far, to suggest the same supplement that I have suggested in other portions of this paper. I believe, namely, that the movements which take place in our mental life are always "ambivalent" (Bleuler), that is, that each movement in one direction contains, by inference, a tacit recognition of the fact that a movement in the opposite direction might take place. Thus, our reverisons toward childhood are in reality relative only, and are tintured with a sense of conflict due to a recognition of a possible movement in the direction of sublimation. Here again Emerson's significant line, "The fiend that man harries is love of the best", comes into mind.

which lead so many persons, when exposed to difficulty and stress, to disregard the summons of the nobler elements in their natures in favor of elements that might be called, in a sense, less noble¹.

It is this consideration of *practical importance* which, in my estimation, should lead us to rate the "sexuality" motive as more significant than the "self-preservation" motive, in the causation and analysis of the psychoneuroses, even though it may be true that the latter motive stands higher in the scale of importance as regards life as a whole. Schopenhauer's "*Wille zum Dasein*" and Nietzsche's "*Wille zur Macht*"², have recently been referred to as lending powerful support to Adler's view, which seems to be also that of Solomon³, and to a great extent that of Jung⁴.

The subject is an important and a difficult one, and could not be discussed thoroughly in short space or without reference to metaphysical considerations. I venture, however, to offer a simple diagram which may help to make my meaning (and Freud's, as I understand it) somewhat clearer.



¹ See Emerson's poem, "Days."

² See Freschl, in "*Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie*", III. Jahrgang, Heft 10-11.

³ See first page, and also the discussion given further on.

⁴ See Fordham Lectures.

Let the line AB represent the aggregate instincts or functions of infancy, without reference to the question whether they are best to be considered as multiple and relatively independent in nature and origin, or as expressive of some primal life-force wholly or partially covered by such terms as *Urslibido* or "*poussée vitale*". Let BC stand for the line of the sexual life and as connecting, eventually, its most obvious and gross features with its most highly sublimated features. Finally, let the line BC^m stand for the various outcomes of the personal development which tend in (practically) non-sexual directions, including those indicated as of prime importance in the publications of Dr. Adler.

Let us now suppose the question to have arisen, in what category one should classify some act of infancy—nursing at the breast, for instance—which, admittedly, while subserving some useful end, such as nutrition, subserves, also, the end of securing some sort of gratification to which the term "massive" might, for certain reasons, be applied. Should one call this gratification "sexual", with Freud, or "nutritional", and perhaps "pre-sexual", with Jung, or should one make it secondary to some attempt to assert the personality, with Adler (and Solomon?)?

What I wish to maintain is this: that our course in this respect should depend upon whether we are engaged in studying, *especially if for practical reasons*, the meaning of some act or thought which we suspect, or believe a patient to suspect, to have sexual connotations, *in his* (the patient's) *sense*, or whether our purpose is a different one from this.

In other words, if nursing is an act which naturally precedes various obvious manifestations of the sexual life, by virtue of yielding certain forms of gratification closely analogous to the obviously sexual, is it not both justifiable

and desirable to call it sexual, provided it is the cruder, infantile manifestations of the sexual life which—for specific, practical considerations—we are under obligation to discover? And does the fact that this same act yields, also, a pleasure which might be called "nutritional", militate against the justice of this procedure?

All that Freud claims, as I grasp the matter, is that infancy contains elements which lend themselves—over and above their other meanings—to the classification "sexual", which for reasons of clinical science,—and therefore, "science",—is of great practical significance. Does this oblige one to deny the value, for its own purposes, of the "self-assertion" explanation; and does the term "pre-sexual" help out the practical situation, even though it be of service in calling attention to other facts which may be of importance in their turn?

In brief, there would seem to be no reason why we should not agree to denominate as the most practically important motive leading to psychopathic illnesses, that one which patients themselves, during analysis, describe as the most important, and find to have played, practically, the most prominent part in their lives, as representing a great group of motives which are at once very strong and very carefully repressed. It is easy enough, of course, to discuss dreams at almost any length without touching on the sexual motive. Ambition and the maternal instinct (etc., etc.), afford ample points for study of quite other and often exceedingly important sorts.

Patients who are injudiciously treated, or who are at any given moment in a state of protest, are apt to feel, when they discover that the personal ambitions (for example) of which they find it so difficult to rid themselves, arose on the basis of some well-marked, and perhaps reflected, self-love (*and therefore sexual love*) existing and emphasized in infancy, that they are proving them-

selves to be sensuous persons in a gross or objectional sense. It is wholly unnecessary, however, that they should feel this any further than it is literally true. The line of evolution which every one must follow in the path from his animal nature to his sublimated nature necessarily begins with a certain sort of sensuousness, and ends logically in disinterested love. This sensuousness is the first step on an ascending scale, or ladder, and should be so regarded, unless, indeed, it has been retained unconsciously as something which the patient in question has cultivated too much, in and for itself. The patient's task is to learn to see his sensuousness in the light of his best self, and as having had a distinct and necessary relationship to his best qualities. But he must now learn to level his sensuousness up to the level of his spirituality, that is, to invest it with the spiritual significance of the good results to which it led, and not to feel (unless there is reason for so doing) that his spirituality is to be read in the terms of his sensuousness, in any sense except the best.

It has long been recognized as a sound psychological proposition (a proposition made great use of by Bergson in his careful reasonings) that everything that a man does, or thinks, so far from standing alone, or having only a short history, has a history at least as long as the man's life. Not only does each act or thought of the adult rest, in part, upon the experiences of the child, in the sense that the boy is, to speak broadly, the father of the man; but the life of the man actually contains the experiences of the boy, as integral and (virtually) active elements of its own essence. What is still more important, *the kinds of reaction* which through early accentuation become characteristic of childhood, either remain (in their own form) characteristic of adult life, even to a degree of which the adult may be wholly unaware; or else become the

parents of new reaction-tendencies in which the old are virtually embodied. I do not see how this proposition, as a general statement of fact, can be controverted; and, indeed, the actual evidence in its favor has become almost overwhelming. It is the old story of the bent twig growing into the twisted bough, but with the difference that the twists met with in the case of the human being are of kinds that occur the more readily, for the fact that as a rule they conform to certain developmental types which are very prone to show themselves.

In the majority of cases such influences are discoverable—or, at least, hints of their presence are discoverable—by adequate dream analyses; and in pathological cases it is often a matter of great importance to make a thorough search for them. This proposition is justified by the fact that in dreams the thought tendency approaches, relatively, the childhood and infantile types, *i. e.*, the "autistic" (Bleuler) type. This being so, the completeness of a dream analysis would seem fairly measurable by the amount of the patient's concealed ("autistic"; infantile) history which it brings to light. It is often admittedly difficult to carry the analysis of a dream beyond a certain point. But unless the whole theory of repression is a mistaken one, it must be conceded that we cannot get even as far as we might if we leave the inquiry to the patient's primary judgment and good sense, even if aided by the primary judgment of the physician.

In summary of the foregoing, I would say: The longer and more elaborate analyses, so far from being the more liable to errors, are usually the soundest, and there is danger that by stopping them too soon one may be following in the footsteps of some of the older-fashioned boarding-school principals who advertise to "finish" at their establishments, the education of young girls.

The thinking processes of the child, although they contain the germs of all the best promise of his later years, are occupied, relatively to those of the adult, with sense perceptions, in which, of course, the inferential recognition of the best possibilities of his development also takes a part. The acts which the child does, and the sensations which he feels, have thus a multiple meaning for him. Nursing, for example, while it secures him nourishment, and is an act of self-assertion, gives rise to a (for him) peculiarly engrossing set of vague, but strong and pleasureable or—so to speak—"sensuous" feelings. Similar statements may be made of a large proportion of all that the child does, and all that is done to him, but far more of certain sorts of daily acts and certain sorts of sensations than of others, of those, namely, which are not at all or not wholly seized upon to serve some specific function of the personal or social life. Analogous multiple meanings and outcomes are attached to the earlier social relationships (that to the parents, etc.), as is well known.

The classification of these sensuous feelings as sexual is, I repeat, not the child's, but the adult's. But there the feelings are, name them as one will; and they certainly continue to play a large part in the form of craving,—highly prized but soon carefully concealed even from his conscious self,—amongst the emotional tendencies of the child's unconscious mind, capable of lending themselves as materials for his imagination to work up into fantastic shapes¹.

If it is true that dreams—like all manifestations of our adult mental life, but in peculiarly large measure—necessarily hark back in some sense to childhood, then the attempt to rehabilitate the period of infancy through psychoanalysis, by working over and recombining the hints

¹ Cf. Bleuler's "Autistisches Denken"; *Jahrb. für Psychoan. Forschungen*, Vol. iv.

which are half revealed and half concealed by the manifest dream elements, must be a procedure of great value.

The proposition quoted from the first page of Dr. Solomon's paper is, then, if conservatively interpreted, expressive of an important truth. But this statement is one which when understood should carry with it no unpleasant connotations. To admit the propriety of such connotations would be to bring an unjustified attack against the infancy of us all. It would be to place ourselves, who claim to be reasonable adults, in the attitude and on the level of the young child who, heedlessly and with extravagant exaggeration of reaction, turns his back on the period from which he (as he would say) has "escaped", and which he is glad rapidly to forget, although in so doing he denies some of the most important sources of his own strength and virtue.

It would be impossible to do substantial justice to the claims for sexuality as underlying the symbolism of dreams, without recognizing that this is a subject which no one approaches primarily without a mental protest on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a sense that complexes are being aroused which we would rather have left dormant. Unless the prejudices from these sources can be overcome, or, at least for the moment, set aside, it is impossible to expect scientific fairness. Dr. Solomon claims that these prejudices are inoperative in his case; but it is at least true that his article is not calculated to dispel such feelings from his readers' minds. For this reason, and also because of its importance, I venture to call attention to the following further considerations:

Some dreams are admitted by every one to be frankly sexual in their meaning, and when they occur they often inspire a sense of distress and self-accusation which is altogether out of reason, although there is an important lesson which they have to teach. Such dreams do not,

however, stand alone. The symbolism which presents itself in them differs only in degree from that present in the closely analogous class of dreams of which the latent meaning is so obviously the same as that of the first sort, that no doubt as to the proper classification of them can possibly be entertained. From these two groups one may pass by insensible degrees and through a long series of gradations to others where only an expert and willing eye can see the sex-significance of the signs and motives that the manifest dream structure offers, side by side, it may be, with "self-preservation" and other motives. In dreams, as in daily life, if the mind is secretly longing for a sensation or emotion of a sensuous nature, any symbol, the next best object or experience, will serve a turn.

From time immemorial, students of social psychology have called attention to just such meanings and just such transitions, as underlying social customs, the peculiarities of wholly "normal" conduct, of speech, of modes of dress, and art. The real ground for criticism lies not in the suggestion by scientific men of these facts and considerations, but in the overdrawn, if well-meant, conservatism of others, which makes them object strongly to their recognition. But the strength of this very opposition pleads for the importance of the facts. Our infantile tendencies and the sensuous instincts which we inherit from the animal species, to whose conflicts and efforts, foreshadowing our own conscious strivings, we largely owe our own good traits, *do* permeate our present acts and thoughts, and we should acknowledge this fact, and see what benefit we can draw from doing so. In the opinion of many able persons this benefit is great. Were it not for the attitude of half-unconscious prejudice to which I have alluded, it is certain that many of the criticisms now so freely brought to bear (ostensibly in the interest of scientific caution) against the attempt to trace the influence

of concealed sensuous, or sex, tendencies and complexes in our lives, would never have been heard. Let any one consider the kindred attempt on the part of ornithologists, or botanists, for example, and recall with what keen zeal a bird or a plant, which apparently belongs to one species, is scrutinized for the presence of this or that hidden characteristic which might justify the placing of it in another category. The same tendency runs through every department of science and of medicine, and is welcomed as a sign of promise, perhaps amongst the very men by whom a similar effort on the part of psychoanalysts is greeted with reproach.

What would one think, for instance, of a naturalist who should decline to accept a new classification of the sort just indicated, a classification involving, let us say, the assimilation of a beautiful flower, like the rose, with some—to us—ugly or insignificant or monstrous variety of the same species “because this might seem to imply an insult to the rose”? Yet it is certain that it is exclusively, or almost exclusively, a feeling of this sort which prevents many critics of the psychoanalytic movement from looking fairly at the evidence which leads another set of scientific men to trace, as partially explanatory of the symbolism of dreams, the evidence of emotions in the dreamer’s unconscious thoughts, based on considerations of a sexual nature, no matter how broadly construed, and although every other motive suggested finds welcome and acceptance.

This botanic simile is of value, also, for another reason. Does, or should, the attractiveness, even for us, of this or that flower depend solely on the qualities that please the eye? Is not—to the intelligent inquirer—the functional efficiency and appropriateness of the flower’s various parts often of such overwhelming interest that the question of mere external beauty becomes insignificant in

comparison? Yet for what end do the greater number of these efficiency-characters exist? Surely to insure the successful operation of the great function of reproduction. Do not the rich colors of the flower mainly exist to serve this need? And do not the cravings in us which are denominated "sensuous" serve, *in part*, a closely similar purpose, especially in infancy and childhood, before language has come in to widen the interests of the child, and help him to bend his energies to other purposes? It would seem as if nature, always "so careful of the race" and jealous lest the pursuit of these new purposes should become too predominant, stimulated and over-stimulated, by such means as were at hand, the sensuous element in the feelings of the infant and of the child, in order to implant a tendency which nothing that transpired afterwards should obliterate, but which on the contrary should become eventually blended with the purest sentiments of the most spiritual love.

Fortunately—but also unfortunately—the child first, and later the adult, learn to keep the primal tendency toward the cultivation of sensuous pleasures largely out of sight, but at the cost of leading a double life in this respect. If it were possible, at the beginning, and from the beginning onward, for each person to estimate with some accuracy how much of the feeling-tone which may be called sensuous was necessary for his development, and utilizable in the interests of real progress, and for marking and accentuating the various degrees of intimacy such as properly exist between, for example, close friends or members of the same family, our problems would be easier; for these demonstrations of intimacy and affection correspond to one form of what I mean by the admissible and useful element in sensuousness. But in practice this careful estimate cannot be made for infancy, and only imperfectly even for adult life. Every thoughtful person

makes it, however, in some measure, and especially those who learn to safeguard themselves as well against the excesses of reaction from these feelings as against the excesses of indulgence. To do this is the task, also, of the patient who submits himself to a psychoanalytic treatment.

We cannot get the full value of our emotions except through feeling their tumultuous heave, and dimly admitting to ourselves that this heave has a power that might on occasions overwhelm us. It is for this reason that, over and above, and under the protection of, our conformity to conventionality in conduct and in speech, without which social life would be impossible, we stow away in our "unconscious" vast stores of connotations to our words and acts, that preserve in effect, without the sacrifice of a single atom of their power, the whole great series of the massive, engrossing sensuous feelings, of very varied sorts, which had filled such an important place in our lives since infancy began. These massive feelings correspond, on the one hand, to wholly desirable, instinctive strivings toward the realization of our functions as perpetuators of our species; on the other hand, to equally powerful and desirable strivings toward the realization of our spiritual destinies as members of the community; while, finally, they represent the emotional excesses in which our finite natures tempt us to indulge, although a wiser insight might have enabled us to see that many of them existed only in and for themselves without tending towards progress, or actually as hamperers of progress, or, at best, as giving something of that sense of emotional heave above alluded to, which we seem so strongly to demand. These connotations are constantly present in greater or less amount, as accompaniments of all our acts, but vary greatly, according to age and temperament, and to other conditions not readily to be classified.

It might be well in some respects if we had two, or more, terms to express these different and somewhat opposing meanings of acts and words which I have classed as sensuous; but the states themselves merge into each other by such gradual shadings that only a carefully trained insight can determine where the desirable, the progressive element or tendency ceases, and the undesirable, in common parlance the "sensuous", element or tendency begins. The act itself gives little information; the important thing is the underlying tendency. In the case of infants, the act of nursing, which is sometimes more, sometimes less sensuous in tendency, is a striking case in point, but great numbers of others could be chosen.

To pass now, at once, to the instances cited by Dr. Solomon: How is one to judge, except by way of a thorough psychoanalysis, whether the emotions of "personal ambition" or the "maternal instinct", as they present themselves in the lives, and still more, in the dreams, of any given persons, are based wholly on desirable, or partly also on undesirable, sense tendencies? I maintain that the face-value evidence on this point, while sufficient for some purposes, is for others insufficient, and that it may be of great importance to learn what special color and emphasis these motives received when they first showed themselves in the self-absorbed days of childhood. This emphasis may not have been excessive; and thus there need not necessarily have been any considerable "sensuous" element or connotation (in the ordinary, social sense of the word "sensuous") to be preserved through the medium of repression. On the other hand, the reverse may have been the case. There may have been a history of pronounced narcissism (or self-love, a form of sex-love), marked by many striking details and manifestations of some analogous history of other sort. Can one utilize the fact of the reappearance of these

temperamental tendencies in dreams, as affording a safe criterion as to their "desirability"? Does the fact that certain recent waking-experiences of the individuals in question provided ample excuse for the recurrence in thought, and hence in dreams, of these tendencies, or the further fact that the dreamer in thinking over his dream comes at once on these apparent causes and estimates them as sufficient, secure to us the needed means of judging them to be so? On the contrary, a mass of evidence so great as to overwhelm all doubt of its validity, assures us that a given act or sentiment occurring in a dream is infinitely more likely to indicate a cropping out of desires that have an immature and sensuous meaning, in addition to its other and obvious significance, than the same act occurring in our daily lives. It would be easy to fill a volume with illustrations of this principle. A man may in daily life embrace his mother or his daughter, or may present them with jewels, or he may demonstrate warm affection for a friend, without exciting any one's suspicion of a double motive. But if he finds himself doing either of these acts in his dream life, an opportunity is afforded him for discovering a tendency more deeply planted in his nature than he had supposed, and which he may then be able to use profitably as a touchstone for his waking conduct. No one need put on a cap that does not fit, but the wise person, engaged in the difficult task of making the best of himself, neglects no useful lights that chance or study throws upon his mysterious "other self", for the outcome of whose promptings he has made himself responsible.

One other problem of special interest is brought up by Dr. Solomon's paper, which is closely akin to the general problem, that has thus far been discussed. This is the problem with relation to the standing of the "self-preservation" motive, as it occurs in dreams, in nervous illnesses, and in the conflicts of our daily lives.

So far as I can see, and as I have already said, Dr. Solomon's general opinion in this matter coincides essentially with that which has been so ably presented in the course of a number of years past by Dr. Alfred Adler of Vienna, and has justly attracted much attention. One can, indeed, hardly read, for the first time, the arguments brought forward in Adler's "Der nervöse Charakter" especially after having been sensitized by the many interesting facts presented in his "*Minderwertigkeit der Organe*", without feeling, even if only for the moment, that the view is a sound one which claims a preponderant significance, over the sexual instinct, of the instinct of self-preservation and the tendency to maintain the "*Persönlichkeitsgefühl*". at all hazards and against all comers, not only as accounting for our conscious efforts, but also as accounting for the deeper currents of our unconscious and repressed life, and, thus, for the principal manifestations of our psychoneurotic symptoms, our dreams, and our artistic strivings. This is, substantially, I judge, Dr. Solomon's thesis also, and while I admit its interest, I think it rests upon a misconception of the *main needs* of psychoanalytic treatment and analysis.

No student of this subject would be tempted to deny that the motives here in question play a strikingly important rôle, whether one studies them as manifestations of the conscious or of the unconscious life. When one subjects these two sets of motives, however, to a careful scrutiny, with references to the whole history of their relationship to human thought and conduct, important distinctions tend to show themselves. In the first place, "self-preservation" and "self-assertion" are, surely, not to be thought of except with reference to the personal relationships of one individual to other individuals, or to himself regarded as another individual; and there are practical reasons which, *under certain circumstances*, forbid

us to overlook the sex-element in these relationships. Then—leaving to one side for a moment the mental status of the infant—it seems to me apparent that the tendency of the “self-preservation” motive is to detach itself more and more as time goes on, from association with the sensuously emotional, illogical, time-neglecting cravings (the reappearance of which in dreams forms—to say the least—one of the cardinal features of these remarkable phenomena), and to form ever new and closer ties with the conscious, logical, willed processes of the mental life. The motives based on sense-cravings, on the other hand, typical as they are of the emotional tendencies of childhood, tend to bury themselves more and more from the conscious interests and attention, and—while retaining their supremacy perhaps in secret—show themselves overtly only during uncensored periods, when voluntary inhibition is relaxed; and, as stated, most of all in dreams. For dreams seek not only available materials but typical materials, to serve as ultimate representatives of the hidden wish. In other words, while dreams reveal all sorts of hidden, or half-hidden, or one-quarter-hidden wishes (including that of self-preservation, as a matter of course), *the final term of the wish-series*, that which all the rest in every case imply and lean upon as the secret source of their own greatest power, is the wish which most definitely reflects the sensuousness of infancy, and which thus represents best the “unconscious” of the adult.

The holding of this opinion does not prevent me from taking a somewhat different, and, as I believe, more satisfying view¹ of the ultimate needs of the situation. I shall not go into this matter here, however, further than to say that, in my opinion, both the instinct of self-preservation, and also the sex-instinct, are attempts at

¹ See *Int. Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse* I, 2, and the other papers above cited.

self-expression which are necessarily partial and imperfect, and which can be adequately described only in metaphysical terms.

The life of every individual is spent in dealing with internal mental conflicts and problems which find in manifold external forms a variety of more or less complete outlets. But this process does not march forward consistently, and on a single line, toward its end. In the history of society we constantly see new movements which hold out promises of great accomplishments, opposed by forces of a deeply-rooted, illogical, often sensuous and selfish, but often very useful and conservative sort. In the history of each individual likewise, the deeper-seeing observer may detect, at each moment, the signs of an equally intense, persistent and eternal contest between the deep, stable, retrovertive tendencies of the "natural man" and the expansive forces that make for a more spiritual life. One portion of this contest leads to a new stability and a better unity on a broader plane. Another portion consists in a useless struggle between real maturity and real immaturity; between excessive, and therefore repressed, sensuousness, and a rational disinterestedness; between the a-social or anti-social and the social tendencies. In the course of this struggle there is a constant tendency to relapse again and again into the toils of primitive desires that tempt us by a thousand subtle devices. The disclosures made by dreams, if properly understood, enable us to see through the disguises which these devices adopt as cloaks for the better fulfillment of their aims. But the task of unmasking is an infinitely difficult one. The earliest, most infantile wishes (later appearing as cravings) are at once the most important and the most deeply concealed wishes, and they are often best concealed when they take on the guise of innocent-seeming, obvious motives, amongst which the motive of self-preservation, maternal instinct, and

ordinary ambitiousness are to be found. The person who is making a self-study should then learn to suspect these motives among the rest.

The brief statement of an actual dream may help to make clearer some of the foregoing statements. The dreamer is a lady of about thirty years,—happily married and with a somewhat delicate child of fifteen months,—who always had been considered, and had considered herself, as normal, strong, well-balanced, and helpful to others, until about a year and a half ago. Without going into her history, as, indeed, I should have no right to do, let it suffice to say that a series of considerable external troubles threw her into a permanent state of internal turmoil, and brought to light—or *caused* as she believed—a variety of tendencies, amongst which over-sensitiveness, extreme self-depreciation, and ideas of violence and hatred figured largely. This lady had always been ardently (though, she believed, not over-passionately) devoted to her mother (now, and then, no longer living), and in the wreck of her qualities,—as she in the egoism of her distress, estimated the situation,—it seemed to her that she had entertained and retained this sentiment of filial love in a pure form, so much so that she felt that if any doubt were thrown on this belief, nothing would be left.

Furthermore, she did not believe that her childhood and youth contained any element of the sensuous, even in its normal form. In fact, many pieces of evidence showed to me that these beliefs were far too narrow, and that they were retained in part under the influence of an immature view of her powers and obligations. Her self-love craving is, I think, too strong.

Amongst the many interesting dreams which she narrated, there was one which she said had repeatedly recurred even before she came under my care. This was a dream in which she saw herself endeavoring distress-

fully to protect her mother from a large rat that threatened to attack her¹, but unable to get to her assistance. Nevertheless, *to her eyes*, the motive of filial love was apparent and sufficient.

Later this dream assumed another form. The scene was laid in a *large and pleasant room where the patient and her mother sat at work*. Then appeared outside a bull, of evil mien, making as if about to burst into the room. The patient hurried her mother into a side room, where for a moment she seemed safe, and as she narrated the circumstances, she was well satisfied, in spite of the sequel, that the main, or only important motive of the dream was her protection of her mother, this time successful. In fact, the bull reappeared, and was about to make its way through the large window of the room, but now it was accompanied (as a sign manual of its meaning) by a calf. At this juncture the mother disappeared, and the patient found herself in bed, with the bull at her face, breathing on her and stroking her with its tongue.

It is unnecessary to inquire into the full meaning of this dream, but it must be plain to any one who has studied dream-interpretation, that its thorough mastery by the patient would be likely to place the complex nature of her relations to her mother and to herself in a new and important light, both as regards infancy and adult life, and to help her to a juster estimate of her present conflicts.

¹ The similarity is noteworthy between this situation and that presented by the now famous daughter, father, and attacking serpent dream of Freud's early patient.

Chapter XIII.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS*.

There are two main reasons why I am glad of the chance to speak tonight on the subject of the psycho-analytic movement, in which for the past four years I have had a share that, small though it has been, has meant more intense and more engrossing labor than I have ever spent on any previous task—a labor often involving much readjustment, sometimes far from pleasant but very satisfactory in most of its results.

In the first place, this movement represents a great boon to many sufferers from a series of extremely distressing and disabling maladies,—more distressing than any one is aware who has not watched the disastrous evidences of them, day by day and from close at hand.

To illustrate this point from my own relatively small experience, I will cite the following case-outlines, which indicate (so far as mere samples can do this), first, that mental disorders ordinarily classified as very serious can often be relieved in this way; next, that neither a bad family history nor long continuance of the symptoms are a necessary bar to improvement or substantial recovery. It goes without saying that this treatment, like all others, has its well-marked limitations, which it neither can nor should be expected to overpass. The persons to whom it appeals, whether as patients or physicians, will be mainly

* Read at a meeting of the Medical Section, Boston Medical Library, in conjunction with the Suffolk District Medical Society, April 1, 1914. Published in the *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, June 11, 1914.

limited to those who are inclined and able to see that a large share of the troubles of this world have as their basis the doubleness of the mental life and the consequent misconceptions of individuals with regard to the influences by which they are being moved. A portion of these misconceptions is due to the fact that men fail to see, perhaps have never been trained to see, that we stand, not as separate individuals, with duties that end in the promotion of our own superficial interests, but as members of smaller and larger communities and groups, and eventually of ideal communities. The sense of isolation, doubt and terror, of jealousy, even of depression and despair, which are so prominent as causes of human misery, and especially of the misery of neurotic patients, would undoubtedly be far less if men were carried along by a sense of devotion to some great cause, some great religious sentiment, in which their longing for more exclusive, personal successes should be merged.

If this were the whole story, then the direction in which the remedy was to be sought would be clearly indicated, in theory at least. But, in fact, this is not the whole story, and the problems at stake cannot be wholly met by a completer recognition of social, or even religious obligations.

There is certainly another great element of difficulty at stake, which consists in the existence of schisms of the personality and self-misunderstandings, that have their root in subtle disorders of development which begin in infancy. These disorders are of such a sort that they cannot be classified as wholly due to an imperfect recognition of the unseen forces which we describe in terms of moral and social obligation. The persons whose development has been disturbed in this way to any considerable extent, are apt to find, at the time when they come up against the necessity of making moral choices, that their

ability to do justice to their best qualities has been undermined by tendencies which have not until then been made obvious by definite results, and of which the nature and mode of origin are entirely hidden from the view.

Such persons find themselves saddled with desires, cravings, or habits which they seem under compulsion to obey, or from which they can escape only by the discovery of some subtle compromise which makes the apparent escape a delusive unreality. Of what benefit is it, for example, to escape from a self-indulgence of some infantile type, only to be left a person of overwhelming prejudice or narrow vision, or of blind and hostile pride?

Fortunately, even these compromises are often attended by a sense of distress which may lead the individual to attempt, with expert aid, to discover the true source and nature of his difficulty. It is in meeting this need that psychoanalysis plays an effective part.

A recent personal letter from Professor Freud, dealing with the theory of the treatment, concludes with this sentence: "The great ethical element in psychoanalytic work is truth, and again truth; and this should suffice for most people. Courage and truth are in what they are mostly deficient."

This proposition might well be taken as the motto of the psychoanalytic movement, for it is truth at which it aims. And the recognition of this principle should serve also as an answer to those who might be willing to see something of value in Freud's demonstration that it is possible, by means of his association method, to enable patients to see more deeply into their own histories and yet are unwilling to accept the results which psychoanalysis has thus far brought to light and have no patience with the details which are brought out.

Without these details, however, the principle would be of little worth, and the acceptance of the principle is

often only a cover for an inner rejection of every attempt to apply this principle for the benefit of an individual patient.

Finally, the fact cannot be too strongly emphasized that there is no necessary hostility between this mode of treatment and any genuine agency for good that social life or the ingenuity of any physician has to offer. On the contrary, in so far as it sets the patient free from the tyranny of his less good impulses, psychoanalysis should make him more susceptible to influences corresponding to the better elements of his nature.

Case 1 is that of a gentleman of middle age, who had been suffering for about fifteen months from serious paranoid symptoms, accompanied with intense depression and a strongly marked suicidal tendency, on account of which it had been necessary to confine him, against his will, in a sanatorium, where he remained about a year. He had improved somewhat when I saw him, and it is not impossible that he would have recovered after a time without psychoanalytic aid. Nevertheless, considering that he was still deeply despondent and suicidal, so that the services of two male nurses were thought necessary, that under this treatment he improved steadily and fairly rapidly, and that he has had no recurrence in the three years that have elapsed since his recovery, the case seems worth recording, even at greater length than is here possible.

This patient had always been of a gentle disposition, highly refined, sensitive and self-deprecative, and had suffered from environmental conditions which received their tone from the temperament of the mother and grandmother, who, though high-minded, cultivated and refined, like himself, were out of touch with many of the more aggressive and practical interests of a boy's life.

It may be accepted as eminently probable that the qualities thus far mentioned first became developed as a result of reaction to positive emotional desires; but whether this is so or not, it is certain that these desires existed and acted as one of the strong influences of his whole life. He was unquestionably a person who suffered from the need of an outlet for feelings which he strove, without success, to sublimate, but in reality repressed. Any fancied sin against sexual purity (as a single, almost accidental, seminal emission at the age of about fourteen), or against the traditions by which he was surrounded, often gave rise to an agony of remorse. Yet his sexual excitability and his curiosity about sex topics were quite strong, and he was thus drawn continually in opposite directions, and became thereby irresolute and inclined to suspiciousness and depression.

This tendency to feel himself drawn in opposite directions was illustrated also very clearly in his relations to his mother. He was devotedly attached to her, but being fond of society in a wider sense he failed to find in her a complete outlet for his emotional life, and thus came to have a morbid sense that he was neglecting her for others, a double feeling that had a deep subconscious root. So matters went on until his mother's death. Some time previous to this he had been occupied in teaching in a boys' school, and had also been through several rather intense attachments which, however, had resulted in nothing except a series of friendships tinged with an unsatisfied desire for something more. The death of his mother seemed to let loose a number of conflicting tendencies, and led gradually to an emotional crisis which reached its culminating point about two months later. He then had a severe "Angst"¹ attack, after which a tendency

¹ The German word "Angst", as technically understood, covers a good deal more than can be indicated by any corresponding word

to suspiciousness, which formed a part of his self-depreciatory habit of mind, became more and more intensified, and associated itself with gloomy forebodings. A specialist was called in, whose attitude and treatment only added fuel to these flames. The patient felt himself humiliated and crowded down, and took easily to the idea of a hostile conspiracy, as a species of relief. Removal to a sanatorium only made bad matters worse. The attendants treated him, as he believed and still believes, with considerable harshness and neglect, and very soon he found himself living in the midst of a fantasy world in which he played the victim's part with every one for his enemy. If a book was sent to him by a friend, he saw in it, both in general and in detail, only studied attempts to mock at his condition. To this end the writers had devoted their main efforts. Certain colors, and various other signs, seemed to him to be displayed to irritate and distress him, and false interpretations were placed by him on every act. Not only real persons, but the powers of the nether world were discovered to be in league against him. The devil's mark was traced on the avenue of the sanatorium, as a sort of bar beyond which he could not safely pass; and this element of his delusional state became so strong that even when fairly well on toward recovery he would exhibit, at least verbally, a degree of belief in this evil deity which seemed strangely at variance with his intelligence and cultivation.

At the time at which the treatment was begun, his physical health, which had previously been reduced, had become somewhat improved, but his delusions (only a small part of which I have here outlined) were still present in full force. The beneficial effect of the treatment soon in English. Its symptomatology is made up of both mental and physical elements of emotional excitement and distress which often reach a high point of severity.

became apparent. It was an immense relief to him to trace out, through the study of reminiscences and dreams, the mental influences which had brought him where he was, and to discover that it was possible to neutralize their effects.

It gradually became possible for him to utilize again his fine intellectual and temperamental traits in the interests of a wide life of friendship and social usefulness, and it is my belief that, understanding the situation as he now does, it would be almost impossible for him to suffer a serious relapse.

Case 2 is that of a lady who had been treated by me without success before my interest in this movement began, and later successfully by this method. Her symptoms, which were of several years' duration, consisted of compulsive and torturing doubts, the extension of which was without limit. It seemed to her impossible to disprove the possibility, dreadful to contemplate, that plants and trees were capable of suffering like men, and this was but a sample of a distrust on her part of the power to form judgments of any sort or even to feel that she had the right to be sure of her own identity and name. This doubting habit had not prevented her from working, it is true, but it had made her exceedingly unhappy, and had given her a sense of isolation at contrast with her naturally sociable and friendly tendencies.

The analysis gradually made it clear to her that her present paradoxical doubts were only covers for a series of uncertainties about old problems of personal conduct, and moral responsibility for definite acts and tendencies of childhood and adolescence of which she was ashamed. It was in the conflicts centering on these early tendencies —that had originated in a craving for personal self-indulgences and personal affection, at variance, as she thought, with a set of ethical standards which she longed

to consider genuine—that the habit of doubt became established. For, blame and criticize herself as she might she could not shake off the fact that she had strongly emotional traits, and, until she became able to secure a rational comprehension of her own nature and her ethical obligations, she had no recourse but to make her doubts themselves, and her false reasoning about them, the servants of the emotional longings. She had become accustomed, and with reason, to regard herself as immature, but could not make head against this immaturity until she came to see in just what respect the estimate was a just one.

In cases of this sort an element of peculiar difficulty for the treatment is often furnished by the fact that the reasoning power itself becomes sophisticated, and is prostituted, as it were, to the keeping alive of the tormenting but fascinating doubts.

This was so in her case. Gradually, however, improvement set in, and for a long time the patient has been so well that except for short periods, during times of especial stress, she has been mistress of her thoughts.

Case 3 is that of a lady still under my care, whose history may be condensed as follows:

Up to the age of about twenty she was ordinarily well balanced, a fine scholar at school and college, finding perhaps too strong an attraction in her literary work with its appeal to her esthetic sense. She was intensely, perhaps too intensely, devoted to her mother, who was for a number of years an invalid. Yet she insists that this relationship was in no way narrowing or unwholesome, but rather of a broadening tendency.

Later analysis brought out several facts about this early period, which, trifling as they had appeared, have become of material significance in indicating the existence

of conflicting trends in her temperament. Had her mother lived, or had she been able to work out a life on lines other than those that she was forced to follow, all might have gone well. But while she was in college her mother died, and she was then called upon to face situations which were not in harmony with instinctive desires that had become stronger, subconsciously, than she knew, to the exclusion of traits of which she stood in need and could not spare. Then inner conflicts began to show themselves, which became especially intensified after her marriage (in itself a very happy one), and forced upon her a series of obligations which she felt herself unfitted to assume, and under conditions peculiarly hard and uncongenial.

Sick, thwarted, and disappointed, she began to react against herself and her environment with an intensity difficult to express adequately. Persons whom she had every cause to love became objects of horror and detestation, and these feelings were poured copiously upon herself as well. Home-making became an impossibility, her despondency bitter and severe, and the desire to end her miseries by her own act a longing scarcely to be resisted.

In spite of the call of obvious duties such as she had never previously disregarded, and in the face of an obviously rational outcome apparently within easy grasp, the inner obstacles in the way of a successful attainment of her best wishes seemed almost insurmountable. Moods of violence lay always close beneath the surface; and though better moods were also near at hand, yet the better moments were fleeting, and for the most part she kept being overwhelmed as if by waves of destructiveness, or drawn out beyond her depths by a strong undertow of despair. It was only after many months of almost daily

treatments that anything like stability seemed to come within her reach. But at present a better outcome seems to be in sight, and the main trend is gradually toward a better state. And the result has been due to the equally gradual defining of the removable portions of the difficulty in terms of the undesirable trends of character and temperament which the patient is learning to discard in the interests of a better sort of progress.

Case 4 is that of a lady, an artist by profession, and of highly neurotic stock, who for some ten years had been tormented by morbid fears which made it painful, if not impossible, for her to go down town, or to places of entertainment. This sense of fear, which was indescribable but prostrating, and for which no obvious cause could be assigned, was gradually traced to longings and cravings which had their origin deeply in her temperament, and which she had been unable to face out, because never fully aware of their meaning or existence. She had had treatment from excellent physicians, but without avail. In the course of a few months, however, she became substantially relieved, so that she could go everywhere with but slight traces of discomfort, and could finally take a foreign trip. I have heard from her at intervals, and in very gratifying terms.

Case 5. Another case which has interested me greatly is that of a young man gentle in demeanor, rather small in stature, a chronic masturbator, suffering from timidity and morbid consciousness of himself, who since earliest childhood, as if either seeking a compensation from these tendencies to a sense of insufficiency, or with the primary love of self-assertion which every infant feels¹, has indulged

¹ Ferenczi has pointed out that the infant, by virtue of the fact that he is the centre of attention, and, through a series of specific signals, can secure the accomplishment of his will, is liable to

in grotesque day-dreams of heroism and domination. In these day-dreams, which came to his memory gradually, during a moderately long treatment, he felt himself a king, or even tyrant, able, like Nero, to gratify fanciful ideas of cruelty. His dreams, like his experiences, have illustrated the concealed motives of his life,—to override others and to seek protection for himself. In a recent dream, of obvious tendency, he found himself at first indentified with the pilot of a newly-built steamship of high power, which he called "Novelty", and in which he was ploughing his way rapidly and successfully through a winding channel into an open sea. Then the scene changed, and he was (like Phaeton aspiring to drive the wagon of the Sun) the easy master of a four-horse sleigh, in which again he was making his way at full speed toward an open and unknown but unf feared land that lay before him.

In thinking of this case and others of like sort, the image has come frequently to my mind of a pair of Siamese twins, each invisible to the other and endowed with opposite characteristics. How could this patient expect to make his better ideas of progress and usefulness avail, so long as they were harnessed to this unrecognized desire for power and domination? The difficulty became even more apparent when, after recognizing the significance of the situation, he admitted that this half hidden love for power, although alien to his more conscious personality, was something from which he could hardly bear the thought of parting. Fortunately he has learned to see, not only in his day-dreams, but also in his depressions, his numerous fears, his doubts, and even in his trains of over-ingenious reasoning through which he seeks to justify acquire a sense of all-powerfulness which may easily become intensified and persistent. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse*. Jahrg. ii, Heft 2.

his false positions, the evidences of personal self-indulgence, the mental equivalents of his masturbation.

In all these respects he is making excellent progress toward character development, and thus recovery.

I have made no attempt to show in detail the mode in which, in these cases, the basis of the later symptoms was laid down in infancy and childhood. It would be impossible to do this satisfactorily without entering at length into the personal histories of each patient, as well as into the discussion of Freud's whole doctrine of infantile and childhood psychology, and his theory of the part played by the accentuation, through arrest, of one or another specific phase of infantile development.

It is enough, for present purposes, to point out that such patients fail to live happily and to work out their best birthrights, by no means always because life offers them so little in the way of health, opportunity, inheritance, or fine traditions, but also because of influences of more or less accidental and theoretically avoidable sort, emphasized in infancy and because of early longings and cravings, which perhaps social traditions, perhaps conscience, could not justify.

In Case 5 the egocentric tendencies of the patient were fostered through the injudicious influence of a nurse who for a long time played toward him the mother's part, though by no means in the best sense. Unfortunately, the sense of supremacy thus early emphasized did not stimulate him to take a really leading part in practical life, even in childhood, so that it was only through idle day-dreams and postponement of daily tasks that his theory of leadership could be kept alive. All the greater was the sense of downfall when actual trials proved this theory to be untenable.

As regards the value of the method used in treatment, I desire to emphasize the point that there is no necessary

hostility whatever between this means of securing benefit and those employed by men who prefer to stimulate their patients to march forward, through work, loyalty, and wholesome living. It is, indeed, difficult for me to conceive why any one should consider the interests of medical progress served by the suggestion that this hostility does exist, while it implies on the other hand a most unfortunate narrowness of view with regard to the varying needs of psychoneurotic patients. Every one whose experience is at all large has seen an abundance of cases where influences which ought to have turned out favorably, if neurological treatment of the old style was practically or theoretically sufficient, have turned out, in fact, anything but successful, because no one had sufficiently recognized the terrible handicap which internal conflicts may create. Of what use to urge such sufferers to toil, pale and panting, toward the summit of their Mount of Difficulty, when they must drang along an unseen ball and chain which deeper insight might remove, leaving them able not alone to help themselves but to show a wider sympathy for their neighbors? The case which comes frequently to my mind in illustration of this sentiment is that of a clergyman, a man of the finest character and highest principles, who was obliged to live as a voluntary exile in a hospital for the insane because he was carried away by the obsession that he would kill some member of his family, to which he was, in fact, devotedly attached. The case was of a sort which is now known to be almost invariably modifiable under favorable conditions, and usually curable under the best conditions, through the psychoanalytic method; and although in this case the best was doubtless done that could be done, yet the time will come when it will be considered a disgrace that such a patient should remain, year after year, with the proper remedy for his malady unsought. The fear of killing, in such cases, represents the persistence of a

fantasy of childhood, clothed with emotions which are usually referable to conditions prevailing at that period of the patient's life and removable later through discovery of their origin.

In the next place, even the very principles underlying this movement have been dreadfully misunderstood, and in order that they may be correctly understood they should be studied carefully and repeatedly.

I shall use the remainder of my time in discussing certain of these points about which misunderstanding chiefly reigns yet should not reign, and will lead off with a few remarks about the central figure of the movement, Professor Sigmund Freud, whom—let me say—I regard as a personal friend, and have learned to respect as a man of superior cultivation and even genius.

I have learned to see in the modes of investigation adopted by this remarkable man, and by those who have followed in his path, the signs of intellectual honesty of a high order. There is room, no doubt, for considerable difference of opinion with regard to the interpretation of the symbolisms met with in dreams, around which controversy has so fiercely raged. But it should be borne in mind that these interpretations of a given symbol, as offered by any given psychoanalyst, are usually based on large numbers of observations by himself or others, through which the meaning suggested has seemed justified. Interpretations so based acquire the value of tentative, partial definitions, offered, of course, for the acceptance or rejection of those who are willing to take into account the conditions which led to the framing of them.

It should be remembered that Freud was, to all intents and purposes, a pioneer explorer in a new territory, and that he felt himself under obligation to report everything which he found there, at the risk of the loss of his own self-respect if he should fail, through carelessness or

timidity, to do so. I say "new territory," for although perhaps none of the principles which Freud announced (such as the principle of repression or that of forgetfulness as an evidence of repression, or of the significance of the several stages of the infantile life for the characteristics of the adult, or of the importance of the sexual emotions) were wholly new, yet it was he who first gave to these principles accurate form and color, organs of locomotion, and an individual virile life; and it was that endowment that caused this great movement to command respect, on the one hand, and to evoke criticism, on the other.

People sometimes speak of Freud as if he had been the first one to speak freely of the sexual life, but in so doing they overlook the extensive publications of such men as Krafft-Ebing, Moll, Havelock Ellis, Janet, and many more, which, important though they are, have mainly slept on the shelves where they were deposited, unknown or shunned save by a few more curious or bolder readers. It was Freud that first breathed vital energy into this neglected topic, and forced its recognition by demonstrating its practical importance. One should not overlook the fact that the somewhat patronizing statements to the effect that Freud and his followers "have gone too far" in this or that direction, or have "misled" many persons to entertain false doctrines, have often been made by men who even now have never trodden the path broken by him through this wilderness, or who might live a thousand years without giving us the splendid gift of Freud's discoveries—a gift which, to be appreciated, should be looked at in terms of its best possibilities, its best animus.

There has been a great deal of misunderstanding also on the subject of Freud's attitude with reference to the significance of the sexual life in the causation of hysteria, and the psychoneuroses of other sorts. It is a

great mistake to assume that in their analyses of a patient's case psychoanalysts see before them nothing but this special phantom. In the first place, it is emphasized by every writer that as a partial cause for every psycho-neurosis, a predisposition exists, which it is impossible to define in exact terms but about which one can say that it implies an excitability of the emotional life, and hence of this great sex-emotion with the rest and predominantly with relation to the rest. This is a predominance which the sex-emotions may be said to share with the instinct to assert one's existence, in the sense of Schopenhauer's *will to live* or Nietzsche's *will for power*. But even these instincts may often be best described in terms of personal relationships, and therefore if one wishes (for reasons of practical classification) in sex terms. Next, it should be recognized that the objective point of every psychoanalysis is the placing at the disposal of the patient's conscious awareness, of everything which his own intuitions feel to be significant. Nothing is to be excluded which he can reveal, whether as regards the history of his environment in childhood and later, or his personal ambitions, or his religious views, or his opinions upon any other subject. More has never been maintained than the fact, testified to, or rather asserted, by the patient's own memory and power of inference, that amongst the turmoil of emotions which form the basis of his hidden complexes, the sex emotions invariably occupy an important place.

With psychoneurotic patients this particular passion comes preeminently into play, for the simple reason that it is not only one of the strongest by which men are moved, but the one most strongly repressed, and that it is thus placed on a vantage ground for special mischief.

For the sake of making clearer Freud's conception of the sexual I give a very free translation of one of the latest of his carefully drawn statements with regard to this point:

again begging those who would pursue the inquiry further to read the fifth chapter of Dr. Pfister's¹ book.

"It is well known that psychoanalysts have been criticized for extending their conception of what is to be understood by the word sexual, far beyond the usual limits. The fact that they have done this is true; whether it is a matter for criticism is another question.

"The conception of 'sexual' as now defined by psychoanalysts is wider than the popular conception in both directions, and the reasons for this widening are best stated in genetic terms. We include in the sexual life the whole range of emotions which had the primitive stirrings of the sexual function as their main root, even when the emotions which were derived from these primitive stirrings are no longer directed toward what at first seemed to be their goal, or have even become directed toward a new goal which would ordinarily be classified as not sexual at all.

"Reasoning in this way, we prefer to use the word 'psychosexual' rather than 'sexual', in order to make it clear that we neither overlook nor underrate the mental factor in the sexual life.

"In other words, we now use the word 'sexuality' in a sense equivalent to that of the German word *sieben*."

In view of this definition and in recognition of what "love" stands for in normal life, can one wonder that the sex-emotions should play the prominent part that is ascribed to them in the causation of the psychoneuroses?

Another very important consideration for fair-minded persons to realize and remember is that when the term "sexual" is used by psychoanalysts with reference to some experience or symbol, it is by no means necessarily meant to imply that the grossest connotation of this word is

¹ Oscar Pfister: Die psychanalytische Methode. "Paedagogium", Band I.

present in the patient's mind. An important principle here comes into play. One justly classifies a series of phenomena by the most prominent and typical of its members, and if one is on the watch for elements of especial significance, of especial danger, for example, then one classifies with special reference to that point. "De potiori designatio fit", or, in other words, there are occasions on which to lay a hand, no matter if gently, on a man's arm is to commit assault and battery.

Another expression of this principle, and one which appeals strongly to me, would be to say that we can judge best of acts, as well as of men, by looking at their tendency or motive power, or *animus*; and this is something which is by no means always seen at first glance.

Let us suppose, for example (what must, from the evolutionary standpoint, be the case), that an unbroken line connects the sensuous with the spiritual and in terms of this situation let us consider the meaning of some given act. Let us suppose that one man kills another. If the *animus* or motive of the first man is in the line of sensuousness, or brutality, we call his act a murder. If it is in the line of the highest interests of the community we call it patriotism.

The question is whether the main trend of such a man's emotion, which in both cases takes in, theoretically, all that the whole line stands for, is more toward the spiritual or more toward the sensuous aspect of his nature.

To a great extent the problem before the nervous invalid is the same with that which every living man is forced to meet:

We come into the world with infinite possibilities ahead of us in the way of moral and intellectual development. Why do most of us fail so signally to realize these possibilities? Surely, in part, because to realize our best

possibilities would imply a thorough utilization of powers of disinterestedness and rationality, of which all of us possess, indeed, the germ, but which we can employ only at the cost of setting aside the temptation to follow the broader and easier paths marked out by pleasure, passion, and self-interest.

The path of disinterestedness and reason is one that mankind has learned only comparatively recently, and, so, imperfectly to tread; the broad and easy path has been trodden by countless generations of beings from which we derive our life.

The conflicts here involved are old ones and have been called by many names, as that of the carnal, the natural, and the animal against the spiritual.

Adam and Eve, preferring knowledge, even with the chance of sin, to ignorance and static content, fought through this conflict in the garden, as Hercules trained himself to do, even in his cradle; and it is noteworthy that in both cases the serpent, symbol alike of sense-temptation and wisdom, played a prominent part.

In such exigencies as these, the child, ignorant of his danger, often endeavors to avoid the necessity of taking a definite stand by adopting a self-deceiving device, which is all the more effective because utilized almost wholly without conscious awareness on his part. The child, namely, instinctively learns that he can reject any given form of self-indulgence, so far as its original shape is concerned, and yet preserve its essence by encouraging its attachment to some otherwise indifferent and allowable conscious process. I am now defining a principle of general psychological significance, and not dealing with its application to any particular form of symptoms. But examples can be furnished by every one's experience, and are given on a large scale by the history of ascetism.

To combat this tendency to self-deceit only thorough-going methods will suffice. One has to learn to ticket, as with a red tag, the beginnings of evil. It is of little use to upbraid one's self, for our acknowledgments of fault and frailty are sometimes the very means by which we keep alive the essence of the fault and frailty.

I am free to admit that the psychoanalyst assumes a responsibility when he disturbs any equilibrium at which another fellow-being has arrived, even such an equilibrium as his nervous symptoms secure to him. But this is true not of the psychoanalyst alone, but of the minister and of the educator, who, like the psychoanalyst, though perhaps in a less trenchant way, are continually endeavoring to bring about a new equilibrium better than the last. I assert only that psychoanalysis has its place and meets certain needs, in these difficult situations, which are not otherwise to be met.

Psychoanalysis helps the patient who has been driven to follow blindly an inferior vision of his destiny in which gratification or some subtle substitute for gratification plays so large a part, to strengthen the slender thread of his rational and spiritual life, and to see that his massive longings and personal affections, that hark back even to infancy, ought to be regarded not solely as something of value in and for themselves, but rather as bridges to something better.

Chapter XIV.

SERVICES TO BE EXPECTED FROM THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC MOVEMENT IN THE PREVENTION OF INSANITY*

I understand that the problem before us for discussion is, How can we best help people to preserve their mental health? and that my part in it is to answer the particular question, What contribution can psychoanalysis make toward this end?

I shall confine my remarks almost exclusively to this one point of prevention, resisting the temptation to wander at length over the wider field of the mental treatment of patients who have actually shown distinct symptoms of one or another form of the psychoses.

It is, however, germane to say that inasmuch as psychoanalysis is best definable, from the therapeutic point of view, as an educational method of high value, and since, under all circumstances, it exerts its usefulness largely through helping the patient to become a more thoughtful, more rational, and more mature person, the aims of prevention and the aims of treatment are to a great extent the same.

It is also proper to point out that the psychoanalytic literature contains very encouraging reports, indicating not only that the temperamental tendency to depressive states, but even the tendency to recurrent manic-depressive

* Read before the Section on Nervous and Mental Diseases at the Sixty-Fifth Annual Session of the American Medical Association, Atlantic City, N. J., June, 1914. Published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, November 28, 1914.

outbreaks, can sometimes be affected favorably by this treatment; and that there is some evidence that patients with dementia praecox in its initial stage can occasionally be benefited in the same manner.

It is my confident belief that the contribution of the psychoanalytic movement to prevention is to become an important one, but that it will make itself felt not so much directly, through the treatment of individual patients, as indirectly and gradually through the stimulus which these searching studies into the nature and history of human motives must exert on parents and educators, in proportion as the principles discovered or emphasized by them become an integral part of psychological doctrine.

To assert that it is possible to prevent or cure a psychosis by mental influence is equivalent to asserting the psychogenic origin of these diseases. To maintain this is not to deny that special toxic influences, general disorders of metabolism, or abnormalities of cerebral structure or development may play an important part as predisposing causes, or even that the influence which these causes exert in one or another case may have been the controlling influence, *sine qua non*.

It is, however, certain that even where this is so, the mechanism of the psychosis, as a mental phenomenon and as the sign of the occurrence of a mental process having a more or less clearly definable aim and meaning, ought to be specifically studied, and that in order to do this thoroughly the physician should have made himself aware of the patient's inner life, both as an individual and as a member and representative of a social group or social groups.

The psychoses and psychoneuroses are not to be regarded (psychologically) as mere misfortunes or mere accidents, but as phenomena that represent definite, instinctive attempts at readjustment and the securing of

some workable equilibrium, on the part of persons whose actual adaptation to their environmental conditions had proved unsatisfactory in the face of this or that special strain, and whose powers of readjustment had shown themselves inadequate to the task of restoring the disturbed balance in any better fashion. This view is in harmony with that of Meyer, Hoch, Bleuler and others who have stood for a partially psychogenic origin of the psychoses, and have recognized that the constitutional and temperamental make-up of each patient's personality is partially responsible for his illness, or, as I should say, for the method which he instinctively adopts to reassert himself. The psychoses form, in short, one more illustration of the general principle that illness may be classified as the manifestation of efforts toward a certain sort of health.

It is no valid argument against this view to say that the outcome of these efforts, from the clinical and social standpoint, seems anything but desirable. The "desirability" depends, as a rule, only on the satisfaction of the patient's unconscious cravings; but in this sense his illness may secure him something which, with one portion of his nature, he may be said to wish for.

There are times when, from this point of view, a fit of anger fills, psychologically, a useful purpose—then, namely, when it makes the rational thinking which the angry person does not wish to use, or cannot use, seem so impossible that no one asks him to attempt it. Similarly, when a wife's hysteria gains her the attentions of her otherwise inattentive husband, it fills, from the standpoint of her deeper longings, an important place. And the process is, for her, all the more "desirable" if it works without any conscious acquiescence on her part.

It is believed by those who accept the explanation

offered by psychoanalysts¹ that the difference in mechanism between the psychoses and the psychoneuroses is one (from the psychological standpoint) mainly of degree. Leaving wholly aside the problem of physical or chemical influences (not by any means as unimportant, but as not germane to this particular discussion) it may be said that in the case of the psychoses the patient's emotional interest and attention is engrossed in his complexes to such an extent that he becomes submerged in them. The "gain" to him through this process is to be reckoned, as already stated, in terms of the fulfilment of an instinctive but unacknowledged attempt to escape from an intolerable emotional situation, or else to satisfy an unconscious craving².

It is of no importance, as a counter argument, to say that this complex process of readjustment (the details of which I do not attempt to indicate here) would never have taken place but for the presence of a physical "disease-process" in his brain or elsewhere.

Let this be proved by all means if it be possible; or let us admit, as with Hoch, that the brain-cells may be undeveloped. We are not questioning or studying these facts, but are studying only the mechanism of the patient's attempts to find an equilibrium of a new sort.

This principle that the psychoses and neuropsychoses come into existence because they serve a purpose, has been discussed so often that I ought perhaps to assume

¹ See especially, as making clear the grounds for this mode of reasoning, Jung's now classical study of *dementia praecox* (published in English as one of the monographs of the *Jour. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*). Freud's investigation of the Schreber case of paranoia (*Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische u. Psychopathologische Forschungen*, iii, 9), Abraham's study of manic-depressive insanity (*Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, ii, 302. See also the brief but excellent study of the psychoses by Bernard Hart entitled "The Psychology of Insanity").

² The term "unconscious", as here used, indicates the absence of selfconscious awareness only.

it as granted, and pass on; but its recognition is so important for the prevention of the psychoses, that a few words of further explanation may not be out of place, the more so that the doctrine here at stake is distinctly an outcome of the psychoanalytic movement.

It seems at first sight almost impossible to get away from the patient's conscious point of view, and to deplore with him and his friends, as if for a misfortune without mitigation, the signs of an oncoming mania or depression or paranoia or dementia praecox. But if, through the aid of knowledge and insight, one can succeed in placing oneself in the depths of the patient's mind, at the center of his vain struggles to make the conditions around him square with his desires, even though these be immature and narrow, it becomes possible to see that his illness may have furnished him a real way out of his perplexity, even if not the one that we, looking on, or he, if possessed of full conscious insight, might have wished to see adopted. The justice of this conception becomes clearer if one scrutinizes, to begin with, the psychological significance of one's own fits of temporary depression, of the "blues". Whatever else the "blues" accomplish, they certainly afford us the chance to bury ourselves in an ocean of self-engrossment, self-pity or self-commendation in which we may become for the time being almost as thoroughly immersed as a dementia praecox patient in his delusions. The difference lies in the power of emergence and its special causes.

I have recently followed with great interest the gradual transition of a reactive outbreak of depressive self-pity, excited by a misfortune in business, into as severe and prolonged and typical a melancholia as one could wish to see¹.

¹ No psychoanalytic treatment was attempted or would have been practicable. After the attack is fairly over it should be used for the prevention of a second attack.

It occasionally happens that a patient with obsessive fears is intelligent enough (after a certain amount of treatment) and frank enough to see and say that in some respects he feels better satisfied with the prospects offered by his dissociation than by those offered by health; then, namely, when to be well means the facing of situations and renunciations that he is unwilling to contemplate. The only alternative recourse seems to be suicide. As a rule, of course, the logic of the process is concealed from his conscious view. Such persons are somewhat like children, who learn to create, in fancy, a separate realm of feeling and fancy, to which they may retreat¹ for the private enjoyment of emotions in which the other elements of their nature do not permit them openly to indulge. In this realm of fancy the child may become for the time a king, or a being to whom all sorts of excesses of imagination are permissible. If, however, he stays in this realm too long, the return into a life of relative reality² and social responsibility may be attended with difficulty. The justification of this comparison only becomes clear when (as sometimes in dementia praecox or paranoia) it is possible to get at the patient's delusions from their deeper and, to him, better side.

What such a child does for a brief space, when he withdraws into this delightful world of fancy, peopled, it may be, by beings from some other sphere,³ the para-

¹ Compare Bleuler's "Das Autistische Denken", *Jahrb. für Psychoanalytische und Psychopathologische Forschungen*, iv, 1.

² I say "relative reality", because even the most conventional and usual sort of life gets its form and color from the imagination of each individual. Each person's world is, in part, his personal world alone.

³ I have a patient at present in mind, of good intelligence, but small in stature and timid in temperament, who suffers both from depression and from compensatory ideas of courage. All his life long he has gained great satisfaction from day-dreams of power and

phrenic (*i. e.*, "dissociated" or schizophrenic) patient may—in the terms of this important theory—be said permanently to do. And, *mutatis mutandis*, similar statements may be made for manic-depressive and for paranoid patients. Such persons may, namely, become in different degrees and ways, so preoccupied with the details of their "autistic" life, even when, to the untrained eye, this does not appear to be the case; they may get so immersed in their fantasies and day-dreams that they lose touch, to a greater or less extent, with the life of relative reality. During a period of many years I have had the chance to watch a young girl who, although still able and even brilliant in certain intellectual lines, has been gradually sinking into such a life of fantasy, in which secret marriages, pregnancies and miscarriages play prominent parts¹.

We are too apt to define each other's tendencies in terms of misfortune, weakness, deficiency and lack. This procedure is misleading. There is really nothing negative in nature. If a plot of ground does not grow grass, it runs to weeds, but the weeds are as positive in their nature as the grass and often more resistive to destruction.

Life may often be said to consist in the gradual (at times apparently sudden) abandonment of equilibriums which had sufficed well enough up to a certain point, in favor of new and more insistent equilibriums that loom up as representing, as the case may be, a more advanced (sublimated) or a more regressive (infantile) but seemingly more stable stage of evolution or of evolutionary tendency.

prominence. Even at the present time, when he is about 22 years old, he occasionally imagines himself to be a supernatural being, wandering through space in the skies or "talking with God", and dreams of driving a four-horse sleigh or piloting a swift boat into that unknown world from which, in reality, he shrinks.

¹ She entirely refused treatment.

It is in the terms of this process that the history of the psychoses should be written.

It is important to recognize that this substitution of new equilibriums for old ones often concerns, at least in the first instance, not the whole personality, but only a part of it, and that in proportion as this happens the individual loses his unity and becomes relatively dissociated.

Also, and by the same token, the process may go on to a great extent without the active or even passive intervention of the consciousness and the constructive imagination, although these powers might, if properly trained to the work, be counted on to lend powerful assistance to the maintenance of the mental unity and to the binding of the forces of the past (which in a certain sense still lives) into one coherent whole with those of the self-foreshadowing future.

These two facts—that the mentally unbalanced person¹ is “dissociated”, *i. e.*, subject to two or more sets of strongly conflicting motives, and that this happens without the intervention of consciousness—which, however, might intervene with profit, at least in a certain proportion of the cases—are to be considered as of fundamental significance.

It is the function of psychoanalysis to see that consciousness comes to its rights and is given its due share in the determination of the result.

I have, however, been led by my experience to believe that patients with oncoming psychoses, several of whom I have watched with interest throughout the gradual development of their illnesses, are very tender plants and need to be handled by psychoanalysts (as by therapeutists of all sorts) with extreme care.

¹ Provided that his disorder is of one of the types here in question.

I also sympathize heartily with the view expressed by several experienced observers¹, that similar care, as well as great patience and friendliness, are essential, if one wishes to do good and avoid harm in dealing with neurotic children by the trenchant weapon of psycho-analysis.

But to say this is to broach the subject of prevention; and before speaking on that point I wish to discuss a little further the general claims of mental influences to be considered as both causative and curative, in theory at least.

It is obvious that the questions which are before us for consideration would never have been asked unless the belief was somewhat prevalent that the degree of liability of any given person to fall a prey to mental disorders of one or another sort was in a measure dependent on the mental influences to which he had been previously subjected. As a matter of fact, I suppose that all physicians tacitly assume this proposition to be proved, if not, indeed, self-evident—even those who would think that we ought to look for the final causes of the psychoses in brain-changes, of toxic or degenerative or hereditary origin, and who would reject the formal assertion that a purely psychogenic basis for these disorders was conceivable.

But if it makes even some difference as regards his liability to insanity, as to what mental environment a person has been subjected to, then several important inferences follow:

In the first place, if the psychoses are even partially of mental origin—*i. e.*, “psychogenic”—who can say how far this may or might be true?

An adequate explanation, satisfactory to all disputants, of the exact etiology and nature of these serious mental disorders will, to be sure, never be furnished

¹ Compare *Internationale Ztschr. f. ärzt. Psychoanal.*

until the time arrives when the nature of the relationship between the body and the mind is expressible in clear and comprehensive terms.

This is largely a philosophical problem¹, and as such cannot be discussed here. I venture nevertheless, to assert that but few students of philosophy would to-day get warm over the particular difficulty that confronts us and that forms a real stumbling block to a certain proportion of physicians. Most such students would surely encourage us to believe that a psychogenic etiology is, theoretically, just as admissible as a physical or an hereditary or a chemical etiology². But when one says "psychogenic etiology", one should be understood as including all that that term implies to the man who uses it. If he believes that all mental phenomena have their physical aspect or that they are hereditary, then "psychogenic" means for him, in so far, "physical", etc. If he does not believe this, then "psychogenic" means for him purely mental.

Both practical and scientific considerations justify us in accepting as genuine any causes which *seem* to lead to these disorders, provided only that they are not reducible to simpler, more manageable terms.

One thing seems to me certain: While it is true that those who study the psychoses as diseases of the brain can count on the powerful aid of chemical and histological tests, it is equally true that those who, on the other hand, prefer to emphasize the psychogenic aspect of this etiological problem have the great advantage of placing themselves squarely in the position of the patient who is

¹ For the most recent discussion of this problem, from the points of view of philosophy and physical science, see "The Concept of Consciousness," by Prof. Edwin Holt, Harvard University.

² This applies even to the psychoses of periodical recurrence and relatively long duration. It is hard to explain these periodic recurrences on any hypothesis. But it is hard also to explain the recurrences of the seventeen-year locust pests.

striving to find himself and to realize his destiny on the battle-ground of social life.

But I pass, now, from the consideration of the mechanism of the psychoses and the needs of the distinctly neurotic child to the subject of preventive education in the stricter sense, as applicable to children at large, whether at home or at school and whether sick or well; and I attempt again to answer the question, What contribution has psychoanalysis to offer?

As I have already indicated, this contribution will perhaps always be mainly an indirect one. I propose nothing so insensate as that parents, or even teachers, should practice psychoanalysis; but I maintain that this branch of medicine has something to offer to parents, more to teachers, and a good deal to the family physician. All these classes of persons need to have their own points of view reformed before they attempt to form the character of the child. They need a wider comprehension than that which has been current hitherto, as to what the psychological nature of the child is, and what his purposes and his dangers are, as expressed in terms of his conflicts, his concealed and repressed thoughts, feelings and desires, and his so often misused imagination; and they need to have this knowledge on the basis of a thorough acquaintance with the psychology of human nature in general, as gained through clinical research.

Needless to say I do not claim that psychoanalysts have, at present, surpassing claims to recognition as physicians, educators or parents. The qualities required for serving in these capacities are numerous, and those which nature and instinct provide may, at their best, be more valuable than those gained through any kind of training whatsoever. No innate capacities are, however, so good but that they can be made still better by study and by knowledge.

In the first place, I think our current standards of conduct, and of thought as related to conduct, inadequately reflect the best conceptions of the ultimate goal of education and of life. Of course, there are vast numbers of persons to whom this proposition is not applicable to any practical extent, and the proportion of these to whom it does not apply is doubtless particularly large among educators.

I presume it will hardly be disputed that the kind of person who most completely fulfils his destiny is he who looks on himself not only as a private and independent individual, but also as at once a member and a representative of the community in which he lives, then of a widening series of communities, and eventually of an ideal and all-comprehensive community. This proposition was long ago made the basis of the educational system of Froebel¹ which should be accepted as offering the best prophylactic method at our command, applicable to all children, though its influence might easily go for nothing unless reinforced by that of the child's environment and home.

But although definitions of this sort are generally accepted as indicating theoretically a suitable scheme of human opportunity and obligation, yet the observation of human conduct leads to the conclusion that the sentiments corresponding to them do not exert the thoroughgoing influence that one might look for. Obviously, these sentiments are but imperfectly accepted by some portion of the minds of most men. The very prevalence of the psychoneurotic illnesses and of the corresponding defects of character and temperament from which all men suffer in some measure, indicates that this is true. For many of these forms of illness, as well as many of the defects of character, are largely based on the self-assertion of

¹ Froebel: *The Education of Man*; see also *Report on the Kindergarten* by Susan E. Blow and others.

the individual in the narrower sense, with his demand for personal "rights", and his (largely infantile, and thus selfish) longings and cravings, as against the assertion of his broader, his ideal self, recognizant rather of obligations to the community and of capabilities for usefulness than of rights.

I blame no one for this situation, and least of all do I bring an indictment against nervous invalids as a class, most of whom are handicapped and narrowed only by virtue of a necessity of development or evolution, against which they may have contended with all the force and light at their command. But the facts are so; and if it be asked what classes of persons it is that most often, even under conditions of the severest strain, escape the toils of invalidism, and of the sense of isolation that goes with it, it may fairly be said that they comprise, first, the persons of high grade such as I have just described¹, who are able thoroughly to learn the lesson of "sublimation," perhaps because they were so "set" by nature and so favored by their environment that they could learn it easily; next those who are so constituted—whether by inheritance or by training—that they fit adequately into the conditions by which they find themselves encompassed, and are not hampered by the visions of unattainable ideals.

¹ This statement might be considered as misleading, but it is difficult to cover every contingency in a brief space. I do not, of course, mean to deny that nervous invalidism is to be found, perhaps to a considerable extent, among persons devoting themselves unselfishly to the public welfare. Of course, among persons of this class, as among others, innate differences of endurance are found, and specific tendencies of a neurotic sort may happen to develop. What I mean to say is that in so far as the ability to lose oneself in one's job, whatever this may be, acts as a steady and wholesome influence, this influence is likely to be more far reaching in proportion as the job in question enlists tendencies of genuine disinterestedness, and makes it possible to put aside considerations of purely personal, as contrasted with social, interest.

It will be understood, of course, that I would classify as high-grade not only those persons whose native powers of reason and intuition, unhampered by serious defects, have been such as to enable them to grasp and define the doctrine of loyalty in its most highly developed and rational form, but all persons who are genuinely loyal to such ideals as they see. It is, in fact, this quality of genuineness that is controlling and indispensable as a factor in education and in life.

It may be urged that psychoanalysis does not take the cultivation of social ideals as an end for which it should directly strive. Technically, this is true. But psychoanalysts know well the evils that attend the over-assertion of personal desires, cultivated too exclusively in and for themselves, and the importance of the opposite course follows by inference. The primary task of the psychoanalyst is to remove handicaps to progress, but only in so far as these give rise to painful conflicts in the mind. They can, however, see and should endorse the schemes of education by which these handicaps are best avoided.

Doctrines of this sort cannot, obviously, be preached to young children, either at home or school, with any prospect of considerable benefit. If too strongly reminded, even of their social obligations and opportunities, children are likely either to react by a revolt, or to develop a hypocritical tendency, both of which results indicate the activity of that very repressive and dissociative tendency which is so objectionable.

On the other hand, teachers, parents and physicians can appreciate these principles, testing the genuineness of their beliefs, if necessary, by psychoanalytic methods, and through them strong influences of the best sort can be brought to bear on the children under their charge. The best teachers do this already, but the

background of intelligent cooperation should become more effective.

The steady progress toward sublimation of those individuals whose developmental tendencies are of the best sort, seems to indicate that they instinctively cultivate (in modes conforming to their age), even from the moment of their birth, the powers and pleasures which seem most personal and private, with reference to a social outcome which is soon seen to imply a loyalty to communities or social groups that exist for them only in an ideal sense¹; while those who fail to instinctively seek this outcome are apt to exhibit, in a negative sense, a dim recognition of the binding force of these social obligations, by developing tendencies which are positively asocial or antisocial in their significance.

Even the study of the sex life finds its most important bearing in its accentuation of the fact that man belongs to society in a sense deeper than commonly appears; that the family and, in general terms, the group should be considered as the unit, rather than the individual.

We ought to work for the maintenance of those educational systems and principles that help children first to feel and then to see that every man is most truly himself as an independent agent when he feels himself bound to merge his private interests in the interests of persons and causes outside of himself. But this tendency should go, in word and conduct, no further than it is expressive of a genuine sentiment.

Social sentiments of this better sort and the conduct based on them should not be regarded as implying standards seldom to be reached, but rather standards to which many

¹ Compare Royce's *Philosophy of Loyalty*, and numerous other publications by the same writer.

persons might measurably attain. Children, especially, are natural idealists and respond to appeals which adults often dismiss as idle.

As illustrative of the kind of service that education can sometimes render, even to very young children, through planting the seeds of the broader sense of social obligations which is so favorable to mental solidarity and health and so hostile to the dissociation that is brought about by repression I will mention an observation, superficially trivial, but suggestively important.

A small child, who had fallen into habits of theft, became strongly captivated by the idea, which was carefully presented to him, that he could take "with his eyes", instead of with his hands, the things that he longed to appropriate, and thus gain, ideally, the satisfaction of possession, reinforced by the gratification of satisfying a dim social ideal, although obliged to renounce the pleasure of exclusive ownership¹, with its denial of the social principle. Subsequent developments indicated that this discovery, which appealed, perhaps, primarily, to his imagination only, helped to effect a real change of temperament.

The educational system that has elaborated most thoroughly the methods of inducing or emphasizing this community sentiment as a goal of progress and has placed them on a practical footing for children between 4 and 6 years old, is undoubtedly the kindergarten system of the great thinker and educator Friedrich Froebel. Kindergartens do not by any means always come up to his ideals, but one cause of this lies in the failure of parents and their advisers to recognize the part which this system aims theoretically to play, and in their failure

¹ I am not attempting here a complete explanation of theft-habits, certain roots of which have been shown by psychoanalysis to be very deeply rooted in infantile instincts.

to give an adequate support to those who are working toward this end.

It is, however, not enough to admit the importance of a general preparatory training of this sort, even if it could be supposed that its principles were to be emphasized through the discipline of the home.

Each child has his own special needs, to be met by appreciative sympathy, direction and correction, and these needs are to be best understood when they are studied in the light of a knowledge of those to whom the tendencies to repression, dissociation and ambivalence have gone on to a more or less excessive degree.

A certain amount of repression, dissociation and ambivalence seems to be an inevitable attendant of competitive existence; but it has not been appreciated until recently at what an early stage in the child's life these tendencies may appear. It is true that, with the majority of children, neither repression nor dissociation, nor the tendency to primary or reactive emotional excess that leads to these results, is developed to any very objectionable extent. Children of the best sort, no matter how childlike and, for a time, immature their traits may be, appear to be marked by a characteristic quality that stamps every act as belonging in part to a maturer future of which it may be said to be prophetic, while, perhaps on that very account, it appears also to belong peculiarly to the present moment.

Nevertheless, the pitfalls into which so many children actually stumble (not so much because they are degenerate in the sense of having progressive brain defects, as because their power of adaptation is insufficient for the requirements of life in a given environment) should be recognized as standing open for even the most broadly adaptable child. The earliest years of all children are years of self-engrossment, the finding of themselves in the sensations

that attend their reflex acts, their impulses, the recognition of their powers, desires and fears, and as reflected in the attention of their parents. And this period is beset from the outset with the danger that these new-found gratifications and excitements will be taken too exclusively in and for themselves.

The engrossment of these primary, primitive and elemental pleasures — which soon become modified by the comparisons which children institute between themselves and others, and the instructive discovery of their capacity for compensations and over-compensations — is then more or less superseded by the engrossments of their powers of fantasy, through which the unpleasant realities of the social life, for which they are still unprepared, can be shoved off for a time, in the interest of a more unified life of imagination.

Hand in hand with this tendency comes the recognition of the possibility of repressing what is too distressing, coupled with that of preserving the pleasurable aroma even of excitements that might be reckoned painful.

And here begins the double life of which every child lover should be able to see the traces and the dangers, and also, it should be said, the possibilities of added usefulness.

Children outgrow, it is true, vast numbers of habits which they are tempted to adopt in these earlier years, and it is as objectionable to see signs of permanent mischief in incidental tendencies as it is to overlook their psychological significance. One may be trustful, but should none the less be watchful.

The principal dangers to which parents are exposed are of a twofold sort. First, they may fail to get any adequate idea of the process which is going on in the child's mind. Next, they may fail to recognize that each child, at each stage of his existence, is instinctively trying

to construct a species of unified world, and is using therefor a set of symbolisms which must, perforce, be based on the sensations which he gets from his own efforts and functions, however foreign and trivial, or even revolting, the language of these symbolisms may seem to the adult.

Finally, they may let the desire to seek their own gratification (even though unconsciously) stand in the way of the best interests of the child.

This latter danger is important and familiar and although not difficult to understand is very difficult to avoid. The love of the parent for the child usually means great devotion: but this is too often given for the sake of a return in kind, and it then partakes of the character of self-love, or mirror love. This sort of devotion fetters the child instead of making him more free, whereas really disinterested love increases the child's independence by arousing in him a corresponding disinterestedness on his part, in a form suitable to his age.

The parent should be a bridge over which the child may pass to a social existence of a wider sort, carrying habits and tendencies of loyalty and service, and feeling within himself a foreshadowing sense of the larger community of which he is to become a part. But, instead, it too often happens that the father or the mother, by dint of the very exclusiveness and intensity of their own affection and the fascination of its exhibition, creates or intensifies a similar exclusiveness in the child's mind, and thus chains him to a set of private gratifications which become sensuous and exacting in proportion as they are asocial. The "father-complex" and "mother-complex" have played with good reason a large part in psychoanalytic writing, as in life¹. Repeatedly have I seen

¹ Compare papers by Abraham and by Jung in the *Jahrb. f. Psychoanal. u. Psychopathol. Forsch.*, I, pp. 110, 155.

lives that should have been eminently happy, threatened with unhappiness through influences like those which I have outlined.

Another important principle which every one should know is that the fantasies and desires of children, even when their object is something which to the adult seems insignificant or unworthy, have meanings which *come near* to being good and useful meanings, and may by chance be transformed by good management into something useful and creative.

If the old saying is true, that the highwayman makes often a good turnkey, then there must have been a time when a dose of prevention would have been in place for him. And the same is the case with children. The slightly neurotic or imaginative child who is bound, at each phase of his life, to try his hand at building an imaginary world of interest, of beauty, and, above all, of power, will do this or symbolize his attempts to do so, by every means that lie at hand.

The intelligent parent will seek to see through the act or the symbol, and to appreciate the child's meanings. These meanings should be divined through real sympathy, based on close but intelligent intimacy, and should be taken at their best value¹. For it may depend on the turn of this straw whether a desirable outcome finally emerges or whether the act or interest that might have served a good turn as a symbol and then have been replaced, becomes, through repression, the center of a hampering craving. The tendency to relive, in later years, the fantasy-life of self-indulgent childhood may arise from either of two sorts of causes; an excessive preference for the self-indulgent pleasures first exhibited at an early period when another and better choice might perhaps have been made with almost equal willingness; and a tendency to regression

¹ Compare R. L. Stevenson's *Lantern Bearers*.

toward these renounced but simpler pleasures, showing itself under conditions of fatigue and strain from which every person seeks instinctively to escape. The child should be protected so far as practicable from both of these dangers, first through having ample inducements offered him for making the best choice, and, next, through being taught to do well and easily the tasks that he is to be called on to do.

In other words, his incitements to the best choice (as, especially, through the imitation of living and historic characters, and through examples afforded by literature), his adaptations and his adaptability should all be held in mind, and with special reference to the specific sorts of dangers that he must encounter.

The imagination of the young child is a weapon of immense power for evil or for good. It can be turned to the support of the reason or to the intensification of sense cravings. But on this great subject I cannot enter here.

The supplementary addition which I propose to this educational scheme is one that in a certain sense restores the ambivalent principle, as one that when rightly understood is broader than even the principle of independence and power, as commonly conceived. The best man—or child—is not alone a single individual; he is likewise a member of a community, or series of communities, eventually of an ideal community of some sort to which he feels that his loyalty is due and to which he becomes rebound. Similarly, just in proportion to the degree that a man makes himself independent of narrowing ties such as imply slavish dependence, whether based on fear or favor, or longing for approbation and attention, or jealousy or envy, and becomes in that sense independent, he becomes once more dependent on the obligations imposed by his own good qualities and powers, according to the principle hinted at by the term "*noblesse oblige*".

If such a person frees himself from the objectionable and hampering features of his childhood, he should retain, nevertheless, and all the more, the best that his childhood stands for, thus expressing, in his life, all that "religion" literally taken, indicates, namely, a rebinding accompanied by a setting-free. Nothing less than this sort of ambivalence should be, I think, the goal of education for the normal and the neurotically disposed child. This sort of rebinding which should show itself able to meet, at least fairly well, any ordinary test of genuineness is also a goal aimed at theoretically by the educational system of Froebel. It is, of course, not to be supposed that a couple of years even in the best kindergartens, much less in any given school which bears that name, is to be reckoned as a sure prevention against subsequent psychoses, any more than it is to be supposed that every person of the type to which I have above alluded as the best in kind, is to be considered as, *ipso facto*, beyond the reach of these dangers. The causative factors ordinarily involved are far too numerous for that, but one reason that I rate so high the possibilities of this system is that while it aims to use all obvious means for the development of character without needlessly calling the conscious attention of the child to this aim, it recognizes also the importance of taking some measures to prepare the child, through very simple investigations into the results of his own acts¹, for making later, even if still only in a simple form, that kind of rational self-scrutiny which psychoanalysts have learned to look on as of so much value.

One of the most obvious fruits of this rational self-scrutiny is that—contrary to the usual belief—it is destructive of that morbid, emotional self-scrutiny that goes by the name of introspection and that shows itself

¹ Compare *The Kindergarten: A Report* by Susan E. Blow and others, 1918.

so often as a sign and a promoter of the neurotic disposition. I am not wedded to any one plan of education, however, and should welcome any scheme that could show evidences of its capacity to develop character, self-reliance and the recognition of community obligations.

Let it not be supposed, however, that this claim can, without further inquiry, be made for any and every system that makes a great point, with quasi-military vigor, on the overcoming of difficulties just for their own sake. This has its value, but it is a value that can easily be estimated too highly. After all, it is the personality and previous training of the teacher that are the elements of chief importance. But every such teacher should have been taught to accept a hint from the experience of the psycho-analyst, and to use, not only general but specific means to make his personality eventually unnecessary to his pupils. The importance of following this rule was pointed out by the able Mme. de Stael, as a consideration worthy the attention of every legislator.

Chapter XV.

THE NECESSITY OF METAPHYSICS*

Some years ago, at the Weimar Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association, I read a paper on the importance of a knowledge of philosophy and metaphysics for psychoanalysts regarded as students of human life. Perhaps if I had had the experience and ability to contribute the results of some original analytic investigation on specific lines, I should not then have ventured into the philosophic field. Perhaps, indeed, if those conditions now obtained I should not be bringing forward similar arguments again, and if any one feels tempted to maintain that philosophic speculation is a camp of refuge for those who, in consequence of temperamental limitations and infantile fixations which ought to be overcome, draw back from the more robust study of emotional repressions on scientific lines, I should admit that the allegation contains an element of truth. But in spite of this, and in spite of the fact that there is some truth also in the statement that the effects—good and bad—of emotional repression make themselves felt, as a partial influence, in all the highest reaches of human endeavor, including art, literature, and religion;—in spite of these partial truths, philosophy and metaphysics are the only means through which the essential nature of many tendencies can be studied of which psychoanalysis describes only the transformations. And this being so it is perhaps reasonable

* Read before the American Psychopathological Association, May 5, 1915. Published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, June 1915.

that one paper should be read at an annual meeting such as this, where men assemble whose duty it is to study the human mind in all its aspects.

I presume that just as, and just because men have minds *and* bodies, an evolutional history in the ordinary sense and a mental history in a sense not commonly considered, so there will always be two, or perhaps three, parties among psychologists and men of science, and each one, in so far as it is limited in its vision, may be considered as abnormal, if one will. I decline, however, to admit that the temperamental peculiarities of one group are more in need either of justification or of rectification through psychoanalysis than those of the others. It is probably true that emotional tension often plays a larger part among persons who love *a priori* reasoning—the “tender-minded” of Dr. James—than it does in those who work through observation; but on the other hand exclusively empirical attitude has its limitations and its dangers. Philosophy and metaphysics deal more distinctively with essential function,—that is, with real existence,—while natural science and the genetic psychology (of which psychoanalysis, strictly speaking, is a branch) deal rather with appearances and with structure. Both are in need of investigation. The *form* which art, religion, and literature assume is determined by men’s personal experiences and special cravings. The *essential motive* of art and religion is, however, the dim recognition by men of their relation to the creative spirit of the universe.

No one can doubt that function logically precedes structure; or if any one does doubt this, he need only observe his own experience and see how in every new acquisition of knowledge or of power there come, first, the thought, the idea, then the effort, next the habit, and finally the modification of cerebral mechanism, in which

the effort and the habit become represented in relatively permanent and static form. In fact, the crux of the whole discussion between science and metaphysics turns on, or harks back to the discussion between function and structure; and it is the latter, in the sense in which I mean the word, that has had of late a too large share of our attention.

The enterprise on which we are all of us embarked,—whether we define it as an investigation, pure and simple, into human nature and human motives, or as a therapeutic attempt to relieve invalids of their symptoms,—is a larger one than it is commonly conceived of as being. Each physician and each investigator has, indeed, the right to say that for practical reasons he prefers to confine his attention to some single portion of one or the other of these tasks, be it never so small. But each one should regard himself as virtually under an obligation to recognize the respects in which this chosen task is incomplete. Every physicist is aware that there is some form of energy underlying, or rather expressing itself in, light and heat and gravitation. Physicists do not study this form of energy, not because they do not wish to but simply because they cannot do so by the only methods that they are allowed to use. But, as a reaction of defense, they sometimes assert that no one else can do so either, that this underlying energy cannot be explained. To say this is, however, in my judgment, to misappreciate what an explanation is.

To explain any matter is to discover the points of similarity, or virtual identity, between the matter studied and ourselves. But in order to do this thoroughly, or rather in order to do it with relation to the essential nature of some form of energy (the "Libido", for example, considered as an unpicturable force) one must first consider what we, the investigators, are, not at our less

good, but at our best. It is with us, as given, with our best qualities regarded as defining in part the Q. E. D. of the experiment, that the investigation must begin. The nature of any and every form of real underlying energy or essence must be defined in terms of our sense of our own will and freedom. And this means that we must conceive and describe ourselves, and expect to conceive and to describe the powers that animate us, no longer as a system of forces subject to the so-called laws of nature (which are, in reality, not immutable) but as relatively free, creative agents; no longer as the product of the interplay of instincts, but as individuals possessed of real reason, real power of love and real self-consistent will. To claim to study the effects of the "Libido", to which we ascribe the vast powers with which we are familiar, yet fail to seek in it what would correspond to our own best attributes, would be to lay aside our duties as students of human nature. It would be to confine our attention to the "structure" of the mind, the form under which it manifests itself, without having studied the laws of its action under conditions which are more favorable to its development.

It must, now, have struck students of psychoanalytic literature that a marked tendency has been shown toward supplementing the study of structure,—that is, the detailed history of men's experiences and evolution, regarded as sequences of phenomena,—by the study of the function or creative energy for which the experiences stand. Silberer, whose work is endorsed by Freud, has gone to a considerable length in this direction; and the whole tendency of Freud's insistence on the relevancy, in the mental sphere, of the law of the conservation of energy has been a movement, though, I think, a narrow one, in this direction. More recently, Jung has emphasized the importance of this tendency, and has dwelt more strongly,

as I think, than the facts warrant, on the supposed unwillingness of Freud to recognize its importance.

Behind the experiences of childhood, for example, lie the temperamental trends of childhood, and it is these with which we really need to get acquainted; for these trends, if not the whole causes and equivalents of the experiences which are recounted to us by our patients, constitute the conditions without which the latter would not have been what they became.

But Jung himself, strangely enough, in both of his carefully prepared arguments, specifically rejects all intention of dealing "metaphysically" with this theme, in spite of the fact that every movement toward a fuller recognition of creative energy is nothing less than metaphysics, even though not in name.

The skilled observer, scrutinizing the motives and peering into the history of the person whose traits and trends he is called on to investigate, must see, in imagination, not only a vast host of acts, but also a vast network of intersecting lines of energy of which the casual observer, and even the intimate friend, may be wholly unaware. We call these lines of energy by many special names,—"Libido" or "Urllibido", first of all, then love and hate and jealousy, and so on.

What are these lines of energy, and how can we study them to the best purpose? Obviously they are incomplete editions of the love and reason and will the laws of which we can study to best advantage in ourselves and in men where they are displayed in their best, that is, in their most constructive form. To make such studies is to recognize metaphysics, but instead of doing this tacitly and implicitly we should do it openly and explicitly.

The study of human nature should, in short, begin at the top, rather than at the bottom; just as, if one had

to choose what phase of a symphony one would choose in order to get an idea of its perfection, one would take some culminating moment rather than the first few notes simply because they were the first. To be accurate, one could not do justice to the symphony except by studying it as a whole, and similarly one should study the man as a whole, including his relations to the universe as a whole. It is as wholes that great poets conceived of their poems and great artists of their pictures, and it is as a whole that each and every human life, standing as it does as the representative of the *body* of the universe, and the *spirit* of the universe, on the other, should implicitly be viewed.

The psychologist should sympathize deeply with the anatomist and the physiologist and the student of cerebral pathology, but equally deeply with the philosopher and the metaphysician who study the implications, present although hidden, that point to the bonds between the individual and the universe. To fail to recognize that these bonds exist,—as is done when the attempt is made to study human beings as if they were really and exclusively the product of their historic past conceived of in an organic sense,—would be to try to build one-half of an arch and expect it to endure. The truth is, we do not, in my opinion, genuinely believe that a human is nothing but the product of his organic past, or the product of his experience.

We believe, by implication, in our metaphysical selves and our corresponding obligations, more strongly than we have taught ourselves to recognize. But to this fact we make ourselves blind through a species of repression, just as many a child, confident of its parents' affection, assumes, for his own temporary purposes, the right to accuse them of hostile intentions which they do not entertain.

We forget, or repress, the fact that the mind of man cannot be made subject to the laws of physics, and yet we proceed to deal with the phenomena dependent on the working of the mind of man as if these laws actually did prevail.

The misleading effects of this tendency are clearly seen where it is a question of the conclusions to be drawn from the researches, admirable in themselves, made under the influence of the genetic method.

The notions seems to prevail that we should prepare ourselves for the formation of just ideas with regard to the mode in which the higher faculties of men come into existence by wiping the slate clean to the extent of assuming that we have before us no data except some few acts or thoughts that are definable in the simplest possible terms, and then watching what happens as the situation becomes more complicated. But one is apt to forget, in doing this, that there is one thing which we cannot wipe off the slate,—namely, ourselves, not taken in the Bergsonian sense alone, but as fully fledged persons, possessed of the very qualities for which we undertake to search, yet without the possession of which the search could not begin. This does not, of course, militate against the value of these genetic researches in one sense. The study of evolutional sequences is still, and forever will be, of enormous value. But it does not teach us nearly as much of the nature of real creativeness as we can learn through the introspection of ourselves in the fullest sense; and I maintain that psychoanalysts are persons who could do this to advantage.

Is not the notion that through the careful watching of the sequences of the evolutionary process, as if from without, we can get an adequate idea of the forces that really are at work, exactly the delusion by which the skillful juggler tries to deceive his audience when he

directs their attention to the shifting objects that he manipulates, and away from his own swiftly moving hands?

My contention is that there are other means of studying the force which we call "Libido" besides that of noting its effects. The justification for this statement is that the force itself is identical, in the last analysis, with that which we feel within ourselves and know as reason, as imagination, and as will, conscious of themselves, and capable of giving to us, directly or indirectly, the only evidence we could ever hope to get, for the existence of real creativeness, spontaneity and freedom.

Every work of art, worthy of the name, gives evidence of the action not alone of a part of a man, but of the whole man; not only of his repressed emotions, but of his intelligence and insight, and of relationships existing between his life and all the other forms of life with which his own is interwoven.

Unity must prevail throughout all nature. Either we are,—altogether, and through and through, our best as well as our less good,—nothing but the expression of repressed cravings, in the sense that they or the conflicts based on them constitute the final *causa vera* of all progress; or else the best that is in us and also our repressed cravings are alike due to the action of a form of energy which is virtually greater than either one of them, inasmuch as it has the capacity of developing into something greater than either.

This is the agency which we should preeminently study, and it is best studied under conditions when instead of being obviously subject to repression, it is most free from repression. That is, it is best studied as it appears in the thoughts and conduct of the best men, at their best, their most constructive moments.

We cannot use our power of reason to deny our reason; for in so doing we affirm the very thing which

we deny. Nor are we under the necessity of using our reason to affirm our reason, since that is the datum without which we cannot undertake our task.

If this view is sound, what practical conclusions can we draw from it? I wish to insist on this question because it was distinctly and positively with the practical end in mind that I ventured to write this paper, and I suggest the following as a few of these conclusions.

(1) We should not speak of the "Libido", in whatever sense this word is taken, as if it were a fixed quantity, like so much heat, or so much fluid, that is, as representing so much measurable force. One current notion which has played a very useful part in psychoanalytic work, yet is misleading in its tendency, is that the "Libido" may be likened to a river which if it cannot find an outlet through its normal channel is bound to overflow its banks and perhaps furrow out a new path. This conception is based on this same law of the conservation of energy to which reference has been made. If, however, I am right in my contention that the "Libido" is only one manifestation of an energy,—greater than simply "vital",—which can be studied to the best purpose only among men whose powers have been cultivated to the best advantage, then it will be seen that this conception of "Libido" as a force of definite amount is not justifiable by the facts.

One does not find that love or reason is subject to this quantitative law. On the contrary, the persons whom most of us recognize as of the highest type do not love any given individual less because their love takes in another. The bond of love holds not only three, but an indefinite number.

The same statement may be made with regard to reason and to will. The power and quantity of them are not exhausted but are increased by use.

I maintain, then, that although the "Libido", in so far as it is regarded as an instinct, does not stand on the same footing with the reason and disinterested love of a person of high cultivation and large views, neither does it stand on the same footing with the physical energy that manifests itself in light and heat and gravitation.

When we come to deal with man and any of his attributes, or as we find them at any age, we ought to look upon him, in my estimation, as animated in some measure by his self-foreshadowing best. And whether it is dreams with which we have to do, or neurotic conflicts, or wilfulness, or regression, we shall learn to see, more and more, as we become accustomed to look for evidences thereof, the signs of this sort of promise, just as we might hope to learn to find, more and more, through the inspection of a lot of seeds of different plants, the evidences which would enable us to see the different outcomes which each one is destined to achieve, even though, at first, they all looked just alike.

(2) The next point has reference to "sublimation". This outcome of individual evolution, as defined by Freud, has a strictly social, not an ethical, meaning. Jung also, in the interesting paper referred to, in his description of the rational aims of psychoanalysis, makes sublimation (though he does not there use the word) the equivalent of a subjective sense of well being, combined with the maximum of biologic effectiveness.

"Die Psychoanalyse soll eine biologische Methode sein, welche das höchste subjektive Wohlbefinden mit der wertvollsten biologischen Leistung zu vereinigen sucht."

But in my opinion, while it may be true that the psychoanalyst may often have reason to be thankful if he can claim a therapeutic outcome of this sort, the logical goal of a psychoanalytic treatment is not covered by the securing of a relative freedom from subjective distress,

even when combined with the satisfactory fulfillment of one's biologic mission. A man has higher destinies than this, and the sense of incompleteness felt by the neurotic patient, which was emphasized by Janet and is recognized by us all, must be more or less painfully felt by every man whose conscience does not assure him that he is really working for an end greater than that here specified. The logical end of a psychoanalytic treatment is the recovery of a full sense of one's highest destiny and origin and of the bearings and meanings of one's life.

On similar grounds I think that the conflicts to which all men find themselves subjected, must be considered, in the last analysis, as conflicts of an ethical description. For it is only in ethical terms that one can define one's relation to the universe regarded as a whole, just as it is only in ethical terms that a man could describe his sense of obligation to support the dignity of fine family traditions or the ideals represented by a team or a social group of which he felt reason to be proud. I realize that a man's sense of pride of his family, his team or his country may be a symptom of narcissistic self-adulation; but like all such signs and symbols—the symbol of the church tower, for example—this is a case where two opposing meanings meet. Every act and motive of our lives, from infancy to age, is controlled by two sets of influences, the general nature of which has here been made sufficiently clear. They correspond on the one hand, to the numerous partial motives which psychoanalysis studies to great advantage, and on the other hand, to the ethical motives which are only thoroughly studied by philosophy.

(3) Another conclusion, which seems to me practically of great importance, follows from this same view. Every one who has studied carefully the life histories of patients, especially of children, and has endeavored in so doing to

follow step by step the experiences through which they reach the various mile-stones on their journey, must have been astonished to observe the evidences of *preparedness* on their part for each new step in this long journey. Human beings seem predestined, as it were, not only in a physical but in a mental sense, for what is coming, and the indications of this in the mental field are greater than the conditions of organic evolution could readily account for. The transcendency of the mind over the brain shows itself here as elsewhere.

We are told that our visions of the unpicturable, the ideal world, which our imagination paints and which our logical reasoning calls for as the necessary cap or final corollary to any finite world which our intelligence can actually define,— that such visions are nothing but the pictures of infantile desires projected on to a great screen and made to mock us with the appearance of reality.

I have nothing whatever to say against the value of the evidence that a portion of our visions are of this origin. In fact, I believe this as heartily as does any one. But I desire strenuously to oppose the view tacitly implied in the statement of the projection theory just cited, the acceptance of which as an exclusive doctrine would involve the virtual rejection of our right, as scientific men, to rely on the principle that the evidence afforded by logical presuppositions and logical inference is as cogent as that furnished through observation.

It is, in my opinion, just because we all belong to a world which is in outline not "in the making" but completed,— because, in short, we are in one sense like heirs returning to our estates,— that this remarkable preparedness of each child is found that impresses us so strongly. The universe is, in a sense, ours by prescriptive right and by virtue of the constitution of our minds. *But the unity of such a universe must, of course, be of a*

sort that includes and indeed implies diversity and conflict as essential elements of its nature.

Psychoanalysts should not make light of inferential forms of reasoning, for it is on this form of reasoning that the value of their own conclusions largely rests. We infer contrary meanings for words that are used ostensibly in one sense, and we infer special conflicts in infancy of which we have but little evidence at hand, and cravings and passions of which it may be impossible to find more than a few traces by way of direct testimony.

Our immediate environment and the world that surrounds us in that sense, appear to our observation, indeed, as "in the making". But besides the power of observation which enables, and indeed forces us to see the imperfection in this environmental world, we possess, or are possessed by, a mental constitution which compels us, with still greater force, to the belief in a goal of positive perfection of which our nearer goals are nothing but the shadow.

It is because I believe in the necessity of such reasoning as this that I am not prepared to accept the "Lust-Unlust" principle (that is, to use philosophical terms, the "hedonistic" principle) as representing the forces by which even the child is finally animated. Men do not reach their best accomplishments, if indeed they reach any accomplishment, through the exclusive recognition, either unconscious or instinctive, of a utilitarian result, or a result which can be couched in terms of pleasure or personal satisfaction as the goal of effort. They may state the goal to themselves in these terms; but this is, then, the statement of what is really a fictitious principle, a principle in positing which the patient does but justify himself and does not define his real motive. Utilitarianism and hedonism and the pleasure-pain principle, useful though they are, are alike imperfect in that they

refer to partial motives, partial forms of self-expression; whereas that which finally moves men to their best accomplishments and makes them dissatisfied with anything less than this, is the necessity rather than the desire to make complete self-expression as their final aim. The partial motives are more or less traceable as if by observation. The larger motives must be felt and reached through inferential reasoning, based on observation of ourselves through careful introspection.

Finally, the practical, therapeutic question arises, as to what measures the psychoanalyst is justified in taking to bring about the best sort of outcome in a given case?

It is widely felt that the psychoanalyst would weaken his own hold on the strong typically analytic principles through which painful conflicts are to be removed if he should form the habit of dealing with ethical issues, and talking of "duties", instead of stimulating his patients to the discovery of resistances and repressions, even of repression the origin of which is not to be found within the conscious life. Yet,—parallel, as one might say, with this clear-cut standard of professional psychoanalytic obligation, the force of which I recognize,—it has to be admitted that there are certain fairly definite limitations to the usefulness of psychoanalysis. As one of these limitations, well-pronounced symptoms of egoism, taking the form of narcissism, are to be reckoned. These symptoms are not easily analyzed away. But if one asks oneself, or asks one's patients, what conditions might, if they had been present from the outset, have prevented this narcissistic outcome (Jehovah type, etc.), the influence that suggests itself—looming up in large shape—is just this broad sense of ethical obligation to which repeated reference has here been made. If these patients could have had it brought home to them in childhood that they belonged, not to themselves conceived of narrowly (that

is, as separate individuals) but only to themselves conceived of broadly as representatives of a series of communities taken in the largest sense, the outcome that happened might perhaps have been averted.

And what might have happened may still happen. What is to be done? Each physician must decide this for himself. He should be able both to do his best as a psychoanalyst and at the same time help the patient to free himself from that sort of repression in consequence of which he is unable to see his own best possibilities. But he cannot do this unless he has trained himself to see and feel in himself the outlines of this vision any more than he could help the patient to rid himself of an infantile complex if he did not appreciate what this complex means. We must trust ourselves, as physicians, with deadly weapons, and with deadly responsibilities, and we ought to be well harried by our consciences if we should do injustice, in using them, either to our scientific or our philosophic training.

Chapter XVI.

THE WORK OF ALFRED ADLER, CONSIDERED WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THAT OF FREUD*.

Some years ago, while studying psychoanalysis for the first time, I acquainted myself in due course with the work of Dr. Alfred Adler of Vienna, and came then to the conclusion that while his contributions, regarded in themselves, were interesting and captivating (partly because presented with such eagerness and confidence), yet they were not such as to make one feel obliged to modify, in any essential respect, the formulations which were originally laid down by Freud and have since then been modified repeatedly, in detail, both by him and by his colleagues. In spite of having reached this judgment, however, the feeling has come over me from time to time, perhaps owing to complexes of my own, that possibly I had failed to do Adler complete justice, and that the problems he had raised called for fresh consideration. I have, therefore, kept up my interest in his views and have tried conscientiously to imbue myself with his spirit. But although I can still find in his writings the same sort of attraction as before, I have found myself arriving always at the old conclusion; and I will now say, once for all, that I endorse the keen, intelligent opinion with regard to Adler's work which was expressed by Freud in that masterly paper with which every one should be familiar, entitled "Zur Geschichte der Psychoanalytischen Bewegung."

* Read before the New York Psychoanalytic Society, November, 1915. Published in the *Psychoanalytic Review*, April, 1916.

It might seem that having said this I have said all that the occasion calls for; but, in fact, the subject cannot be dismissed so lightly.

In the first place, Adler's work is intrinsically interesting; and it is often useful to state to oneself in his terms some of the situations that arise, provided one can trust oneself not to regard the conceptions thus reached as final for all purposes, and can hold oneself ready to go beyond them, or to discard them altogether, whenever it becomes possible, through either of these two courses, to gain a better understanding of the case in hand. It would be much more satisfactory, however, to follow Adler where he should be followed, if only he had more cordially accepted Freud's work as having led up to and for the most part anticipated his own, and had aimed frankly at accentuating those elements in Freud's explanations which had seemed to him in need of emphasis, and at adding whatever he could add to supplement and strengthen the splendid and consistent structure which the psychoanalytic method has made it possible to rear. Unfortunately, instead of supplementing, he thought it necessary to supplant. And many of his colleagues have, therefore, found it impossible to utilize his conceptions as freely as they would have been glad to do, lest they should seem to endorse the opinion that his formulations reduce Freud's observations to a place of secondary importance.

Few thorough students of the subject could for a moment admit such a conclusion as this to be justifiable, and the fact that Adler himself asserts it, and that it seems to be oftentimes in the background of his mind even when he does not express it, detracts seriously from the value of his work. It is hard to avoid thinking of him as in some measure like the lawyer who feels himself under obligation to state only his client's case.

But there is another and more important reason for calling attention, at this time, to Adler's views. It is well known that Freud's doctrines have been received with great hostility, not, it would appear, either because the evidence which he adduces is based on faulty observation or because his mode of reasoning is unscientific, but because the conclusions to which they have provisionally led run counter to the prejudices of convention¹.

Such being the case, a great longing has been felt by many conscientious students of human nature to find some way of escape from accepting Freud's conclusions without doing injustice to their own sense of scientific fairness. To such persons Adler's mode of explanation is only too attractive. In plain terms, it offers a weapon with which Freud may be conveniently struck down by those who are—even unconsciously—so minded, without danger of incurring a worse verdict, in their own estimation, than that of "justifiable homicide."

It is, to be sure, true that the task of persuading either the lay or the medical public is a hard one, and perhaps an advocate of the Freudian cause may be excused if he does not, on each and every occasion, express bluntly all that he believes to be true with regard to the significance of the sex life, around which so dense a mist of social prejudice has been cast. But it is one thing to abstain, for one or another reason, from saying, or from striving to assert, even to oneself, the whole of an important truth, and a very different thing to offer, or to adopt, an explanation which has the aspect of being a complete expression of the whole truth, simply because it is a more palatable expression. I am here thinking of the many persons who would, as I believe, if they were

¹ In support of this statement I would call attention, amongst other essays, to a recent book by Edwin B. Holt, professor of psychology in Harvard University, entitled "The Freudian Wish."

willing to throw their minds entirely open, reach a different conclusion from that which they do reach.

I beg the members of this society to keep these two sets of considerations in mind while I hastily review the main points of Adler's work.

Adler's first book, a monograph of 92 pages entitled "Studie über Minderwertigkeit von Organen," was published in 1907 (that is, while the author was still working with Freud), and in it the principles were laid down of which the contents of his later publications have been mainly an elaboration. This monograph is a brilliant piece of work, and although not free from defects—due mainly to the fact that it confidently asserts conclusions for which no sufficient evidence is forthcoming—it is decidedly stimulating and suggestive.

The writer's thesis is that one of the main causes, both of disease and of favorable evolution, is to be found in the existence of relative defects or functional "inferiorities" (Minderwertigkeiten) of one or more organs of the body; and, further, in the reactions of the organism against these defects. Thus are formed centers for new activity (functional and nutritional), the results of which may make themselves very widely felt, mainly in one or the other of two very important ways. On the one hand, a series of organs, not primarily affected but either functionally or biologically related to the one which was the seat of the primary defect or "inferiority," is liable to become involved, and in this way the organism may fall a prey to special diseases which it might otherwise have been able to resist. This new series of diseases is apt to be inter-related through the tendency to the eventual involvement of several organs belonging to one and the same segment.

It would carry us too far afield to take up in detail the many special claims which are made in the course of

the elaboration of these doctrines, or to apportion to the author his due share in the working out of the principles at stake—which, in their essential features, are, of course, not new. I will only say that the brief case-reports that are given, while they might be of value as illustrations, by no means furnish the materials needed to convince one that the author is right in referring, as he does, such numbers of different disorders to a single tendency. The verdict "Important if true, but not proven" rises constantly to the mind,—as, for example, with reference to the claim that a tabes with special localization of the process in the optic nerve, in the case of one of two brothers, is considered to be related to a blepharospasm of the other brother, on the assumed basis of a family "Minderwertigkeit" of the optic system.

More important for our purposes is the second outcome of these localized organic or functional conditions of "inferiority" or defect, that, namely, which is classifiable as "compensation" or "overcompensation." Here again the writer deals with principles which are universally accepted as important. Indeed, there is no problem in biology or pathology or psychology—especially psychopathology—that has furnished more fascinating subjects for investigation than that which concerns the manner in which the organism deals with its weaknesses and defects, replaces its lost parts, heals its wounds, and makes its local disorders the starting points of diseases on the one hand, better qualified organs and functions, on the other.

It would have been of great benefit to the reader if the author, in the course of his brilliant illustrations of the manner in which compensation is effected, and turned, as it so often is, into over-compensation, had stated just what he felt desirous of claiming as strictly original with himself. One would be particularly glad to know, for

example, to what extent priority is claimed for the important assertion that success in evolutional adaptation is due, not so much to the accidental possession of powers which give to one or another organism an advantage in the struggle for existence, as to the capacity for increased growth, with the attending chance for variability of outcome, which shows itself in the overcoming of localized organic "inferiority." The "inferior" organ, Adler says, is an organ which retains embryonic characters and the "inferiority" itself, as here considered, is of embryonic origin. Hence the opportunity for novelty in the details of new development.

Prominent amongst the organs and systems which become secondarily involved as a consequence of these localized defects are the sex organs and the nervous system. It is, indeed, practically impossible that either of these should entirely escape. In fact, it is by virtue of the adaptability provided by the nervous system and the nervous functions that compensation and over-compensation pre-eminently show their power. The reasons for the involvement of the sex functions are several in number. More will be said on these points in a discussion of Adler's main work, "*Über den nervösen Charakter*," and I will only call attention further here, to the points of agreement emphasized by the writer as existing between himself and Freud.

Before proceeding actually to do this I would point out one statement by Adler with which Freud's name is coupled, yet with regard to which the term "in agreement" could not be used. On page 25 of this first book, namely, Adler says that carcinoma occurs with special frequency on those parts of the body which Freud has classified as "erogenic zones," and has spoken of as especially important in relation to the neuroses. These are the mouth, the anus, the breast, the genital sphere, etc.

If this statement could be substantiated in the author's sense, that is, if it could be shown that these parts of the body are sources of pleasure-giving sensations because they are "inferior" (see below), and, further, that cancer occurs with especial frequency in them on this same account, it would certainly be a matter of much interest. Thus far, however, evidence for the latter claim has not been furnished. The statement itself, it should be understood, has not been endorsed, or, so far as I know, discussed by Freud.

On page 28 the author calls attention, perhaps with good reason, to the fact that the quality in any organ which makes it most likely to serve as a center for sensations such as its possessor is in danger of cultivating too much in and for themselves, is this very functional or structural "inferiority" that unfits the organ to play its best part in the cultural development of the individual as a whole. He goes on to say that this "inferiority" of organs affects, eventually and in characteristic fashion, the mental development of the individual (during instinctive attempts at compensation), and that in consequence of this the neuroses and psychoses are more likely to occur in individuals of this stamp. Freud's observations, he says, have furnished abundant justification for the statement that the history of almost every child who is later to fall a victim to these psychoneurotic disorders gives evidence of such tendencies to inferiority of organs. But, as before remarked, the outcome is often an over-compensation, such as changed Demosthenes from a stammering boy to the greatest orator of Greece, and it is mainly in this sense, Adler thinks, that inferiority and genius are related.

On page 62, Adler shows how the mental functions intervene to intensify the protection extended to "inferior" organs and functions, and to lessen the evil results that might flow therefrom. This intensification becomes especially

significant at the point where the organ in question begins to be subjected to the strains of "culture." And here begin the processes of repression which, he says, Freud has classified as "organische Verdrängung."

I am not familiar with Freud's use of this term, but it is true that repression does begin, for him, when the child, who had hitherto been, for the most part, a creature of pleasure-seeking instinct, comes to feel, at first dimly, the influence of social training. To this epoch (the commencement of which would be dated variously by different observers, and for different children) is to be referred also, according to Freud's view, the tendency on the child's part to collect, through repression, a portion of his experiences in his "unconscious," while another portion is made to subserve the increasing interests of the ego regarded as a social personality. It is in the first of these two reservoirs, as is well known, that many of the sex feelings and ideas are stored—forever timeless and the source of unacknowledged pleasures—which, later, play such an important part in the history of the psycho-neuroses and the psychoses. But this explanation Adler does not admit in the sense that Freud means it, although at the period now under consideration his disagreement had not found definite expression.

On page 63 the author expresses himself as at one with Freud in the latter's generalization with reference to the tendency which the infant and the child show to find pleasure in all such processes as running, leaping, looking, listening, nursing, and the operations of the toilet. The existence of this pleasure-tone, he says, is a frequent cause of the obstinacy with which the various functional disorders of childhood, related to the organs concerned, resist correction; and this fact may be made use of in training and in "suggestive" treatment.

This same point is dwelt on more at length in the

discussion that here follows, and it is pointed out again with special reference to the repression theory of Freud, that the "inferior" organ is particularly prone to be a pleasure-organ and disinclined to lend itself to educational tendencies of better sorts. Freud's observations, he thinks, need to be supplemented by the statement that the functional disorders of childhood are the direct result of an imperfect compensation in innervation (psychomotorischer Überbau).

On page 71 occurs the first statement that clearly indicates Adler's approaching radical divergence from Freud's doctrine. In speaking of the "interesting psychical phenomena of repression, substitution, and conversion that the analyses made by Freud have brought out, and that I also have found to be the most important features of the psychoneuroses," Adler says these are also due to the above described attitude of the patient's mind, induced through the influence of "inferior" organs. To the same cause is due the uniform finding of a sexual basis (sexuelle Grundlage) for the psychoneuroses.

I will not attempt to say how far Freud would endorse this statement¹. My sole purpose at present is to show that at this period Adler still held substantially to the Freudian clinical statements, although he had begun to refer them to what had already become to him the sole cause—direct or indirect—of all our nervous woes, namely, *Minderwertigkeit von Organen*.

On page 76 a statement is made to which it is certain Freud could never have agreed in any exclusive sense, since it leaves out of consideration the emotional causes of the phenomenon to be referred to. Adler says, namely,

¹ Freud has always been friendly to well-grounded biologic modes of explanation and was so toward this work of Adler's. His objection, if any was felt, would have had reference to the foreshadowed exclusiveness of Adler's doctrine.

that the spasm of the adductors of the thighs seen in certain cases of enuresis and induced by attempts to separate the thighs quickly, is due to an extension of the reflex zone of the sphincter, and is analogous to the pharyngeal spasm induced by increase of the throat-reflex.

The analysis of this interesting monograph could be extended further, but enough has been said to show that while the writer is working on a fruitful theme, his work suggests too much the following of one scent. This should not diminish our gratitude to him for having shown us in what direction investigations are to be made, but it may very properly indicate the necessity of caution as to the acceptance of the conclusions drawn. And we should be cautious, too, not to let ourselves be swept away by the idea, which Adler seems to endorse, that the overcoming of weakness is the sole source of strength. This doctrine has the appearance of being true, because when strength is exerted it does overcome some obstacle—perhaps at once an internal and an external obstacle. But an essential element in the truth of this situation is the fact that every organism is under an impulsion—at least, from time to time—to work positively toward a better state. This tendency is studied by Bergson¹ under the name of *élan vital*, but is felt by every man under the form of will addressed to the attainment of an ideal goal.

I can not accept the view that, either in the life of the individual or in the history of evolution, the instinctive attempt to escape from evil is a source of all progress toward virtue; that there is no real nobility or real spontaneity but only an imitation, that comes wrapped in the dim recognition of our weakness and our failure. On the contrary, I believe and shall maintain that the very existence of this sense of failure implies already the

¹ "Evolution Créatrice."

recognition on our parts that we belong, by right, to an order of things which is not best defined in terms of competition.

Freud's clear, succinct analysis of the nature and origin of Adler's error, from his standpoint, is based on his own theory of the development of the child which was set forth so well by Federn¹ in his address before this society delivered not so very many months ago. This theory also fails to take cognizance of the view to which I have just alluded, in accordance with which evolution is to be thought of as inspired throughout by an impulse—a desire, as it were—to move toward "the best." It has, however, the great merit of considering the child as animated by two main sets of motives instead of one only.

Adler's self-assertion explanation is obviously sound; but so, too, is the view which recognizes in the pleasure-pain theory a highly important influence, and in the pleasures and pains that center round the sex-life potent forces in the setting up of life-long tendencies.

Adler's second book, "Über den nervösen Charakter," which represents the consummation of the ideas which had been long germinating in his mind, was published in 1912. Its merits and defects are like those of the previous monograph. That is, the book represents the outcome of an immense amount of industry, but bears the defect of having been written too much under the conviction on the writer's part that he had found the one master-key to the interpretation of the psychoneuroses, if not of nearly all the phenomena of the mental life. It is, in short, a piece of special pleading.

It is also, in my opinion, a very serious defect in this book that the writer fails to recognize the value of the

¹ Cf. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. II, No. 1: The Principles of Pain-Pleasure and of Reality.

work of Freud and his colleagues, not only in itself, but also as bearing on his own scientific claims. Instead of this he has placed himself in opposition to them, and has thus introduced a schism into what should have been a continuity. I think his work is open to this criticism not simply because he has failed to show any sufficient reason for his claim that Freud's generalizations are better to be understood when viewed from his standpoint, but also because he seems to have failed to see that his own propositions had for the most part been covered by the observations and formulations of his distinguished predecessor. In fact, the terms which he chooses for clothing his ideas do not differ essentially in meaning from those employed by Freud. In some respects and for some contingencies the one terminology is preferable, in others the other; but Adler makes little or no attempt to show either that Freud's terminology existed or under what conditions one or the other should be preferred. This seems to me a serious matter.

Freud's "Phantasie" expresses the idea that the patient carries in his mind, usually as a heritage from early childhood, a conception of his relation to the world which is, in many respects, false, yet which guides his conduct. This definition would practically answer for Adler's "fictive Leitlinie" or "Zwecksetzung" also. If Adler intended to insist that this notion should be clothed with more dynamic force than Freud had had in mind, the argument should have been brought up and discussed upon its merits.

Freud willingly admits that "Sicherung" is a better word than his "Sicherheitsmaßregel," but the meaning is the same.

The underlying idea of the volume is well defined in the preface. The writer puts himself (as does Freud also, for that matter) on the side of those scientific observers

who see in evolution little more than a struggle for adaptation and mastery, the search for a workable equilibrium. It is easy to see why, starting with this idea, he defines the investigation as a research in "comparative individual psychology"; for it is from the contest between individuals for supremacy that he would seem to derive the phenomena even of social life. He does not claim, in this book, to have covered the ground of normal social psychology, or even normal individual psychology. But from what references are made to these subjects it is clear that he regards the individual psychology of the neurotic patient as a suitable basis for all that we need to know, so far as the scope of these researches goes, even for the normal person. In fact, he justifies the word "comparative" by saying that in the study of the neurotic cases it is necessary to follow the same plan which was used in the "Studie der Minderwertigkeiten von Organen," namely, to assume as normal, for purposes of comparison, a standard arbitrarily chosen, since no really normal standard, as he believes, exists.

Quoting Virchow's proposition that an individual is to be regarded as virtually a community, all members of which work together for a common purpose, Adler declares that the strivings of each person are instinctively, and—it would seem—exclusively, dictated by a dynamic impulse leading him to assert and maintain such a conception of his own personality as shall give him, as an individual, a sense of pre-eminence and security. A conception of this sort is, of course bound to be relatively narrow and artificial ("fictive Leitlinie"), because it is his private interests that each individual is assumed to be seeking primarily to subserve.

Every child, it is affirmed, starts in life with a sense of "inferiority," as evidenced even by the first cry with which he meets his new surroundings. But a sense of

inferiority is an intolerable burden, and so the child makes it his main task, from his birth onward, to convert this sense of inferiority into a sense of superiority, and to increase his sense of personal dignity and importance (Personalitätsgefühl).

Moved by this impulse, he pushes off, in an instinctive, often cramp-like manner, every situation by which this craving for pre-eminence seems endangered, or turns himself away therefrom. The goal thus aimed at, it should be noted, is not only a selfish goal (even to the extent that the cultivation of private interests is made to stand as the sole origin of social progress), but it would seem that the benefit sought by the individual is primarily a sense of security rather than an actual security, and that he is not at all concerned to find a chance to play his best part in the history of the world. This latter outcome, if it comes at all, comes only incidentally; and all progress—if progress it may be called—is dependent on the longing or craving to escape from the primal weakness, absolute and relative, which is made the one solid fact of nature, the one dynamic influence on which evolution can confidently count.

This longing for supremacy in imagination—which is, in general terms, the equivalent of Nietzsche's "Wille zur Macht"—leads the patient to posit goals and plans which are by no means always of such a sort that through them he is likely to play his best part in the "real world," but rather such as might secure recognition from others and intensify his own sense of personal efficiency and security,—his feeling that he is, after all, "a man." To get this sense of security a person—or at least a patient—will use, if necessary, any one of a thousand subtle wiles, will make any sacrifice, even, for example, to the extent of accepting the rôle of the depressed and hunted victim or of the masochist or the pervert. Even the criminal,

the liar, and the cheat may gain, for a time, the sense of power and mastery, if this is what he deeply seeks. In the interest of this acquisition, responsibility and danger are often strenuously avoided in fact while perhaps sought nominally and for appearance's sake. In this same interest, double-facedness towards oneself and toward the world may be treated as a fine art. This tendency to seek security and an artificial goal, chosen for the momentary satisfaction that it gives, is present even in the dream life.

So skilful and ingenious does Adler show himself in the elaboration of this principle, and so seductive is the thought, inspired by his ardor, that a unifying cause of human strivings has been found, that one gladly abstains at first from asking on what grounds so large a claim is made and why no other principle of progress or behavior is referred to.

Lest it may seem as if the criticisms here offered were simply dictated by an undue sensitiveness on my part with reference to Adler's attitude toward the psycho-analytic movement, I quote a few lines which form a portion of the summary of a sympathetic, yet critical review of Adler's work, by a writer (Miss Amy Tanner) in the Pedagogical Seminary of June, 1915:

"All this is most suggestive and tends to make one believe in the general theory of compensation for the sense of inferiority. It helps one not at all, however, in tracing the guiding lines, for the characteristic attempts just described may rise as the result of feeling inferior, whatever the cause of this feeling, whether organic or social, justified or not. Here, indeed, in trying to work out the chief guiding lines, one finds what seems to me the chief weakness of the theory in its present form. We have already noted that Adler tells us that the particular form which the compensation takes depends upon the reserve powers of the individual. It may come through a

symmetrical organ, or any other organ, or through building up the nervous superstructure of the organ itself. But if we take the case where the nervous superstructure is built up, we enter at once into a field where two large classes of complications occur, viz., the psychical and the social or cultural. It is not sufficient to say that the child with a weak eye will cultivate the visual part of his brain and his psyche. He may or he may not. That seems to depend wholly upon the social, and especially the family, environment.

"Granted that the little child has a feeling of insecurity originating in some inferior organ, and that he has an aggressive impulse to overcome, to rid himself of this unpleasant feeling, the particular line or direction which he will follow in order to abandon this note may vary as infinitely as do personalities themselves and their relations to their social environment."

The reviewer seems, in short, to think (and this is certainly my view) that every person is—of necessity and virtually from birth—a member of society and eventually of an ideally conceived society. He is not forced into action solely by a *vis a tergo*, but is himself a creative center, and an active component of the social groups to which he owes allegiance.

And these groups, too, by virtue of the creative energy that is in them, and through them in him, influence his acts, and make him exert himself, not solely to escape evil, but positively to do good—or evil if it may so happen.

Nevertheless, it is true likewise, and terribly true, that the influences described by Adler in such extraordinary richness of detail, the crushing sense of inferiority, the longing for mastery, etc., do exist, and—side by side with the sex-influences, though with a somewhat different emphasis—they exert an immense and often a

controlling force in our lives. But this Freud has always realized and insisted on, as thorough readers of him know well and only superficial or hostile readers can dispute. Not only does every psychoanalytic study take into account the element of personal aggressiveness and its opposite, however, but it shows, if properly done, the true relationship between these self-assertions of the ego and the sex-repressions that go with them. This is notably the case with the studies of masochism and sadism, for example.

In his "Einleitung" (pp. 4 and 5), as well as later in detail, Adler cuts himself fairly loose from Freud on three important points, and cuts himself loose also, as it seems to me, from good psychology of every sort.

The first point concerns Freud's designation of the "libido" as the motive power in the determination of the psychoneuroses. I am well aware that, on philosophical grounds, the question may well be raised whether the "libido" might not be included in some broader energetic conception, and it is also possible¹, that it is susceptible of being analyzed further into several component parts. But as used by Freud it is a clinical conception, which corresponds to a series of facts of easy clinical observation, and it is hard to see what good scientific interest is served by throwing it away. And what does Adler offer in its place? Of course only, as always, his "neurotic goal-seeking tendency" ("fictive Leitlinie"), a term which even when explained gives no hint of a content like that of the "libido."

Obviously this discarding of a word that serves so good a purpose could only be justified in case the whole doctrine according to which the repressions which find a partial outlet in the compromises of neurotic symptoms

¹ Especially in view of a personal conversation with Prof. E. B. Holt of Harvard University.

are mainly, and always in part, sexual in their content, should be discarded likewise; and this Adler proceeds to do, in the interest of his "männlicher Protest," which at best affords an outlet mainly for the "reason" (even though instinctive) and the will.

Let it be granted that a self-assertion of Adler's type invariably occurs—which is by no means evident; must it then be the only influence at work? Adler does not indeed reject the sex ideas and sex symbolisms, but he makes them a "form of speech," a mode or "jargon," through which the "Wille zur Macht" finds a chance to voice itself.

It is true that he has the authority of Nietzsche for this claim, but if it could be substantiated then we should have to say farewell altogether to the idea that feeling is a fundamental element of thought, unanalyzable except in terms of more feeling.

Let one consider the intense joys, the anger and the anguish that the very word "sex" is capable of arousing, the novels that have been written, the wars and battles that have been fought, for which the sex-feelings were the center, the part that pure sensation plays in these feelings, the age at which¹ they first begin to show themselves, and then let one decide whether it was a true service that Adler rendered to science when he sought to minimize the significance of these conceptions which the experience of mankind has stamped as of transcendent interest.

With justice did Freud say, in the historical review to which reference has been made, that in the picture of life as Adler paints it, "No room is left for the passion of love. It might seem strange that so dreary an outlook as this should be able to command approval. But it should

¹ Cf. Ferenczi: "Entwicklungsstufen des Wirklichkeitssinnes," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse*, I, 2.

not be forgotten that human beings, weighed down as they are under the yoke of their sex-needs, are ready to accept anything and everything if only they can hope thereby to eliminate the sex-problem."

That the feeling thus indicated constitutes a portion of the reason for the acceptance in some quarters of such views as Adler's is beyond doubt. And yet, the escape thus instinctively grasped for is not to be won permanently in this fashion; it is to be won only by being met and scrutinized, with intelligence and conscientiousness. This is likely to happen—so far as one can see—only in the case of individuals and relatively small, though constantly increasing, groups of persons. But, furthermore, a careful survey of the situation contemplated by Adler's formulations will show that it does not really set aside, even in theory, the necessity of studying the phenomena of the sex-life; nor would Adler himself contend that this is so. Even if it be granted, for the sake of argument, that the sexual histories given by patients in defining their serious distresses and disablements are all translatable into the vocabulary of self-assertion; even then the old language with its long familiar terms must still remain the only one by means of which adequate communication will be possible, with regard to a large series of topics, either between doctors and their patients or between man and man.

The sex-language is a universal and primary language because reproduction is a law of life, both in the realm of biology and—even—in the realm of thought. And it is, in part, a language of an unusual and specific sort, because there is so much material, so many and such strong emotions, to be dealt with, that repression, with its peculiar functions, has to be brought to the aid of ordinary discourse.

It is true of competition and self-assertion also that

they make a strong appeal to the emotions, to deal with which repression is brought in. President Hall, for example¹, has called attention to this point with reference to anger. But on the whole, the emotions of this competitive order come more especially into relation with the relatively conscious, logical sphere of thought, and repression (in a deep sense) would perhaps occupy a less important place in regard to them, were it not for the presence of sexual connotations (in a broad sense) such as must necessarily play a part wherever human relations are concerned.

Freud's third alleged error is with regard to the "infantile wish" situation, as related to the etiology of the psycho-neuroses and of dreams. The indictment is on the familiar lines, and the counter-arguments would be much the same with those already specified. Freud's view of the phases through which the infant passes have been stated carefully and at sufficient length by him, in various published papers, and were recently summarized and modified in an article on "Die Disposition zur Zwangsnurose²." Federn has also given, within a few months³, an admirable review of the relationship between the pleasure-pain reactions of the child's nature, on the basis of which the "unconscious" is built up, and the ego-emphasizing tendencies which lead to cultural results. Any one who feels inclined to believe that the interests of scientific observation are subserved by the attempt to crowd into the one mould of self-assertion the various traits corresponding to these successive but different attempts at self-expression on the child's part, should care-

¹ "Anger as a Primary Emotion, and the Application of Freudian Mechanisms to its Phenomena," *Jour. of Abnormal Psychology*, June-July, 1915.

² *Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse*, I, 6.

³ *Loc. cit.*

fully read these impressive documents and the evidence that leads up to them.

It is not that it is impossible to refer mental phenomena to a unifying basis. This can be done; for the mind is always one, whether engaged mainly in thinking, mainly in feeling, or mainly in acting; and indeed¹ thought and action may be virtually the same process. But to say this is not to say that either one of these modes of manifestation is more fundamental than the other, and, in particular, it is not to justify the disregarding of obvious and useful generalizations made on the basis of accurate clinical observation.

I pass now to the consideration of the second important reason, referred to at the beginning of this paper, for discussing further Adler's views. There are, namely, many persons, who, for reasons that are obvious and that should be understood and may be sympathized with, although they cannot be endorsed on scientific grounds, long for evidence that Freud is mistaken in his assertion with respect to the part played by the sexual life, both in the causation of the neuroses and the building up of temperament and character and social customs. One representative of this class of persons is Dr. Meyer Solomon, of Chicago, a frequent writer in the journals of abnormal psychology². Though claiming to be, as I have said, a well-wisher of our movement, Dr. Solomon feels that he must issue solemn warnings to Freud and all of us, that we should change our ways and views with reference to this mooted point. And the result is that in

¹ Cf. Edwin B. Holt, "The Freudian Wish."

² In an article published in this *Review* (Vol. II, No. 1) Dr. Solomon refers to the importance of the biologic standpoint as a supplement to the psychologic. No psychoanalyst would dispute this claim (see earlier footnote). The only question is as to emphasis in special cases.

his own psychoanalytic studies, as, for example in his dream analyses, he is satisfied to arrest his inquiries at a point at which a thorough analysis, in my estimation, should begin.

I feel the importance of this state of mind because, owing to one reason and another, it has taken me a long time to come to a realizing sense of what a thorough psychoanalytic investigation means. And while I now welcome any criticisms of the Freudian methods that make me deal more broadly with the situations that present themselves, I have learned at last to feel very suspicious of anything that savors of this lack of thoroughness, in which I am tempted to indulge.

In further illustration of this point I would refer to an editorial in the Boston Med. and Surg. Journal for September 30, 1915, entitled "A New Theory of the Neurotic Constitution." This editorial says, after referring to the psychoanalytic movement led by Freud, that Alfred Adler of Vienna, a disciple of Freud, "impelled by rather original concepts . . . , now offers a new theory of the make-up of the neurotic individual." After this follows a brief but good account of Adler's views. It may, of course, be regarded as an open question, what is the best way of introducing to the public a new subject like psychoanalysis. Freud's way we all know. It is to tell the truth exactly as it appeals to him. I do not assert that he says exactly the same things to each audience. He has at times talked to companies of laymen and has, I believe, used different expressions from those which one finds in his scientific works. He does not, however, attempt to give an impression which is at variance with what he really thinks, or which offers a convenient "way out." But the temptation is strong, perhaps with many of us (I will say it certainly of myself) to do just this, and the writer of the editorial in question may have yielded to it.

Another person to whose writings I must refer in this connection is President Stanley Hall. But in saying what I do I will say also that psychoanalysis has had no stauncher friend in America than he, and that there is perhaps no one whose endorsement has counted for so much as his or to whom a deeper debt of gratitude is due. Nevertheless, in his paper on "Anger" referred to above, he offers certain criticisms that demand discussion. The first of these is that it is "both shallow and banausic" to ascribe the aversion of psychologists toward psychoanalysis, to social or ethical repression, and that the real causes are "both manifold and deeper." These causes, he says, "are part of a complicated protest of normality, found in all and even in the resistance of subjects of analysis, which is really a factor which is basal for self-control, of the varying good sides of which Freudians tell us nothing. The fact is that there are other things in the human psyche than sex and its ramifications. Hunger, despite Jung, fear despite Sadger, and anger despite Freud, are just as primary, aboriginal and independent as sex, and we fly in the face of fact and psychic experience to derive them all from sex, although it is freely granted that in morbid cases each may take on predominant sex features."

Further on he says: ". . . we might prove . . . that the *Idstrieb* is basal, and that the fondest and most comprehensive of all motives is that to excel others, not merely to survive, but to win a larger place in the sun, and that there is some connection between the Darwinian psychogenesis and Max Stirner and Nietzsche, which Adler has best evaluated."

While I sympathize with the obvious intention of a portion of these remarks, it seems to me that the main part of the outspoken and the implied criticisms which they express is without justice. No one doubts the value

of studying the psychology of anger or of using the psychoanalytic method for this purpose; neither does any one doubt the importance of studying the other self-assertive ego-complexes in the same fashion. Only recently¹ Freud himself has called attention to the need of doing this, and has recognized and expressed the possibility that the sexual basis might prove insufficient for such purposes.

Several things are, however, to be borne in mind in this connection. In the first place, any person who studied these self-assertive tendencies of the human mind without having previously occupied himself, in a thoroughly sympathetic and understanding manner, with the principles thus far advanced by Freud, would be more than likely to underrate the erotic element that helps to give these tendencies their special forms. Dr. Hall himself falls into this error—so it seems to me—in some of the statements that he makes with reference to anger. One can readily understand the feeling which President Hall attributes to the more academic psychologists in speaking of the "protest of normality." Nevertheless, I think we have the right to expect of men of this standing and training that they should have looked deeply enough into these matters to be able to realize, as we realize, that no such protest is really in place.

I believe that I, myself, appreciate, for instance, as thoroughly as any psychologist in the land, that feelings and motives and tendencies such as one may classify as "normal" or "the best" are mingled in some measure with others of a very different sort. There is, I think, no real "normal" short of absolute perfection. But every man is drawn toward a better or the absolute best goal, on the one hand, yet, on the other hand, by virtue of his evolutional history and relationships, in the direction of

¹ Cf. "Triebes und Triebschicksale," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse*, III, 1.

more infantile goals. I do not feel that I see the former less clearly for directing my vision for a moment on the latter, but rather that the contrary is true. Neither do I expect my patients to remain long with any such false feeling or false "protest"; and I regard it as a "resistance," to be recognized and removed, if this occurs.

I do not doubt for a moment, nor do I understand that Freud doubts, that "there are other things in the human psyche than sex and its ramifications." But into our thoughts and feelings about these "other things" ideas of sex and its ramifications indirectly enter; and so, too, do these other things enter even into the sex-strivings of the child.

In practice we should learn to keep the different subjects which we investigate apart, just as we keep our studies into mind and body, physiology and psychology apart, even while we know that at bottom they are related to couples which are really units. A man may be, I trust, a philosopher, a student of ethics, and of social morals, and a psychologist of the normal, and yet a psychoanalyst in the sense of Freud. He may and should, moreover, learn to make one set of studies supplementary to the other. But he must not mix them in such a way that, like the patient with a compulsion neurosis, he does not know where the one set of thoughts begins and the other ceases. To use a simile that I have employed elsewhere, a church tower may be taken in two senses, the phallic and the religious sense; and so, too, it may be recognized that in religion sex elements appear and play a prominent part. But one is not obliged, on that account, to assume that religion is all sex; and the tendency to do this constitutes, I admit and often have asserted, a pitfall into which, as I believe, psychoanalysts often, though needlessly, have fallen. It is not true that just because religion can be sexualized, in one sense, with profit to the truth,

it has no other nature, or reason for existence. We must learn to aid the psychoanalyst of the future to be severely critical without being too destructive or too monoideistic. There are strictly scientific paths to follow in the purely mental realms, as well as in the physical, and in these mental realms the laws of physics do not rule. Neither are they contradicted, but they are surely overruled by mental laws in which logic and philosophy and the inferences and necessary presuppositions that are related to them have a standing which is denied to empirical observation.

Something of this may, I think, have been in Adler's mind when he made his self-assertion studies and described with such insistence the efforts of the neurotic invalid to reach a goal. His goal differs absolutely from mine. His constantly recedes, and like Nietzsche's, with whom he feels himself in sympathy, it hints at a never-ending procession of super and super-super-men; mine is commensurate with the universe, defined, as we have the right, even if vaguely, to define it.

It is not given to every one to have the same clear vision and the firm courage with reference to the principles and mission of the psychoanalytic movement that have been so characteristic of our leader, Freud. Had he been moved, from the outset, by motives such as one or another of us would like to see him recognize, it is certain that neither would the movement itself be where it is, nor should we be in the position to criticize so freely as we do. We ought, therefore, to be patient and forbearing, and while forming our visions of the future, with reference to his discoveries, we ought to have a clear vision also of the past and present, at their best.

The lessons of loyalty are readily forgotten. It is very easy and enticing, after the first flush of enthusiasm for the work of a great leader has somewhat passed away,

and lesser men begin to come forward with sharp criticisms and with generalizations that claim to be original but that shine really with reflected light, to transfer to these men the allegiance which is still, in reality, the leader's due.

It seems to me fair to say, in conclusion, that Adler, brilliant and ingenious though he is, has followed a method which is much less safe than that of Freud. It would be fairer to characterize his main book as an attempt to exploit one element in character-formation rather than as a study of character, even of the neurotic. In short—as I see the matter—Freud is, within certain well-defined (and wide) limits, an observer of remarkable fidelity and clearness of vision; whereas Adler, though a keen analyst, reasons as if greatly hampered by narrowing complexes.

Freud's aim has always been, I think, to apply his mind to the facts before him as one applies wax to a surface which it is desired to reproduce, that is, with the sole object of learning what is there, and all that there is there, *so far as in him lies*. I remember being much impressed by one passage in his excellent "Ratschläge," in which he describes himself as endeavoring to push forward his own uncensored "unconscious" to meet half way the groping "unconscious" of his patient. That which a man learns in this way may not be the whole truth; but it will surely represent a genuine effort to obtain the truth, and an effort which would be curtailed in its value as genuine if the person who used it assumed, or presumed, to correct or modify, for any purpose of expediency, the details of the situation as he saw it. If observers coming after Freud, and using either the same method or another of equal or greater value, find reasons to arrive at conclusions different from those which he has reached, they may doubtless prove to be benefactors of science or their

race. But it is certain that their own conclusions will be of little value, and their method not one to be recommended, if in reaching the former or employing the latter they are led to set aside as worthless or as needless the facts and deductions which this clear-eyed observer had set down as true. New doctrines may go further than old ones, and may absorb them and give to them a different meaning. But unless the old doctrines were false in the sense of having been made by a man who was false to his own sense of accuracy and truth, they surely stand as data to be explained or dealt with with respect.

Chapter XVII.

ON THE UTILIZATION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PRINCIPLES IN THE STUDY OF THE NEUROSES*.

I propose to do no more in this paper than to indicate the first steps toward an attempt at the further formulating of relationships between mental processes and physiological processes, on lines analogous to those followed by Dr. Kempf in his interesting communications¹. My attention has been directed to the desirability of doing this through an effort which I have been making to trace the significance of acroparaesthesia, about which I have just made a communication before the American Neurological Association.

Inquiries of this sort should be all the more in order on account of the fact that the practical interdependence of bodily and mental processes is so close, and shows itself in so many new and unexpected ways. The work of Dr. Cannon on the physiology of the emotions and that of Pavlow on the psychology of digestion illustrate this point. Impressive also is the fact that almost all of the philosophic systems of the day are monistic systems. It is substantially admitted by every one that in whichever direction we move in, though, amongst the network of processes which, for the sake of convenience, we still classify separately as "bodily" and "mental," we find the

* Read at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington, D. C., May 11, 1916. Published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, August 1916.

¹ *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1915, Vol. II, Nos. 2 and 4.

same fundamental principles, or laws, everywhere observed; and we may therefore hope to see the three guides—philosophy, psychology and physiology—coming gradually more nearly within shouting distance of one another. Or, to express the same sentiment in better terms, we may fairly hope, especially since the advent of psycho-analysis on the field, to see intelligent and thorough-going introspection (whether of the trained and philosophic minded layman, working by himself, or of the trained and intelligent patient, working with his physician) joining hands with the skilled observation of animals in the laboratory, each lending support to the other, in new ways. A new step in this direction has been recently made through Edwin B. Holt's attempt to simplify all vital processes by classifying them with reference to their motor outcome,—that is, by treating them all as "motor attitudes" or as modes of "behavior¹." This attempt seems far too narrow and exclusive in its scope, but it is welcome in the same sense in which Sherrington's splendid studies of the reflex are welcome, the value of which for psychology and psychiatry has so recently been emphasized by Kempf.

Hitherto, the work of investigators in this field has been almost entirely on genetic lines; but this mode of inquiry, while it is very fruitful of valuable results, is faulty when used in an exclusive way, and needs to be supplemented by a movement of a different sort. It seems altogether logical and advisable, at first sight, to prepare ourselves for our studies of man by making ourselves familiar with the experimental data derived from the careful observation of the animal series, and then of the primitive man and of the child. But to carry out this method in an exclusive fashion seems to me open to serious objection. Holt's *motor attitude* view seems appli-

¹ The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics, Henry Holt and Company, 1915.

cable enough when one has to deal only with the fish who darts through the water, either in flight or in pursuit of prey; or so long as one is studying, as by the accurate methods of Sherrington, the scratch reflexes and the locomotion and static attitudes of the dog. But for all our knowledge of motives, even in these cases, we are obliged to depend on our own motives and the inferences we draw from them. And here comes in, as eminently pertinent, the reasoning of Lévy-Bruhl¹, who points out (as Freud has also done) how complex and how intense the emotional reactions are among the savage races, how they reflect the complex fears and feelings amongst which these primitive people pass their lives, and how dangerous it is to reason from ourselves to them. We all know this, from our studies into the psychology of the child, and should feel the right to doubt how much we know about the motives of the fish. The same objection applies, so it seems to me, to the Darwinian conceptions of animal evolution. We see the results of struggle and contest among the animals, and can, of course, infer, with some show of justice, the motives or absence of motives that underlie them. But in making the visible result the basis of our conclusions, we must perforce leave out much in the way of motive at which we could not easily arrive through estimating the causes of our own conduct, *yet for the estimation of which a close knowledge of ourselves and of our own childhood is an excellent preparation.* It is only, then, as a preparatory training that I suggest making use of the principles obtained through the psycho-analytic study of the neurotic invalid, in the interest of a new viewpoint for clinical neurology and for physiology; but as such a training I think that they may be of service.

¹ *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures.* See also W. Trotter: *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.* Macmillan, 1915.

Prominent among these principles is that under which "symptoms" are defined as constructive mechanisms, or "compromises," and described as securing real gains, though perhaps of purely temporary and perhaps of economically harmful sorts when looked at from the standpoint of the patients' wider interests.

In the paper on acroparaesthesia¹ above referred to I made use of this principle (which has, of course, been made familiar through earlier studies of a variety of sorts, and especially, amongst observers, by J. Hughlings Jackson, Virchow and Verworn) by way of pointing out that we ought to be continually on the watch for the constructive element of the neuroses (such as acroparaesthesia, epilepsy, and migraine) instead of accentuating forever their status as calamities. I became greatly interested in this point a number of years ago, while studying the relation of cretinism to the results of an acute destruction of the thyroid gland. The cretin differs from the myxoedematous patient in that he represents a certain positive type of being, and not simply the degradation of a normal type. In a similar sense, we are all prepared, I think, to believe that the hysterical and the obsessive patient represents the outcome of a partially constructive, not of a simply destructive tendency. The regression toward one's infantile fixations never means simply and solely a real return to infancy as represented by one of its less good phases.

In a similar way, too, it may be said that there is probably something constructive in a migraine, or in acroparaesthesia, or even in epilepsy. These processes are no doubt like weeds that spring up on the failure of the co-ordinations that favor nobler growth. But they spring up as something which has a significance of its own; and

¹ Cf. Publications of the Am. Neu. Assn., to appear in N. Y. *Jr. Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*

this is, I think, one of the best lessons to be gathered from psycho-analytic observations.

Another principle has reference to the question of the significance of *habit*, which plays such a large part in the phenomena of what we will call "morbid physiology" and "morbid psychology" alike. What is this "habit," the literature of which is so extensive? It is easy enough to assume an analogue for it in physical processes, such as inertia; or to say that what one has done once one tends more readily to do again because the paths are broken. But can we not go a little further than this, in a psycho-analytic sense?

It is well known that Dr. Jung has spoken of mental lethargy or sloth (*Trägheit*) of the nervous system, or of the mental tendencies, as underlying many of the phenomena met with in the study of the psychoneuroses; and in the maintenance of this mental lethargy, or sloth, habit seems to play a large part. I have been much interested of late in studying this matter with reference to the mental dullness of which patients so frequently complain, and which obviously serves in part as a defense mechanism against their own critical tendencies or those of the physician. Professor Freud, at the conclusion of a recent communication, remarks, about this phenomenon, what had already occurred to me as true, that it is not to be thought of in a negative sense, as one is inclined to describe habit, but that, on the contrary, it is a symptom having a positive meaning and playing a positive part, as I have indicated. Freud asserts that it is the equivalent of what has been denominated "fixation." However this may be, I suggest that this habit, even when met with in ordinary neurological conditions, as in relation to migraine, etc., also plays a part analogous to that which it plays in the psychoneuroses. It is a constructive mechanism and to be dealt with as such; and the fact that it leads to results

which are socially unfortunate is no argument against this view. Both fixations and habits have a certain value, although I am reminded of the fact that various psychologists have spoken of habits as constituting also obstacles to progress. However, there is a line of one of Emerson's poems which runs, "When half-gods go the gods arrive." We are all familiar with the application, in psycho-analysis, of the principle here implied, since the "half-gods" to which Emerson refers are the subconscious handicaps or fixations which restrain men from sublimation.

In the same sense, it may be that in combatting the neurological disorders such as I have mentioned, the physician ought to make a double effort, in as systematic a manner as possible. That is, he ought to discourage and break up by every means in his power those lower forms of constructive mechanisms which tend to reproduce themselves in a periodic way, but at the same time to encourage assiduously the formation of co-ordinations occupying a broader and more widely constructive place.

To sum up what I have tried to say, and which is to be regarded as only provisional, I believe that the best attitude in which to approach the study either of ordinary neurological processes, or of the phenomena which characterize the psychoneuroses studied by the psycho-analyst, is on the basis of a familiarity with a background of normality, obtained through a study of human beings at their best. The architect who has made himself familiar with the processes of construction elaborated through the genius and industry of the best minds and the best ideals, is in a better position to do justice to the rude architecture of the savage than one who has accustomed himself to savage types alone.

On similar grounds, it is really at once better and more scientific to approach a splendid piece of work, like

that of Sherrington, or the clinical observations of the neurologist, with a mental background formed through the study of the intellectual, the emotional, the volitional, in general terms the ideally constructive life of the human being at his best, than it is to approach such work without this basis of preparation.

We may be forced to assume, in doing this, that the mind, with all that it implies, is virtually present in the so-called lower co-ordinatory centers of the spinal cord, or the neural ganglia of the circulatory apparatus. But to make this assumption, even if it should seem as on its face trivial, is to do something which is really worth doing, and which is certain to provide us with suggestions for scientific observation that are well worth having.

Chapter XVIII.

THE WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD*.

What are the features of the work of Sigmund Freud¹,—that is, of the psychoanalytic movement,—which will make it of enduring value; and what are its weaknesses and false aims? Finally, what justification was there for the defection of Adler and of Jung,—events which must be rated as of marked significance?

The present seems a fitting time for making these inquiries, for the psychoanalytic movement has been subjected to severe criticism for many years, and yet is slowly, but steadily, attracting more attention, not only from physicians and from patients, but also from psychologists.

Its elements of strength, which have secured for it a lasting place, are, first, that it has demonstrated afresh, from a relatively new standpoint and with a marvellous fullness of illustration, the importance of studying men's unconscious, or unacknowledged motives, and impulses to thought and action, and, next, that it has described an extraordinarily effective method for doing this, which is practically new.

* Presented at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, May 24, 1917, as part of the Symposium on "The Theories of Freud, Jung and Adler." Published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, August 1917.

¹ For brevity's sake, I have made no attempt, in this short communication, to assign to the several members of the able group of men who have worked hand in hand with Freud, the recognition which is their due. I trust that this omission will be overlooked and its cause appreciated.

When one considers all that has been accomplished by Freud and by his colleagues, in the course of the researches that have led to these results;—the light that has been thrown upon the meaning of dreams, of the symptoms of neurotic illnesses and so, virtually, of neurotic illness itself, of personal and social customs and institutions, both of primitive and civilized men and races of men; and when one considers the explanations—important even though partial—through which Freud has sought to account for men's tendency to express themselves in poetry and art and philosophy and religion, it excites no wonder that this great movement is steadily attracting more and more attention, and from unexpected quarters.

Who would have dreamed, a decade or more ago, that to-day college professors would be teaching Freud's doctrines to students of both sexes, scientific men turning to them for light on the nature of the instincts, and educators for hints on the training of the young?

These phenomena do not indicate much of a change of heart on the part of early critics, it is true, for prejudices die hard; but they do indicate two significant facts. The first is that the task to which Freud found himself committed,—namely, the study of the thoughts, feelings, and motives of which men are unconscious yet which strongly and strangely influence their moods and conduct,—is one¹ that all thoughtful men must and will study.

The next most noteworthy fact is that, in dealing with this task Freud showed, not only a remarkable ability and power of insight but a still more remarkable fearlessness, a tireless energy in seeking evidence, and an unsurpassed fidelity in observation. This is, indeed, one of the cases where it is impossible to consider a man's work without taking his personality into account,

¹ Consider the hold which novels and dramas have upon everyone.

and Freud's personality was such that up to a certain point his testimony is as reliable as the wax impression of a coin.

But every man has his weaknesses and limitations, and in Freud's case these were shown in the fact that while he became exceedingly adept in recognizing certain influences, he failed, mainly, though, I think, not wholly, because his attention was thus engrossed, to take sufficient note of others that likewise were at play. For a time this made no obvious difference. He has never pretended to do more than to demonstrate the presence of one group of repressed motives (the sexual group); or, rather, to bring to the surface repressed thoughts of all sorts, but in the belief that the sex classification was the best. This portion of the work has given rise to bitter criticisms, which were largely based on prejudice and need not be considered here. After a time, however, when, following a sort of logical destiny, he was led to apply his explanations to the whole range of human life, new obligations were involved and new sorts of criticism came to view. These were not wholly dictated, like the earlier ones, by narrow prejudice, based on the very repressions that he sought to study, but on the fact that the type of mind of which his is an example is not the only sort that is useful even for purposes of scientific investigation; nor is the method which he followed the only suitable one for the study of human life.

The breaking away of Adler and of Jung are, I think, partly to be explained on such grounds as these, though it was partly due, likewise, I believe, to a misconception of their scientific duty,—a misconception which led them to reject without sufficient reason, formulations of Freud's which were of permanent value.

It is, however, true, as I believe, that Freud's strong accentuation of the sex motive, and of the merits

of the sex mode of classification, although dictated, no doubt, by an instinctive feeling that, otherwise, the goal sought—primarily the therapeutic goal—would not be won, did, nevertheless, prevent him from adequately filling the position of judicial student of human motives as a whole, that circumstances almost forced him to assume.

There are empirical grounds for this criticism and also scientific, or philosophic grounds.

The arguments brought forward, for example, by Josiah Royce in almost all his recent books¹, by Trotter², by Coe³, by Stanley Hall⁴, and others, while they do not in the least impugn the value of Freud's arguments *ad hoc*, *i. e.*, as contributions of immense importance to the subject of sex-motivation, do emphasize, in their turn, social motives other than sexual, and not to be classed as sexual without some forcing, which one could wish that Freud had studied. Similar comments can be made with regard to the effects of his rigid acceptance of the "scientific" method in his studies.

One may succeed in showing that the motives of a given philosopher, a poet or adherent of religion, are permeated by sensual longings of infantile origin; and one may then go to work, if one will, to pick to pieces the rational postulates on which a given philosophy or religion rests its claims. Still, something will remain that the mind feels to be of vast importance, and for which "sublimation," as usually defined, does not adequately account. The grown man recognizes motives which are foreign to the child, or to nature, but which, on monistic grounds, one must assume to have been represented there, in some fashion.

¹ Cf. *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, for ex.

² *The Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*.

³ *The Psychology of Religion*.

⁴ *Auger. Jr. of Abn. Psychol.*

Freud's own arguments show this. He is avowedly a scientific monist, and, properly speaking, should classify himself with the "realists" or "behaviorists" of the present day, who are, virtually, materialists. But science, physics, chemistry and mechanics know no "emotion," in the best human sense, and even the James-Lange theory, although it may explain *almost the whole* mystery, still leaves something unexplained.

Professor Holt¹ praises Freud's formulations and, with great justice, adopts his views about the "wish" as the corner-stone of his psychology. But Holt's "wish," like James's "emotion," leaves one cold, while the "wish" in Freud's sense is anything but cold. A "something," undiscoverable by reason, seems left out when one accepts the realistic scheme as binding, and Freud was quick to see and reprobate this tendency when it came to estimating the value of Adler's conception of the nature of human motives, as he does in his history of the psychoanalytic movement². Adler, as Freud points out, in throwing so much emphasis upon aggression, in his analysis of motives, leaves no room for love. But it is hard to see how Freud, if he would be a strictly logical follower of the scientific method, can bring in love. Unless one assumes that the essence of love, in the most spiritual sense, is in some way, represented even in the physical world, then it cannot get in at all, and it becomes necessary to accept a building, the base of which is not broad enough to support the superstructure.

Some of these points may now be taken up for further study, and I would say, to begin with, that Freud's personality presents itself under several different aspects, which may be defined as those of the clinician,

¹ E. B. Holt: The Freudian Wish.

² Sigmund Freud: Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung. (Now to be had in English.)

the scientific (psychologic) student, the student and conscientious member of society, and finally (little as he would be inclined to admit the fact), of the philosophic thinker, seeking to generalize his conclusions and to state them in universal terms.

These phases of Freud's thought are not all, as I have said, of equal value.

As detector of unacknowledged motives and definer of methods for detecting them; as analyzer of the personal and social situations in which these hidden motives play their part (interpretation of dreams, wit, conduct, tabus, etc.); above all, as founder of the "free association" method, he is without a rival. If, however, one looks to him for broad and balanced views of life in all its manifold aspects, and for a judicial-minded interpretation of men's acts and thoughts under conditions where many motives—conscious as well as unconscious, and both conscious and unconscious in varying degrees—come into play, one is doomed to partial disappointment: his job is of a more specialized sort. As a philosopher he is weak. On the whole, he stands out as a courageous, unflinching, pioneer-investigator and a man of genius;—and it should be recognized that where he is weak he has never claimed to be strong¹. Had he not been so daring, so sincere, so

¹ Freud has disclaimed interest in the philosophic mode of approach, or familiarity with its methods and arguments; it is the "libido" of the philosopher that, alone, he has felt concerned to study, and the philosophic attitude has seemed to him a mode of seeking compensation, like (in his estimation) the religious attitude. This mode of looking at the matter has its real value, especially in so far as it is based on direct character-analysis. But when he (and his co-workers) make the sweeping statements they do—though without arguing them out critically—about the standing of physical law in the determination of mental phenomena, they assume the authority of philosophers and make themselves correspondingly responsible.

faithful, and, withal, so much of a sleuth-hound as he was (in a good sense and in the interests of knowledge), the science of psychology would still be without its best impulse to real growth and practical utility; and psycho-neurological therapeutists, ignorant of a large portion of the forces which they aspire to manipulate, would still be fumbling in the dark with powerful, two-edged weapons, in the use of which they could obtain no adequate, systematic training. On the other hand, had Freud's splendid analytic powers been supplemented by an equally powerful capacity and impulse to make himself acquainted with all the forces shaping human lives, at their best, in all their fullness and richness, before he studied them in their narrowness and weakness and in the imperfect stages of their development, and had he—equipped as he is with strong intelligence—been moved to recognize the limitations of the scientific method, and to see that, just as the language of signs and feeling transcends that of logical concept-building at one end of the scale, so the language of trained and illumined intuition transcends it at the other end; had he, in short, been a man of more idealistic type, then psychoanalysis—if it had come into existence at all—might perhaps have been kept free from what even certain fair-minded men have considered as one-sidedness. But *would it have come into existence at all?* Probably not. For although it is, I believe, easily conceivable that a man of philosophic, idealistic, or religious tendencies and training should be able, if intelligent, to make himself a useful and even a progressive and orthodox psychoanalyst, yet it is exceedingly improbable that such a man would have become a psychoanalytic *pioneer* of a thoroughgoing type. It is hard to believe, in short, that psychoanalysis could have had a development equally fruitful with that which it has had and yet one markedly different in origin and detail. This portion of

medical progress needed to be guided by just such a man as Sigmund Freud, and we may be deeply grateful for his advent. He taught us to abstain from referring psychopathic "symptoms" (exclusively or primarily) either to bodily malnutrition or hereditary taint (often such lame and insufficient modes of explanation), still less to lack of will on the patient's part; and threw the primary emphasis, instead, on a set of definite psychologic causes which he showed how to bring out, in detail, with reference to each special case. But in his eager search for causes, he took as his standard the rigid kinds of causation studied by the physicist, and so became committed to a mode of conceiving the manifestations of human effort which does not do them justice. This was a misapplication of the scientific method, but the effort of which it formed a part was practically fruitful and stimulating to research.

The different phases of Freud's thought followed each other, to some extent, in chronological series. I prefer, however, to disregard this circumstance, which has no significance for the purpose of this study, and ask your attention rather to the fact that they are present and closely interwoven throughout all his work. That is, the same constitutional tendencies of mind, the same sort of personal equation, have been operative continuously, from the outset, and have acted, I believe, very favorably as regards one portion of his work, less so, and even unfavorably, as regards other portions.

Assuming, for example (what is substantially correct), that these various attitudes or tendencies of mind, by virtue of the fact that they belonged to Freud's personality, came, all, rapidly into play, and taking into account, as one should, his rugged courage and thorough-going honesty, and the fact that he had been trained in the scientific rather than in the philosophic school, one may

perceive that something of the following sort must have taken place: He began his work with a therapeutic aim,—that is, with the interests of given patients in his mind. If he had been content to remain a therapist, without publishing much beyond an enumeration of the cures that he had made; or if he had confined his published statements to a few clinical generalizations, and a few broad hints about the importance of the sex issues, such as Charcot had thrown out, he would undoubtedly have achieved reputation and success. But his genius (untempered and unhampered, in the main, by considerations of practical policy and personal aggrandizement) would not permit this cramping. Obviously, he soon perceived that the needs of his patients—if they were to gain anything through the truth as he saw it—would require them to look on their lives with the same inexorable seriousness that would be required for the successful carrying through of a difficult scientific research. And more than this, he soon gained a vision of the needs of society as reflected and expressed in those of the single patient; and a vision, too, of the vastness of the part played, in the lives of historical characters and of the imaginers of those described in fiction and in myth, by the hidden motives of which he had found himself on the trail. Finally, stimulated by his success in using the genetic method (that is, in tracing out the working of the apparently blind, will-less, primary instincts in even the highest, that is, the most complex, manifestations of conscious human life), Freud was led to adopt the general views which must be classified as "deterministic" in a philosophic sense. But he gives no adequate arguments to support these views, and it is here, in my opinion, rather than in his (monographic) over-emphasis of the sex-motive, that the scientific weakness of his work is to be found. It has been urged against

him¹, that in his sociological studies—which have been incidental rather than serious or exhaustive—he has not given sufficient attention to the various influences, other than those based on sex, by which men living in social groups are practically moved,—pre-eminently the gregarious instinct in its different forms. Freud has met this criticism indirectly in one of his recent papers, where he admits that he has not as yet studied with care what he calls the “ego” complexes. He seems to refer this failure to lack of time and opportunity; but he says, also, that he has as yet seen no unifying principle that promises more for the purposes of such a study than the sex-principle. I would offer, as a partial explanation of this situation, the fact referred to at the beginning of this paper, that his chief instinctive interest and the best opportunity for his method have lain elsewhere than in the fields of sociologic research, in a broad sense. In spite of this, he has been obliged to figure, more or less, as a sociologist, and cannot long escape from assuming, explicitly, the responsibility attaching to the authority thus thrust upon him.

The recognition of the wider needs and scientific issues which his empirical study of men's unconscious motives brought to light, together with the increasing realization of the therapeutic difficulties involved in many of his cases, doubtless augmented Freud's determination to search out to the utmost every indication of repressed “sexuality,” and this brought him much criticism, which was only relatively sound.

The time is not ripe, even yet, for laying down rules that would enable the physician to decide how far he should encourage a given patient to go in this spying out of the repressed sensual elements in his thoughts and conduct.

¹ Trotter: *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. Dr. G. Stanley Hall and others have given voice to similar criticisms.

Freud started from the thesis¹ that the conscientious psychoanalyst ought to be considered as within his rights and duty in dealing with these issues—or encouraging his patients to deal with them—just as with any other issues. He held it to be best to encourage plain speaking, as in line with the assumption that both he and his patients were to be regarded as engaged, single-mindedly, in carrying out a serious research, and as aiming for an education which, so far as it went, should be genuine at least. Conscious of the rectitude of his own motives, Freud felt convinced that the evils attendant on this plan of outspokenness were far less serious than those attendant on the plan of covered speech and careful phrasing that would permit of much juggling with subtle tendencies to sensuality. Doubtless there are dangers in all methods, and perhaps time will show that the essential point is that the physician should know himself with a thoroughness that should be as nearly absolute as possible, and then vary his method more or less with reference to the given patient's symptoms, habits of mind and previous training. That he should do this is, indeed, implied by Freud in his urgent insistence on letting the patient virtually lead in the research while the physician and his views are held as in abeyance. But this is a recommendation difficult to follow in some cases. Patients, by virtue of their instinctive power of insight, are close students of the physician's personality, and whatever he may say or leave unsaid, his standards will always be taken, more or less, as guides. This, too, the patient, by the theory, must learn to see and voice, but even such an antidote to harm will sometimes fail.

The therapeutic situation was unsatisfactory in several

¹ Sharply defined and illustrated, for example, in his "Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse," *Monatschr. f. Psychiatrie u. Neurologie*. Bd. XXVIII, H. 4.

respects at the period when Freud began his investigations, and indeed it is so still. The relationship between physicians and their neuropathic patients, in particular, was marked by subtle evils of a somewhat serious sort. In proportion as neurological practitioners were successful their own personalities played too pronounced a part: they were prone to become either too masterful or too intimate, in response to a willingness and even a longing, on their patient's part, to play a complementary rôle in these respects.

This was an abuse, which, in accordance with Freud's definition of the term, could fairly be called "sexual" in its nature; and the fashion for hypnotism, so prevalent at one time, only increased the danger while making it more difficult of detection. One of the benefits to be expected as an outcome of the psychoanalytic movement is that relationships of a more straightforward sort between doctors and patients, will, hereafter, be encouraged, and equivocal, debilitating relationships discouraged. Freud and his followers¹ have striven hard for a better state of things in this respect, but it must be clearly seen that the condition essential for a permanent improvement is the adoption of high standards among physicians themselves. Self-knowledge can be a stepping-stone to this, but it must lead to an instinctive attitude, transcending knowledge; and it is as difficult for the physician to gain this for himself as it is for the patient to overcome his more obvious symptoms. It is extremely difficult to bring about a genuine and permanent elevation of the character-level in any person, sick or well, and sometimes one has to rest content with a gain which is but superficial. But even this is of some value, as Freud himself has pointed out²

¹ See "Presidential Address" by Dr. W. A. White, in forthcoming issue of the *Psychoanalytic Review*.

² Cf. "Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod; die Entzuschung des Krieges."

in his comments on the breaking down of pseudo-civilization under the stress of war.

Considerations of the above sort should help to explain, if not altogether to justify, some of Freud's interpretations in another field.

It is true that one does not find, in the character-studies by him and by his closest followers, of such men—actual or fictitious—as Leonardo, Hamlet and the like, or of the myth-makers and the primitive-culture men, signs of a well-balanced, judicial weighing of the all-various forces actually in play. This is not even attempted, indeed; and instead, we are given an interesting and keen analysis of certain concealed influences which, in their turn, the antecedent biographers had neglected. This situation is typical of the whole psychoanalytic movement, in its strength and in its weakness, or defect. These character-analyses are not biographies but monographic studies of certain tendencies which ought to be better understood. One should not rail against the defects of this tendency, however, without remembering that except for this exaggerated emphasis the vitally important motives now brought out would never have been seen. A community ignorant of itself, and ignorant of its ignorance, yet stung by the suspicion of its own narrowness, and of weaknesses and temptations which it does not realize the importance of facing in all their bearings, is naturally hostile to a frankly truthful interpreter of the facts as they seem to him, and one prepared to state them baldly in accordance with the principle *de potiori denominatio fit*.

It was inevitable that, in proportion as his observations accumulated, Freud should generalize them, in the form of propositions which came to serve at once as expressions of his past experience and formulations for his and others' use in further studies. To many persons, amongst whom I would include myself, these formulations seem in the main

sound and useful. Their validity has, however, been strongly called in question, and certain of the objections — those by Adler and by Jung — must be very briefly commented on. I refer especially to the propositions about infantile sexuality, fixation and regression.

It is of great interest to decide whether, on strictly scientific grounds, there is any good justification for the claim made by Alfred Adler¹ that Freud is entirely at sea in using the category of sexuality as primary and basal. It is only, Adler claims, the will for power, or self-assertion (or, eventually, self-preservation) that should be looked upon as a basal motive, the sexual impulse being classifiable as secondary, or, in Adler's own words, only as a *form of speech*, in which another and deeper influence reveals itself.

This view is interesting, but as a criticism of Freud's position it can not, I think, maintain its ground.

In the first place, Freud was making², not a biologic, but a clinical argument when he asserted the fundamentality of the sex-motive. It was a question solely of fundamentality in the patient's mind; and surely patients are not torn and thrilled by their desire for supremacy (regarded as freed — if one can so regard it — from the sex-feelings that attend it) at all as they are torn and thrilled by their (unrecognized and unacknowledged) sex-passions. Neither is the repression discoverable in the one case at all comparable to that met with in the other. And as patients cannot be expected to abandon the sex-conceptions and terminology in describing their ideas and feelings, it would

¹ Cf. "Über den nervösen Charakter." (Now to be had in English.) Every one who cares about the truth of these matters should read Adler's own words and note their animus, which is one of very unscientific virulence.

² See his admirable statements in "Zur Geschichte der psycho-analytischen Bewegung."

be a forced and artificial demand to make of the clinical observer that he should do so.

But, to go further, it cannot, in my estimation, be claimed, on any ground, that the category of "self assertion" is more fundamental than that of "sexuality." Neither, on the other hand, is anything to be gained by asserting (true though it is, as a rule, from the patient's standpoint) that the reverse should be maintained. In fact, both of these exceedingly important categories or modes of classification imply that a man is to be thought of, first of all, as a social animal, a virtual member of a virtual community.

But, in theory and in an ideal sense, the members of a community meet, not as rivals but as equals and in co-operation; and where rivalry or misunderstanding arises among the members of human societies, men, sooner or later, come to recognize the need for an intermediary, or "interpreter" in Royce's sense¹. Indeed, it is possible that this function is foreshadowed even in the animal kingdom—as, pre-eminently, by the appearance of the offspring, who requires the joint care of the father and mother, and serves as a pledge of fellowship and co-operation. It is true, of course (and this has long been recognized by Freud), that the lust for power, whether for its own sake or (as urged by Adler) in a compensatory sense, is relatively primitive and fundamental enough, in all conscience. But no good reasons exist, I think, for looking on it otherwise than as secondary to the co-operative, gregarious or "herd" instinct, or as more fundamental than the sex-instinct. To live—even to think—is to strive to reproduce oneself: that amount and form of creation at least is necessary and universal. But the conditions essential for the ideal community do not imply, as theoretically necessary, a *sex-problem* (in a "morbid"

¹ Cf. Royce: *War and Insurance; The Hope of the Great Community*, and other publications.

sense); nor does the bare existence of a community theoretically require a supremacy-problem¹.

It will, I trust, be believed that I have no desire to belittle the value of Alfred Adler's contributions to the working out of the principles of compensation (as for organ-inferiority), or to deny the significance of the principle of self assertion and the "fictitious goal" of the neurotic patients—amongst whom all men are to be reckoned. Freud has always recognized these principles.

It is also true that philosophy began, practically, with the demands for solution of the problem of evil, and that the sex-problem and the supremacy problem, arising side by side, had much to do with the modern doctrines of sociology and characterology. But it was a serious wrong, on Adlers's part, to attempt to destroy where his obvious function was to emphasize and to consolidate.

As regards the criticisms brought by Jung against Freud's formulations, I see in them the suggestion of a mode of looking at the subject which the former found congenial while to the latter it was not so, combined with what seems to me a needless denial of some of Freud's most important claims.

Jung strives for a broader formulation of the whole situation than Freud, with his primarily clinical, or empirical, interests, has adopted; and somewhat as Freud sees the infant behind the adult, so Jung sees nature, striving to organize itself, behind man. The "mother," conceived of

¹ I will call attention, in passing, to the fact that just as men ship or drift easily into rivalry, in Adler's sense (i.e., into a relationship which is a sort of mockery of co-operation), so Royce's community of interpretation (a triadic relationship of good sort) is mocked in the form described by Freud in which a man and a woman are unable to love each other to the full extent except in the virtual presence of a rival.

concretely, disappears, therefore, in the creative instinct, and in the instincts of dependence, from which man must free himself. These are justifiable and interesting views, and the data used in illustration of them are very rich.

It is easy for me to understand and sympathize with Jung's desire for this broader formulation, and easy, too, to understand his wish to be of more service to the patient with reference to the "present issue." On the other hand, I can sympathize very strongly, also, with the feeling of Freud and his friends, that to go far in this latter course would often be to impose one's own personality upon the patient, and would lead inexperienced students of psycho-analysis to abandon methods in the use of which more rigid studies might have made them competent. Furthermore, I cannot in the least sympathize with the rejection by Jung of Freud's theories of regression, infantile sexuality, and fixation. Jung carries out his analyses, so he says, in the old fashion, and it is difficult to see how he can fail to recognize the value of the principles which he formerly used so extensively and with such good effect. The theory of fixation can, indeed, be stated in such technical fashion that it seems repellent to the novice; but it can also be stated in terms that make it acceptable to every person of intelligence, even if untrained.

As regards the philosophic problem, I have but one word more to add. Freud has pointed out, with eminent justice, that the mind of the philosopher, if subjected to analytic study, reveals itself as under two influences, one of which is a craving, of infantile origin. The scientific mind is free, he thinks, from this doubleness of motive. This is true, if the proposition be taken in Freud's sense. But to my thinking, the scientific mind is from another standpoint eminently narrow, and subject to modes of reasoning that do not satisfy all the requirements of the situation.

If a "*unit of composition*" must be adopted, in order to satisfy the need for a monistic scheme, which we all feel, this cannot be such a unit as would be available solely for the arbitrarily chosen portion of existence which alone can be studied by scientific methods. We are men, with all that that implies, before we decide to limit our researches or to begin them, and should not let ourselves be contented with modes of defining what we are that cannot, if carried out logically, be considered as otherwise than cramping.

The feeling would not have been so intense, on the part of Freud and his adherents, with regard to the change of front by Dr. Jung toward some of the most fundamental of the psychoanalytic doctrines—especially the doctrine of infantile sexuality and its bearings, and that which affirms the therapeutic significance of tracing out, through careful analysis, the complete history of the patient's fixations and regressions—unless these men had felt that the success of a very difficult enterprise was at stake. It is proper that the grounds of this feeling should be understood, not only because the doctrines in question are so important that one cannot give them up and yet fairly call oneself a psychoanalyst, in Freud's sense, but also because the pressure to give them up, or modify them, is still so strong and subtle.

The fact is, there are a great many persons who would gladly avail themselves of Freud's doctrines to the extent of making a partial, relatively superficial analysis of thoughts and memories, yet who would strongly shrink—the physicians from urging, the patients from being urged—to make this process thoroughgoing. Certain though it is that many changes will creep gradually into psychoanalytic procedures, it is exceedingly desirable that these should be made by physicians who have not only

been thoroughly trained in what might be called orthodox method and beliefs, but who still accept as sound the principles upon which these are based. Otherwise, the method will degenerate, and, more and more, the old reliance on the mentor- and adviser-types of psychotherapeutist will gradually be reverted to, not alone with reference to the class of cases where their services suffice, but for all cases.

Fortunately, however, this result is not likely to happen to the degree that one might fear. The teachings of Freud and his colleagues as to the benefits to be gained through a thorough searching-out of his unacknowledged experiences, on the patient's part, have become so far ingrained in psychotherapeutics that the lesson is never likely to be entirely unlearned. What is more to be feared is that therapeutic traditions may arise that, while considered of the best, will be, in fact, less good than they might otherwise have been, and that the scientific outcome of the psychoanalytic movement may suffer correspondingly.

Chapter XIX.

SKETCH FOR A STUDY OF NEW ENGLAND CHARACTER*.

During portions of the past few years, I have had the opportunity to investigate as freely as I wished into the life-history of a lady who came to me originally as a patient, but became, later, a friendly and eager fellow-worker. I hope, eventually, to publish at some length extracts from the rich store of material which she has written out, at my suggestion, and which possesses the kind of interest and power of conviction such as belongs peculiarly to every genuine account of individual experiences of an intimate sort.

The story as here given seems to me important, not because of dramatic features,—which, in fact, it does not possess,—but on the following accounts: (1) It illustrates conflicts which present themselves to many persons. (2) It throws light on certain undesirable effects of a strict, "old-fashioned" religious training, and on the symptomatology of the so-called "New England conscience" (which has a very morbid side). (3) Finally, what is of prime importance, it brings into strong relief certain common and typical influences which tend to prevent the relationship between children and their parents from being a source of unadulterated benefit to both, as it should be, but, on the contrary, to make it, in some respects, a source of temptations and conflicts of which the best that can be said is that they are not without their compensations.

* Published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, June 1917.

This lady came to me for the first time about five years ago, when forty-nine years old, "not as a very sick person,"—though in fact she had been a good deal of an invalid since birth,—"but in the hope of learning how to adjust herself to life." And so satisfactory has been her progress along these lines, to such a degree has she exchanged her former sense of inhibition and incompleteness for one of freedom and emancipation, that the spectacle of her improvement has been, for me, a source of satisfaction and encouragement.

At her first visit she said that she felt nervous, shy, apprehensive, and lacking in self-confidence, conscious of intelligence but unable to use it to good purpose. When called upon to meet people in a social way she often hesitated in her speech, and then her voice would grow harsh and loud and her hands tremulous, sometimes to a high degree. She suffered much from periodical headaches, not distinctly migrainoid in type, and, in addition, from a dull headpressure which had grown to be habitual. I will anticipate the further history of this symptom by saying that it proved to be distinctly of neurotic origin. It seemed to her, as the analysis proceeded, that the headaches were the expression of a sort of helpless rage with reference to her troubles, and they grew less and eventually ceased as her conflicts became resolved. It might have been thought that they were due to eye-strain, from which she suffered seriously until about thirteen years of age. But in fact, the headaches did not come on until she was twenty-seven years old,—that is, long after the correction of her error of refraction had been made by glasses; nor was any further treatment of this sort operative in bringing her relief. It is also of interest that these headaches came, she said, at first at nine days' intervals, then at intervals of six, and finally of three days. I shall take advantage of some future occasion to point out

that the number three and its multiples played an important part in her unconscious thoughts, as indicated by her dreams.

Her defective eyesight, if not mainly responsible for her headaches, was of much significance on other grounds. It was not the fashion in that day to spend much time in studying children's eyesight; and the fact that the duty of self-subjection and of overriding difficulty by effort loomed up as paramount in her parents' eyes, turned aside their attention—devoted though they were, after their own fashion—from the need of other sorts of treatment. Throughout her childhood, before the corrective glasses were applied, her eyesight was so poor that she often stumbled as she walked, and to read books or music, or problems on the blackboard, or to do fine housework, involved a painful strain. This condition, combined with her deficiency in endurance, led her almost to abandon active games and to lose the training in power of adjustment that goes with them, and brought her much scolding for carelessness and stupidity,—through which a native tendency to self-disparagement became intensified.

It was the study of the direct and indirect effects of special organic weaknesses, such as eye-strain, that induced Alfred Adler of Vienna to regard these local weaknesses as the point of departure for his theory of character-formation¹. Every organic (and so, functional) defect serves as a direct handicap, on the one hand, and leads, on the other hand, to instinctive compensatory efforts (especially

¹ The theory of compensation here referred to has long been recognized as a very important one, and Adler's contributions to it are of real value. I do not believe, however, that it has anything like the exclusive, thorough-going significance which he attributes to it. Pain and evil are, fortunately, not our only teachers; nor is adjustment to a given universe our only goal.

on the part of the nervous system) which may induce a high degree of real compensation, and, indeed, over-compensation, or to complex reactions of substitution. Such influences were undoubtedly present in this case, not only as they relate to the defective eyesight, but also, and probably still more, with reference to ill-health from other causes. For this patient was a seven months' child, and remained for a long time poorly nourished, growing a little stronger after some years, only to fall sick again in adolescence. Furthermore (for special reasons which cannot be referred to here), her very advent was unwelcome, and both her weakness and her sex were sources of regret and mortification to her mother; and these facts increased the necessity for special compromises, adaptations, and compensations on her part, of the true nature of which she has gradually become aware.

The facts given by my patient at the first recital of her troubles might have seemed suggestive of nothing more than one of the common forms of nervous invalidism, with its bottomless well of minor sufferings, for which the term "neurasthenia" is still, by many persons, looked upon as competent to cover, though in fact it tells nothing of the mechanisms involved. Little by little, however, more light was thrown upon the sources of her troubles.

Starting life as a weakly child, and with few companions outside of her own family, she became a somewhat self-centered girl, but an ardent and—as the phrase runs—an "over-conscientious" student, and showed evidence of a fine mind.

At the period of her first visit to me she was living alone, her mother having died some months before, and likewise (several years earlier), the older of her two brothers, to whom she had been passionately devoted.

Further questioning as to her symptoms showed that beneath a non-committal manner she carried a highly

overwrought, emotional sensitiveness, through which her longings for recognition had become converted into pain, in which form she found a certain (poor and incomplete) gratification. As a part of this tendency she had become very unpleasantly acute to sounds and odors, and also to the slightest interruption to whatever occupation she might be engaged upon, even through calls made by good friends. In fact, social intercourse was longed for; yet so little did she understand her own needs and the means of meeting them that the most trifling demand for sacrifices in the practical interest of a wider social life aroused almost a sense of resentment in her mind. Every trivial noise, even the rustling of a newspaper, she says, would bring a frown of annoyance to her forehead. The odors which she disliked often had reference to dishes which her mother liked, and—inspired by a certain hostility to herself, as she half-fancied—insisted on having cooked.

"To-day," she writes, "I think that my objections were an infantile mode of expressing opposition to my mother, I wanted to be mistress of my own home (*i. e.*, of a home of my own)."

As for visitors, her double feelings made her adopt a manner toward them which said "Goodbye," in spite of the fact that she was inwardly bewailing her loneliness, longing for companionship and love, and desperate to break through the isolation in which she felt herself. She would have been ready enough, at any moment, to call herself "selfish," "morbid," "egoistic," but to do so would have been of no avail and unjust to her best self.

No person's character is wholly unified, and the character of every one may conveniently be studied under four heads, as representing four tendencies that are closely interwoven. (1) Every person is striving in some measure, even though helplessly, to express the best that is in him, and thus to fulfil his social obligations. (2) Every one is

under an intense pressure to conform in thought and conduct to standards virtually set by the community. This tendency might be described as an instinctive attempt at protective coloration. (3) Every one has in him a more or less strong leaning to revert, in action, thought and feeling, to the level of standards which express that quality in him which might be described, according to circumstances, as immature, infantile, pleasure-seeking, carnal, or personal in an exclusive sense. Finally (4), inasmuch as there is no difference except in degree between the nervous invalid and the so-called normal person, it would be fair to say that every one carries symptoms which have the following two meanings: in the first place, they indicate that he is seeking to escape from the handicaps just referred to, more or less as the persons described by Dante are striving to climb up the Hill of Purgatory; in the next place they indicate also that he is still under the sway of the passionate longings which he feels to be incompatible with his best social tendency.

This patient had the desires indicated under the first of these headings, in considerable degree. But mingled with them there were strong longings of the third order,—for the sake of gratifying which she learned to use her imagination in a way that was unsatisfactory, and unproductive of permanently good results. Excitement, symbolizing her desires, came to play too large a part in her fancies and her dreams, and she learned too much to seek for gratification in the pain of her symptoms.

One tendency of this lady, which made little show as a symptom on the surface, yet which in its working out was perhaps the worst one of all, was that she seemed impelled by some cross-purpose impulse to do or say, at critical moments, the very thing that defeated her own object. This tendency is familiar enough to every one, but in her not only was it so strong that she lost some

excellent chances for remunerative and pleasant work and for forming valuable friendships, but it has a psychological interest which I will speak of later. I was reminded, in thinking on this symptom, of the inability of Sisyphus to drink of the refreshing waters that kept rising to his lips. The inhibitions of King Saul may be recalled, in further illustration.

Besides these various traits, this patient was subject to compulsions of familiar sorts, affecting both her thoughts and acts.

"When we sign our names to letters," she writes, "that is commonly the end. But to me it was not the end. I wrote them over and over again, even when I was certain. When mailing them I would hesitate a long time, standing before the letter-box. Finally I would put them in, and immediately wish to snatch them out. Hours afterwards I would picture myself pulling them out of the box."

In a similar fashion she required repeated assurances that she had closed a bureau drawer or locked a door.

Here we see evidence enough of doubt and fear about her ability to follow a consistent aim in life, and the frantic efforts to follow at once two incompatible courses, two divergent paths, or, again, to repress and to lock her mind against instinctive longings, which, had she understood them better, she might have faced and made to jibe with reason and her best desires. Instead of this, they stood as signs of what might be called the tragedy of a baffled life, which came near to being balked and wrecked.

Discontent, and a strong tendency to brood painfully over the past, soon led, as she records, to an exhaustion and a series of petulant changes of mood virtually toward herself.

"Other people appeared to be living happy lives . . . My present disappointment was the result of obedience to parents, faithfulness to duty, utter elimination of self. It did not pay to be so self-sacrificing. If I had my life to live over again I would be reckless in self-gratification . . . Before I knew it I became exacting toward myself and toward every one in the house. Fear pursued me every moment of the day, fear lest I swerve from the straight path of duty."

She had been very fond of music and longed for a musical education, but this her father would not sanction and it was characteristic that she reacted in Calvinistic fashion to her disappointment and became a "wet-blanket to enjoyment."

"My Puritan training demanded quiet. The piano must not be used except for appropriate music. There must be no teas, no spreads, no afternoon callers. Except for the singing of hymns morning and night, the house had to be as quiet as the grave. Qualms of conscience accompanied the reading of the psalms."

Nevertheless,

"My heart yearned mightily for the very pleasures that I condemned."

Another set of symptoms clustered around the fact that from her earliest years she entertained longings for motherhood, which were far too intense and far too little understood. Even a superficial analysis of her dreams makes this abundantly evident. In fact, the very first dream after she presented herself for treatment, which is recognized as being of special significance, showed her in my office in company with her mother, and as if indenti-

fying herself with her, a circumstance which her experience and associations showed clearly to have that significance. She felt that in this dream she was giving away the secret of her life—the longing to be herself a mother. "Furthermore," she says, "as a very small child, between three and four years of age, I loved other children dearly. From the time I was nine until I was twelve I had the care of my youngest brother." This experience was important and perhaps, in part, controlling. She was extremely devoted to this younger brother, and on that ground enjoyed the care of him. Nevertheless, she had often to sit by his cradle while friends were playing outside, and the half-repressed longing to be with them became strong within her mind. After she grew older and had graduated from college, she developed almost a hatred for the girls who boarded with her mother, while at the same time envying them their joys. The children also became objects of hostility to her. They were "disturbers of the peace."

I have said that her arrival in the world was an unwelcome event to her mother, but certain further details about her early childhood call also for mention. Her mother—a person of fine traits and great power of self-denial, but herself a prey to conflicts and dissatisfied with her lot as she found it—had married without the knowledge and consent of her family, and had kept the marriage secret, presumably because she was a teacher and could not afford to give up her place.

My patient was prematurely born, weighed only two and one-half pounds at birth, and was an unpleasing sight. The attending physician was angry and gave the mother a scolding which she resented as unjust, and this increased her inclination "to hate the innocent cause" of the painful situation. Only her father was pleased, and his joy was not unmixed with pain. From then on, however, he took his child under his special charge and was

absolutely devoted. For three months every one despaired of the child's life. When she was a young girl her father wrote her a note of intense solicitude, in which he described in strong terms the depth of interest with which he regarded her career. Her mother was so unhappy about the whole situation that it was "a distress to have me near," the patient writes; "it was a relief to her whenever I went away from home." Again:

"I did not know why my mother did not love me. I knew simply that she did not. I made pathetic efforts to gain her love,—all without success. I think father gave me an extra measure of love because of mother's refusal. Naturally I turned more and more toward father. His affection had in it something of passion."

Her mother on the contrary objected to tokens of affection, and "the fact that she repulsed me made me all the more ardent in my demonstration toward other people."

Her father then, became the object of her admiration and was her constant companion so far as his business, which called him much away from home, allowed. As time went on this (reciprocated) passion for her father grew steadily more strong and more engrossing.

The evidence is overwhelming, though I can do no more than hint at it in this place, that her longing for closer intimacy, or identification, with him was as strong as it well could be, and knew, in fact, no limits. He once said to her that if he were not married to her mother he would like to take her for his wife; and her mother, in her turn, exclaimed, on one occasion, "I believe you would marry your father, if you could." As a child of eleven she adopted for herself, in secrecy, a middle name which began with the same letter with her father's middle name, in order that their initials might be identical. On one occasion, when they were all three on a journey, which

involved a trip by water, when her father and mother were about to enter their stateroom for the night she put out her hand, under a strong but momentary impulse, to hold her mother back, and incurred in so doing the latter's great displeasure.

At one period in her life—when she was seventeen or eighteen years of age—her father distinctly held her back, by the expression of a strong wish, from the chance of finding a real lover. He did this because he wished her to devote her whole time to her studies. Whether this was desirable or not, these are possibilities with which it is dangerous to tamper. His wish at that time was law, and although it is true that she did later find her affections more or less strongly involved, yet there is no doubt that the magic of his personality held her with far too strong a grip. When he was growing infirm, he expressed a hope, at last, that she would marry. But then it was too late, and when she caught his meaning she felt, with intense grief, that he had deserted her. He had been, as she said, her God; and when finally he died she felt as if God had literally forsaken her.

I speak of these details, which might easily be multiplied, for the reason that parents often fail to realize that their children belong not to them, but to the world, and that their place in the world must be found largely through their own unaided efforts. The love of the parent for the child, as of the child for the parent, begins with a strong longing which is essentially *in them*, rather than *for its object*, and it may happen that much thought and the cultivation of a willingness to make great sacrifices is required before the passionate devotion takes on at least its best form.

Another unfortunate outcome of such an intense devotion between the parent and child of opposite sexes is that it very often interferes seriously with the feeling

of the child for the parent of the same sex. Every person, and especially every child, intensifies his feelings through the principle of contrast. How often does one hear it said, when an opinion, favorable or unfavorable, is expressed—let us say, of one of two brothers, or two sisters,—“Yes, this is true of him (or her), but not nearly so true as it is of the other of the two.” Such was eminently the case with my patient. Her mother was conscientious and devoted, but their temperaments were not harmonious, and the gap between them, although it was never positively recognized even as a gap, became a chasm in the patient's inner thoughts through the intensity of her devotion to her father.

This may be a suitable place for calling attention to a principle which, in my judgment, is of great importance. It often offends the mind of persons not accustomed to adequately broad thinking on these subjects, to hear it said that a child takes its father as a God, while at the same time it is often pointed out that the love for the father is largely selfish in its nature, an intensification of the child's love for itself. On the other hand, psychologists of certain sorts are only too fond of pointing out that there is nothing to the conception of God but what is derived from the contemplation of the father's virtues, and a longing to make them one's own.

In similar fashion, it offends the mind to have it pointed out that the ceremonials of religion are but a modified form of the neurotic ceremonials of expiation and propitiation which the guilty feeling person adopts for his own relief; or that the symbols of religious worship are identical with symbols instinctively selected, usually in pagan days, with far different and apparently opposed meaning. What is said later in this paper about the significance of the breeze, wind and spirit involves the same principles in another form.



But it is time that our views should become broader on these matters, and this broadening is needed by the advocates both of what might be called the leaders of spiritual thought, on the one hand, and those, on the other hand, who can see in the spiritual life nothing but an outgrowth of material forces of the universe, conceived of in a narrow sense. What is needed is that both sets of views should be modified in such a way that it should be seen that the spiritual idea can gain body and richness through the contribution of sense images and feelings without losing anything of its own value. If our thoughts are in the skies, our feet must and should be on the earth, and there is nothing belittling in the fact that our instincts are, in a sense, the offspring of the forces of nature, the instincts of the animal, and of the primitive savage, as well as — pre-eminently — of our own childhood.

It does not materially change the nature of our obligations in this respect that a given person accentuates too much one or another step on this road from the "natural" toward the spiritual, and makes a stopping-place, at which to linger with undue enjoyment, of what should be a place of passage. The person who makes this error is sure to suffer therefor. But in some measure and in some respect we all do it, and each one deserves the understanding sympathy of the rest. In fact, as I believe, as there is no person who does not cling unduly to some infantile trait or self-indulgence, so there is no one whose life is not animated in some measure by the slender but irresistible influence which sets toward a grouping of his powers and forces such as is for him "the best." And this connects each person with his own ideal self, or, better, demonstrates the existence of this ideal self in him.

Had the feeling for her father retained a purely spiritual form, and had she been able to play a satisfactory part in the so-called real world, this patient's father-love

might have been well and good. In fact, it led to fanciful longings which made it hard for her to take her own place amongst her natural companions.

I have said that the patient's early and later religious training played an extremely significant part among the influences that formed her temperament, and will now go into this subject at somewhat greater length. Her memory on this point reaches back to the time when she was four years old, and she recalls that even then she had begun to take part in the daily readings from the Bible and in learning passages by heart, and had come under the influence of what she always referred to as "the little red book," a narrow, bigoted publication by the American Tract Society, on the basis of which she was expected to regulate her life. Unfortunately the common pleasures of childhood were, to say the least, very imperfectly represented, and but little chance was afforded for play, which to the normal child is as the breath of life.

"Both my parents recognized that children must play; nevertheless, the time taken for it was rather considered wasted. Sunday School teachers impressed upon all the children the fact that they must work, and the hymn, 'Work, for the night is coming,' was one of those that incited us to action of a helpful order . . . Even our pleasures were of a serious nature."

And again,

"Something was decidedly wrong with a child if he did not think it was his chief joy to love God and obey Him. This included love and obedience to parents. The obedience exacted by the church and the home was of such an absolute character as to very nearly exclude individual choice. Perfect obedience was a real hindrance to full self-expression. My mother once said, 'Your Aunt

Mary has disciplined Richard and given him such a rigid training that she does not know the real nature of the boy.' I know this same thing was true of myself."

And again,

"Not only was play discouraged to a large extent, but we were given the impression that it was a sin to waste time, that we were accountable to God for every moment and we must make every moment count towards some good end. This conviction was like a lash driving us to duty. There were moments when I felt myself hating the words 'duty' and 'discipline.' I would almost have been willing to die to escape them.

"As I expected a voice from Heaven, so in answer to prayer I looked for gifts from Heaven. A father will hold up a toy in front of an infant, then when the infant reaches for it will drop it into his lap. In the same way my imagination pictured God as bestowing gifts upon me, and I seemed to think they would come without any effort on my part save the asking. This was an unfortunate idea and acted also as an inhibition. Why work for something which I could obtain without work? I am certain many an adult Christian of those days behaved as if he believed the same thing.

"The body was considered as a hindrance to spirituality. We were encouraged to despise the body and to think more about the well-being of the soul. It seemed as if the body were something which prevented the life of the soul instead of representing a channel for energy to flow out to the immediate environment. One reason why the body was despised was because it caused the soul to sin. If a person longed to dance, that was a pleasure of the body and must be denied because the heavenward progress of the soul would be impeded. When I was about seven years of age, I begged my parents to

let me have dancing lessons. It could not be allowed. Only very worldly people would indulge in dancing. When it came to singing, there was not much difference made. Children might sing school songs and Sunday School songs and hymns. Later one could enter a church-choir or, perhaps, join a chorus where oratorios were sung. To be a concert singer or to think of studying for opera was like going to perdition. Going to the theatre and playing cards were sins of a high order.

"Aside from the books used in our school work, we were permitted to read only a very few others—'Pilgrim's Progress,' 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,' books of travel, and (as we grew older) Milton's 'Paradise Lost,' and Shakespeare's plays. After a while the Sunday School had a library; but books received from there were very flat and uninteresting, of the 'goody-goody' sort."

This religious training created an atmosphere which was indeed stimulating to her conscience, and inspiring to her literary instincts, since she learned to know the Bible through and through; but in several respects it had a distinctly unfavorable effect. In the first place, she found it hard to breathe freely in an atmosphere so strongly charged with influences in which her intellect could take but little part; and then she found in it a stimulus to emotions which were, by nature, only too easily aroused. With her acute intelligence and sympathy, she did not fail to become intensely interested in the Old Testament narratives, and of necessity she interpreted them, unconsciously, in her own fashion. God became, virtually, the equivalent both of her adored father, and also of her critical, over-watchful mother¹. Also, the instincts which

¹ The all-seeing eye of God (as of her mother) became a source of terror, emphasized by a Free-mason's diploma which her father had, from the top of which a glaring eye looked out.

she learned to recognize later as typically sexual began to take shape and to become engrossing, though, for the time, the form that they assumed was thoroughly mystical and spiritually symbolic. When only four years old she conceived of God as, on the one hand the all-powerful Creator, even of new-born children, and at the same time as a spirit, or, in almost the literal sense, as wind (see the "pursuit" dream No. 2 below). Readers of psycho-analytic literature will remember that Freud, in the imagined history of Leonardo, refers to the vultures as being, according to the legend, impregnated by the wind, as if taking the place of a mysterious and powerful deity. This idea was my patient's also, and she proceeded soon to apply it, subconsciously, with reference to herself. Two of her dreams bear on this point, and also the belief which she entertained in a thoroughly simple and childlike fashion, that since God is all powerful and "a spirit," and as children come into existence through his fiat, the parent might be sexless and occupy a wholly passive rôle. The wind passes over the face of the water and stirs its surface, thereby showing its presence there, as the angel stirred the Pool of Bethesda, and the creation of new life follows as of course. Through this idea the vital significance of both air and water took on for her a new form and meaning which biology might have sanctioned.

Moreover, in the Old Testament, Jacob and others had several wives, and Jacob worked twice seven years for Rachel. Why, then, should not she, as well as her mother, be the wife of her adored father? And was not this the reason why she should yield to his wishes in the matter of her studies, and devote seven years (as actually happened) in working for him? And why, then, should she not receive her just reward?

It is significant, as illustrative of these conflicts, that my patient had repeatedly, between the ages of eight and

eleven years, a dream which, with certain modifications, recurred in later life, and has come up even very lately. I give the dream in her own words:

"I see myself wandering through an empty house. Suddenly a dreadful ogre rushes out from one of the rooms and pursues me. Without wings I seem to go up stairs and yet not touch them with my feet. I hide in dark closets to escape the ogre. Then I hear him coming and I hurry on in the greatest fear. Now I am far in advance, now he almost grasps me. Then when I have reached the last gasp, one of two things happens,—either the roof opens and I float out heavenward in relief and joy, or else I fall to the floor in a little heap of exhausted despair. At that instant the ogre disappears."

Every student of dreams knows how common these "pursuit" dreams are, and that they signify at once a longing for a pleasure undefined and a shrinking from one's own unuttered and indeed unutterable emotions as being indefensible. "Pursuit" betokens the awakening of a desire for attention—natural in itself—which startles and terrifies its possessor through its very intensity, its mysterious, vague power, its warning of instinctive cravings, strangely familiar yet hitherto unrecognized. Its significance in this case is emphasized by the fact that when she was eight years old (that is, when these dreams began) she had an experience which made a profound impression and indeed formed the beginning of a new epoch. As she was playing, namely, with some other children in the garret of the house of one of them, some boys, a little older than they, broke in on them, exposed themselves and attempted to throw them down; tried, in short, to commit an assault on them, an outcome which was cut short by a noise which led to fear of interruption.

Not only this, but for some time afterwards the same boys continued to annoy them on the street, threatening them with knives drawn with dire vengeance if they reported them at home.

Worst of all, in a psychological sense, was the fact that the fear thus excited, great as it was, was accompanied by an amount of curiosity and desire which was overwhelming and disastrous, especially so to my patient on account of her rigidly religious education, for this had led her to regard her only real and admissible self to be a self of "spirit," free from earthly passions¹.

At a much later date, after her fancies and fantasies had long occupied themselves with the relation between her father and herself, the following modification of her childhood dream occurred.

"My mother, my sister, and myself are living in a fine old-fashioned mansion. It is light and airy, having many windows. The lovely white-enamel woodwork delights me; but there is no furniture in the rooms. They are absolutely bare. The house stands in the midst of a beautiful park where magnificent oaks are so close together that a bird's-eye view of their tops would show a carpet of green. I seem to see myself high in the air enjoying such a view. In fact, during the first few moments of the dream, I am outside of the house looking at it and finding pleasure in its beauties and the charm of its situation. My mother and sister are in an inner room of this big, square man-

¹ Some fifteen years later this patient had an analogous experience (psychologically) which revised and amplified the first. She was, namely, accosted on the village street by an adult "exhibitionist", with the result that she became haunted by terrifying visions, in which she would see herself lying prostrate at his feet, as in one of the two outcomes of her "pursuit" dreams of childhood.

sion. While dreaming I am conscious that they also represent myself. Then I am in the house with them. Without warning there comes, from within *me*, a sensation as of some force active there. In an instant it is outside of and in pursuit of me. *Beginning like a gentle breeze, it increases until it has the strength of a hurricane which nothing can withstand.* To escape its power I run into a hall, and bolt behind me *three* doors there. I have shut my mother and sister in with that 'dreadful something!' But no; it cannot be confined. It passes through the bolted doors to my side of them. *Then the 'force' is no longer simply a force, but it becomes a person with a purpose.* I rush out into the park. My feet leave the ground. With a superhuman effort I make my way in the air to the tree-tops where I walk along on the huge boughs from tree to tree, trying to conceal myself beneath, or behind, the foliage. I look for the pursuer. There he is below me—he is likewise looking for me. It is a man on horseback. The horse is high-spirited, is turning in circles, and his head is held erect by the rider's firm grasp on the short reins. The horse cannot throw that man. I watch them with interest. Then I find myself awake."

In another dream, of this same period, she saw her father and herself lying side by side and realized his caresses with gratification.

I will not undertake to give here a full analysis of this dream, for to do so would require too much discussion. The following comments are, however, of especial interest.

1. The patient has no "sister," though as a child she longed for one, just as every child at a certain period of his infancy longs to intensify the consciousness of himself by discovering or assuming some duplicate of himself. It is

well-known to students of dreams, and suggested itself at once to the patient, that the invention on her part of the "mother and sister" symbolized a desire, not only for the duplication of herself as a complete personality, but also the intensification in thought of her maternal longing, and her womanly longings in a general and specific sense. It will be noted that she says that while dreaming she was conscious that these dream personages represented herself; and in placing them in the "dark, interior room" (as she later said) of the mansion which she makes so beautiful, she symbolized the idea of their central position in relation to her interests and to herself.

2. The recognition of the fact that the "force" which eventually pursued her started as a stirring *within herself*, is of distinct interest, because it indicates an accurate representation of the truth. It is, indeed, our own feelings that pursue us.

3. Finally, the "force" "becomes a person with a purpose," and from the secure protection of the tree-tops she discovers that this person is her father, whom she had so strongly wished to look on as as her lover and whose power and manhood she delights to witness.

The dream as a whole is, in short, an allegory of her life of imagination, with some of its most fundamental longings. In fact, she had an instinct of motherhood which amounted to a strong craving, and made her identify herself with her own mother (as an obvious exemplar of the maternal instinct and in spite of their tacit lack of sympathy) and long for more signs of affection from her than she actually received. At one period she tended her younger brother—then an infant—with great devotion and at considerable sacrifice, and learned to think of him, longingly, as her child. In her fantasies she jumbled together her cravings for childhood and parenthood, protection and domination, and became a person perpetually seeking a

fanciful and mystical realization of gratifications which she could not practically reach.

It may be of interest to note here, as throwing a side light on some of the tendencies thus far referred to, that when my patient was between two and three years old a brother was born who was a very attractive child, and she remembers that her father gave him some attention;—"enough" she writes, "to arouse in me a feeling of jealousy," in spite of the fact that she became very fond of the child and devoted to its care. A dream which she had when still a little girl, in which she represented herself as terrified by the idea that her brother had died, may be taken, if the usual interpretation of such dreams is sound, as indicating the activity of such jealousy. In her subconscious thoughts she wished him out of her way and in the dream she saw him very vividly as dead.

The warmth of her father's affection for my patient then came in to accentuate a tendency, which would probably have been formed even without that cause (if only as a matter of compensation), to exalt herself in her own eyes. She felt that to be so warmly loved was proof that she was worthy of being loved. Spurred on by this egoistic ardor she began to develop a strong ambition both to excel in school and to conquer in such simple games as she played. In fact, she carried so far the passion to win out over the rest, that it interfered curiously with their comfort and her own.

The dream about her baby brother's death was followed, at no great interval, by another in which (presumably in obedience to a suppressed wish) she represented her mother as having died. This dream also, which, with some reason, it greatly annoyed her mother to hear told, became a source of torture to her conscience. But her conscience was as complex

in its workings as were her other tendencies, and in looking back at the incident and the events that followed it, she writes:

"Perhaps as an atonement for the sub-conscious crime of wishing evil I spurred myself on to renewed duty. I was as cruel to myself as if I had been striking my body with a lash. Also, I tried to be as hard with other people as I was on myself, which, of course, caused me to be rather disliked by my schoolmates. I did not understand why they felt that way, for I knew I had only kindly feelings toward them. I wanted them to do right, because if they did not do right they would suffer."

In the same letter she writes, further: "Punishment was always connected with wrong-doing. The reward of merit system was in full force in those days. The good child was rewarded and the bad child punished. The good child always obeyed his parents and other people in authority. I tried to please father in order to deserve his affection. I was anxious to please mother in order to win her love. Parents decided what was good for their children, and in our home at least there could be no appeal from that decision. It was shown to be our duty as children to give absolute obedience. Independence was impossible, and the way in which we eased our spirits from the undue pressure was to imitate our parents by striving to have authority over our schoolmates, through endeavoring to compel them to do the things which we called right. . . . The tendency to dominate other people, particularly my mates, soon caused me to be avoided. That, and the fact that I was kept in the house so much, to take care of my baby brother, made me a prey to loneliness. Then I began to imagine myself different from other children. A neighbor's child exactly my age, was doing very well with music. My progress

was compared with hers, the result being not at all to my credit. The lonelier I grew, and the more unhappy I felt, the more I clung to father. His love for me should be a comfort for all my disappointments.

"This tendency to lean on him increased year after year, so that when I was twelve years old his approval made me blissfully happy and his disapproval put me into an abyss of distress. I never seemed to feel real happiness apart from father. That was a dangerous state of affairs, of which father himself had no suspicion. But mother's eye was open to all those things. She was quite certain that father paid me altogether too much attention; in other words, she was jealous. No doubt I deserved reproof, but I believe that the more jealous she became the more she found fault with my behavior. However that may have been, it is unfortunate for any child to be tossed about between the conflicting emotions of its parents . . . I came by my own intense feelings most naturally, as can very well be seen.

"One day father sent me a heart-shaped valentine, made of white gauze, roses, and narrow blue ribbon. I thought my heart would burst with joy when I knew who sent this love token."

This tension was somewhat relieved, at one point, through another influence, equally objectionable, which she describes as follows:

"A religious revival moved the city to its depths¹. For two or three months during one winter nearly every one attended the meetings. They were well calculated to stir up almost every emotion of which a human being is capable. A great number of Bible subjects were introduced

¹ This lady's home was in a city in another part of the country, somewhat remote from Boston.

at the revival meetings. The bliss of Heaven and the tortures of hell were both pictured to the audience in vivid colors. It is not to be wondered at that a sensitive child, like myself, should suddenly begin to dream of the Last Judgment."

In this dream "the figure of Christ was floating high above me. For an instant I was uncertain whether I deserved to go to Him or not (cf. the ogre dream of childhood, above described). Would he receive me? The next moment a happy little soul went soaring heavenward."

There are many other features in the case to which attention might properly be called, but I refer only to one more which really deserves, in large measure, to be mentioned in connection with her father worship, and also as a part of her longing for domination. This is a tendency almost deserving the name of kleptomania, which showed itself slightly in earlier years, and again at a later period, although in fact the actual thefts, such as they were, occurred but a limited number of times in all. As a little girl she stole a pear from a fruit-dealer's, under the following conditions: It was at the time when the longing for domination was very strong in her, and to have the upper hand gave a kind of exultation. It was a form of excitement filled with fascination.

"Not far from my father's office there was a fruit store. Sometimes the owner stood in the doorway; sometimes he was half concealed in the darkness of the room. But wherever he might be he kept an eye on the fruit-stand in front of the store. Just because he was so afraid that something would be taken from him I longed to snatch a pear or an apple and dash out of sight before he could seize me. I did not want the fruit; I wanted to

'beat him at his own game.' He made me think of an ugly spider ready to spring on some one. I would take good care that he did not catch *me*. The right moment came. In a twinkling I was off with a pear; in another twinkling I had thrown my trophy away. At first I felt quite fine over my exploit. But then the New England conscience came into play . . . I never confessed the sin, however. But for a long time, whenever I passed that store, involuntarily I quickened my steps . . ."

The next event of this sort was when she and her brother exchanged car tickets, that they had given them to go to Sunday School, for candy from a confectionery store.

Finally, many years later,—in fact, within a comparatively recent period,—some much more important events of this kind occurred which should justly excite the interest of the student and which may justly be considered as throwing a new light on the otherwise trifling occurrences of her childhood. On three occasions, namely, she took a book from a second-hand book-store, and on several other occasions she picked up from a counter, with an impulse to carry them away (which, however, she did not allow to completely fulfil itself)—at one time a blue leather pocket-book, at another a doll's pocket-book of the size of a postage stamp, at another a bit of narrow baby lace, then a scrap of *filet* curtain lace, again, a white belt far too large for her, and finally some small pearl buttons similar to shoe buttons and also pale blue in color.

What was the cause of these impulses to theft? Certainly not any desire to keep or own the articles taken. For, in fact, none of them were of value to her, and all were returned except two of the three books. These she gave away to persons whom, for the grati-

fication of her own half recognized desires, she wished to think of as reading them and being impressed by them. Not only this, but she replaced each one of these books by one of her own which she considered of greater value.

It is worth while to go into the matter a little further, partly for its intrinsic interest in this case, partly because thieving of this general character represents tendencies which deserve far broader study than they commonly receive.

If I have succeeded in my intention I have made it clear that this patient was a person of very strong emotions, which did not lead her to either of the more satisfactory outlets of marriage and the establishment of a home, or to an active social life to which she could give her interests with a whole heart. She was like a stream partially dammed up and forced to find its exit outside its normal channel. As a young girl she had greatly wished, as I have said, to study music, and if this could have been made possible all might have been well. Another, analogous, opportunity for a satisfying occupation offered itself on her graduation from college; but this was rejected by her own cross-purpose tendencies, while the music she abandoned in obedience to her father's wish. That, to her, was law, and without consciously willing it her father strove to mould her life in accordance with his own desires. At one time she repelled a chance to marry, still under the control of the wish to make her father all in all, while at another period, when something of this sort might well have come to pass, she drew back from even the possibility, in consequence of a feeling to which he had given expression, that she ought to devote that period of her life to study.

Being the sort of person that she was, there was nothing left for her but to gain, through her fancy and

in a symbolic way, the gratification of her inhibited wishes¹.

If this tendency is clearly understood, the meaning of the thefts will readily be seen, even without an attempt to interpret them at length. The theft of the pear from the fruit-stand has already been explained in the patient's own words, as inspired by a desire for domination, to "get the better of some one," the wish to outwit somebody. The thefts of the books will be better understood if I say that she had a dream in which the patient represented herself as snatching and running away with some jewels belonging to her sister-in-law, and hiding them in a box in the basement of a house half demolished as if through a bomb. The analysis left no doubt that this expressed a desire (really felt but not consciously accepted) to appropriate her brother's children as born, or to be born, of herself. This sister-in-law was a person of dominating character, whom she felt to have stolen her brother from her, yet whom, in a sense, she feared. The evidence, which I have not space to indicate, showed that my patient longed to regain possession of her brother for herself (or, failing that, then his children), and this desire showed itself in indirect form just after the death of the man who, but for her father, might have been her lover.

The three books were taken after she had broken away from another male friend who was, in a sense, a lover (though she never could have married him) and who stood, in a measure, for her father—whom books always, pre-eminently, symbolized in her mind. All three of these books were—from the nature of their contents

¹ I am not prepared to assert that my patient's failures were due quite as exclusively to her absorption in her father as is here represented. But that the part played by this influence was very great is beyond a doubt.

—related directly or indirectly to her repressed wish to be identified with her father. The leather pocket-book was of a color of which he was extremely fond, and it appeared in several of her dreams. The doll's pocket-book, the narrow baby lace, and the *filet* curtain lace seem to have been taken under the impulse of longing for children of her own; and in fact, one of them had an association in her mind with a German story she had recently been reading, entitled "Lace." The heroine of this story had been given some lace by her lover as an engagement present.

Stated in this off-hand way, the explanations here offered may carry no conviction; but those who are familiar with the interpretation of dreams, and who realize that the thoughts expressed in dreams differ but little from the instinctive thoughts of daily life, will be more inclined to believe that they are true. The white belt, the small pearl buttons of pale blue color, would be accepted as the expression of other wishes in the same class if there were opportunity to present the evidence at length.

To summarize the teachings of this case, one might say that,—partly in consequence of ill health during childhood and adolescence, partly because of the unwisely stringent, emotionally stimulating training to which she was subjected, partly because of the failure on the part of her devoted parents to recognize her best needs,—this patient became like a person seeking for a hidden treasure that she had never seen, yet which she felt belonged to her, picturing it with her vivid fancy under a thousand forms no one of which corresponded to the truth.

The tendencies which she showed as regards her father and her mother were of a kind that has received much attention from psychoanalysis, and might be considered as constituting a fairly typical illustration of the psychological

situation to which the name of "Œdipus Complex" has been given.

But where one of these striking tendencies of early childhood (which occur even with normally developing children, though in a very transient and evanescent form) is as strongly marked as in this instance, it rarely if ever forms the only neurotic feature of the situation. There are four or five phases and a larger number of special tendencies, some or all of which are likely to stand out (in the course of the analysis) in greater or less measure.

I have not sought to bring out these other features of the case (although all of them would repay study), but I will mention the two principal ones, lest it should seem that I had overlooked them.

(1) There were distinct signs of an accentuation of the so-called "autoerotic" period of earliest childhood, and (2) equally distinct signs of the tendency to emphasize relationships with persons of her own sex familiar to every one under the name of "crushes," or as intense friendships. The latter tendency was especially marked in one rather overwhelming friendship that lasted nearly fifteen years, and the eventual rupture of this relationship, through a decided stand taken by my patient, was the token of a growing sense of independence and insight on her part.

It is also noteworthy that the patient's compensatory wish-fulfilment fantasies took on many curious and subtle forms. One of these consisted in the very frequent employment, in her dream life, of the number "three," or, rather, of the principle of triplification; as where three girls, dressed just alike and obviously representing a poly-plication, and thus an intensification, of certain wished-for qualities in herself, presented themselves at her side as helpers in a time of trouble.

Every one is aware that this tendency to triplification or—to use a more convenient though inaccurate terminology

—the use of “three” and its multiples, has played a larger part in the history of mystic thought than even the use of five or seven. Three is pre-eminently a sacred number, and its appearance in the “trinity” of Christian theology is only one instance out of a vast number. Usener’s book, “Die Dreiheit,” gives numerous examples of the tendency. In seeking for an explanation of this widespread custom, that careful author goes no further than the idea of intensification through an extended form of reduplication, the number three being considered as virtually equivalent to “indefinitely large.” I would only say, in supplementation of this idea, that there are strong and instinctive sex-notations to the number three and that these came into play in the case here considered. They relate partly to the family idea—father, mother, child (which is, of course, contained, amongst others, in the Trinity conception)—and also to other matters.

I have said that the effects of treatment, in this case, were eminently satisfactory. The patient feels that she has had a species of new birth. It should be added, however, that this result, while it would have been impossible without psychoanalytic aid, has been greatly furthered by congenial work and an increase of social intercourse of a good sort.

Chapter XX.

TWO CASES OF PSYCHOLEPSY† OF EMOTIONAL ORIGIN IN WHICH PSYCHOANALYSIS PROVED OF SERVICE IN INDUCING SOCIAL RE-ADJUSTMENT*.

It is important that all persons who are interested in the subject of epilepsy and its treatment should make themselves familiar with all the conditions which simulate epilepsy yet which are really of a different sort. This is especially important in view of the fact that these conditions are usually more amenable to treatment than true epilepsy is. But, for that matter, the pathogenesis of epilepsy itself is by no means so clear but that the study of these symptomatically similar conditions may throw light upon it, different in essential nature though they perhaps are; and, indeed, one circumstance that makes it particularly important to take the whole matter up again is that the recent researches into medical psychology have rendered it possible to look at both of these conditions from a new and very important angle.

The first case is that of a lady, fifty-two years old, who consulted me eight years ago for the following

† A large number of conditions have been brought together under the heading of *psycholepsy*, amongst which these cases can properly be classed. Janet has described a number of these in his book, "Les Obsessions et la Psychasthénie." Others were recorded by Dr. George A. Waterman and myself in the *Boston Med. and Surg. Jr.*, 1905, Vol. CLII, p. 509, and still others by Dr. Wm. G. Spiller in the *Jr. Nerv. and Ment. Disease*, 1907, Vol. 34, p. 411. It seems unnecessary to bring the bibliography up to date.

* Published in *American Medicine*, February, 1918.

symptoms, which had been present for three years—that is to say, since she was forty-one years old. Her main trouble was that she was liable, under certain circumstances, to a sudden loss of automatic and voluntary control over her muscles, so that her head would fall upon her chest, her eyes close, her lower jaw drop, and frequently her whole body collapse in a heap upon the floor. The duration of these attacks varied from one to three or five minutes, but they would be shortened if some one took hold of her by the hand, thus giving her a sense of protection and support¹. Sometimes, instead of falling to the ground she could guide herself to a chair, but even then there was almost complete relaxation of the muscles of the trunk and limbs. Indeed, further investigations, which were made repeatedly and carefully by myself and verified by a colleague, showed that both the knee-jerk and the pupillary light reflex would instantly disappear when this relaxation came on, both phenomena returning gradually as the attack passed off. At the time I saw the patient she was liable to have several such attacks as these a day, but the number varied greatly according to the conditions of her environment. Thus, anybody who could induce in her a fit of laughing—to which she was easily moved—could throw her into an attack at once. This happened often, and it was noteworthy that a jocose remark by her brother (with whom she lived alone, and whose sense of humor was acute) was especially apt to have this effect upon her. One is reminded of the very severe results induced by tickling—especially with certain persons, at the hands of special tormentors—and also of extreme muscular relaxation that sometimes attends prolonged fits of laughing ("die of

¹ Perhaps vaguely reminiscent of a special form of protection and support which she had craved so long (see below) and which had been hers in childhood.

laughing"). The analogy of these phenomena with those here recorded is indeed closer than one might think (see below) because in both cases there is probably a personal "abandonment," of hysterical character, which has a deep emotional and even sensuous root. A tendency is also occasionally noticed, especially among children, as a true epileptic symptom, to "catch the breath" and even to lose consciousness altogether under conditions of excitement.

My patient's attacks generally occurred indoors, but sometimes, also, on the street, though never unless she was startled, as happened once when she was accosted by a friend coming up unexpectedly from behind. The result, under these conditions, was strangely disproportionate to the manifest or apparent cause, suggesting former situations when to be surprised by someone coming unexpectedly would have been annoying and distressing. As time went on, these seizures tended to occur somewhat independently of the special causations that had appeared necessary at first, though scarcely ever except on the basis of some emotion, which might be of a trivial sort but which always, or nearly always, was induced suddenly, and ostensibly through some other person. Occasionally they would come on when she was alone, but then apparently in consequence of a thought which would connect her with a person. The further study of the history showed, indeed, that, from the psychologic standpoint, these attacks implied a peculiar longing for a personal relationship, the type of which was illustrated by a special series of experiences spread over a considerable number of years. In other words, the case seemed to be one of hysteria.

I did not, however, allow myself, at first, to accept this diagnosis, especially in view of the loss of knee-jerk and pupillary-reflex¹ during the attacks and of the fact

¹ The observations of late years have shown that these reflexes may fail in hysteria, as is, indeed, well known.

that the patient was usually unable to speak at these times, so that it was difficult to be convinced that consciousness was not lost, or at least modified, for a brief space, in spite of her opinion to the contrary.

Another symptom from which the patient suffered, at about the same period with these psycholeptic seizures, was an extreme tendency to drowsiness, which might cause her to fall asleep at any hour of the day, provided she sat quietly in a chair, either with or without a book, and almost invariably made her drop off when riding in a train. Sometimes, indeed, she would fall asleep at table. This tendency also has been observed a number of times in what is called true epilepsy. The same symptom is met with, to some extent, in myxedema; but a careful examination failed to show other signs of this disorder in the case of my patient, nor did the thyroid treatment, which I instituted, have any effect in checking any of her symptoms.

A good many of her seizures occurred in my office, and I learned to detect their approach by a peculiar drawling which came in her speech, and by the dropping of the corners of the mouth and half closure of the eyelids, as happens with persons struggling against drowsiness. When these symptoms appeared I could sometimes help her to cut short the approaching attack.

One more symptom should be noticed, which I found later to be of considerable significance,—namely, a distressing set of feelings in the legs, not localized and not invariably associated with the attacks or with the loss of strength. These feelings she concluded to be of sensuous origin, and this conclusion helped to bring the true nature of her whole illness clearly before her mind.

As regards her personal history, I found, on careful inquiry, that this lady, although ostensibly gay, really had a streak of profound sadness in her disposition, and that

she looked back upon her childhood, which in all outward respects had been a very happy one, as a period of great inward unhappiness. The environmental conditions had been favorable, her parents were judicious and affectionate, and she cherished a great affection for them—which, perhaps, in the case of her father, was too strong for her own good. The essential point was that she was overcome by passionate longings, which she repressed without understanding their meaning; and it may perhaps be reckoned as an indirect sign of this that the mysteries of nature, especially strong winds, had a remarkable influence in bringing on a strong sense of fear and gloom.

I must abbreviate the history leading up to the psycholeptic seizures (which was gradually brought out through many interviews) and say, in the first place, that these repressed longings found a temporary expression in a prolonged homosexual friendship with a young girl of her own age, when both were in their adolescence, and later in a long, absorbing, and, in its results, a tragic relationship with a much older and married, man, an old family friend, who took advantage of his position to induce in her, through constant and, one might justly say, villainous and heartless repetitions of a sort of personal attention which he understood well how to use for his own pleasure, an almost complete subordination to his selfish will. These attentions—which, so far as her state of mind was concerned, had all the evil effect of a seduction—went on through many years,—for a period, indeed, which began in her childhood and continued until circumstances broke them off, somewhat abruptly, not long before the attacks above recorded first appeared—leaving her mind emotionally void, except for family anxieties. These were prolonged and pressing and contributed indirectly to her illness, in general and in special ways.

I have recently studied at considerable length the case of another patient, who, in a series of recurrent dreams which began in childhood, imagined herself pursued and finally falling in a species of abandonment at the feet of her pursuer. The study of the case now under consideration made it clear that the attacks of muscular collapse here studied were virtually of the same nature, and that their continuance served to keep alive a sort of organic memory of a series of events by which her emotions were overpowered and her chances for happiness through the establishment of a new home were swept away. The situation was made worse by the fact that the patient's brother, to whom she was devotedly attached, was for many years a drunkard and a source of terrible anxiety, which was all the more intense from the fact that she felt obliged to conceal it from her friends. Many a time she has stood with trembling limbs, waiting for him to return in the middle of the night, and prepared almost to "faint away" in anticipation of what she was to see.

Again, her father, to whom she was so much attached, was a man of fine and strong character, but probably not unlike herself in temperament, though with chances for self-expression and sublimation which had been denied to her. She took him in many respects as a model for herself, and was consumed with fear lest he should suspect what was passing in her mind. She believes, however, that had he not been able to turn his passions into work, it might easily have happened that they would have consumed him as they did her, or found expression in some subtle symbolism.

The patient's dreams deserve careful study, and so, too, do certain other temperamental symptoms, from which I will select the following:

There seems little reason to doubt that the sort of anxious sadness, accompanied with a causeless sense of

distress, that marked her earlier years, was a species of anxiety hysteria. She recalls, indeed, that even in the cradle the rolling of her head from side to side¹ gave her a passionate excitement. Crowds affected her strangely and unpleasantly, so that she had to go away from them —a hint at the strong, one might say electric, nature of the personal bonds that established themselves so readily between her and others. I have spoken of the strong impression made on her by storms and wind, and will add that the same was true of death, and indeed everything that savored of mystery and fear. She recalls that after a severe snowstorm, when she was a little girl, on an occasion when her brother was sent to bring her home from school in a sleigh, she was overcome by terror lest she should not be able to get into the house². She was subject to night-palsies, so that on waking she would be unable to move. There can be little doubt that these, too, contained an erotic element which lay in wait for her under many circumstances and gave a special color to many forms of excitement, as it did to the rolling of her head in the cradle. In frequent nightmares she would feel as if some animal or vaguely defined person were trying to climb on to her bed. Until eight or ten years old she suffered from incontinence of urine, and would sometimes dream of the dripping of water from the faucet that she was not able to control³. In later years she dreamed occasionally of her attacks, which is rather rare; but in these dreams there were people around who would protect her, just as in reality she longed for someone to touch her and bring the spell to an end, or, again, just

¹ A form of muscle eroticism characteristic of early childhood.

² These fears, like that of crowds, were, of course, "phobic" in their nature.

³ Cf. Hug-Hellmuth, *Aus dem Seelenleben des Kindes*. Soon to be had in English translation.

as one might suppose that Andromeda and Brunhild longed, after their fashion, for some young protector to release them. For my patient, however, there was no satisfying joy; only desire, not to be appeased, but still to be endured better when understood and faced. In one of her many dreams she seemed to see a team of horses, strong and vigorous, trying to drive into the entry of her house, while she denied them entrance. This tells, after a fashion, the story of her life.

I have said that this patient was fifty-two years old when she first came to me for treatment. She lived out of town and could not attend with regularity, and, in spite of being intelligent, her temperament was not such as to make the case an easy one for treatment. Nevertheless, she improved considerably, and her attacks lost their worst features. If her life had had more outlets of a congenial sort she might perhaps have lost them all.

The second case of which I wish to speak is that of a young man of about twenty-seven years of age, of fine training and intelligence, who suffered from singular fainting attacks that occurred whenever he was called upon to come prominently before others, especially other people of his own sex and older than himself,—that is, of an age to excite especial deference. His brother had suffered from similar attacks under like circumstances, and neurotic symptoms of an analogous, though not the same, sort had been present in the case of one or more male relatives on the father's side.

No real difficulty in differential diagnosis between this condition and true epilepsy might ever have arisen, especially if all the conditions had been taken into consideration. Cases of fainting do occur, however, where the diagnostic difficulty is great, and on that account it is worth calling attention to the fact that this young man, in spite of his intelligence, suffered greatly from an over-

whelming sense of self-abasement, attended by a longing for the affection and protection of those who stood toward him in a position of authority. Such persons were generally of his own sex, and the longing which he showed for their affection and protection, attended as it was with lack of confidence in himself, showed itself likewise in the recognition of a strong attraction toward younger boys, with reference to whom he in his turn could assume the attitude of protector.

Dreams bore out, in an interesting way, the evidence given by his waking experiences, and showed, moreover, more strongly than one would have otherwise been led to believe, that although manly and courageous in his principles he found himself forced to struggle against a species of effeminacy, partly based on an inadequately defined sex-development in early years. The fainting attacks were so frequent and so serious, at one time, that they bade fair to mar, if not wreck, a promising career. But under an analytic treatment of no great duration a satisfactory improvement occurred all along the line, and it is fair to anticipate that he will meet with a success reasonably commensurate with his abilities, which are above the average. Thoroughgoing recognition of his handicaps, on the one hand, and an emphasis on social obligations and interests of all sorts, small and large, are likely to prove, in the future, as they have during the treatment, the main factors in his progress.

Chapter XXI.

THE INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN SYMBOLISMS*.

I have had the opportunity, during the past few years, to study carefully the case of an unmarried lady, about fifty years of age, a portion of whose history I have recently recorded elsewhere¹. She was the oldest child of hard-working New England parents, typically high-minded, studious, intelligent, and strongly "religious" in their habits and traditions. The other children were two brothers, one of whom had died a good many years before I knew the patient, as had her father also, who played a part of immense importance for the development of her character and temperament. Not long before her coming to me, her mother had likewise passed away, leaving her alone except for her younger brother, who was married and had two children. As a young girl and throughout her adolescence this patient lived in a mental atmosphere strongly charged with ideas of "duty and sin," "sin and duty," to such an extent that it became very hard for her to follow her natural instincts—which were (I now believe) those of an affectionate, lively, sociable, pleasure-loving, rather imaginative person, with emotional tendencies which were in part of a somewhat immature type. Everything that, as a child, she did or abstained from doing was done or abstained from intensely, and in conscious obedience to orders—which, although kindly meant, were often ill-chosen as regards her best development—and the emotional reactions that attended her efforts at conformity were marked

* Published in the *Psychoanalytic Review*, April, 1918.

¹ *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, June, 1907.

by strong repressions. Ill health in childhood, and other influences (narrow parental views on the subject of amusement, etc.) made her outward life a very restricted one, with but few of the outlets in the form of play that are of such immense importance for the growing child; and she became, in consequence, rather petulant, precocious, introvertive, self-assertive, with strong, largely unconscious longings, the nature of which it has become possible to investigate. But, hand in hand with these qualities, there went also fine, generous traits, with marked powers of self-denial and self-devotion, together with literary capacities which only needed adequate development to become excellent.

To complete this brief outline of her outward life, I will say that she went eventually to college, sacrificing in so doing—for the sake of conformity to the wishes of her father, to whom she was passionately attached—a desire to study music, for which she had some talent. Repressed, misunderstood and unacknowledged cravings, distressing conflicts, conscious struggles against bodily weaknesses (dependent, in part, on definable disturbances of metabolism¹), marked her college life. Although seeming a normal, if rather feeble person, she suffered, in silence, from typical compulsive tendencies, from a singular habit of doing and saying the wrong thing at critical moments, and from sundry other peculiarities, hostile to her peace and indicative of an un-free, more or less dissociated personality. In spite of these handicaps she was able to teach successfully during several years after graduation, and eventually to devote much time and energy to the care of her mother, with whom, however, she never felt thoroughly in sympathy and from whom she did not receive—so she believes—the genuine affection that was a daughter's due. Painfully

¹ She had a mild but troublesome Graves' disease, which necessitated constant treatment.

conscious of this lack, and given to exaggerated estimates based on undue sensitiveness, she felt her emotional life checked and starved; and although her intense love for her father and her brothers (thoroughly disinterested in part, if partly the expression of a personal craving) compensated, in some measure, for the unsatisfactoriness of her relations to her mother, and became, presumably, itself intensified thereby, yet the net result was an increasing tendency to self-imposed social isolation and morbid introspection. Fortunately, her intelligence, good feeling, and good sense, though worsted temporarily in these inner struggles, retained their elasticity, and the results of treatment were eminently satisfactory.

I have no intention of describing the course of the analysis as a whole, but only of discussing certain selected symbolisms of the patient's dreams. The justification for doing this lies mainly in the intrinsic interest of these symbolisms in themselves, partly in other considerations which will appear.

Since first attempting to describe these symbolisms and their meaning (now a number of months ago), my feeling about them and about the problems which the thought of them suggested has undergone a considerable change. In the beginning scientific curiosity was my main motive, and the symbols stood for nothing more than pointers to erotic traits which repression had concealed. As I began to write, however, with this idea in view, I felt that I was in the way of giving a one-sided impression of this patient in dwelling so strongly on these infantile tendencies that seemed so strikingly at variance with her other qualities.

Wishing, as she did, to make her experience, even if painful, of use to others and to the cause of science, the patient was ready enough to see emphasis thrown, if that seemed necessary, on the erotic, pleasure-loving,

individualistic side of her character, which had grown luxuriantly in the dark, although occupying for the most part a compartment by itself¹. Also, moved by the same feelings, she was inclined to assert that even the tendencies which had seemed altruistic—her very genuine love for her father and her "religious" habits of thought—had been utilized by her as fuel for the flame of her repressed erotic fancies; and I was content, at first, to accept her view without much mental comment. The patient had written out (see below) some interesting associations connected with the idea of "air" as a creative agent, which had been aroused by the reading of Freud's "Leonardo²," where the legend is recalled of the vultures impregnated by the wind, and had embodied in them some striking memories of her early, Bible-reading days, and various thoughts that connected these memories with her father and her brother and brought to light the ardor of her love for them.

But, more and more, as I thought the matter over, I began to ask myself whether this attitude was justified, and spent much thought over the old problem, what "religion" is, and whether it has any standing in its own right as a real source of motives, or must be considered solely as the "projection" of a "wish-fantasy," and what the bearing is of these questions on the significance of symbolism and of dreams. A similar set of inquiries arose with reference to the possible relationship between the evident philosophical and logical properties of the symbol "three"³ and its equally evident erotic meanings. Here, again, I may say that the patient, although amply able,

¹ It goes without saying that these tendencies permeated, in some measure, her whole mental life.

² English translation published by Moffat, Yard & Co., New York.

³ See below.

by virtue of ability and inclination, to deal with logical and philosophical situations, was quite willing, at first, to minimize the more abstruse meanings of the symbol "three" as having anything to do with her choice of it as a mode of expression, and to accept the erotic associations as alone of causal value.

But as time went on I came to regard her readiness to adopt the purely erotic or "infantile-fixation" explanation, as a "symptom," and became persuaded, for myself, that certain ideas which I had for a long time entertained, but had laid aside as perhaps of little service in connection with strictly psychoanalytic work, were, after all, of practical significance for the understanding of this case.

So far as these ideas can profitably be formulated at this point, they are as follows: No wish—not even a dream wish of infantile type, that could not express itself adequately in words or even in symbols—can be entertained as if it stood for itself alone. Every wish implies a wisher, and a wisher with a personality that thrills with self-foreshadowing possibilities of adjustment to planes of development not yet clearly visible to him but determined by the fact that he is a member of a group, and a group of such a sort that its boundaries tend to widen the more he may strive to define its limits. In fact, every special group tends to dissolve into the immaterial something that corresponds to the purposes for which it came into existence and others which were implied in them. These possibilities of development tend to form a theoretically discoverable background of association for the symbols in which each wish is clothed; and if one were bent on tracing out all the thought-experiences as well as the act-experiences¹ from which a given symbol derives its connotative meanings, it would be as important to dis-

¹ In fact, the difference between the two is mainly nominal.

cover and define these foreshadowings¹ of possible adaptations to actual and ideal relationships as it is to discover and define the buried experiences of early childhood that linger in the form of nearly useless, or even harmful, sensuous, pleasure-giving cravings of sorts familiar to all students of psychoanalysis.

In a former paper² I likened these latter cravings (unwelcomed and unacknowledged by consciousness) to unwelcome and unacknowledged infants whom their

¹ Every man's possibilities of development are far more truly a part of him at any and every given moment than he would be inclined to admit.

"And like a pilgrim who is travelling on a road where he hath never been before, who believes that every house which he sees from afar is the hostel, and finding that it is not directs his belief to another, and so from house to house until he comes to the hostel; even so our soul, so soon as it enters upon the new and never-yet-made journey of life, directs its eyes to the goal of its supreme good, and therefore whatever it sees that appears to have some good in it, it thinks to be it. And because its knowledge is at first imperfect, through having no experience or instruction, little goods appear great to it; and therefore it begins first from them in its longing. And so we see little children intensely longing for an apple, and then going on further, longing for a little bird, and then further on longing for fine clothes, and then a horse, and then a mistress, and then wealth, but not much, then much and then enormous. And this comes to pass because in none of these things does he find that *for which he is ever searching*, but believes he will find it further on." — Dante Alighieri: *The Convivio*, Fourth Treatise, Chap. XII, 1, 146.

Every person is, in short, not only the product of theoretically definable experiences; he is also and of necessity a *searcher*, and the undefined objects of his search (which are by no means covered by motives definable as *libido*) exist in a measure as determinants of his course. After a time every one's "issues" define themselves as moral issues, as obligations, and a psychoanalytic investigation, for physician as well as for patient, is not solely an affair of reason but also an affair of morals. And the same is true of the mind itself.

² *Imago*, B. I; reply to criticism by Dr. Ferenczi.

parents gladly would suppress and if possible forget, and the former (the not yet thought-out thoughts and feelings) to children unborn but dreaded as sources of unmeasurable responsibility. As I have said, I had laid aside these conceptions as perhaps likely to distract my attention from the study of the infantile fantasies and fixations to which it seemed so important, as it is so difficult, to do justice. For many situations, and in the case of many patients, as where the main problem is the discovery of fairly well defined causes of specific phobias, it does indeed appear unnecessary to deal much, if at all, with considerations relating to the "whole meaning"¹ or possibilities of development, or "aspirations" of the individual as a whole. In other cases, however, of which the present is an example, this is, I think, not true. In spite of her willingness to admit the contrary, this lady has exhibited, in increasing degree, social-sublimation longings and religious longings² not wholly traceable to metamorphosed libido-strivings. This proposition is only the expression of my opinion, and it would doubtless command more ready acceptance if it could be clearly shown that a man's mental growth is not wholly dependent on a *vis a tergo*, that is, not wholly a product of biologic evolution—a process of adjustment to a "given" physical environment (and eventually a mental environment though conceived of as an outgrowth of the physical)—but an attempt on the part of a really spontaneous and creative being to "find itself" in a self-creating universe of which it is a representative member. Of course, evolution as a whole would represent such an "attempt" on a large scale, and my argument would imply that the "energetic" something which underlies evolution, contains and uses, at each

¹ Cf. Josiah Royce's use of this term in various publications.

² That is, desire to play a part in social betterments, taking, on the one hand, a practical, on the other hand, an idealized form.

moment, an impulse of which human volition is the example most clearly evident to us.

Even if this proposition cannot be substantiated, however—though I believe it can be—and even if the universe is built and “works out” its destiny on some such principle as is operative in the conversion of so much heat into so much motion, it would still be necessary to reason *as if* there were such a thing as self-determination permeating and in part accounting for men’s thoughts and acts. And so, too, it would be *as if* no “wish” was ever wholly “regressive” but always of such a sort as to acknowledge tacitly the existence of social and so “moral” obligations, even in an ideal sense.

But I pass on to the actual symbolisms that are to be considered, and begin with one of which the chief interest lies in its power to illustrate afresh how oddly and unexpectedly the influences act which have their main root in the erotic constituent of our unconscious wishes.

When this patient was at college, namely, her handwriting provoked comment from one of her professors, who noticed a marked tendency on her part to finish off her letters—more especially the capital letters—with elaborately long, full and rounding curves.

This peculiarity of handwriting is of a sufficiently familiar type, and various causes, amongst which a general expansiveness of temperament would figure, might be brought forward to account for it. Its principal interest lies in the fact that it had (in her estimation) a partial origin in an anal erotism which, in its turn, is of significance as being one of several signs of an autoerotic tendency which played, indirectly, an important part in the building of her temperament.

This fondness for full, rounding curves showed itself, not alone in the handwriting but in various ways, at different periods of her childhood, and one evidence of

it was a marked fondness for pitchers with rounding sides, the first of which was given her by a cousin when she was but a small child, and soon afterwards broken, to her intense distress. The circumstance was trivial enough, and there would seem to be no reason for going beyond the obvious fact of a real esthetic fancy, to account for it, or for the further fact that when she was about nine years old, and first took drawing lessons, her fancy for pitchers and vases with "full, rounded sides" became almost an obsession. It is, however, of scientific interest, in view of what we know of the effect of early childhood experiences of erotic sorts, in helping to explain mental tendencies far more important than the insignificant ones here at stake, to note that these memories connected themselves with another that took her back to her third or fourth year. At that period her father took her for her first visit to the real country, which—full of eager receptivity as she was, both for things of the senses and things of the spirit—greatly aroused her interest.

"One morning we started out to walk across the fields, but I did not walk—rather I skipped by his (her father's) side for pure joy. The blue sky, the fleecy clouds, the green grass and frolicking lambs, all told of the coming of spring....

"I noticed some little specks on the grass. Of course I had to ask what they were. When I heard that they were the droppings of the lambs I became quite excited. After that I observed the habits of all animals. Being in the country gave me ample opportunity for such studies. The horse, the cow, the dog, the cat, and the pigs in the pig-sty fascinated me and started up a series of 'whys' within my inquiring mind. At the farm where I was staying the pig-sty was next to an old-fashioned 'privy.' It was built very loosely; there were big cracks between the boards.

Whenever I was taken to that place, I had a good chance to notice the pigs, because they were visible through the cracks. I could see pink noses poked between the boards. I could hear grunting and squealing. I had a feeling of terror; I thought the pigs wanted to eat me. I was thankful that the hole in my own special little seat was very small, so that I could not fall through it and be devoured. Of course I was in no danger, but I was always fearful of a mishap. Some older person had charge of me, so I was perfectly safe. On our return to the house we would stop to look at the pigs. I enjoyed the sight of their little curly tails; I wondered why pigs had them and people did not. 'Oh, God made them so;—that was the invariable answer to my question.'

With her present memory of these events, she believes that there was an unconscious bond of erotic interest—to, which her emotional nature predisposed her, even before her visit to the country with her father—between her fancy for curving letter-appendages, her fondness for curving pitchers (and similar objects having an even more potent and private interest), and finally, her excitement, when three years old, over the pig-sty discoveries with their obvious connotations. And so, insignificant in itself, the experience acquires the interest of a typical experience. The pig-sty fascination stood for a dim and varied host of sensuous fascinations, of sorts which could be partly named, and which connected a certain phase of infancy (when the patient's active fancy worked on materials already tabooed) with another and esthetic phase, looking toward the future and seeking instinctively to utilize the sensuousness of infancy as an element in its own development. Men undertake to read temperament through a study of the handwriting, and, crude though this branch of science is, it doubtless has a certain standing. But if it ever

develops further, or in proportion as it does so, this will happen in part through the medium of observations of the general type of those here given. For it is largely emotion—and if emotion, then pre-eminently, those forms of emotion that hint at sensuously colored experiences of kinds now prohibited—which give, perhaps not the main impulse through which customs and habits are determined, but an impulse which is of peculiar importance for a double reason: namely, partly because its appeal is strong and subtle, partly because it is withdrawn from supervision. What happened here in the case of handwriting is liable to happen, and must happen, in the case of many other customs that are more vitally important. The fact that the esthetic interest was also real made it of more service as a means of exciting a sensuous, non-esthetic, fancy (deeply founded as all anal complexes are bound to be); and the reverse was likewise true.

"The original little brown pitcher had a fat little body, with curves just like those of a pig's back. The handle of the pitcher was like a curly tail. A fat pig and a fat pitcher were linked in thought subconsciously. An interest in art became a very easy matter when founded upon such a love of curves. . . . In adding tails to letters, I was renewing a delight of early childhood, a delight dating back to my third year and to surprises at the farm. Evidently a certain chain of association lingered in my thought. In writing a paragraph of whatever nature, I felt a distinct dissatisfaction if certain letters were left tailless. My mind refused to rest until I had looked back over the work and had added all the missing tails. An internal compulsion made me do this."

The "internal compulsion" of which this patient speaks was, however, a compulsion not only to gratify a sensuous impulse of self-indulgence, but to utilize in this gratification

a habit dedicated in its own right to another purpose of greater social value; and in yielding to the temptation to do this the patient was, on a small scale and with reference to a trivial matter, both denying for the moment the sense of obligation to this social allegiance and also, by that very act, admitting its binding force. It will appear more clearly in the discussion of the other symbolisms referred to in this paper, how important this double process is for the daily life of every man. For every one has, not the right only, but the duty and the instinct, both to strive for a broader, more adequate expression of his best aims as a member of society, and also, in doing this, to utilize in the best way his emotional and sensuous endowment—that part of him which, with more gifted persons, might express itself in poetry, in music, or in art of fine sorts. In accomplishing this task the danger is continuously present that he may prostitute his best desires to the chance of reinforcing, to the point of excess, these emotional and sensuous elements in his nature, instead of utilizing the latter to enrich the former. That is, he may sensualize and sexualize his religion and his best forms of love. But those motives, which he dimly feels to be bonds of relationship with the community and the universe at its best, still remain as possible sources of rehabilitation and progress. And whatever one may say of so doing as a practical proposition, it is theoretically within the right and duty of every physician to see that his patients realize the significance of both terms of this conflict, or antithesis. Willing and wishing to sympathize with others who follow the less good paths in these respects and find themselves driven helplessly before the gusts of passion, we are bound to observe carefully the less obvious successes and failures that are taking place before our eyes. Every one does this on a small scale, and one hears (as described in biographical and romantic

literature) the praises of those who succeed and the criticisms of those who fail. A great many successes and failures are, however, deeply hidden from superficial view, and it is only through searching methods of psychoanalytic investigation that they are brought to light.

I have next to say something about certain symbolisms related to *muscular* or *movement-erotism*. The remarks will best be grouped about certain recurrent dreams, of which I will briefly report two. The muscular feelings of excitement or relaxation here referred to pass over without a break into those related to respiratory, or air-erotism, and also to the father-complex, as well as to the domination and inferiority complexes; from which points one can travel as much further as one will.

Ogre dream, of frequent occurrence in childhood:

"I see myself wandering through an empty house. Suddenly a dreadful ogre rushes out from one of the rooms and pursues me. Without wings I seem to go up stairs and yet not touch them with my feet. I hide in dark closets to escape the ogre. Then I hear him coming and I hurry on in the greatest fear. Now I am far in advance, now he almost grasps me. Then when I have reached the last gasp, one of two things happens; either the roof opens and I float out heavenward in relief and joy, or else I fall to the floor in a little heap of exhausted despair. At that instant the ogre disappears."

This dream, familiar in type, gains in interest when taken in connection with the next.

"My mother, my sister, and myself are living in a fine old-fashioned mansion. It is light and airy, having many windows. The lovely white-enamel wood-work delights me, but there is no furniture in the rooms. They are absolutely bare. The house stands in the midst of a beautiful park where magnificent oaks are so close together that a bird's-eye view of their tops would show a carpet

of green. I seem to see myself high in the air enjoying such a view. In fact, during the first few moments of the dream, I am outside of the house looking at it and finding pleasure in its beauties and the charm of its situation. My mother and sister¹ are in an inner room of this big square mansion. While dreaming I am conscious that they also represent myself. Then I am in the house with them. Without warning there comes, from within me, a sensation as of some force active there. In an instant it is outside of and in pursuit of me. Beginning like a gentle breeze, it increases until it has the strength of a hurricane which nothing can withstand. To escape its power I run into a hall, and bolt behind me three doors there. I have shut my mother and sister in with that 'dreadful something'! But no: it cannot be confined. It passes through the bolted doors to my side of them. Then the 'force' is no longer simply a force, but it becomes a person with a purpose. I rush out into the park. My feet leave the ground. With a superhuman effort I make my way in the air to the tree-tops where I walk along on the huge boughs from tree to tree, trying to conceal myself beneath, or behind the foliage. I look for the pursuer. There he is below me — he is likewise looking for me. It is a man on horseback. The horse is high-spirited, is turning in circles, and his head is held erect by the rider's firm grasp on the short reins. The horse cannot throw that man. I watch them with interest. Then I find myself awake."

This dream opens up a number of problems which I pass by. Its momentary interest centers in the breeze-like force, felt at first within herself, then outside, and eventually assuming the characteristics of her father, who

¹ Cf. Stekel: *Über den Traum*. I do not, however, fully agree with the author in his view, held at the time of publication of this valuable work (*g. v.*), that these sensuous symbolisms represent sensuality alone. Reasons for a broader view are here presented.

was positively identified by her as the person on horseback upon whom she gazed with admiration. The father here corresponds in part to the creative yearnings which were so strong in her, and of which he was at once the (acquired) object and the symbolic expression. Such a child is like a person who has drunk of the love-philter, and whose need to give and feel love transcends any of the special forms and outlets that are found for it in the course of evolutionary history. But what is, in the last analysis, the nature and source of this need to give and feel love, which is so deeply founded in every human being? Is it solely of evolutionary origin, and does it exist solely in the interest of the budding sex-life which is soon to play so important a rôle? The study of man's social history and instincts and of his unconquerable, unappeasable idealism contradicts this view. If behind the father-, or mother-love there lie, on one side, the individualistic, sensuous needs of the child, it is equally true that beyond the father, in the other direction, there lies a dim recognition of that for which "fatherhood" stands, in an ideal sense. But, to get this in its full form, the child must go beyond his experience, and get an inkling of the possibilities of development or "complete meaning" of his own mind and personality. "Alles vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis." The father as person—deeply and sensuously loved as such, it may be—is "vergänglich" in this sense, but points to ideal possibilities of desire which are not thus "vergänglich."

This seems to me worth saying, because too much is sometimes made of the "father-love," or "father-complex" as standing as a model, or serving as a category, for so much else that happens later; as determining, for example, both the form and substance of the religious attitude, define it as one may. The argument is true, but not the whole truth. So far-reaching—in a sense, so all-embracing

—an emotion like that of love, which appeals so strongly to sensuous, personal desires, upon the one side, and upon the other to a rational disinterestedness of the highest type, in which personal claims and wishes become merged in social claims and wishes, cannot profitably be defined from any single standpoint. For human nature, like the universe, has its deep, unresolvable paradoxes, such as those which appear when one deals with such conceptions and contrasts as "body and mind," "substance and essence," "the many and the one," and which imply the existence of two real poles—real in their separateness and equally real in their essential unity—as real and as mutually essential as the polarities in electricity.

The strongly socialized, idealized forms of love do not exist simply as branchings-out of anything that could be thought of as a sexual *libido*. They exist also as in their own right, and while they are interpenetrated with *libido*, in Freud's sense, the truer statement is that both are expressions of an everywhere operative, self-active, creative energy.

So, too, while the religious feelings (take them as one will), between which and the feelings of love close affinities exist, must have their sensuous and erotic leanings (for this is only tantamount to saying that they have an evolutionary history), it is also true that sensuous feelings often have their religious leanings, and may, if rightly used, enrich by their presence the fineness of the religious feelings. By "religious feelings," in this sense, I mean the feelings based on the recognition of the transcendent, self-active element in ourselves and in the life outside¹, by

¹ It is obvious that the views here presented are related, in certain of their trends, to opinions which others,—notably Jung, and in some respects Adler,—have expressed, though still more to another's, here unnamed.

It should however, be said that Adler's (and Nietzsche's) doctrines, while they imply the underlying sociality of man's instincts

virtue of which men are able to preserve their independence and yet to merge their desires in efforts and wishes for the welfare of the community in the widest sense.

Nevertheless, it is certainly true that the principal gain or satisfaction, instinctively sought, and won, by my patient, through these fancies, was of a sensuous, erotic character, as the following remarks will show:

"The Bible," she writes, "was familiar to me from the very beginning of my own personal history. At home we had family prayers every day, and all the children read Bible-verses. The description of the creation was fascinating in the extreme. My imagination pictured each detail.

"'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form and void . . .'

"I wondered how the earth could *take on form*, then I learned that God could create something out of nothing—at least that was the way I interpreted what was told me.

"In Matthew xix, 26, we read:

as a basis for his instinctive self-assertion, do not accord to the larger conception its due place. "Dominance" is not the best foundation for an ideal society.

Also, as regards Jung, while I sympathize with his recognition of the parental-complex as not wholly covered by the sensuous element contained in it and as based partly on a "religious" instinct, which Freud would consider as due to fantasy alone (cf. his "Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung," English trans. No. 25, Nerv. Ment. Dis. Mon. Series), yet I think that Jung fails in almost discarding the sensuous, and especially the infantile sensuous elements altogether. Nor does he, I think, note that the sensuous owes its intensification, in part, to the recognition, and at the same time the defiant setting at naught, of the more spiritual obligations.

“But Jesus beheld them and said unto them, With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.’

“So I believed that God could do anything. Among many questions which demanded an answer, were these important ones: Where did little brother come from? Ans. From heaven. Who made him? Ans. God created him. Did God make me? Ans. Yes, God made you; God made you and—and gave you to us. This reasoning caused me to think that only one thing was necessary to bring a little child into the world. That one thing was a fiat of the Almighty. God had said: ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light. Now He might say: ‘Let there be a child,’ and there would be a child. The simplicity of this was awe-inspiring, but did not wholly satisfy curiosity. I wanted to know the *how* of everything. I bent over my Bible again. ‘And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.’ (Genesis i, 2.) To me it seemed that not only did the Spirit move, but the waters moved also, because He hovered over them. I think the story of the pool of Bethesda had something to do with this idea:

“In these (five porches) lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, *waiting for the moving of* the water. . . . For an angel went down at a certain season into the pool and troubled the water. Whosoever then first after the troubling of the water stepped in was made whole of whatsoever disease he had.’

“That person had a new lease of life. Therefore, in one sense, healing can be considered a creative act. But I was not so much concerned about the healing as about the moving of the water. I pictured the Spirit of God as *troubling the water*, far back in the days before the

world was. But what was the Spirit of God like? The Bible helped me out on that point. The story of Pentecost was very instructive:

“‘And when Pentecost was fully come, they were all together with one accord in one place. And suddenly there came a sound from Heaven as of a rushing mighty wind; and it filled all the house where they were sitting.’

“With great interest I read the next verse:

“‘And they were filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance.’

“Some people may say that mentally I was in deep water. Nevertheless I remember having had these thoughts long before I knew the truth about birth. I had the idea that air in motion and water in motion were both somehow connected with birth. Hence my interest in bubbling springs. The ‘mighty wind’ was the Holy Spirit. The story of the Immaculate Conception made me feel quite certain that I was right:

“‘And the angel answered and said unto her, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called, The Son of God.’

“Yes, here was God saying unto Mary: Let there be a child.

“One of my dreams has been difficult for me to understand, but this childhood belief may help to explain a part of it. In the dream about the three bolted doors,

the force which was like a 'mighty wind,' and passed through them, may have represented this same birth (impregnation) fancy.

"In another dream, where my brother is leaping from a cliff to a beach below, the association connected with the word 'beach' brought to light the fact that one of my chief delights was going with him to a beautiful spring of water which was covered at high tide but was pure and fresh at other times. So 'wind' and 'water' met (in my thought) and together they brought back to consciousness the early ideas as to procreation, ideas which I had absolutely forgotten."

Investigation has made it clear, that in this patient's childhood fancy the conceptions of father, husband, child, mother, were fused or closely interwoven.

The evidence afforded by clinical research makes it seem probable that, underlying and partly determining these relatively elaborate and later fantasies, the idea of the power of wind has a more personal autoerotic root in the unconscious recognition of physiological processes in which this element figures. The analysis brought out the probable existence of this root in this patient's case, and the following incident is of interest, partly in that connection and partly as binding the various ideas together:

In early adult life the patient had a somewhat serious illness which required the prolonged attention of an eminent physician in another city, whom she came to take as a substitute for her father and to treat with undue confidence. Of the physician's part in taking advantage of the patient's confidence I will say nothing. A number of years after the treatment at his hands had ceased she saw him for a few moments once again, in an almost incidental way, and on returning home threw herself, fatigued, upon her bed, for a few moments' rest. In the

interests of refreshment she began taking deep breaths, and then the feeling came over her that in her deep inspirations she was somehow entering again into peculiarly intimate relations with this person. Finally, as she made a long expiration, it seemed to her that a symbolic birth-act was taking place, and that she was giving birth to his child.

It is easy to see that an idea of this sort might have occurred without reference to any specific function of the inspired and expired air. In the patient's mind, however, this reference did play a part, and illustrated the fantastic conceptions that have been above recorded¹.

The next piece of symbolism of which I wish to speak has reference to the number 3 (or the idea of triplication, or triangulation), which figured with great frequency in my patient's dreams, in ways that the following citation will indicate:

Dream I. The patient is walking on the edge of a steep cliff. Her brother, clad in bathing costume, comes up behind her and then precipitates himself on to the beach below. She climbs down painfully and with difficulty to aid him. While trying to rescue him, three girls, dressed identically, come to her aid, and one of them takes off

¹ Both primitive and medieval literature give evidence of widespread mystical conceptions as to the fructifying power of air or wind; and the same is true of the fantasies of childhood, which still weave themselves so strangely around the assumed connection between the taking of food, its fate within the body and the marvellous power of the feces to fructify the land. In all this process "air" or "wind" plays a part rated as very important. The subject is too large and too familiar to call for references, but I would cite, as especially important, Dr. Ernest Jones's paper, *Die Empfängnis der Jungfrau Maria durch das Ohr* (*Jahrbuch f. Psychoanalyse*, Bd. VI, 1914). Freud's "Leonardi da Vinci" (now to be had in English) takes up, in the same sense, the old popular belief in the impregnating power of the air, with special reference to the impregnation of the vulture.

and gives her a white sweater, which she puts on her brother.

(Investigation seems to show that these three girls are triplifications of herself, but as favored with a degree of health and youth and vigor that had been foreign to her. The white sweater recalls one actually presented to this brother by his mother.)

Dream II. Three girls of a physical type somewhat analogous to the preceding seem to be taking possession of a room which the patient had occupied, in a certain boarding-place. There is some dispute about the ownership of a watch and pin that had for some time been hanging on the entry-wall, and the patient snatches them, saying that they were more hers by right than theirs, and had been there long before they came.

The girls appear as rivals (*i. e.*, as implying conflicting interests within herself), perhaps with some homosexual connotation, especially as the patient had recently broken off a close relationship of this sort of many years' standing.

Dream III. In a long and elaborate dream, the triplification-tendency seemed to be illustrated in seven or eight different ways. A strongly "exhibitionist" tendency comes out in parts of this dream (as in various others and in numerous experiences). At one point, three girls, dressed identically in a material of dark blue color (this color was for her a father-emblem, as having been much liked by him), sit Turkish fashion on a flat roof, supported on pillars which one of them climbed, during the dream, in exhibitionist fashion. At another point a "barge-like" house was to be seen, with glass sides (exhibitionism) which entirely covered a small "island" in the midst of a pond or lake. This structure had three horizontal floors (or partitions) of the same size and shape, one below, as if resting on the ground, one at the top, and a third at an

intermediate position. When the patient looked again, these partitions had become heartshaped.

Dream IV. In this dream the patient passed through a "cultivated, fertile strip of land," lying between two avenues, and in it twelve palm¹ trees grew, arranged in three rows of four each².

Dream V. Twelve steps lead up from a partly underground basement (grocery shop) and her "double" (her close friend for many years, see above) is mounting them, followed by the dreamer herself. Having reached the sixth step her friend bends backward and falls³. She, being on the third step, catches her, and carrying her back into the store places her on some empty orange-boxes. The store contains, otherwise, raisins and oranges, but nothing else.

In another dream (VI), the patient's intimate friend (the two being present at a musical entertainment) makes *three* attempts to sing and then collapses to the ground.

Passing by a number of analogous situations in which *three* appears as if with some significance of meaning, I

¹ The palm trees occurred here, obviously, with a mainly phallic meaning, while in another dream they carried death connotations. "Death" in her fantasies, however, was closely related to birth, as was shown strikingly in one "buried alive" dream, in which she rejoiced to note that the slab of stone over the grave was raised some inches from the ground.

² This dream (see below) has interesting homosexual or bisexual features, in which the patient and her mother figure.

³ In another dream, into which *three* does not enter but which may help to explain the last, the patient mounts a step-ladder behind her mother, "fearing that she will fall" and wishing to support her, though in fact she (the patient) comes up so abruptly as almost to push her mother off. Her mother then bends toward a shelf to place something upon it (other dreams show the shelf to be a sexual symbol) and reaches over her shoulder, as if to do the same thing (domination and hostility). Her mother's hand and wrist, and likewise her own, become invisible (*i. e.*, she does not like to think of them —doubtless, in part, for reasons familiar to every psychoanalyst).

will refer to a single symbol in a long dream (VII)—a roll, namely, of wall paper which carries a design made up of three ("or five") pale blue¹ wavy lines, alternating with one red line, the whole design being repeated many times.

Finally, I give one more dream (VIII) for the reason that the symbol occurs in it, for the only time, in the definite form of a triangle.

Dream VIII. "I was awake for a few seconds, then fell asleep and had another dream. Again I heard a voice. It said: 'What did you have for dinner . . . supper?' To answer the question I did not mention what I had had for any meal, but I was much surprised to find myself holding a paper bag in my right hand. Into the bag I saw myself put three triangular-shaped raspberry tarts such as I had had for breakfast the day before. Strangely enough the tarts did not drop to the bottom of the bag. Therefore, there was nothing but air there. I was much astonished. Only a child would answer such a question in such a way. I was quite disgusted, and heard myself exclaiming (in the dream): 'How infantile!'"

To any one whose interest in such matters as are here discussed goes beyond the simple gratification of curiosity, the study of number symbolisms is of absorbing interest. At first sight, numbers seem contrived for utilitarian and scientific ends alone, and it is, therefore, peculiarly impressive to find them serving as symbols of emotion, especially sex-emotions². But, in fact, the emotional significance attaching to numbers as standing for "groups"—as, a pair, a handful, a lot, a crowd (and, by contrast,

¹ Her father's favorite color.

² Lévy-Bruhl: *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures*, 1910; Hug-Hellmuth: *Einige Beziehungen zwischen Erotik and Mathematik. Imago*, B. IV, H. 1.

a single one) etc.—is obviously very great¹, and points to a use of numbers that long preceded the “enumeration” of the relatively educated man. The flexibility and variability of any series of numbers and their interchangeability with geometrical forms makes them peculiarly fitted for use as symbols. Medieval art and ecclesiastical history abound in illustrations of this principle, but I will cite only one which for a double reason is suited to our present purposes. This is the familiar isosceles-triangle-shaped figure, representing the virgin or some other person typifying the Church, who stands draped in a symmetrically spreading robe, sheltered beneath which are two or more protected “children.”

That numbers and forms (especially the triangle) are used with sensuous meanings, is, indeed, a matter of common knowledge, and all students of dreams are, furthermore, aware how almost inconceivably elaborate are the games—as it were—which the unconscious imagination plays with itself, where numbers are the pawns that stand for persons and situations which, in their turn, represent interests of deep emotional importance to the dreamer. The emotional interest attaching to numbers may be more especially general, or mystic, as where—to take a trivial instance—peculiar significance is attributed to the third “shock,” or third attempt (“which never fails”), or to “three” as standing, even among primitive peoples, for a group, of indefinite size, etc.; or it may be more especially specific, as where (as is common enough in dreams) a street-number stands for a certain person, or a special date and number is made unhallowed by painful experiences. These two sorts of usage merge and overlap and are often interchangeable, and if I distinguish between them at all it is only for convenience sake and to suggest a possible means of delimitation of a large subject.

¹ *Ibid.*

It is certain that "three" is felt as one of the most significant of numbers (whether regarded as a numeral, as a figure—in its Arabic or its Roman form—or in the form of the triangle, or as signifying triplification); and also that it has certain well-marked sex-meanings, both masculine and feminine in nature. Usener's book, "Über die Dreiheit," tells with laborious care what a part this number has played in ancient and medieval history, but seems to find for it no further psychological significance than as representing the indefinite form of multiplicity, or an intensification to which duplication leads up. In Christian and in Pagan art, the representations of the deity appear doubled or tripled, in identical forms, as in several of my patient's dreams.

Eugene Tavenner's interesting paper¹ on "three" as a magic number in old Roman times, gives another series of related data which help to show how widespread the use of this symbol is, as a group-designation, and prepare one to believe that where the number three comes in dreams it is to be thought of, not as a case of fanciful happening but as evidence, one must believe, partly of the grip of a strong and universal interest of a specific sort, partly of a typical mode of working of the mind.

But Tavenner goes no further in his explanation of this tendency than Usener, whose theory he cites.

In essence, this theory is historical and not psychological, *i. e.*, not brought into relation with the genesis of the mental interests and functions. Valuable though it doubtless is, the explanation offered by these writers needs to be supplemented in two directions, which the words "genesis of the mental functions," if taken broadly, will serve to indicate. Tavenner says:

¹ Three as a Magic Number in Latin Literature. *Trans. of the Am. Philological Assn.*, Vol. XLVII, 1916.

"It is a well-known fact that certain Brazilian and other savage tribes count on the joints of one finger, bringing their systems of definite numbers to a close with *two*. Under such conditions the notion of *three* is indicated by the expression *two one*, four by the expression *two two*, etc., while the number which has the third place in such savage systems means not *three* but *many*¹. 'Our Indo-Germanic ancestors,' continues Usener, 'must have remained for a long time at the stage where they counted on the joints of one finger in this way. The further advance to *four*, *five*, and the decimal system seems to have been both rapid and easy.' For this reason the numbers two and three made a very lasting impression in their popular speech, their religion, their folk lore, and their magic. We have only to recall our own expression that 'two is a company, three is a crowd,' and the German saying, 'Einer ist keiner, zwei viele, drei eine Menge,' to convince ourselves that there was really a time when, to our ancestors, three meant an indefinitely large number, beyond the limits of the definite number system. So also Diels has reached the conclusion that the number three derived its peculiar magic value from the fact that it was "die ursprüngliche Endzahl der primitiven Menschheit². This seems to be the most probable explanation of the origin of the belief in the great magic power of the number three."

The direct evidence as to the meaning of the symbol given by my patient was but slight, but this fact, in itself, is of a certain interest. She felt its intensification-

¹ Taylor (*Primitive Culture*, 8d. Amer. ed., 1, 242 ff.) and other students of anthropology give ample evidence of the present existence among backward tribes of number systems ending in two and three.

² *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie*, X (1897), 292; and *Festschrift f. Th. Gomperz*, p. 8, n. 8.

value—its “many” or manifolding significance—and still more, though entirely vaguely, its sensual or erotic significance, though she could not or did not trace this out. Knowing, however, as we do, that the triangle has long stood as a sign both of masculinity and femininity (and sometimes, as here, of both at once), this failure (in so far as it is not to be laid at my door) points to the repression of an erotic emotion pressing for recognition, and it is doubtless in this direction that the interest in the symbol is largely to be sought. Its use may not be confined simply to the revealing and concealing of a sensuous feeling or emotion. In my patient's case its employment hints, I think, at a recognition of ambisexual tendencies on her part, in which respect it is classifiable with several other very striking symbols to which reference cannot be made in this paper.

Not only is this true, but there is another very important meaning to which “three” inevitably points—namely, in standing for father, mother, child, that group so deeply important for every person's life, as each one's personal experience verifies and as the history of the Holy Family brings out in striking form.

The other universally valid connotation for the number three relates to its significance as recalling the logical and philosophical mental processes, of which, as I believe, every person is subconsciously aware, not so much through his intelligence and reason as through his feeling. Three legs, or feet, are not more typically essential, or typically adequate, for the support of a table or a stool than is the syllogism for the founding of a reasoned-out conclusion. Neither is this sort of logical process—with which the famous Hegelian triad may, for present purposes, be grouped—more important in its place than is the kindred fact that every typical mental process implies an assertion, a negation of this assertion as insufficient and imperfect,

and then a return to the universal positive which every one feels within him, as to a never-to-be-exhausted source of help in the further search for truth. Analogous to this, again, is the implication of subject, object, and process as a triad essential to many mental acts, as in the statement of a proposition, and the threefold aspect (of reason, feeling and will) under which the mind is so frequently described.

Finally, there are interesting social relationships of a triadic sort that are not fully covered by the formula "Two's company, three's a crowd," or by the conception of the family as a special group. It will be remembered that there are many men, as Freud has pointed out, who are capable of love yet who cannot develop this capacity to the full extent, except in the presence of a rival. Of course, as originally described by Freud, the "love" in question was conceived of as of a rather sensuous sort, but I believe that the situation is more broadly significant than this idea would indicate. Many excellent people fail to see favorable elements in various relationships in which they are chief actors, until another's praise of their good fortune, or the danger of losing some advantage accruing to them through another's rivalry, forces this recognition on their notice.

Another highly interesting triadic relationship, negatively analogous to the last mentioned, is that described by Royce¹ under the name of the "community of interpretation." The relationship of two persons (diadic) contains, as Royce points out, certain elements of special danger or of weakness, due to competition, misunderstanding, lack of confidence, etc. But if then there comes in a suitable third person (the insurance agent, for example, who intermediates between the individual bene-

¹ See, especially, *War and Insurance*, Macmillan, 1914.

ficiary and the public, as represented by the company) a peculiarly satisfactory basis of understanding may become established. A child may—one might suppose—establish such a relationship between disagreeing parents.

The question is now pertinent: Is there any reason to believe that any of these more elaborate meanings were in my patient's thoughts; and if so, how did they bear upon the problem, why she found so great enjoyment in the number "three" as a symbol?

With regard to the first points, I can say that the lady in question has always shown a strong interest in logical processes of all sorts, and particularly in the kinds of relationships here in question.

Also, in my opinion, it is fair to consider that such processes, which every thinking man finds more or less congenial, imply the existence of innate mental qualities which every one can claim some share of and which no one can escape the self-imposing obligation to employ. Of course, however, the degree to which they are employed varies very widely.

It is highly probable that, when it comes to seeking, instinctively, for sensuous regressions—as in dreams—the forms of sensuousness which are (to some persons) peculiarly gratifying (just because peculiarly at variance with convention) are those in which motives and feelings which contain elements of (real) spiritual or intellectual aspiration are utilized in the service of erotic cravings. There is a spice of adventure in every protest, even if instinctive and unconscious, against taboos of every sort—as for example, in the use of oaths. Janet makes this clear in his excellent descriptions¹ of the obsessed patients who feel compelled, in church, to imagine themselves desecrating the sacred and consecrated utensils for purposes commonly

¹ *Les Obsessions et la Psychasthenie.* Felix Alcan, Paris, 1903.

thought of as unclean¹ or vile. It is doubtless the contrast that attracts, in the case of the acts inspired by the anal complex, and the root may be the same in both cases. Indeed, the principle involved is so well recognized that I should not have referred to it but for its interest in connection with these number dreams.

It is an interesting fact that this patient's younger brother, when between three and four years old, made great use of a similar tendency, after the following fashion: evidently wishing—in fantasy—to intensify his own divergent feelings through objectification and projection, he imagined himself represented by three boys to whom he gave highly original names, which I must not here reproduce but will designate by the numbers "One," "Two" and "Three," respectively, while "Four" may stand for him, himself. "Two" was a boy of mischievous tendencies, "Three" a good boy, whereas "One" was a boy whose tendencies were neither good nor bad. For what then did "One" stand? It is improbable that this very young child worked out any of the philosophical or psychological issues here a stake, but it is the belief of my patient, his sister, that their germs may well have been present to his mind. "One" was certainly not colorless for him, as it might have been supposed it would be, and in trying to define what position it did occupy it is interesting to discover that² the word "neuter," to which the negative meaning of "neither," "sexless," etc., is usually given, is really to be thought of as implying "both," and especially both masculine and feminine. An analogy would perhaps be the third term in the Hegelian

¹ The fact that the German officers yielded, largely, to this temptation, during their stay in the chateaux of France, is of considerable interest.

² As I am informed by Dr. J. S. Van Teslaar, on the basis of careful study of the subject.

dialectic, or the "conclusion" which strives to embody what there is of value in both of two discordant or discrepant propositions. Or, again, to take a biologic simile of genetic interest, one might think of the "undifferentiated" cell, which, through division, is destined to create two other, more highly specialized cells, of diverging functions. However this may be, these three personages played a considerable part in this boy's life. When he had done anything wrong he would throw the blame from himself on to "Two," who would then be banished from the group, which was thus reduced to "Three," "One" and himself.

But then, partly through the influence of his mother, who entered into the game but used it to reinforce her discipline, it would be made to appear that "Three" should not and would not stay in this diminished group because it was evident that he himself was really guilty in company with "Two" and could not shift his responsibility so easily. This idea, that the virtuous "Three" should be banished, distressed him very greatly and he would instantly decide to be good himself and thus bring back "Three" and also "Two." No matter what happened "One" always remained, like the "organ point" which gives unity to a series of changing chords. An analogous unity is that which preserves the changing "personality" intact through change, or which expresses itself in the concept "the many and the one."

In further discussion of the meanings of "three" as a symbol, my patient suggested that it had for her the signification of "completeness," as implying, for example, "all the love there is," all the possible amount of intensification and the like¹.

¹ Cf. the dream into which the house enters, which was built with three heart-shaped superimposed floors or parallel, horizontal partitions.

It is obvious that this idea coincides largely with that of Usener and Tavenner, in whose conceptions three stands for a symbol of an indefinite "many." But it means, perhaps, not only many in the sense of an indefinite "lot," but signifies, as has been said, "completeness," so many that one could not work for more, the three legs of the stool which support it firmly, the unity of masculine plus feminine, implied in "neuter" or in the concept of hermaphroditism regarded as "true."

It has been suggested that the extremely common use of triplification in heraldry (three spears, three boars' heads, etc.) conveys this idea of completeness or perfection, and my patient believes that it figures as a basis for the use of the symbol, in her case, alongside of the erotic connotation.

A consideration of the mixture of motives implied in these various possible sorts of uses of the number and symbol "three" exhibits as probable the presence of psychological tendencies on my patient's part, not alone in one direction but in two opposite directions, and it is the establishment of this proposition that is the main purpose of this paper.

I believe, namely, that one should recognize as important not alone the regressive tendency, the seeking of opportunities for sensuous enjoyment of a subtle sort—implying a species of defiant prostitution of a possible higher meaning in the interest of a concealed lower meaning—in this use, even in dreams, of symbols of double or multiple signification but also the tendency to accept and acknowledge as valid the "better standard which is departed from." It is as if the patient was to say: "I admit my obligation to support the actual and ideal social standards from which I regress, even though I seem, in regressing, to repudiate them. In fact, I derive a peculiarly acute satisfaction, of a sensuous sort, from

the very fact that I deny, for the moment, their prior and transcendent claims."

The next symbolisms to which attention will be called relate to the always important subject of theft, where the motive of mere acquisition is practically absent. A far better designation of this form of thieving (which would embrace most instances of so-called kleptomania) would be "symbolic," and the object of its analysis should be to discover the infantile roots of the desire symbolized and to get—in accordance with the foregoing argument—such hints as one can of the double or multiple tendencies at work and the relative value of each.

It is reasonable to believe, as has been asserted, that for some cases the mere secret handling of forbidden objects carries with it something of the gratification and excitement that attends more obvious forms of autoerotic handling, which are thus recalled. I cannot reject the possibility that this element was present here. It is likely to have played no great part, however, if only because the number of the thefts was so small, and certainly it pales in significance when compared with certain other influences, namely, the longing for self-assertion (sought partly in compensation, partly for its own value), and the desire to possess and own her father and her brother, to whom she was so passionately devoted.

The occasion of the stealings and the objects stolen were, in brief, as follows: (1) a pear from a fruit-stand in childhood, taken in bravado and immediately thrown away; (2) "three" doses of an effervescent medicine belonging to her brother—trifling theft enough, but sufficient to call down reprobation from him and of special interest for special reasons; (3) certain books; (4) two pocket-books from a store; (5) some bits of lace; (6) a belt, too large for her; (7) certain small pearl buttons.

Two dream-thefts were also of much interest. One involved the (symbolic) taking of her sister-in-law's children, and the other an analogous theft, perhaps indirectly related to this, but in which she herself figures as the person stolen from. Finally, there was a significant temptation to take certain brass hinges and other door-furnishings which had curious associations.

1. The pear theft is described by the patient herself as follows:

"To have the upper hand gave a kind of exultation. It was a form of excitement filled with fascination. Not far from my father's office there was a fruit store. Sometimes the owner stood in the doorway. Sometimes he was half concealed in the darkness of the room. But wherever he might be, he kept an eye on the fruit stand in front of the store. Just because he was so afraid that something would be taken from him, for that very reason I longed to snatch a pear or an apple and dash out of sight before he could seize me. I did not want the fruit. I wanted to 'beat him at his own game.' He made me think of an ugly spider ready to spring on some one. I would take good care that he did not catch *me* (but she longed to have him do so, as he had caught other children with whom she longed to be, in a sense, identified¹).

"The right moment came; in a twinkling I was off with a pear,—in another twinkling I had thrown the trophy away. At first I felt quite fine over my exploit.

¹ Cf. the "pursuit" dreams above. The pleasure of pursuit and even of capture recalled childhood experiences (as is so common) with a favorite uncle in whom she saw virtually her father, and also the memory of not infrequent fallings through tripping and the like, as a consequence of her poor eyesight, which were made sweet for her through the pettings and consolings from her father himself, by which they were often followed.

But then the New England conscience came into play—"It is a sin to steal a pin. It is a *sin* to steal a pin." I never confessed the *sin*, however. For a long time, whenever I passed that store, involuntarily I quickened my steps."

2. The effervescent-salts theft contains, in the patient's estimation, a meaning of the following sort: from her earliest years and as an outcome of her Bible studies, this imaginative patient had had special fantasies about procreation and bubbling springs, a portion of which have already been described in her own words with special reference to her longing to be identified with her brother, who occupied much the same place with her father in her longings. The drinking of her brother's "bubbling spring" of effervescent salts signified, for her unconscious fancy, this gratification of her longing for identification with him. In itself (*i. e.*, regarded as a piece of gross appropriation of property), the theft had no meaning and corresponded to no need.

3. The book theft was symbolic of her hunger of mind and soul, and, in particular, expressive of her longing for her father's stronger and stronger love, since the reading of books was his breath of life and constant habit, and closely associated with him. It was (though probably not in an uncomplicated sense) like the taking of a flower associated with him. But the element of secrecy and the breaking of bonds to which she felt allegiance—and which for his sake she broke—doubtless played its part.

None of the articles taken were kept by the patient. The books were given away to persons whose possession of them had a particular interest for her, and they were replaced by others that would have a greater value, as she thought, for the second-hand book dealer from whom she took them.

The articles numbered 4 and 5, which were taken up but never carried away at all, seem to have had the following (principal) significance: No. 4 (the pocket-book)¹ and No. 5 (the baby lace) point to her longing for a child, a probability which is intensified by the fact that she had been reading and was engaged in translating a novel entitled "Lace," referring to a present of lace from a lover to his lady.

No. 6 (the too large white belt) suggested pregnancy.

No. 7 (the small pale blue pearl buttons) hint at the same meaning, partly because of the special significance of shoe-buttons (with reference to the well-attested meanings of foot and shoe) testified to an interesting piece of symbolism occurring in a dream which I have not space to give.

The brass hinges, lock and door fastenings, which she was tempted to take under peculiar conditions, were positively felt to have the same significance with the buttons. They refer, namely, to the possible closing and opening of doors to her own mansion, in a sense made clear in the ogre dream and the wind dreams ("pursuit" dreams) which I reported earlier. At about the same time that this dream was had, the patient was under the compulsion mentioned at the outset, of doubly locking her own chamber-door.

I have thought it worth while to mention all these matters because of the peculiar interest which always attaches to the evidence that theft experiences are not always—perhaps far less often than they seem—the vulgar performances of an anti-social personage. For my patient—to accept her own estimate—the thefts were tinged with the excitement that always accompanies a reaching outside of the conventional and socially lawful, toward a reward felt to belong, by natural law, to him

¹ A not uncommon dream-symbol in the sense of the vagina.

who has the boldness to demand his felt due. It is a case of the individual against the community; and while psychoanalysts and patients, as citizens, should feel themselves as much the guardians of the community as any other men, yet they are also in a position to comprehend with peculiar force the longings and cravings of the individual. In my patient's case these cravings were strongly for maternity and for her mother's rights in her father and her brother. These points are brought out yet more strongly by the following two dreams which testify, inferentially, to the strength of the social motives which were set aside or sacrificed for the intensification of the sensuous and personal motives.

The dreamer saw herself on the street in swift pursuit of her sister-in-law, and a moment later was tearing a pair of ear-rings from her ears. The dreamer then turned and was herself pursued by her sister-in-law, who ran after her presumably to take the ornaments away. There was a house further up on the right-hand side of the street. The front of the house looked as if it had been struck by a bomb. The front basement-wall was no longer there, the place was open to the light of day. The dreamer and her sister-in-law ran to this house. The steps ascending to the front door were partly destroyed, the drawing-room was in ruins, one window being broken and many bricks having fallen out. On the floor above, in the front bedroom, there was only a small opening in the wall, something like a port-hole in a ship. In this room the sister-in-law's mother was sitting. The dreamer wondered if she would find her own mother there too. When the sister-in-law arrived at the house, she ran up the front door-steps and on further until she reached the second floor. She did not see that the dreamer had gone slyly into the basement and was concealing the jewels in a box, covering it first with (so-called "invisible") pink-and-white plaid cloth

and then with white ashes¹. The dreamer was in fear of being discovered. When the danger was over, she started to rush up the broken door-steps after her sister-in-law, but paused half way and, instead of going further, sent a volley of harsh words up the stairway. With that she woke in a great emotional tumult, and was saying to herself two or three times in close succession: "Oh, I hope I shall never speak like that to anybody. It was dreadful".

Later the patient wrote:

"Recently two dreams have disquieted me because they were moving-pictures of petty thieving. Then, last Tuesday, while in a store, there came over me a strong impulse to take certain things (brass hinges, rivets, notebooks, and candy). I did not yield to the impulse. I left the place as quickly as possible, yet the appearance of such a desire (in the *open*, so to speak, and not merely in dreams) gave me a distinct shock and a self-fear which has not subsided.

"What did it mean? What did that strong impulse signify? It said as plainly as words: *If I cannot steal children, I will steal something else. If I may not have what I want, I will take what I can get.*

"I am glad I understand this. I think, too, that a love of excitement is behind many an impulse to steal—particularly where the things are of no use afterwards."

The other dream about stealing was as follows:

"In my native city a steep street was seen. On the right side it had very high houses, on the left, an embankment surmounted by a low stone wall. (There is, in reality, no such street there.) An observer of a 'moving-picture,' I saw myself walking up the street. One second, I was

¹ Possibly a hint at anal memories.

alone, the next instant two little girls and a stout, dark-complexioned woman appeared at my right. The children were dressed alike, in white blouses and dark blue skirts: the woman was entirely in black. Her face seemed familiar to me. Her age was somewhere between thirty-five and forty-five years. She had taught the children to steal. One little girl was eight, and the other eleven years old. These children were too close to me for comfort, and she kept at their right. We formed a straight line across the sidewalk, so there was but little space between myself and the gutter. They started, all three, to go up the incline with me. Suddenly the woman vanished. At the same moment I knew the children had stepped behind me and taken money from a bag which I was holding under my left arm.

"Note.—This was the small black bag which I use every day. When I have more than a dollar in that bag I carry it as just described. When there is only small change, I let my hand drop to my side.

"The children took bills, and not coin. Then they, too, were no longer visible—children and bills.

"Since I intended to go on a journey, I had an extra reason for wishing to recover my money. Therefore I turned, went down the hill to the railroad-station, sought out the station-matron, and then she accompanied me back up the street whence I had come. She had on a long white apron completely covering her dress, and she wore a white cap. She walked at my left, as we hurried along, looking on all sides for the children (idea of concealment). They were not to be seen anywhere. I was chiefly occupied in examining the windows of the houses on our right. At last, high up, on the top floor of one of the apartment-houses, the woman in black looked down on me for a fraction of a second and then peered at me from behind the 'half-blind' which covered half of the window offering

this fleeting view of the enemy. With this glimpse of her the dream ended."

In setting forth the rather wide-reaching generalizations which have occupied many pages of this paper, I have been led, primarily, by the idea that not symbols alone but all emotions have two faces and consequently that one should not define a person's desires as "retrograde" or sensual, without noting that they are this eminently by contrast with others of a different sort, and in a sense that the psychoanalyst at least is bound to understand.

In fact, all that I have said applies rather to the edification of the physician than—directly—to the edification of the patient. It may be necessary, or desirable, to confine the psychoanalytic inquiry to a certain group of repressions of which—it should be said—the physician can more or less accurately prophesy the nature, and which the patient—reversing, as all patients are prone to do, the path of the repression—will sooner or later bring to light.

But it should be clearly known that the patient's mind contains also a variety of other data which he is not likely to bring to light, yet which it is vitally important for him to recognize, if this can but be brought about without detriment to his progress, as significant sources of motive. Such matters are certain inherent "moral obligations," which every one who will listen to his own conscience will find that he feels, first, as a member of the "community," in a widening sense; next as a virtual member of an ideal community, or—if one will—of the universe. I will waive the question whether the psychoanalyst ought to bring these matters definitely to the patient's notice (though I will say that I believe one reason this obligation is not felt is that the first mentioned obligations are not believed to exist as such); but it is certain that the psychoanalyst cannot be thoroughly

competent for his task unless he has them in the background of his mind. And I believe that the time will come and is at hand, when it will be found that the physician can often act in both ways as helper to his patients, without either the loss of self-respect or failure to perform both tasks adequately. The universe is not, as I believe, founded in logical "reason" alone, much less in "scientific" reason as that word is usually understood. Moral intuition also plays its part, and probably discovers its right to do so because of inherent necessities and not solely because of utilitarian adjustments.

Chapter XXII.

ELEMENTS OF STRENGTH AND ELEMENTS OF WEAKNESS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC DOCTRINES.*

I vividly remember a remark made by Professor Freud on the occasion of my first personal interview with him, which followed one of his important lectures in Worcester, in 1909. We had been talking, obviously—though the details of the conversation I do not distinctly recall—about the significance of his well-known belief that the principle of causality applied as definitely, and, virtually, in the same sense, in the realm of human thought¹ as it does in

* Published in the *Psychoanalytic Review*, April 1919, the editor of which appended the following explanatory footnote: "At the last meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association at Atlantic City, Dr. Putnam was on the program to read a paper on the Symbolism of the Number Three. He was unable, however, to be present at the meeting and his paper was read by title by Dr. L. E. Emerson. Subsequently Dr. Putnam promised this paper to the *Psychoanalytic Review* for publication. At the time of his death his paper was found in process of revision, together with a considerable number of notes. That portion which is printed above is the beginning of the paper which had evidently been finally revised and it is given the title which was apparently intended to be the new title for the paper as it had developed in the writer's mind.

"Although the paper as printed is incomplete the editor feels that it will be welcomed by the readers of the *Psychoanalytic Review* as a last message from one who did so much during his life time for the psychoanalytic movement and particularly by those who knew him personally and loved him."

¹ It is, of course, mainly to the "casual," instinctive sorts of thinking that this statement is meant to apply. It would perhaps be a fair inference, however, to conclude that Freud has been inclined to view all thinking as an outgrowth from the same root with that

the realm of physics. We are what we are (I assume him to have said) because we have been what we have been—have been, that is, as products of biologic evolution, personal experience and social education, but not as products of which, in his opinion, is indeed "instinctive," but has been wrongly considered as "casual"; and so, like that, a product of repressed, unconscious emotions, seeking for an outlet. If this inference is sound, it points at once to what I regard as a serious fault in reasoning. In any case, it may be permissible to assume that the inference is just, and to use the remark, so construed, for the purpose of illustrating the main argument of this paper. All bodies, even if organic, of course obey in part the "laws" of physics. The principle of causality, so evident in the operation of these "laws," is traceable also in the mental sphere, and more clearly in the unconscious than in the conscious realm of thought. But the analogy between even unconscious thinking and the phenomena due to heat or gravitation is remote enough, while in the case of conscious thinking it is permissible only as a figure of speech.

I have no right or wish to assert that Freud would deny the justice of this criticism (or counter-statement) or would positively affirm either that unconscious thinking is literally equivalent to a physical phenomenon or that conscious thinking stands on the same basis with unconscious thinking.

Neither he nor his stricter followers have, however, passed in review the factors underlying the so-called higher mental processes, in any adequate fashion. On the contrary, it is, as I understand, Freud's opinion that the unconscious is the real and only gateway to the conscious, and so that what is true of the latter must be true also of the former. But this premise can be counted as sound only in so far as that every proposition must be vague, or "general," or intuitive, etc., before it is thoroughly apperceived and becomes an integrated asset of conscious thought. Yet these vague intuitions may be related just as much to the most spiritual movements of the mind as to the least spiritual and most earthly or infantile. The former are just as truly "primary," in a logical and real sense, as the latter,—the "genetic" method to the contrary notwithstanding. The developing individual is continually making new departures (new attempts to establish relationships with the environment *as a whole*) which are just as significant in the eye of a liberal biology as those of birth or infancy. But this does not, of course, militate against the importance of the last named.

anything that could be denominated as spontaneous choice, with reference to an ideal aim consciously conceived.

I then asked, in effect, whether, if this principle should be accepted as binding, it would not rule out all moral estimates of whatsoever sort; so that, for example, one could no longer speak of one person as "better" or "worse" than another, or as having a "noble" or "ignoble" character, and so on. Instead of the willed acts of responsible "persons," we should then be forced to see, in the behavior of living men, only the evidences of automatic and necessary reactions to specific and (theoretically) determinable causes, most of them removed from the control of consciousness altogether, until brought out by "analysis" in his sense. To this Freud replied, with impressive earnestness¹, that it was not moral estimates that were needed for solving the problem of human life and motives, but more *knowledge*.

Ever since that day I have thought over this remark—which assumed an increasing significance in proportion as I came to realize its psychoanalytic background, and also to define my own beliefs—until it came to stand in my mind as a testimony, alike to the strength and to the weakness, of the great movement to which Freud has dedicated the greater portion of his life. It testifies to its strength because the very kernel of this movement has been a conscientious attempt to substitute intelligent scrutiny for emotional reaction; and to its weakness because the knowledge to which appeal has been made, while it is well adapted to make clear certain elements in human nature, is not well adapted to define human nature as a whole, or at its best. I have come more and more to think that it is impossible to give a just impression

¹ I cannot quote the exact words used, and am amplifying my own thought and question in order to bring out the essence of Freud's view with greater clearness.

of even the unconscious factor in the mental life unless one, at the same time, defines the influence of the conscious factors, and one unfortunate effect of the psychoanalytic movement (as an offset to many good effects) has been to wean observers too much away from the study of the conscious life and of the ultimate intuitions.

The justice of these two statements is, I think, illustrated by what has been written about "art" in its relation to the unconscious life in Freud's sense, and to the conscious life.

Let me say at once that in this very dedication of his life to this cause, considering all that it has meant in the way of sacrifice, sincerity, courage, and thorough-going obedience to the primary, unanalyzed *sense of obligation*, which every human being feels, Freud has indicated his practical acceptance of moral standards, for the existence of which the factors that he mainly relies upon in his attempt to account for the characters of other men afford an insufficient basis. Perchance, if before setting out to discover how far the influence of repressed and unconscious motives could be utilized for this purpose, he had made a mental inventory of the best tendencies in himself—his literary aspirations, his political liberality, his zeal for widening the bounds of knowledge, his sense of obligation to the calls of friendship and of duty, and so on—he might have come to realize that "sublimation" is neither solely a byproduct of "libido," nor due solely to the combined action of that influence and of the influence of social pressure. It represents, in addition, the unfolding, or coming to light of powers which, however dependent they are for their expression on both the factors mentioned, exist essentially in their own right, and serve as an indication that every individual is—by birthright and by virtue of the inherent nature of his mind—under the sway of

energies that foreshadow the approaching change. The "libido" represents one of the less developed phases of this all-pervading, self-determining energy; but before any of the more important forms of sublimation can become crystallized and evident, many new influences must enter into play (growing ever more complex through interaction) which are just as truly primary and essential as the "libido" itself¹, just as the flowering of a plant, with its increased dependence on favoring conditions, is as primary as are the first changes in the seed.

This is, at least, the view to which I have learned to give adherence, and it is one which considers an individual as, not simply a collection of automatically acting, adjustive tendencies to a given environment, but, likewise, a creative center, or series of creative centers. Strictly speaking, the self-adjustment of an organic creature is always a species of creation in itself. But the further this process departs from the wax and seal type, and the more it approaches the type where the process itself involves wide changes in both organism and environment and implies the pursuit of idealized ends, the more appropriate does the term "creative" become. From this standpoint, the term "sublimation," suggesting, as it does, the passive modification of the individual on previously existing lines alone, is not a suitable designation for the complex process by way of which each person (so far as he is capable of development) moves toward the discovery of himself—especially in his relations to the social groups in which every one should aim to play an increasingly important part.

¹ The principles invoked by Henry Fairfield Osborn, in his book "The Origin and Evolution of Life" (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1917), indicates a portion of this progress interestingly, from the materialistic standpoint. He does not, however, study mental development as such to any great extent.

But whatever one may say on this point, it is certain that the chance, made possible by the researches of Freud and his colleagues, to substitute knowledge of some sort for unreflective emotional reaction, and thus to eliminate passion, misunderstanding, and misery, even if only in somewhat greater measure than before, and withal, to look more deeply into the motives of men no longer living, came to me, as to many persons, as a refreshing breeze.

It is still hard enough, even for those who "know," in Freud's sense, to keep from the thoughts, if not the lips, the manifold social epithets, by the aid of which (often for egoistic reasons of self-assurance or defence) we keep one fellow-being at such an unreasonable distance, and sedulously seek another's patronage, or express longings which we do not acknowledge to ourselves. Before the days of Freud it was simply impossible to realize what hosts of hidden feelings inspire such designations as "mean," "cowardly," "selfish," "criminal," "perverse," and thus to exchange them for terms suggestive of their causes, or to take them as indications that the motives of those who used them might need scrutiny. How many persons are there who have felt themselves crushed and isolated under such epithets—often self-applied—and yet who, in the light of psychoanalytic study, have learned to regain their own sense of companionship and self-respect, at the sole cost of a willingness to break away from illusion and from self-deceit.

With what indescribable hope and zeal have great numbers of persons—"sick" and "well"—sprung to the task of working this great mine of discovery still further, inspired by the new developments with relation to the history of childhood, the meaning of dreams, the meaning of myths, the deeper significance of wit and "forgetfulness," and of what seemed like "chance" in speech and conduct! And how profitably has this work gone on!

What important corroboration and supplementation have Freud and his colleagues furnished, also, to the facts and arguments of such men as Janet and Havelock Ellis, and how have the fine observations of these men gained thereby in point and value!

Since earliest times, men have been urged to *know themselves* as the first step toward *being themselves* at their best; and here seemed an opportunity of a highly practical sort, to do this very thing thoroughly, *even if only along certain special lines*. In opening this door of knowledge, and in demonstrating, in detail, the method by the aid of which any one who is willing properly to prepare himself may go further in the task of *discovering what men know without realizing that they know it*, Freud certainly rendered a vast service. In rendering it, moreover, he performed the first duty that is ordinarily required of an explorer, that, namely, of reporting his observations, in monographic fashion, just as they presented themselves to him, and of giving his provisional conclusions based on these observations taken by themselves.

But the best tribute that one can pay to the fine qualities of a great leader—especially a great psycho-analyst—is to develop one's own independent thought, with reference to his work, and to the propositions laid down by him as fundamental. As a part of this task I venture to assert, as on several previous occasions, that through following a too exclusively monographic plan of investigation, and through appealing too exclusively to that kind of knowledge that seeks, not only to work objectively, but to take the laws of physical science as determinative, psychoanalysts have been led, to the detriment of their own cause, into modes of looking at human life that are too narrow and confining. Or, to put the matter differently, it would be of material advantage to the community at large if the leaders in this movement should, in future, so

train themselves as to understand better the other modes of approach which might put many matters in a new light. The pioneer cannot, perhaps, afford to be continually reminding himself that he may be overestimating the importance of the scent that he is following. For in the beginning it is hard to say to what it may be leading; and Freud has done quite right—in view of the extraordinarily ingenious modes of self-deception prevalent among human beings, who still cling strongly to their carnal instincts—in insisting on the necessity of dwelling on motives that less skilled and keen observers have preferred to overlook. Perhaps these signs have not, in some cases, the significance that Freud attributed to them. But in other cases their significance may be immense, and it is only long experience, as every skilled physician knows, that enables one to decide, in such a case, with any prospect of success¹. Freud has had the public spirit and the courage to take his chance of proving a false prophet; and if he underestimates the standing of morals, ethics and religion, he has shown qualities that (as in the case of Abou Ben Adhem) quite justify one in classifying him as a practical moralist.

As an illustration of this "overlooking" tendency among non-Freudian observers of — otherwise — the best standing, I would call attention to the fact that Dr. von Hug-Hellmuth, an accurate and thoroughgoing reflector of the Freudian views, has been able² to utilize many observations made by such students of childhood as Preyer,

¹ It is certain that one reason why anti-Freudian observers have accused him of overrating the sexual import of acts and symbols is that they have overlooked this tendency in dealing with their own observations.

² Dr. H. von Hug-Hellmuth: *Aus dem Seelenleben des Kindes*. Deuticke, 1913. Now to be had in English translation, *Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 29*.

Shinn, Scupin, and others, in proof of the justice of Freud's statements about the sexual life of childhood. The question of its importance is another matter.

It should also be noted, in fairness, by those who (like myself) believe that Freud fails to do justice to the claims of philosophy and religion as genuine modes of approaching and expressing the truth, that philosophy and religion often serve as cloaks to cover self-indulgent wishes that are not otherwise acknowledged, or as indirect modes of expression of such wishes.

O B I T U A R Y
by
ERNEST JONES *

One of the greatest blows that the young science of psycho-analysis has suffered has been the death of Dr. J. J. Putnam, who was amongst the staunchest of its supporters. It is our mournful duty here to relate a record of his life and career, especially in so far as the latter concerns our science.

Dr. Putnam was born in Boston on October 3, 1846, and was therefore just over seventy-two when he died on November 4, 1918. He had a distinguished ancestry from some of the most notable families of New England. His father was a well-known physician in Boston, and his grandfather was for many years Judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts. His mother's father, who married a Cabot, was Dr. James Jackson, one of the most notable figures of his time in American medicine; Dr. Putnam published a memoir of his life in 1905.

Dr. Putnam graduated at Harvard University in 1866, at the early age of 20. Soon afterwards he continued his medical education abroad, studying at Leipsic, Vienna, and London under Rokitansky, Meynert, and Hughlings Jackson respectively. His decision to specialise in neurology was thus early evident, and on his return to America he was appointed Lecturer on Nervous Diseases at the Harvard Medical School, in 1872. In 1893 he was made the first Professor of Diseases of the Nervous System at that University, and held the appointment until 1912, when

* Published in *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. I, p. 6.

he was made Professor Emeritus. The other institution with which he was most prominently connected was the Massachusetts General Hospital, where he established a neurological clinic and was its chief from 1874 to 1909. In the earlier years he maintained a neuropathological laboratory in his own house, the forerunner of the present Department of Neuropathology at the Harvard Medical School. As a teacher of elementary students he was perhaps not at his best. The subject was an optional one, was not considered of great practical value, and Dr. Putnam perhaps lacked the ability to present complex subjects in an elementary way, the very richness of his knowledge and the scrupulous conscientiousness with which he attempted to communicate all of it militating against complete success. Those very qualities, however, made his teaching all the more valuable to more advanced students of the subject.

Dr. Putnam was the last survivor of a group of men who founded the American Neurological Association, in 1874, and was also a founder of the Boston Society of Psychiatry and Neurology. He took an active share in the work and discussions of these societies, as well as of several other medical ones, *e. g.* the Association of American Physicians, the American Psychopathological Association, and the American Psychoanalytical Association, throughout his medical career, becoming in turn President of most of them. He was undoubtedly one of the pioneers of American Neurology, and the lack of sympathy or help with which this branch of medicine was at first regarded only served to bring out his determination and persistence, both prominent traits in his character. He did an enormous amount of original research in clinical and pathological neurology and published over a hundred papers on it. Perhaps the most notable were his contributions to the study of neuritis, especially the lead and arsenical varieties,

and other affections of the peripheral nerves; he did more work on the cord and nerves than on the brain. He wrote extensively, but always with painstaking care. He was a master of English, and his work would be worth reading if only for the language in which it is expressed.

In the earlier years his professional interests centered around the problems of organic neurology, but in the last fifteen years of his life they shifted to those of clinical psychology. As will be seen from the subjoined bibliography, nine tenths of his writings in this field belong to this latter period. The transition seems to have been made *via* the subject of the traumatic neuroses. Both because of his commanding position in neurology and because of his remarkable uprightness and impartial honesty he was extensively called upon to give evidence in medico-legal cases of this nature, and his unfailing sympathy, especially with the badly understood sufferings of others, soon led him to take a special interest in the traumatic neuroses.

The first real contribution to clinical psychology dates from 1904, and as it is of interest to us in several respects, a short account may be given of it. With characteristic modesty, the author reviews the latest work done in psychotherapy "by special Students of the Subject" (No. 6 in bibliography). The opening sentence strikes the note of sympathy with neurotic suffering, which at that time was much rarer even than at present. It runs: "There are but few kinds of disorders which interfere more with the happiness of the community than those which cause a painful and hampered action of the mind though without implying the presence of serious mental derangement (*i. e.* insanity)." He goes on to say: "It frequently happens that the question of happiness or unhappiness of patients with severe forms of neurasthenia (*i. e.* neurosis) depends largely on influences which would ordinarily be classed as social rather than medical, though, in fact, the physician can help greatly in

determining what the outcome of these influences shall be... The time must surely come when nervousness and even serious mental derangements will be regarded in much the same light as other forms of illness, and with the growth of such a sentiment as this there will be great mitigation of individual suffering." The stress here laid on the social aspects of the neuroses was typical of his permanent attitude, in sharp contrast to the then prevailing narrower medical view of them as a "functional" disorder of the brain, and it adumbrated his subsequent activity in widening the famous Social Service of the Massachusetts General Hospital to include the social care of neurotics, a work which has now become a national movement in America, under the name of "Mental Hygiene." The best account of the social service movement is given in a later article entitled: "The Treatment of Psychasthenia from the Stand-point of the Social Consciousness" (No. 10). After this introduction he reviews the latest work of Janet, Prince, and Sidis on the subconscious, and remarks: "These studies have taught us that, while we regard ourselves as free agents and our mental life as forming one harmonious mechanism, no one is really as free, no one's life is so complete a unity as he would like to think." He comments on the renewed wave of interest in hypnotism with the shrewd remark that "There has been, I think, a clearer recognition of the fact that one cannot deal satisfactorily with "suggestion" until a great deal more has been learned of the nature of the diseases in the treatment of which "suggestion" sometimes proved a partial aid."

Thus equipped, with insight into the social nature of neurotic disorders, with some knowledge of subconscious activities and a restless desire to know more about them, with an unusual sympathy for neurotic suffering and a remarkable aptitude for opening his mind to the ideas of other workers, he approached the works of Freud. He

seems to have read them attentively in the following year, and, although it was about three years before he entirely accepted the new theories, he published early in 1906 a paper of remarkable interest in more than one respect. In the first place, apart from a few reviews of the "Studien"—amongst which one by Mitchell Clarke in *Brain* in 1898 is always worthy of memory—this paper may be said to be the *first* one on psycho-analysis in English, and the first adequate account of it in that tongue. He gives an excellent, though brief, summary of the "Studien," "Traumdeutung," and "Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens," and comments on them as follows with characteristic generosity: "All of the publications are written in a fluent style and with an abundance of illustration which give evidence of wide reading, general cultivation, and imaginative ability, and have secured for him (*i. e.* Freud) an attentive audience, as well among professional psychologists as among neurologists of his own stamp." He relates three cases in which he has attempted to apply the psycho-analytic method; as is to be expected, the analyses would rank as quite elementary, though by no means devoid of interest. He then summarises his attitude towards the matter. His criticism is not at all of the usual kind, but mainly relates to his doubt, on philosophical grounds, whether what is revived from ancient memories and emotions constitutes the original ones or rather an after-effect of them. On the practical psychotherapeutic side he doubts whether the method is necessary except in extreme cases, and tries to coordinate it with other methods of substitution with which he is more familiar. His "sidetracking" method of treatment was evidently an attempt to increase sublimation, to replace the neurotic symptoms by social activities. To sum up, at this point he was deeply interested in psycho-analysis, but as yet unconvinced.

In December 1908 Dr. Morton Prince invited me to be his guest in Boston, when I first met Dr. Putnam. On arriving I found that I was expected to discuss psycho-analysis before a private gathering of distinguished psychologists and neurologists, and immediately perceived that Dr. Putnam stood out from the rest in his open-minded attitude and the serious desire for knowledge with which he plied question after question. These were, as well as the almost embarrassing attitude of modesty towards a man more than thirty years his junior, the main features of the impression he produced on me on this first meeting, and the friendship thus begun was continuous and close until his death. In the following May we collaborated in a symposium on psychotherapy held by the American Therapeutic Society at New Haven, and by that time I could definitely regard him as a psycho-analytical colleague. In August of the same year came the visit of Professor Freud, accompanied by Drs. Jung and Ferenczi, to America. He joined our company — Dr. Brill was also there — and, like the rest of us, derived great benefit both from the lectures and the advantages of personal intercourse with Professor Freud. He entertained the latter afterwards at his summer camp in the Adirondack mountains, and I have no doubt that the impressions of that stay formed an abidingly pleasant memory for both.

These events made a turning-point in Dr. Putnam's attitude towards psycho-analysis. From that time on he remained a convinced and enthusiastic adherent, and the greater part of his activities in the remaining ten years of his life was devoted to extending the knowledge of the new science. In the same year he wrote a long essay entitled "Personal Impressions of Sigmund Freud and his Work" (No. 15) which excited widespread attention in America, and from then on he never ceased to expound the principles of psycho-analysis before congresses, medical and psycho-

logical societies, in addresses and courses of lectures, besides in voluminous writings. In 1911 he came to Europe, visited Dr. Jung at Zürich — Professor Freud was also there — and read a paper at the Weimar congress, where European colleagues had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with his personality.

Although some of his psycho-analytical writings are of considerable technical interest (especially, for example, Nos. 24, 26, 30, 43) most of them are of an expository nature. In presenting the principles of psycho-analysis, and in discussing the many objections that have been raised against it, he excelled, and I do not know any one who has matched him in this field. Written in a charmingly easy and fluent style, the combination of clear conviction with tolerant considerateness for even the most annoying of opponents had a peculiarly persuasive effect, and it is to be hoped that they will find a more permanent home than in the various journals where they are at present scattered.

His attitude towards the psycho-analytical theory had the following special feature, to omit mention of which would be to give a very one-sided view of his relationship to psycho-analysis. On the one hand he was fully convinced from personal experience both of the truths of the individual conclusions reached by the application of this method and of their general social importance. On the other hand, however, he maintained that it was highly desirable, if not absolutely essential, to widen the basis of psycho-analytical principles by incorporating into them certain philosophical views especially concerning the relationship of the individual to the community at large and to the universe in general. He regarded this not as a criticism of psycho-analysis, but as a proposed enrichment of it; indeed it was rather a quarrel with science as a whole than with psycho-analysis, though for obvious

reasons it came more to the front in the case of the latter. On this matter alone, which evidently meant a great deal to him personally, he was really obstinate, and he could never be brought to see how it could be possible to take the results of psycho-analytical investigations quite empirically without feeling the need to commit oneself to any particular philosophical system. For years he maintained a steady correspondence with me on this question, and I fear it was a genuine disappointment to him that his views made so little impression on his psycho-analytical colleagues. To me the most remarkable point in the whole affair was that the strength with which he held his views made no difference to his conviction as to the truth of the details of psycho-analysis; in spite of his desire to fuse science and philosophy, in practice he had no difficulty in keeping them apart. I do not know of any other example in which philosophical views have not become placed in the service of some or other unconscious resistance, manifesting themselves in the guise of a sceptical opposition to some aspect of psycho-analysis.

He behaved characteristically as regards the various attempts to read another meaning into the results of psycho-analysis. Jung's renunciation of these frankly puzzled him. He could sympathize with what he called Jung's desire for a broader formulation of psycho-analysis, having a similar tendency himself, but he wrote unequivocally: "I cannot in the least sympathize with the rejection by Jung of Freud's theories of repression, infantile sexuality, and fixation" (No. 42, 1917). Adler's views, which have obtained a wider vogue in America — where they count among their adherents no less a man than Stanley Hall — gave him more trouble, possibly because he had himself many traits in common with Adler's chief character-type. He gave his work a very sympathetic hearing and discussed it at length before the New York Psychoanalytic

Society in 1915 (No. 40). He gave Adler high credit for his earlier ideas on *Organminderwertigkeit*, etc., but insisted that these were in no sense incompatible with the psycho-analytical theory and greatly regretted Adler's subsequent rejection of the latter.

When I put together my personal impressions of Dr. Putnam, the following attributes strike me as the most prominent in his character. First of all his extraordinarily high ethical standard of uprightness, honour, fairness and loyalty. Absolutely correct conduct and attitude were to him so natural and obvious that he was more bewildered than disapproving when he heard of the opposite. He had no trace of the "puritanical" intolerance that so often goes with a strict moral code. His quite extraordinary tolerance extended as much to views as to behaviour. *Audi alteram partem* was a first maxim with him, and the degree of his singular open-mindedness, receptivity, and liberality of thought may be measured from the fact alone that he became an enthusiastic adherent of such revolutionary ideas as those of psycho-analysis with which he first entered into close relationship when he was over sixty years of age. Equally natural to him was an innate modesty of both thought and manner; so marked was this, indeed, that at times it bordered on a slightly morbid self-depreciation. He always regarded himself as a beginner, a learner, as primarily a student, an attitude much fortified by a restless striving for knowledge.

Dr. Putnam was further characterised by a charming amiability which was also innate. His considerateness and kindness for others were complete, and he could always be relied on to help some one else, as I know from my own experience (I may mention only one example, how he came to Toronto to support me in a symposium on psychotherapy held by the Canadian Medical Association, before which a couple of well-known neurologists had

planned to discredit me). There remains to be mentioned a valuable character trait, namely, persistence and determination, one which stood him in good stead in many periods of his life, not least during the fight to obtain a hearing for psycho-analysis in America. Tenacious adherence to convictions won by close thought and direct experience, combined with a benevolent tolerance for the views of others and a readiness to open his mind at all times, make a rare combination in actual life—in spite of the fact that most people think they possess them to the full—and these Dr. Putnam had in the highest degree.

Of the place he won in his private circle, in the American medical profession, in the development of neurology, in widely ramifying social services, it does not become us to speak here. To us it is only too clear that we have lost a loyal and gifted friend and co-worker, whose name will always be remembered with honour and gratitude in the history of psycho-analysis.

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