

Chapter 27 **Man: From Sociobiology to Sociology**

Let us now consider man in the free spirit of natural history, as though we were zoologists from another planet completing a catalog of social species on Earth. In this macroscopic view the humanities and social sciences shrink to specialized branches of biology; history, biography, and fiction are the research protocols of human ethology; and anthropology and sociology together constitute the sociobiology of a single primate species.

Homo sapiens is ecologically a very peculiar species. It occupies the widest geographical range and maintains the highest local densities of any of the primates. An astute ecologist from another planet would not be surprised to find that only one species of *Homo* exists. Modern man has preempted all the conceivable hominid niches. Two or more species of hominids did coexist in the past, when the *Australopithecus* man-apes and possibly an early *Homo* lived in Africa. But only one evolving line survived into late Pleistocene times to participate in the emergence of the most advanced human social traits.

Modern man is anatomically unique. His erect posture and wholly bipedal locomotion are not even approached in other primates that occasionally walk on their hind legs, including the gorilla and chimpanzee. The skeleton has been profoundly modified to accommodate the change: the spine is curved to distribute the weight of the trunk more evenly down its length; the chest is flattened to move the center of gravity back toward the spine; the pelvis is broadened to serve as an attachment for the powerful striding muscles of the upper legs and reshaped into a basin to hold the viscera; the tail is eliminated, its vertebrae (now called the coccyx) curved inward to form part of the floor of the pelvic basin; the occipital condyles have rotated far beneath the skull so that the weight of the head is balanced on them; the face is shortened to assist this shift in gravity; the thumb is enlarged to give power to the hand; the leg is lengthened; and the foot is drastically narrowed and lengthened to facilitate striding. Other changes have taken place. Hair has been lost from most of the body. It is still not known why modern man is a "naked ape." One plausible explanation is that nakedness served as a device to cool the body during the strenuous pursuit of prey in the heat of the African plains. It is associated with man's exceptional reliance on sweating to reduce body heat; the human body contains from two to five million sweat glands, far more than in any other primate species.

The reproductive physiology and behavior of *Homo sapiens* have also undergone extraordinary evolution. In particular, the estrous cycle of the female has changed in two ways that affect sexual and social behavior. Menstruation has been intensified. The females of some other primate species experience slight bleeding, but only in women is there a heavy sloughing of the wall of the "disappointed womb" with consequent heavy bleeding. The estrus, or period of female "heat," has been replaced by virtually continuous sexual

activity. Copulation is initiated not by response to the conventional primate signals of estrus, such as changes in color of the skin around the female sexual organs and the release of pheromones, but by extended foreplay entailing mutual stimulation by the partners. The traits of physical attraction are, moreover, fixed in nature. They include the pubic hair of both sexes and the protuberant breasts and buttocks of women. The flattened sexual cycle and continuous female attractiveness cement the close marriage bonds that are basic to human social life.

At a distance a perceptive Martian zoologist would regard the globular head as a most significant clue to human biology. The cerebrum of *Homo* was expanded enormously during a relatively short span of evolutionary time (see Figure 27-1). Three million years ago *Australopithecus* had an adult cranial capacity of 400-500 cubic centimeters, comparable to that of the chimpanzee and gorilla. Two million years later its presumptive descendant *Homo erectus* had a capacity of about 1000 cubic centimeters. The next million years saw an increase to 1400-1700 cubic centimeters in Neanderthal man and 900-2000 cubic centimeters in modern *Homo sapiens*. The growth in intelligence that accompanied this enlargement was so great that it cannot yet be measured in any meaningful way. Human beings can be compared among themselves in terms of a few of the basic components of intelligence and creativity. But no scale has been invented that can objectively compare man with chimpanzees and other living primates.




Figure 27-1 The increase in brain size during human evolution. (Redrawn from Pilbeam, 1972.)

We have leaped forward in mental evolution in a way that continues to defy self-analysis. The mental hypertrophy has distorted even the most basic primate social qualities into nearly unrecognizable forms. Individual species of Old World monkeys and apes have notably plastic social organizations; man has extended the trend into a protean ethnicity. Monkeys and apes utilize behavioral scaling to adjust aggressive and sexual interactions; in man the scales have become multidimensional, culturally adjustable, and almost endlessly subtle. Bonding and the practices of reciprocal altruism are rudimentary in other primates; man has expanded them into great networks where individuals consciously alter roles from hour to hour as if changing masks.

It is the task of comparative sociobiology to trace these and other human qualities as closely as possible back through time. Besides adding perspective and perhaps offering some sense of philosophical ease, the exercise will help to identify the behaviors and rules by which individual human beings increase their Darwinian fitness through the manipulation of society. In a phrase, we are searching for the human biogram (Count, 1958; Tiger and Fox, 1971). One of the key questions, never far from the thinking of anthropologists and biologists who pursue real theory, is to what extent the biogram represents an adaptation to modern cultural life and to what extent it is a phylogenetic vestige. Our civilizations were jerrybuilt around the biogram. How have they been influenced by it? Conversely, how much flexibility is there in the biogram, and in which parameters particularly? Experience with other animals indicates that when organs are hypertrophied, phylogeny is hard to reconstruct. This is the crux of the problem of the evolutionary analysis of human behavior. In the remainder of the chapter, human qualities will be discussed insofar as they appear to be general traits of the species. Then current knowledge of the evolution of the biogram will be reviewed, and finally some implications for the planning of future societies will be considered.

Plasticity of Social Organization

The first and most easily verifiable diagnostic trait is statistical in nature. The parameters of social organization, including group size, properties of hierarchies, and rates of gene exchange, vary far more among human populations than among those of any other primate species. The variation exceeds even that occurring between the remaining primate species. Some increase in plasticity is to be expected. It represents the extrapolation of a trend toward variability already apparent in the baboons, chimpanzees, and other cercopithecoids. What is truly surprising, however, is the extreme to which it has been carried.

Why are human societies this flexible? Part of the reason is that

the members themselves vary so much in behavior and achievement. Even in the simplest societies individuals differ greatly. Within a small tribe of !Kung Bushmen can be found individuals who are acknowledged as the "best people"—the leaders and outstanding specialists among the hunters and healers. Even with an emphasis on sharing goods, some are exceptionally able entrepreneurs and unostentatiously acquire a certain amount of wealth. !Kung men, no less than men in advanced industrial societies, generally establish themselves by their mid-thirties or else accept a lesser status for life. There are some who never try to make it, live in run-down huts, and show little pride in themselves or their work (Pfeiffer, 1969). The ability to slip into such roles, shaping one's personality to fit, may itself be adaptive. Human societies are organized by high intelligence, and each member is faced by a mixture of social challenges that taxes all of his ingenuity. This baseline variation is amplified at the group level by other qualities exceptionally pronounced in human societies: the long, close period of socialization; the loose connectedness of the communication networks; the multiplicity of bonds; the capacity, especially within literate cultures, to communicate over long distances and periods of history; and from all these traits, the capacity to dissemble, to manipulate, and to exploit. Each parameter can be altered easily, and each has a marked effect on the final social structure. The result could be the observed variation among societies.

The hypothesis to consider, then, is that genes promoting flexibility in social behavior are strongly selected at the individual level. But note that variation in social organization is only a possible, not a necessary consequence of this process. In order to generate the amount of variation actually observed to occur, it is necessary for there to be multiple adaptive peaks. In other words, different forms of society within the same species must be nearly enough alike in survival ability for many to enjoy long tenure. The result would be a statistical ensemble of kinds of societies which, if not equilibrating, is at least not shifting rapidly toward one particular mode or another. The alternative, found in some social insects, is flexibility in individual behavior and caste development, which nevertheless results in an approach toward uniformity in the statistical distribution of the kinds of individuals when all individuals within a colony are taken together. In honeybees and in ants of the genera *Formica* and *Pogonomyrmex*, "personality" differences are strongly marked even within single castes. Some individuals, referred to by entomologists as the elites, are unusually active, perform more than their share of lifetime work, and incite others to work through facilitation. Other colony members are consistently sluggish. Although they are seemingly healthy and live long lives, their per-individual output is only a small fraction of that of the elites. Specialization also occurs. Certain individuals remain with the brood as nurses far longer than the average, while others concentrate on nest building or foraging. Yet somehow

the total pattern of behavior in the colony converges on the species average. When one colony with its hundreds or thousands of members is compared with another of the same species, the statistical patterns of activity are about the same. We know that some of this consistency is due to negative feedback. As one requirement such as brood care or nest repair intensifies, workers shift their activities to compensate until the need is met, then change back again. Experiments have shown that disruption of the feedback loops, and thence deviation by the colony from the statistical norms, can be disastrous. It is therefore not surprising to find that the loops are both precise and powerful (Wilson, 1971a).

The controls governing human societies are not nearly so strong, and the effects of deviation are not so dangerous. The anthropological literature abounds with examples of societies that contain obvious inefficiencies and even pathological flaws—yet endure. The slave society of Jamaica, compellingly described by Orlando Patterson (1967), was unquestionably pathological by the moral canons of civilized life. "What marks it out is the astonishing neglect and distortion of almost every one of the basic prerequisites of normal human living. This was a society in which clergymen were the 'most finished debauchees' in the land; in which the institution of marriage was officially condemned among both masters and slaves; in which the family was unthinkable to the vast majority of the population and promiscuity the norm; in which education was seen as an absolute waste of time and teachers shunned like the plague; in which the legal system was quite deliberately a travesty of anything that could be called justice; and in which all forms of refinements, of art, of folkways, were either absent or in a state of total disintegration. Only a small proportion of whites, who monopolized almost all of the fertile land in the island, benefited from the system. And these, no sooner had they secured their fortunes, abandoned the land which the production of their own wealth had made unbearable to live in, for the comforts of the mother country." Yet this Hobbesian world lasted for nearly two centuries. The people multiplied while the economy flourished.

The Ik of Uganda are an equally instructive case (Turnbull, 1972). They are former hunters who have made a disastrous shift to cultivation. Always on the brink of starvation, they have seen their culture reduced to a vestige. Their only stated value is *ngag*, or food; their basic notion of goodness (*marangik*) is the individual possession of food in the stomach; and their definition of a good man is *yakwana marang*, "a man who has a full belly." Villages are still built, but the nuclear family has ceased to function as an institution. Children are kept with reluctance and from about three years of age are made to find their own way of life. Marriage ordinarily occurs only when there is a specific need for cooperation. Because of the lack of energy, sexual activity is minimal and its pleasures are con-

sidered to be about on the same level as those of defecation. Death is treated with relief or amusement, since it means more *ngag* for survivors. Because the unfortunate *Ik* are at the lowest sustainable level, there is a temptation to conclude that they are doomed. Yet somehow their society has remained intact and more or less stable for at least 30 years, and it could endure indefinitely.

How can such variation in social structure persist? The explanation may be lack of competition from other species, resulting in what biologists call ecological release. During the past ten thousand years or longer, man as a whole has been so successful in dominating his environment that almost any kind of culture can succeed for a while, so long as it has a modest degree of internal consistency and does not shut off reproduction altogether. No species of ant or termite enjoys this freedom. The slightest inefficiency in constructing nests, in establishing odor trails, or in conducting nuptial flights could result in the quick extinction of the species by predation and competition from other social insects. To a scarcely lesser extent the same is true for social carnivores and primates. In short, animal species tend to be tightly packed in the ecosystem with little room for experimentation or play. Man has temporarily escaped the constraint of interspecific competition. Although cultures replace one another, the process is much less effective than interspecific competition in reducing variance.

It is part of the conventional wisdom that virtually all cultural variation is phenotypic rather than genetic in origin. This view has gained support from the ease with which certain aspects of culture can be altered in the space of a single generation, too quickly to be evolutionary in nature. The drastic alteration in Irish society in the first two years of the potato blight (1846-1848) is a case in point. Another is the shift in the Japanese authority structure during the American occupation following World War II. Such examples can be multiplied endlessly—they are the substance of history. It is also true that human populations are not very different from one another genetically. When Lewontin (1972b) analyzed existing data on nine blood-type systems, he found that 85 percent of the variance was composed of diversity within populations and only 15 percent was due to diversity between populations. There is no *a priori* reason for supposing that this sample of genes possesses a distribution much different from those of other, less accessible systems affecting behavior.

The extreme orthodox view of environmentalism goes further, holding that in effect there is no genetic variance in the transmission of culture. In other words, the capacity for culture is transmitted by a single human genotype. Dobzhansky (1963) stated this hypothesis as follows: "Culture is not inherited through genes, it is acquired by learning from other human beings . . . In a sense, human genes have surrendered their primacy in human evolution to an entirely new,

nonbiological or superorganic agent, culture. However, it should not be forgotten that this agent is entirely dependent on the human genotype." Although the genes have given away most of their sovereignty, they maintain a certain amount of influence in at least the behavioral qualities that underlie variations between cultures. Moderately high heritability has been documented in introversion-extroversion measures, personal tempo, psychomotor and sports activities, neuroticism, dominance, depression, and the tendency toward certain forms of mental illness such as schizophrenia (Parsons, 1967; Lerner, 1968). Even a small portion of this variance invested in population differences might predispose societies toward cultural differences. At the very least, we should try to measure this amount. It is not valid to point to the absence of a behavioral trait in one or a few societies as conclusive evidence that the trait is environmentally induced and has no genetic disposition in man. The very opposite could be true.

In short, there is a need for a discipline of anthropological genetics. In the interval before we acquire it, it should be possible to characterize the human biogram by two indirect methods. First, models can be constructed from the most elementary rules of human behavior. Insofar as they can be tested, the rules will characterize the biogram in much the same way that ethograms drawn by zoologists identify the "typical" behavioral repertoires of animal species. The rules can be legitimately compared with the ethograms of other primate species. Variation in the rules among human cultures, however slight, might provide clues to underlying genetic differences, particularly when it is correlated with variation in behavioral traits known to be heritable. Social scientists have in fact begun to take this first approach, although in a different context from the one suggested here. Abraham Maslow (1954, 1972) postulated that human beings respond to a hierarchy of needs, such that the lower levels must be satisfied before much attention is devoted to the higher ones. The most basic needs are hunger and sleep. When these are met, safety becomes the primary consideration, then the need to belong to a group and receive love, next self-esteem, and finally self-actualization and creativity. The ideal society in Maslow's dream is one which "fosters the fullest development of human potentials, of the fullest degree of humanness." When the biogram is freely expressed, its center of gravity should come to rest in the higher levels. A second social scientist, George C. Homans (1961), has adopted a Skinnerian approach in an attempt to reduce human behavior to the basic processes of associative learning. The rules he postulates are the following:

1. If in the past the occurrence of a particular stimulus-situation has been the occasion on which a man's activity has been rewarded, then the more similar the present stimulus-situation is to the past one, the more likely the man is at the present time to emit this activity or one similar to it.

2. The more often within a given period of time a man's activity rewards the behavior of another, the more often the other will perform the behavior.

3. The more valuable to a man a unit of the activity another gives him, the more often he behaves in the manner rewarded by the activity of the other.

4. The more often a man has in the recent past received a rewarding activity from another, the less valuable any further unit of that activity becomes to him.

Maslow the ethologist and visionary seems a world apart from Homans the behaviorist and reductionist. Yet their approaches are reconcilable. Homans' rules can be viewed as comprising some of the enabling devices by which the human biogram is expressed. His operational word is *reward*, which is in fact the set of all interactions defined by the emotive centers of the brain as desirable. According to evolutionary theory, desirability is measured in units of genetic fitness, and the emotive centers have been programmed accordingly. Maslow's hierarchy is simply the order of priority in the goals toward which the rules are directed.

The other indirect approach to anthropological genetics is through phylogenetic analysis. By comparing man with other primate species, it might be possible to identify basic primate traits that lie beneath the surface and help to determine the configuration of man's higher social behavior. This approach has been taken with great style and vigor in a series of popular books by Konrad Lorenz (*On Aggression*), Robert Ardrey (*The Social Contract*), Desmond Morris (*The Naked Ape*), and Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox (*The Imperial Animal*). Their efforts were salutary in calling attention to man's status as a biological species adapted to particular environments. The wide attention they received broke the stifling grip of the extreme behaviorists, whose view of the mind of man as a virtually equipotent response machine was neither correct nor heuristic. But their particular handling of the problem tended to be inefficient and misleading. They selected one plausible hypothesis or another based on a review of a small sample of animal species, then advocated the explanation to the limit. The weakness of this method was discussed earlier in a more general context (Chapter 2) and does not need repetition here.

The correct approach using comparative ethology is to base a rigorous phylogeny of closely related species on many biological traits. Then social behavior is treated as the dependent variable and its evolution deduced from it. When this cannot be done with confidence (and it cannot in man) the next best procedure is the one outlined in Chapter 7: establish the lowest taxonomic level at which each character shows significant intertaxon variation. Characters that shift from species to species or genus to genus are the most labile. We cannot safely extrapolate them from the cercopithecoid monkeys

and apes to man. In the primates these labile qualities include group size, group cohesiveness, openness of the group to others, involvement of the male in parental care, attention structure, and the intensity and form of territorial defense. Characters are considered conservative if they remain constant at the level of the taxonomic family or throughout the order Primates, and they are the ones most likely to have persisted in relatively unaltered form into the evolution of *Homo*. These conservative traits include aggressive dominance systems, with males generally dominant over females; scaling in the intensity of responses, especially during aggressive interactions; intensive and prolonged maternal care, with a pronounced degree of socialization in the young; and matrilineal social organization. This classification of behavioral traits offers an appropriate basis for hypothesis formation. It allows a qualitative assessment of the probabilities that various behavioral traits have persisted into modern *Homo sapiens*. The possibility of course remains that some labile traits are homologous between man and, say, the chimpanzee. And conversely, some traits conservative throughout the rest of the primates might nevertheless have changed during the origin of man. Furthermore, the assessment is not meant to imply that conservative traits are more genetic—that is, have higher heritability—than labile ones. Lability can be based wholly on genetic differences between species or populations within species. Returning finally to the matter of cultural evolution, we can heuristically conjecture that the traits proven to be labile are also the ones most likely to differ from one human society to another on the basis of genetic differences. The evidence, reviewed in Table 27-1, is not inconsistent with this basic conception. Finally, it is worth special note that the comparative ethological approach does not in any way predict man's unique traits. It is a general rule of evolutionary studies that the direction of quantum jumps is not easily read by phylogenetic extrapolation.

Barter and Reciprocal Altruism

Sharing is rare among the nonhuman primates. It occurs in rudimentary form only in the chimpanzee and perhaps a few other Old World monkeys and apes. But in man it is one of the strongest social traits, reaching levels that match the intense trophallactic exchanges of termites and ants. As a result only man has an economy. His high intelligence and symbolizing ability make true barter possible. Intelligence also permits the exchanges to be stretched out in time, converting them into acts of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). The conventions of this mode of behavior are expressed in the familiar utterances of everyday life:

"Give me some now; I'll repay you later."

Table 27-1 General social traits in human beings, classified according to whether they are unique, belong to a class of behaviors that are variable at the level of the species or genus in the remainder of the primates (labile), or belong to a class of behaviors that are uniform through the remainder of the primates (conservative).

Evolutionarily labile primate traits	Evolutionarily conservative primate traits	Human traits
		SHARED WITH SOME OTHER PRIMATES
Group size		Highly variable
Group cohesiveness		Highly variable
Openness of group to others		Highly variable
Involvement of male in parental care		Strong
Attention structure		Centripetal on leading males
		Highly variable, but territoriality is general
Intensity and form of territorial defense		SHARED WITH ALL OR ALMOST ALL OTHER PRIMATES
	Aggressive dominance systems, with males dominant over females	Consistent with other primates, although variable
	Scaling of responses, especially in aggressive interactions	Consistent with other primates
	Prolonged maternal care; pronounced socialization of young	Consistent with other primates
	Matrilineal organization	Mostly consistent with other primates
		UNIQUE
		True language, elaborate culture
		Sexual activity continuous through menstrual cycle
		Formalized incest taboos and marriage exchange rules with recognition of kinship networks
		Cooperative division of labor between adult males and females

"Come to my aid this time, and I'll be your friend when you need me."

"I really didn't think of the rescue as heroism; it was only what I would expect others to do for me or my family in the same situation."

Money, as Talcott Parsons has been fond of pointing out, has no value in itself. It consists only of bits of metal and scraps of paper by which men pledge to surrender varying amounts of property and services upon demand; in other words it is a quantification of reciprocal altruism.

Perhaps the earliest form of barter in early human societies was the exchange of meat captured by the males for plant food gathered by the females. If living hunter-gatherer societies reflect the primitive state, this exchange formed an important element in a distinctive kind of sexual bond.

Fox (1972), following Lévi-Strauss (1949), has argued from ethnographic evidence that a key early step in human social evolution was the use of women in barter. As males acquired status through the control of females, they used them as objects of exchange to cement alliances and bolster kinship networks. Preliterate societies are characterized by complex rules of marriage that can often be interpreted directly as power brokerage. This is particularly the case where the elementary negative marriage rules, proscribing certain types of unions, are supplemented by positive rules that direct which exchanges must be made. Within individual Australian aboriginal societies two moieties exist between which marriages are permitted. The men of each moiety trade nieces, or more specifically their sisters' daughters. Power accumulates with age, because a man can control the descendants of nieces as remote as the daughter of his sister's daughter. Combined with polygyny, the system insures both political and genetic advantage to the old men of the tribe.

For all its intricacy, the formalization of marital exchanges between tribes has the same approximate genetic effect as the haphazard wandering of male monkeys from one troop to another or the exchange of young mature females between chimpanzee populations. Approximately 7.5 percent of marriages contracted among Australian aborigines prior to European influence were intertribal, and similar rates have been reported in Brazilian Indians and other preliterate societies (Morton, 1969). It will be recalled (Chapter 4) that gene flow of the order of 10 percent per generation is more than enough to counteract fairly intensive natural pressures that tend to differentiate populations. Thus intertribal marital exchanges are a major factor in creating the observed high degree of genetic similarity among populations. The ultimate adaptive basis of exogamy is not gene flow *per se* but rather the avoidance of inbreeding. Again, a 10 percent gene flow is adequate for the purpose.

The microstructure of human social organization is based on sophisticated mutual assessments that lead to the making of contracts.

As Erving Goffman correctly perceived, a stranger is rapidly but politely explored to determine his socioeconomic status, intelligence and education, self-perception, social attitudes, competence, trustworthiness, and emotional stability. The information, much of it subconsciously given and absorbed, has an eminently practical value. The probe must be deep, for the individual tries to create the impression that will gain him the maximum advantage. At the very least he maneuvers to avoid revealing information that will imperil his status. The presentation of self can be expected to contain deceptive elements:

Many crucial facts lie beyond the time and place of interaction or lie concealed within it. For example, the "true" or "real" attitudes, beliefs, and emotions of the individual can be ascertained only indirectly, through his avowals or through what appears to be involuntary expressive behavior. Similarly, if the individual offers the others a product or service, they will often find that during the interaction there will be no time or place immediately available for eating the pudding that the proof can be found in. They will be forced to accept some events as conventional or natural signs of something not directly available to the senses. (Goffman, 1959)

Deception and hypocrisy are neither absolute evils that virtuous men suppress to a minimum level nor residual animal traits waiting to be erased by further social evolution. They are very human devices for conducting the complex daily business of social life. The level in each particular society may represent a compromise that reflects the size and complexity of the society. If the level is too low, others will seize the advantage and win. If it is too high, ostracism is the result. Complete honesty on all sides is not the answer. The old primate frankness would destroy the delicate fabric of social life that has built up in human populations beyond the limits of the immediate clan. As Louis J. Halle correctly observed, good manners have become a substitute for love.

Bonding, Sex, and Division of Labor

The building block of nearly all human societies is the nuclear family (Reynolds, 1968; Leibowitz, 1968). The populace of an American industrial city, no less than a band of hunter-gatherers in the Australian desert, is organized around this unit. In both cases the family moves between regional communities, maintaining complex ties with primary kin by means of visits (or telephone calls and letters) and the exchange of gifts. During the day the women and children remain in the residential area while the men forage for game or its symbolic equivalent in the form of barter and money. The males cooperate in bands to hunt or deal with neighboring groups. If not actually blood relations, they tend at least to act as "bands of brothers." Sexual bonds are carefully contracted in observance with tribal customs and are

intended to be permanent. Polygamy, either covert or explicitly sanctioned by custom, is practiced predominantly by the males. Sexual behavior is nearly continuous through the menstrual cycle and marked by extended foreplay. Morris (1967a), drawing on the data of Masters and Johnson (1966) and others, has enumerated the unique features of human sexuality that he considers to be associated with the loss of body hair: the rounded and protuberant breasts of the young woman, the flushing of areas of skin during coition, the vaso-dilation and increased erogenous sensitivity of the lips, soft portions of the nose, ear, nipples, areolae, and genitals, and the large size of the male penis, especially during erection. As Darwin himself noted in 1871, even the naked skin of the woman is used as a sexual releaser. All of these alterations serve to cement the permanent bonds, which are unrelated in time to the moment of ovulation. Estrus has been reduced to a vestige, to the consternation of those who attempt to practice birth control by the rhythm method. Sexual behavior has been largely dissociated from the act of fertilization. It is ironic that religionists who forbid sexual activity except for purposes of procreation should do so on the basis of "natural law." Theirs is a misguided effort in comparative ethology, based on the incorrect assumption that in reproduction man is essentially like other animals.

The extent and formalization of kinship prevailing in almost all human societies are also unique features of the biology of our species. Kinship systems provide at least three distinct advantages. First, they bind alliances between tribes and subtribal units and provide a conduit for the conflict-free emigration of young members. Second, they are an important part of the bartering system by which certain males achieve dominance and leadership. Finally, they serve as a homeostatic device for seeing groups through hard times. When food grows scarce, tribal units can call on their allies for altruistic assistance in a way unknown in other social primates. The Athapaskan Dogrib Indians, a hunter-gatherer people of the northwestern Canadian arctic, provide one example. The Athapaskans are organized loosely by the bilateral primary linkage principle (June Helm, 1968). Local bands wander through a common territory, making intermittent contacts and exchanging members by intermarriage. When famine strikes, the endangered bands can coalesce with those temporarily better off. A second example is the Yanomamö of South America, who rely on kin when their crops are destroyed by enemies (Chagnon, 1968).

As societies evolved from bands through tribes into chiefdoms and states, some of the modes of bonding were extended beyond kinship networks to include other kinds of alliances and economic agreements. Because the networks were then larger, the lines of communication longer, and the interactions more diverse, the total systems became vastly more complex. But the moralistic rules underlying these arrangements appear not to have been altered a great deal. The average individual still operates under a formalized code no more elaborate than that governing the members of hunter-gatherer societies.

Role Playing and Polyethism

The superman, like the super-ant or super-wolf, can never be an individual; it is the society, whose members diversify and cooperate to create a composite well beyond the capacity of any conceivable organism. Human societies have effloresced to levels of extreme complexity because their members have the intelligence and flexibility to play roles of virtually any degree of specification, and to switch them as the occasion demands. Modern man is an actor of many parts who may well be stretched to his limit by the constantly shifting demands of his environment. As Goffman (1961) observed, "Perhaps there are times when an individual does march up and down like a wooden soldier, tightly rolled up in a particular role. It is true that here and there we can pounce on a moment when an individual sits fully astride a single role, head erect, eyes front, but the next moment the picture is shattered into many pieces and the individual divides into different persons holding the ties of different spheres of life by his hands, by his teeth, and by his grimaces. When seen up close, the individual, bringing together in various ways all the connections he has in life, becomes a blur." Little wonder that the most acute inner problem of modern man is identity.

Roles in human societies are fundamentally different from the castes of social insects. The members of human societies sometimes cooperate closely in insectan fashion, but more frequently they compete for the limited resources allocated to their role-sector. The best and most entrepreneurial of the role-actors usually gain a disproportionate share of the rewards, while the least successful are displaced to other, less desirable positions. In addition, individuals attempt to move to higher socioeconomic positions by changing roles. Competition between classes also occurs, and in great moments of history it has proved to be a determinant of societal change.

A key question of human biology is whether there exists a genetic predisposition to enter certain classes and to play certain roles. Circumstances can be easily conceived in which such genetic differentiation might occur. The heritability of at least some parameters of intelligence and emotive traits is sufficient to respond to a moderate amount of disruptive selection. Dahlberg (1947) showed that if a single gene appears that is responsible for success and an upward shift in status, it can be rapidly concentrated in the uppermost socioeconomic classes. Suppose, for example, there are two classes, each beginning with only a 1 percent frequency of the homozygotes of the upward-mobile gene. Suppose further that 50 percent of the homozygotes in the lower class are transferred upward in each generation. Then in only ten generations, depending on the relative sizes of the groups, the upper class will be comprised of as many as 20 percent homozygotes or more and the lower class of as few as 0.5 percent or less. Using a similar argument, Herrnstein (1971b) proposed that as environmental opportunities become more nearly equal

within societies, socioeconomic groups will be defined increasingly by genetically based differences in intelligence.

A strong initial bias toward such stratification is created when one human population conquers and subjugates another, a common enough event in human history. Genetic differences in mental traits, however slight, tend to be preserved by the raising of class barriers, racial and cultural discrimination, and physical ghettos. The geneticist C. D. Darlington (1969), among others, postulated this process to be a prime source of genetic diversity within human societies.

Yet despite the plausibility of the general argument, there is little evidence of any hereditary solidification of status. The castes of India have been in existence for 2000 years, more than enough time for evolutionary divergence, but they differ only slightly in blood type and other measurable anatomical and physiological traits. Powerful forces can be identified that work against the genetic fixation of caste differences. First, cultural evolution is too fluid. Over a period of decades or at most centuries ghettos are replaced, races and subject people are liberated, the conquerors are conquered. Even within relatively stable societies the pathways of upward mobility are numerous. The daughters of lower classes tend to marry upward. Success in commerce or political life can launch a family from virtually any socioeconomic group into the ruling class in a single generation. Furthermore, there are many Dahlberg genes, not just the one postulated for argument in the simplest model. The hereditary factors of human success are strongly polygenic and form a long list, only a few of which have been measured. IQ constitutes only one subset of the components of intelligence. Less tangible but equally important qualities are creativity, entrepreneurship, drive, and mental stamina. Let us assume that the genes contributing to these qualities are scattered over many chromosomes. Assume further that some of the traits are uncorrelated or even negatively correlated. Under these circumstances only the most intense forms of disruptive selection could result in the formation of stable ensembles of genes. A much more likely circumstance is the one that apparently prevails: the maintenance of a large amount of genetic diversity within societies and the loose correlation of some of the genetically determined traits with success. This scrambling process is accelerated by the continuous shift in the fortunes of individual families from one generation to the next.

Even so, the influence of genetic factors toward the assumption of certain broad roles cannot be discounted. Consider male homosexuality. The surveys of Kinsey and his coworkers showed that in the 1940's approximately 10 percent of the sexually mature males in the United States were mainly or exclusively homosexual for at least three years prior to being interviewed. Homosexuality is also exhibited by comparably high fractions of the male populations in many if not most other cultures. Kallmann's twin data indicate the probable existence of a genetic predisposition toward the condition. Accordingly, Hutchinson (1959) suggested that the homosexual genes may

possess superior fitness in heterozygous conditions. His reasoning followed lines now standard in the thinking of population genetics. The homosexual state itself results in inferior genetic fitness, because of course homosexual men marry much less frequently and have far fewer children than their unambiguously heterosexual counterparts. The simplest way genes producing such a condition can be maintained in evolution is if they are superior in the heterozygous state, that is, if heterozygotes survive into maturity better, produce more offspring, or both. An interesting alternative hypothesis has been suggested to me by Herman T. Spieth (personal communication) and independently developed by Robert L. Trivers (1974). The homosexual members of primitive societies may have functioned as helpers, either while hunting in company with other men or in more domestic occupations at the dwelling sites. Freed from the special obligations of parental duties, they could have operated with special efficiency in assisting close relatives. Genes favoring homosexuality could then be sustained at a high equilibrium level by kin selection alone. It remains to be said that if such genes really exist they are almost certainly incomplete in penetrance and variable in expressivity, meaning that which bearers of the genes develop the behavioral trait and to what degree depend on the presence or absence of modifier genes and the influence of the environment.

Other basic types might exist, and perhaps the clues lie in full sight. In his study of British nursery children Blurton Jones (1969) distinguished two apparently basic behavioral types. "Verbalists," a small minority, often remained alone, seldom moved about, and almost never joined in rough-and-tumble play. They talked a great deal and spent much of their time looking at books. The other children were "doers." They joined groups, moved around a great deal, and spent much of their time painting and making objects instead of talking. Blurton Jones speculated that the dichotomy results from an early divergence in behavioral development persisting into maturity. Should it prove general it might contribute fundamentally to diversity within cultures. There is no way of knowing whether the divergence is ultimately genetic in origin or triggered entirely by experiential events at an early age.

Communication

All of man's unique social behavior pivots on his use of language, which is itself unique. In any language words are given arbitrary definitions within each culture and ordered according to a grammar that imparts new meaning above and beyond the definitions. The fully symbolic quality of the words and the sophistication of the grammar permit the creation of messages that are potentially infinite in number. Even communication about the system itself is made possible. This is the essential nature of human language. The basic attributes can be broken down, and other features of the transmission proc-

ess itself can be added, to make a total of 16 design features (C. F. Hockett, reviewed by Thorpe, 1972a). Most of the features are found in at least rudimentary form in some other animal species. But the productivity and richness of human languages cannot be remotely approached even by chimpanzees taught to employ signs in simple sentences. The development of human speech represents a quantum jump in evolution comparable to the assembly of the eucaryotic cell.

Even without words human communication would be the richest known. The study of nonverbal communication has become a flourishing branch of the social sciences. Its codification is made difficult by the auxiliary role so many of the signals play to verbal communication. Categories of these signals are often defined inconsistently, and classifications are rarely congruent (see, for example, Renský, 1966; Crystal, 1969; Lyons, 1972). In Table 27-2 a composite arrangement is presented that I hope is both free of internal contradiction and consistent with current usage. The number of nonvocal signals, including all facial expressions, body postures and movement, and touch, probably number somewhat in excess of 100. Brannigan and Humphries (1972) have made a list of 136, which they believe is close to exhaustive. The number is consistent with the wholly independent estimate of Birdwhistle (1970), who believes that although the human face is capable of as many as 250,000 expressions, less than 100 sets of the expressions comprise distinct, meaningful symbols. Vocal paralinguistic signals, insofar as it can be separated from the prosodic modifications of true speech, has not been cataloged so painstakingly. Grant (1969) recognized 6 distinct sounds, but several times this number would probably be distinguished by a zoologist accustomed to preparing ethograms of other primate species. In summary, all paralinguistic signals taken together almost certainly exceed 150 and may be close to 200. This repertoire is larger than that of the majority of other mammals and birds by a factor of three or more, and it exceeds

slightly the total repertoires of both the rhesus monkey and chimpanzee.

Another useful distinction in the analysis of human paralinguistic can be made between signals that are prelinguistic, defined as having been in service before the evolutionary origin of true language, and those that are postlinguistic. The postlinguistic signals are most likely to have originated as pure auxiliaries to speech. One approach to the problem is through the phylogenetic analysis of the relevant properties of primate communication. Hooft (1972), for example, has established the homologues of smiling and laughing in facial expressions of the cercopithecoid monkeys and apes, thus classifying these human behaviors among our most primitive and universal signals.

Human language, as Marler (1965) argued, probably stemmed from richly graded vocal signals not unlike those employed by the rhesus monkey and chimpanzee, as opposed to the more discrete sounds characterizing the repertoires of some of the lower primates. Human infants can utter a wide variety of vocalizations resembling those of macaques, baboons, and chimpanzees. But very early in their development they convert to the peculiar sounds of human speech. Multiple plosives, fricatives, nasals, vowels, and other sounds are combined to create the 40 or so basic phonemes. The human mouth and upper respiratory tract have been strongly modified to permit this vocal competence (see Figure 27-2). The crucial changes are associated with man's upright posture, which may have provided the initial but still incomplete impetus toward the present modification. With the face directed fully forward, the mouth gave way to the upper pharyngeal space at a 90-degree angle. This configuration helped to push the rear of the tongue back until it formed part of the forward wall of the upper pharyngeal tract. Simultaneously the pharyngeal space and the epiglottis were both considerably lengthened.

These two principal changes, the shift in tongue position and lengthening of the pharyngeal tract, were responsible for the versatility in sound production. When air is forced upward through the vocal cords it generates a buzzing noise that can be varied in intensity and duration but not in the all-important qualities of tone that produce phoneme differentiation. The latter effect is achieved as the air passes up through the pharyngeal tract and mouth cavity and out through the mouth. These structures together form an air tube which, like any cylinder, serves as a resonator. When its position and shape are altered, the tube emphasizes different combinations of frequencies emanating from the vocal cords. The result, illustrated in Figure 27-2, is the sounds we distinguish as phonemes (see also Lenneberg, 1967, and Denes and Pinson, 1973).

However, the great advance in language acquisition did not come from the ability to form many sounds. After all, it is theoretically possible for a highly intelligent being to speak only a *single* word and still communicate rapidly. It need only be programmed like a

Table 27-2 The modes of human communication.

I. Verbal Communication (Language): the utterance of words and sentences
II. Non-verbal Communication
A. <i>Prosody</i> : tone, tempo, rhythm, loudness, pacing, and other qualities of voice that modify the meaning of verbal utterances
B. <i>Paralanguage</i> : signals separate from words used to supplement or to modify language
1. Vocal paralanguage: grunts, giggles, laughs, sobs, cries, and other nonverbal sounds
2. Nonverbal paralanguage: body posture, motion, and touch (kinesic communication); possibly also chemical communication




Figure 27-2 The human vocal apparatus has been modified in a way that greatly increases the variety of sounds that can be produced. The versatility was an essential accompaniment of the evolution of human speech. The upper diagrams show the ways in which man differs from the chimpanzee and other nonhuman primates: the angulation between the mouth and the upper respiratory tract is increased, the pharyngeal space is lengthened, and the back half of the tongue has come to form the front wall of the long tract above the vocal cords. The lower diagrams illustrate how movement of the tongue changes the shape of the air space to generate different sounds. (Modified from Howells, 1973, and Denes and Pinson, 1973.)

digital computer. Variation in loudness, duration, and pacing could be added to increase the transmission rate still more. It will be recalled that a single chemical substance, if modulated perfectly under ideal conditions, can generate up to 10,000 bits per second, far in excess of the capacity of human speech. Human languages gain their power instead from syntax, the dependence of meaning on the linear ordering of words. Each language possesses a grammar, the set of rules governing syntax. To truly understand the nature and origin of grammar would be to understand a great deal about the construction of the human mind. It is possible to distinguish three competing models that attempt to describe the known rules:

First Hypothesis: *Probabilistic left-to-right model*. The explanation favored by extreme behavioristic psychologists is that the occurrence of a word is Markovian, meaning that its probability is determined by the immediately preceding word or string of words. The developing child learns which words to link together in each appropriate circumstance.

Second Hypothesis: *Learned deep-structure model*. There exist a limited number of formal principles by which phrases of words are combined and juxtaposed to create various meanings. The child more or less unconsciously learns the deep structure of his own culture. Although the principles are finite in number, the sentences that can be generated from them are infinite in number. Animals cannot speak simply because they lack the necessary level of cognitive or intellectual ability, not because of the absence of any special "language faculty."

Third Hypothesis: *Innate deep-structure model*. The formal principles exist as suggested in hypothesis number two, but they are partially or wholly genetic. In other words, at least some of the principles emerge by maturation in an invariant manner. A corollary of this proposition is that much of the deep structure of grammar is widespread if not universal in mankind, notwithstanding the profound differences in surface structure and word meaning that exist between languages. A second corollary is that animals cannot speak because they lack this inborn language faculty, which is a qualitatively unique human property and not simply an outcome of man's quantitatively superior intelligence. The innate deep-structure model is the one that has come to be associated most prominently with the name of Noam Chomsky, and appears to be currently favored by most psycholinguists.

The probabilistic left-to-right model has already been eliminated, at least in its extreme version. The number of transitional probabilities a child would have to learn in order to compute in a language such as English is enormous, and there is simply not enough time in childhood to master them all (Miller, Galanter, and Pribram, 1960). Grammatical rules are actually learned very rapidly and in a predict-

able sequence, with the child passing through forms of construction that anticipate the adult form while differing significantly from it (Brown, 1973). This kind of ontogeny is typical of the maturation of innate components of animal behavior. Nevertheless, the similarity cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of a genetic program general to humanity.

The ultimate resolution of the problem, as Roger Brown and other developmental psycholinguists have stressed, cannot be achieved until deep grammar itself has been securely characterized. This is a relatively new area of investigation, scarcely dating beyond Chomsky's *Syntactic Structures* (1957). From the beginning it has been marked by a complicated, rapidly shifting argumentation. The basic ideas have been presented in recent reviews by Slobin (1971) and Chomsky (1972). Here it will suffice to define the main processes recognized by the new linguistic analysis. *Phrase structure grammar*, which is exemplified in Figure 27-3, consists of the rules by which sentences are built up in a hierarchical manner. Phrases can be thought of as modules that are substituted for other, equivalent modules or added *de novo* into sentences to change meanings. These elements cannot be split and the parts interchanged without creating serious difficulties. In the example "The boy hit the ball," "the ball" is intuitively such a unit. It can be easily taken out and replaced with some other phrase such as "the shuttlecock" or simply the word "it." The combination "hit the" is not such a unit. Despite the fact that the two words are juxtaposed, they cannot be easily replaced without creating difficulties for the construction of the entire remainder of the sentence. By observing the rules we all know subconsciously, the sentence can be expanded by the insertion of appropriately selected phrases: *After taking his position, the little boy swung twice and finally hit the ball and ran to first base.*

In short, phrase structure grammar decrees the ways in which phrases can be formed. It generates what has been called the deep structure of the word strings as opposed to the surface structure, or the mere order in which the individual words appear. But of course the sequences in which phrases and terminal words appear are crucial to the meaning of the sentence. "The boy hit the ball" is very different from "What did the boy hit?" even though the deep (phrase) structure is similar. The rules by which the deep structures are converted into surface structures by the assembling of phrases are called *transformational grammar*. A transformation is an operation that converts one phrase structure into another. Among the most basic operations are substitutions ("what" for "the ball"), displacement (placing "what" before the verb), and permutation (switching the positions of related words).

The psycholinguists have described, for English, both phrase structure and transformational grammar. The evidence does not appear

RULES OF PHRASE STRUCTURE GRAMMAR

1. SENTENCE → NOUN PHRASE + VERB PHRASE
2. NOUN PHRASE → ARTICLE + NOUN
3. VERB PHRASE → VERB + NOUN PHRASE
4. ARTICLE → the, a
5. NOUN → boy, girl, ball
6. VERB → hit

TREE OF PHRASE STRUCTURES




Figure 27-3 An example of the rules of phrase structure grammar in the English language. The simple sentence "The boy hit the ball" is seen to consist of a hierarchy of phrases. At each level one phrase can be substituted for another of equivalent composition, but the phrases cannot be split and their elements interchanged. (Based on Slobin, 1971.)

to be adequate, however, to choose between hypotheses two and three, in other words to decide whether the grammars are innately programmed or whether they are learned. The basic operations of transformation occur in all known human languages. However, this observation by itself does not establish that the precise rules of transformation are the same.

Is there a universal grammar? This question is difficult to answer because most attempts to generalize the rules of deep grammar have been based on the semantic content of one particular language. Students of the subject seldom confront the problem as if it were genuinely scientific, in a way that would reveal how concrete and soluble it might be. In fact, natural scientists are easily frustrated by the diffuse, oblique quality of much of the psycholinguistic literature, which often seems unconcerned with the usual canons of proposition and evidence. The reason is that many of the writers, including Chomsky, are structuralists in the tradition of Lévi-Strauss and Piaget.

They approach the subject with the implicit world view that the processes of the human mind are indeed structured, and also discrete, enumerable, and evolutionarily unique with no great need to be referred to the formulations of other scientific disciplines. The analysis is nontheoretical in the sense that it fails to argue from postulates that can be tested and extended empirically. Some psychologists, including Roger Brown and his associates and Fodor and Garrett (1966), have adduced testable propositions and pursued them with mixed results, but the trail of speculation on deep grammar has not been easy to follow even for these skillful experimentalists.

Like poet naturalists, the structuralists celebrate idiosyncratic personal visions. They argue from hidden premises, relying largely on metaphor and exemplification, and with little regard for the method of multiple competing hypotheses. Clearly, this discipline, one of the most important in all of science, is ripe for the application of rigorous theory and properly meshed experimental investigation.

A key question that the new linguistics may never answer is when human language originated. Did speech appear with the first use of stone tools and the construction of shelters by the *Australopithecus* man-apes, over two million years ago? Or did it await the emergence of fully modern *Homo sapiens*, perhaps even the development of religious rites in the past 100,000 years? Lieberman (1968) believes that the date was relatively recent. He interprets the Makapan *Australopithecus* restored by Dart to fall close to the chimpanzee in the form of its palate and pharyngeal tract. If he is right, this early hominid might not have been able to articulate the sounds of human speech. The same conclusion has been drawn with respect to the anatomy and vocal capacity of the Neanderthal man (Lieberman et al., 1972), which if true places the origin of language in the latest stages of speciation in the genus *Homo*. Other theoretical aspects of the evolutionary origin of human speech have been discussed by Jane Hill (1972) and I. G. Mattingly (1972). Lenneberg (1971) has hypothesized that the capacity for mathematical reasoning originated as a slight modification of linguistic ability.

Culture, Ritual, and Religion

The rudiments of culture are possessed by higher primates other than man, including the Japanese monkey and chimpanzee (Chapter 7), but only in man has culture thoroughly infiltrated virtually every aspect of life. Ethnographic detail is genetically underprescribed, resulting in great amounts of diversity among societies. Underprescription does not mean that culture has been freed from the genes. What has evolved is the capacity for culture, indeed the overwhelming tendency to develop one culture or another. Robin Fox (1971) put the argument in the following form. If the proverbial experiments

of the pharaoh Psammetichos and James IV of Scotland had worked, and children reared in isolation somehow survived in good health,

I do not doubt that they *could* speak and that, theoretically, given time, they or their offspring would invent and develop a language despite their never having been taught one. Furthermore, this language, although totally different from any known to us, would be analyzable by linguists on the same basis as other languages and translatable into all known languages. But I would push this further. If our new Adam and Eve could survive and breed—still in total isolation from any cultural influences—then eventually they would produce a society which would have laws about property, rules about incest and marriage, customs of taboo and avoidance, methods of settling disputes with a minimum of bloodshed, beliefs about the supernatural and practices relating to it, a system of social status and methods of indicating it, initiation ceremonies for young men, courtship practices including the adornment of females, systems of symbolic body adornment generally, certain activities and associations set aside for men from which women were excluded, gambling of some kind, a tool- and weapon-making industry, myths and legends, dancing, adultery, and various doses of homicide, suicide, homosexuality, schizophrenia, psychosis and neuroses, and various practitioners to take advantage of or cure these, depending on how they are viewed.

Culture, including the more resplendent manifestations of ritual and religion, can be interpreted as a hierarchical system of environmental tracking devices. In Chapter 7 the totality of biological responses, from millisecond-quick biochemical reactions to gene substitutions requiring generations, was described as such a system. At that time culture was placed within the scheme at the slow end of the time scale. Now this conception can be extended. To the extent that the specific details of culture are nongenetic, they can be decoupled from the biological system and arrayed beside it as an auxiliary system. The span of the purely cultural tracking system parallels much of the slower segment of the biological tracking system, ranging from days to generations. Among the fastest cultural responses in industrial civilizations are fashions in dress and speech. Somewhat slower are political ideology and social attitudes toward other nations, while the slowest of all include incest taboos and the belief or disbelief in particular high gods. It is useful to hypothesize that cultural details are for the most part adaptive in a Darwinian sense, even though some may operate indirectly through enhanced group survival (Washburn and Howell, 1960; Masters, 1970). A second proposition worth considering, to make the biological analogy complete, is that the rate of change in a particular set of cultural behaviors reflects the rate of change in the environmental features to which the behaviors are keyed.

Slowly changing forms of culture tend to be encapsulated in ritual. Some social scientists have drawn an analogy between human ceremonies and the displays of animal communication. This is not correct. Most animal displays are discrete signals conveying limited

meaning. They are commensurate with the postures, facial expressions, and elementary sounds of human paralanguage. A few animal displays, such as the most complex forms of sexual advertisement and nest changing in birds, are so impressively elaborate that they have occasionally been termed ceremonies by zoologists. But even here the comparison is misleading. Most human rituals have more than just an immediate signal value. As Durkheim stressed, they not only label but reaffirm and rejuvenate the moral values of the community.

The sacred rituals are the most distinctively human. Their most elementary forms are concerned with magic, the active attempt to manipulate nature and the gods. Upper Paleolithic art from the caves of Western Europe shows a preoccupation with game animals. There are many scenes showing spears and arrows embedded in the bodies of the prey. Other drawings depict men dancing in animal disguises or standing with heads bowed in front of animals. Probably the function of the drawings was sympathetic magic, based on the quite logical notion that what is done with an image will come to pass with the real thing. This anticipatory action is comparable to the intention movements of animals, which in the course of evolution have often been ritualized into communicative signals. The waggle dance of the honeybee, it will be recalled, is a miniaturized rehearsal of the flight from the nest to the food. Primitive man might have understood the meaning of such complex animal behavior easily. Magic was, and still is in some societies, practiced by special people variously called shamans, sorcerers, or medicine men. They alone were believed to have the secret knowledge and power to deal effectively with the supernatural, and as such their influence sometimes exceeded that of the tribal headmen.

Formal religion *sensu stricto* has many elements of magic but is focused on deeper, more tribally oriented beliefs. Its rites celebrate the creation myths, propitiate the gods, and resanctify the tribal moral codes. Instead of a shaman controlling physical power, there is a priest who communes with the gods and carries their favor through obedience, sacrifice, and the proffered evidences of tribal good behavior. In more complex societies, polity and religion have always blended naturally. Power belonged to kings by divine right, but high priests often ruled over kings by virtue of the higher rank of the gods.

It is a reasonable hypothesis that magic and totemism constituted direct adaptations to the environment and preceded formal religion in social evolution. Sacred traditions occur almost universally in human societies. So do myths that explain the origin of man or at the very least the relation of the tribe to the rest of the world. But belief in high gods is not universal. Among 81 hunter-gatherer societies surveyed by Whiting (1968), only 28, or 35 percent, included high gods in their sacred traditions. The concept of an active, moral God who created the world is even less widespread. Furthermore, this concept most commonly arises with a pastoral way of life. The greater

Table 27-3 The religious beliefs of 66 agrarian societies, partitioned according to the percentage of subsistence derived from herding. (From *Human Societies* by G. and Jean Lenski. Copyright © 1970 by McGraw-Hill Book Company. Used with permission.)

Percentage of subsistence from herding	Percentage of societies believing in an active, moral creator God	Number of societies
36-45	92	13
26-35	82	28
16-25	40	20
6-15	20	5

the dependence on herding, the more likely the belief in a shepherd god of the Judaeo-Christian model (see Table 27-3). In other kinds of societies the belief occurs in 10 percent or less of the cases. Also, the God of monotheistic religions is always male. This strong patriarchal tendency has several cultural sources (Lenski, 1970). Pastoral societies are highly mobile, tightly organized, and often militant, all features that tip the balance toward male authority. It is also significant that herding, the main economic base, is primarily the responsibility of men. Because the Hebrews were originally a herding people, the Bible describes God as a shepherd and the chosen people as his sheep. Islam, one of the strictest of all monotheistic faiths, grew to early power among the herding people of the Arabian peninsula. The intimate relation of the shepherd to his flock apparently provides a microcosm which stimulates deeper questioning about the relation of man to the powers that control him.

An increasingly sophisticated anthropology has not given reason to doubt Max Weber's conclusion that more elementary religions seek the supernatural for the purely mundane rewards of long life, abundant land and food, the avoidance of physical catastrophes, and the defeat of enemies. A form of group selection also operates in the competition between sects. Those that gain adherents survive; those that cannot, fail. Consequently, religions, like other human institutions, evolve so as to further the welfare of their practitioners. Because this demographic benefit applies to the group as a whole, it can be gained in part by altruism and exploitation, with certain segments profiting at the expense of others. Alternatively, it can arise as the sum of generally increased individual fitnesses. The resulting distinction in social terms is between the more oppressive and the more beneficent religions. All religions are probably oppressive to some degree, especially when they are promoted by chiefdoms and states. The tendency is intensified when societies compete, since religion can be effectively harnessed to the purposes of warfare and economic exploitation.

The enduring paradox of religion is that so much of its substance

is demonstrably false, yet it remains a driving force in all societies. Men would rather believe than know, have the void as purpose, as Nietzsche said, than be void of purpose. At the turn of the century Durkheim rejected the notion that such force could really be extracted from "a tissue of illusions." And since that time social scientists have sought the psychological Rosetta stone that might clarify the deeper truths of religious reasoning. In a penetrating analysis of this subject, Rappaport (1971) proposed that virtually all forms of sacred rites serve the purposes of communication. In addition to institutionalizing the moral values of the community, the ceremonies can offer information on the strength and wealth of tribes and families. Among the Maring of New Guinea there are no chiefs or other leaders who command allegiance in war. A group gives a ritual dance, and individual men indicate their willingness to give military support by whether they attend the dance or not. The strength of the consortium can then be precisely determined by a head count. In more advanced societies military parades, embellished by the paraphernalia and rituals of the state religion, serve the same purpose. The famous potlatch ceremonies of the Northwest Coast Indians enable individuals to advertise their wealth by the amount of goods they give away. Rituals also regularize relationships in which there would otherwise be ambiguity and wasteful imprecision. The best examples of this mode of communication are the *rites de passage*. As a boy matures his transition from child to man is very gradual in a biological and psychological sense. There will be times when he behaves like a child when an adult response would have been more appropriate, and vice versa. The society has difficulty in classifying him one way or the other. The *rite de passage* eliminates this ambiguity by arbitrarily changing the classification from a continuous gradient into a dichotomy. It also serves to cement the ties of the young person to the adult group that accepts him.

To sanctify a procedure or a statement is to certify it as beyond question and imply punishment for anyone who dares to contradict it. So removed is the sacred from the profane in everyday life that simply to repeat it in the wrong circumstance is a transgression. This extreme form of certification, the heart of all religions, is granted to the practices and dogmas that serve the most vital interests of the group. The individual is prepared by the sacred rituals for supreme effort and self-sacrifice. Overwhelmed by shibboleths, special costumes, and the sacred dancing and music so accurately keyed to his emotive centers he has a "religious experience." He is ready to reassert allegiance to his tribe and family, perform charities, consecrate his life, leave for the hunt, join the battle, die for God and country. *Deus vult* was the rallying cry of the First Crusade. God wills it, but the summed Darwinian fitness of the tribe was the ultimate if unrecognized beneficiary.

It was Henri Bergson who first identified a second force leading

to the formalization of morality and religion. The extreme plasticity of human social behavior is both a great strength and a real danger. If each family worked out rules of behavior on its own, the result would be an intolerable amount of tradition drift and growing chaos. To counteract selfish behavior and the "dissolving power" of high intelligence, each society must codify itself. Within broad limits virtually any set of conventions works better than none at all. Because arbitrary codes work, organizations tend to be inefficient and marred by unnecessary inequities. As Rappaport succinctly expressed it, "Sanctification transforms the arbitrary into the necessary, and regulatory mechanisms which are arbitrary are likely to be sanctified." The process engenders criticism, and in the more literate and self-conscious societies visionaries and revolutionaries set out to change the system. Reform meets repression, because to the extent that the rules have been sanctified and mythologized, the majority of the people regard them as beyond question, and disagreement is defined as blasphemy.

This leads us to the essentially biological question of the evolution of indoctrinability (Campbell, 1972). Human beings are absurdly easy to indoctrinate—they *seek* it. If we assume for argument that indoctrinability evolves, at what level does natural selection take place? One extreme possibility is that the group is the unit of selection. When conformity becomes too weak, groups become extinct. In this version selfish, individualistic members gain the upper hand and multiply at the expense of others. But their rising prevalence accelerates the vulnerability of the society and hastens its extinction. Societies containing higher frequencies of conformer genes replace those that disappear, thus raising the overall frequency of the genes in the metapopulation of societies. The spread of the genes will occur more rapidly if the metapopulation (for example, a tribal complex) is simultaneously enlarging its range. Formal models of the process, presented in Chapter 5, show that if the rate of societal extinction is high enough relative to the intensity of the counteracting individual selection, the altruistic genes can rise to moderately high levels. The genes might be of the kind that favors indoctrinability even at the expense of the individuals who submit. For example, the willingness to risk death in battle can favor group survival at the expense of the genes that permitted the fatal military discipline. The group-selection hypothesis is sufficient to account for the evolution of indoctrinability.

The competing, individual-level hypothesis is equally sufficient. It states that the ability of individuals to conform permits them to enjoy the benefits of membership with a minimum of energy expenditure and risk. Although their selfish rivals may gain a momentary advantage, it is lost in the long run through ostracism and repression. The conformists perform altruistic acts, perhaps even to the extent of risking their lives, not because of self-denying genes selected at

the group level but because the group is occasionally able to take advantage of the indoctrinability which on other occasions is favorable to the individual.

The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Group and individual selection can be reinforcing. If war requires spartan virtues and eliminates some of the warriors, victory can more than adequately compensate the survivors in land, power, and the opportunity to reproduce. The average individual will win the inclusive fitness game, making the gamble profitable, because the summed efforts of the participants give the average member a more than compensatory edge.

Ethics

Scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologized. The subject at present consists of several oddly disjunct conceptualizations. The first is *ethical intuitionism*, the belief that the mind has a direct awareness of true right and wrong that it can formalize by logic and translate into rules of social action. The purest guiding precept of secular Western thought has been the theory of the social contract as formulated by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In our time the precept has been rewoven into a solid philosophical system by John Rawls (1971). His imperative is that justice should be not merely integral to a system of government but rather the object of the original contract. The principles called by Rawls "justice as fairness" are those which free and rational persons would choose if they were beginning an association from a position of equal advantage and wished to define the fundamental rules of the association. In judging the appropriateness of subsequent laws and behavior, it would be necessary to test their conformity to the unchallengeable starting position.

The Achilles heel of the intuitionist position is that it relies on the emotive judgment of the brain as though that organ must be treated as a black box. While few will disagree that justice as fairness is an ideal state for disembodied spirits, the conception is in no way explanatory or predictive with reference to human beings. Consequently, it does not consider the ultimate ecological or genetic consequences of the rigorous prosecution of its conclusions. Perhaps explanation and prediction will not be needed for the millennium. But this is unlikely—the human genotype and the ecosystem in which it evolved were fashioned out of extreme unfairness. In either case the full exploration of the neural machinery of ethical judgment is desirable and already in progress. One such effort, constituting the second mode of conceptualization, can be called *ethical behaviorism*. Its basic proposition, which has been expanded most fully by J. F. Scott (1971), holds that moral commitment is entirely learned, with

operant conditioning being the dominant mechanism. In other words, children simply internalize the behavioral norms of the society. Opposing this theory is the *developmental-genetic conception* of ethical behavior. The best-documented version has been provided by Lawrence Kohlberg (1969). Kohlberg's viewpoint is structuralist and specifically Piagetian, and therefore not yet related to the remainder of biology. Piaget has used the expression "genetic epistemology" and Kohlberg "cognitive-developmental" to label the general concept. However, the results will eventually become incorporated into a broadened developmental biology and genetics. Kohlberg's method is to record and classify the verbal responses of children to moral problems. He has delineated six sequential stages of ethical reasoning through which an individual may progress as part of his mental maturation. The child moves from a primary dependence on external controls and sanctions to an increasingly sophisticated set of internalized standards (see Table 27-4). The analysis has not yet been directed to the question of plasticity in the basic rules. Intracultural variance has not been measured, and heritability therefore not assessed. The

difference between ethical behaviorism and the current version of developmental-genetic analysis is that the former postulates a mechanism (operant conditioning) without evidence and the latter presents evidence without postulating a mechanism. No great conceptual difficulty underlies this disparity. The study of moral development is only a more complicated and less tractable version of the genetic variance problem (see Chapters 2 and 7). With the accretion of data the two approaches can be expected to merge to form a recognizable exercise in behavioral genetics.

Even if the problem were solved tomorrow, however, an important piece would still be missing. This is the *genetic evolution of ethics*. In the first chapter of this book I argued that ethical philosophers intuit the deontological canons of morality by consulting the emotive centers of their own hypothalamic-limbic system. This is also true of the developmentalists, even when they are being their most severely objective. Only by interpreting the activity of the emotive centers as a biological adaptation can the meaning of the canons be deciphered. Some of the activity is likely to be outdated, a relic of adjustment to the most primitive form of tribal organization. Some of it may prove to be *in statu nascendi*, constituting new and quickly changing adaptations to agrarian and urban life. The resulting confusion will be reinforced by other factors. To the extent that unilaterally altruistic genes have been established in the population by group selection, they will be opposed by allelomorphs favored by individual selection. The conflict of impulses under their various controls is likely to be widespread in the population, since current theory predicts that the genes will be at best maintained in a state of balanced polymorphism (Chapter 5). Moral ambivalence will be further intensified by the circumstance that a schedule of sex- and age-dependent ethics can impart higher genetic fitness than a single moral code which is applied uniformly to all sex-age groups. The argument for this statement is the special case of the Gadgil-Bossert distribution in which the contributions of social interactions to survivorship and fertility schedules are specified (see Chapter 4). Some of the differences in the Kohlberg stages could be explained in this manner. For example, it should be of selective advantage for young children to be self-centered and relatively disinclined to perform altruistic acts based on personal principle. Similarly, adolescents should be more tightly bound by age-peer bonds within their own sex and hence unusually sensitive to peer approval. The reason is that at this time greater advantage accrues to the formation of alliances and rise in status than later, when sexual and parental morality become the paramount determinants of fitness. Genetically programmed sexual and parent-offspring conflict of the kind predicted by the Trivers models (Chapters 15 and 16) are also likely to promote age differences in the kinds and degrees of moral commitment. Finally, the moral standards of individuals during early phases of colony growth should

Table 27-4 The classification of moral judgment into levels and stages of development. (Based on Kohlberg, 1969.)

Level	Basis of moral judgment	Stage of development
I	Moral value is defined by punishment and reward	1. Obedience to rules and authority to avoid punishment 2. Conformity to obtain rewards and to exchange favors
II	Moral value resides in filling the correct roles, in maintaining order and meeting the expectations of others	3. Good-boy orientation: conformity to avoid dislike and rejection by others 4. Duty orientation: conformity to avoid censure by authority, disruption of order, and resulting guilt
III	Moral value resides in conformity to shared standards, rights, and duties	5. Legalistic orientation: recognition of the value of contracts, some arbitrariness in rule formation to maintain the common good 6. Conscience or principle orientation: primary allegiance to principles of choice, which can overrule law in cases where the law is judged to do more harm than good

differ in many details from those of individuals at demographic equilibrium or during episodes of overpopulation. Metapopulations subject to high levels of r extinction will tend to diverge genetically from other kinds of populations in ethical behavior (Chapter 5).

If there is any truth to this theory of innate moral pluralism, the requirement for an evolutionary approach to ethics is self-evident. It should also be clear that no single set of moral standards can be applied to all human populations, let alone all sex-age classes within each population. To impose a uniform code is therefore to create complex, intractable moral dilemmas—these, of course, are the current condition of mankind.

Esthetics

Artistic impulses are by no means limited to man. In 1962, when Desmond Morris reviewed the subject in *The Biology of Art*, 32 individual nonhuman primates had produced drawings and paintings in captivity. Twenty-three were chimpanzees, 2 were gorillas, 3 were orang-utans, and 4 were capuchin monkeys. None received special training or anything more than access to the necessary equipment. In fact, attempts to guide the efforts of the animals by inducing imitation were always unsuccessful. The drive to use the painting and drawing equipment was powerful, requiring no reinforcement from the human observers. Both young and old animals became so engrossed with the activity that they preferred it to being fed and sometimes threw temper tantrums when stopped. Two of the chimpanzees studied extensively were highly productive. "Alpha" produced over 200 pictures, while the famous "Congo," who deserves to be called the Picasso of the great apes, was responsible for nearly 400. Although most of the efforts consisted of scribbling, the patterns were far from random. Lines and smudges were spread over a blank page outward from a centrally located figure. When a drawing was started on one side of a blank page the chimpanzee usually shifted to the opposite side to offset it. With time the calligraphy became bolder, starting with simple lines and progressing to more complicated multiple scribbles. Congo's patterns progressed along approximately the same developmental path as those of very young human children, yielding fan-shaped diagrams and even complete circles. Other chimpanzees drew crosses.

The artistic activity of chimpanzees may well be a special manifestation of their tool-using behavior. Members of the species display a total of about ten techniques, all of which require manual skill. Probably all are improved through practice, while at least a few are passed as traditions from one generation to the next. The chimpanzees have a considerable facility for inventing new techniques, such as the use of sticks to pull objects through cage bars and to pry open boxes. Thus the tendency to manipulate objects and to explore their uses appears to have an adaptive advantage for chimpanzees.

The same reasoning applies a fortiori to the origin of art in man. As Washburn (1970) pointed out, human beings have been hunter-gatherers for over 99 percent of their history, during which time each man made his own tools. The appraisal of form and skill in execution were necessary for survival, and they probably brought social approval as well. Both forms of success paid off in greater genetic fitness. If the chimpanzee Congo could reach the stage of elementary diagrams, it is not too hard to imagine primitive man progressing to representational figures. Once that stage was reached, the transition to the use of art in sympathetic magic and ritual must have followed quickly. Art might then have played a reciprocally reinforcing role in the development of culture and mental capacity. In the end, writing emerged as the idiographic representation of language.

Music of a kind is also produced by some animals. Human beings consider the elaborate courtship and territorial songs of birds to be beautiful, and probably ultimately for the same reasons they are of use to the birds. With clarity and precision they identify the species, the physiological condition, and the mental set of the singer. Richness of information and precise transmission of mood are no less the standards of excellence in human music. Singing and dancing serve to draw groups together, direct the emotions of the people, and prepare them for joint action. The carnival displays of chimpanzees described in earlier chapters are remarkably like human celebrations in this respect. The apes run, leap, pound the trunks of trees in drumming motions, and call loudly back and forth. These actions serve at least in part to assemble groups at common feeding grounds. They may resemble the ceremonies of earliest man. Nevertheless, fundamental differences appeared in subsequent human evolution. Human music has been liberated from iconic representation in the same way that true language has departed from the elementary ritualization characterizing the communication of animals. Music has the capacity for unlimited and arbitrary symbolization, and it employs rules of phrasing and order that serve the same function as syntax.

Territoriality and Tribalism

Anthropologists often discount territorial behavior as a general human attribute. This happens when the narrowest concept of the phenomenon is borrowed from zoology—the "stickleback model," in which residents meet along fixed boundaries to threaten and drive one another back. But earlier, in Chapter 12, I showed why it is necessary to define territory more broadly, as any area occupied more or less exclusively by an animal or group of animals through overt defense or advertisement. The techniques of repulsion can be as explicit as a precipitous all-out attack or as subtle as the deposit of a chemical secretion at a scent post. Of equal importance, animals respond to their neighbors in a highly variable manner. Each species is characterized by its own particular behavioral scale. In extreme

cases the scale may run from open hostility, say, during the breeding season or when the population density is high, to oblique forms of advertisement or no territorial behavior at all. One seeks to characterize the behavioral scale of the species and to identify the parameters that move individual animals up and down it.

If these qualifications are accepted, it is reasonable to conclude that territoriality is a general trait of hunter-gatherer societies. In a perceptive review of the evidence, Edwin Wilmsen (1973) found that these relatively primitive societies do not differ basically in their strategy of land tenure from many mammalian species. Systematic overt aggression has been reported in a minority of hunter-gatherer peoples, for example the Chippewa, Sioux, and Washo of North America and the Murngin and Tiwi of Australia. Spacing and demographic balance were implemented by raiding parties, murder, and threats of witchcraft. The Washo of Nevada actively defended nuclear portions of their home ranges, within which they maintained their winter residences. Subtler and less direct forms of interaction can have the same result. The !Kung Bushmen of the Nyae Nyae area refer to themselves as "perfect" or "clean" and other !Kung people as "strange" murderers who use deadly poisons.

Human territorial behavior is sometimes particularized in ways that are obviously functional. As recently as 1930 Bushmen of the Dobe area in southwestern Africa recognized the principle of exclusive family land-holdings during the wet season. The rights extended only to the gathering of vegetable foods; other bands were allowed to hunt animals through the area (R. B. Lee in Wilmsen, 1973). Other hunter-gatherer peoples appear to have followed the same dual principle: more or less exclusive use by tribes or families of the richest sources of vegetable foods, opposed to broadly overlapping hunting ranges. Thus the original suggestion of Bartholomew and Birdsell (1953) that *Australopithecus* and the primitive *Homo* were territorial remains a viable hypothesis. Moreover, in obedience to the rule of ecological efficiency, the home ranges and territories were probably large and population density correspondingly low. This rule, it will be recalled, states that when a diet consists of animal food, roughly ten times as much area is needed to gain the same amount of energy yield as when the diet consists of plant food. Modern hunter-gatherer bands containing about 25 individuals commonly occupy between 1000 and 3000 square kilometers. This area is comparable to the home range of a wolf pack but as much as a hundred times greater than that of a troop of gorillas, which are exclusively vegetarian.

Hans Kummer (1971), reasoning from an assumption of territoriality, provided an important additional insight about human behavior. Spacing between groups is elementary in nature and can be achieved by a relatively small number of simple aggressive techniques. Spacing and dominance within groups is vastly more complex, being tied to all the remainder of the social repertory. Part of man's problem is that his intergroup responses are still crude and primitive, and

inadequate for the extended extraterritorial relationships that civilization has thrust upon him. The unhappy result is what Garrett Hardin (1972) has defined as tribalism in the modern sense:

Any group of people that perceives itself as a distinct group, and which is so perceived by the outside world, may be called a tribe. The group might be a race, as ordinarily defined, but it need not be; it can just as well be a religious sect, a political group, or an occupational group. The essential characteristic of a tribe is that it should follow a double standard of morality—one kind of behavior for in-group relations, another for out-group.

It is one of the unfortunate and inescapable characteristics of tribalism that it eventually evokes counter-tribalism (or, to use a different figure of speech, it "polarizes" society).

Fearful of the hostile groups around them, the "tribe" refuses to concede to the common good. It is less likely to voluntarily curb its own population growth. Like the Sinhalese and Tamils of Ceylon, competitors may even race to outbreed each other. Resources are sequestered. Justice and liberty decline. Increases in real and imagined threats congeal the sense of group identity and mobilize the tribal members. Xenophobia becomes a political virtue. The treatment of nonconformists within the group grows harsher. History is replete with the escalation of this process to the point that the society breaks down or goes to war. No nation has been completely immune.

Early Social Evolution

Modern man can be said to have been launched by a two-stage acceleration in mental evolution. The first occurred during the transition from a larger arboreal primate to the first man-apes (*Australopithecus*). If the primitive hominid *Ramapithecus* is in the direct line of ancestry, as current opinion holds, the change may have required as much as ten million years. *Australopithecus* was present five million years ago, and by three million years B.P. it had speciated into several forms, including possibly the first primitive *Homo* (Tobias, 1973). As shown in Figure 27-1, the evolution of these intermediate hominids was marked by an accelerating increase in brain capacity. Simultaneously, erect posture and a striding, bipedal locomotion were perfected, and the hands were molded to acquire the precision grip. These early men undoubtedly used tools to a much greater extent than do modern chimpanzees. Crude stone implements were made by chipping, and rocks were pulled together to form what appear to be the foundations of shelters.

The second, much more rapid phase of acceleration began about 100,000 years ago. It consisted primarily of cultural evolution and must have been mostly phenotypic in nature, building upon the genetic potential in the brain that had accumulated over the previous millions of years. The brain had reached a threshold, and a wholly new, enormously more rapid form of mental evolution took over.




Figure 27-4 This simplified phylogeny of the Old World higher primates shows that only three existing groups have shifted from the forest to the savanna. They are the baboons (*Papio*), the gelada monkey (*Theropithecus gelada*), and man. (Based on Napier and Napier, 1967, and Simons and Ettel, 1970.)

This second phase was in no sense planned, and its potential is only now being revealed.

The study of man's origins can be referred to two questions that correspond to the dual stages of mental evolution:

—What features of the environment caused the hominids to adapt differently from other primates and started them along their unique evolutionary path?

—Once started, why did the hominids go so far?

The search for the prime movers of early human evolution has extended over more than 25 years. Participants in the search have included Dart (1949, 1956), Bartholomew and Birdsell (1953), Etkin (1954), Washburn and Avis (1958), Washburn et al. (1961), Rabb et

al. (1967), Reynolds (1968), Schaller and Lowther (1969), C. J. Jolly (1970), and Kortlandt (1972). These writers have concentrated on two indisputably important facts concerning the biology of *Australopithecus* and early *Homo*. First, the evidence is strong that *Australopithecus africanus*, the species most likely to have been the direct ancestor of *Homo*, lived on the open savanna. The wear pattern of sand grains taken from the Sterkfontein fossils suggests a dry climate, while the pigs, antelopes, and other mammals found in association with the hominids are of the kind usually specialized for existence in grasslands. The australopithecine way of life came as the result of a major habitat shift. The ancestral *Ramapithecus* or an even more antecedent form lived in forests and was adapted for progression through

trees by arm swinging. Only a very few other large-bodied primates have been able to join man in leaving the forest to spend most of their lives on the ground in open habitats (Figure 27-4). This is not to say that bands of *Australopithecus africanus* spent all of their lives running about in the open. Some of them might have carried their game into caves and even lived there in permanent residence, although the evidence pointing to this often quoted trait is still far from conclusive (Kurtén, 1972). Other bands could have retreated at night to the protection of groves of trees, in the manner of modern baboons. The important point is that much or all of the foraging was conducted on the savanna.

The second peculiar feature of the ecology of early men was the degree of their dependence on animal food, evidently far greater than in any of the living monkeys and apes. The *Australopithecus* were catholic in their choice of small animals. Their sites contain the remains of tortoises, lizards, snakes, mice, rabbits, porcupines, and other small, vulnerable prey that must have abounded on the savanna. The man-apes also hunted baboons with clubs. From analysis of 58 baboon skulls, Dart estimated that all had been brought down by blows to the head, 50 from the front and the remainder from behind. The *Australopithecus* also appear to have butchered larger animals, including the giant sivatheres, or horned giraffes, and dinotheres, elephantlike forms with tusks that curved downward from the lower jaws. In early Acheulean times, when *Homo erectus* began employing stone axes, some of the species of large African mammals became extinct. It is reasonable to suppose that this impoverishment was due to excessive predation by the increasingly competent bands of men (Martin, 1966).

What can we deduce from these facts about the life of early man? Before an answer is attempted, it should be noted that very little can be inferred directly from comparisons with other living primates. Geladas and baboons, the only open-country forms, are primarily vegetarian. They represent a sample of at most six species, which differ too much from one another in social organization to provide a baseline for comparison. The chimpanzees, the most intelligent and socially sophisticated of the nonhuman primates, are forest-dwelling and mostly vegetarian. Only during their occasional ventures into predation do they display behavior that can be directly correlated with ecology in a way that has meaning for human evolution. Other notable features of chimpanzee social organization, including the rapidly shifting composition of subgroups, the exchange of females between groups, and the intricate and lengthy process of socialization (see Chapter 26), may or may not have been shared by primitive man. We cannot argue either way on the basis of ecological correlation. It is often stated in the popular literature that the life of chimpanzees reveals a great deal about the origin of man. This is not necessarily true. The manlike traits of chimpanzees could be due to evolutionary

convergence, in which case their use in evolutionary reconstructions would be misleading.

The best procedure to follow, and one which I believe is relied on implicitly by most students of the subject, is to extrapolate backward from living hunter-gatherer societies. In Table 27-5 this technique is made explicit. Utilizing the synthesis edited by Lee and DeVore (1968; see especially J. W. M. Whiting, pp. 336-339), I have listed the most general traits of hunter-gatherer peoples. Then I have evaluated the lability of each behavioral category by noting the amount of variation in the category that occurs among the nonhuman primate species. The less labile the category, the more likely that the trait displayed by the living hunter-gatherers was also displayed by early man.

What we can conclude with some degree of confidence is that primitive men lived in small territorial groups, within which males were dominant over females. The intensity of aggressive behavior and the nature of its scaling remain unknown. Maternal care was prolonged, and the relationships were at least to some extent matrilineal. Speculation on remaining aspects of social life is not supported either way by the lability data and is therefore more tenuous. It is likely that the early hominids foraged in groups. To judge from the behavior of baboons and geladas, such behavior would have conferred some protection from large predators. By the time *Australopithecus* and early *Homo* had begun to feed on large mammals, group hunting almost certainly had become advantageous and even necessary, as in the African wild dog. But there is no compelling reason to conclude that men did the hunting while women stayed at home. This occurs today in hunter-gatherer societies, but comparisons with other primates offer no clue as to when the trait appeared. It is certainly not essential to conclude a priori that males must be a specialized hunter class. In chimpanzees males do the hunting, which may be suggestive. But in lions, it will be recalled, the females are the providers, often working in groups and with cubs in tow, while the males usually hold back. In the African wild dog both sexes participate. This is not to suggest that male group hunting was not an early trait of hominids, only that there is no strong independent evidence to support the hypothesis.

This brings us to the prevailing theory of the origin of human sociality. It consists of a series of interlocking models that have been fashioned from bits of fossil evidence, extrapolations back from extant hunter-gatherer societies, and comparisons with other living primate species. The core of the theory can be appropriately termed the *autocatalysis model*. It holds that when the earliest hominids became bipedal as part of their terrestrial adaptation, their hands were freed, the manufacture and handling of artifacts was made easier, and intelligence grew as part of the improvement of the tool-using habit. With mental capacity and the tendency to use artifacts increas-

Table 27-5 Social traits of living hunter-gatherer groups and the likelihood that they were also possessed by early man.

Traits that occur generally in living hunter-gatherer societies	Variability of trait category among nonhuman primates	Reliability of concluding early man had the same trait through homology
Local group size: Mostly 100 or less	Highly variable but within range of 3-100	Very probably 100 or less but otherwise not reliable
Family as the nuclear unit	Highly variable	Not reliable
Sexual division of labor: Women gather, men hunt	Limited to man among living primates	Not reliable
Males dominant over females	Widespread although not universal	Reliable
Long-term sexual bonding (marriage) nearly universal; polygyny general	Highly variable	Not reliable
Exogamy universal, abetted by marriage rules	Limited to man among living primates	Not reliable
Subgroup composition changes often (fission-fusion principle)	Highly variable	Not reliable
Territoriality general, especially marked in rich gathering areas	Occurs widely, but variable in pattern	Probably occurred; pattern unknown
Game playing, especially games that entail physical skill but not strategy	Occurs generally, at least in elementary form	Very reliable
Prolonged maternal care; pronounced socialization of young; extended relationships between mother and children, especially mothers and daughters	Occurs generally in higher cercopithecoids	Very reliable

ing through mutual reinforcement, the entire materials-based culture expanded. Cooperation during hunting was perfected, providing a new impetus for the evolution of intelligence, which in turn permitted still more sophistication in tool using, and so on through cycles of causation. At some point, probably during the late *Australopithecus* period or the transition from *Australopithecus* to *Homo*, this autocatalysis carried the evolving populations to a certain threshold of competence, at which the hominids were able to exploit the antelopes, elephants, and other large herbivorous mammals teeming around them on the African plains. Quite possibly the process began when the hominids learned to drive big cats, hyenas, and other carnivores from their kills (see Figure 27-5). In time they became the primary hunters themselves and were forced to protect their prey from other predators and scavengers. The autocatalysis model usually includes the proposition that the shift to big game accelerated the process of mental evolution. The shift could even have been the impetus that led to the origin of early *Homo* from their australo-

pithecine ancestors approximately two million years ago. Another proposition is that males became specialized for hunting. Child care was facilitated by close social bonding between the males, who left the domiciles to hunt, and the females, who kept the children and conducted most of the foraging for vegetable food. Many of the peculiar details of human sexual behavior and domestic life flow easily from this basic division of labor. But these details are not essential to the autocatalysis model. They are added because they are displayed by modern hunter-gatherer societies.

Although internally consistent, the autocatalysis model contains a curious omission—the triggering device. Once the process started, it is easy to see how it could be self-sustaining. But what started it? Why did the earliest hominids become bipedal instead of running on all fours like baboons and geladas? Clifford Jolly (1970) has proposed that the prime impetus was a specialization on grass seeds. Because the early pre-men, perhaps as far back as *Ramapithecus*, were the largest primates depending on grain, a premium was set on the ability to

manipulate objects of very small size relative to the hands. Man, in short, became bipedal in order to pick seeds. This hypothesis is by no means unsupported fantasy. Jolly points to a number of convergent features in skull and dental structure between man and the gelada, which feeds on seeds, insects, and other small objects. Moreover, the gelada is peculiar among the Old World monkeys and apes in sharing the following epigamic anatomical traits with man: growth of hair around the face and neck of the male and conspicuous fleshy adornments on the chest of the female. According to Jolly's model, the freeing of the hands of the early hominids was a preadaptation that permitted the increase in tool use and the autocatalytic concomitants of mental evolution and predatory behavior.

Later Social Evolution

Autocatalytic reactions in living systems never expand to infinity. Biological parameters normally change in a rate-dependent manner to slow growth and eventually bring it to a halt. But almost miraculously, this has not yet happened in human evolution. The increase in brain size and the refinement of stone artifacts indicate a gradual improvement in mental capacity throughout the Pleistocene. With the appearance of the Mousterian tool culture of *Homo sapiens neanderthalensis* some 75,000 years ago, the trend gathered momentum, giving way in Europe to the Upper Paleolithic culture of *Homo s. sapiens* about 40,000 years B.P. Starting about 10,000 years ago agriculture was invented and spread, populations increased enormously in density, and the primitive hunter-gatherer bands gave way locally to the relentless growth of tribes, chiefdoms, and states. Finally, after A.D. 1400 European-based civilization shifted gears again, and knowledge and technology grew not just exponentially but superexponentially (see Figures 27-6, 27-7).

There is no reason to believe that during this final sprint there has been a cessation in the evolution of either mental capacity or the predilection toward special social behaviors. The theory of population genetics and experiments on other organisms show that substantial changes can occur in the span of less than 100 generations, which for man reaches back only to the time of the Roman Empire. Two thousand generations, roughly the period since typical *Homo sapiens* invaded Europe, is enough time to create new species and to mold them in major ways. Although we do not know how much mental evolution has actually occurred, it would be false to assume that modern civilizations have been built entirely on capital accumulated during the long haul of the Pleistocene.

Since genetic and cultural tracking systems operate on parallel tracks, we can bypass their distinction for the moment and return to the question of the prime movers in later human social evolution in its broadest sense. Seed eating is a plausible explanation to account

for the movement of hominids onto the savanna, and the shift to big-game hunting might account for their advance to the *Homo erectus* grade. But was the adaptation to group predation enough to carry evolution all the way to the *Homo sapiens* grade and farther, to agriculture and civilization? Anthropologists and biologists do not consider the impetus to have been sufficient. They have advocated the following series of additional factors, which can act singly or in combination.

Sexual Selection

Fox (1972), following a suggestion by Chance (1962), has argued that sexual selection was the auxiliary motor that drove human evolution all the way to the *Homo* grade. His reasoning proceeds as follows. Polygyny is a general trait in hunter-gatherer bands and may also have been the rule in the early hominid societies. If so, a premium would have been placed on sexual selection involving both epigamic display toward the females and intrasexual competition among the males. The selection would be enhanced by the constant mating provocation that arises from the female's nearly continuous sexual receptivity. Because of the existence of a high level of cooperation within the band, a legacy of the original *Australopithecus* adaptation, sexual selection would tend to be linked with hunting prowess, leadership, skill at tool making, and other visible attributes that contribute to the success of the family and the male band. Aggressiveness was constrained and the old forms of overt primate dominance replaced by complex social skills. Young males found it profitable to fit into the group, controlling their sexuality and aggression and awaiting their turn at leadership. As a result the dominant male in hominid societies was most likely to possess a mosaic of qualities that reflect the necessities of compromise: "controlled, cunning, cooperative, attractive to the ladies, good with the children, relaxed, tough, eloquent, skillful, knowledgeable and proficient in self-defense and hunting." Since positive feedback occurs between these more sophisticated social traits and breeding success, social evolution can proceed indefinitely without additional selective pressures from the environment.

Multiplier Effects in Cultural Innovation and in Network Expansion

Whatever its prime mover, evolution in cultural capacity was implemented by a growing power and readiness to learn. The network of contacts among individuals and bands must also have grown. We can postulate a critical mass of cultural capacity and network size in which it became advantageous for bands actively to enlarge both. In other words, the feedback became positive. This mechanism, like sexual selection, requires no additional input beyond the limits of





Figure 27-5 At the threshold of autocatalytic social evolution two million years ago, a band of early men (*Homo habilis*) forages for food on the African savanna. In this speculative reconstruction the group is in the act of driving rival predators from a newly fallen dinotherium. The great elephantlike creature had succumbed from exhaustion or disease, its end perhaps hastened by attacks from the animals closing in on it. The men have just entered the scene. Some drive away the predators

by variously shouting, waving their arms, brandishing sticks, and throwing rocks, while a few stragglers, entering from the left, prepare to join the fray. To the right a female sabertooth cat (*Homotherium*) and her two grown cubs have been at least temporarily intimidated and are backing away. Their threat faces reveal the extraordinary gape of their jaws. In the left foreground, a pack of spotted hyenas (*Crocota*) has also retreated but is ready to rush back the moment an opening is provided.



The men are quite small, less than 1.5 meters in height, and individually no match for the large carnivores. According to prevailing theory, a high degree of cooperation was therefore required to exploit such prey, and it evolved in conjunction with higher intelligence and the superior ability to use tools. In the background can be seen the environment of the Olduvai region of Tanzania as it may have looked at this time. The area was covered by rolling parkland and rimmed to the east by

volcanic highlands. The herbivore populations were dense and varied, as they are today. In the left background are seen three-toed horses (*Hipparion*), while to the right are herds of wildebeest and giant horned giraffelike creatures called sivatheres. (Drawing by Sarah Landry, prepared in consultation with F. Clark Howell. The reconstruction of *Homotherium* was based in part on an Aurignacian sculpture; see Rousseau, 1971.)

social behavior itself. But unlike sexual selection, it probably reached the autocatalytic threshold level very late in human prehistory.

Increased Population Density and Agriculture

The conventional view of the development of civilization used to be that innovations in farming led to population growth, the securing of leisure time, the rise of a leisure class, and the contrivance of civilized, less immediately functional pursuits. The hypothesis has been considerably weakened by the discovery that !Kung and other hunter-gatherer peoples work less and enjoy more leisure time than most farmers. Primitive agricultural people generally do not produce surpluses unless compelled to do so by political or religious authorities (Carneiro, 1970). Ester Boserup (1965) has gone so far as to suggest the reverse causation: population growth induces societies to deepen their involvement and expertise in agriculture. However, this explanation does not account for the population growth in the first place. Hunter-gatherer societies remained in approximate demographic equilibrium for hundreds of thousands of years. Something else tipped a few of them into becoming the first farmers. Quite possibly

the crucial events were nothing more than the attainment of a certain level of intelligence and lucky encounters with wild-growing food plants. Once launched, agricultural economies permitted higher population densities which in turn encouraged wider networks of social contact, technological advance, and further dependence on farming. A few innovations, such as irrigation and the wheel, intensified the process to the point of no return.

Warfare

Throughout recorded history the conduct of war has been common among tribes and nearly universal among chiefdoms and states. When Sorokin analyzed the histories of 11 European countries over periods of 275 to 1,025 years, he found that on the average they were engaged in some kind of military action 47 percent of the time, or about one year out of every two. The range was from 28 percent of the years in the case of Germany to 67 percent in the case of Spain. The early chiefdoms and states of Europe and the Middle East turned over with great rapidity, and much of the conquest was genocidal in nature. The spread of genes has always been of paramount importance. For

Type of society	Some institutions, in order of appearance	Ethnographic examples	Archaeological examples
STATE	Local group autonomy Egalitarian status Ephemeral leadership Ad hoc ritual Reciprocal economy Unranked descent groups Pantribal solidarities Calendaric ritual Ranked descent groups Redistributive economy Hereditary leadership Elite endogamy Full-time craft specialization Stratification Kingship Codified law Bureaucracy Military draft Taxation	FRANCE ENGLAND INDIA U.S.A.	Classic Mesoamerica Sumer Shang China Imperial Rome
CHIEFDOM		TONGA HAWAII KWAKWITL NOOTKA NATCHEZ	Gulf Coast Olmec of Mexico (1000 B.C.) Samarran of Near East (5300 B.C.) Mississippian of North America (1200 A.D.)
TRIBE		NEW GUINEA HIGHLANDERS SOUTHWEST PUEBLOS SIOUX	Early Formative of Inland Mexico (1500-1000 B.C.) Prepottery Neolithic of Near East (8000-6000 B.C.)
BAND		KALAHARI BUSHMEN AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES ESKIMO SHOSHONE	Paleoindian and Early Archaic of U.S. and Mexico (10,000-6000 B.C.) Late Paleolithic of Near East (10,000 B.C.)

Figure 27-6 The four principal types of societies in ascending order of sociopolitical complexity, with living and extinct examples of each. A few of the sociopolitical institutions are shown, in the approximate order in which they are interpreted to have arisen. (From Flannery, 1972. Reproduced, with permission, from "The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations," *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, Vol. 3, p. 401. Copyright © 1972 by Annual Reviews, Inc. All rights reserved.)




Figure 27-7 The number of important inventions and discoveries, by century, from A.D. 1000 to A.D. 1900. (From Lenski, 1970, after Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1958. Compiled from L. Darmstaedter and R. DuBois Reymond, *4000 Jahre-Pionier-Arbeit in den Exakten Wissenschaften*, Berlin, J. A. Stargart, 1904.)

example, after the conquest of the Midianites Moses gave instructions identical in result to the aggression and genetic usurpation by male langur monkeys:

Now kill every male dependent, and kill every woman who has had intercourse with a man, but spare for yourselves every woman among them who has not had intercourse. (Numbers 31)

And centuries later, von Clausewitz conveyed to his pupil the Prussian crown prince a sense of the true, biological joy of warfare:

Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, determined to find a glorious end, and fate will crown your youthful brow with a shining glory, which is the ornament of princes, and engrave your image in the hearts of your last descendants.

The possibility that endemic warfare and genetic usurpation could be an effective force in group selection was clearly recognized by Charles Darwin. In *The Descent of Man* he proposed a remarkable model that foreshadowed many of the elements of modern group-selection theory:

Now, if some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the others, invented a new snare or weapon, or other means of attack or defence,

the plainest self-interest, without the assistance of much reasoning power, would prompt the other members to imitate him; and all would thus profit. The habitual practice of each new art must likewise in some slight degree strengthen the intellect. If the invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in number, spread, and supplant other tribes. In a tribe thus rendered more numerous there would always be a rather greater chance of the birth of other superior and inventive members. If such men left children to inherit their mental superiority, the chance of the birth of still more ingenious members would be somewhat better, and in a very small tribe decidedly better. Even if they left no children, the tribe would still include their blood-relations, and it has been ascertained by agriculturists that by preserving and breeding from the family of an animal, which when slaughtered was found to be valuable, the desired character has been obtained.

Darwin saw that not only can group selection reinforce individual selection, but it can oppose it—and sometimes prevail, especially if the size of the breeding unit is small and average kinship correspondingly close. Essentially the same theme was later developed in increasing depth by Keith (1949), Bigelow (1969), and Alexander (1971). These authors envision some of the “noblest” traits of mankind, including team play, altruism, patriotism, bravery on the field of battle, and so forth, as the genetic product of warfare.

By adding the additional postulate of a threshold effect, it is possible to explain why the process has operated exclusively in human evolution (Wilson, 1972a). If any social predatory mammal attains a certain level of intelligence, as the early hominids, being large primates, were especially predisposed to do, one band would have the capacity to consciously ponder the significance of adjacent social groups and to deal with them in an intelligent, organized fashion. A band might then dispose of a neighboring band, appropriate its territory, and increase its own genetic representation in the metapopulation, retaining the tribal memory of this successful episode, repeating it, increasing the geographic range of its occurrence, and quickly spreading its influence still further in the metapopulation. Such primitive cultural capacity would be permitted by the possession of certain genes. Reciprocally, the cultural capacity might propel the spread of the genes through the genetic constitution of the metapopulation. Once begun, such a mutual reinforcement could be irreversible. The only combinations of genes able to confer superior fitness in contention with genocidal aggressors would be those that produce either a more effective technique of aggression or else the capacity to preempt genocide by some form of pacific maneuvering. Either probably entails mental and cultural advance. In addition to being autocatalytic, such evolution has the interesting property of requiring a selection episode only very occasionally in order to proceed as swiftly as individual-level selection. By current theory, genocide or genosorption strongly favoring the aggressor need take place only once every few generations to direct evolution. This alone could

push truly altruistic genes to a high frequency within the bands (see Chapter 5). The turnover of tribes and chiefdoms estimated from atlases of early European and Mideastern history (for example, the atlas by McEvedy, 1967) suggests a sufficient magnitude of differential group fitness to have achieved this effect. Furthermore, it is to be expected that some isolated cultures will escape the process for generations at a time, in effect reverting temporarily to what ethnographers classify as a pacific state.

Multifactorial Systems

Each of the foregoing mechanisms could conceivably stand alone as a sufficient prime mover of social evolution. But it is much more likely that they contributed jointly, in different strengths and with complex interaction effects. Hence the most realistic model may be fully cybernetic, with cause and effect reciprocating through sub-cycles that possess high degrees of connectivity with one another. One such scheme, proposed by Adams (1966) for the rise of states and urban societies, is presented in Figure 27-8. Needless to say, the equations needed to translate this and similar models have not been written, and the magnitudes of the coefficients cannot even be guessed at the present time.

In both the unifactorial and multifactorial models of social evolution, an increasing internalization of the controls is postulated. This shift is considered to be the basis of the two-stage acceleration cited earlier. At the beginning of hominid evolution, the prime movers were external environmental pressures no different from those that have guided the social evolution of other animal species. For the moment, it seems reasonable to suppose that the hominids underwent two adaptive shifts in succession: first, to open-country living and seed eating, and second, after being preadapted by the anatomical and mental changes associated with seed eating, to the capture of




Figure 27-8 A multifactorial model of the origin of the state and urban society. (From Flannery, 1972; based on Adams, 1966. Reproduced, with permission, from "The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations," *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, Vol. 3, p. 408. Copyright © 1972 by Annual Reviews, Inc. All rights reserved.)

large mammals. Big-game hunting induced further growth in mentality and social organization that brought the hominids across the threshold into the autocatalytic, more nearly internalized phase of evolution. This second stage is the one in which the most distinctive human qualities emerged. In stressing this distinction, however, I do not wish to imply that social evolution became independent of the environment. The iron laws of demography still clamped down on the spreading hominid populations, and the most spectacular cultural advances were impelled by the invention of new ways to control the environment. What happened was that mental and social change came to depend more on internal reorganization and less on direct responses to features in the surrounding environment. Social evolution, in short, had acquired its own motor.

The Future

When mankind has achieved an ecological steady state, probably by the end of the twenty-first century, the internalization of social evolution will be nearly complete. About this time biology should be at its peak, with the social sciences maturing rapidly. Some historians of science will take issue with this projection, arguing that the accelerating pace of discoveries in these fields implies a more rapid development. But historical precedents have misled us before: the subjects we are talking about are more difficult than physics or chemistry by at least two orders of magnitude.

Consider the prospects for sociology. This science is now in the natural history stage of its development. There have been attempts at system building but, just as in psychology, they were premature and came to little. Much of what passes for theory in sociology today is really labeling of phenomena and concepts, in the expected manner of natural history. Process is difficult to analyze because the fundamental units are elusive, perhaps nonexistent. Syntheses commonly consist of the tedious cross-referencing of differing sets of definitions and metaphors erected by the more imaginative thinkers (see for example Inkeles, 1964, and Friedrichs, 1970). That, too, is typical of the natural history phase.

With an increase in the richness of descriptions and experiments, sociology is drawing closer each day to cultural anthropology, social psychology, and economics, and will soon merge with them. These disciplines are fundamental to sociology *sensu lato* and are most likely to yield its first phenomenological laws. In fact, some viable qualitative laws probably already exist. They include tested statements about the following relationships: the effects of hostility and stress upon ethnocentrism and xenophobia (LeVine and Campbell, 1972); the positive correlation between and within cultures of war and combative sports, resulting in the elimination of the hydraulic model of aggressive drive (Sipes, 1973); precise but still specialized

models of promotion and opportunity within professional guilds (White, 1970); and, far from least, the most general models of economics.

The transition from purely phenomenological to fundamental theory in sociology must await a full, neuronal explanation of the human brain. Only when the machinery can be torn down on paper at the level of the cell and put together again will the properties of emotion and ethical judgment come clear. Simulations can then be employed to estimate the full range of behavioral responses and the precision of their homeostatic controls. Stress will be evaluated in terms of the neurophysiological perturbations and their relaxation times. Cognition will be translated into circuitry. Learning and creativeness will be defined as the alteration of specific portions of the cognitive machinery regulated by input from the emotive centers. Having cannibalized psychology, the new neurobiology will yield an enduring set of first principles for sociology.

The role of evolutionary sociobiology in this enterprise will be twofold. It will attempt to reconstruct the history of the machinery and to identify the adaptive significance of each of its functions. Some of the functions are almost certainly obsolete, being directed toward such Pleistocene exigencies as hunting and gathering and intertribal warfare. Others may prove currently adaptive at the level of the individual and family but maladaptive at the level of the group—or the reverse. If the decision is taken to mold cultures to fit the requirements of the ecological steady state, some behaviors can be altered experientially without emotional damage or loss in creativity. Others cannot. Uncertainty in this matter means that Skinner's dream of a culture predesigned for happiness will surely have to wait for the new neurobiology. A genetically accurate and hence completely fair code of ethics must also wait.

The second contribution of evolutionary sociobiology will be to monitor the genetic basis of social behavior. Optimum socioeconomic systems can never be perfect, because of Arrow's impossibility theorem and probably also because ethical standards are innately pluralistic. Moreover, the genetic foundation on which any such normative system is built can be expected to shift continuously. Mankind has never stopped evolving, but in a sense his populations are drifting. The effects over a period of a few generations could change the identity of the socioeconomic optima. In particular, the rate of

gene flow around the world has risen to dramatic levels and is accelerating, and the mean coefficients of relationship within local communities are correspondingly diminishing. The result could be an eventual lessening of altruistic behavior through the maladaptation and loss of group-selected genes (Haldane, 1932; Eshel, 1972). It was shown earlier that behavioral traits tend to be selected out by the principle of metabolic conservation when they are suppressed or when their original function becomes neutral in adaptive value. Such traits can largely disappear from populations in as few as ten generations, only two or three centuries in the case of human beings. With our present inadequate understanding of the human brain, we do not know how many of the most valued qualities are linked genetically to more obsolete, destructive ones. Cooperativeness toward groupmates might be coupled with aggressivity toward strangers, creativeness with a desire to own and dominate, athletic zeal with a tendency to violent response, and so on. In extreme cases such pairings could stem from pleiotropism, the control of more than one phenotypic character by the same set of genes. If the planned society—the creation of which seems inevitable in the coming century—were to deliberately steer its members past those stresses and conflicts that once gave the destructive phenotypes their Darwinian edge, the other phenotypes might dwindle with them. In this, the ultimate genetic sense, social control would rob man of his humanity.

It seems that our autocatalytic social evolution has locked us onto a particular course which the early hominids still within us may not welcome. To maintain the species indefinitely we are compelled to drive toward total knowledge, right down to the levels of the neuron and gene. When we have progressed enough to explain ourselves in these mechanistic terms, and the social sciences come to full flower, the result might be hard to accept. It seems appropriate therefore to close this book as it began, with the foreboding insight of Albert Camus:

A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land.

This, unfortunately, is true. But we still have another hundred years.