Replay Attack in TLS 1.3 0-RTT Handshake: Countermeasure Techniques

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Version 2


The Paper

- Conference: 2023 IEEE 6th International Conference on Electrical, Electronics and System Engineering (ICEESE)
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- Goal: review anti-replay protection techniques
- Keywords: TLS 1.3, replay attack, 0-RTT, handshake




Context

- TLS resumable connections
- TLS 1.3 introduced 0-RTT resume mode, based on a Session Ticket created during the initial full handshake encrypted with a Session Ticket Encryption Key (STEK)
- 0-RTT obtained by sending a single message that contains both the ClientHello (with a Session Ticket encrypted with a known STEK) and Application Data (also known as Early Data)



Attack Scenarios

- Replay attack
- Attacker intercepts and replays ClientHello messages with Early Data
- The replayed message is valid because the ClientHello contains a Session Ticket recognized by the server
- ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: the attacker performs a MITM and makes the client to believe that the 0-RTT message wasn't received, triggering a resending



Freshness check

Reject ClientHello messages whose gmt_unix_time too much in the past

- ✓ Simple implementation
- X Can be inconvenient and there is an exploitable time window for attackers

ClientHello Recording


The server keeps a list of received **ClientHello** messages and uses it to detect and discard replays

- Can block all replay attacks
- X Complex setup in distributed environments, complex synchronization

Single-Use Tickets

The server **deletes** the **STEK** used to decrypt the early data after the first 0-RTT resume, making it impossible to decrypt the Session Tickets of replayed messages.

- Can block all replay attacks
- X Complex setup in distributed environments, complex synchronization



Application Profile

Each application should implement a specific **profile** that specifies under which conditions it will use 0-RTT (e.g. HTTP GET).

- Flexibility
- X Not 100% safe, requires intervention at application level

Separate API

Both client and servers use libraries that make 0-RTT usage **explicit**, rather than implicit and automatic.

- ✓ Explicit behaviour
- X Requires TLS libs restructuring and programmers attention

Puncture Pseudorandom Function (PPRF)

By using PPRF the server can decrypt 0-RTT early data only once.

Example approach: a server maintains a session ticket encryption key (STEK) k that can decrypt any session ticket. Then it uses it to decrypt a ticket t and it generates a STEK k' that can decrypt all session tickets but t and so on...

- ✓ Forward secrecy
- X Long processing time, not practical in distributed environments

Universal SSL

Introduced by **Cloudflare** in 2015 (doesn't support TLS 1.3), Universal SSL stores negotiated sessions into multiple **Memcached** instances. Each session is indexed and encrypted by **Session ID**.

- ✓ Great performance
- X Memcached servers are synchronized only within each Cloudflare PoP



Just-in-Time Shared Keys (JIT-SK)

Based on a **synchronized PRNG**, dynamically changes keys for each session to secure 0-RTT messages (the same key cannot be reused multiple times, so "blind replaying" is impossible).

- ✓ Prevents replay attacks while providing forward secrecy
- X Doesn't support distributed environments

Conclusions

0-RTT is here to stay

The performance improvements are real (the paper stats that 0-RTT resume is 44.7% than 1-RTT) and the percentage of resumed TLS connections is also quite high (40% in some applications).

0-RTT anti-reply protection requires trade offs:

The evaluated protections introduce overheads and/or inconveniences, especially in distributed environments (e.g. CDNs), therefore 0-RTT replay protection is still an open research topic.

THANK YOU!