# What Explains Local Policy Cleavages? Examining the Policy Preferences of Public Officials at the Municipal Level

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**Abstract**

A growing literature argues that national issues and partisanship structure local-level conflict in the United States. This argument contrasts starkly with the traditional view of local politics as fundamentally nonpartisan and nonideological. In this paper, we reconsider these diverging arguments, using a large-scale survey of municipal officials to identify the latent dimensions that underlie elite preferences across cities and on a common scale. Our results demonstrate that elite preferences in local politics—unlike in national politics—are multidimensional. In particular, we find evidence of two underlying cleavages: one based on partisanship, the other based on a market orientation to the provision of local services. Importantly, these latent dimensions correlate with self-reported indicators of constituent group support, suggesting that each dimension reflects substantively meaningful features of conflict in local electoral politics. These findings contribute to our understanding of local policymaking and provide a foundation for studying municipal responsiveness moving forward.

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A growing literature documents the nationalization of urban and local politics in the United States, with evidence suggesting that local election outcomes, elite preferences, and policy are all increasingly oriented around partisanship (Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014; Einstein and Kogan, 2015; Einstein and Glick, 2016; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw, 2016; Hopkins, 2018; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw, Forthcoming). Despite this seeming convergence between national and subnational politics, however, there is reason to believe that local politics remains fundamentally unique. Indeed, for decades, scholars have argued that local politics is subject to a distinct set of demands and considerations, with little place for the type of ideological conflicts seen at higher levels of government. This nonideological, almost-bureaucratic policy environment stems primarily from the many economic and institutional constraints imposed on local governments and the responsibility to address a core set of issues—e.g., education, housing, and public service provision—that simply do not map cleanly onto the left/right ideological continuum and on which preferences may often be idiosyncratic (Adrian, 1952; Tiebout, 1956; Peterson, 1981; Oliver, Ha and Callen, 2012).

This theoretical divergence between the traditional view of local politics and the increasing evidence of partisan conflict raises a number of questions: If local politics is nationalizing, is partisanship the all-encompassing force that scholars of state and national politics have come to observe? Or, are there uniquely local dimensions of conflict that persist even in the face of this rising nationalization? If so, what structures these conflicts among local policymakers?

In this paper, we examine the cleavages that underlie elite preferences in local politics across an array of important local issues. To do so, we conduct a large-scale, broad-based survey of mayors and city councilmembers, analyzing responses from 1,191 local officials in total. The benefit to this approach is that it allows us to estimate the underlying latent dimensions of local preferences across cities on a common scale. Moreover, it allows us to capture differences in elite preferences in areas that are often unobserved using common measures of local policy, particularly public spending.

Our results demonstrate that local politics remains a unique policy domain in the United States. Specifically, we show that elite preferences in local politics—unlike those of their state and national counterparts—are multidimensional, and we provide evidence of two substantively meaningful cross-city cleavages. First, consistent with the growing evidence on local nationalization, we document substantial patterns of liberal/conservative ideological division across cities. This cleavage structures much of the policy space for local elites, both for issues that are redistributive in nature (e.g., as in Einstein and Glick (2016)) and those that are not.[1] Second, we find evidence of an important cross-cutting dimension in local politics, defined primarily by a market-based orientation toward the provision of public goods. This dimension explains divergences in preferences on issues such as service privatization, charter schools, and school choice, and reflects the unique opportunities and challenges that local governments face in service delivery at this level. We validate the substantive meaning of our two latent dimensions by examining the individual and city-level characteristics of respondents at each end of the ideological continuum, along with the electoral constituencies that they identify as having supported them during their most recent electoral contest.

Collectively, our findings contribute to our understanding of municipal politics, demonstrating that to understand democratic responsiveness, representation, and the policymaking process at this level, scholars need to account for the multidimensional nature of local politics. Indeed, while the nationalization of local politics is undeniable, it is not all-encompassing, and scholars should heed this fact as they continue to study the dynamics of local policymaking moving forward.

## Survey of Local Officials

Our study surveyed local officials in three waves: an in-person paper survey of mayors in attendance at The Seminar on Transition and Leadership for Newly-Elected Mayors cospon-

[1]Notably, this pattern is true across a variety of local contexts, suggesting that even if some of the issues that we consider are not presently relevant for certain cities, the officials we surveyed would likely respond in an ideological fashion if that were to change.

sored by the Harvard Kennedy School's Institute of Politics and the U.S. Conference of Mayors in December of 2015 (n= 14), an online survey distributed via email to sitting mayors in April 2016 (n= 180), and an online survey distributed via email to sitting city councilors (or councilor equivalents) in December 2016 (n= 997).[2] The email addresses for the second and third waves were obtained from Project Vote Smart (PVS). In total, we solicited responses from 1,098 mayors and 8,643 council members, receiving a total of 1,191 responses.[3]

Overall, our three survey waves included at least one elected official from a total of 729 municipalities. Generally, our cities cover a broad range of of contexts, with one city from all fifty states and a large degree of variation in size, demographic composition, and wealth. However, because PVS focuses on gathering data for cities and towns with a population greater than 29,000, our sample is representative of this target population, not the full population of municipal governments at-large. Full summary statistics detailing the makeup of the sample, along with a comparison to national averages, can be found in Appendix A.

## Local Policy Survey Questions

Our survey asked mayors and city councilmembers a series of questions regarding salient issues facing local governments. Rather than simply asking them their opinion about various policy solutions, however, we follow Einstein and Glick (2014, 2016) and solicit their opinions in the context of a series of hypothetical, costly tradeoffs between competing policies and values. By using this approach, we aim to capture local officials' constrained policy preferences and avoid responses that are fundamentally cheap talk.

We supplement Einstein and Glick's original three tradeoff questions on reducing income inequality, gentrification, and climate change with nine additional tradeoffs regarding expanding access to charter schools, expanding access to affordable housing, promoting underrepresented groups, passing LGBT anti-discrimination laws, raising the minimum wage,

[2]We dropped three cases in which the same official filled out the survey in multiple waves.

[3]We asked respondents whether the survey was completed by the elected official or a staff member. Only 15 were completed by staff. In an interesting test of how accurately staff represent the views of elected officials, in one case, the survey was completed by both. Answers were remarkably similar.

requiring police to wear body cameras, privatizing city services, supporting open enrollment across district schools, and raising fees for public transit. For example, for the survey's privatization question, respondents read the statement "Privatizing city services can provide cities a valuable revenue source, even if it reduces city control of service provision"; they then indicated their agreement or disagreement with the statement on a standard Likert scale, ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree." A full list of these tradeoff questions can be found in Appendix B.

Figure 1 displays the baseline distribution of responses to our twelve tradeoff questions. Across all issue areas, local officials' opinions are far from unanimous, undermining the traditional claim that there is minimal—or only economic-related—disagreement in local politics (e.g., Peterson (1981)). For example, nearly as many local officials agree as disagree with the statement "Cities should invest in affordable housing, even if it negatively affects neighboring property values," while a plurality of local officials agree with the statement "Cities should require police officers to wear body cameras, even if it sometimes makes it difficult for them to do their job." For a few tradeoffs, like expanding access to charter schools, increasing the minimum wage, and reducing income inequality, nearly as many local officials *neither agree nor disagree* with the tradeoff in question as take a clear stance.

## The Latent Dimensions of Local Politics

Given the considerable variation across policy preferences, both on issues that are decidedly local (e.g., service privatization) and those that are salient at the national level (e.g., reducing income inequality), we now turn to describing the structure of this variation. Is it largely idiosyncratic and unconstrained, as some scholars have suggested (Peterson, 1981; Oliver, Ha and Callen, 2012), or are there systematic cleavages across issues? Do these cleavages reflect national partisanship or do they reflect unique features of local politics instead?

To address these questions, we use the "Basic Space" scaling method developed by Poole (1998). The method is specifically designed for extracting latent dimensions from ordinal

Figure 1: Distribution of Responses to Tradeoff Questions




preferences scales, with the logic being that even though each respondent may interpret the preference scale differently, they will typically get the relative ordering across their responses correct, allowing us to map the observed ordinal data onto underlying latent dimensions that may explain those preferences (Armstrong II et al., 2014).[4] These estimated weights are similar to factor loadings from factor analysis and can be used to identify the substantive meaning of each dimension.

In performing the scaling, we consider two primary questions: first, what is the dimensionality of the latent space; and second, what issues load onto each dimension? To evaluate dimensionality, we examined the variance explained by one, two, and three-dimensional models. The results suggest that two underlying dimensions are necessary to explain the variation

[4]In updating the method developed by Aldrich and McKelvey (1977), Poole (1998) allowed for estimation in multiple dimensions and for missing data to be included in the analysis. This is particularly useful in our case as we supplemented our survey with additional tradeoff questions following the initial wave of mayors, so a method that permits missing data allows us to bridge across the different iterations of the survey.

in responses, with the first dimension explaining about 47 percent of the variation in the data and a second dimension that explains about 9 percent. As a reference point, in Poole (1998), the scaling of 14 National Election Study issue questions yielded two dimensions explaining 51 and 10 percent of the variation. The inclusion of a third dimension did not significantly improve the explanatory power of the model and appeared to primarily be picking up noise in the data.

Next, to identify the substantive meaning of each dimension, we compare the issue-specific weights and $R^2$ values for one and two-dimensional models, with higher weights and $R^2$ statistics indicating that an issue corresponds more to a particular dimension. For example, looking at the results for a one-dimensional model (D1) in Table 1, we see that the question about LGBT anti-discrimination laws is best explained by this dimension, with an issue-specific $R^2$ value of .66 and a weight of -3.86. Other issues that also align with this dimension include inequality, climate change, the minimum wage, support for underrepresented groups, and, to a lesser extent, affordable housing. These are all issues that divide liberals and conservatives in national politics, suggesting that this dimension reflects a traditional left-right ideological divide.

Table 1: Basic Space Scaling of Policy Tradeoff Questions

| | N | D1 Weight | D1 $R^2$ | D2 Weight | D2 $R^2$ | D2 $R^2$− D1 $R^2$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inequality | 1048 | -3.50 | 0.66 | -0.44 | 0.66 | 0.01 |
| Property Values | 1045 | 0.84 | 0.06 | -0.29 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Climate Change | 1043 | -3.66 | 0.67 | -0.32 | 0.67 | 0.00 |
| Affordable Housing | 1046 | -2.82 | 0.47 | -1.42 | 0.53 | 0.06 |
| Charter Schools | 1039 | 2.26 | 0.29 | -3.73 | 0.68 | 0.39 |
| Minimum Wage | 1045 | -3.37 | 0.61 | -0.34 | 0.61 | 0.00 |
| Police | 1048 | -1.20 | 0.10 | -1.79 | 0.21 | 0.11 |
| Transit | 1021 | 0.80 | 0.06 | -0.52 | 0.07 | 0.01 |
| LGBT Protections | 1025 | -3.91 | 0.66 | -0.57 | 0.66 | 0.01 |
| Privatization | 1030 | 2.04 | 0.23 | -2.87 | 0.46 | 0.22 |
| School Choice | 1028 | 0.38 | 0.01 | -3.47 | 0.40 | 0.39 |
| Underrepresented Groups | 1026 | -3.24 | 0.62 | -1.03 | 0.66 | 0.03 |

*Issue specific-weights and $R^2$ produced by "Basic Space" scaling method. Higher values for each issue category indicate greater accordance with the respective dimension, D1 or D2.*

In contrast, the questions on school choice, charter schools, and service privatization are not explained well by the first dimension (in this case, relatively small D1 weights and $R^2$ values). Instead, they appear to all load onto the second dimension (D2). This is evident from looking at the D2 weights and the gain in the $R^2$ from a two- versus one-dimensional model. For example, the question about school choice was uncorrelated with the first dimension, yet has a sizable -3.46 D2 weight and a .40 gain in $R^2$ when we incorporate a second dimension. That we see similar patterns for all three issues suggests that preferences in this area are correlated in a way that is distinct from the liberal/conservative divide. Specifically, given the commonalities across these issues, we argue that this dimension is reflective of a preferences for market-based solutions for the provision of local public goods.

Finally, the questions on property values (gentrification), police body cameras, and public transit—issues which have no clear left/right orientation and are not involved in debates about market-oriented solutions—are not captured by either dimension. This implies one of two things: first, that preferences on these issues are not inherently connected to other local issues; or, second, that these issues are systematically related to issues that were not asked about on our survey. For example, preferences about body cameras may be a function of attitudes about government transparency, yet our survey did not ask about other issues related to this potential dimension (e.g., policies addressing access to public records or local campaign finance laws). The implication is that while we identify a multidimensional space, with two substantive cleavages, there may be other latent dimensions that structure unmeasured and/or uniquely local aspects of the issue space.

## Examining the Substantive Meaning of Each Dimension

What explains the ideological placement of the local officials in our data? To answer this question, we conduct two related analyses. First, we examine the relationship between the individual and city-level characteristics of each elected official and their ideological placement on each dimension with regressions in which our ideology estimates are the dependent vari-

able.[5] The coefficients from these models are shown in Figure 2, with full results available in Appendix C. The solid, black points and confidence intervals correspond to the models with the first dimension ideal point as the dependent variable, while the blue, dashed intervals correspond to those using the second dimension.

Beginning with the results using the first dimension ideal point as the dependent variable, we see that party identification is a substantively large, statistically significant predictor of ideological placement, with Republicans and independents both being estimated as further to the right than their Democratic counterparts. At the city level, we also observe that officials from cities with larger nonwhite populations and higher median incomes are higher on this dimension, while those from cities with a large share of college graduates are lower. These patterns, in tandem with the evidence about which issues load onto this dimension—inequality, the minimum wage, and social issues, among others—-are consistent with the argument that our first dimension represents a liberal/conservative ideological divide. They also are consistent with the argument that partisanship not only shapes attitudes about redistribution at this level, as previous research suggests, but is also associated with preferences across a variety of other important local policy domains.

In contrast, Figure 2 shows that the second dimension is neither clearly nor exclusively predicted by party identification or ideology. Indeed, Republicans are estimated as only slightly below their Democratic counterparts on this scale, with no difference between Democrats and independents. Instead, our results illustrate the importance of two city-level factors: the share of the local population that is nonwhite and the share that is Hispanic. Higher shares of each of these contextual factors correlate with lower second dimension estimates. Given the issues that load onto this dimension—support for charter schools, school choice, and the privatization of city services—and the extensive literature documenting the role of race in local politics (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1986; Shah and Marschall, 2012; Hajnal and Trounstine, 2014; Trounstine, 2016), this should not necessarily be surprising:

[5]To account for multiple responses from some cities, we cluster our standard errors by city for all analyses.

Figure 2: Individual and City-Level Characteristics and Ideological Placement




*Coefficients are from two models, identifying individual- and city-level predictors of Dimension 1 and Dimension 2, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by city.*

decisions to privatize or adopt market-oriented solutions often have disparate impact across communities, and so we would expect elected officials from nonwhite areas to hold different views than those from more homogenously white cities.

Next, to further explore the substantive meaning of our latent dimensions, we examine the relationship between each official's two ideal points and the level of support they reported receiving from a diverse set of constituency groups. We identify these constituencies by asking each official to "rank the strength of support that you have received" from a set of common local interest groups on a five-point scale, with further instructions to skip a group if they are not active locally. For ease of interpretation, we coarsen the response scale so that a 1 represents support, a -1 opposition, and a 0 neither support nor opposition. Importantly, these constituency support questions were in no way presented as related to

the policy tradeoffs in our survey, with the tradeoff questions separated from this battery by a series of personality and demographic items.

Figure 3 shows the results of this analysis, depicting coefficients from models with the constituency indicators as independent variables and ideal points on our two latent dimensions as dependent variables. Looking at the first dimension, we see positive coefficients for economically right-leaning chambers of commerce and civic/fraternal organizations. In contrast, for left-leaning groups, such as environmental and LGBT organizations, we observe significant and negative relationships. Finally, support by each local party committee is also correlated with the first dimension in the expected directions.

Figure 3: Constituency Support and Ideological Placement




*Coefficients are from two models, predicting where city officials fall Dimension 1 and Dimension 2, respectively, as a function of their self-identified constituency support. Standard errors are clustered by city.*

For the second dimension, support from environmental groups and large individual donors—

who are common in education policy, where market-based solutions abound—is correlated with lower estimates on this dimension; in contrast, support from from unions, particularly teacher's unions, and state officials predicts higher values. Given the substantial stake that each of these groups has in battles over market-based policy, these patterns are precisely what we would expect if this dimension reflected this unique feature of local policy.

# Conclusion

In this paper, we contribute to the growing literature showing that ideology underpins local policy and service provision. Specifically, we show that across a range of important local policy issues, elite preferences in local politics can be characterized by two dimensions: a left/right ideological orientation that appears to parallel national politics and a market orientation toward the provision of government services. We also show that these dimensions are predicted by individual characteristics of each elected official, the demographic context of their city, and the groups that tend to support them come election time. Collectively, these patterns suggest that the two dimensions we identify capture meaningful political cleavages that orient the local political environment.

Our findings are important because they demonstrate that partisanship is only one facet of the local political process. While partisanship's influence has certainly grown in significance in recent years, which in many ways has helped to revitalize the study of American local politics, other cleavages are likely to remain. This has important implications for how we study and understand local representation. Indeed, a purely national focus may miss important features of how local officials represent their constituents—or deviate from them. In turn, being aware of this underlying multidimensionality is vital to ensuring that we capture the full dynamics of the local political process moving forward.

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# Online Appendix for: What Explains Local Policy Cleavages?: Examining the Policy Preferences of Public Officials at the Municipal Level

March 15, 2019

## Contents

# A Survey Sample

Within our sample of mayors, 191 cities or towns are represented. Among councilors, 627 unique cities or towns were represented, with 244 of those cities having responses from multiple councilors. In 383 cities, a single councilor responded, two councilors each responded in 157 cities, and over three councilors responded in 87 cities. The maximum number of councilors to respond from a single city was 7. Figure A.1 shows the geographic distribution of the cities and towns in our sample.

Table A.1 compares the baseline characteristics of the cities from which we received a survey response to the population of cities and towns at-large. Figure A.2 depicts the full distributions of these same variables for each group, along with all cities and towns with a population greater than 29,000. We choose a cutoff of 29,000 as a comparison set because Project Vote Smart, the online source for the emails we used to contact local officials, maintains information primarily from cities above this threshold.[1] As Table A.1 and Figure A.2 make clear, our sample of cities is not representative of cities at-large in the United States; it is, however, quite comparable to Project Vote Smart's target sample of cities and town with a population greater than 29,000.

[1]Information provided by Savannah Nguli of Project Vote Smart via email in March 2016.

Figure A.1: Geographic Distribution of Cities in Sample



Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Cities in Sample

| | | Minimum | Maximum | Median | Mean | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Population** | | | | | | |
| | Sample | 789 | 8,427,000 | 54,550 | 118,600 | 382,358 |
| | All Cities/Towns | 21 | 8,427,000 | 1,131 | 8,189 | 68,369 |
| **Percent Racial Minorities** | | | | | | |
| | Sample | 0% | 96% | 23% | 27% | 17% |
| | All Cities/Towns | 0% | 100% | 7% | 16% | 22% |
| **Percent of Hispanic Origin** | | | | | | |
| | Sample | 0% | 97% | 10% | 15% | 16% |
| | All Cities/Towns | 0% | 100% | 3% | 10% | 18% |
| **Per Capita 12-mo Income** | | | | | | |
| | Sample | $11,060 | $83,420 | $28,100 | $31,130 | $11,831 |
| | All Cities/Towns | $223 | $381,100 | $22,730 | $25,590 | $13,328 |
| **Percent with Bachelor's Degree or Higher** | | | | | | |
| | Sample | 6% | 81% | 31% | 35% | 16% |
| | All Cities/Towns | 0% | 100% | 17% | 21% | 16% |
| **Percent Manufacturing** | | | | | | |
| | Sample | <1% | 36% | 10% | 10% | 5% |
| | All Cities/Towns | 0% | 100% | 11% | 12% | 10% |

*Sample: n = 685; "All cities/towns" includes all U.S. Census-designated "places" with over 20 people (excluding Puerto Rico): n = 28,800.*

Figure A.2: Sampled Cities Compared to Population of Cities and Towns At-Large



## A.1 Characteristics of Officials in the Sample

Table A.2 includes summary statistics for the mayors and city councilmembers who responded to our survey. Unfortunately, given the challenges involved in collecting data at the local level, there is no high-quality, external database with information about the population of local elected officials. However, given our focus on partisanship, it is worth highlighting that we have relatively good balance in this area, with substantial shares of both Democrats and Republicans. It is also notable that the majority of our sample is white and male; although we have no way to verify this, given the well-documented challenges to achieving equal representation, we believe this likely aligns with the broader population.

Table A.2: Summary Statistics for City Officials in Sample

| | Mayors | Councilors | | Mayors | Councilors |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Gender** | | | **Partisanship** | | |
| Male | 56% | 59% | Democratic | 29% | 42% |
| Female | 16% | 28% | Republican | 36% | 23% |
| Missing | 20% | 14 % | Independent | 16% | 22% |
| | | | *⇀ D Leaner* | *5%* | *7%* |
| **Race** | | | *⇀ R Leaner* | *4%* | *7%* |
| White | 66% | 72% | *⇀ Neither* | *6%* | *8%* |
| Black | 1% | 6% | Missing | 18% | 8% |
| Hispanic | 3% | 4% | | | |
| Asian | 1% | 1% | **Identify as Progressive** | | |
| Native American | 1% | <1% | Definitely Yes | 8% | 22% |
| Mixed | 2% | 2% | Probably Yes | 28% | 31% |
| Other | <1% | 2% | Probably Not | 20% | 16% |
| Missing | 20% | 13% | Definitely Not | 13% | 14% |
| | | | Unsure | 2% | 5% |
| **Ideology** (1 = Very Lib, 5 = Very Cons.) | | | Missing | 20% | 12% |
| Mean | 3.13 | 2.84 | | | |
| SD | 0.77 | 0.96 | | | |
| Missing | 20% | 13% | | | |

# B Policy Tradeoff Questions

1. Cities should try to reduce income inequality, even if doing so comes at the expense of business and/or wealthy residents.

2. It is good for a neighborhood when it experiences rising property values, even if it means that some current residents might have to move out.

3. Cities should play a strong role in reducing the effects of climate change, even if it means sacrificing revenues and/or expending financial resources.

4. Cities should invest in affordable housing, even if it negatively influences neighboring property values.

5. Cities should expand access to charter schools, even if it negatively impacts traditional neighborhood schools.

6. Cities should raise the minimum wage, even if it means fewer employment opportunities overall.

7. Cities should require their police officers to wear body cameras, even if it sometimes makes it difficult for them to do their job.

8. Cities should increase fares for public transit to improve transportation infrastructure, even if it reduces ridership among low-income residents.

9. Cities should pass LGBT anti-discrimination laws, even if it violates some residents' religious beliefs.

10. Privatizing city services can provide cities a valuable revenue source, even if it reduces city control of service provision.

11. Students should be able to select whichever public school they wish to attend, regardless of what neighborhood they live in.

12. Cities should play an active role in ensuring social justice for citizens of underrepresented groups, even if it means changing long-standing institutions or practices.

# C Full Results: Individual/City-Level Predictors

Table C.3: Individual/City-Level Characteristics and Ideological Placement by Office Type

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | D1 Ideal Point | | | D2 Ideal Point | | |
| | All Officials | Mayors | Councilmembers | All Officials | Mayors | Councilmembers |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Republican | 0.245*** | 0.161*** | 0.261*** | −0.051*** | −0.041 | −0.053** |
| | (0.016) | (0.038) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.047) | (0.021) |
| Independent | 0.146*** | 0.060 | 0.162*** | −0.032 | 0.033 | −0.038 |
| | (0.021) | (0.046) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.058) | (0.024) |
| Ideology | 0.133*** | 0.158*** | 0.128*** | −0.007 | 0.051* | −0.013 |
| | (0.008) | (0.025) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.027) | (0.010) |
| White | 0.002 | −0.091** | 0.007 | 0.020 | 0.026 | 0.019 |
| | (0.016) | (0.041) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.060) | (0.018) |
| Male | 0.032*** | 0.002 | 0.033** | 0.003 | −0.003 | 0.003 |
| | (0.012) | (0.034) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.045) | (0.014) |
| Mayor | −0.037** | | | −0.020 | | |
| | (0.015) | | | (0.018) | | |
| log(Population) | −0.029*** | −0.010 | −0.030*** | −0.021*** | −0.006 | −0.022*** |
| | (0.006) | (0.021) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.031) | (0.007) |
| % Nonwhite | 0.075** | 0.169* | 0.065* | −0.138*** | −0.022 | −0.151*** |
| | (0.036) | (0.093) | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.109) | (0.046) |
| % Hispanic | 0.017 | −0.029 | 0.020 | −0.133*** | −0.247** | −0.124*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.098) | (0.043) | (0.042) | (0.122) | (0.046) |
| % College Grad. | −0.174*** | −0.251 | −0.169*** | −0.058 | −0.194 | −0.048 |
| | (0.050) | (0.174) | (0.053) | (0.058) | (0.215) | (0.061) |
| log(Median Income) | 0.067*** | 0.145* | 0.060** | −0.002 | 0.119 | −0.015 |
| | (0.023) | (0.083) | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.104) | (0.029) |
| Constant | −0.822*** | −1.785** | −0.747*** | 0.357 | −1.233 | 0.516* |
| | (0.233) | (0.904) | (0.242) | (0.267) | (1.135) | (0.283) |
| Observations | 1,002 | 139 | 863 | 1,002 | 139 | 863 |
| $R^2$ | 0.655 | 0.564 | 0.668 | 0.064 | 0.092 | 0.073 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
All standard errors clustered at the city-level

## C.1 Two-Dimensional Ideal Points by Party Identification

Figure C.3, for example, plots the ideal points for all of the mayors and councilmembers in our data, with the liberal/conservative dimension on the x-axis and the dimension related to market-based solutions on the y-axis. Each point on the plot represents a specific respondent, with points for Republican officials colored red, the points for Democratic officials colored blue, and the points for independents colored to match the party with which they most closely identify. For a random subset of local officials, we include their city's name instead of a point on the plot to provide a broader picture of the municipalities that our respondent's represent.

This is a simpler, more straightforward test of the relationship between our two dimensions and party, however, the visualization makes two points remarkably clear. First, the first dimension correlates strongly with partisan identification, with Democrats generally on the left and Republicans on the right. Second, despite the clear partisan separation on the first dimension, we see no apparent relationship between partisanship and the second dimension. Instead, Figure C.3 shows a relatively broad range of variation in attitudes on market-related policies that cross-cuts the partisan-structured liberal/conservative divide.

Figure C.3: Ideal Points for Local Officials from Basic Space Scaling



# D Full Results: Constituency Support

Table D.4: Constituency Support and and Ideological Placement by Office Type

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | D1 Ideal Point | | | D2 Ideal Point | | |
| | All Officials | Mayors | Councilmembers | All Officials | Mayors | Councilmembers |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Local Business Groups | 0.047*** | 0.024 | 0.049*** | −0.008 | −0.009 | −0.008 |
| | (0.015) | (0.045) | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.039) | (0.016) |
| Faith-Based Orgs. | 0.012 | 0.007 | 0.015 | −0.013 | −0.071* | −0.006 |
| | (0.014) | (0.041) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.042) | (0.015) |
| Civic/Fraternal Orgs. | 0.032* | 0.128*** | 0.015 | −0.006 | 0.055 | −0.011 |
| | (0.018) | (0.046) | (0.020) | (0.017) | (0.043) | (0.018) |
| Environemntal Groups | −0.105*** | −0.096** | −0.107*** | −0.028* | 0.027 | −0.037** |
| | (0.016) | (0.048) | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.039) | (0.017) |
| Health Industry | 0.003 | −0.040 | 0.013 | 0.001 | 0.053 | −0.007 |
| | (0.015) | (0.052) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.046) | (0.017) |
| Large Individual Donors | −0.015 | −0.003 | −0.020 | −0.040*** | −0.056 | −0.034** |
| | (0.013) | (0.039) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.040) | (0.013) |
| LGBT Orgs. | −0.101*** | −0.144*** | −0.093*** | −0.020 | −0.045 | −0.018 |
| | (0.015) | (0.048) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.047) | (0.018) |
| Local Democratic Comm. | −0.052*** | −0.066** | −0.051*** | 0.005 | −0.038 | 0.014 |
| | (0.013) | (0.033) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.030) | (0.015) |
| Local Republican Comm. | 0.103*** | 0.088*** | 0.106*** | −0.017 | 0.009 | −0.016 |
| | (0.012) | (0.027) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
| Newspapers | 0.001 | 0.046* | −0.010 | 0.003 | −0.006 | 0.004 |
| | (0.011) | (0.028) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.027) | (0.013) |
| Police/Firefighter Unions | 0.027** | 0.002 | 0.033** | 0.023* | 0.078** | 0.014 |
| | (0.012) | (0.027) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.034) | (0.013) |
| Teacher's Unions | −0.008 | 0.012 | −0.011 | 0.049*** | 0.048 | 0.050*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.055) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.043) | (0.018) |
| Other Unions | −0.013 | 0.006 | −0.013 | 0.023 | 0.016 | 0.024 |
| | (0.016) | (0.032) | (0.018) | (0.016) | (0.040) | (0.017) |
| State Officials | 0.038** | −0.007 | 0.047*** | 0.027* | 0.050 | 0.023 |
| | (0.017) | (0.077) | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.040) | (0.016) |
| Federal Officials | 0.018 | −0.014 | 0.024 | −0.036** | −0.028 | −0.040** |
| | (0.016) | (0.055) | (0.018) | (0.015) | (0.032) | (0.017) |
| Real Estate Industry | 0.004 | −0.032 | 0.010 | −0.020 | −0.079** | −0.016 |
| | (0.014) | (0.042) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.039) | (0.015) |
| Women's Orgs. | −0.026 | −0.037 | −0.025 | −0.009 | −0.057 | −0.001 |
| | (0.017) | (0.054) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.045) | (0.018) |
| Constant | −0.007 | 0.025 | −0.011 | 0.026* | 0.022 | 0.029* |
| | (0.019) | (0.050) | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.042) | (0.016) |
| Observations | 760 | 113 | 647 | 760 | 113 | 647 |
| $R^2$ | 0.500 | 0.487 | 0.516 | 0.094 | 0.229 | 0.091 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |