
Risc-V Security




Intrinsic Security

Zero Trust Model

- Security as a basic feature of HW, SW
 Firmware
- Support security through entire lifecycle
- Guidelines matched to profiles







ISA affecting

Non ISA affecting



proposal exists

progress ongoing

Security Model

- State Goals of Security and Rationale
- Abstracted from implementation specifics
- Platform specifications can reference appropriate sections
 - By Profile, By Vertical
- Reuse Existing standards when appropriate



Security Model

Secure Boot

- Immutable Root of Trust
- Secure Boot Chain
- Mutable Root of Trust
- Attestation through every stage
- Temporal Isolation
- Certificate Format
- Binary Format
- ...

LifeCycle Management

- Development and Debug
- Provisioning
- IDentity
- Update
- Anti Roll back
- Decommissioning

- Intention is to reference from Platform Specifications
 - Shall Should May in platform spec
 - Security Model itself is Non-ISA affecting



Trusted Execution

- Memory Safety
 - PMP based TFFs
- Hardware based Isolation
 - M-Class secure functions
 - A-Class Maintaining privilege levels in TEE
- Confidential Compute
 - Mutually untrusted applications
 - Isolated Application Enclaves
 - Encrypted Enclaves
- Attestation of entire software chain from initial boot
- Security aware Debugging



Robustness

- Control Flow Integrity
 - BTI, PAC etc
- Side Channel Leakage Protection
 - ISA extensions to control uArch?
 - Fence.t
- Capability Based
 - o CHERI JWG
 - Alternatives?



Security Ecosystem


- Security Services
 - Reference implementations
 - Secure Boot
 - Attestation
 - **...**
 - Optimised library ports
 - OpenSSL
 - mbed Crypto
 - OS ports
 - APIs

- Standards and Certification
 - Formal Security Proofs
 - Certification mapping
- Verticals
 - Any Specific requirements?



Proposed Reorganisation of Security in Risc-V





Proposed Reorganisation of Security in Risc-V



- Start Security Model team under HC to create high level recommendations around RoT, secure boot, attestation chain, temporal isolation, updateability, identity, and the rationale.
- Move most of the Current TEE TG work to a new SIG 'Memory Safety SIG' -
 - Meetings structure unchanged, chair remains Nick
 - Create individual TGs for each task with specific charter
- Refocus the Security Tech SIG
 - Suresh remains chair
 - Trusted Execution and Confidential Computing
 - Initial work is to define the requirements, aim to charter TG(s)
- Create Joint Working Group (JWG) for CHERI discussion
- CFI ready to charter TG
- Restart SCA discussion on fence.T and other proposals
- Also need focus on Security SW and Ecosystem any volunteers?