# **Grand Challenges for Abstract Interpretation**

### Patrick COUSOT

École Normale Supérieure 45 rue d'Ulm 75230 Paris cedex 05, France

Patrick.Cousot@ens.fr
www.di.ens.fr/~cousot

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# **Talk Outline**

•	A few words on abstract interpretation	
	(5 mn)	. 3
•	A Practical application to the verification of	
	embedded, real-time, synchronous, safety super- critical software (15 mn)	12
•	Challenges for abstract interpretation	
	(5 mn)	34

# A Few Words on Abstract Interpretation

### **Abstract Interpretation**

• Abstract interpretation theory formalizes the idea of sound approximation for mathematical constructs involved in the specification of the semantics and properties of computer systems.

### References

- [POPL'77] P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation: a unified lattice model for static analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints. In 4<sup>th</sup> POPL, pages 238–252, 1977.
- [Thesis] P. Cousot. Méthodes itératives de construction et d'approximation de points fixes d'opérateurs monotones sur un treillis, analyse sémantique de programmes. Thèse d'État ès sciences mathématiques, Université scientifique et médicale de Grenoble, Grenoble, 21 Mar. 1978.
- [PO- PL '79] P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. In 6<sup>th</sup> POPL, pages 269–282, 1979.
- [JLC '92] P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation frameworks. J. Logic and Comp., 2(4):511-547, 1992.



## 1 – Abstract Domains

- Program concrete properties are specified by the (operational) semantics of programming languages;
- Program abstract properties are elements of abstract domains (posets/lattices/...);
- Program property abstraction is performed by (effective) conservative approximation of concrete properties;
- The abstract properties (hence abstract semantics) are sound but may be incomplete with respect to the concrete properties (semantics);

# 2 – Correspondence between Concrete and Abstract Properties

- If any concrete property has a best approximation, approximation is formalized by Galois connections (or equivalently closure operators, Moore families, etc. 1);
- Otherwise, weaker abstraction/ concretization correspondences are available <sup>2</sup>;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation frameworks. JLC 2(4):511-547, 1992.





<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. ACM POPL'79, pp. 269–282, 1979.

# 3 – Semantics Abstraction

- Program concrete semantics and specifications are defined by syntactic induction and composition of fix-points (or using equivalent presentations <sup>3</sup>);
- The property abstraction is extended compositionally to all constructions of the concrete/abstract semantics, including fixpoints;
- This leads to a constructive design of the abstract semantics by approximation of the concrete semantics <sup>4</sup>;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. *Inductive definitions, semantics and abstract interpretation*. POPL, 83–94, 1992.





<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Compositional and inductive semantic definitions in fixpoint, equational, constraint, closure-condition, rule-based and game theoretic form. CAV '95, LNCS 939, pp. 293–308, 1995.

# 4 — Effective Analysis/Checking/ Verification Algorithms


- Computable abstract semantics lead to effective program analysis/checking/verification algorithms;
- Furthermore fixpoints can be approximated iteratively by convergence acceleration through widening/narrowing that is non-standard induction <sup>5</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation: a unified lattice model for static analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints. ACM POPL, pp. 238–252, 1977.





# **Example: Grammar Abstraction**



# **Applications of Abstract Interpretation**

- Static Program Analysis [POPL '77,78,79] inluding Dataflow Analysis [POPL '79,00], Set-based Analysis [FPCA '95],
   Predicate Abstraction [Manna's festschrift '04]
- Syntax Analysis [TCS 290(1) 2002]
- Hierarchies of Semantics (including Proofs) [POPL '92, TCS 277(1-2) 2002]
- Typing [POPL '97]
- Model Checking [POPL '00]

# Applications of Abstract Interpretation (Cont'd)

- Program Transformation [POPL '02]
- Software watermarking [POPL '02]

All these techniques involve sound approximations that can be formalized by abstract interpretation


# A Practical Application of Abstract Interpretation to the Verification of Safety Critical Embedded Software

### Reference

- [1] B. Blanchet, P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret, L. Mauborgne, A. Miné, D. Monniaux, and X. Rival. Design and implementation of a special-purpose static program analyzer for safety-critical real-time embedded software. The Essence of Computation: Complexity, Analysis, Transformation. Essays Dedicated to Neil D. Jones, LNCS 2566, pages 85–108. Springer, 2002.
- [2] B. Blanchet, P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret, L. Mauborgne, A. Miné, D. Monniaux, and X. Rival. A static analyzer for large safety-critical software. PLDI'03, San Diego, June 7–14, ACM Press, 2003.



# **Static Program Analysis**



# ASTRÉE: A Sound, Automatic, Specializable, Domain-Aware, Parametric, Modular, Efficient and Precise Static Program Analyzer

www.astree.ens.fr

- C programs:
  - structured C programs;
  - no dynamic memory allocation;
  - no recursion.
- Application Domain: safety critical embedded real-time synchronous software for non-linear control of very complex control/command systems.

# **Concrete Operational Semantics**

- International norm of C (ISO/IEC 9899:1999)
- restricted by implementation-specific behaviors depending upon the machine and compiler (e.g. representation and size of integers, IEEE 754-1985 norm for floats and doubles)
- restricted by user-defined programming guidelines (such as no modular arithmetic for signed integers, even though this might be the hardware choice)
- restricted by program specific user requirements (e.g. assert)

### **Abstract Semantics**

- Reachable states for the concrete operational semantics
- Volatile environment is specified by a *trusted* configuration file.

# Implicit Specification: Absence of Runtime Errors

- No violation of the norm of C (e.g. array index out of bounds)
- No implementation-specific undefined behaviors (e.g. maximum short integer is 32767)
- No violation of the programming guidelines (e.g. static variables cannot be assumed to be initialized to 0)
- No violation of the programmer assertions (must all be statically verified).

# **Example application**

 Primary flight control software of the Airbus A340/A380 fly-by-wire system





- C program, automatically generated from a high-level specification
- A340: 132,000 lines, 75,000 LOCs after preprocessing, 10,000 global variables, over 21,000 after expansion of small arrays.

# The Class of Considered Periodic Synchronous Programs

declare volatile input, state and output variables;
initialize state and output variables;

### loop forever

- read volatile input variables,
- compute output and state variables,
- write to volatile output variables;
  wait for clock ();

### end loop

- Requirements: the only interrupts are clock ticks;
- Execution time of loop body less than a clock tick [3].

#### Reference

[3] C. Ferdinand, R. Heckmann, M. Langenbach, F. Martin, M. Schmidt, H. Theiling, S. Thesing, and R. Wilhelm. Reliable and precise WCET determination for a real-life processor. *ESOP* (2001), LNCS 2211, 469–485.



# Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer

- Static: compile time analysis ( $\neq$  run time analysis Rational Purify, Parasoft Insure++)
- Program Analyzer: analyzes programs not micromodels of programs (\neq PROMELA in SPIN or Alloy in the Alloy Analyzer)
- Automatic: no end-user intervention needed ( $\neq$  ESC Java, ESC Java 2)
- Sound: covers the whole state space ( $\neq$  MAGIC, CBMC) so never omit potential errors ( $\neq$  UNO, CMC from coverity.com) or sort most probable ones ( $\neq$  Splint)



# Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer (Cont'd)

- Multiabstraction: uses many numerical/symbolic abstract domains (≠ symbolic constraints in Bane)
- Infinitary: all abstractions use infinite abstract domains with widening/narrowing ( $\neq$  model checking based analyzers such as VeriSoft, Bandera, Java PathFinder)
- Efficient: always terminate ( $\neq$  counterexample-driven automatic abstraction refinement BLAST, SLAM)
- Specializable: can easily incorporate new abstractions (and reduction with already existing abstract domains)
   (≠ general-purpose analyzers PolySpace Verifier)



# Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer (Cont'd)

Domain-Aware: knows about control/command (e.g. digital filters) (as opposed to specialization to a mere programming style in C Global Surveyor)

Parametric: the precision/cost can be tailored to user needs by options and directives in the code

Automatic Parametrization: the generation of parametric directives in the code can be programmed (to be specialized for a specific application domain)

# Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer (Cont'd)

Modular: an analyzer instance is built by selection of O-CAML modules from a collection each implementing an abstract domain

Precise: few or no false alarm when adapted to an application domain — VERIFIER!

# Benchmarks for the Primary Flight Control Software of the Airbus A340


Comparative results (commercial software):
 4,200 (false?) alarms,

3.5 days;

• Our results:

① alarm,
1h20 on 2.8 GHz PC,
300 Megabytes
→ A world première!

# General-Purpose Abstract Domains: Intervals and Octagons



$$egin{array}{l} ext{Intervals:} & 1 \leq x \leq 9 \ 1 \leq y \leq 20 \ ext{Octagons [4]:} & 1 \leq x \leq 9 \ x+y \leq 78 \ 1 \leq y \leq 20 \ x-y \leq 03 \ \end{array}$$

Difficulties: many global variables, IEEE 754 floating-point arithmetic (in program and analyzer)

### Reference

- [4] A. Miné. A New Numerical Abstract Domain Based on Difference-Bound Matrices. In *PADO'2001*, LNCS 2053, Springer, 2001, pp. 155–172.
- [5] A. Miné. Relational abstract domains for the detection of floating-point run-time errors. In ESOP'04, Barcelona, LNCS, Springer, 2004 (to appear).

# **Floating-Point Computations**

### • Code Sample:

```
/* float-error.c */
int main () {
  float x, y, z, r;
  x = 1.000000019e+38;
  y = x + 1.0e21;
  z = x - 1.0e21;
  r = y - z;
  printf("%f\n", r);
} % gcc float-error.c
% ./a.out
0.000000
```

$$(x+a)-(x-a)\neq 2a$$

```
/* double-error.c */
int main () {
double x; float y, z, r;
/* x = ldexp(1.,50) + ldexp(1.,26); */
x = 1125899973951488.0;
y = x + 1;
z = x - 1;
r = y - z;
printf("%f\n", r);
% gcc double-error.c
% ./a.out
134217728.000000
```

### **Clock Abstract Domain for Counters**

### • Code Sample:

```
R = 0;
while (1) {
  if (I)
    { R = R+1; }
  else
    { R = 0; }
  T = (R>=n);
  wait_for_clock ();
}
```

- Output T is true iff the volatile input I has been true for the last n clock ticks.
- The clock ticks every s seconds for at most h hours, thus R is bounded.
- To prove that R cannot overflow, we must prove that R cannot exceed the elapsed clock ticks (impossible using only intervals).

### • Solution:


- We add a phantom variable clock in the concrete user semantics to track elapsed clock ticks.
- For each variable X, we abstract three intervals: X, X+clock, and X-clock.
- If X+clock or X-clock is bounded, so is X.



### **Boolean Relations for Boolean Control**

### • Code Sample:

```
/* boolean.c */
typedef enum {F=0,T=1} BOOL;
BOOL B;
void main () {
  unsigned int X, Y;
  while (1) {
    B = (X == 0);
    if (!B) {
      Y = 1 / X;
```



The boolean relation abstract domain is parameterized by the height of the decision tree (an analyzer option) and the abstract domain at the leafs


# **Control Partitionning for Case Analysis**

### • Code Sample:


```
/* trace_partitionning.c */
void main() {
  float t[5] = {-10.0, -10.0, 0.0, 10.0, 10.0};
  float c[4] = {0.0, 2.0, 2.0, 0.0};
  float d[4] = {-20.0, -20.0, 0.0, 20.0};
  float x, r;
  int i = 0;
  ... found invariant -100 \le x \le 100 ...

while ((i < 3) && (x >= t[i+1])) {
    i = i + 1;
  }
  r = (x - t[i]) * c[i] + d[i];
}
```


### Control point partitionning:



### Trace partitionning:




### 2<sup>d</sup> Order Digital Filter:




# **Ellipsoid Abstract Domain for Filters**

- Computes  $X_n = \begin{cases} \alpha X_{n-1} + \beta X_{n-2} + Y_n \\ I_n \end{cases}$
- The concrete computation is bounded, which must be proved in the abstract.
- There is no stable interval or octagon.
- The simplest stable surface is an ellipsoid.




unstable interval



Reference

[6] J. Feret. Static analysis of digital filters. In ESOP'04, Barcelona, LNCS, Springer, 2004 (to appear).

### **Example of Analysis Session**





### The main loop invariant

A textual file over 4.5 Mb with

- 6,900 boolean interval assertions ( $x \in [0; 1]$ )
- 9,600 interval assertions  $(x \in [a; b])$
- 25,400 clock assertions  $(x+\operatorname{clk} \in [a;b] \land x-\operatorname{clk} \in [a;b])$
- 19,100 additive octagonal assertions  $(a \le x + y \le b)$
- 19,200 subtractive octagonal assertions ( $a \le x y \le b$ )
- 100 decision trees
- 60 ellipse invariants, etc . . .

involving over 16,000 floating point constants (only 550 appearing in the program text)  $\times$  75,000 LOCs.

# Conclusion on Verification by Abstraction

- Most applications of abstract interpretation tolerate a small rate (typically 5 to 15%) of false alarms:
  - Program transformation  $\rightarrow$  do not optimize,
  - Typing → reject some correct programs, etc,
  - WCET analysis → overestimate;
- Some applications require no false alarm at all:
  - Program verification.
- Theoretically possible [SARA '00], practically feasible [PLDI '03]

#### Reference

[SARA '00] P. Cousot. Partial Completeness of Abstract Fixpoint Checking, invited paper. In 4<sup>th</sup> Int. Symp. SARA '2000, LNAI 1864, Springer, pp. 1–25, 2000.

[PLDI'03] B. Blanchet, P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret, L. Mauborgne, A. Miné, D. Monniaux, and X. Rival. A static analyzer for large safety-critical software. PLDI'03, San Diego, June 7–14, ACM Press, 2003.



# Grand Challenges for Abstract Interpretation

# Scaling-up Static Program Analysis

- Success on 100 000 LOCS (primary flight control software of the Airbus A340)
- Working on 500 000 LOCS (primary flight control software of the Airbus A380)
- → We should be able to statically analyze huge software
  (3 000 000 LOCS (all software of the A380) to 30 000 000
  LOCS (Windows OS)).

# Formal Verification of Static Analyzers

- Abstract interpretation can formalize static program analysis [POPL '77,78,79]
- The design and programming of ASTRÉE is tightly guided by abstract interpretation
- We should be able to completely verify the ASTREE static analyzer.

# Formalization of Compilation

Abstract interpretation can formalize:

- Parsing [TCS 290(1) 2002]
- Typing [POPL '97]
- Static analysis [POPL '77,78,79]
- Program transformation (partial evaluation, code generation) [POPL '02]
- We should be able to completely formalize compilation.

# THE END, THANK YOU

More references at URL www.di.ens.fr/~cousot www.astree.ens.fr.



