

Abstract Interpretation and Application to the Static Analysis of Safety-Critical Embedded Computer Software

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Abstract

Static software analysis has known brilliant successes in the small, by proving complex program properties of programs of a few dozen or hundreds of lines, either by systematic exploration of the state space or by interactive deductive methods. To scale up is a definite problem. Very few static analyzers are able to scale up to millions of lines without sacrificing automation and/or soundness and/or precision. Unsound static analysis may be useful for bug finding but is less useless in safety critical applications where the absence of bugs, at least of some categories of common bugs, should be formally verified.

After recalling the basic principles of abstract interpretation including the notions of abstraction, approximation, soundness, completeness, false alarm, etc., we introduce the domain-specific static analyzer ASTRÉE (www.astree.ens.fr) for proving the absence of runtime errors in safety critical real time embedded synchronous software in the large.

The talk emphasizes soundness (no runtime error is ever omitted), parametrization (the ability to refine abstractions by options and analysis directives), extensibility (the easy incorporation of new abstractions to refine the approximation), precision (few or no false alarms for programs in the considered application domain) and scalability (the analyzer scales to millions of lines).

In conclusion, present-day software engineering methodology, which is based on the control of the design, coding and testing processes should evolve in the near future, to incorporate a systematic control of final software product thanks to domain-specific analyzers that scale up.

1. Classical Examples of Bugs

Classical examples of bugs in integer computations

The factorial program (fact.c)

```
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int fact (int n ) {
```

```
    int r, i;
```

```
    r = 1;
```

```
    for (i=2; i<=n; i++) {
```

```
        r = r*i;
```

```
    }
```

```
    return r;
```

```
}
```

```
int main() { int n;
```

```
    scanf("%d",&n);
```

```
    printf("%d!=%d\n",n,fact(n));
```

```
}
```

$\leftarrow \text{fact}(n) = 2 \times 3 \times \cdots \times n$

\leftarrow read n (typed on keyboard)

\leftarrow write $n! = \text{fact}(n)$

Compilation of the factorial program (fact.c)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int fact (int n ) {
    int r, i;
    r = 1;
    for (i=2; i<=n; i++) {
        r = r*i;
    }
    return r;
}

int main() { int n;
    scanf("%d",&n);
    printf("%d!=%d\n",n,fact(n));
}
```

% gcc fact.c -o fact.exec
%


Executions of the factorial program (fact.c)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int fact (int n ) {
    int r, i;
    r = 1;
    for (i=2; i<=n; i++) {
        r = r*i;
    }
    return r;
}
int main() { int n;
    scanf("%d",&n);
    printf("%d!=%d\n",n,fact(n));
}
```

```
% gcc fact.c -o fact.exec
% ./fact.exec
3
3! = 6
% ./fact.exec
4
4! = 24
% ./fact.exec
100
100! = 0
% ./fact.exec
20
20! = -2102132736
```


Bug hunt


- Computers use **integer modular arithmetics** on n bits (where $n = 16, 32, 64$, etc)
- Example of an **integer representation on 4 bits** (in *complement to two*) :



- Only **integers between -8 and 7** can be represented on 4 bits
- We get $7 + 2 = -7$
 $7 + 9 = 0$

The bug is a failure of the programmer

In the computer, the function `fact(n)` coincide with $n! = 2 \times 3 \times \dots \times n$ on the integers only for $1 \leq n \leq 12$:



And in OCAML the result is different!

```
let rec fact n = if (n = 1) then 1 else n * fact(n-1);;
```

| fact(n) | C | OCAML |
|----------|-------------|------------|
| fact(1) | 1 | 1 |
| ... | ... | ... |
| fact(12) | 479001600 | 479001600 |
| fact(13) | 1932053504 | -215430144 |
| fact(14) | 1278945280 | -868538368 |
| fact(15) | 2004310016 | -143173632 |
| fact(16) | 2004189184 | -143294464 |
| fact(17) | -288522240 | -288522240 |
| fact(18) | -898433024 | -898433024 |
| fact(19) | 109641728 | 109641728 |
| fact(20) | -2102132736 | 45350912 |
| fact(21) | -1195114496 | 952369152 |

| | | |
|----------|-------------|------------|
| fact(22) | -522715136 | -522715136 |
| fact(23) | 862453760 | 862453760 |
| fact(24) | -775946240 | -775946240 |
| fact(25) | 2076180480 | -71303168 |
| fact(26) | -1853882368 | 293601280 |
| fact(27) | 1484783616 | -662700032 |
| fact(28) | -1375731712 | 771751936 |
| fact(29) | -1241513984 | 905969664 |
| fact(30) | 1409286144 | -738197504 |
| fact(31) | 738197504 | 738197504 |
| fact(32) | -2147483648 | 0 |
| fact(33) | -2147483648 | 0 |
| fact(34) | 0 | 0 |

Why? What is the result of fact(-1) ?


Proof of absence of runtime error by static analysis

```
% cat -n fact_lim.c
1 int MAXINT = 2147483647;
2 int fact (int n) {
3     int r, i;
4     if (n < 1) || (n = MAXINT) {
5         r = 0;
6     } else {
7         r = 1;
8         for (i = 2; i<=n; i++) {
9             if (r <= (MAXINT / i)) {
10                r = r * i;
11            } else {
12                r = 0;
13            }
14        }
15    }
16    return r;
17 }
18
```

```
19 int main() {
20     int n, f;
21     f = fact(n);
22 }
```

```
% astree -exec-fn main fact_lim.c |& grep WARN
%
```

→ No alarm!



Examples of classical bugs in floating point computations

Mathematical models and their implementation on computers

- Mathematical models of physical systems use real numbers
- Computer modeling languages (like SCADE) use real numbers
- Real numbers are hard to represent in a computer (π has an infinite number of decimals)
- Computer programming languages (like C or OCAML) use floating point numbers

Floats

- *Floating point numbers* are a finite subset of the *rationals*
- For example one can represent **32 floats on 6 bits**, the 16 positive normalized floats spread as follows on the line:



- When real computations do not spot on a float, one must **round the result to a close float**

Example of rounding error (1)

$$(x + a) - (x - a) \neq 2a$$

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main() {
    double x, a; float y, z;
    x = 1125899973951488.0;
    a = 1.0;
    y = (x+a);
    z = (x-a);
    printf("%f\n", y-z);
}
```

```
% gcc arrondi1.c -o arrondi1.exec
% ./arrondi1.exec
134217728.000000
%
```


Example of rounding error (2)

$$(x + a) - (x - a) \neq 2a$$

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main() {
    double x, a; float y, z;
    x = 1125899973951487.0;
    a = 1.0;
    y = (x+a);
    z = (x-a);
    printf("%f\n", y-z);
}
```


```
% gcc arrondi2.c -o arrondi2.exec
% ./arrondi2.exec
0.000000
%
```

Bug hunt (1)

Doubles

Reals

Floats




Bug hunt (2)

Doubles

Reals

Floats




Proof of absence of runtime error by static analysis

```
% cat -n arrondi3.c
1 int main() {
2     double x; float y, z, r;;
3     x = 1125899973951488.0;
4     y = x + 1;
5     z = x - 1;
6     r = y - z;
7     __ASTREE_log_vars((r));
8 }

% astree -exec-fn main -print-float-digits 10 arrondi3.c \
  |& grep "r in "
direct = <float-interval:  r in [-134217728, 134217728] >(1)
```

⁽¹⁾ ASTRÉE considers the worst rounding case (towards $+\infty$, $-\infty$, 0 or to the nearest) whence the possibility to obtain -134217728.

The verification is done in the worst case



Examples of bugs due to rounding errors

- The **patriot missile bug** missing Scuds in 1991 because of a software clock incremented by $\frac{1}{10}$ th of a seconde $((0,1)_{10} = (0,0001100110011001100\dots)_2$ in binary)
- The **Exel 2007 bug** : 77.1×850 gives 65,535 but displays as 100,000! ⁽²⁾

| | | | | | |
|---|---|--------|--|---|--------|
| 2 | $65535 \cdot 2^{-37}$ | 100000 | | $65536 \cdot 2^{-37}$ | 100001 |
| 3 | $65535 \cdot 2^{-36}$ | 100000 | | $65536 \cdot 2^{-36}$ | 100001 |
| 4 | $65535 \cdot 2^{-35}$ | 100000 | | $65536 \cdot 2^{-35}$ | 100001 |
| 5 | $65535 \cdot 2^{-34}$ | 65535 | | $65536 \cdot 2^{-34}$ | 65536 |
| 6 | $65535 \cdot 2^{-36} \cdot 2^{-37}$ | 100000 | | $65536 \cdot 2^{-36} \cdot 2^{-37}$ | 100001 |
| 7 | $65535 \cdot 2^{-35} \cdot 2^{-37}$ | 100000 | | $65536 \cdot 2^{-35} \cdot 2^{-37}$ | 100001 |
| 8 | $65535 \cdot 2^{-35} \cdot 2^{-36}$ | 100000 | | $65536 \cdot 2^{-35} \cdot 2^{-36}$ | 100001 |
| 9 | $65535 \cdot 2^{-35} \cdot 2^{-36} \cdot 2^{-37}$ | 65535 | | $65536 \cdot 2^{-35} \cdot 2^{-36} \cdot 2^{-37}$ | 65536 |

(2) Incorrect float rounding which leads to an alignment error in the conversion table while translating 64 bits IEEE 754 floats into a Unicode character string. The bug appears exactly for six numbers between 65534.99999999995 and 65535 and six between 65535.99999999995 and 65536.

Bugs in the everyday numerical world

Bugs are frequent in everyday life

- Bugs proliferate in banks, cars, telephones, washing machines, ...
- Example (bug in an ATM machine located at 19 Boulevard Sébastopol in Paris, on 21 November 2006 at 8:30):



- Hypothesis (Gordon Moore's law revisited): the number of software bugs in the world double every 18 months??? :- (


2. Program verification

Principle of program verification

- Define a **semantics** of the language (that is the effect of executing programs of the language)
- Define a **specification** (example: absence of runtime errors such as division by zero, un arithmetic overflow, etc)
- Make a **formal proof** that the semantics satisfies the specification
- Use a computer to **automate the proof**


Semantics of programs

Operational semantics of program P



Example: execution trace of fact(4)


```
int fact (int n ) {  
    int r = 1, i;  
    for (i=2; i<=n; i++) {  
        r = r*i;  
    }  
    return r;  
}
```



```
n ← 4; r ← 1;  
i ← 2; r ← 1 × 2 = 1;  
i ← 3; r ← 2 × 3 = 6;  
i ← 4; r ← 6 × 4 = 24;  
i ← 5;  
return 24;
```

Program specification

Specification of program P




Example of specification

```
int fact (int n ) {  
    int r, i;  
    r = 1;  
    for (i=2; i<=n; i++) {  
        r = r*i;  
    }  
    return r;  
}
```

← no overflow of i++
← no overflow of r*i

Formal proofs

Formal proof of program P




$$\text{Semantics}[P] \subseteq \text{Specification}[P]$$

Undecidability and complexity

- The mathematical proof problem is **undecidable**⁽³⁾
- Even assuming finite states, the **complexity** is much too high for combinatorial exploration to succeed
- Example: 1.000.000 lines \times 50.000 variables \times 64 bits \simeq **10^{27} states**
- Exploring **10^{15} states per seconde**, one would need 10^{12} s $>$ **300 centuries** (and a lot of memory)!

⁽³⁾ there are infinitely many programs for which a computer cannot solve them in finite time even with an infinite memory.

Testing is incomplete




3. Abstract Interpretation [1]


Reference

- [1] P. Cousot. Méthodes itératives de construction et d'approximation de points fixes d'opérateurs monotones sur un treillis, analyse sémantique de programmes. Thèse d'État ès sciences mathématiques. Université scientifique et médicale de Grenoble. 1978.

Abstraction of program P




Proof by abstraction



$$\text{Abstraction}(\text{Semantics}[[P]]) \subseteq \text{Specifcator}[[P]]$$


Soundness of abstract interpretation

Abstract interpretation is sound




$$\text{Semantics}[[P]] \subseteq \text{Abstraction}(\text{Semantics}[[P]])$$

Example of unsound abstraction ⁽⁴⁾




⁽⁴⁾ Unsoundness is always excluded by abstract interpretation theory.

Unsound abstractions are inconclusive (false negatives) ⁽⁴⁾




⁽⁴⁾ Unsoundness is always excluded by abstract interpretation theory.


Incompleteness of abstract interpretation



An alarm can originate from an error



An alarm can originate from an over-approximation



4. Applications of Abstract Interpretation

The Theory of Abstract Interpretation

- A theory of **sound approximation** of mathematical structures, in particular those involved in the behavior of computer systems
- Systematic derivation of **sound methods and algorithms** for **approximating undecidable or highly complex problems** in various areas of computer science
- Main practical application is on the **safety and security of complex hardware and software** computer systems
- **Abstraction**: extracting information from a system description that is relevant to proving a property

Applications of Abstract Interpretation

- **Static Program Analysis** (or Semantics-Checking) [CC77], [CH78], [CC79] including Dataflow Analysis; [CC79], [CC00], Set-based Analysis [CC95], Predicate Abstraction [Cou03], ...
- **Grammar Analysis and Parsing** [CC03];
- **Hierarchies of Semantics and Proof Methods** [CC92b], [Cou02];
- **Typing & Type Inference** [Cou97];
- **(Abstract) Model Checking** [CC00];
- **Program Transformation** (including compile-time program optimization, partial evaluation, etc) [CC02];


Applications of Abstract Interpretation (Cont'd)

- Software Watermarking [CC04];
- Bisimulations [RT04, RT06];
- Language-based security [GM04];
- Semantics-based obfuscated malware detection [PCJD07].
- Databases [AGM93, BPC01, BS97]
- Computational biology [Dan07]
- Quantum computing [JP06, Per06]

All these techniques involve **sound approximations** that can be formalized by **abstract interpretation**


5. Application of Abstract Interpretation to Static Analysis

Semantics




(Infinite) set of traces (finite ou infinite)

Abstraction to a set of states (invariant)




Set of points $\{(x_i, y_i) : i \in \Delta\}$, Floyd/Hoare/Naur invariance proof method [Cou02]

Abstraction by signs




Signs $x \geq 0, y \geq 0$ [CC79]

Abstraction by intervals




Intervals $a \leq x \leq b, c \leq y \leq d$ [CC77]

Abstraction by octagons




Octagons $x - y \leq a, x + y \leq b$ [Min06]

Abstraction by polyedra




Polyedra $a.x + b.y \leq c$ [CH78]

Abstraction by ellipsoids



Ellipsoids $(x - a)^2 + (y - b)^2 \leq c$ [Fer05b]

Abstraction by exponentials



Exponentials $a^x \leq y$ [Fer05a]

6. Invariant Computation by Fixpoint Approximation [CC77]

Fixpoint equation

$\{y \geq 0\} \leftarrow$ hypothesis

$x = y$

$\{I(x, y)\} \leftarrow$ loop invariant

while ($x > 0$) {

$x = x - 1$;

}

Floyd-Naur-Hoare verification conditions:

$$(y \geq 0 \wedge x = y) \implies I(x, y)$$

initialisation

$$(I(x, y) \wedge x > 0 \wedge x' = x - 1) \implies I(x', y)$$

iteration

Equivalent fixpoint equation:

$$I(x, y) = x \geq 0 \wedge (x = y \vee I(x + 1, y)) \quad (\text{i.e. } I = F(I)^{(5)})$$

(5) We look for the most precise invariant I , implying all others, that is $\text{lfp}^{\implies} F$.

Accelerated Iterates $I = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} F^n(\text{false})$

$$I^0(x, y) = \text{false}$$

$$\begin{aligned} I^1(x, y) &= x \geq 0 \wedge (x = y \vee I^0(x + 1, y)) \\ &= 0 \leq x = y \end{aligned}$$


$$\begin{aligned} I^2(x, y) &= x \geq 0 \wedge (x = y \vee I^1(x + 1, y)) \\ &= 0 \leq x \leq y \leq x + 1 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} I^3(x, y) &= x \geq 0 \wedge (x = y \vee I^2(x + 1, y)) \\ &= 0 \leq x \leq y \leq x + 2 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} I^4(x, y) &= I^2(x, y) \nabla I^3(x, y) \leftarrow \text{widening} \\ &= 0 \leq x \leq y \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} I^5(x, y) &= x \geq 0 \wedge (x = y \vee I^4(x + 1, y)) \\ &= I^4(x, y) \quad \text{fixed point!} \end{aligned}$$

The invariants are computer representable with octagons!



7. Scaling up

The difficulty of scaling up

- The abstraction must be **coarse** enough to be **effectively computable** with reasonable resources
- The abstraction must be **precise** enough to **avoid false alarms**
- **Abstractions to *infinite domains with widenings*** are **more expressive** than abstractions to *finite domains* (when considering the analysis of a programming language) [CC92a]
- **Abstractions are ultimately incomplete** (even intrinsically for some semantics and specifications [CC00])

Abstraction/refinement by tuning the cost/precision ratio in ASTRÉE

- Approximate reduced product of a choice of coarsenable/refinable abstractions
- Tune their precision/cost ratio by
 - Globally by parametrization
 - Locally by (automatic) analysis directivesso that the overall abstraction is not uniform.


Example of abstract domain choice in ASTRÉE

```
/* Launching the forward abstract interpreter */  
/* Domains:  Guard domain, and Boolean packs (based on Absolute  
value equality relations, and Symbolic constant propagation  
(max_depth=20), and Linearization, and Integer intervals, and  
congruences, and bitfields, and finite integer sets, and Float  
intervals), and Octagons, and High_passband_domain(10), and  
Second_order_filter_domain (with real roots)(10), and  
Second_order_filter_domain (with complex roots)(10), and  
Arithmetico-geometric series, and new clock, and Dependencies  
(static), and Equality relations, and Modulo relations, and  
Symbolic constant propagation (max_depth=20), and Linearization,  
and Integer intervals, and congruences, and bitfields, and  
finite integer sets, and Float intervals.  */
```

Example of abstract domain functor in ASTRÉE: decision trees

– Code Sample:

```
/* boolean.c */
typedef enum {F=0,T=1} BOOL;
BOOL B;
void main () {
    unsigned int X, Y;
    while (1) {
        ...
        B = (X == 0);
        ...
        if (!B) {
            Y = 1 / X;
        }
        ...
    }
}
```



The boolean relation abstract domain is parameterized by the height of the decision tree (an analyzer option) and the abstract domain at the leafs

Reduction [CC79, CCF⁺08]

Example: reduction of intervals [CC76] by simple congruences [Gra89]

```
% cat -n congruence.c
```

```
1 /* congruence.c */
2 int main()
3 { int X;
4   X = 0;
5   while (X <= 128)
6     { X = X + 4; };
7   __ASTREE_log_vars((X));
8 }
```

```
% astree congruence.c -no-relational -exec-fn main |& egrep "(WARN)|(X in)"
direct = <integers (intv+cong+bitfield+set): X in {132} >
```

Intervals : $X \in [129, 132]$ + congruences : $X = 0 \bmod 4 \implies X \in \{132\}$.

Parameterized abstractions

- Parameterize the cost / precision ratio of abstractions in the static analyzer
- Examples:
 - **array smashing**: `--smash-threshold n` (400 by default)
→ smash elements of arrays of size $> n$, otherwise individualize array elements (each handled as a simple variable).
 - **packing in octagons**: (to determine which groups of variables are related by octagons and where)
 - `--fewer-oct`: no packs at the function level,
 - `--max-array-size-in-octagons n` : unsmashed array elements of size $> n$ don't go to octagons packs

Parameterized widenings

- Parameterize the rate and level of precision of widenings in the static analyzer
- Examples:
 - **delayed widenings**: `--forced-union-iterations-at-beginning n` (2 by default)
 - **thresholds for widening** (e.g. for integers):

```
let widening_sequence =  
  [ of_int 0; of_int 1; of_int 2; of_int 3; of_int 4; of_int 5;  
    of_int 32767; of_int 32768; of_int 65535; of_int 65536;  
    of_string "2147483647"; of_string "2147483648";  
    of_string "4294967295" ]
```

Analysis directives

- Require a **local refinement** of an abstract domain
- Example:

```
% cat repeat1.c
typedef enum {FALSE=0,TRUE=1} BOOL;
int main () {
    int x = 100; BOOL b = TRUE;

    while (b) {
        x = x - 1;
        b = (x > 0);
    }
}

% astree -exec-fn main repeat1.c |& egrep "WARN"
repeat1.c:5.8-13::[call#main@2:loop@4>=4:]: WARN: signed int arithmetic
range [-2147483649, 2147483646] not included in [-2147483648, 2147483647]
%
```


Example of directive (Cont'd)

```
% cat repeat2.c
typedef enum {FALSE=0,TRUE=1} BOOL;
int main () {
    int x = 100; BOOL b = TRUE;
    __ASTREE_boolean_pack((b,x));
    while (b) {
        x = x - 1;
        b = (x > 0);
    }
}

% astree -exec-fn main repeat2.c |& egrep "WARN"
%
```

The insertion of this directive could be automated in *ASTRÉE* (if the considered family of programs has “repeat” loops).

Automatic analysis directives

- The directives can be inserted automatically by static analysis
- Example:

```
% cat p.c
int clip(int x, int max, int min) {
    if (max >= min) {
        if (x <= max) {
            max = x;
        }
        if (x < min) {
            max = min;
        }
    }
    return max;
}

void main() {
    int m = 0; int M = 512; int x, y;
    y = clip(x, M, m);
    __ASTREE_assert(((m<=y) && (y<=M)));
}


% astree -exec-fn main p.c |& grep WARN
%
```

```
% astree -exec-fn main p.c -dump-partition
...
int (clip)(int x, int max, int min)
{
    if ((max >= min))
    { __ASTREE_partition_control((0))
      if ((x <= max))
      {
          max = x;
      }
      if ((x < min))
      {
          max = min;
      }
      __ASTREE_partition_merge_last(());
    }
    return max;
}
...
%
```

Adding new abstract domains

- The **weakest invariant** to prove the specification may **not** be **expressible** with the current refined abstractions \Rightarrow **false alarms** cannot be solved
- No solution, but adding a **new abstract domain**:
 - **representation** of the abstract properties
 - abstract property **transformers** for language primitives
 - **widening**
 - **reduction** with other abstractions
- **Examples** : ellipsoids for filters [Fer05b], exponentials for accumulation of small rounding errors [Fer05a], quaternions, ...

Abstraction by ellipsoid for filters




Ellipsoids $(x - a)^2 + (y - b)^2 \leq c$ [Fer05b]

Example of analysis by ASTRÉE

```
typedef enum {FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1} BOOLEAN;
BOOLEAN INIT; float P, X;
void filter () {
    static float E[2], S[2];
    if (INIT) { S[0] = X; P = X; E[0] = X; }
    else { P = (((((0.5 * X) - (E[0] * 0.7)) + (E[1] * 0.4))
                + (S[0] * 1.5)) - (S[1] * 0.7)); }
    E[1] = E[0]; E[0] = X; S[1] = S[0]; S[0] = P;
    /* S[0], S[1] in [-1327.02698354, 1327.02698354] */
}
void main () { X = 0.2 * X + 5; INIT = TRUE;
    while (1) {
        X = 0.9 * X + 35; /* simulated filter input */
        filter (); INIT = FALSE; }
}
```

Abstraction by exponentials for accumulation of small rounding errors



Exponentials $a^x \leq y$

Example of analysis by ASTRÉE

```
% cat retro.c
typedef enum {FALSE=0, TRUE=1} BOOL;
BOOL FIRST;
volatile BOOL SWITCH;
volatile float E;
float P, X, A, B;
```

```
void dev( )
{ X=E;
  if (FIRST) { P = X; }
  else
    { P = (P - (((2.0 * P) - A) - B) * 5.0e-03);
      B = A;
      if (SWITCH) {A = P;}
      else {A = X;}
    }
}
```

```
void main()
{ FIRST = TRUE;
  while (TRUE) {
    dev( );
    FIRST = FALSE;
    __ASTREE_wait_for_clock();
  }
}
```

```
% cat retro.config
__ASTREE_volatile_input((E [-15.0, 15.0]));
__ASTREE_volatile_input((SWITCH [0,1]));
__ASTREE_max_clock((3600000));
```

```
astree -exec-fn main -config-sem retro.config
retro.c | grep "|P|" | tail -n 1
|P| <=1.0000002*((15. +
5.8774718e-39/(1.0000002-1))*(1.0000002)clock -
5.8774718e-39/(1.0000002-1)) + 5.8774718e-39 <=
23.039353
```

8. Industrial Application of Abstract Interpretation

Examples of sound static analyzers in industrial use

- For C critical synchronous embedded control/command programs (for example for Electric Flight Control Software)
- aiT [FHL⁺01] is a static analyzer to determine the Worst Case Execution Time (to guarantee synchronization in due time)
- ASTRÉE [BCC⁺03] is a static analyzer to verify the absence of runtime errors



Industrial results obtained with ASTRÉE

Automatic proofs of absence of runtime errors in Electric Flight Control Software:

- Software 1 : 132.000 lines of C, 40mn on a PC 2.8 GHz, 300 megabytes (nov. 2003)
- Software 2 : 1.000.000 lines of C, 34h, 8 gigabytes (nov. 2005)

no false alarm

World premières !

9. Present and Future Work

Foundational Work

- Formalization of the descriptions of the behavior of discrete/hybrid complex systems⁽⁶⁾ and mecanisation of the reasonings on such systems in terms of abstract interpretation
- Abstraction of numerical⁽⁷⁾, symbolic⁽⁸⁾ and control-flow⁽⁹⁾ properties.

(6) image analysis [Ser94], biological systems [DFFK07, DFFK08, Fer07], quantum calculus [JP06], etc

(7) for example efficient and correct implementation of polyhedra with floats

(8) for example

- low level memory models
- complex dynamic data structures
- cryptographic protocols

(9) for example, quasi-synchronism, concurrency, ...

Technological Transfert

- Widening of the application domain of ASTRÉE (space, aircraft engines, automobile, rail, telecommunications)
- Certification of ASTRÉE (for the aeronautic industry)
- Industrialisation of ASTRÉE

Challenges

Short term : Help of the diagnostic of **origin of alarms**

Midterm : **Parallelism**

Long term : **Liveness** for infinite systems

10. Conclusion

Conclusion

- **Vision**: to understand the numerical world, different **levels of abstraction** must be considered
- **Theory**: **abstract interpretation** ensures the coherence between abstractions and offers effective approximation techniques to cope with infinite systems
- **Applications**: the choice of effective abstraction which are coarse enough to be *computable* and precise enough to be *avoid false alarms* is central to **master undecidability and complexity** in **model and program verification**

The futur

- **Software engineering** : Manual validation by **control of the software design process** will be complemented by the **verification of the final product**
- **Complex systems** : abstract interpretation applies equally well to the **analysis of systems with discrete/hybrid evolution** (image analysis [Ser94], biological systems [DFFK07, DFFK08, Fer07], quantum computation [JP06], etc)

THE END

Thank you for your attention

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Answers to questions

- The integers are encoded on 32 bits in C and on 31 bits in OCAML (one bit is used for garbage collection)
- The call of `fact(-1)` calls `fact(-2)` which calls `fact(-3)`, etc. For each call, it is necessary to stack the parameter and return address, which ends by a stack overflow:

```
% ocaml
```

```
Objective Caml version 3.10.0
```

```
# let rec fact n = if (n = 1) then 1 else n * fact(n-1);;
```

```
val fact : int -> int = <fun>
```

```
# fact(-1);;
```

```
Stack overflow during evaluation (looping recursion?).
```