« Vérification de logiciel embarqués critiques par interprétation abstraite »

Patrick Cousot
École normale supérieure
45 rue d'Ulm, 75230 Paris cedex 05, France
Patrick.Cousot@ens.fr www.di.ens.fr/~cousot

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Résumé

Les difficultés avec les méthodes formelles sont qu'elles requièrent une spécification formelle, une sémantique formelle du langage de programmation et, à cause de l'indécidabilité, présentent de sérieuses limitations sur la vérification automatique que la sémantique du programme satisfait la spécification. Les démonstrateurs de théorèmes ont besoin d'une assistance humaine tandis que la vérification exhaustive de modèles nécessite des modèles finis qui, sauf peut-être pour le matériel, sont généralement incomplets.

L'analyse statique offre une alternative intéressante, complètement automatique, en particulier quand la spécification peut être choisie implicitement. C'est le cas par exemple de la preuve d'absence d'erreurs à l'exécution pour laquelle l'utilisateur n'a pas besoin de donner une spécification complexe. De plus l'analyse statique prend en compte des modèles infinis des calculs du programme directement calculés à partir du texte du programme de sorte que l'utilisateur n'a aucun besoin de fournir un modèle fini du programme et de son environnement d'exécution. Finalement les états accessibles en cours d'exécution sont calculés approximativement par une sur-approximation qui n'omet aucun cas possible. Par conséquent les questions délicates de sémantiques des programmes peuvent être résolues en considérant une approximation de tous les cas possibles.

Si cette idée d'approximation permet de traiter les problèmes d'indécidabilité, elle a l'inconvénient majeur de prendre en compte des exécutions du programme qui sont fictives, sans aucun exécution correspondante observable dans les conditions d'exploitation du programme. Ces exécutions fictives, dont l'analyse ne peut déterminer si elles sont fictives ou observables, peuvent être à l'origine d'erreurs à l'exécution, qui doivent donc être signalées et constituent des « fausses alarmes ». En général ces fausses alarmes doivent être résolues par inspection manuelle du code ce qui est extrêmement coûteux.

Tout le problème est donc de choisir des abstractions de la sémantique du programme qui ne produisent pas ou peu de fausses alarmes. Pour ce faire, on peut restreindre la famille des programmes à analyser à un domaine d'application particulier de façon à adapter exactement les abstractions aux structures de données, primitives de calcul et schémas d'algorithmes spécifiques à ce domaine d'application.

Nous présenterons les éléments de la théorie de l'interprétation abstraite sur lesquelles reposent la correction de la notion d'approximation en analyse statique. Puis nous introduirons l'analyseur statique ASTRÉE (www.astree.ens.fr), qui est spécialisé dans la vérification de l'absence d'erreurs à l'exécution pour les programmes de contrôle/commande. L'analyseur utilise des abstractions générales (comme les intervalles, les octogones, le partitionnement de données et du contrôle) ainsi que des abstractions spécifiques au domaine d'applications (par exemple pour traiter les filtres ou l'accumulation potentielle d'erreurs d'arrondi). Finalement nous rendrons compte de l'application réussie d'ASTRÉE à la preuve d'absence d'erreurs à l'exécution dans des logiciels récents de commande de vol électrique.

Contents

1. Motivation

Bugs Now Show-Up in Everyday Life

– Bugs now appear frequently in everyday life (banks, cars, telephones, . . .)

– Example (HSBC bank ATM [1] at 19 Boulevard Sébastopol in Paris, failure on Nov. 21st 2006 at 8:30 am):

[1] cash machine, cash dispenser, automatic teller machine.

A Strong Need for Software Better Quality

– Poor software quality is not acceptable in safety and mission critical software applications.



– The present state of the art in software engineering does not offer sufficient quality garantees

The Complexity of Software Design

– The design of complex software is difficult and economically critical

– Example (www.designnews.com/article/CA6475332.html):

Boeing Confirms 787 Delay, Fasteners, Flight Control Software Code Blamed

John Dodge, Editor-in-Chief – Design News, September 5, 2007

> Boeing officials confirmed today that a fastener shortage and problems with flight control software have pushed "first flight" of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner to sometime between mid-November and mid-December.
>
> ...
>
> The software delays involve Honeywell Aerospace, which is responsible for flight control software. The work on this part of the 787 was simply underestimated, said Bair.

Tool-Based Software Design Methods

– New tool-based software design methods will have to emerge to face the unprecedented growth and complexification of critical software

– E.g. FCPC (Flight Control Primary Computer)
  - A220: 20 000 LOCs,
  - A340 (V1): 130 000 LOCS
  - A340 (V2): 250 000 LOCS
  - A380: 1.000.000 LOCS
  - A350: static analysis to be integrated in the software production

Static Analysis

A *static analyzer* is a program that

– takes as input:
  - a program P (written in some given programming language $\mathbb{P}$ with a given semantics $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{P}}$)
  - a specification S (implicit $\mathcal{S}[\![P]\!]$ or written in some specification language $\mathbb{S}$ with a given semantics $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{S}}$)

– *always terminates* and delivers *automatically* as output:
  - a diagnosis on the validity of the program semantics with respect the specification semantics

Difficulties of Static Analysis

– automatic + infinite state + termination $\Longrightarrow$ undecidable!

– for a programming (and a specification) language, not for a given model of a given program:

$$\forall P \in \mathbb{P} : \forall S \in \mathbb{S} : \mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{P}}[\![P]\!] \subseteq \mathcal{S}_{\mathbb{S}}[\![P, S]\!]?$$

or, more simply for an *implicit specification* $\mathfrak{S}[\![P]\!]$:

$$\forall P \in \mathbb{P} : \mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{P}}[\![P]\!] \subseteq \mathfrak{S}[\![P]\!]?$$

Soundness and Completeness

– Soundness: for all $P \in \mathbb{P}$, if the answer is yes (no) then $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{P}}[\![P]\!] \subseteq \mathfrak{S}[\![P]\!]$ (resp. $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{P}}[\![P]\!] \not\subseteq \mathfrak{S}[\![P]\!]$)

– Completeness: for all $P \in \mathbb{P}$, if $\mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{P}}[\![P]\!] \subseteq \mathfrak{S}[\![P]\!]$ ($\mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{P}}[\![P]\!] \not\subseteq \mathfrak{S}[\![P]\!]$) then the answer is yes (resp. no)

We always require SOUNDNESS!

Undecidability $\Longrightarrow$ no completeness

Problems with Formal Methods

- Formal specifications (abstract machines, temporal logic, ...) are costly, complex, error-prone, difficult to maintain, not mastered by casual programmers
- Formal semantics of the specification and programming language are inexistant, informal, irrealistic or complex
- Formal proofs are partial (static analysis), do not scale up (model checking) or need human assistance (theorem proving & proof assistants)

  $\Rightarrow$ High costs (for specification, proof assistance, etc).

Avantages of Static Analysis

- Formal specifications are implicit (no need for explicit, user-provided specifications)
- Formal semantics are approximated by the static analyzer (no user-provided models of the program)
- Formal proofs are automatic (no required user-interaction)
- Costs are low (no modification of the software production methodology)
- Scales up to 100.000 to 1.000.000 LOCS
- Rapid and large diffusion in embedded software production industries

Disadvantages of Static Analysis

- Imprecision (acceptable in some applications like WCET or program optimization)
- Incomplete for program verification
- False alarms are due to unsuccessful automatic proofs in 5 to 15% of the cases

For example, 1% of 500.000 potential (true or false) alarms is 5.000, too much to be handled by hand!

Remedies to False Alarms in ASTRÉE

- ASTRÉE is specialized to specific program properties [2]
- ASTRÉE is specialized to real-time synchronous control/command programs written in C
- ASTRÉE offers possibilities of refinement [3]

The cost of adapting ASTRÉE to a specific program, should be a small fraction of the cost to test the specific program properties verified by ASTRÉE.

[2] proof of absence of runtime errors

[3] parametrizations and analysis directives

2. Informal Introduction to Abstract Interpretation

Abstract Interpretation

There are two fundamental concepts in computer science (and in sciences in general) :

- **Abstraction** : to reason on complex systems
- **Approximation** : to make effective undecidable computations

These concepts are formalized by abstract interpretation

References

[POPL '77] P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation: a unified lattice model for static analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints. In 4^{th} *ACM POPL*.

[Thesis '78] P. Cousot. Méthodes itératives de construction et d'approximation de points fixes d'opérateurs monotones sur un treillis, analyse sémantique de programmes. Thèse ès sci. math. Grenoble, march 1978.

[POPL '79] P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. In 6^{th} *ACM POPL*.

Principle of Abstraction

Operational semantics



Safety property



Test/Debugging is Unsafe



Bounded Model Checking is Unsafe



Over-Approximation



Abstract Interpretation is Sound



Soundness and Incompleteness

Soundness Requirement: Erroneous Abstraction [4]



[4] This situation is always excluded in static analysis by abstract interpretation.

Soundness Requirement: Erroneous Abstraction [5]



5 This situation is always excluded in static analysis by abstract interpretation.

Imprecision $\Rightarrow$ False Alarms



Design by Refinement

Global Interval Abstraction → False Alarms



Local Interval Abstraction $\rightarrow$ False Alarms



Refinement by Partitionning



Intervals with Partitionning



State-based versus Trace-based Partitioning

State-based partitionning at control points:



Trace-based partitionning at control points:



Delaying abstract unions in tests and loops is more precise for non-distributive abstract domains (and much less expensive than disjunctive completion).

Trace Partitioning

Principle:

- Semantic equivalence:

```
if (B) { C1 } else { C2 }; C3
```

```
if (B) { C1; C3 } else { C2; C3 };
```

- More precise in the abstract: concrete execution paths are merged later.

Application:

```
if (B)
  { X=0; Y=1; }
else
  { X=1; Y=0; }
R = 1 / (X-Y);
```

cannot result in a division by zero

Case analysis with loop unrolling

– Code Sample:

```
/* trace_partitionning.c */
void main() {
  float t[5] = {-10.0, -10.0, 0.0, 10.0, 10.0};
  float c[4] = {0.0, 2.0, 2.0, 0.0};
  float d[4] = {-20.0, -20.0, 0.0, 20.0};
  float x, r;
  int i = 0;
  __ASTREE_known_fact(((-30.0 <= x) && (x <= 30.0)));
  while ((i < 3) && (x >= t[i+1])) {
    i = i + 1;
  }
  r = (x - t[i]) * c[i] + d[i];
  __ASTREE_log_vars((r));
}
```




```
% astree -exec-fn main -no-trace -no-relational trace-partitioning.c |& egrep "(WARN)|(r in)"
direct = <float-interval: r in [-20, 20] >
%
% astree -exec-fn main -no-partition -no-trace -no-relational trace-partitioning.c \
  |& egrep "(WARN)|(r in)"
direct = <float-interval: r in [-100, 100] >
%
```

3. The ASTRÉE static analyzer

http://www.astree.ens.fr/

Project Members

Bruno Blanchet [6]

Patrick Cousot

Radhia Cousot

Jérôme Feret

Laurent Mauborgne

Antoine Miné

David Monniaux [7]

Xavier Rival

[6] Nov. 2001 —— Nov. 2003.

[7] Nov. 2001 —— Aug. 2007.

Programs Analyzed by Astrée and their Semantics

Programs analysed by ASTRÉE

– Application Domain: large safety critical embedded real-time synchronous software for non-linear control of very complex control/command systems.

– C programs:

- with

  · basic numeric datatypes, structures and arrays

  · pointers (including on functions),

  · floating point computations

  · tests, loops and function calls

  · limited branching (forward `goto`, `break`, `continue`)

– with (cont'd)
  - `union` ù NEW [Min06a]
  - pointer arithmetics & casts [Min06a]
– without
  - dynamic memory allocation
  - recursive function calls
  - unstructured/backward branching
  - conflicting side effects
  - C libraries, system calls (parallelism)

Such limitations are quite common for embedded safety-critical software.

The Class of Considered Periodic Synchronous Programs

declare volatile input, state and output variables;
initialize state and output variables;
loop forever
- read volatile input variables,
- compute output and state variables,
- write to output variables;

__ASTREE_wait_for_clock ();
end loop

Task scheduling is static:

– Requirements: the only interrupts are clock ticks;

– Execution time of loop body less than a clock tick, as verified by the aiT WCET Analyzers [FHL+01].

Concrete Operational Semantics

- International norm of C (ISO/IEC 9899:1999)
- *restricted by* implementation-specific behaviors depending upon the machine and compiler (e.g. representation and size of integers, IEEE 754-1985 norm for floats and doubles)
- *restricted by* user-defined programming guidelines (such as no modular arithmetic for signed integers, even though this might be the hardware choice)
- *restricted by* program specific user requirements (e.g. `assert`, execution stops on first runtime error [8])

[8] semantics of C unclear after an error, equivalent if no alarm

Different Classes of Run-time Errors

1. Errors terminating the execution [9]. ASTRÉE warns and continues by taking into account only the executions that did not trigger the error.
2. Errors not terminating the execution with predictable outcome [10]. ASTRÉE warns and continues with worst-case assumptions.
3. Errors not terminating the execution with unpredictable outcome [11]. ASTRÉE warns and continues by taking into account only the executions that did not trigger the error.

$\Rightarrow$ ASTRÉE is sound with respect to C standard, unsound with respect to C implementation, unless no false alarm.

[9] floating-point exceptions e.g. (invalid operations, overflows, etc.) when traps are activated

[10] e.g. overflows over signed integers resulting in some signed integer.

[11] e.g. memory corruptionss.

Specification Proved by ASTRÉE

Implicit Specification: Absence of Runtime Errors

- No violation of the norm of C (e.g. array index out of bounds, division by zero)
- No implementation-specific undefined behaviors (e.g. maximum short integer is 32767, NaN)
- No violation of the programming guidelines (e.g. static variables cannot be assumed to be initialized to 0)
- No violation of the programmer assertions (must all be statically verified).

Modular Arithmetic

Modular arithmetics is not very intuitive

In C:

```
% cat -n modulo-c.c
     1 #include <stdio.h>
     2 int main () {
     3 int x,y;
     4 x = -2147483647 / -1;
     5 y = ((-x) -1) / -1;
     6 printf("x = %i, y = %i\n",x,y);
     7 }
     8

% gcc modulo-c.c
% ./a.out
x = 2147483647, y = -2147483648
```

Static Analysis with ASTRÉE

```
% cat -n modulo.c
     1 int main () {
     2 int x,y;
     3 x = -2147483647 / -1;
     4 y = ((-x) -1) / -1;
     5 __ASTREE_log_vars((x,y));
     6 }
     7
% astree -exec-fn main -unroll 0 modulo.c\
 |& egrep -A 1 "(<integers)|(WARN)"
modulo.c:4.4-18::[call#main@1:]: WARN: signed int arithmetic range
  {2147483648} not included in [-2147483648, 2147483647]
  <integers (intv+cong+bitfield+set): y in [-2147483648, 2147483647] /\ Top
   x in {2147483647} /\ {2147483647} >
```

ASTRÉE signals the overflow and goes on with an unkown value.

Float Overflow

Float Arithmetics does Overflow

In C:

```
% cat -n overflow.c
 1  void main () {
 2  double x,y;
 3  x = 1.0e+256 * 1.0e+256;
 4  y = 1.0e+256 * -1.0e+256;
 5  __ASTREE_log_vars((x,y));
 6  }
% gcc overflow.c
% ./a.out
x = inf, y = -inf
```

```
% astree -exec-fn main
overflow.c |& grep "WARN"
overflow.c:3.4-23::[call#main1:]:
WARN: double arithmetic range
[1.79769e+308, inf] not
included in [-1.79769e+308,
1.79769e+308]
overflow.c:4.4-24::[call#main1:]:
WARN: double arithmetic range
[-inf, -1.79769e+308] not
included in [-1.79769e+308,
1.79769e+308]
```

The Ariane 5.01 maiden flight

– June 4^{th}, 1996 was the maiden flight of Ariane 5

The Ariane 5.01 maiden flight failure

- June 4^{th}, 1996 was the maiden flight of Ariane 5
- The launcher was destroyed after 40 seconds of flight because of a software overflow [12]

[12] A 16 bit piece of code of Ariane 4 had been reused within the new 32 bit code for Ariane 5. This caused an uncaught overflow, making the launcher uncontrolable.

Rounding

Example of rounding error

```
/* float-error.c */
int main () {
  float x, y, z, r;
  x = 1.000000019e+38;
  y = x + 1.0e21;
  z = x - 1.0e21;
  r = y - z;
  printf("%f\n", r);
}
% gcc float-error.c
% ./a.out
0.000000
```

```
/* double-error.c */
int main () {
double x; float y, z, r;
/* x = ldexp(1.,50)+ldexp(1.,26); */
x = 1125899973951488.0;
y = x + 1;
z = x - 1;
r = y - z;
printf("%f\n", r);
}
% gcc double-error.c
% ./a.out
134217728.000000
```

$$(x + a) - (x - a) \neq 2a$$

Example of rounding error

```
/* float-error.c */
int main () {
  float x, y, z, r;
  x = 1.000000019e+38;
  y = x + 1.0e21;
  z = x - 1.0e21;
  r = y - z;
  printf("%f\n", r);
}
% gcc float-error.c
% ./a.out
0.000000
```

```
/* double-error.c */
int main () {
double x; float y, z, r;
/* x = ldexp(1.,50)+ldexp(1.,26); */
x = 1125899973951487.0;
y = x + 1;
z = x - 1;
r = y - z;
printf("%f\n", r);
}
% gcc double-error.c
% ./a.out
0.000000
```

$$(x + a) - (x - a) \neq 2a$$

Explanation of the huge rounding error

(1)



(2)



Static analysis with ASTRÉE [13]

```
% cat -n double-error.c
 2  int main () {
 3  double x; float y, z, r;;
 4  /* x = ldexp(1.,50)+ldexp(1.,26); */
 5  x = 112589973951488.0;
 6  y = x + 1;
 7  z = x - 1;
 8  r = y - z;
 9  __ASTREE_log_vars((r));
10  }
% gcc double-error.c
% ./a.out
134217728.000000
% astree -exec-fn main -print-float-digits 10 double-error.c |& grep "r in
direct = <float-interval: r in [-134217728, 134217728] >
```

[13] ASTRÉE makes a worst-case assumption on the rounding ($+\infty$, $-\infty$, 0, nearest) hence the possibility to get -134217728.

Example of accumulation of small rounding errors

```
% cat -n rounding-c.c
 1  #include <stdio.h>
 2  int main () {
 3   int i; double x; x = 0.0;
 4   for (i=1; i<=1000000000; i++) {
 5    x = x + 1.0/10.0;
 6   }
 7  printf("x = %f\n", x);
 8  }
% gcc rounding-c.c
% ./a.out
x = 99999998.745418
%
```

since $(0.1)_{10} = (0.00011001100110011001100\ldots)_2$

Static analysis with ASTRÉE

```
% cat -n rounding.c
     1  int main () {
     2   double x; x = 0.0;
     3   while (1) {
     4    x = x + 1.0/10.0;
     5    __ASTREE_log_vars((x));
     6    __ASTREE_wait_for_clock(());
     7   }
     8  }
% cat rounding.config
 __ASTREE_max_clock((1000000000));
% astree -exec-fn main -config-sem rounding.config -unroll 0 rounding.c\
 |& egrep "(x in)|(\|x\|)|(WARN)" | tail -2
direct = <float-interval: x in [0.1, 200000040.938] >
  |x| <= 1.*((0. + 0.1/(1.-1))*(1.)^clock - 0.1/(1.-1)) + 0.1
      <= 200000040.938
```

The Patriot missile failure

– "On February 25th, 1991, a Patriot missile ... failed to track and intercept an incoming Scud (*)."

– The software failure was due to accumulated rounding error (†)

(*) This Scud subsequently hit an Army barracks, killing 28 Americans.

(†)
– "Time is kept continuously by the system's internal clock in tenths of seconds"
  – "The system had been in operation for over 100 consecutive hours"
  – "Because the system had been on so long, the resulting inaccuracy in the time calculation caused the range gate to shift so much that the system could not track the incoming Scud"



Scaling

Static Analysis of Scaling with ASTRÉE

```
% cat -n scale.c
 1 int main () {
 2  float x; x = 0.70000001;
 3  while (1) {
 4   x = x / 3.0;
 5   x = x * 3.0;
 6   __ASTREE_log_vars((x));
 7   __ASTREE_wait_for_clock(());
 8  }
 9 }
```

```
% gcc scale.c
% ./a.out
x = 0.699999988079071
```

```
% cat scale.config
 __ASTREE_max_clock((1000000000));
% astree -exec-fn main -config-sem scale.config -unroll 0 scale.c\
 |& grep "x in" | tail -1
direct = <float-interval: x in [0.69999986887, 0.700000047684] >
%
```

Filtering

Ellipsoid Abstract Domain for Filters

2^d Order Digital Filter:



- Computes $X_n = \begin{cases} \alpha X_{n-1} + \beta X_{n-2} + Y_n \\ I_n \end{cases}$
- The concrete computation is bounded, which must be proved in the abstract.
- There is no stable interval or octagon.
- The simplest stable surface is an ellipsoid.



execution trace



unstable interval



stable ellipsoid

Filter Example [Fer04]

```
typedef enum {FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1} BOOLEAN;
BOOLEAN INIT; float P, X;
void filter () {
  static float E[2], S[2];
  if (INIT) { S[0] = X; P = X; E[0] = X; }
  else { P = (((((0.5 * X) - (E[0] * 0.7)) + (E[1] * 0.4))
             + (S[0] * 1.5)) - (S[1] * 0.7)); }
  E[1] = E[0]; E[0] = X; S[1] = S[0]; S[0] = P;
  /* S[0], S[1] in [-1327.02698354, 1327.02698354] */
}
void main () { X = 0.2 * X + 5; INIT = TRUE;
  while (1) {
    X = 0.9 * X + 35; /* simulated filter input */
    filter (); INIT = FALSE; }
}
```

Time Dependence

Arithmetic-Geometric Progressions (Example 1)

```
% cat count.c
typedef enum {FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1} BOOLEAN;
volatile BOOLEAN I; int R; BOOLEAN T;
void main() {
  R = 0;
  while (TRUE) {
    __ASTREE_log_vars((R));
    if (I) { R = R + 1; }          ← potential overflow!
    else { R = 0; }
    T = (R >= 100);
    __ASTREE_wait_for_clock(());
  }}
```

```
% cat count.config
__ASTREE_volatile_input((I [0,1]));
__ASTREE_max_clock((3600000));
% astree -exec-fn main -config-sem count.config count.c|grep '|R|'
|R| <= 0. + clock *1. <= 3600001.
```

Arithmetic-Geometric Progressions: Example 2

```
% cat retro.c
typedef enum {FALSE=0, TRUE=1} BOOL;
BOOL FIRST;
volatile BOOL SWITCH;
volatile float E;
float P, X, A, B;

void dev( )
{ X=E;
  if (FIRST) { P = X; }
  else
    { P =  (P - ((((2.0 * P) - A) - B)
            * 4.491048e-03)); };
  B = A;
  if (SWITCH) {A = P;}
  else {A = X;}
}
```

```
void main()
{ FIRST = TRUE;
  while (TRUE) {
    dev( );
    FIRST = FALSE;
    __ASTREE_wait_for_clock(());
  }}
% cat retro.config
__ASTREE_volatile_input((E [-15.0, 15.0]));
__ASTREE_volatile_input((SWITCH [0,1]));
__ASTREE_max_clock((3600000));
|P| <= (15.  + 5.87747175411e-39
/ 1.19209290217e-07) * (1
+ 1.19209290217e-07)^clock
- 5.87747175411e-39 /
1.19209290217e-07 <= 23.0393526881
```

Overapproximation with an Arithmetic-Geometric Progression



Arithmetic-geometric progressions [14] [Fer05]

– Abstract domain: $(\mathbb{R}^+)^5$

– Concretization:

$$\gamma \in (\mathbb{R}^+)^5 \longmapsto \wp(\mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{R})$$

$$\gamma(M, a, b, a', b') =$$

$$\{f \mid \forall k \in \mathbb{N} : |f(k)| \leq \left(\boldsymbol{\lambda}\, x \cdot ax + b \circ (\boldsymbol{\lambda}\, x \cdot a'x + b')^k\right)(M)\}$$

i.e. any function bounded by the arithmetic-geometric progression.

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[14] Interval in $\mathbb{R}$

4. The industrial use of ASTRÉE

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Example application

– Primary flight control software of the Airbus A340 family/A380 fly-by-wire system

– C program, automatically generated from a proprietary high-level specification (à la Simulink/SCADE)

– A340 family: 132,000 lines, 75,000 LOCs after preprocessing, 10,000 global variables, over 21,000 after expansion of small arrays, now $\times$ 2

– A380: $\times$ 3/7

Digital Fly-by-Wire Avionics [15]

[15] The electrical flight control system is placed between the pilot's controls (sidesticks, rudder pedals) and the control surfaces of the aircraft, whose movement they control and monitor.

Benchmarks (Airbus A340 Primary Flight Control Software)

- V1 [16], 132,000 lines, 75,000 LOCs after preprocessing
- Comparative results (commercial software):

  4,200 (false?) alarms, 3.5 days;
- Our results:

  0 alarms,

  40mn on 2.8 GHz PC, 300 Megabytes

  $\longrightarrow$ A world première in Nov. 2003!

16 "Flight Control and Guidance Unit" (FCGU) running on the "Flight Control Primary Computers" (FCPC). The three primary computers (FCPC) and two secondary computers (FCSC) which form the A340 and A330 electrical flight control system are placed between the pilot's controls (sidesticks, rudder pedals) and the control surfaces of the aircraft, whose movement they control and monitor.

The main loop invariant for the A340 V1

A textual file over 4.5 Mb with

– 6,900 boolean interval assertions ($x \in [0; 1]$)

– 9,600 interval assertions ($x \in [a; b]$)

– 25,400 clock assertions ($x + \text{clk} \in [a; b] \wedge x - \text{clk} \in [a; b]$)

– 19,100 additive octagonal assertions ($a \leq x + y \leq b$)

– 19,200 subtractive octagonal assertions ($a \leq x - y \leq b$)

– 100 decision trees

– 60 ellipse invariants, etc ...

involving over 16,000 floating point constants (only 550 appearing in the program text) $\times$ 75,000 LOCs.

(Airbus A380 Primary Flight Control Software)

– **0** alarms (Nov. 2004), after some additional parametrization and simple abstract domains developments

– Now at 1,000,000 lines!

34h,

8 Gigabyte

$\longrightarrow$ A world grand première!

Possible origins of imprecision and how to fix it

In case of false alarm, the imprecision can come from:

- Abstract transformers (not best possible) $\longrightarrow$ improve algorithm;
- Automatized parametrization (e.g. variable packing) $\longrightarrow$ improve pattern-matched program schemata;
- Iteration strategy for fixpoints $\longrightarrow$ fix widening [17];
- Inexpressivity i.e. indispensable local inductive invariant are inexpressible in the abstract $\longrightarrow$ add a new abstract domain to the reduced product (e.g. filters).

[17] This can be very hard since at the limit only a precise infinite iteration might be able to compute the proper abstract invariant. In that case, it might be better to design a more refined abstract domain.

5. Conclusion

Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer

Sound: – ASTRÉE is a bug eradicator: finds all bugs in a well-defined class (runtime errors)

– ASTRÉE is not a bug hunter: finding some bugs in a well-defined class (e.g. by *bug pattern detection* like FindBugs™, PREfast or PMD)

– ASTRÉE is exhaustive: covers the whole state space (≠ MAGIC, CBMC)

– ASTRÉE is comprehensive: never omits potential errors (≠ UNO, CMC from coverity.com) or sort most probable ones to avoid overwhelming messages (≠ Splint)

Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer (Cont'd)

Static: compile time analysis ($\neq$ run time analysis Rational Purify, Parasoft Insure++)

Program Analyzer: analyzes programs not micromodels of programs ($\neq$ PROMELA in SPIN or Alloy in the Alloy Analyzer)

Automatic: no end-user intervention needed ($\neq$ ESC Java, ESC Java 2), or PREfast (annotate functions with intended use)

Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer (Cont'd)

Multiabstraction: uses many numerical/symbolic abstract domains ($\neq$ symbolic constraints in Bane or the canonical abstraction of TVLA)

Infinitary: all abstractions use infinite abstract domains with widening/narrowing ($\neq$ model checking based analyzers such as Bandera, Bogor, Java PathFinder, Spin, VeriSoft)

Efficient: always terminate ($\neq$ counterexample-driven automatic abstraction refinement BLAST, SLAM)

Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer (Cont'd)

Extensible/Specializable: can easily incorporate new abstractions (and reduction with already existing abstract domains) ($\neq$ general-purpose analyzers PolySpace Verifier)

Domain-Aware: knows about control/command (e.g. digital filters) (as opposed to specialization to a mere programming style in C Global Surveyor)

Parametric: the precision/cost can be tailored to user needs by options and directives in the code

Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer (Cont'd)

Automatic Parametrization: the generation of parametric directives in the code can be programmed (to be specialized for a specific application domain)

Modular: an analyzer instance is built by selection of OCAML modules from a collection each implementing an abstract domain

Precise: very few or no false alarm when adapted to an application domain $\longrightarrow$ it is a VERIFIER!

The Future of the ASTRÉE Analyzer

– ASTRÉE has shown usable and useful in one industrial context (*electric flight control*):
  - as a R & D tool for A340 V2 and A380,
  - as a production tool for the A350;
– More applications are forthcoming (ES_PASS project);
– Industrialization is simultaneously under consideration.

THE END, THANK YOU

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