

# Grand Challenges for Abstract Interpretation

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## Talk Outline

- A few words on abstract interpretation  
(5 mn) ..... 3
- A Practical application to the verification of  
embedded, real-time, synchronous, safety super-  
critical software (15 mn) ..... 12
- Challenges for abstract interpretation  
(5 mn) ..... 34



# A Few Words on Abstract Interpretation



# Abstract Interpretation

- Abstract interpretation theory formalizes the idea of sound approximation for mathematical constructs involved in the specification of the semantics and properties of computer systems.

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## References

- [POPL '77] P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation: a unified lattice model for static analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints. In 4<sup>th</sup> POPL, pages 238–252, 1977.
- [Thesis] P. Cousot. *Méthodes itératives de construction et d'approximation de points fixes d'opérateurs monotones sur un treillis, analyse sémantique de programmes*. Thèse d'État ès sciences mathématiques, Université scientifique et médicale de Grenoble, Grenoble, 21 Mar. 1978.
- [PO- PL '79] P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. In 6<sup>th</sup> POPL, pages 269–282, 1979.
- [JLC '92] P. Cousot & R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation frameworks. *J. Logic and Comp.*, 2(4):511–547, 1992.



# 1 – Abstract Domains

- Program **concrete properties** are specified by the (operational) **semantics** of programming languages;
- Program **abstract properties** are elements of abstract domains (posets/lattices/...);
- Program property abstraction is performed by (effective) **conservative approximation** of concrete properties;
- The abstract properties (hence abstract semantics) are **sound** but may be **incomplete** with respect to the concrete properties (semantics);

## 2 – Correspondence between Concrete and Abstract Properties

- If any concrete property has a best approximation, approximation is formalized by **Galois connections** (or equivalently **closure operators**, **Moore families**, etc.<sup>1</sup>);
- Otherwise, weaker **abstraction/ concretization** correspondences are available <sup>2</sup>;

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<sup>1</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. *Systematic design of program analysis frameworks*. ACM POPL'79, pp. 269–282, 1979.

<sup>2</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. *Abstract interpretation frameworks*. JLC 2(4):511–547, 1992.

### 3 – Semantics Abstraction

- Program concrete **semantics** and **specifications** are defined by syntactic induction and composition of fixpoints (or using equivalent presentations <sup>3</sup>);
- The property abstraction is **extended compositionally** to all constructions of the concrete/abstract semantics, including fixpoints;
- This leads to a **constructive design of the abstract semantics** by approximation of the concrete semantics <sup>4</sup>;

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<sup>3</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. *Compositional and inductive semantic definitions in fixpoint, equational, constraint, closure-condition, rule-based and game theoretic form*. CAV '95, LNCS 939, pp. 293–308, 1995.

<sup>4</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. *Inductive definitions, semantics and abstract interpretation*. POPL, 83–94, 1992.

## 4 — Effective Analysis/Checking/ Verification Algorithms


- Computable abstract semantics lead to effective **program analysis/checking/verification algorithms**;
- Furthermore fixpoints can be approximated iteratively by **convergence acceleration** through widening/narrowing that is non-standard induction <sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> P. Cousot & R. Cousot. *Abstract interpretation: a unified lattice model for static analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints*. ACM POPL, pp. 238–252, 1977.



# Example: Grammar Abstraction



## Applications of Abstract Interpretation

- **Static Program Analysis** [POPL '77,78,79] including **Dataflow Analysis** [POPL '79,00], **Set-based Analysis** [FPCA '95], **Predicate Abstraction** [Manna's festschrift '04]
- **Syntax Analysis** [TCS 290(1) 2002]
- **Hierarchies of Semantics (including Proofs)** [POPL '92, TCS 277(1–2) 2002]
- **Typing** [POPL '97]
- **Model Checking** [POPL '00]



## Applications of Abstract Interpretation (Cont'd)

- **Program Transformation** [POPL '02]
- **Software watermarking** [POPL '02]

All these techniques involve **sound approximations** that can be formalized by **abstract interpretation**



# A Practical Application of Abstract Interpretation to the Verification of Safety Critical Embedded Software


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## Reference

- [1] B. Blanchet, P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret, L. Mauborgne, A. Miné, D. Monniaux, and X. Rival. Design and implementation of a special-purpose static program analyzer for safety-critical real-time embedded software. *The Essence of Computation: Complexity, Analysis, Transformation. Essays Dedicated to Neil D. Jones*, LNCS 2566, pages 85–108. Springer, 2002.
- [2] B. Blanchet, P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret, L. Mauborgne, A. Miné, D. Monniaux, and X. Rival. A static analyzer for large safety-critical software. PLDI'03, San Diego, June 7–14, ACM Press, 2003.



# Static Program Analysis



# ASTRÉE: A Sound, Automatic, Specializable, Domain-Aware, Parametric, Modular, Efficient and Precise Static Program Analyzer

[www.astree.ens.fr](http://www.astree.ens.fr)

- C programs:
  - structured C programs;
  - no dynamic memory allocation;
  - no recursion.
- **Application Domain:** safety critical embedded real-time synchronous software for non-linear control of very complex control/command systems.



## Concrete Operational Semantics

- International **norm of C** (ISO/IEC 9899:1999)
- *restricted by* **implementation-specific behaviors** depending upon the machine and compiler (e.g. representation and size of integers, IEEE 754-1985 norm for floats and doubles)
- *restricted by* user-defined **programming guidelines** (such as no modular arithmetic for signed integers, even though this might be the hardware choice)
- *restricted by* program specific **user requirements** (e.g. assert)

# Abstract Semantics

- Reachable states for the concrete operational semantics
- Volatile environment is specified by a *trusted* configuration file.



## Implicit Specification: Absence of Runtime Errors

- No violation of the **norm of C** (e.g. array index out of bounds)
- **No** implementation-specific **undefined behaviors** (e.g. maximum short integer is 32767)
- No violation of the **programming guidelines** (e.g. static variables cannot be assumed to be initialized to 0)
- No violation of the **programmer assertions** (must all be statically verified).

## Example application

- Primary flight control software of the Airbus A340/A380 fly-by-wire system



- C program, automatically generated from a high-level specification
- A340: 132,000 lines, 75,000 LOCs after preprocessing, 10,000 global variables, over 21,000 after expansion of small arrays.

# The Class of Considered Periodic Synchronous Programs

```
declare volatile input, state and output variables;  
initialize state and output variables;  
loop forever  
  - read volatile input variables,  
  - compute output and state variables,  
  - write to volatile output variables;  
  wait_for_clock ();  
end loop
```

- Requirements: the only interrupts are clock ticks;
- Execution time of loop body less than a clock tick [3].

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## Reference

- [3] C. Ferdinand, R. Heckmann, M. Langenbach, F. Martin, M. Schmidt, H. Theiling, S. Thesing, and R. Wilhelm. Reliable and precise WCET determination for a real-life processor. *ESOP (2001)*, LNCS 2211, 469–485.



## Characteristics of the **ASTRÉE** Analyzer

**Static:** compile time analysis ( $\neq$  run time analysis **Rational Purify**, **Parasoft Insure++**)

**Program Analyzer:** analyzes programs not micromodels of programs ( $\neq$  **PROMELA** in **SPIN** or **Alloy** in the **Alloy Analyzer**)

**Automatic:** no end-user intervention needed ( $\neq$  **ESC Java**, **ESC Java 2**)

**Sound:** covers the whole state space ( $\neq$  **MAGIC**, **CBMC**) so never omit potential errors ( $\neq$  **UNO**, **CMC** from **coverity.com**) or sort most probable ones ( $\neq$  **Splint**)



## Characteristics of the **ASTRÉE** Analyzer (Cont'd)

- Multiabstraction:** uses many numerical/symbolic abstract domains ( $\neq$  symbolic constraints in **Bane**)
- Infinitary:** all abstractions use infinite abstract domains with widening/narrowing ( $\neq$  model checking based analyzers such as **VeriSoft**, **Bandera**, **Java PathFinder**)
- Efficient:** always terminate ( $\neq$  counterexample-driven automatic abstraction refinement **BLAST**, **SLAM**)
- Specializable:** can easily incorporate new abstractions (and reduction with already existing abstract domains) ( $\neq$  general-purpose analyzers **PolySpace Verifier**)



## Characteristics of the ASTRÉE Analyzer (Cont'd)

**Domain-Aware:** knows about control/command (e.g. digital filters) (as opposed to specialization to a mere programming style in C Global Surveyor)

**Parametric:** the precision/cost can be tailored to user needs by options and directives in the code

**Automatic Parametrization:** the generation of parametric directives in the code can be programmed (to be specialized for a specific application domain)



## Characteristics of the **ASTRÉE** Analyzer (Cont'd)

**Modular:** an analyzer instance is built by selection of **O-CAML** modules from a collection each implementing an abstract domain

**Precise:** few or no false alarm when adapted to an application domain  $\longrightarrow$  **VERIFIER!**


# Benchmarks for the Primary Flight Control Software of the Airbus A340

- Comparative results (commercial software):
  - 4,200 (false?) alarms,
  - 3.5 days;
- Our results:
  - 0 alarm,
  - 1h20 on 2.8 GHz PC,
  - 300 Megabytes
  - A world première!





# General-Purpose Abstract Domains: Intervals and Octagons



Intervals:

$$\begin{cases} 1 \leq x \leq 9 \\ 1 \leq y \leq 20 \end{cases}$$

Octagons [4]:

$$\begin{cases} 1 \leq x \leq 9 \\ x + y \leq 78 \\ 1 \leq y \leq 20 \\ x - y \leq 03 \end{cases}$$

**Difficulties:** many global variables, IEEE 754 floating-point arithmetic (in program and analyzer)

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## Reference

- [4] A. Miné. A New Numerical Abstract Domain Based on Difference-Bound Matrices. In *PADO'2001*, LNCS 2053, Springer, 2001, pp. 155–172.
- [5] A. Miné. Relational abstract domains for the detection of floating-point run-time errors. In *ESOP'04*, Barcelona, LNCS , Springer, 2004 (to appear).

# Floating-Point Computations

- Code Sample:

```
/* float-error.c */
int main () {
    float x, y, z, r;
    x = 1.000000019e+38;
    y = x + 1.0e21;
    z = x - 1.0e21;
    r = y - z;
    printf("%f\n", r);
} % gcc float-error.c
% ./a.out
0.000000
```

$$(x + a) - (x - a) \neq 2a$$

```
/* double-error.c */
int main () {
    double x; float y, z, r;
    /* x = ldexp(1.,50)+ldexp(1.,26); */
    x = 1125899973951488.0;
    y = x + 1;
    z = x - 1;
    r = y - z;
    printf("%f\n", r);
}
% gcc double-error.c
% ./a.out
134217728.000000
```

# Clock Abstract Domain for Counters

- Code Sample:

```
R = 0;
while (1) {
  if (I)
    { R = R+1; }
  else
    { R = 0; }
  T = (R>=n);
  wait_for_clock ();
}
```

- Output T is true iff the volatile input I has been true for the last *n* clock ticks.
- The clock ticks every *s* seconds for at most *h* hours, thus *R* is bounded.
- To prove that *R* cannot overflow, we must prove that *R* cannot exceed the elapsed clock ticks (*impossible using only intervals*).


- Solution:

- We add a phantom variable *clock* in the concrete user semantics to track elapsed clock ticks.
- For each variable *X*, we abstract *three intervals*: *X*, *X+clock*, and *X-clock*.
- If *X+clock* or *X-clock* is bounded, so is *X*.

# Boolean Relations for Boolean Control

- Code Sample:

```
/* boolean.c */
typedef enum {F=0,T=1} BOOL;
BOOL B;
void main () {
    unsigned int X, Y;
    while (1) {
        ...
        B = (X == 0);
        ...
        if (!B) {
            Y = 1 / X;
        }
        ...
    }
}
```



The boolean relation abstract domain is parameterized by the height of the decision tree (an analyzer option) and the abstract domain at the leafs

# Control Partitionning for Case Analysis


- Code Sample:

```
/* trace_partitionning.c */
void main() {
  float t[5] = {-10.0, -10.0, 0.0, 10.0, 10.0};
  float c[4] = {0.0, 2.0, 2.0, 0.0};
  float d[4] = {-20.0, -20.0, 0.0, 20.0};
  float x, r;
  int i = 0;


  ... found invariant  $-100 \leq x \leq 100$  ...

  while ((i < 3) && (x >= t[i+1])) {
    i = i + 1;
  }
  r = (x - t[i]) * c[i] + d[i];
}
```



## Control point partitionning:



## Trace partitionning:




## 2<sup>d</sup> Order Digital Filter:



unstable interval

# Ellipsoid Abstract Domain for Filters

- Computes  $X_n = \begin{cases} \alpha X_{n-1} + \beta X_{n-2} + Y_n \\ I_n \end{cases}$
- The concrete computation is **bounded**, which must be proved in the abstract.
- There is **no stable interval or octagon**.
- The simplest stable surface is an **ellipsoid**.



stable ellipsoid

## Reference

- [6] J. Feret. Static analysis of digital filters. In *ESOP'04*, Barcelona, LNCS , Springer, 2004 (to appear).

# Example of Analysis Session

Visualizer

Search string:  Next Previous First Last Goto line:

Program points: Current

Context

- file2.c:126
  - Call main @ file2.c:205
    - While @ file2.c:232
      - Iter = 2
        - Call filtre2 @ file2.c:254
          - 0
        - Iter = 3
          - Call filtre2 @ file2.c:254
            - 0
          - Iter = 4
            - Call filtre2 @ file2.c:254
              - 0

Sources

file2.c

```
typedef enum {FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1} BOOLEAN;
BOOLEAN INIT;
float P, X;

void filtre2 () {
    static float E[2], S[2];
    if (INIT) {
        S[0] = X;
        P = X;
        S[0] = X;
    } else {
        P = (((0.4677826 * X) - (E[0] * 0.7700725)) + (E[1] * 0.4344376)) + (S[0] * 1.5419) - (S[1] * 0.6740476);
        E[1] = E[0];
        E[0] = X;
        S[1] = S[0];
        S[0] = P;
    }
}

void main () {
    X = 0.2 * X + 5;
    INIT = TRUE;
    while (TRUE) {
        X = 0.9 * X + 35;
        filtre2 ();
        INIT = FALSE;
    }
}
```

Location: filtre2.c:126[call#main@20:loop@23>=4:call#filtre2@25]

Variables: P (1)

Invariant:

<interval: P in [-1252.84, 1252.84] inter [-3362.7, 3491.96]>clock inter [-3362.7, 3491.96]-clock>

Filtre d'ordre 2

Var_entree 1	:E[0]
Var_entree 2	:E[1]
Var_sortie	:P
Var_sortie_pred	:S[1]
coef_e1	:0.4677826
coef_e2	:-0.7700725
coef_e3	:0.4344376
coef_a	:1.5419
coef_b	:-0.6740476

Egalite des entrees a l'origine!!

Nb de deroulement : 38

plus_grande entree	:<= 935.935061096
erreur en entree	:<= 0.00246160101051
gain leres sorties	:<= 1.33715602022
gain last entrees	:<= 1.3366487752
gain autres entrees	:<= 0.00213381749462
erreur_sortie	:<= 0.0400176854152
sortie_max	:<= 1253.02359782

<octagon:

```
filtre2.c@12@5=
{ -5430.9504421651563462 <= P <= 39396.917979075267795,
```

info

/\* Analyzer launched at 2004/ 3/16 20:41:58  
 Command line was "/Volumes/PB\_cousot\_PGP/Projet/absinthe2/analyzer.opt --exec-fn main filtre2.c --export-invariant-stat filtre2.bin "  
 Launched by "cousot" on "PB-G4-Patrick-COUSOT.local"

file2.c — line 12 — column 6 — character 193

## The main loop invariant

A textual file over 4.5 Mb with

- 6,900 boolean interval assertions ( $x \in [0; 1]$ )
- 9,600 interval assertions ( $x \in [a; b]$ )
- 25,400 clock assertions ( $x + \text{clk} \in [a; b] \wedge x - \text{clk} \in [a; b]$ )
- 19,100 additive octagonal assertions ( $a \leq x + y \leq b$ )
- 19,200 subtractive octagonal assertions ( $a \leq x - y \leq b$ )
- 100 decision trees
- 60 ellipse invariants, etc ...

involving over 16,000 floating point constants (only 550 appearing in the program text)  $\times$  75,000 LOCs.





## Conclusion on Verification by Abstraction

- Most applications of abstract interpretation **tolerate a small rate** (typically 5 to 15%) **of false alarms**:
  - Program transformation → do not optimize,
  - Typing → reject some correct programs, etc,
  - WCET analysis → overestimate;
- Some applications **require no false alarm** at all:
  - **Program verification**.
- **Theoretically possible** [SARA '00], **practically feasible** [PLDI '03]

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### Reference

- [SARA '00] P. Cousot. Partial Completeness of Abstract Fixpoint Checking, invited paper. In *4<sup>th</sup> Int. Symp. SARA '2000*, LNAI 1864, Springer, pp. 1–25, 2000.
- [PLDI '03] B. Blanchet, P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret, L. Mauborgne, A. Miné, D. Monniaux, and X. Rival. A static analyzer for large safety-critical software. PLDI'03, San Diego, June 7–14, ACM Press, 2003.



# Grand Challenges for Abstract Interpretation



## Scaling-up Static Program Analysis

- Success on 100 000 LOCS (primary flight control software of the Airbus A340)
  - Working on 500 000 LOCS (primary flight control software of the Airbus A380)
- We should be able to statically analyze huge software (3 000 000 LOCS (all software of the A380) to 30 000 000 LOCS (Windows OS)).

## Formal Verification of Static Analyzers

- Abstract interpretation can formalize static program analysis [POPL '77,78,79]
- The design and programming of ASTRÉE is tightly guided by abstract interpretation
  - We should be able to completely verify the ASTRÉE static analyzer.

# Formalization of Compilation

Abstract interpretation can formalize:

- Parsing [TCS 290(1) 2002]
- Typing [POPL '97]
- Static analysis [POPL '77,78,79]
- Program transformation (partial evaluation, code generation) [POPL '02]

→ We should be able to completely formalize compilation.



# THE END, THANK YOU

More references at URL [www.di.ens.fr/~cousot](http://www.di.ens.fr/~cousot)  
[www.astree.ens.fr](http://www.astree.ens.fr).

