

Supplementary Appendix to “Reciprocity versus Reelection”

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March 27, 2019

A Type 2 Candidate Second Election Benefits




Figure A.1: Type 2 Candidate Second Election Benefits with High Cost of Voting




Figure A.2: Type 2 Candidate Second Election Benefits with Low Cost of Voting

B Treatment 1 Instructions

INSTRUCTIONS

Welcome and thank you for coming today to participate in this experiment. This is an experiment in decision making. You will receive \$7.00 participation fee if you complete the session. In addition to that if you follow the instructions and are careful with your decisions, you can earn a significant amount of money, which will be paid to you at the end of the session.

During the experiment it is important that you do not talk to any other subjects. Please either turn off your cell phones or put them on silent. If you have a question, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will answer your question. Failure to comply with these instructions means that you will be asked to leave the experiment and all your earnings will be forfeited.

The experiment will last about 60 minutes. The experiment consists of 5 identical decision rounds.

ROLES AND TYPES

At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned a role. The three possible roles you can be assigned are “**Voter 1**,” “**Voter 2**” or “**Candidate**.” Your role will stay fixed throughout all 5 rounds of the experiment.

At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly sorted into groups of 3 people. Each group will consist of a Voter 1, a Voter 2 and a Candidate. You will be matched with different participants in each round. No participant will ever be informed about the identities of the participants they are paired with, neither during nor after the experiment.

Furthermore, in each round, Candidate is assigned a type. The computer randomly assigns Candidate to be either “**Type 1**” or “**Type 2**,” with equal probability of being assigned either type. Candidate’s type is fixed just for that round, and is assigned independently and randomly in each round. While Candidate will know his/her type, Voter 1 and Voter 2 will never learn Candidate’s type at any point.

SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS IN A ROUND

At the beginning of each round, Voter 1, Voter 2 and Candidate are given \$6.00 each. A round consists of two possible (sequential) elections, with Voter 1 voting in the first election and Voter 2 voting in the second election.


The sequence of events in a round is as follows.

1) Matching and Type Assignment:

First, you are randomly matched with two other participants in the room.

If you are Candidate, then you learn your randomly assigned type: Type 1, or Type 2. Candidate has an equal chance of being assigned either type. It is important to note that Voter 1 and Voter 2 do not learn Candidate’s type but may try to infer them from Candidate’s choices.

An example Voter 2 screen is shown below.



This is Round 1.

Your designated role is **Voter 2**. You will keep this role throughout all rounds of the experiment.

You are randomly matched with two other participants in the room. You are given an endowment of **\$6.00** for this round.

Following, you continue to the first election.

2) First Election:

The first election proceeds as follows.

A) Voter 1 decides to **vote** for Candidate or **not vote**. Voting costs Voter 1 **\$1.00** while not voting is **costless**.

An example Voter 1 screen is shown below.



Round 1 First Election Role: Voter 1


Please make your decision about whether to vote for Candidate or not vote.

As a reminder, voting for Candidate costs **\$1.00**. Not voting is **costless**.

☐ Yes (costs \$1.00)
☐ No (costless)

B) Next, Candidate and Voter 2 learn about Voter 1's voting decision. If Voter 1 votes for Candidate, then Candidate is elected. Otherwise, Candidate is not elected and the round immediately ends.

An example screen is shown below. In this example, Voter 1 happens to elect Candidate. This is just an example and is not to suggest how you should make your decision if you are Voter 1.



Voter 1 voted for Candidate.

C) If elected, Candidate is given **\$15.00** to distribute in any proportion between Voter 1 and Voter 2. Candidate must distribute all of the \$15.00. Candidate can divide the \$15.00 in any amount $\{ \$0.00, \$0.01, \$0.02, \$0.03, \dots, \$15.00 \}$ between Voter 1 and Voter 2.

Furthermore, if Candidate is of Type 1, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 1. Similarly, if Candidate is of Type 2, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 2.

An example Candidate screen is shown below.

Since you were elected by Voter 1, you have been given **\$15.00** to divide between Voter 1 and Voter 2. As a reminder, you keep **\$0.01** for every **\$0.01** shared with the voter of your type.

Please enter how much you would like to give Voter 1.

Please enter how much you would like to give Voter 2.

D) Finally, if Candidate is elected, Voter 1 and Voter 2 learn about Candidate's allocation of the \$15.00.

An example screen is shown below. In this example, Candidate happens to distribute \$11.51 to Voter 1 and \$3.49 to Voter 2. This is just an example and is not to suggest how you should make your decision if you are Candidate.

Candidate shared **\$11.51** of the **\$15.00** with Voter 1.

Candidate shared **\$3.49** of the **\$15.00** with Voter 2.

This concludes the first election.

The second election now begins.

If Candidate is elected in the first election, then you continue to the second election. Otherwise, the round is over.

3) Second Election:

The second election proceeds as follows. The example screens are left out as they are similar to the respective screens in the first election.

A) Voter 2 decides to **vote** for Candidate or **not vote**. Voting costs Voter 2 **\$1.00** while not voting is **costless**.

B) Next, Candidate and Voter 1 learn about Voter 2's voting decision. If Voter 2 votes for Candidate, then Candidate is elected. Otherwise, Candidate is not elected and the round immediately ends.

C) If elected, Candidate is given **\$10.00** to distribute in any proportion between Voter 1 and Voter 2. Candidate must distribute all of the \$10.00. Candidate can divide the \$10.00 in any amount $\{ \$0.00, \$0.01, \$0.02, \$0.03, \dots, \$10.00 \}$ between Voter 1 and Voter 2.

As in the first election, if Candidate is of Type 1, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 1. Similarly, if Candidate is of Type 2, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 2.

D) Finally, if Candidate is elected, Voter 1 and Voter 2 learn about Candidate's allocation of the \$10.00 and the round ends.

Once the round ends, you proceed to the next round where you will be matched with new partners and receive a new \$6.00 endowment.

SUMMARY: POTENTIAL EARNINGS PER ROUND

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Voter 1} &= \begin{cases} \$6.00 - \$1.00 & \text{if Candidate elected in both elections} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 first election} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 second election} \\ \$6.00 - \$1.00 & \text{if Candidate elected in first election only} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 first election} \\ \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate unelected} \end{cases} \\
 \text{Voter 2} &= \begin{cases} \$6.00 - \$1.00 & \text{if Candidate elected in both elections} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 first election} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 second election} \\ \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate elected in first election only} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 first election} \\ \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate unelected} \end{cases} \\
 \text{Type 1 Candidate} &= \begin{cases} \$6.00 + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 first election} & \text{if elected in both elections} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 second election} \\ \$6.00 + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 first election} & \text{if elected in first election only} \\ \$6.00 & \text{if unelected} \end{cases} \\
 \text{Type 2 Candidate} &= \begin{cases} \$6.00 + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 first election} & \text{if elected in both elections} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 second election} \\ \$6.00 + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 first election} & \text{if elected in first election only} \\ \$6.00 & \text{if unelected} \end{cases}
 \end{aligned}$$

FINAL EARNINGS

Once the experiment is finished, the computer will randomly pick 1 round out of the 5 rounds that you completed. The earnings you made on that round will be your earnings for the experiment. Hence, you should make careful decisions in each round because it might be a paying round.

Are there any questions?

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Furthermore, in each round, Candidate is assigned a type. The computer randomly assigns Candidate to be either “**Type 1**” or “**Type 2**,” with equal probability of being assigned either type. Candidate’s type is fixed just for that round, and is assigned independently and randomly in each round. While Candidate will know his/her type, Voter 1 and Voter 2 will never learn Candidate’s type at any point.

SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS IN A ROUND

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
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An example Voter 2 screen is shown below.



This is Round 1.

Your designated role is **Voter 2**. You will keep this role throughout all rounds of the experiment.

You are randomly matched with two other participants in the room. You are given an endowment of **\$6.00** for this round.

Following, you continue to the first election.

2) First Election:

The first election proceeds as follows.

A) Voter 1 decides to **vote** for Candidate or **not vote**. Voting costs Voter 1 **\$6.00** while not voting is **costless**.

An example Voter 1 screen is shown below.



Round 1 First Election Role: Voter 1

Please make your decision about whether to vote for Candidate or not vote.

As a reminder, voting for Candidate costs **\$6.00**. Not voting is **costless**.

☐ Vote for Candidate
☐ Do not vote

B) Next, Candidate and Voter 2 learn about Voter 1's voting decision. If Voter 1 votes for Candidate, then Candidate is elected. Otherwise, Candidate is not elected and the round immediately ends.

An example screen is shown below. In this example, Voter 1 happens to elect Candidate. This is just an example and is not to suggest how you should make your decision if you are Voter 1.



Voter 1 voted for Candidate.

C) If elected, Candidate is given **\$15.00** to distribute in any proportion between Voter 1 and Voter 2. Candidate must distribute all of the \$15.00. Candidate can divide the \$15.00 in any amount $\{ \$0.00, \$0.01, \$0.02, \$0.03, \dots, \$15.00 \}$ between Voter 1 and Voter 2.

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An example Candidate screen is shown below.

Since you were elected by Voter 1, you have been given **\$15.00** to divide between Voter 1 and Voter 2. As a reminder, you keep **\$0.01** for every **\$0.01** shared with the voter of your type.

Please enter how much you would like to give Voter 1.

Please enter how much you would like to give Voter 2.

D) Finally, if Candidate is elected, Voter 1 and Voter 2 learn about Candidate's allocation of the \$15.00.

An example screen is shown below. In this example, Candidate happens to distribute \$11.51 to Voter 1 and \$3.49 to Voter 2. This is just an example and is not to suggest how you should make your decision if you are Candidate.

Candidate shared **\$11.51** of the **\$15.00** with Voter 1.

Candidate shared **\$3.49** of the **\$15.00** with Voter 2.

This concludes the first election.

The second election now begins.

If Candidate is elected in the first election, then you continue to the second election. Otherwise, the round is over.

3) Second Election:

The second election proceeds as follows. The example screens are left out as they are similar to the respective screens in the first election.

A) Voter 2 decides to **vote** for Candidate or **not vote**. Voting costs Voter 2 **\$6.00** while not voting is **costless**.

B) Next, Candidate and Voter 1 learn about Voter 2's voting decision. If Voter 2 votes for Candidate, then Candidate is elected. Otherwise, Candidate is not elected and the round immediately ends.

C) If elected, Candidate is given **\$10.00** to distribute in any proportion between Voter 1 and Voter 2. Candidate must distribute all of the \$10.00. Candidate can divide the \$10.00 in any amount $\{ \$0.00, \$0.01, \$0.02, \$0.03, \dots, \$10.00 \}$ between Voter 1 and Voter 2.

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FINAL EARNINGS

Once the experiment is finished, the computer will randomly pick 1 round out of the 5 rounds that you completed. The earnings you made on that round will be your earnings for the experiment. Hence, you should make careful decisions in each round because it might be a paying round.

Are there any questions?

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SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS IN A ROUND

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
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1) Matching and Type Assignment:

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If you are Candidate, then you learn your randomly assigned type: Type 1, or Type 2. Candidate has an equal chance of being assigned either type. It is important to note that Voter 1 and Voter 2 do not learn Candidate’s type.

An example Voter 2 screen is shown below.



This is Round 1.

Your designated role is **Voter 2**. You will keep this role throughout all rounds of the experiment.

You are randomly matched with two other participants in the room. You are given an endowment of **\$6.00** for this round.

Following, you continue to the first election.

2) First Election:

The first election proceeds as follows.

A) Voter 1 decides to **vote** for Candidate or **not vote**. Voting costs Voter 1 **\$1.00** while not voting is **costless**.

An example Voter 1 screen is shown below.



Round 1 First Election Role: Voter 1

Please make your decision about whether to vote for Candidate or not vote.

As a reminder, voting for Candidate costs **\$1.00**. Not voting is **costless**.

☐ Yes (costs \$1.00)
☐ No (costless)

B) Next, Candidate and Voter 2 learn about Voter 1's voting decision. If Voter 1 votes for Candidate, then Candidate is elected. Otherwise, Candidate is not elected and the round immediately ends.

An example screen is shown below. In this example, Voter 1 happens to elect Candidate. This is just an example and is not to suggest how you should make your decision if you are Voter 1.



Voter 1 voted for Candidate.

C) If elected, Candidate is given **\$15.00** to distribute in any proportion between Voter 1 and Voter 2. Candidate must distribute all of the \$15.00. Candidate can divide the \$15.00 in any amount $\{ \$0.00, \$0.01, \$0.02, \$0.03, \dots, \$15.00 \}$ between Voter 1 and Voter 2.

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An example Candidate screen is shown below.

Since you were elected by Voter 1, you have been given **\$15.00** to divide between Voter 1 and Voter 2. As a reminder, you keep **\$0.01** for every **\$0.01** shared with the voter of your type.

Please enter how much you would like to give Voter 1.

Please enter how much you would like to give Voter 2.

D) Finally, if Candidate is elected, Voter 1 learns about Candidate's allocation of the \$15.00.

An example Voter 1 screen is shown below. In this example, Candidate happens to distribute \$11.51 to Voter 1 and \$3.49 to Voter 2. This is just an example and is not to suggest how you should make your decision if you are Candidate.

Round 1 First Election Role: Voter 1

Candidate shared **\$11.51** of the **\$15.00** with Voter 1.

Candidate shared **\$3.49** of the **\$15.00** with Voter 2.

This concludes the first election.

The second election now begins.

In contrast, Voter 2 does not learn about Candidate's allocation of the \$15.00 until the round ends. An example Voter 2 screen is shown below.

Round 1 First Election Role: Voter 2

Candidate has divided the **\$15.00** between Voter 1 and Voter 2. You will learn the allocation at the end of the second election.

This concludes the first election.

The second election now begins.

If Candidate is elected in the first election, then you continue to the second election. Otherwise, the round is over.

3) Second Election:

The second election proceeds as follows. The example screens are left out as they are similar to the respective screens in the first election.

A) Voter 2 decides to **vote** for Candidate or **not vote**. Voting costs Voter 2 **\$1.00** while not voting is **costless**.

B) Next, Candidate and Voter 1 learn about Voter 2's voting decision. If Voter 2 votes for Candidate, then Candidate is elected. Otherwise, Candidate is not elected and the round immediately ends.

C) If elected, Candidate is given **\$10.00** to distribute in any proportion between Voter 1 and Voter 2. Candidate must distribute all of the \$10.00. Candidate can divide the \$10.00 in any amount $\{ \$0.00, \$0.01, \$0.02, \$0.03, \dots, \$10.00 \}$ between Voter 1 and Voter 2.

As in the first election, if Candidate is of Type 1, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 1. Similarly, if Candidate is of Type 2, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 2.

D) Finally, Voter 2 learns about Candidate's allocation of the \$15.00 in the first election. Furthermore, if Candidate is elected, Voter 1 and Voter 2 learn about Candidate's allocation of the \$10.00 in the second election. This concludes the round.

Once the round ends, you proceed to the next round where you will be matched with new partners and receive a new \$6.00 endowment.

SUMMARY: POTENTIAL EARNINGS PER ROUND

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If you are Candidate, then you learn your randomly assigned type: Type 1, or Type 2. Candidate has an equal chance of being assigned either type. It is important to note that Voter 1 and Voter 2 do not learn Candidate’s type.

An example Voter 2 screen is shown below.

This is Round 1.

Your designated role is **Voter 2**. You will keep this role throughout all rounds of the experiment.

You are randomly matched with two other participants in the room. You are given an endowment of **\$6.00** for this round.

Following, you continue to the first election.

2) First Election:

The first election proceeds as follows.

A) Voter 1 decides to **vote** for Candidate or **not vote**. Voting costs Voter 1 **\$6.00** while not voting is **costless**.

An example Voter 1 screen is shown below.

Round 1 First Election Role: Voter 1

Please make your decision about whether to vote for Candidate or not vote.

As a reminder, voting for Candidate costs **\$6.00**. Not voting is **costless**.

☐ Vote for Candidate
☐ Do not vote

B) Next, Candidate and Voter 2 learn about Voter 1's voting decision. If Voter 1 votes for Candidate, then Candidate is elected. Otherwise, Candidate is not elected and the round immediately ends.

An example screen is shown below. In this example, Voter 1 happens to elect Candidate. This is just an example and is not to suggest how you should make your decision if you are Voter 1.

Voter 1 voted for Candidate.

C) If elected, Candidate is given **\$15.00** to distribute in any proportion between Voter 1 and Voter 2. Candidate must distribute all of the \$15.00. Candidate can divide the \$15.00 in any amount $\{ \$0.00, \$0.01, \$0.02, \$0.03, \dots, \$15.00 \}$ between Voter 1 and Voter 2.

Furthermore, if Candidate is of Type 1, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 1. Similarly, if Candidate is of Type 2, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 2.

An example Candidate screen is shown below.

Since you were elected by Voter 1, you have been given **\$15.00** to divide between Voter 1 and Voter 2. As a reminder, you keep **\$0.01** for every **\$0.01** shared with the voter of your type.

Please enter how much you would like to give Voter 1.

Please enter how much you would like to give Voter 2.

D) Finally, if Candidate is elected, Voter 1 learns about Candidate's allocation of the \$15.00.

An example Voter 1 screen is shown below. In this example, Candidate happens to distribute \$11.51 to Voter 1 and \$3.49 to Voter 2. This is just an example and is not to suggest how you should make your decision if you are Candidate.

Round 1 First Election Role: Voter 1

Candidate shared **\$11.51** of the **\$15.00** with Voter 1.

Candidate shared **\$3.49** of the **\$15.00** with Voter 2.

This concludes the first election.

The second election now begins.

In contrast, Voter 2 does not learn about Candidate's allocation of the \$15.00 until the round ends. An example Voter 2 screen is shown below.

Round 1 First Election Role: Voter 2

Candidate has divided the **\$15.00** between Voter 1 and Voter 2. You will learn the allocation at the end of the second election.

This concludes the first election.

The second election now begins.

If Candidate is elected in the first election, then you continue to the second election. Otherwise, the round is over.

3) Second Election:

The second election proceeds as follows. The example screens are left out as they are similar to the respective screens in the first election.

A) Voter 2 decides to **vote** for Candidate or **not vote**. Voting costs Voter 2 **\$6.00** while not voting is **costless**.

B) Next, Candidate and Voter 1 learn about Voter 2's voting decision. If Voter 2 votes for Candidate, then Candidate is elected. Otherwise, Candidate is not elected and the round immediately ends.

C) If elected, Candidate is given **\$10.00** to distribute in any proportion between Voter 1 and Voter 2. Candidate must distribute all of the \$10.00. Candidate can divide the \$10.00 in any amount $\{ \$0.00, \$0.01, \$0.02, \$0.03, \dots, \$10.00 \}$ between Voter 1 and Voter 2.

As in the first election, if Candidate is of Type 1, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 1. Similarly, if Candidate is of Type 2, then Candidate is given an additional \$0.01 to keep for every \$0.01 distributed to Voter 2.

D) Finally, Voter 2 learns about Candidate's allocation of the \$15.00 in the first election. Furthermore, if Candidate is elected, Voter 1 and Voter 2 learn about Candidate's allocation of the \$10.00 in the second election. This concludes the round.

Once the round ends, you proceed to the next round where you will be matched with new partners and receive a new \$6.00 endowment.

SUMMARY: POTENTIAL EARNINGS PER ROUND

$$\text{Voter 1} = \begin{cases} \$6.00 - \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate elected in both elections} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 first election} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 second election} \\ \\ \$6.00 - \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate elected in first election only} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 first election} \\ \\ \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate unelected} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Voter 2} = \begin{cases} \$6.00 - \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate elected in both elections} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 first election} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 second election} \\ \\ \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate elected in first election only} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 first election} \\ \\ \$6.00 & \text{if Candidate unelected} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Type 1 Candidate} = \begin{cases} \$6.00 + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 first election} & \text{if elected in both elections} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 second election} \\ \\ \$6.00 + \text{Allocation to Voter 1 first election} & \text{if elected in first election only} \\ \\ \$6.00 & \text{if unelected} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Type 2 Candidate} = \begin{cases} \$6.00 + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 first election} & \text{if elected in both elections} \\ + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 second election} \\ \\ \$6.00 + \text{Allocation to Voter 2 first election} & \text{if elected in first election only} \\ \\ \$6.00 & \text{if unelected} \end{cases}$$

FINAL EARNINGS

Once the experiment is finished, the computer will randomly pick 1 round out of the 5 rounds that you completed. The earnings you made on that round will be your earnings for the experiment. Hence, you should make careful decisions in each round because it might be a paying round.

Are there any questions?