

Results for PEACE Follow Up

September 20, 2018

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1 Paper Tables

Table 1: Program impacts on number, length, severity, and resolution of land disputes

Dependent Variable	Endline 1							Endline 2						
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	WY Adj. p-val (6)	Holms Adj p-val (7)	Control mean (8)	N (9)	ITT (10)	control mean (%) (11)	Est. p-val (12)	WY Adj. p-val (13)	Holms Adj p-val (14)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents														
Any serious land dispute	0.221	5,435	0.003 [0.016]	1.2	0.867	1.000 ^a	0.867	0.087	4,011	0.008 [0.011]	8.8	0.473	1.000 ^b	0.722
Any unresolved land dispute	0.070	5,435	-0.020 [0.008]**	-28.0	0.015	1.000 ^a	0.043	0.024	4,011	0.002 [0.005]	6.4	0.744	1.000 ^b	0.744
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.122	5,435	-0.010 [0.012]	-8.1	0.397	1.000 ^a	0.636	0.041	4,011	-0.012 [0.006]**	-29.3	0.039	0.000 ^b	0.113
Property damage or violence in land dispute	0.091	5,435	-0.012 [0.009]	-13.2	0.183			0.021	4,011	-0.007 [0.004]	-31.2	0.117		
Threats	0.114	5,435	-0.006 [0.011]	-5.3	0.596			0.035	4,011	-0.010 [0.006]*	-28.9	0.069		
Property damage	0.041	5,435	-0.013 [0.006]**	-32.4	0.029			0.010	4,011	-0.005 [0.003]*		0.072		
Violence	0.077	5,435	-0.007 [0.008]	-8.7	0.416			0.017	4,011	-0.004 [0.004]	-21.4	0.361		
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute														
Length of maximum land conflict								13.247	353	3.642 [2.889]	27.5	0.208	0.500 ^d	0.552
Resolved land dispute	0.684	1,212	0.072 [0.027]**	10.5	0.009	0.000 ^c	0.045	0.668	353	-0.024 [0.046]	-3.6	0.603	0.500 ^d	0.603
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.554	1,212	-0.024 [0.035]	-4.3	0.496	1.000 ^c	0.826	0.476	353	-0.192 [0.047]**	-40.4	0.000	0.000 ^d	0.000
Property damage or violence	0.411	1,212	-0.037 [0.030]	-9.1	0.213			0.243	353	-0.090 [0.042]**	-37.2	0.035		
Threats	0.515	1,212	-0.013 [0.035]	-2.5	0.713	1.000 ^c	0.826	0.408	353	-0.157 [0.048]**	-38.6	0.001	0.000 ^d	0.007
Property damage	0.186	1,212	-0.051 [0.025]**	-27.4	0.041	0.000 ^c	0.154	0.114	353	-0.067 [0.027]**	-58.5	0.016	0.000 ^d	0.078
Violence	0.349	1,212	-0.022 [0.028]	-6.3	0.442	1.000 ^c	0.826	0.202	353	-0.056 [0.042]	-28.0	0.185	0.500 ^d	0.552
Witchcraft								0.065	353	0.035 [0.026]	54.3	0.182	0.500 ^d	0.552

Table 2: Program impacts on number, length, severity, and resolution of all dispute types

Dependent Variable	Endline 1							Endline 2						
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	WY Adj. p-val (6)	Holms Adj p-val (7)	Control mean (8)	N (9)	ITT (10)	control mean (%) (11)	Est. p-val (12)	WY Adj. p-val (13)	Holms Adj p-val (14)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents														
Any serious dispute	0.299	5,435	0.022 [0.018]	7.2	0.220	0.891 ^a	0.391	0.306	4,011	0.012 (0.017)	4.1	0.456	1.000 ^b	0.703
Any unresolved dispute	0.118	5,435	-0.013 [0.011]	-11.0	0.250	0.500 ^a	0.391	0.064	4,011	-0.004 (0.009)	-6.6	0.623	1.000 ^b	0.703
Any threats, property damage, or violence								0.101	4,011	-0.015 (0.010)	-15.2	0.111	0.500 ^b	0.295
Panel B: Conditional on dispute														
Resolved dispute	0.676	1,670	0.051 [0.024]**	7.5	0.033	0.000 ^c	0.065	0.767	1,227	-0.019 (0.026)	-2.5	0.467	1.000 ^d	0.715
Resolved via informal mechanism	0.247	1,671	0.018 [0.025]	7.4	0.470	0.000 ^c	0.470	0.409	1,227	-0.019 (0.027)	-4.6	0.487	1.000 ^d	0.715
Any threats, property damage, or violence								0.331	1,227	-0.069 (0.026)**	-20.7	0.009	0.000 ^d	0.026
Property damage or violence								0.190	1,227	-0.027 (0.022)	-14.1	0.222		
Threats								0.274	1,227	-0.072 (0.024)**	-26.2	0.003		
Property damage								0.048	1,227	-0.019 (0.011)*	-40.0	0.085		
Violence								0.173	1,227	-0.018 (0.021)	-10.2	0.411		

Table 3: Effect on land security and investment 3-year endline

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)
Security rights index for house and farm	4,011	0.045	-0.085 [0.037]
Improvement index for house and farm	4,011	0.023	-0.066 [0.037]
Index of Fallow Land for farm	3,666	0.003	-0.004 [0.044]
Size of farm	3,598	37.481	2.773 [1.051]

Table 4: Heterogeneity in land security and investment, 3-year endline

Dependent variable	Political Connectedness			Market Tenure			Owns own land		
	Coeff. on treatment	Coeff. on treatment- covariate interaction	Net effect (sum)	Coeff. on treatment	Coeff. on treatment- covariate interaction	Net effect (sum)	Coeff. on treatment	Coeff. on treatment- covariate interaction	Net effect (sum)
Security index through rights	-0.126 [0.037]***	0.140 [0.058]**	0.014 [0.047]	-0.129 [0.063]**	0.083 [0.067]	-0.046 [0.031]	-0.087 [0.031]***	0.058 [0.076]	-0.030 [0.072]
Property investment index, z-score	-0.046 [0.031]	-0.022 [0.054]	-0.068 [0.046]	-0.013 [0.050]	-0.044 [0.054]	-0.056 [0.029]**	-0.049 [0.028]*	-0.017 [0.064]	-0.067 [0.060]
Size of land (house and farm)	2.235 [1.137]**	1.496 [1.956]	3.731 [1.653]**	2.689 [2.082]	-0.152 [2.303]	2.537 [1.057]**	3.247 [1.034]***	-3.106 [2.513]	0.141 [2.327]

Table 5: Effect on norms, attitudes and skills, 3-year endline

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)
Bias index	4,011	-0.009	-0.002 [0.046]
Defection index	4,011	-0.043	0.045 [0.041]
Empathy index	4,010	0.002	0.030 [0.033]
Forum choice index	4,011	-0.028	0.031 [0.037]
Managing emotions index	4,011	-0.031	0.067 [0.031]
Mediation index	4,011	0.003	-0.062 [0.037]
Negotiation index	4,011	0.002	0.002 [0.027]

Table 6: Effect on community-level disputes

Dependent Variable	Endline 1				Endline 2			
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Control mean (5)	N (6)	ITT (7)	ITT / control mean (%) (8)
Any Violence	0.442	940	0.085 [0.037]**	19.3	0.622	971	-0.057 [0.057]	-9.1
Level of community violence	0.790	940	0.152 [0.083]*	19.2	0.984	971	-0.131 [0.096]	-13.3
Intertribal violence	0.028	940	0.008 [0.013]	30.0	0.021	971	-0.016 [0.008]**	-77.8
Violent strike or protest	0.061	940	-0.004 [0.016]	-7.1	0.002	971	0.015 [0.009]	912.4
Youth-elder dispute	0.110	940	0.044 [0.029]	40.2	0.103	967	0.003 [0.023]	3.4
Peaceful strike or protest	0.100	940	0.037 [0.025]	37.1	0.059	971	0.010 [0.019]	16.0
Interfamily land disputes	0.274	940	0.030 [0.037]	11.1	0.548	971	-0.071 [0.066]	-12.9
Conflicts with other towns	0.154	940	-0.005 [0.033]	-3.5	0.171	970	-0.038 [0.029]	-22.2
Witch hunts	0.015	940	0.023 [0.013]*	153.3	0.011	971	-0.008 [0.005]*	
Trial by ordeal	0.048	940	0.019 [0.018]	39.4	0.070	971	-0.027 [0.018]	-39.1

Table 7: Estimated aggregate effects of the program on violent disputes among the 30,000 households in treatment communities

Dependent Variable	ATE		Net effect		Net Effect imputed for missing year
	Endline 1	Endline 2	Endline 1	Endline 2	
Any threats, property damage, or violence	-0.010	-0.012	-303	-325	-942
Threats	-0.006	-0.010	-183	-275	-687
Property damage or violence in land dispute	-0.012	-0.007	-365	-177	-813
Property damage	-0.013	-0.005	-406	-139	-817
Violence	-0.007	-0.004	-206	-101	-459
Property damage + violence (land)	-0.020	-0.009	-611	-240	-1,276

2 Appendix Tables

Table A.1: 2008 baseline summary statistics and test of randomization balance

Table A.2: Effects of intense treatment

	Endline 1			Endline 2		
	Normal treatment	Intensive treatment	Sum	Normal treatment	Intensive treatment	Sum
Resident: If assigned: Attended peace program	0.251 [0.023]***	0.086 [0.045]*	0.336 [0.040]***			
Any serious land dispute	0.010 [0.018]	-0.030 [0.030]	-0.020 [0.028]	0.007 [0.012]	-0.013 [0.016]	-0.006 [0.014]
Any threats, property damage, or violence	-0.008 [0.013]	-0.008 [0.021]	-0.016 [0.019]	-0.013 [0.007]*	-0.006 [0.009]	-0.019 [0.007]**
Security rights index for house and farm				-0.083 [0.044]*	0.008 [0.064]	-0.075 [0.054]
Improvement index for house and farm				-0.066 [0.039]*	0.027 [0.061]	-0.039 [0.056]

Table A.3: Heterogeneity by demographics and peace background on conflict

	Female			Youth			Wealth			Muslim minority			Any ethnic minority			Prior peace education			Pct. town prior peace		
	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum
Any serious land dispute	-0.002 [0.015]	0.018 [0.018]	0.016 [0.013]	0.014 [0.014]	-0.012 [0.017]	0.002 [0.013]	0.008 [0.011]	-0.016 [0.017]	-0.008 [0.021]	0.009 [0.011]	-0.009 [0.026]	-0.001 [0.024]	0.009 [0.011]	-0.013 [0.026]	-0.004 [0.024]	0.014 [0.021]	-0.016 [0.048]	-0.002 [0.032]	0.030 [0.017]*	-0.079 [0.051]	-0.049 [0.039]
Any unresolved land dispute	0.005 [0.008]	-0.008 [0.010]	-0.002 [0.006]	0.005 [0.006]	-0.006 [0.009]	-0.001 [0.007]	0.002 [0.005]	-0.011 [0.008]	-0.010 [0.009]	-0.002 [0.005]	0.030 [0.012]**	0.028 [0.012]**	-0.001 [0.005]	0.025 [0.013]*	0.023 [0.012]*	0.009 [0.009]	-0.019 [0.021]	-0.010 [0.014]	0.006 [0.007]	-0.019 [0.024]	-0.013 [0.019]
Property damage	-0.009 [0.004]**	0.008 [0.005]	-0.001 [0.004]	-0.002 [0.004]	-0.007 [0.005]	-0.008 [0.004]**	-0.005 [0.003]*	-0.003 [0.004]	-0.009 [0.005]*	-0.005 [0.003]*	0.002 [0.007]	-0.004 [0.006]	-0.005 [0.003]	-0.003 [0.008]	-0.008 [0.007]	-0.004 [0.005]	-0.002 [0.012]	-0.006 [0.008]	-0.003 [0.005]	-0.007 [0.015]	-0.010 [0.011]
Resolved land dispute	-0.062 [0.067]	0.081 [0.102]	0.019 [0.070]	-0.133 [0.075]*	0.201 [0.109]*	0.068 [0.069]	-0.021 [0.046]	-0.085 [0.074]	-0.106 [0.089]	-0.014 [0.049]	-0.171 [0.137]	-0.185 [0.128]	-0.008 [0.050]	-0.153 [0.138]	-0.161 [0.128]	0.048 [0.109]	-0.185 [0.248]	-0.137 [0.155]	-0.049 [0.097]	0.083 [0.270]	0.033 [0.191]

Table A.4: Heterogeneity by demographics and peace background on security and investment

	Female			Youth			Wealth			Muslim minority			Any ethnic minority			Prior peace education			Current member of a peace group		
	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum
Security rights index, aggregated	-0.093 [0.051]*	0.015 [0.064]	-0.078 [0.047]*	-0.087 [0.045]*	0.003 [0.066]	-0.084 [0.054]	-0.088 [0.037]**	0.067 [0.060]	-0.020 [0.075]	-0.091 [0.040]**	0.050 [0.098]	-0.041 [0.089]	-0.090 [0.040]**	0.035 [0.099]	-0.054 [0.090]	-0.119 [0.090]	0.081 [0.210]	-0.038 [0.133]	-0.213 [0.072]**	0.469 [0.208]**	0.256 [0.151]*
Improvement index, aggregated	-0.112 [0.055]**	0.086 [0.063]	-0.025 [0.042]	-0.082 [0.052]	0.029 [0.064]	-0.052 [0.047]	-0.070 [0.037]*	0.099 [0.052]*	0.029 [0.063]	-0.060 [0.039]	-0.056 [0.092]	-0.117 [0.091]	-0.060 [0.039]	-0.062 [0.092]	-0.122 [0.091]	-0.135 [0.075]*	0.174 [0.164]	0.039 [0.105]	-0.199 [0.066]**	0.492 [0.221]**	0.293 [0.171]*
Index of Fallow Land, farm	0.001 [0.053]	-0.012 [0.068]	-0.011 [0.057]	-0.053 [0.056]	0.096 [0.066]	0.043 [0.053]	-0.007 [0.043]	0.079 [0.063]	0.071 [0.075]	-0.012 [0.046]	0.060 [0.105]	0.048 [0.097]	-0.011 [0.046]	0.053 [0.104]	0.042 [0.096]	-0.018 [0.103]	0.035 [0.218]	0.017 [0.131]	-0.088 [0.083]	0.309 [0.229]	0.221 [0.163]
Size of farm	5.609 [2.225]**	-3.734 [2.875]	1.875 [1.837]	5.063 [2.173]**	-2.654 [2.761]	2.409 [1.809]	3.614 [1.415]**	2.553 [2.791]	6.167 [3.350]*	3.498 [1.523]**	2.138 [4.357]	5.635 [4.147]	3.520 [1.527]**	1.878 [4.385]	5.398 [4.149]	3.399 [3.044]	0.888 [7.497]	4.287 [5.011]	5.468 [2.895]*	-7.376 [10.319]	-1.908 [7.964]

3 Extra Tables

3.1 All conflict and security variables

Table E.1: Additional p-value corrections, general and land conflict combined

Dependent Variable	Endline 1						Endline 2					
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	Adj. p-val (6)	Control mean (7)	N (8)	ITT (9)	ITT / control mean (%) (10)	Est. p-val (11)	Adj. p-val (12)
Panel A: Land dispute outcomes for all residents												
Any serious land dispute	0.221	5,435	0.003 (0.016)	1.2	0.867	0.889 ^a	0.087	4,011	0.008 (0.011)	8.8	0.473	0.988 ^b
Any unresolved land dispute	0.070	5,435	-0.020 (0.008)**	-28.0	0.015	0.138 ^a	0.024	4,011	0.002 (0.005)	6.4	0.744	0.988 ^b
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.122	5,435	-0.010 (0.012)	-8.1	0.397	0.839 ^a	0.041	4,011	-0.012 (0.006)**	-29.3	0.039	0.510 ^b
Property damage or violence in land dispute	0.091	5,435	-0.012 (0.009)	-13.2	0.183		0.021	4,011	-0.007 (0.004)	-31.2	0.117	
Threats	0.114	5,435	-0.006 (0.011)	-5.3	0.596		0.035	4,011	-0.010 (0.006)*	-28.9	0.069	
Property damage	0.041	5,435	-0.013 (0.006)**	-32.4	0.029		0.010	4,011	-0.005 (0.003)*		0.072	
Violence	0.077	5,435	-0.007 (0.008)	-8.7	0.416		0.017	4,011	-0.004 (0.004)	-21.4	0.361	
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute												
Length of maximum land conflict							13.247	353	3.642 (2.889)	27.5	0.209	0.907 ^b
Resolved land dispute	0.684	1,212	0.072 (0.027)***	10.5	0.009	0.117 ^a	0.668	353	-0.024 (0.046)	-3.6	0.604	0.988 ^b
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.554	1,212	-0.024 (0.035)	-4.3	0.496	0.889 ^a	0.476	353	-0.192 (0.047)***	-40.4	0.000	0.007 ^b
Property damage or violence	0.411	1,212	-0.037 (0.030)	-9.1	0.213		0.243	353	-0.090 (0.042)**	-37.2	0.035	
Threats	0.515	1,212	-0.013 (0.035)	-2.5	0.713		0.408	353	-0.157 (0.048)***	-38.6	0.001	
Property damage	0.186	1,212	-0.051 (0.025)**	-27.4	0.041		0.114	353	-0.067 (0.027)**	-58.5	0.016	
Violence	0.349	1,212	-0.022 (0.028)	-6.3	0.442		0.202	353	-0.056 (0.042)	-28.0	0.186	
Witchcraft							0.065	353	0.035 (0.026)	54.3	0.182	
Panel C: General dispute outcomes for all residents												
Any serious dispute	0.299	5,435	0.022 (0.018)	7.2	0.220	0.714 ^a	0.306	4,011	0.012 (0.017)	4.1	0.456	0.988 ^b
Any unresolved dispute	0.118	5,435	-0.013 (0.011)	-11.0	0.250	0.726 ^a	0.064	4,011	-0.004 (0.009)	-6.6	0.623	0.988 ^b
Any threats, property damage, or violence							0.101	4,011	-0.015 (0.010)	-15.2	0.111	0.754 ^b
Panel D: Conditional on a dispute												
Resolved dispute	0.676	1,670	0.051 (0.024)**	7.5	0.033	0.241 ^a	0.767	1,227	-0.019 (0.026)	-2.5	0.467	0.988 ^b
Resolved via informal mechanism	0.247	1,671	0.018 (0.025)	7.4	0.470	0.889 ^a	0.409	1,227	-0.019 (0.027)	-4.6	0.487	0.988 ^b
Any threats, property damage, or violence							0.331	1,227	-0.069 (0.026)***	-20.7	0.009	0.210 ^b
Property damage or violence							0.190	1,227	-0.027 (0.022)	-14.1	0.222	
Threats							0.274	1,227	-0.072 (0.024)***	-26.2	0.003	0.094 ^b
Property damage							0.048	1,227	-0.019 (0.011)*	-40.0	0.085	0.706 ^b
Violence							0.173	1,227	-0.018 (0.021)	-10.2	0.411	0.988 ^b

Table E.2: All land and security results

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)
Security rights index for house and farm	4,011	0.045	-0.085 [0.037]	-187.9
Security rights index for farm	3,666	0.048	-0.090 [0.037]	-187.1
Security rights index for house	3,850	0.034	-0.068 [0.038]	-200.8
Improvement index for house and farm	4,011	0.023	-0.066 [0.037]	-281.1
Improvement index for farm	4,011	0.015	-0.061 [0.034]	-409.4
Improvement index for house	3,850	0.022	-0.042 [0.034]	-192.9
Index of Fallow Land for farm	3,666	0.003	-0.004 [0.044]	-131.5
Has ever let land rest	3,666	0.682	0.018 [0.020]	2.6
Will let land rest in future	3,666	0.730	0.014 [0.018]	1.9
Num. of seasons to rest	3,666	3.347	-0.063 [0.145]	-1.9
Level of security if land resting	3,666	2.322	-0.052 [0.036]	-2.2
Size of farm	3,598	37.481	2.773 [1.051]	7.4

3.2 Subcomponents of Norms and Skills

Table E.3: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment Bias

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)
Bias index	4,011	-0.009	-0.002 [0.046]
Thinks bad to gossip (z-score)	4,011	0.039	-0.072 [0.039]
Comm. thinks bad to gossip (z-score)	3,721	-0.028	0.026 [0.043]
Thinks bad to tell lies (z-score)	4,011	0.003	-0.001 [0.038]
Comm. thinks bad to tell lies (z-score)	3,717	-0.046	0.057 [0.037]
Thinks bad to take sides (z-score)	4,011	0.026	-0.048 [0.039]
Comm thinks bad to take sides (z-score)	3,833	-0.034	0.023 [0.043]

Table E.4: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Defection

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)
Defection index	4,011	-0.043	0.045 [0.041]
Thinks bad to renege (z-score)	4,011	0.014	-0.061 [0.045]
Comm. thinks bad to renege (z-score)	3,717	0.000	-0.066 [0.042]
Thinks good to take palava to elders (z-score)	4,011	-0.044	0.067 [0.036]
Comm. thinks good to take palava to elders (z-score)	3,706	-0.027	0.016 [0.038]
Doesn't think okay to take palava to police (z-score)	4,011	0.005	0.009 [0.037]
Comm. doesn't think okay to take palava to police (z-score)	3,846	-0.043	0.066 [0.046]
Thinks bad to take palava to biased forum (z-score)	4,011	-0.021	0.038 [0.038]
Comm thinks bad to take palava to biased forum (z-score)	3,693	-0.058	0.088 [0.039]

Table E.5: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Forum Choice

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)
Forum choice index	4,011	-0.028	0.031 [0.037]
Thinks good to go to good talkers first (z-score)	4,011	-0.004	-0.005 [0.038]
Thinks good to talk to others first (z-score)	3,850	-0.013	0.046 [0.038]
Thinks good to talk (z-score)	4,011	0.002	-0.030 [0.034]
Comm. thinks good to talk (z-score)	3,926	-0.003	0.001 [0.035]
Doesn't think okay to go to police first (z-score)	4,011	-0.013	0.018 [0.038]
Comm doesn't think okay to go to police first (z-score)	3,824	-0.050	0.047 [0.043]

Table E.6: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Managing Emotions

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)
Managing emotions index	4,011	-0.031	0.067 [0.031]
Thinks shouldn't spoil property (z-score)	4,011	0.035	-0.077 [0.037]
Comm thinks shouldn't spoil property (z-score)	3,760	-0.043	0.076 [0.041]
Stays calm (z-score)	4,010	-0.022	0.043 [0.032]
Cools temper (z-score)	4,010	-0.028	0.039 [0.032]
Don't talk bad (z-score)	4,010	-0.034	0.089 [0.037]

Table E.7: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Mediation

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)
Mediation index	4,011	0.003	-0.062 [0.037]
Thinks good to ask friends for help (z-score)	4,011	0.007	-0.037 [0.034]
Comm thinks good to ask friends for help (z-score)	3,927	-0.008	-0.005 [0.035]
Thinks its good to talk (z-score)	4,011	0.035	-0.107 [0.040]
Community brings people together in palava (z-score)	3,949	-0.017	-0.013 [0.033]
Thinks okay to help others (z-score)	4,011	0.011	-0.061 [0.041]
Comm thinks okay to help others (z-score)	3,953	-0.021	-0.001 [0.036]
Bring others together (z-score)	4,010	-0.009	-0.010 [0.035]
Help others agree (z-score)	4,010	0.009	-0.050 [0.033]
Helps others understand (z-score)	4,010	0.002	-0.018 [0.033]
Cool others' temper (z-score)	4,010	-0.005	-0.021 [0.035]

Table E.8: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Negotiation

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)
Negotiation index	4,011	0.002	0.002 [0.027]
Comm. thinks its good to talk (z-score)	4,011	-0.004	-0.011 [0.037]
Thinks its good to talk (z-score)	3,919	-0.002	-0.032 [0.031]
Thinks gifts okay (z-score)	4,011	0.011	-0.006 [0.036]
Comm. thinks gifts okay (z-score)	3,820	0.010	-0.023 [0.032]
Talks with opposing side (z-score)	4,010	-0.008	0.009 [0.032]
Makes other side understand (z-score)	4,010	0.005	-0.003 [0.029]
Proposes solution (z-score)	4,010	-0.010	0.013 [0.035]
Compromizes with other (z-score)	4,010	-0.035	0.042 [0.031]
Forgives others (z-score)	4,010	-0.004	0.019 [0.040]

3.3 Using years-of-treatment as treatment variable

Table E.9: Resident-Level Effect of years since Treatment on Land Conflicts

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents				
Any serious land dispute	4,011	0.088	-0.028 [0.015]	-31.9
Any unresolved land dispute	4,011	0.024	-0.009 [0.006]	-35.3
Any threats, property damage, or violence	4,011	0.041	-0.014 [0.006]	-34.3
Property damage or violence in land dispute	4,011	0.021	-0.005 [0.004]	-26.3
Threats	4,011	0.035	-0.015 [0.006]	-41.8
Property damage	4,011	0.010	-0.009 [0.005]	-87.4
Violence	4,011	0.017	-0.004 [0.004]	-20.3
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute				
Length of maximum land conflict	353	12.844	5.362 [2.356]	41.7
Resolved land dispute	353	0.662	0.039 [0.044]	5.9
Any threats, property damage, or violence	353	0.469	-0.076 [0.044]	-16.2
Property damage or violence	353	0.238	-0.042 [0.037]	-17.7
Threats	353	0.404	-0.090 [0.042]	-22.3
Property damage	353	0.114	-0.092 [0.043]	-81.2
Violence	353	0.198	-0.015 [0.037]	-7.6
Witchcraft	353	0.070	-0.056 [0.034]	-80.8

Table E.10: Resident-Level Effect of years since Treatment on Land Conflicts: IV

Dependent Variable	Endline 1					Endline 2				
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	IV est. (3)	SE (4)	ITT / control mean (5)	Control mean (6)	N (7)	IV est. (8)	SE (9)	ITT / control mean (10)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents										
Any serious land dispute	0.222	1,900	0.011	0.027	4.8	0.085	1,692	0.018	0.013	20.9
Any unresolved land dispute	0.067	1,900	0.008	0.011	11.5	0.023	1,692	0.004	0.006	18.8
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.121	1,900	0.017	0.019	14.3	0.038	1,692	0.007	0.006	18.2
Property damage or violence in land dispute	0.087	1,900	0.026	0.014*	29.4	0.019	1,692	0.006	0.004*	32.2
Threats	0.114	1,900	0.010	0.019	9.2	0.033	1,692	0.007	0.005	21.6
Property damage	0.039	1,900	0.010	0.009	26.6	0.009	1,692	0.004	0.002*	47.0
Violence	0.075	1,900	0.016	0.013	21.4	0.016	1,692	0.005	0.004	32.7
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute										
Length of maximum land conflict						13.883	145	-0.770	3.636	-5.5
Resolved land dispute	0.697	429	-0.024	0.039	-3.4	0.657	145	0.045	0.041	6.8
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.546	429	0.046	0.052	8.4	0.449	145	0.023	0.043	5.2
Property damage or violence	0.393	429	0.092	0.042**	23.5	0.225	145	0.037	0.033	16.5
Threats	0.511	429	0.018	0.050	3.5	0.384	145	0.030	0.044	7.9
Property damage	0.174	429	0.037	0.035	21.4	0.106	145	0.030	0.022	27.8
Violence	0.337	429	0.054	0.039	16.0	0.188	145	0.030	0.032	16.0
Witchcraft						0.062	145	-0.006	0.019	-9.6

3.4 Community-Level Impacts

Table E.11: Community-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Conflicts

Dependent Variable	Endline 1				Endline 2			
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Control mean (5)	N (6)	ITT (7)	ITT / control mean (%) (8)
Any Violence	0.442	940	0.085 [0.037]**	19.3	0.622	971	-0.057 [0.057]	-9.1
Level of community violence	0.790	940	0.152 [0.083]*	19.2	0.984	971	-0.131 [0.096]	-13.3
Intertribal violence	0.028	940	0.008 [0.013]	30.0	0.021	971	-0.016 [0.008]**	-77.8
Violent strike or protest	0.061	940	-0.004 [0.016]	-7.1	0.002	971	0.015 [0.009]	912.4
Youth-elder dispute	0.110	940	0.044 [0.029]	40.2	0.103	967	0.003 [0.023]	3.4
Peaceful strike or protest	0.100	940	0.037 [0.025]	37.1	0.059	971	0.010 [0.019]	16.0
Interfamily land disputes	0.274	940	0.030 [0.037]	11.1	0.548	971	-0.071 [0.066]	-12.9
Conflicts with other towns	0.154	940	-0.005 [0.033]	-3.5	0.171	970	-0.038 [0.029]	-22.2
Witch hunts	0.015	940	0.023 [0.013]*	153.3	0.011	971	-0.008 [0.005]*	
Trial by ordeal	0.048	940	0.019 [0.018]	39.4	0.070	971	-0.027 [0.018]	-39.1

3.5 Plot-Level Impacts

Table E.12: Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Investments

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)
Property investment index, z-score	7,861	0.018	-0.052 [0.026]*	-287.8
Monetary value of improvement, house and farm, (z-score)	7,848	0.016	-0.044 [0.028]**	-279.1
Non-monetary improvement, house and farm (z-score)	7,848	0.007	-0.018 [0.025]	-252.9
Made an improvement, house and farm	7,861	0.360	-0.028 [0.012]***	-7.8

Table E.13: Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Security

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)
Security index through rights	7,516	0.041	-0.078 [0.030]*	-191.2
Level of security of boundaries, house and farm	7,516	2.462	-0.058 [0.020]**	-2.4
Has ability to inherit, house and farm	7,515	2.317	-0.123 [0.025]	-5.3
Has ability to sell, house and farm	7,515	1.075	0.008 [0.031]***	0.8
Has ability to pawn, house and farm	7,516	1.051	0.004 [0.031]	0.4
Has ability to survey, house and farm	7,516	1.849	-0.037 [0.031]	-2.0

Table E.14: Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Main Outcomes

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control Mean (2)	ATE (3)	ATE / control mean (4)
Security rights index, aggregated	4,011	0.045	-0.083 [0.037]**	-183.5
Improvement index, aggregated	4,011	0.023	-0.065 [0.037]*	-275.5
Index of Fallow Land, farm	3,666	0.003	-0.003 [0.044]	-109.3
Size of farm	3,598	37.481	2.750 [1.051]***	7.3