

Results for PEACE Follow Up

October 11, 2018

Contents

1	Explanation	2
2	Paper Tables	3
3	Appendix Tables	5
4	Extra Tables	10
4.1	All conflict and security variables	11
4.2	Subcomponents of Norms and Skills	14
4.3	Using years-of-treatment as treatment variable	17
4.4	Effect of being dropped on violence outcomes	20
4.5	Community-Level Impacts	22
4.6	Plot-Level Impacts	23

List of Tables

1	Program impacts on number, length, severity, and resolution of land disputes	3
2	Program impacts on number, length, severity, and resolution of all dispute types	3
3	Effect on land security and investment 3-year endline	4
4	Heterogeneity in land security and investment, 3-year endline	4
5	Effect on norms, attitudes and skills, 3-year endline	4
6	Effect on community-level disputes	5
7	Estimated aggregate effects of the program on violent disputes among the 30,000 households in treatment communities	5
A.1	2008 baseline summary statistics and test of randomization balance	6
A.2	Effects of intense treatment	6
A.3	Heterogeneity by demographics and peace background on conflict	7
A.4	Heterogeneity by demographics and peace background on security and investment	7
A.5	Summary statistics of conflict outcomes by demographics and peace background	8
A.6	Summary statistics of security and investment by demographics and peace background	9
A.7	Questions on Attitudes, Norms and Skills	10
E.1	Additional p-value corrections, general and land conflict combined	11
E.2	All land conflict results, endlines 1 and 2	12
E.3	All general conflict results, endlines 1 and 2	13
E.4	All land and security results	14
E.5	Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment Bias	14
E.6	Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Defection	15
E.7	Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Forum Choice	15
E.8	Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Managing Emotions	16
E.9	Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Mediation	16
E.10	Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Negotiation	17
E.11	Resident-Level Effect of years since Treatment on Land Conflicts	18
E.12	Resident-Level Effect of years since Treatment on Land Conflicts: IV	19
E.13	Resident-Level Effect of being dropped on violence outcomes	20
E.14	Comparison of community-level baseline summary statistics for dropped and non-dropped communities	21
E.15	Community-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Conflicts	22
E.16	Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Investments	23
E.17	Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Security	23
E.18	Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Main Outcomes	23

1 Explanation

Reviewers are concerned with who in particular feels insecure about their property. Which groups feel insecure?

Table A.6 shows means of all key outcomes across various demographic dummy variables. Security rights variables are in the bottom, in panel E. I have not yet done a regression analysis for these variables yet, however I believe the current table is still informative. Please let me know if you want to see this exact table, but with regression estimates instead.

Reviewers are concerned about us dropping communities between Endline 1 and Endline 2. What was the process used to select which communities to drop?

1. Enumerators gave use a list of 68 communities (some of whom were treated) that they deemed difficult to reach.
2. We ran a probit regression to predict, for each community, the probability of assignment to treatment.
3. Of the "difficult to reach" communities, of which 41 were eligible to be dropped, we dropped 20 and made a weight for the rest that is 43/20
4. Of the communities in the bottom 35% of predicted probability of assignment to treatment, of which 41 were eligible to be dropped, we dropped 20 and make a weight for the rest that is 41/20.

What defines being eligible to be dropped?

- Being a control community
- Not being a control area in a in a larger community where another area in that community is treated (this is just one community).

Do the weights affect our Endline 1 results at all?

Table E.13 answers this question. It shows two regressions. First, a regression with the Endline communities with Endline 2 weights. This means that the communities that were dropped are not in the regression, and communities that *could have been dropped*, but weren't, are weighted more heavily. As you can see, all of our main effects hold.

Second, it shows the effect of being a dropped community on all outcomes. There are no weights in this regression. As you can see, being a dropped is never a significant predictor of violence.

- *Note: I do not yet have a pretty table showing correlates of being dropped, but can make one if we still think it is necessary.*
- *Additional note: An earlier version of Table E.13 where we had only the sample of non-dropped communities, but without additional weighting. I toyed with the idea of putting that regression in Table E.13 as well, but decided there was enough information in the table already. Results are the exact same.*

Reviewers are concerned about how we handle multiple hypotheses. What are we doing to respond?

In all of our ITT tables, we have corrected for multiple outcomes using the Westfall-Young method and the Sidak-Holmes method. In particular, we are using the `wyoung` package from `ssc` in Stata. The Westfall-Young approach involves constructing simulated p-values from bootstrapping (sampling with replacement). We came into this process under the impression that the Westfall-Young method would be less restrictive than the Holmes method, but this has not been the case. In all likelihood this is because our outcome measures are noisy.

Tables 1 and 2 have a unique set of corrections, where we avoid correcting for the sub-components of indices. Table E.1 shows adjusted results for land and general conflict in the same family. All other tables just have all outcomes in the table placed into the same family.

Paper Tables

Table 1: Program impacts on number, length, severity, and resolution of land disputes

Dependent Variable	Endline 1							Endline 2						
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	WY Adj. p-val (6)	Holms Adj p-val (7)	Control mean (8)	N (9)	ITT (10)	ITT / control mean (%) (11)	Est. p-val (12)	WY Adj. p-val (13)	Holms Adj p-val (14)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents														
Any serious land dispute	0.221	5,435	0.003 [0.016]	1.2	0.867	0.887 ^a	0.867	0.087	4,011	0.008 [0.011]	8.8	0.473	0.872 ^b	0.854
Any unresolved land dispute	0.070	5,435	-0.020 [0.008]**	-28.0	0.015	0.080 ^a	0.057	0.024	4,011	0.002 [0.005]	6.4	0.744	0.878 ^b	0.854
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.122	5,435	-0.010 [0.012]	-8.1	0.397	0.725 ^a	0.781	0.041	4,011	-0.012 [0.006]**	-29.3	0.039	0.266 ^b	0.182
Property damage or violence in land dispute	0.091	5,435	-0.012 [0.009]	-13.2	0.183			0.021	4,011	-0.007 [0.004]	-31.2	0.117		
Threats	0.114	5,435	-0.006 [0.011]	-5.3	0.596			0.035	4,011	-0.010 [0.006]*	-28.9	0.069		
Property damage	0.041	5,435	-0.013 [0.006]**	-32.4	0.029			0.010	4,011	-0.005 [0.003]*		0.072		
Violence	0.077	5,435	-0.007 [0.008]	-8.7	0.416			0.017	4,011	-0.004 [0.004]	-21.4	0.361		
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute														
Length of maximum land conflict								13.247	353	3.642 [2.889]	27.5	0.209	0.680 ^b	0.609
Resolved land dispute	0.684	1,212	0.072 [0.027]**	10.5	0.009	0.075 ^a	0.045	0.668	353	-0.024 [0.046]	-3.6	0.604	0.878 ^b	0.854
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.554	1,212	-0.024 [0.035]	-4.3	0.496	0.773 ^a	0.781	0.476	353	-0.192 [0.047]**	-40.4	0.000	0.008 ^b	0.000
Property damage or violence	0.411	1,212	-0.037 [0.030]	-9.1	0.213			0.243	353	-0.090 [0.042]**	-37.2	0.035		
Threats	0.515	1,212	-0.013 [0.035]	-2.5	0.713			0.408	353	-0.157 [0.048]**	-38.6	0.001		
Property damage	0.186	1,212	-0.051 [0.025]**	-27.4	0.041			0.114	353	-0.067 [0.027]**	-58.5	0.016		
Violence	0.349	1,212	-0.022 [0.028]	-6.3	0.442			0.202	353	-0.056 [0.042]	-28.0	0.186		
Witchcraft								0.065	353	0.035 [0.026]	54.3	0.182		

Table 2: Program impacts on number, length, severity, and resolution of all dispute types

Dependent Variable	Endline 1							Endline 2						
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	WY Adj. p-val (6)	Holms Adj p-val (7)	Control mean (8)	N (9)	ITT (10)	ITT / control mean (%) (11)	Est. p-val (12)	WY Adj. p-val (13)	Holms Adj p-val (14)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents														
Any serious dispute	0.299	5,435	0.022 [0.018]	7.2	0.220	0.533 ^a	0.525	0.306	4,011	0.012 [0.017]	4.1	0.456	0.920 ^b	0.912
Any unresolved dispute	0.118	5,435	-0.013 [0.011]	-11.0	0.250	0.533 ^a	0.525	0.064	4,011	-0.004 [0.009]	-6.6	0.623	0.920 ^b	0.912
Any threats, property damage, or violence								0.101	4,011	-0.015 [0.010]	-15.2	0.111	0.513 ^b	0.444
Panel B: Conditional on dispute														
Resolved dispute	0.676	1,670	0.051 [0.024]**	7.5	0.033	0.164 ^a	0.125	0.767	1,227	-0.019 [0.026]	-2.5	0.467	0.920 ^b	0.912
Resolved via informal mechanism	0.247	1,671	0.018 [0.025]	7.4	0.470	0.533 ^a	0.525	0.409	1,227	-0.019 [0.027]	-4.6	0.487	0.920 ^b	0.912
Any threats, property damage, or violence								0.331	1,227	-0.069 [0.026]**	-20.7	0.009	0.102 ^b	0.053
Property damage or violence								0.190	1,227	-0.027 [0.022]	-14.1	0.222		
Threats								0.274	1,227	-0.072 [0.024]**	-26.2	0.003		
Property damage								0.048	1,227	-0.019 [0.011]*	-40.0	0.085		
Violence								0.173	1,227	-0.018 [0.021]	-10.2	0.411		

Table 3: Effect on land security and investment 3-year endline

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	Est. p-val (4)	Wy adj. p-val (5)	Holms adj. p-val (6)
Security rights index for house and farm	4,011	0.045	-0.085 [0.037]**	0.024	0.124	0.071
Improvement index for house and farm	4,011	0.023	-0.066 [0.037]*	0.079	0.194	0.151
Index of Fallow Land for farm	3,666	0.003	-0.004 [0.044]	0.926	0.937	0.926
Size of farm	3,598	37.481	2.773 [1.051]***	0.009	0.072	0.036

Table 4: Heterogeneity in land security and investment, 3-year endline

Dependent variable	Political Connectedness			Market Tenure			Owns own land		
	Coeff. on treatment	Coeff. on treatment- covariate interaction	Net effect (sum)	Coeff. on treatment	Coeff. on treatment- covariate interaction	Net effect (sum)	Coeff. on treatment	Coeff. on treatment- covariate interaction	Net effect (sum)
Security index through rights	-0.126 [0.037]***	0.140 [0.058]**	0.014 [0.047]	-0.129 [0.063]**	0.083 [0.067]	-0.046 [0.031]	-0.087 [0.031]***	0.058 [0.076]	-0.030 [0.072]
Property investment index, z-score	-0.046 [0.031]	-0.022 [0.054]	-0.068 [0.046]	-0.013 [0.050]	-0.044 [0.054]	-0.056 [0.029]**	-0.049 [0.028]*	-0.017 [0.064]	-0.067 [0.060]
Size of land (house and farm)	2.235 [1.137]**	1.496 [1.956]	3.731 [1.653]**	2.689 [2.082]	-0.152 [2.303]	2.537 [1.057]**	3.247 [1.034]***	-3.106 [2.513]	0.141 [2.327]

Table 5: Effect on norms, attitudes and skills, 3-year endline

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	Est. p-val (4)	Wy adj. p-val (5)	Holms adj. p-val (6)
Bias index	4,011	-0.009	-0.002 [0.046]	0.962	0.998	0.997
Defection index	4,011	-0.043	0.045 [0.041]	0.274	0.793	0.798
Empathy index	4,010	0.002	0.030 [0.033]	0.363	0.832	0.836
Forum choice index	4,011	-0.028	0.031 [0.037]	0.400	0.832	0.836
Managing emotions index	4,011	-0.031	0.067 [0.031]**	0.032	0.292	0.203
Mediation index	4,011	0.003	-0.062 [0.037]*	0.094	0.496	0.447
Negotiation index	4,011	0.002	0.002 [0.027]	0.945	0.998	0.997

Table 6: Effect on community-level disputes

Dependent Variable	Endline 1							Endline 2						
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	WY Adj. p-val (6)	Holms Adj p-val (7)	Control mean (8)	N (9)	ITT (10)	ITT / control mean (%) (11)	Est. p-val (12)	WY Adj. p-val (13)	Holms Adj p-val (14)
Any Violence	0.442	940	0.085 [0.037]**	19.3	0.021	0.291 ^a	0.193	0.622	971	-0.057 [0.057]	-9.1	0.319	0.730 ^b	0.735
Level of community violence	0.790	940	0.152 [0.083]*	19.2	0.070	0.565 ^a	0.478	0.984	971	-0.131 [0.096]	-13.3	0.171	0.609 ^b	0.677
Intertribal violence	0.028	940	0.008 [0.013]	30.0	0.512	0.907 ^a	0.884	0.021	971	-0.016 [0.008]**	-77.8	0.039	0.462 ^b	0.331
Violent strike or protest	0.061	940	-0.004 [0.016]	-7.1	0.782	0.962 ^a	0.952	0.002	971	0.015 [0.009]	912.4	0.104	0.593 ^b	0.585
Youth-elder dispute	0.110	940	0.044 [0.029]	40.2	0.124	0.671 ^a	0.603	0.103	967	0.003 [0.023]	3.4	0.880	0.895 ^b	0.880
Peaceful strike or protest	0.100	940	0.037 [0.025]	37.1	0.144	0.671 ^a	0.606	0.059	971	0.010 [0.019]	16.0	0.613	0.875 ^b	0.850
Interfamily land disputes	0.274	940	0.030 [0.037]	11.1	0.408	0.907 ^a	0.878	0.548	971	-0.071 [0.066]	-12.9	0.282	0.693 ^b	0.735
Conflicts with other towns	0.154	940	-0.005 [0.033]	-3.5	0.870	0.962 ^a	0.952	0.171	970	-0.038 [0.029]	-22.2	0.194	0.644 ^b	0.677
Witch hunts	0.015	940	0.023 [0.013]*	153.3	0.087	0.624 ^a	0.517	0.011	971	-0.008 [0.005]*		0.085	0.583 ^b	0.551
Trial by ordeal	0.048	940	0.019 [0.018]	39.4	0.298	0.872 ^a	0.830	0.070	971	-0.027 [0.018]	-39.1	0.120	0.593 ^b	0.592

Table 7: Estimated aggregate effects of the program on violent disputes among the 30,000 households in treatment communities

Dependent Variable	ATE		Net effect		Net Effect imputed for missing year
	Endline 1	Endline 2	Endline 1	Endline 2	
Any threats, property damage, or violence	-0.010	-0.012	-303	-325	-942
Threats	-0.006	-0.010	-183	-275	-687
Property damage or violence in land dispute	-0.012	-0.007	-365	-177	-813
Property damage	-0.013	-0.005	-406	-139	-817
Violence	-0.007	-0.004	-206	-101	-459
Property damage + violence (land)	-0.020	-0.009	-611	-240	-1,276

3 Appendix Tables

Table A.1: 2008 baseline summary statistics and test of randomization balance

Table A.2: Effects of intense treatment

	Endline 1			Endline 2		
	Normal treatment	Intensive treatment	Sum	Normal treatment	Intensive treatment	Sum
Attended program if treated	0.251 [0.023]***	0.086 [0.045]*	0.336 [0.040]***			
Any serious land dispute	0.010 [0.018]	-0.030 [0.030]	-0.020 [0.028]	0.007 [0.012]	-0.013 [0.016]	-0.006 [0.014]
Any threats, property damage, or violence	-0.008 [0.013]	-0.008 [0.021]	-0.016 [0.019]	-0.013 [0.007]*	-0.006 [0.009]	-0.019 [0.007]**
Security rights index for house and farm				-0.083 [0.044]*	0.008 [0.064]	-0.075 [0.054]
Improvement index for house and farm				-0.066 [0.039]*	0.027 [0.061]	-0.039 [0.056]

Table A.3: Heterogeneity by demographics and peace background on conflict

	Female			20-40 years old			Wealth index			Any ethnic minority			% town peace education at baseline			% town peace group at baseline		
	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum
Any serious land dispute	-0.002 [0.015]	0.018 [0.018]	0.016 [0.013]	0.014 [0.014]	-0.012 [0.017]	0.002 [0.013]	0.008 [0.011]	-0.016 [0.017]	-0.008 [0.021]	0.009 [0.011]	-0.013 [0.026]	-0.004 [0.024]	0.030 [0.017]*	-0.079 [0.051]	-0.049 [0.039]	0.014 [0.021]	-0.016 [0.048]	-0.002 [0.032]
Any unresolved land dispute	0.005 [0.008]	-0.008 [0.010]	-0.002 [0.006]	0.005 [0.006]	-0.006 [0.009]	-0.001 [0.007]	0.002 [0.005]	-0.011 [0.008]	-0.010 [0.009]	-0.001 [0.005]	0.025 [0.013]*	0.023 [0.012]*	0.006 [0.007]	-0.019 [0.024]	-0.013 [0.019]	0.009 [0.009]	-0.019 [0.021]	-0.010 [0.014]
Conditional on a land dispute																		
Any threats, property damage, or violence	-0.229 [0.066]***	0.079 [0.104]	-0.150 [0.074]**	-0.192 [0.071]***	-0.001 [0.107]	-0.193 [0.071]***	-0.190 [0.047]***	-0.066 [0.079]	-0.256 [0.089]***	-0.185 [0.051]***	-0.068 [0.143]	-0.253 [0.130]*	-0.206 [0.106]*	0.086 [0.327]	-0.120 [0.238]	-0.251 [0.124]**	0.152 [0.273]	-0.099 [0.165]
Resolved land dispute	-0.062 [0.067]	0.081 [0.102]	0.019 [0.070]	-0.133 [0.075]*	0.201 [0.109]*	0.068 [0.069]	-0.021 [0.046]	-0.085 [0.074]	-0.106 [0.089]	-0.008 [0.050]	-0.153 [0.138]	-0.161 [0.128]	-0.049 [0.097]	0.083 [0.270]	0.033 [0.191]	0.048 [0.109]	-0.185 [0.248]	-0.137 [0.155]

Table A.4: Heterogeneity by demographics and peace background on security and investment

	Female			20-40 years old			Any ethnic minority			Politically connected			Has market tenure			Owns plot		
	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum	Treatment	Interaction	Sum
Security index through rights	-0.082 [0.041]**	0.008 [0.056]	-0.074 [0.041]*	-0.078 [0.041]*	-0.000 [0.056]	-0.078 [0.042]*	-0.083 [0.032]***	0.037 [0.080]	-0.045 [0.075]	-0.126 [0.037]***	0.140 [0.058]**	0.014 [0.047]	-0.129 [0.063]**	0.083 [0.067]	-0.046 [0.031]	-0.087 [0.031]***	0.058 [0.076]	-0.030 [0.072]
Property investment index, z-score	-0.086 [0.038]**	0.067 [0.048]	-0.020 [0.033]	-0.063 [0.036]*	0.021 [0.048]	-0.042 [0.035]	-0.047 [0.028]*	-0.043 [0.071]	-0.090 [0.069]	-0.046 [0.031]	-0.022 [0.054]	-0.068 [0.046]	-0.013 [0.050]	-0.044 [0.054]	-0.056 [0.029]**	-0.049 [0.028]*	-0.017 [0.064]	-0.067 [0.060]
Size of land (house and farm)	4.318 [1.358]***	-3.070 [1.821]*	1.247 [1.287]	3.282 [1.341]**	-1.014 [1.823]	2.268 [1.307]*	2.678 [1.010]***	0.854 [2.853]	3.532 [2.714]	2.235 [1.137]**	1.496 [1.956]	3.731 [1.653]**	2.689 [2.082]	-0.152 [2.303]	2.537 [1.057]**	3.247 [1.034]***	-3.106 [2.513]	0.141 [2.327]

Table A.5: Summary statistics of conflict outcomes by demographics and peace background

	All Endline 2 residents		Gender		Age		Below median wealth		Any ethnic minority		Any peace education in town at baseline		Any peace group in town at baseline	
	Mean	SD	Men	Women	above 40	20-40	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Pct. of Endline 2 residents			0.48	0.52	0.49	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.87	0.13	0.07	0.93	0.03	0.97
Panel A: Land dispute outcomes for all residents														
Any serious land dispute	0.09	0.28	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.09	0.12	0.09
Any unresolved land dispute	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.02
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.04	0.18	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.04
Property damage or violence in land dispute	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Threats	0.03	0.17	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03
Property damage	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Violence	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute														
Length of maximum land conflict	14.50	28.07	14.95	13.95	16.20	13.11	17.17	11.49	14.35	15.63	14.42	14.50	14.49	14.50
Resolved land dispute	0.66	0.47	0.65	0.67	0.69	0.64	0.61	0.72	0.66	0.68	0.87	0.65	0.67	0.66
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.40	0.49	0.41	0.40	0.36	0.44	0.42	0.38	0.41	0.32	0.27	0.41	0.20	0.41
Property damage or violence	0.21	0.41	0.23	0.18	0.16	0.24	0.17	0.25	0.21	0.22	0.13	0.21	0.07	0.21
Threats	0.35	0.48	0.35	0.36	0.33	0.37	0.39	0.31	0.37	0.24	0.20	0.36	0.13	0.36
Property damage	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.00	0.10
Violence	0.18	0.39	0.20	0.16	0.14	0.22	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.20	0.07	0.19	0.07	0.19
Witchcraft	0.07	0.26	0.08	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.07
Panel C: General dispute outcomes for all residents														
Any serious dispute	0.31	0.46	0.31	0.30	0.25	0.36	0.34	0.27	0.32	0.24	0.25	0.31	0.35	0.30
Any unresolved dispute	0.06	0.25	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.12	0.06
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.09	0.29	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.08	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.09
Panel D: Conditional on a dispute														
Resolved dispute	0.76	0.43	0.78	0.74	0.74	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.76
Resolved via informal mechanism	0.41	0.49	0.40	0.41	0.39	0.41	0.47	0.32	0.41	0.37	0.37	0.41	0.41	0.40
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.31	0.46	0.29	0.33	0.30	0.31	0.33	0.29	0.32	0.21	0.26	0.31	0.25	0.31
Property damage or violence	0.18	0.39	0.16	0.20	0.16	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.12	0.14	0.19	0.11	0.19
Threats	0.25	0.44	0.24	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.22	0.26	0.17	0.21	0.26	0.23	0.25
Property damage	0.04	0.20	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.04
Violence	0.17	0.38	0.15	0.19	0.15	0.19	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.11	0.11	0.18	0.11	0.17

Table A.6: Summary statistics of security and investment by demographics and peace background

	All Endline 2 residents		Gender		Age		Any ethnic minority		Politically connected		Has market tenure		Owns plot	
	Mean	SD	Men	Women	above 40	20-40	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Pct. of Endline 2 residents			0.48	0.52	0.49	0.51	0.87	0.13	0.68	0.32	0.15	0.85	0.85	0.15
Property investment index, z-score	0.00	1.00	0.12	-0.12	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	0.08	-0.13	0.02	0.00	-0.02
Monetary value of improvement, house and farm, (z-score)	-0.00	1.00	0.07	-0.06	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.10	0.02	0.01	-0.03
Non-monetary improvement, house and farm (z-score)	-0.00	1.00	0.07	-0.07	-0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.04	-0.03	0.07	-0.09	0.02	-0.00	0.02
Made an improvement, house and farm	0.35	0.48	0.42	0.28	0.34	0.36	0.36	0.32	0.33	0.39	0.30	0.36	0.35	0.33
Security index through rights	0.00	1.00	0.11	-0.11	0.05	-0.05	0.03	-0.23	-0.02	0.04	-0.49	0.09	-0.04	0.22
Feels secure in boundaries, house and farm	0.87	0.34	0.90	0.84	0.89	0.85	0.86	0.89	0.86	0.89	0.85	0.87	0.85	0.94
Has ability to inherit, house and farm	0.80	0.40	0.85	0.75	0.84	0.76	0.80	0.81	0.77	0.86	0.68	0.82	0.78	0.90
Has ability to sell, house and farm	0.26	0.44	0.28	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.15	0.27	0.23	0.17	0.27	0.25	0.31
Has ability to pawn, house and farm	0.26	0.44	0.28	0.23	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.16	0.26	0.24	0.17	0.27	0.25	0.30
has ability to survey, house and farm	0.61	0.49	0.67	0.56	0.63	0.59	0.62	0.54	0.59	0.65	0.46	0.64	0.59	0.70

4 Extra Tables

4.1 All conflict and security variables

Table E.1: Additional p-value corrections, general and land conflict combined

Dependent Variable	Endline 1							Endline 2						
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	WY Adj. p-val (6)	Holms Adj p-val (7)	Control mean (8)	N (9)	ITT (10)	ITT / control mean (%) (11)	Est. p-val (12)	WY Adj. p-val (13)	Holms Adj p-val (14)
Panel A: Land dispute outcomes for all residents														
Any serious land dispute	0.221	5,435	0.003 [0.016]	1.2	0.867	0.864 ^a	0.868	0.087	4,011	0.008 [0.011]	8.8	0.473	0.984 ^b	0.986
Any unresolved land dispute	0.070	5,435	-0.020 [0.008]**	-28.0	0.015	0.148 ^a	0.111	0.024	4,011	0.002 [0.005]	6.4	0.744	0.984 ^b	0.986
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.122	5,435	-0.010 [0.012]	-8.1	0.397	0.823 ^a	0.868	0.041	4,011	-0.012 [0.006]**	-29.3	0.039	0.450 ^b	0.331
Property damage or violence in land dispute	0.091	5,435	-0.012 [0.009]	-13.2	0.183			0.021	4,011	-0.007 [0.004]	-31.2	0.117		
Threats	0.114	5,435	-0.006 [0.011]	-5.3	0.596			0.035	4,011	-0.010 [0.006]*	-28.9	0.069		
Property damage	0.041	5,435	-0.013 [0.006]**	-32.4	0.029			0.010	4,011	-0.005 [0.003]*		0.072		
Violence	0.077	5,435	-0.007 [0.008]	-8.7	0.416			0.017	4,011	-0.004 [0.004]	-21.4	0.361		
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute														
Length of maximum land conflict								13.247	353	3.642 [2.889]	27.5	0.209	0.871 ^b	0.847
Resolved land dispute	0.684	1,212	0.072 [0.027]***	10.5	0.009	0.109 ^a	0.080	0.668	353	-0.024 [0.046]	-3.6	0.604	0.984 ^b	0.986
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.554	1,212	-0.024 [0.035]	-4.3	0.496	0.856 ^a	0.868	0.476	353	-0.192 [0.047]***	-40.4	0.000	0.006 ^b	0.001
Property damage or violence	0.411	1,212	-0.037 [0.030]	-9.1	0.213			0.243	353	-0.090 [0.042]**	-37.2	0.035		
Threats	0.515	1,212	-0.013 [0.035]	-2.5	0.713			0.408	353	-0.157 [0.048]***	-38.6	0.001		
Property damage	0.186	1,212	-0.051 [0.025]**	-27.4	0.041			0.114	353	-0.067 [0.027]**	-58.5	0.016		
Violence	0.349	1,212	-0.022 [0.028]	-6.3	0.442			0.202	353	-0.056 [0.042]	-28.0	0.186		
Witchcraft								0.065	353	0.035 [0.026]	54.3	0.182		
Panel C: General dispute outcomes for all residents														
Any serious dispute	0.299	5,435	0.022 [0.018]	7.2	0.220	0.702 ^a	0.775	0.306	4,011	0.012 [0.017]	4.1	0.456	0.984 ^b	0.986
Any unresolved dispute	0.118	5,435	-0.013 [0.011]	-11.0	0.250	0.720 ^a	0.775	0.064	4,011	-0.004 [0.009]	-6.6	0.623	0.984 ^b	0.986
Any threats, property damage, or violence								0.101	4,011	-0.015 [0.010]	-15.2	0.111	0.718 ^b	0.652
Panel D: Conditional on a dispute														
Resolved dispute	0.676	1,670	0.051 [0.024]**	7.5	0.033	0.235 ^a	0.208	0.767	1,227	-0.019 [0.026]	-2.5	0.467	0.984 ^b	0.986
Resolved via informal mechanism	0.247	1,671	0.018 [0.025]	7.4	0.470	0.856 ^a	0.868	0.409	1,227	-0.019 [0.027]	-4.6	0.487	0.984 ^b	0.986
Any threats, property damage, or violence								0.331	1,227	-0.069 [0.026]***	-20.7	0.009	0.194 ^b	0.095
Property damage or violence								0.190	1,227	-0.027 [0.022]	-14.1	0.222		
Threats								0.274	1,227	-0.072 [0.024]***	-26.2	0.003		
Property damage								0.048	1,227	-0.019 [0.011]*	-40.0	0.085		
Violence								0.173	1,227	-0.018 [0.021]	-10.2	0.411		

Table E.2: All land conflict results, endlines 1 and 2

Dependent Variable	Endline 1				Endline 2			
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Control mean (5)	N (6)	ITT (7)	ITT / control mean (%) (8)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents								
Any serious land dispute	0.221	5,435	0.003 [0.016]	1.2	0.087	4,011	0.008 [0.011]	8.8
Any unresolved land dispute	0.070	5,435	-0.020 [0.008]**	-28.0	0.024	4,011	0.002 [0.005]	6.4
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.122	5,435	-0.010 [0.012]	-8.1	0.041	4,011	-0.012 [0.006]**	-29.3
Property damage or violence in land dispute	0.091	5,435	-0.012 [0.009]	-13.2	0.021	4,011	-0.007 [0.004]	-31.2
Threats	0.114	5,435	-0.006 [0.011]	-5.3	0.035	4,011	-0.010 [0.006]*	-28.9
Property damage	0.041	5,435	-0.013 [0.006]**	-32.4	0.010	4,011	-0.005 [0.003]*	
Violence	0.077	5,435	-0.007 [0.008]	-8.7	0.017	4,011	-0.004 [0.004]	-21.4
Length of maximum land conflict phantom					1.147	4,011	0.411 [0.279]	35.9
Length of mean land conflict					0.396	4,011	0.131 [0.094]	33.0
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute								
Resolved land dispute	0.684	1,212	0.072 [0.027]***	10.5	0.668	353	-0.024 [0.046]	-3.6
Resolved via informal mechanism	0.193	1,212	0.032 [0.024]	16.4	0.251	353	0.031 [0.051]	12.3
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.554	1,212	-0.024 [0.035]	-4.3	0.476	353	-0.192 [0.047]***	-40.4
Property damage or violence	0.411	1,212	-0.037 [0.030]	-9.1	0.243	353	-0.090 [0.042]**	-37.2
Threats	0.515	1,212	-0.013 [0.035]	-2.5	0.408	353	-0.157 [0.048]***	-38.6
Property damage	0.186	1,212	-0.051 [0.025]**	-27.4	0.114	353	-0.067 [0.027]**	-58.5
Violence	0.349	1,212	-0.022 [0.028]	-6.3	0.202	353	-0.056 [0.042]	-28.0
Witchcraft					0.065	353	0.035 [0.026]	54.3

Table E.3: All general conflict results, endlines 1 and 2

Dependent Variable	Endline 1				Endline 2			
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Control mean (5)	N (6)	ITT (7)	ITT / control mean (%) (8)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents								
Any serious dispute	0.299	5,435	0.022 [0.018]	7.2	0.306	4,011	0.012 [0.017]	4.1
Any unresolved dispute	0.118	5,435	-0.013 [0.011]	-11.0	0.064	4,011	-0.004 [0.009]	-6.6
Any threats, property damage, or violence					0.101	4,011	-0.015 [0.010]	-15.2
Property damage or violence in a land dispute					0.058	4,011	-0.006 [0.008]	-10.8
Threats					0.084	4,011	-0.018 [0.009]**	-20.9
Property damage					0.015	4,011	-0.006 [0.004]	-37.2
Violence					0.053	4,011	-0.003 [0.007]	-4.8
Length of maximum conflict					1.852	4,011	0.447 [0.289]	24.1
Length of mean conflict					0.400	4,011	0.081 [0.060]	20.1
Length of mean conflict					1.308	1,227	0.201 [0.161]	15.4
Length of maximum conflict					6.052	1,227	1.164 [0.788]	19.2
Panel B: Conditional on dispute								
Resolved dispute	0.676	1,670	0.051 [0.024]**	7.5	0.767	1,227	-0.019 [0.026]	-2.5
Resolved via informal mechanism	0.247	1,671	0.018 [0.025]	7.4	0.409	1,227	-0.019 [0.027]	-4.6
Any threats, property damage, or violence					0.331	1,227	-0.069 [0.026]***	-20.7
Property damage or violence					0.190	1,227	-0.027 [0.022]	-14.1
Threats					0.274	1,227	-0.072 [0.024]***	-26.2
Property damage					0.048	1,227	-0.019 [0.011]*	-40.0
Violence					0.173	1,227	-0.018 [0.021]	-10.2
Witchcraft					0.029	1,227	0.006 [0.010]	19.7

Table E.4: All land and security results

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	WY. adj. p-val (6)	Holms adj. p-val (7)
Security rights index for house and farm	4,011	0.045	-0.085 [0.037]**	-187.9	0.024	0.268	0.216
Security rights index for farm	3,666	0.048	-0.090 [0.037]**	-187.1	0.016	0.214	0.164
Security rights index for house	3,850	0.034	-0.068 [0.038]*	-200.8	0.076	0.527	0.509
Improvement index for house and farm	4,011	0.023	-0.066 [0.037]*	-281.1	0.079	0.527	0.509
Improvement index for farm	4,011	0.015	-0.061 [0.034]*	-409.4	0.078	0.527	0.509
Improvement index for house	3,850	0.022	-0.042 [0.034]	-192.9	0.229	0.698	0.727
Index of Fallow Land for farm	3,666	0.003	-0.004 [0.044]	-131.5	0.926	0.942	0.926
Has ever let land rest	3,666	0.682	0.018 [0.020]	2.6	0.377	0.757	0.849
Will let land rest in future	3,666	0.730	0.014 [0.018]	1.9	0.441	0.770	0.849
Num. of seasons to rest	3,666	3.347	-0.063 [0.145]	-1.9	0.666	0.872	0.888
Level of security if land resting	3,666	2.322	-0.052 [0.036]	-2.2	0.146	0.609	0.613
Size of farm	3,598	37.481	2.773 [1.051]***	7.4	0.009	0.168	0.103

4.2 Subcomponents of Norms and Skills

Table E.5: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment Bias

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	Est. p-val (4)	Wy adj. p-val (5)	Holms adj. p-val (6)
Bias index	4,011	-0.009	-0.002 [0.046]	0.962	0.997	0.999
Thinks bad to gossip (z-score)	4,011	0.039	-0.072 [0.039]*	0.068	0.387	0.390
Comm. thinks bad to gossip (z-score)	3,721	-0.028	0.026 [0.043]	0.555	0.942	0.961
Thinks bad to tell lies (z-score)	4,011	0.003	-0.001 [0.038]	0.984	0.997	0.999
Comm. thinks bad to tell lies (z-score)	3,717	-0.046	0.057 [0.037]	0.126	0.530	0.554
Thinks bad to take sides (z-score)	4,011	0.026	-0.048 [0.039]	0.219	0.687	0.710
Comm thinks bad to take sides (z-score)	3,833	-0.034	0.023 [0.043]	0.595	0.942	0.961

Table E.6: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Defection

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	Est. p-val (4)	Wy adj. p-val (5)	Holms adj. p-val (6)
Defection index	4,011	-0.043	0.045 [0.041]	0.274	0.728	0.722
Thinks bad to renege (z-score)	4,011	0.014	-0.061 [0.045]	0.177	0.610	0.622
Comm. thinks bad to renege (z-score)	3,717	0.000	-0.066 [0.042]	0.122	0.585	0.596
Thinks good to take palava to elders (z-score)	4,011	-0.044	0.067 [0.036]*	0.061	0.419	0.398
Comm. thinks good to take palava to elders (z-score)	3,706	-0.027	0.016 [0.038]	0.670	0.902	0.891
Doesn't think okay to take palava to police (z-score)	4,011	0.005	0.009 [0.037]	0.815	0.902	0.891
Comm. doesn't think okay to take palava to police (z-score)	3,846	-0.043	0.066 [0.046]	0.148	0.596	0.617
Thinks bad to take palava to biased forum (z-score)	4,011	-0.021	0.038 [0.038]	0.321	0.728	0.722
Comm thinks bad to take palava to biased forum (z-score)	3,693	-0.058	0.088 [0.039]**	0.026	0.263	0.211

Table E.7: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Forum Choice

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	Est. p-val (4)	Wy adj. p-val (5)	Holms adj. p-val (6)
Forum choice index	4,011	-0.028	0.031 [0.037]	0.400	0.886	0.908
Thinks good to go to good talkers first (z-score)	4,011	-0.004	-0.005 [0.038]	0.891	0.989	0.988
Thinks good to talk to others first (z-score)	3,850	-0.013	0.046 [0.038]	0.222	0.827	0.828
Thinks good to talk (z-score)	4,011	0.002	-0.030 [0.034]	0.380	0.886	0.908
Comm. thinks good to talk (z-score)	3,926	-0.003	0.001 [0.035]	0.988	0.989	0.988
Doesn't think okay to go to police first (z-score)	4,011	-0.013	0.018 [0.038]	0.640	0.964	0.953
Comm doesn't think okay to go to police first (z-score)	3,824	-0.050	0.047 [0.043]	0.273	0.841	0.853

Table E.8: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Managing Emotions

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	Est. p-val (4)	Wy adj. p-val (5)	Holms adj. p-val (6)
Managing emotions index	4,011	-0.031	0.067 [0.031]**	0.032	0.185	0.150
Thinks shouldn't spoil property (z-score)	4,011	0.035	-0.077 [0.037]**	0.040	0.204	0.150
Comm thinks shouldn't spoil property (z-score)	3,760	-0.043	0.076 [0.041]*	0.067	0.217	0.187
Stays calm (z-score)	4,010	-0.022	0.043 [0.032]	0.184	0.383	0.335
Cools temper (z-score)	4,010	-0.028	0.039 [0.032]	0.221	0.383	0.335
Don't talk bad (z-score)	4,010	-0.034	0.089 [0.037]**	0.017	0.147	0.097

Table E.9: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Mediation

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	Est. p-val (4)	Wy adj. p-val (5)	Holms adj. p-val (6)
Mediation index	4,011	0.003	-0.062 [0.037]*	0.094	0.635	0.627
Thinks good to ask friends for help (z-score)	4,011	0.007	-0.037 [0.034]	0.271	0.887	0.891
Comm thinks good to ask friends for help (z-score)	3,927	-0.008	-0.005 [0.035]	0.880	0.994	0.991
Thinks its good to talk (z-score)	4,011	0.035	-0.107 [0.040]***	0.008	0.147	0.083
Community brings people together in palava (z-score)	3,949	-0.017	-0.013 [0.033]	0.688	0.991	0.991
Thinks okay to help others (z-score)	4,011	0.011	-0.061 [0.041]	0.133	0.739	0.715
Comm thinks okay to help others (z-score)	3,953	-0.021	-0.001 [0.036]	0.970	0.994	0.991
Bring others together (z-score)	4,010	-0.009	-0.010 [0.035]	0.781	0.994	0.991
Help others agree (z-score)	4,010	0.009	-0.050 [0.033]	0.130	0.739	0.715
Helps others understand (z-score)	4,010	0.002	-0.018 [0.033]	0.592	0.991	0.991
Cool others' temper (z-score)	4,010	-0.005	-0.021 [0.035]	0.541	0.991	0.991

Table E.10: Resident-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Negotiation

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	Est. p-val (4)	Wy adj. p-val (5)	Holms adj. p-val (6)
Negotiation index	4,011	0.002	0.002 [0.027]	0.945	1.000	0.999
Comm. thinks its good to talk (z-score)	4,011	-0.004	-0.011 [0.037]	0.758	1.000	0.999
Thinks its good to talk (z-score)	3,919	-0.002	-0.032 [0.031]	0.310	0.945	0.965
Thinks gifts okay (z-score)	4,011	0.011	-0.006 [0.036]	0.865	1.000	0.999
Comm. thinks gifts okay (z-score)	3,820	0.010	-0.023 [0.032]	0.473	0.992	0.994
Talks with opposing side (z-score)	4,010	-0.008	0.009 [0.032]	0.787	1.000	0.999
Makes other side understand (z-score)	4,010	0.005	-0.003 [0.029]	0.923	1.000	0.999
Proposes solution (z-score)	4,010	-0.010	0.013 [0.035]	0.711	1.000	0.999
Compromizes with other (z-score)	4,010	-0.035	0.042 [0.031]	0.180	0.820	0.862
Forgives others (z-score)	4,010	-0.004	0.019 [0.040]	0.643	1.000	0.999

4.3 Using years-of-treatment as treatment variable

Table E.11: Resident-Level Effect of years since Treatment on Land Conflicts

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents				
Any serious land dispute	4,011	0.088	-0.028 [0.015]*	-31.9
Any unresolved land dispute	4,011	0.024	-0.009 [0.006]	-35.3
Any threats, property damage, or violence	4,011	0.041	-0.014 [0.006]**	-34.3
Property damage or violence in land dispute	4,011	0.021	-0.005 [0.004]	-26.3
Threats	4,011	0.035	-0.015 [0.006]**	-41.8
Property damage	4,011	0.010	-0.009 [0.005]*	-87.4
Violence	4,011	0.017	-0.004 [0.004]	-20.3
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute				
Length of maximum land conflict	353	12.844	5.362 [2.356]**	41.7
Resolved land dispute	353	0.662	0.039 [0.044]	5.9
Any threats, property damage, or violence	353	0.469	-0.076 [0.044]*	-16.2
Property damage or violence	353	0.238	-0.042 [0.037]	-17.7
Threats	353	0.404	-0.090 [0.042]**	-22.3
Property damage	353	0.114	-0.092 [0.043]**	-81.2
Violence	353	0.198	-0.015 [0.037]	-7.6
Witchcraft	353	0.070	-0.056 [0.034]*	-80.8

Table E.12: Resident-Level Effect of years since Treatment on Land Conflicts: IV

Dependent Variable	Endline 1					Endline 2				
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	IV est. (3)	SE (4)	ITT / control mean (5)	Control mean (6)	N (7)	IV est. (8)	SE (9)	ITT / control mean (10)
Panel A: Outcomes for all residents										
Any serious land dispute	0.222	1,900	0.011	0.027	4.8	0.085	1,692	0.018	0.013	20.9
Any unresolved land dispute	0.067	1,900	0.008	0.011	11.5	0.023	1,692	0.004	0.006	18.8
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.121	1,900	0.017	0.019	14.3	0.038	1,692	0.007	0.006	18.2
Property damage or violence in land dispute	0.087	1,900	0.026	0.014*	29.4	0.019	1,692	0.006	0.004*	32.2
Threats	0.114	1,900	0.010	0.019	9.2	0.033	1,692	0.007	0.005	21.6
Property damage	0.039	1,900	0.010	0.009	26.6	0.009	1,692	0.004	0.002*	47.0
Violence	0.075	1,900	0.016	0.013	21.4	0.016	1,692	0.005	0.004	32.7
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute										
Length of maximum land conflict						13.883	145	-0.770	3.636	-5.5
Resolved land dispute	0.697	429	-0.024	0.039	-3.4	0.657	145	0.045	0.041	6.8
Any threats, property damage, or violence	0.546	429	0.046	0.052	8.4	0.449	145	0.023	0.043	5.2
Property damage or violence	0.393	429	0.092	0.042**	23.5	0.225	145	0.037	0.033	16.5
Threats	0.511	429	0.018	0.050	3.5	0.384	145	0.030	0.044	7.9
Property damage	0.174	429	0.037	0.035	21.4	0.106	145	0.030	0.022	27.8
Violence	0.337	429	0.054	0.039	16.0	0.188	145	0.030	0.032	16.0
Witchcraft						0.062	145	-0.006	0.019	-9.6

4.4 Effect of being dropped on violence outcomes

Table E.13: Resident-Level Effect of being dropped on violence outcomes

Dependent variable	N (1)	Control mean		Effect of		Effect as pct of control	
		Full sample w/ E2 weights (2)	Dropped comms. only (3)	Treatment w/ E2 weights (4)	Dropping No weights (5)	Treatment (6)	Dropping (7)
Panel A: Land dispute outcomes for all residents							
Any serious land dispute	3,995	0.22	0.21	0.009 (0.017)	0.002 (0.024)	4.23	0.86
Any unresolved land dispute	3,995	0.07	0.06	-0.019 (0.008)**	-0.010 (0.011)	-27.54	-15.79
Any threats, property damage, or violence	3,995	0.12	0.12	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.016)	-7.74	-7.42
Property damage or violence in land dispute	3,995	0.09	0.09	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.014)	-14.40	-7.60
Threats	3,995	0.11	0.12	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.015)	-4.48	-4.68
Property damage	3,995	0.04	0.03	-0.017 (0.007)**	-0.024 (0.010)	-38.74	-85.25
Violence	3,995	0.08	0.08	-0.009 (0.009)	0.000 (0.013)	-10.96	0.16
Panel B: Conditional on a land dispute							
Resolved land dispute	883	0.69	0.70	0.075 (0.029)**	0.028 (0.042)	10.86	4.00
Any threats, property damage, or violence	883	0.57	0.57	-0.030 (0.039)	-0.027 (0.049)	-5.26	-4.69
Property damage or violence	883	0.43	0.40	-0.040 (0.033)	-0.009 (0.047)	-9.29	-2.20
Threats	883	0.53	0.54	-0.021 (0.039)	-0.017 (0.047)	-3.90	-3.10
Property damage	883	0.20	0.13	-0.062 (0.028)**	-0.086 (0.041)	-30.63	-64.29
Violence	883	0.37	0.35	-0.029 (0.032)	0.013 (0.043)	-7.74	3.61
Panel C: General dispute outcomes for all residents							
Any serious dispute	3,995	0.30	0.28	0.024 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.024)	8.11	-7.65
Any unresolved dispute	3,995	0.12	0.10	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.014)	-8.64	-18.48
Panel D: Conditional on a dispute							
Resolved dispute	1,242	0.68	0.68	0.043 (0.025)*	0.009 (0.037)	6.32	1.29
Resolved via informal mechanism	1,243	0.23	0.28	0.017 (0.027)	0.031 (0.041)	7.26	11.21

Table E.14: Comparison of community-level baseline summary statistics for dropped and non-dropped communities

Baseline covariate	Means		Median		Std. dev.		Effect of Dropping
	Kept	Dropped	Kept	Dropped	Kept	Dropped	
Mean town educational attainment (years)	5.17	5.11	5.05	5.03	2.63	2.21	-0.29 (0.37)
Log number of households in community	5.34	5.48	5.57	5.75	1.10	1.09	-0.04 (0.23)
Town wealth index	0.01	-0.20	-0.21	-0.17	0.63	0.45	-0.23 (0.06)***
Town average violence experience index (0-13)	4.19	4.73	4.15	4.97	1.65	1.60	0.33 (0.25)
% of town reporting land taken at baseline	0.10	0.11	0.05	0.05	0.11	0.17	0.00 (0.02)
% of town reporting assault at baseline	0.17	0.25	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.26	0.01 (0.05)
% of town reporting land conflict at baseline	0.24	0.25	0.20	0.15	0.22	0.25	-0.04 (0.04)
% of town reporting witchcraft victimization at baseline	0.08	0.14	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.18	0.02 (0.02)
% of town reporting violence at drinking water source at baseline	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.01 (0.02)
Index of progressive political beliefs of town at baseline	3.87	3.71	3.92	3.74	0.55	0.54	-0.29 (0.10)***
Index of progressive ethnic attitudes at baseline	5.75	5.97	5.65	5.92	1.18	1.20	0.32 (0.31)
% of town accepting inter-religious marriage at baseline	0.66	0.68	0.65	0.70	0.20	0.21	0.00 (0.05)

4.5 Community-Level Impacts

Table E.15: Community-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Conflicts

Dependent Variable	Endline 1							Endline 2						
	Control mean (1)	N (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)	Est. p-val (5)	WY Adj. p-val (6)	Holms Adj p-val (7)	Control mean (8)	N (9)	ITT (10)	ITT / control mean (%) (11)	Est. p-val (12)	WY Adj. p-val (13)	Holms Adj p-val (14)
Any Violence	0.442	940	0.085 [0.037]**	19.3	0.021	0.291 ^a	0.193	0.622	971	-0.057 [0.057]	-9.1	0.319	0.730 ^b	0.735
Level of community violence	0.790	940	0.152 [0.083]*	19.2	0.070	0.565 ^a	0.478	0.984	971	-0.131 [0.096]	-13.3	0.171	0.609 ^b	0.677
Intertribal violence	0.028	940	0.008 [0.013]	30.0	0.512	0.907 ^a	0.884	0.021	971	-0.016 [0.008]**	-77.8	0.039	0.462 ^b	0.331
Violent strike or protest	0.061	940	-0.004 [0.016]	-7.1	0.782	0.962 ^a	0.952	0.002	971	0.015 [0.009]	912.4	0.104	0.593 ^b	0.585
Youth-elder dispute	0.110	940	0.044 [0.029]	40.2	0.124	0.671 ^a	0.603	0.103	967	0.003 [0.023]	3.4	0.880	0.895 ^b	0.880
Peaceful strike or protest	0.100	940	0.037 [0.025]	37.1	0.144	0.671 ^a	0.606	0.059	971	0.010 [0.019]	16.0	0.613	0.875 ^b	0.850
Interfamily land disputes	0.274	940	0.030 [0.037]	11.1	0.408	0.907 ^a	0.878	0.548	971	-0.071 [0.066]	-12.9	0.282	0.693 ^b	0.735
Conflicts with other towns	0.154	940	-0.005 [0.033]	-3.5	0.870	0.962 ^a	0.952	0.171	970	-0.038 [0.029]	-22.2	0.194	0.644 ^b	0.677
Witch hunts	0.015	940	0.023 [0.013]*	153.3	0.087	0.624 ^a	0.517	0.011	971	-0.008 [0.005]*		0.085	0.583 ^b	0.551
Trial by ordeal	0.048	940	0.019 [0.018]	39.4	0.298	0.872 ^a	0.830	0.070	971	-0.027 [0.018]	-39.1	0.120	0.593 ^b	0.592

4.6 Plot-Level Impacts

Table E.16: Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Investments

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)
Property investment index, z-score	7,861	0.018	-0.052 [0.026]**	-287.8
Monetary value of improvement, house and farm, (z-score)	7,848	0.016	-0.044 [0.028]	-279.1
Non-monetary improvement, house and farm (z-score)	7,848	0.007	-0.018 [0.025]	-252.9
Made an improvement, house and farm	7,861	0.360	-0.028 [0.012]**	-7.8

Table E.17: Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Security

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control mean (2)	ITT (3)	ITT / control mean (%) (4)
Security index through rights	7,516	0.041	-0.078 [0.030]***	-191.2
Feels secure in boundaries, house and farm	8,022	0.873	-0.025 [0.008]***	-2.9
Has ability to inherit, house and farm	8,022	0.813	-0.048 [0.010]***	-6.0
Has ability to sell, house and farm	8,022	0.268	-0.010 [0.013]	-3.6
Has ability to pawn, house and farm	8,022	0.264	-0.012 [0.013]	-4.5
has ability to survey, house and farm	8,022	0.619	-0.016 [0.013]	-2.5

Table E.18: Plot-Level Effect of Treatment Assignment on Main Outcomes

Dependent Variable	N (1)	Control Mean (2)	ATE (3)	ATE / control mean (4)
Security rights index, aggregated	4,011	0.045	-0.083 [0.037]**	-183.5
Improvement index, aggregated	4,011	0.023	-0.065 [0.037]*	-275.5
Index of Fallow Land, farm	3,666	0.003	-0.003 [0.044]	-109.3
Size of farm	3,598	37.481	2.750 [1.051]***	7.3