



UNSC

STUDY GUIDE



PEMUN
Pernambuco Model United Nations

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PERNAMBUCO MODEL UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

STUDY GUIDE

Topic A: The situation in Somalia

*Topic B: Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts in West Africa
and Sahel*



PERNAMBUCO MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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STUDY GUIDE

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WELCOME LETTER FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Dearest delegates,

In this second edition, the PEMUN brings once more our commitment in providing realistic committees with themes of great national and internacional relevance. We have worked devotedly to provide you delegates, study guides of the utmost excellence, all for the enrichment of your knowledge, helping you to take ownership of the debate and to encourage you to go deeper into the topics.

The themes approached were thought with much love and care, both to reach urgent subjects in the international cenario, as well as to make you reflect and improve your academic and discursive capacities. In special, it was our wish to provide a democratic floor of debate to themes and narratives often put aside by the society.

We are aware of the enormous benefits that the participation in simulations of internacional organisms bring to all spheres of learning. Because of that, we truly wish that you can make the most of this guide and of the opportunity to participate in this event. We hope to make your clamours one loud voice again.

Good studies,

The Academic Secretariat of II PEMUN

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There could be a 100 people in a room and 99 don't believe in you, but all you need is just one who does, and it can change everything. For our luck, we have had not only one person, but many. We had the Academic Secretariat's belief in us, individually and as a group, so it is indispensable that we thank their incommensurable support and the hope they have unwavering maintained that we could accomplish our goals.

It is also important to recognize the assistance provided by our partners in the construction of PEMUN. Our teachers, guest lecturers, the Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, Federal University of Pernambuco, Faculdade de Direito do Recife, UNIT and fellow MUNs – our special thanks to AMUN, SOI, MUNIS, UFRGSMUN, TEMAS –, all of which contributed in their own way so that we could make this committee and the second edition of PEMUN even more memorable.

Also, we would like to thank our loved ones, who have been an essential part of this process, never running out of patience and always encouraging us to go further and to give our best to this project. Finally, to Renan, Pelúcio, Fred, Oliver, Drica and Catarina, the lucky charms of this committee, our eternal love.

To all of you, we dedicate this Study Guide.

LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION

Anna Beatriz Cezar, also known as Annabia, is a 20-year-old law student at the Recife Law School. She was born in Petrolina and her desire to see the world is loud and clear until this day, being the traveler of the group. She is a leo sun, but her thoughtful and generous personality denies all the negative stereotypes associated to her star sign. She is kind and uses all of her impressive editing skills to make sure every single word is perfectly placed in the document. No matter what time of day, Annabia will always be dressed in the best outfits, which may or may not be a habit inspired by her secretly favorite movie, *The Devil Wears Prada*. Just like Miranda, she loves to wear black. With her, all meetings are incredible and the love she nurtures for musicals and music in general is very well-appreciated. Back home her love for pets is complete, with her having a cat who was a significant part of this project.

Julia Lemos, a 2nd period student of the famous Recife Law School, is the youngest director of this committee, with only 18 years old, and one of the cutest people you will ever meet - because of that, she prefers to be called by Ju or any other nickname, since Julia seems like you are arguing with her. Academically speaking, she has an intense determination and willingness to strive to do her best. She is always willing to defend minorities and trying to make the most of issues of inclusiveness. Her struggle for Women's rights is something very remarkable in her productions and in everything she does. Outside of the academic life, Ju loves musicals (the appreciation for it is apparently an interest of almost everyone in this committee) and grew up watching *Glee* (and singing along with her beautiful voice). She is a proud Virgo, loves Ariana Grande, deeply admires Audrey Hepburn – not only as a fashion symbol, but mostly by the incredible human being she was – and she is a vegetarian attracted to vegan things, especially pizzas (who does not?). It's always good to remember her talent for fashion and the love she puts in everything she does – it does not matter if you need a hug or a kind word, she will always be there to share with you the good things in life.

~~**Maria Beatriz**~~ **Bia Montenegro**, 21 years old and a student of the 4th period of Recife Law School (the notorious FDR), is the committee's anticipated fairy (procrastination simply does not exist with this impressing human being) and Miss “let's organize everything

as soon as possible” (we do not blame her, once she is studying so many subjects that she will probably finish college in half the estimated time). She is a proud Gemini who loves the universe, music and musicals - whether on stage, whether in films - and her favorite movie is *The Lord of the Rings*, although she vehemently denies this fact. She also loves to read, being unable to choose just one favorite book, and is very enthusiastic about New Year’s Eve. *Pernambucana raiz*, Bia appreciates *Carnaval* and her favorite cake could not be other than the delicious *bolo de rolo* (but she loves cakes in general). Bia practically only wears sneakers (she is super stylish), and despite the resting bitch face she ~~has~~ says she has, she is pure love and finding someone else as amazing as her is going to be basically impossible – besides that, she is a Hufflepuff in her heart, and if that is not proof of how much love can a human being have, we honestly do not know what is.

Mateus Steffano – or just Steffano, which is sort of the ideal name for a mafia boss – is a 5th period Law student. Though he is only 20 years old, he gives off some serious dad vibes, which might just be because he looks a bit serious and distant. Don’t be fooled, though: he is an amazing guy and an awesome friend, reliable to a fault. He is also a Gemini, but he won’t be able to tell you much about it, since he doesn’t really know what it means. Instead, you should probably talk to him about football, as long as you don’t cuss out his team, Sport. One more thing: Don Steffano has a really bad memory, so don’t be offended if he doesn’t remember you; he’ll be nice to you either way. And if he does remember you, he’ll probably compare you to some character from *Friends*, because that is how he analyzes someone’s personality – an unfailing trick, by the way.

Now, let us present you **Rafaella Almeida**, also known as the *zonanortense* Queen of Oversharing and the best person you will ever meet, like, ever. One of the founding members of the committee, Mommy’s Princess Rafinha (or even *Rafinea*) is only a 4th Semester Law Student, but has already received her master’s degree in *Friends*, the TV Series, and a PhD in Harry Potter studies. With cooking abilities that would make Monica Geller herself proud, Ra (as she also likes to be called) is sure to make you fall in love with her sweets - but, sorry, delegates, this renowned chef is taken. Our beloved director, when not binge-watching Netflix latest trends, can be found writing fanfiction pieces on her own family’s secrets. This Gemini (I know, right? Who’d guess?) is also a pet-lover (!!!), but, sadly, her parents won’t let her raise a pet, so she circumvented their decision and adopted all UNSC Directors instead. All

jokes aside, Rafinha is truly an amazing person with a heart of gold, and don't tell us we didn't warn you when you're obsessed with her at the end of PEMUN.

Renato Gurgel, or, as we say in Portuguese, “cristal supremo”, was presented to this earth on November 15, 1995, at Christmas City - RN (doubtful circumstances, since he is believed to be the lost child of Ms. Britney Spears). His colleagues envy him as he is only 23 years old and has already graduated in Law at UFRN and now studies International Relations at UnP. Mr. Gurgel exceeds at absolutely everything he does, such as his ~~TEE~~ loving child Valentina, whom all of us directors hold very close to heart. Rumors are that he basically tutored the other directors on ABNT rules and basic math. Such rumors are true. Besides mastering the art of always being right, he currently holds the prize for best smirk, and we can also expect him to pull some fashionista moments at PEMUN II and win yet another *direfashion* prize to add to his collection (this is probably bound to happen, but let it be said that Anna Bia will be a strong competitor). Mr. Gurgel has, to this day, participated in 7 different MUNs around the country, with multiple participations in each, totalizing about 20 (TWENTY!) times he was involved and took roles varying from delegate, director, tutor, editor, revisor and a member of the secretariat itself. Fortune tells that one such as Renato Gurgel will one day use his minions to take power and ascend to his final form of Ultimate Queen of All MUNs – and we look forward to this day.

*"History, despite its wrenching pain,
Cannot be unlived, and if faced with courage,
Need not be lived again.
Lift up your eyes upon
The day breaking for you."*

(Maya Angelou)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AMISOM | African Union Mission to Somalia |
| AQIM | Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb |
| ARS | Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somali |
| AU | African Union |
| CGPCS | Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia |
| CNRDRE | Committee for the Reestablishment of Democracy and the Restoration of the State |
| CTITF | Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force |
| DPPA | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs |
| ESPD | European Security and Defense Policy |
| FC-G5S | Force Conjoint du G5 Sahel |
| FGS | Federal Government of Somalia |
| FIS | Islamic Salvation Front |
| G5S | G5 Sahel |
| GIA | Armed Islamic Group |
| GSPC | Salafist Group of Preaching and Combat |
| ICU | Islamic Courts Union |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| IED's | Improvised Explosive Devices |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| ISIL | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| ISWAP | Islamic State in West Africa Province |
| JAK-A | Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria |
| JNIM | Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin |
| JTF ORO | Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order |
| LCBC | Lake Chad Basin Commission |
| MINUSMA | United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali |

| | |
|----------|---|
| MNJTF | The Multinational Joint Task Force |
| MNLA | National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad |
| MUJWA | Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OBP | Oceans Beyond Piracy |
| OSES | Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel |
| PIP | Priority Investment Program |
| PSC | Peace and Security Council |
| PSGs | Peace and Statebuilding Goals |
| SNA | Somalia National Army |
| SNM | Somali National Movement |
| SNPC | Somalia National Peace Conference |
| SRC | Supreme Revolutionary Council |
| SMSG | Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| SRSP | Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party |
| SYC | Somali Youth Club |
| SYL | Somali Youth League |
| TFG | Transitional Federal Government |
| TFP | Transition Federal Parliament |
| TNG | Transitional National Government |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNOSOM I | United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| UNITAF | United Nations International Task Force |
| UNOWA | United Nations Office for West Africa |
| UNOWAS | The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel |
| UNPO | Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSOM | United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia |
| UPDF | Uganda People's Defense Force |
| USC | United Somali Congress |
| WSLF | Western Somali Liberation Front |

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1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this Study Guide is to highlight the main points of two different crises that come from areas marked by their idiosyncrasies, but that have in common the grave social and economic problems which are the roots of their current predicaments. As we are dealing with issues regarding peace and security, which are of interest not only to the region, but to the entire world, it is only right that they are discussed in the midst of the Security Council, which will deliberate to find the best possible solutions to these matters.

The first subject we will broach is an overview of the United Nations and its Security Council, providing information necessary to understanding the basics regarding their origins and operations, such as the composition of the committee and what powers it possesses.

Afterwards, we will dive into the first main topic covered by this Study Guide: the situation in Somalia. The historical background will provide context to the current crisis, and will later be expanded by showing the many facets of the problem and the efforts to quench it, which can only be successful if able to address substantial issues such as the Government's (lack of) structure, the presence of pirates in the Gulf of Aden and the alarming and long-lasting humanitarian crisis.

The second main topic will then discuss the threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts in West Africa and Sahel. By first learning the UN's understanding of terrorism, the topic will consider how said problem manifests in the area, what groups perpetrate it and which initiatives strive to put an end to it.

Lastly, though only a synthesized version of these issues will be presented, it is expected that the reader's curiosity will be fueled, encouraging more research about the subjects, beyond what these pages contain. Through your studies and knowledge, we expect that you feel the clamors to your participation in the construction of a better world. Embrace your power, make a stand and unite your beliefs to ours to make our whispers one loud voice again. Without further ado, welcome to the Security Council, and good luck with your studies!

2 THE UNITED NATIONS

“We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war (...)” (UNITED NATIONS, 1945) – these initial words, presented on the preamble of the Charter of United Nations, composed by 111 articles, are the milestones of the foundation of the United Nations. The Letter was signed in June 1945 in San Francisco, United States, and came into force on the 24th of October of that same year. It expresses the purpose of the 51 countries that took part on the United Nations Conference to reach a treaty to promote peace and justice among nations, hindering the outcome of new global proportioned armed conflicts, especially concerning the scenario succeeding two great wars that devastated the world and made millions of victims. Alongside the growth of the organization, its importance emerged, and its scope widened, encompassing guidelines that go from the creation of international laws to the protection of human rights.

Nowadays, the Organization has its headquarters in New York and 193 member-states. Due its dimension, the activities of the UN are divided in six main organs, vital for its good functioning and administration: The General Assembly (UNGA, composed by all the 193 member-states) the Security Council (UNSC, which contains 15 members, 5 of them with the status of permanent-members), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat (UNITED NATIONS, 1945). In order to deal with substantive issues, it works with six main Committees: Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), Economic and Financial Committee (ECOFIN), Social, Cultural and Humanitarian Committee (SOCHUM), Special Political and Decolonization (SPECPOL), Administrative and Budgetary Committee, and the Legal Committee.

The UN also has specialized bodies such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), besides working with many other organs including World Trade Organization (OWT) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), thus aiming to maximize the usage of multilateral institutions and the interweaving of countries in the international system.

2.1 The beginning of the UN

The first actions towards arranging an international cooperation arose within the end of the First World War, when the winner nations came up with a peace treaty founding the League of Nations, main predecessor of the UN. As of its legacy, many organs of the League of Nations, such as the International Labour Organization, were absorbed by the organization to come.

Thus, in 1941, on the Declaration of St. James' Palace, it is endorsed the international intention directed to collective work in order to seeking and keeping peace. In the same year, the Atlantic Charter was signed between Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States, and Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of England. The leaders endorsed the principles of world order, international justice and economic cooperation that should serve as guidelines for the construction of a better and more pacific future. Although it lacks legal validity, the Charter was later signed by the Soviet Union and nine other European governments. The principles of the Atlantic Charter inspired the United Nations Declaration, signed in 1942 by 26 allied countries that assumed the compromise of keep fighting the power of the Axis.

In 1953, at the Tehran and Moscow Conferences, the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China reunited to establish a post-war international organization that would have as objectives maintaining peace and international security and that would look beyond the military victories of the Allies. The Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta Conferences (1944 - 1945), recognized the urgency of an international alliance to replace the failed League of Nations. Thus, began the development of the Charter of United Nations. The San Francisco Conference, where delegates from 50 nations got reunited, representative equivalent of 80% of the world population, conceived after long debates and negotiations, the Charter of United Nations. Signed on the 26 June 1945, the treaty established the foundation of the United Nations.

2.2 The UN Charter

The Charter went into effect in October 1945 and is regarded as the normative and founding letter of international law. In line with its commitment to Human Rights and humanitarian law, the Charter's essential premises, which serve as base for international

stability, consist of: the plurality of equally sovereign states, collective responsibility for peace, the principle of equal rights and of peoples' self-determination, and the policy of non-interference on internal state affairs. Through such, the organization manages to function in order to attain its goals of ensuring fundamental Human Rights, achieving world peace, the nations' social progress through cooperation, and the creation of conditions able to maintain justice and international order.

The Charter delineates the UN principles, the bodies' duties, composition, international treaties bureaucracy and pacific dispute settlement measures. The procedure rules of the UN bodies of any kind are mostly based on a democratic system by which all members have the floor to express concerns and are expected to respect the votes made by each member.

2.3 The Security Council

This section discourses about the Security Council, its composition, powers, functions, voting procedures and some characteristics important to its operation. It also explains some articles in which the creation of this Council was based upon and are of major importance to the organization of the UNSC until this day.

2.4 Composition

Table 1 – Current composition of the UNSC.

| United Nations Security Council Members 2019 | End of term year |
|---|------------------|
| French Republic | Permanent member |
| Republic of China | Permanent member |
| Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | Permanent member |
| United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | Permanent member |
| United States of America | Permanent member |
| Kingdom of Belgium | 2020 |
| Republic of Côte d'Ivoire | 2019 |
| Dominican Republic | 2020 |
| Republic of Equatorial Guinea | 2019 |
| Federal Republic of Germany | 2020 |
| Republic of Indonesia | 2020 |
| State of Kuwait | 2019 |
| Republic of Peru | 2019 |
| Republic of Poland | 2019 |
| Republic of South Africa | 2020 |

Source: Designed by the author.

2.5 Functions and powers

According to the UN Charter, the United Nations Security Council has the maintenance of international peace and security as its primary responsibility, and, for that purpose, its decisions, which must follow the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,¹ must be carried out by all Member States (UNITED NATIONS, 1945). Therefore, UNSC resolutions are considered binding, as Member States must not violate their terms². Also,

¹ The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations are listed in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter, and include the principle of sovereign equality of its Members, the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State (UNITED NATIONS, 1945).

² The only other UN body capable of binding resolutions is the General Assembly in the specific case of resolutions under “Uniting for Peace”, a reference to UNGA Resolution 377(V), which stated that the UNGA is

admissions of new States to the United Nations must be approved by the Security Council, as well as by the General Assembly.

In order to fulfill its primary responsibility, the UNSC acts on a regular basis under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, which refer, respectively, to the pacific settlement of disputes and to threats of peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression.

Under Chapter VI, the UNSC is a relevant body for its capability of summoning interested parties to settle international disputes which might endanger international peace and security should they continue. In situations like these, the Security Council has the power to act as a mediator and the faculty of recommending procedures or methods of conduct adjustment deemed appropriate (UNITED NATIONS, 1945).

Chapter VII grants the Security Council the power to decide upon measures to be taken in the aforementioned subjects, which include those mentioned in Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. The Charter refers to measures unrelated to the use of armed force and includes “[...] complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (UNITED NATIONS, 1945).

Article 42, on the other hand, may be invoked when the measures described in Article 41 are inadequate or have not proved themselves adequate in the specific situation (UNITED NATIONS, 1945). Therefore, the UN Charter allows the Security Council to take actions as deemed necessary to fulfill its primary responsibility, which include blockades and operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations (UNITED NATIONS, 1945). It is under Chapter VII that the UNSC authorizes the deployment of peacekeeping forces with varying mandates to determined regions according to the scale of the conflict. Needless to say, all Member States shall comply with Resolutions acting under Chapter VII by the Security Council, agreeing to make available their armed forces, assistance, facilities and rights of passage necessary for maintaining peace and security.

According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, although each mission has its own particularities, they still share aspects in common. The DPKO points out the following as examples of activities Peacekeeping operations may be required to work on:

capable of consider matters of international peace and security and duly determine the measures to be taken when the UNSC, due to “[...] lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility” (UNITED NATIONS, 1950).

Prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spillover of conflict across borders;
Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;
Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development. (UNITED NATIONS, 201-).

2.6 Voting and procedures

Concerning the Security Council, its composition, functions, procedures, powers and actions, the UN Charter has dedicated Chapters V to VIII, composed of Articles 23 to 54. Following the established by the Charter, the United Nations Security Council is composed by fifteen members, of which five are permanent – the French Republic, the Republic of China³, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics⁴, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America – and 10 non-permanent ones, elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Furthermore, the UNSC can invite delegations to represent certain interests that are under discussion and that may affect these non-Council members, nevertheless they do not have voting powers (UNITED NATIONS, 1945).

Each delegation holds one vote, even though the permanent members also have the capacity to “veto” any draft resolution, since UNSC resolutions can only be approved when counting with 2/3 affirmative votes of the delegations and no opposition by a permanent member. According to the UN Charter, all the Members of the United Nations are subjugated to accept and execute utterly the Council’s resolutions, which makes the UNSC the only UN body with mandatory force – all other bodies only have recommendatory skills (UNITED NATIONS, 1945).

³ The People’s Republic of China is the recognized successor of the Republic of China, acknowledged by the UN in 1971.

⁴ The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics gave rise to the Russian Federation with the government transition, recognized by the UN.

3 INITIAL ASSESSMENTS ON THE TOPICS

In the globalized world in which we live, the different political conflicts and the humanitarian and economic situation of a certain region have the capacity to influence events in the rest of the world, with Syrian immigration resulting from a civil war being a great example (SCHILLINGS, 2018). Therefore, it is important to be aware of political and socioeconomic events in the global sphere. This Study Guide is focused on two extremely important topics worldwide: the situation of Somalia and threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts in Sahel and West Africa.

Facing political problems since the 70's, Somalia is, nowadays, one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the World Bank, half of Somalia's population lives below the poverty line. Famine is a common problem, hardened by climate issues, such as constant droughts (WORLD BANK, 2019). Traditionally insecure groups, such as children (UNOCHA, 2017) and women (UNDP, 2015), perceive the situation from an even more problematic point of view.

The humanitarian crisis in Somalia can be explained by its unique political situation, as it will be explained in the course of this guide. After the fall of General Barre, in 1991, Somalia had been in a state of anarchy for not having a central government controlling the region until the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Its territory is fragmented into small autonomous territories, one of which declared independence: Somaliland. The population lives in a perpetual state of civil war since that period, with different groups (including terrorist ones such as Al-Shabaab) trying to impose their authority on the rest. By the absence of a strong central authority, another big issue is the piracy developed in the east coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

On the opposite geographic side of Africa, terrorist acts represent a big problem for the countries in West Africa and Sahel. This region is well known for its humanitarian issues as well, with the example of Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world (HARRINGTON, 2018) and which has the highest birth rate on the planet (MAY, 2019). In this scenario, although it is not as highlighted as the terrorist groups in the Middle East by the

Media, there are countless jihadist groups⁵ that threaten the legitimacy of national states and are responsible for several deaths of civilians. The most important of these are the Boko Haram and the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

The Islamic faith of the local people, combined with unfavorable weather conditions, poor humanitarian conditions and low border patrols are facts that can explain the insurgence of terrorist jihadist groups in that area. Historically initiated in Lake Chad and Sahel, those terrorist groups are now scattered over almost all the countries in West Africa.

Even though those two topics are very severe and demand immediate international efforts, they are not among the top priorities of the international agendas. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance that the international community discusses the issues, facing the actual problems and preventing the spread of them and the insurgence of others.

⁵ In a literal sense, the word "jihad" translates into effort, struggle. In the Quran, it possess a few connotations, one of which is the struggle against an open enemy, only in self-defense and if persecuted because of their faith, as a way to preserve universal religious freedom. Throughout the ages, this concept has been misconstrued and used by some groups to validate their violent actions. Currently, it is adopted by Islamist extremists to justify their acts of terrorism as the fulfillment of their duty towards God. That is neither the true meaning of the word, as Islam does not condone such brutality, nor is it a representation of the beliefs of its followers, the majority of who are peaceful and abhor these notions (RASHID, 2017).

4 TOPIC A - THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

For more than 25 years, Somalia has been ravaged by humanitarian suffering and political instability, providing fertile ground for terrorism to blossom and worrying the international community. Therefore, the following topics will be discussing the events that led to the current scenario, touching on the country's colonization, its independence, the haunting military rule, the government's breakdown, the internal and foreign countermeasures and the crisis that cause Somalia to be considered one of the most collapsed and corrupt States in the world (CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX, 2018).

4.1 Historical background

This section will shine a light on key moments of Somalia's timeline, which is crucial to analyze what paved the way for the country's shattered status and what measures should be avoided when developing new efforts.

4.1.1 The colonial rule and the independence of Somalia

During the 19th and 20th centuries there was a massive colonization of African countries by the then great European powers, which caused profound social, political and economic impacts in the countries kept under European control. In this process, Somalia was divided by European colonizers into five different parts, creating a general division in the Northern and Southern parts, into which the numerous clans and tribes existing in Somalia were allocated (ELMI, 2010).

As many other African countries, Somalia was and still is formed by an enormous quantity of tribes and clans, whose existence it is important to highlight. Although Somalia is ethnically and culturally homogenous – with the majority following Islamism⁶ and the general

⁶ Islam, which means "submission to the will of God", is the world's second largest religion, and began with the Prophet Muhammad, in the year 622. Its followers are called Muslims, who believe there is only one God (Allah). They follow the laws of the Quran and the Sunnah, and adhere to the five pillars of Islam – the declaration of faith, five daily prayers, donating to charity, fasting during Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in a lifetime (BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2009).

ethnic ancestral being “the Somali”–, the country is made up of a tribal society in which five powerful main ones (Isaaq, Dir, Digil and Mirifle, Hawiye and Darood) are divided up into numerous clans, splitting the population in the political arena (VENUGOPALAN, 2017). This structure refers to the pre-colonial period and, by its rootedness in the country's social constitution, has become one of the major challenges to the solid formation of an united and fortified Somali State, since most of these tribes have strong rivalries with each other, besides the nomadic reality of many clans (HESSE, 2011).

Somalia had four colonizers – three of them being European countries – whose distribution in Somali territory was as follows - exemplified on the map shown on Image 1: in 1887, Great Britain occupied the Northern part as its protectorate; Italy claimed the Southern portion in 1905; France settled its colonies where today is the territory of Djibouti; and Ethiopia, the only non-European colonizer, occupied the Ogaden region (RIGGS, 2003). Despite all the cultural, social and political differences, the Northern and Southern parts united in a great demonstration of nationalism during the early 20th century, in a revolutionary movement of resistance and independence from the colonizers, guided by a citizen of the Ogaden region. However, the movement was repressed by Great Britain, as occurred with several other attempts at independence during the period between 1930 to 1950 (CARDOSO, 2012).

Image 1 – The colonial rule.



Source: Robert Moe (2011).

In 1948, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), a local group, became a nationalist organization calling for the unification of all the Somali-speaking lands into a Great Somalia, changing its name to the ‘Somali Youth League’ (SYL). The reasons for this fast radicalization were many, but it is most immediately attributable to the international deliberations over the future of the Italian East African Empire, for which Great Britain and Italy had plans to create a Great Somalia under British administration (BARNES, 2007). To fight these plans, the SYL surfaced to defend the ideal of a Great Somalia free of the influences and control of colonizers, playing a key role in the Somali struggle for independence by expanding the nationalist project through the Somali territory (AHMED, 1999; BARNES, 2007).

After World War II, there was an emergence and growth of a series of nationalist movements throughout the European colonies in Asia and Africa, exposing the growing struggle of the colonized territories for freedom (AHMED, 1999). Somali nationalism was extremely important for the achievement of independence and the creation of the modern State of Somalia, which occurred on July 1st, 1960, when the Southern part conquered

independence from Italy, while the Northern portion became independent from Great Britain on June 26th (VENUGOPALAN, 2017).

Since that year, Somalia experienced a period of civil government, which lasted almost 10 years. With the South's independence, Somalia declared itself the Somali Democratic Republic (VENUGOPALAN, 2017). The Northern and Southern regions were united under a multi-party democracy, working together in an attempt to ally all five regions under one government. Adan Abdullah Osman Daar, elected as provisional president, kept the nationalist ideal strongly present in the course of his mandate, in which a referendum approved a new constitution for the country on 20 June 1961, establishing its union. Daar's government was marked by aggressiveness towards neighboring countries, a fact responsible for the reduction of its international approval (AHMED, 1999).

Despite the unification and government centralization, cultural and political differences grew in Somalia, given the vast number of parties that were created in a short space of time. In the 1967 Elections, Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmarke, from the SYL, was elected president by the National Assembly in June, while the SYL won the overwhelming majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly's elections in 1964 and 1969 (LEWIS, 1972).

Regardless of the political advances, Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world, depending on international aid to maintain the economy running. Sharmarke's government failed to keep the regions unified, and the economic and social issues were steadily aggravating (AHMED, 1999). On 15 October 1969, President Sharmarke was assassinated by a policeman, shaking the already existing political, social and economic instability, deeply affecting Somali history (CARDOSO, 2012). On October 21st, the General Mohammed Siad Barre led a military coup d'État, taking over power and establishing a military regime that lasted from 1969 to 1991 (LEWIS, 1972).

4.1.2 The military regime of Siad Barre


Since the beginning of his government, Barre established, amidst the Cold War, a socialist regime, supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, with whom Barre firmed close and strong ties (VENUGOPALAN, 2017). The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), whose leader was the president himself, seized power on 3 November 1969, abolishing all the political parties – except his own, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) – and

extinguishing Somalia's Constitution (HESSE, 2011). Laws were passed to grant the government wide powers of detention and execution, and various paramilitaries, militias and security agencies were created, including the National Security Service and the Somalia National Army (SNA) (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1990).

In the first years of his government, Barre had a relatively high popularity, partly due to the financial support given by the Soviet Union (VENUGOPALAN, 2017). To strengthen the socialist ideal and guarantee more power and control, General Barre used propaganda as an attempt to eliminate tribalism, with the slogan "socialism unites, tribalism divides" (HESSE, 2011). Furthermore, the government started programs to develop the infrastructure and nationalize companies, a strategy encouraged by Somalia's population.

His regime became increasingly oppressive and violent by the end of the 1970s, although mass atrocities did not begin at that time (BARNES, 2007). In the 1960s, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was a rebel group created with the purpose of fighting for Somalia's self-determination in the Ogaden region, mastered by Ethiopia. General Barre recognized the WSLF in 1977, which led both countries – Somalia and Ethiopia – to a conflict denominated the Ogaden War. Although it lasted a short time – from 1977 to 1978 – this war was a milestone in the current panorama, profoundly and radically modifying the international relations established until then. The Soviet Union recanted its support of Somalia and started to assist Ethiopia, that was a Western ally. In counterpoint, Barre went to the United States looking for support, but Somalia was forced to retreat (RIGGS, 2003).

Image 2 – Somalia and the Ogaden region.



Source: GREG dataset, Stratfor, 2016.

The Ogaden War had profound impacts on Somalia, not only for its violence – there were sixty thousand deaths: approximately 6,000 soldiers and 25,000 civilians –, but also for Somalia’s stability (VENUGOPALAN, 2017). With this defeat, there was a decadence of the nationalist project, leading to a deep period of instability. Afterwards, Somalia had to deal with social chaos, a weakened economy, scars from the Ogaden War, refugees from the conflict and the poverty and hunger that plagued the country (CARDOSO, 2012).

In the 1980s, the rise of opposition armed movements began. Throughout the 1980s, Barre’s regime responded to many oppositional militias by employing increasingly violent and restrictive measures. An estimate made by The Africa Watch’s report said that approximately 60,000 people were killed between 1988 and the beginning of 1990 (COMPAGNON, 2013).

Barre’s regime continued to launch targeted reprisals against the civilian population throughout 1990, being responsible for thousands of civilian executions in and around Mogadishu. The government bombed Northern towns and villages as a repressive response to rebellions organized by the Isaaq clan – in a short space of time, the Southern region would join the rebellion movement (VENUGOPALAN, 2017).

After a repressive regime with an unsuccessful war followed by catastrophic results and a scenario of disorder, starvation and extreme violence, the government lost ground. At the end of 1990, the United Somali Congress (USC) launched an offensive on the capital, and

on 27 January 1991, Barre fled, leaving a power gap and a series of profound and delicate problems after the breakdown of the central authority of his government (VENUGOPALAN, 2017).

4.1.3 The collapse of central authority

Following the crumbling of the last functioning central government in 1991, clan rivalry was at its worse and fragmented groups failed to agree on a power-sharing formula. The country was dismantled into various territories controlled by warlords, faction chiefs and regional administrations such as Somaliland, Puntland, the Jubba Interim Administration (Jubaland) and Marihanland. Non-state armed groups have since been fighting over control and further intensifying the infringement of human rights and humanitarian law violations (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1992) as civil war ensued, increasing to over 2 million the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) (AVIS & HERBERT, 2016).

The period of 1992-1995 was marked by big UN and US – UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II – interventions aimed at providing humanitarian aid and peace talks. However, they all failed to fulfill their mandate due to, among other reasons, heavy resistance by armed clan militias and even by the civilian population, lack of support from any Somali government and the shifting of focus over the course of missions. They all withdrew, leaving Somalis with little to no assistance to deal with the warlords' warfare (SHAW, 1995).⁷

In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) culminated in the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG), the first official authority in eight years. It was dominated by Mogadishu-based clans, especially the Hawiye, not being, therefore, a national unity government (VENUGOPALAN, 2017). This led to strong opposition, specially by the Ethiopian-backed clan coalition, SRRC, whose leader was Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the autonomous State of Puntland. Due to TNG's lack of capable governance, new peace conferences were held in Kenya from 2002 to 2004, sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), formed mostly by Somalia's neighbours. Eventually, in 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was created and the Transition Federal Parliament (TFP) elected Abdullahi Yusuf, close ally of Ethiopia, as president. It was adopted a 4.5 power-sharing formula, providing parity of seats in Parliament for the 4 major clans –

⁷ For more information, see topic 4.2.

the Hawiye, Darood, Dir and Dingle Mirifle –, and half that number to remaining minority groups (MITI, 2010). This system, however, ended up institutionalizing clannism and creating internal disputes as clan interests were prioritized over the country's own (HERSI et al, 2015).

The TFG proved to be fragile and struggled for recognition by the population and for control over territories, as clan militias were unwilling to give up power and refused a federalist structure. An Islamist insurgency took place, with Local *Shari'ah*⁸ courts strengthening and establishing their authority and legitimacy in their areas of control (more information on the Courts will be provided in topic 4.3.4). Amidst tension of both Ethiopia and the US fearing an Islamist extremist awakening in Somalia, the Americans denounced the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) of giving refuge to Al-Qaida suspects. The ICU, however, denied such claims, causing the US to support Ethiopia's attack on Somali ground that took place in December 2006, following president Yusuf's request for an intervention. Ethiopia itself feared that the Islamist would align with Ethiopia's rival, Eritrea (VENUGOPALAN, 2017). In fact, the latter eventually got involved, turning the conflict it into a proxy war⁹ between the two countries (MITI, 2010). Ethiopia's invasion in Somalia resulted in the worst bloodshed since the civil war in the 90's, as well as the worst humanitarian crisis in Africa so far (GETTLEMAN, 2007), with massive violations of Human Rights and humanitarian law standards (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2008).

The ICU quickly lost ground and fragmented into factions, such as the moderate Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somali (ARS) and the radical Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen. In February 2007, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the largest ever mission in African soil, began to operate. After an UN-backed ceasefire in June 2008, a new TFG was agreed upon and included moderate Islamist forces, with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, leader of the ARS, being elected president. Still, the new government proved to be very factionalized and unmanageable.


With Al-Shabaab (topic 4.3.4 will also discuss the group in detail) beginning a new insurgency and having its actions spilled over Somali borders and threatening international security, Kenyan troops intervened in October 2011. AMISOM increased its forces and was backed by Kenyan and Ethiopian troops (these were later integrated into AMISOM).

⁸ For more information, see footnote 14 on page 38.

⁹ A conflict instigated by opposing powers who deploy a strategy to indirectly fight each other by providing aid to and directing third parties involved in action who serve their interests, instead of being personally involved in the war themselves.

Throughout 2012, Al-Shabaab successively lost control over towns and slipped away into rural areas, making it the end of Al-Shabaab’s “golden age” (VENUGOPALAN, 2017).

Image 3 – The retreat of the Al-Shabaab Islamist militant group in Somalia in 2012.



Source: Evan Centanni (2012).

Since the TFG was immersed in corruption, marginalized local governments, and had not yet achieved its goals, the international community reached a consensus to end Somalia’s transition process. In February 2012, the London Conference was attended by 40 heads of State and set deadlines for concluding transition, with seven key issues agreed upon, including security, terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and international cooperation. It premiered a new phase of multilateral effort in Somalia’s reconstruction (CHITIYO & RADER, 2012).

The TFG ended in August and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was formed under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s presidency in the first Somali presidential elections since 1967.¹⁰ The new mandate included rebuilding Somalia’s basic structures and preparing the country for the democratic transition, with new elections to take place in 2016. Foreign embassies reopened in Mogadishu and the US re-established diplomatic ties with Somalia for the first time in 20 years (VENUGOPALAN, 2017).

¹⁰ More on the FGS on topic 4.3.1.

The warfare that took place between 2007 and 2012 killed more than 10,000 people, mostly civilians, and displaced many thousands more, initiating a severe humanitarian crisis (BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, 2018). In conclusion, political scientist Kenneth Menkhaus points some reasons for the turmoil that has been devastating Somalia since the collapse: the incompetence of government leaders, a divisive clan system, the negative intervention of neighboring countries with hidden agendas to maintain the chaotic status quo and the incompetence of external mediators who were usually misinformed on the situation (MENKHAUS, 2003).

4.1.4 The current state

Since its constitution in 2012, the FGS has taken important steps to implement the necessary reforms to solve the crisis that devastates the country, measures which are being increasingly financed from domestic revenue that has been expanded and better managed by the government (UNPRESS, 2019). The New Deal for Somalia helped in such accomplishment, providing cooperation in establishing, funding and realizing the set Peace and State building Goals (PSGs) (HEARN; ZIMMERMAN, 2014).

The Federal Parliament of Somalia was able to transition to a bicameral Parliament, responsible for choosing the new president. Although scheduled for 2016, the presidential elections were consecutively postponed until, in 2017, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Farmaajo, was selected as president, in a process tarnished by allegations of bribery and corruption (GETTLEMAN, 2017). On a positive note, it was also subject of deeper public scrutiny that tends to be upheld as the country already prepares itself for the 2020 elections (SOLIMAN, 2016).

The federal member states also underwent elections, in a manner which was by no means harmonious, because of their historically tense relationship with the central government. One instance of undue interference by the latter was when the FGS arrested in December 2018 Mukhtar Robow, a former deputy-leader of Al-Shabaab who was running for regional president, an event that sparked manifestations in which 15 protestants were killed and more than 300 were arrested, as the people claimed for greater autonomy from the central power. After having asked for clarification on the arrest of Robow and the protestants, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia, Nicholas Haysom, was

asked by the government to leave the country, as it was said he interfered with its sovereignty (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2019).

The episodes cited serve as illustration of the systematic corruption and mismanagement that threatens the legitimacy of the government and of its institutions. Currently, Somalia is ranked by Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world, as it has been since 2006 (RAHMAN, 2017). This venality affects and is affected by the political instability, with government officials — by means of bribery — and businessmen — by patronage networks and monopolies — profiting heavily from such practices, which also help terrorism to thrive, all to the detriment of the population (BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, 2016).

Such activities divert the much-needed capital which should be directed to funding public services, deepen the divide of the already fragmented power factions, enable the mostly unconstrained functioning of terrorist groups, hinder the efficiency of the security forces and bar the free operation of the media and of civil society organizations (RAHMAN, 2017). There have been measures taken to solve the issue, such as the passing of an anti-corruption law and the establishment of an anti-corruption commission, as well as the arrest of high-ranking officials charged with embezzlement, but there is still much to be done (UNPRESS, 2019).

In addition, the misuse of power is another facet of the problem: the security forces unlawfully kill and harm civilians in operations, and the intelligence agencies operate without legal authority, arrest and detain people without charges or legal counsel, and have, on occasion, tortured people suspected of being terrorists. The military court tries people without the due process of law. The government frequently and forcibly practices large-scale evictions. The accountability is almost nonexistent (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2018).

Yet, no matter how grave these issues may be, they are not the most severe problem that Somalia currently faces: the frequent acts of terrorism, with their devastating consequences on all areas of society, continue to impede the most fundamental rights of those who inhabit the country. The Islamist group Al-Shabaab is the most imminent threat and will be more thoroughly analyzed on the topic 4.3.4. Beyond that, there is also the prevailing humanitarian crisis that has for decades desolated Somalia, which will be addressed on topic 4.5.

Finally, it is important to add that throughout the process of striving to put the country in order, the Somali government has received aid from numerous countries and organizations, which have donated money, supplies and assistance, most importantly by sending missions that aim to help stabilize the country. These have resulted in mixed outcomes, which will be further discussed on the subsequent topic.

4.2 International missions in Somalia

The severity of the Somali situation worsened every day, with increasingly high levels of violence, extreme hunger and poverty among the population. The degree of human suffering has, therefore, been a decisive factor for the UN's interventions through missions in the country, which were a crucial experiment to determine how it would conduct further peacekeeping efforts (SHAW, 1995). Thousands of people were living in misery and starvation while rival clans seized resources and controlled the distribution of food and other supplies, preventing their provision to the population. The UN concluded that intervention forces would be necessary when negotiation sessions failed to secure a ceasefire between the factions and clan violence blocked further efforts to import aid (BILES, 1992).

4.2.1 First efforts

The brutal civil war and ensuing famine that stroke Somalia in the early 90's led to interventions that left significant and lasting effects on the country.

UNOSOM I

The United Nations brokered a ceasefire between the Mogadishu clans and imposed an arms embargo in January 1992 (S/RES/933). In August, supported by UNSC Resolution 746 (1992), the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), consisting of 50 observers and 500 peacekeepers, arrived in the capital to monitor the ceasefire, protect the UN staff, aid workers and civilians, and ensure the delivery of aid to the population. Implementation of the mission proved difficult due to its limited size and mandate, failing to provide detailed directives concerning its implementation. UNOSOM I struggled to operate, practically playing no role in resolving the conflict (SHAW, 1995).

UNITAF

As the situation deteriorated with multiple relief convoys being sacked and Somali factions' animosity, the US entered the stage in December 1992, offering to lead a UN mission focusing on humanitarian aid. Through Resolution 794 (1992), the UNSC approved the United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF), also known as 'Operation Restore Hope', a multinational force composed of over 38,000 troops from different countries, replacing UNOSOM I.

However, the UNSC began to push for an expanded mandate, which included state-building measures, rival clans' reconciliation, training a Somali police force and disarming factions (UNSC, 1993). The US, reluctant to get involved in nation-building and confrontation, refused to implement these additional scopes, focusing on securing humanitarian aid, therefore addressing the consequences but not the causes of the conflict (SHAW, 2005). Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst argue that the failure to disarm warlords and militias while blue helmets still held the capacity to do so was one of the colossal flaws of the mission (CLARKE; HERBST, 1997).

In September 1993, the US shifted focus and launched an offensive against warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid's group. Two American Black Hawk Helicopters were shot down and 18 soldiers killed in what came to be known as the 'Black Hawk Down Episode'. This became a symbol of the international interventions' failure in Somalia. Following this, the Battle of Mogadishu was ensued in October, claiming the lives of hundreds of civilians. The mission was formally ended, the US removing its troops and leaving Somalia in a permanent state of war under the warlords' fight (MENKHAUS, 2007).

UNOSOM II

The UN transferred power from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, now operating under the mandate of Resolution 814 (1993) and finally responsible for nation-building programs addressing the economic, political and social structures of the country. Still, the mission once more shifted its focus to an intensive search for General Aidid, compromising neutrality and making targets of the troops. Aidid was not captured and security for humanitarian aid decreased, cultivating the resentment amongst the Somalis, further hindering the mission. There were also few diplomatic accomplishments, since clan leaders did not have many

opportunities to negotiate due to UN troops being too busy hunting down Aidid (SHAW, 1995).

UNOSOM II ended its mandate in March 1995, leaving the country without having solved root causes of the conflict or Somalia's inability to address those causes itself (SMITH, 2012). In addition, foreign troops under UN command were accused of having committed plenty of violations of human rights and humanitarian law (COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 1994). Leaving humiliated, neither the US nor the UN saw fit to spend additional efforts in Somalia, bequeathing external interventions to be primarily led by regional actors, notably the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) (HERSI, 2018).

4.2.2 AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active mission deployed by the African Union (AU) through a United Nations (UN) approved mandate. AMISOM was created on 19 January 2007, with an initial six-month mandate. The mission was first deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007 and focused on the protection of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in the capital for the stabilization campaign throughout central-south territory. Since then, AMISOM has expanded and strengthened its operations and mandates (FEJERSOV et al, 2017).

AMISOM started with approximately 1,600 soldiers coming from the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF). Nowadays, AMISOM has a broad Military Component, with more than 22,000 troops from five countries – Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti – and 400 police officers. However, the counter-insurgency doctrine affirms that at least 47,000 troops would be necessary to combat Al-Shabaab successfully in Somalia (FEJERSOV et al, 2017).

The purpose of the mission is to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and to try to stabilize the situation of the country, creating conditions necessary for the conduct of humanitarian activities. Headed by the AMISOM force commander, the Component also provides protection to the country's Federal Institutions on their functions and helps secure Somalia's infrastructure, including its airports and seaports (FEJERSOV et al, 2017).

The UNSC Resolution UNSCR S/RES/2372 (2017) determined strategic objectives to be followed by AMISOM:

Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia; reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia (UNSC, 2017, p. 2).

Under the same Resolution, AMISOM is authorized to carry out some priority tasks, such as conducting targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and assisting the Somali security force on protecting the Somali authorities and population¹¹ (UNSC, 2017). After more than a decade, AMISOM has, in fact, been able to approach a concrete possibility of conquering peace; nonetheless, there are still many issues to be solved by the African Union Mission, with the support of its most important partner, the Somali National Army (SNA) (WILLIAMS, 2016).

4.2.3 UNSOM

In 2012, the FGS requested the UN to reorganize itself in a form that could offer the former “one door to knock on”, facilitating their exchanges. Established in June 2013 by Resolution 2102, The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) aims to support the FGS on the process of peace-building and State-building. More specifically, it seeks to facilitate governance, develop justice and security institutions, advocate for human rights and coordinate international assistance (UNSOM, 2013). It is a political mission that serves as a focus of integration to all UN activities in Somalia, prompting them to work in tandem, and in cooperation with AMISOM, to achieve better results.

Nonetheless, concerns were raised about the impact UNSOM would have on humanitarian action, especially when the mission was first established. Although one of its mandated functions is the protection of human rights, it is debated if the political nature of the

¹¹ To verify all the tasks established by the UN Security Council, see United Nations Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017).

mission may lead to the politicization of the humanitarian action, making the Somali people affected believe it to be biased and less reliable, which disintegrates the confidence they once held for such aid (GUTERRES, 2017). Furthermore, it is argued UNSOM's cooperation with AMISOM limits the action of humanitarian organizations, as they are now unable to negotiate with Al-Shabaab to gain access to certain areas in order to offer aid (ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM, 2015).

4.3 Political and administrative structure

The Federal Republic of Somalia is, according to its 2012 provisional Constitution, a semi-presidential parliamentary Republic, with the federal president acting as its head of State and the Prime Minister as its head of the executive branch of the government. It is a confessional State, due to its recognition of Islam as its sole religion and the prohibition of practices against its principles; and one should also note the Constitution positions the Holy *Quran*¹², the *Sunnah*¹³ and *Shari'ah* Law¹⁴ above itself, even if Article 11 (3) establishes the prohibition of discrimination by the State regarding age, race, color, tribe, ethnicity, culture, dialect, gender, birth, disability, religion, political opinion, occupation or wealth (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA, 2012).

As stated in Article 48, there are two levels of government in Somalia, which are the Federal Government Level and the Federal Member States Level. As of 2019, the Federal Member States of Somalia are Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, South West State of Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, with the latter two comprising a series of undetermined issues (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA, 2012), which will be addressed accordingly.

4.3.1 Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)

¹² The Quran, from the Arabic equivalent "the revelation", is the sacred book for Islam, believed to be a revelation by the religion's monotheistic figure revealed by prophet Muhammed over a period of 23 years which culminated in the latter's passing in 632. The Quran is viewed by Islam as a book of guidance for mankind and also contains detailed descriptions of historical passages (HUGHES, 1995).

¹³ According to Hugues (1995, p. 622), the term refers to the customs or manners of life usually associated with the traditions pertaining the prophet Muhammed and what he did, what he enjoined or what was done or said in his presence, not being prohibited by him. In general, the Sunnah refers to the traditional law enforced in Islamic communities not directly based on the Quran (HUGUES, 1995).

¹⁴ By Hughes' (1995, 572) definition, means "the law [system], including both the teaching of the Qu'ran and of the traditional sayings of Muhammad".

The Federal Government of Somalia is the constitutional entity responsible for all matters regarding the country as a federal union (FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA, 2012). It was formed in 2012, as the successor for the Transitional Federal Government that followed the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic, and is the sole entity internationally recognized as responsible for the Somali State, being the representative of Somalia in the United Nations and all other international organizations the country is a part of (FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA, 2012).

On the other hand, while the Constitution states its legitimacy over all branches of government, reality shows it struggles with even basic state functions such as providing peace and security to its citizens. Currently, the FGS controls about half the territory in Somalia, mainly due to the presence of non-state armed groups and the declarations of independence and autonomy of the regions of Somaliland and Puntland (DAHL, 2017).

4.3.2 The territory of Somaliland

The territory of Somaliland is, on all matters concerning the Somali Constitution, one of its Federal Member States, even though it has unilaterally declared its independence in 1991¹⁵, confirmed by a referendum in 2001. However, its independence is yet to be recognized by any other country or international organization, even though the self-proclaimed territory maintains informal ties with foreign governments. Otherwise, Somaliland remains a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) since 2004 (UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANIZATION, 2017)¹⁶.

If the criteria for statehood defined by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, 1933)¹⁷ were to be applicable, one might notice they are arguably fulfilled by Somaliland. It does


¹⁵ Article 49 of the Somali Constitution states the Federal Member States of the Federal Republic of Somalia are the ones existing prior to 1991, in order to maintain sovereignty over Somaliland territory (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA, 2012).

¹⁶ According to itself, the UNPO consists of an international nonviolent and democratic membership organization composed by indigenous peoples, minorities, unrecognized states and occupied territories joined together to defend their political, social and cultural rights and promote their right to self-determination. (UNREPRESENTED..., 2014).

¹⁷ Ratified by 16 States, namely Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United States of America and Venezuela.

have a defined territory, albeit the region of Sanaag is disputed with the Puntland State of Somalia; it has an approximate permanent population of 3,500 thousand citizens (UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND; FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA, 2014); it has a functioning government, complete with an approved Constitution, national symbols and democratically elected authorities on all levels; and maintains formal and informal relations with a number of other African States, as well as the U.K., the U.S. and the UN (INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 2006).

Image 4 – Somaliland Protectorate boundaries in 1948.



Source: Rick J. Davis, compiled and drawn by the Directorate of Colonial Surveys (2014).

The will for independence stems from the historical ties to the previous protectorate of British Somaliland, with whom modern-day Somaliland shares roughly the same borders. After British influence in Africa started fading in the mid-1950s, the protectorate managed to gain independence on 26 June 1960, staying as such for only six days, when it merged with Italian Somalia to become one of the constituents for the Somali Republic in 1960. A referendum to ratify this union took place in 1961, and, even though more than 60% of Somaliland's voters opposed the idea of merging with its Italian counterpart, the latter's greater population managed to approve the measure (INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, 2001).

Thirty years of political unrest later, due to dictator Barre's grip in Northern Somalia and the war with Ethiopia, complete with a grave refugee crisis, an independence movement in 1988 led by the Somali National Movement (SNM) plunged the region into a civil war against the Federal government. Such event, called by some as the "Hargeisa holocaust" (INGIRIIS, 2016), was later recognized by the United Nations, in 2001, as the occurrence of the crime of genocide against the Isaaq people of Somaliland between 1987 and 1989. The unrest only saw an end when the SNM, along with Ethiopian guerrilla groups, managed to overthrow the government and force Barre into exile, leaving Mogadishu in anarchy (LACEY, 2005).

After brief moments of peace and ceasefires following the independence referendum in 1991, one may consider that lasting peace was only achieved in the Hargeisa Peace Accord, in February 1997. Since this event, clans and warlords in Somaliland agreed upon the cessation of all hostilities and military demobilization, an interim constitution for a transition period of three years, the reelection of President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and an accommodation of Somaliland's minority clans with increased representation in the Somaliland House of Parliament (INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, 2001).

According to Jhazbhay (2009, p. 19), "Since the conference, Somaliland has experienced a period of uninterrupted security, which has facilitated its continuing constitutional, political and socio-economic development". This newfound peace paved the way for foreign investors to explore Somaliland gas and oil reserves, signaling interest in its coastal regions and offshore leases in the Gulf of Aden (JHAZBHAY, 2009).

Nowadays, Somaliland maintains relatively stable political conditions, with well-defined branches of government, including a functioning Presidency and Cabinet of Ministers, a bicameral Parliament and a judicial system complete with a Supreme Court, district and regional courts and regional appeal courts (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA, 2012). However, rule of law is a sensitive matter in the breakaway region.

Three different legal systems are applicable to solving disputes between Somalilanders: the formal law, enforced by the *de facto* sovereign nation's courts; the customary law, involving elders representing clans from either party; and the *Shari'ah* Law, through committees made up of Islamic scholars, with only the formal and customary law's verdicts being legally binding (JEFFREY, 2016). Also, despite its intentions to distance itself

from the Federal Government of Somalia, Somaliland still applies the 1962 Somali Penal Code.

4.3.3 Puntland State of Somalia

The Puntland State of Somalia is, according to the country's Constitution, one of the composing bodies of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA, 2012), internationally recognized as an autonomous region due to its 1998 declaration of autonomy. It does not aspire its independency, instead seeking union within the Somali borders, while also keeping its autonomy; as such, Puntland rejects Somaliland's will for becoming an independent State (VENUGOPALAN, 2017).

Notably, Puntland has had its share of disputes with Somaliland, regarding the latter's proposed dominance of the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn provinces, collectively known as the Khatumo State, which serves as a buffer zone between the breakaway region and Puntland, and also as the center of conflicts between the two parties and itself, since the Khatumo State's leaders declared its autonomy in 2012. In this controversy, Puntland claims territorial sovereignty over Sool and Sanaag in Article 3 (1) of its 2012 Constitution (PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA, 2012).

Puntland was a part of the historical Italian Somaliland (VENUGOPALAN, 2017) and, since the 1991 collapse of the Somali government, has seen notable economic growth due to its ports in the Gulf of Aden (PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA, 2017). Recently, Puntland went through a democratization process, in which its population aspire to elect their representatives in multi-party elections, however, such election system is overdue (GAROWE ONLINE, 2018).


4.3.4 Non-state armed groups

Due to Barre's fall and the overall collapse of the Somali government in 1991, Islamic courts based on the *Shari'ah* Law were the region's main judicial system, which had seen great support by the almost entirely Muslim country. Based on the lack of state presence, the judges also engaged in providing the population with other services, such as regular policing and education, in attempt to make sense of the newfound anarchy. The courts soon united to

cooperate with each other, and their supporters congregated to create an armed militia, the ICU, to defend the courts' interests and to take control over activities in Southern Somalia, lasting until 2006 (ADAMU, 2009).

The Union's demise also gave birth to insurgent militant groups such as Al-Shabaab and the Hizbul Islam. The Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, whose name translates to "Movement of Striving Youth" in Arabic is also called solely Al-Shabaab, "the Youth". Dedicated to overthrow the Somali government in its quest against the "enemies of Islam", the group quickly managed to seize major rural areas in the country and to defeat the TFG, presided by former ICU ally, Sheikh Ahmed, in cities such as Baidoa and the capital, Mogadishu. The group is often associated with jihadist organization Al-Qaida in its global agenda, and is also considered a terrorist organization by several Western governments, as well as the U.A.E.'s (ADAMU, 2009).

Image 5 – Political Situation in Somalia in April, 2017, highlighting the presence of Al-Shabaab.



Source: James Dahl (2017)

Since its establishment, the group has occupied regions in Southern Somalia, particularly in the Jubaland and South West States of Somalia, in order to weaken the already fragile grips of power in the country, with the mission of destabilizing and winning control over the Somali government. According to Kampere (2012, n.p.),

Al Shabaab spends most of its money on four things: providing social services to its members (including paying salaries to foreign fighters); fighting to overthrow Somalia's Transitional Government and to expel Ethiopian troops from Somali territory; waging a violent campaign against nonbelievers (jihad), which includes recruiting and training fighters and buying weapons and equipment; and preaching extremism (KAMPERE, 2012)

Nowadays, the group remains active, as it took responsibility for the 2017 suicide bombing in Mogadishu, which killed over 600 people, and took control over the strategical city of Bosaso in the Puntland region on 28 July 2018 (BURKE, 2017). Despite the jihadist group having lost control of the cities – it was forced out of the capital in August 2011 — Al-Shabaab is still in control of rural areas (VENUGOPALAN, 2017). Its financial resources come from illegal charcoal and sugar trades, ransoms from kidnappings, appropriation of humanitarian aid resources and other forms (VENUGOPALAN, 2017).

According to Hussein Sheikh-Ali (2018), former national security and counter-terrorism adviser to the government of Somalia and creator of the Al-Shabaab defectors' program, in order to defeat Al-Shabaab, the group should be listened to, as it is highly organized and has punctual demands. In his words, Al-Shabaab rejects the current constitutional order established in Somalia and fights for the expulsion of foreign troops in the country, both also being provisions envisioned by president Mohamed "Farmaajo" Mohamed. Finally, the openness for conciliation is, historically, a valuable asset Somalia must be proud of. To the former adviser, reconciliation and dialogue with the group's leaders is possible and recommended to achieve lasting peace (SHEIKH-ALI, 2018).

4.4 The Gulf of Aden and the East Coast of Somalia

Economic importance, threats to international security and the precarious situation of Somalia make this region extremely important in current days. The main aspects of this topic are going to be detailed below.

4.4.1 The Gulf of Aden

Image 6 — The Gulf's location.



Source: Google Maps (edited).

The Gulf of Aden is a deepwater basin in the Indian Ocean, specifically located between the south coast of Yemen, in the Arabian Peninsula, and the north coast of Somalia and Djibouti, in Africa. It forms a natural sea link between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. It has this name due to the city of Aden, located in Yemen, which was an important city in the colonial era (ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 2019).


Since ancient times, it has been used for fishing, trading and transportation. During the colonial era, because of its privileged position – located on the great Mediterranean Sea-Indian Ocean trade Route –, the Gulf was a strategic waterway searched by Portugal, the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain (ESA, 2006).

Nowadays, it is still important for the local people and for the international trade, having three important ports: Aden (Yemen), Berbera and Bosaso (Somalia). Due to the hot temperature of the water, the rich fauna and the low level of pollution (even though it is increasing), the Gulf is an excellent point for fishing (ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 2019).

4.4.2 Economic importance of the region

Considering that 80% of the world's trade is transported by the water (OLIVEIRA, 2009), the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia are extremely important for the global economy, due to their privileged location, as it can be seen in the map below, which shows strategic trade points around the region:

Image 7 – The Horn of Africa, surrounding waters, and key locations.



Source: Congressional Cartography Program, Library of Congress, adapted by CRS Graphics.

This region is highly relevant for shipping because it connects the oil producing countries of the Middle East with the rest of the world through the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal and contributes to navigation in the Indian Ocean (FACTBOX, 2009).

Per year, nearly 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden, transporting oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America, corresponding to 22% of worldwide shipping and 12% of worldwide oil shipping. Considering only the oil impact, it is important to highlight that around 30% of Europe's oil goes through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea (FACTBOX, 2009).

Besides the oil factor, the Gulf and Suez Canal are the main trade routes for dry commodities and containerized cargo between Asia, Europe and the Americas, along with large quantities of liquefied natural gas exports from Qatar and Algeria directed to consumers in the West and in Asia. The alternative route, round South Africa's Cape of Good Hope, would add three weeks or more from a typical route (FACTBOX, 2009).

4.4.3 Piracy

After the fall of president Barre in 1991, the absence of a central government has conducted to a situation in which the coastguard was nonexistent. As a result, the Somali coast has become a “no man's land”, attracting fishing fleets from all over the world, searching for the natural resources in this area. The illegal occupation of foreign fleets was catastrophic for the local fishermen. It is estimated to have contributed to a reduction of around 30% in catch potential and an estimated \$300 million worth of seafood was stolen from the country's coastline each year (THAROOR, 2009). Beyond that, these ships destroyed the equipment of the local fishermen, attacked Somali vessels and polluted the water (OLIVEIRA, 2009).

Unprotected by the State, the local fishermen started to patrol the coast and defend their territory themselves. At the beginning, they used to hijack ships and demand a ransom, an elementary strategy to frighten foreign fleets. However, those attacks began to catch the attention of Somali warlords, as they were interested in the profitability of these ransoms. Soon, such leaders began to finance these attacks, which no longer solely targeted fishing fleets, and came to be more sophisticated (OLIVEIRA, 2009).

The pirates are often well equipped, with highly developed electronic equipment. Once the ship is hijacked, the pirates don't usually steal the cargo, as they are more interested in using the watercraft as a mothership or holding it for ransom (WORLD BANK, 2013).

Data on piracy impact is outdated, mainly because this problem has been significantly reduced over the years. In 2013, the World Bank estimated that the loss on volume of international trade damaged by Somali pirates was about 7.4%, including in that number a variety of trade costs, such as direct shipping costs, insurance, private security, rerouting to other sea routes, air shipping and others. Considering the amount of trade in the world, piracy cost the global economy an estimated 18 billion dollars per year. Considering only the cost of

rerouting, it is estimated that if one-third of the Far-East European cargo routes were diverted via the Cape of Good Hope, it would trigger 7.5 billion dollars extra in expenses worldwide (WORLD BANK, 2013).

Piracy does not only disturb international trade; tourism and fishing are also affected. The same report from the World Bank has shown that tourists from North America and Europe, who are the ones that contribute the most to tourism in the region, have decreased their visits by 18.6%. From East Asia and the Pacific, there was a reduction of 39.1%. Analyzing the impact on fishing, since Somali pirates became active, the annual tuna catch dropped by 26.8% in the Western part of the Indian Ocean (where the attacks happen) relative to the Eastern part, and annual fisheries exports fell by 23.8% (WORLD BANK, 2013).

Finally, piracy also affects the arrival of humanitarian help. About 93% of aid supplies comes from the sea, passing through the Gulf of Aden. The necessity to escort the vessels that grant provisions is also a problem that makes the cost of help far more expensive (PEDRA, 2012).

Since 2008, several international bodies and various countries have been interfering on the situation of Somali piracy, such as EU NAVFOR ((EUNAVFOR, 2018), NATO (NATO, 2016). and Combined Task Force 151 (COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, 2016). The Security Council has also contributed to solve the situation.


It has turned into the main legislative body against piracy in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, creating resolutions against it. The main ones are numbers 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851 (2008) and 1897 (2009), all of which encourage States to conduct anti-piracy naval operations (OLIVEIRA, 2009). It is worth to speak about Resolution 1851, which led to the creation of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), a community of approximately 80 countries and international organizations which coordinate political and military efforts addressing the problem (S/RES/1851); and Resolution 1816, that allowed naval forces to enter Somali waters in order to deter and disrupt piracy for a period of six months, later extended for a further year (S/RES/1816).

4.4.4 Current situation

Ten years prior, the East coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden were considered the hub of international piracy. It was not occasional that in 2008, for the first time since the

Second World War, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council deployed forces together to control and expel piracy off the region. After anti-piracy measures led by international organizations (topic 3.4) and countries like Russia, China and India, combined with the introduction of armed guards, barbed wire and evasive-maneuver training on merchant ships, piracy in this region has severely decreased over the years (ECONOMIST, 2018). It can be observed in the graphic below how it reached its peak in 2012 and, since then, the number of attacks has reduced.

Image 8 – Somali pirate attacks 2008-2018.



Source: European Naval Force (2018).

However, the number increased slightly in 2017, due to the reduction of vessel vigilance in the area. According to a report given in the beginning of 2018 from the NGO Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP), the activity is spreading and evolving (MONKS, 2018). The situation is not entirely solved and, given the economic importance of the region and the impact that piracy caused in the beginning of this decade, international efforts are still necessary.

4.5 Humanitarian crisis

Difficulties in maintaining a stable governance due to a history of civil war, terrorist threats and domination by military organizations, once added to common droughts since the 1970s, made Somalia an environment of large humanitarian needs. The traditionally unsafe

groups, like children and women, perceive the situation from an even more problematic standpoint. In the last decade, the country and the international community have engaged in more actions towards the conquering of stable human rights. Measures such as the facilitated interaction with the issue in 2011 by the OHCHR and the creation of action plans regarding the most vulnerable were established, but the humanitarian crisis is still prevalent.

4.5.1 Drought, famine and terrorist groups

Although Somalia has always been characterized by recurrent droughts, the past year was unusual: unlike in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (UNOCHA, 2016), when the groups located in high risk areas suffered from the El Niño and its drying consequences, the period from March to June of 2018 brought an unexpectedly above average rainfall caused by the Gu Season¹⁸ (FSNAU, 2018).

The rain, before its occurrence, was actually a source of hope for most communities, since it was expected to help the widespread famine caused by the severe aridity. However, even though the drought was temporarily alleviated by it, the Gu season caused floods that led to an increase on vulnerability in the areas of Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle and its southwestern surroundings, harming around 830,000 people (UNOCHA, 2018)¹⁹.

When the surprising impact of the climate change took over Somalia, the country already had an alarming famine situation as a result of the long dry cycles and the consequent death of most of the livestock and the harsh conditions to practice agriculture (FAO, 2017). Once the abrupt flooding took place, the people in the affected areas had to face displacements, a situation which was responsible for even larger malnutrition problems, since trades were now harder to be made, jobs were lost, and grains deteriorated in the inundation. The famine percentage was only decreased – it dropped 22%, going from 3.3 million to 2.5 million people in famine – due to the increased efforts in humanitarian assistance, from international and Somali authorities, but 5.4 million people still need life-saving support (UNOCHA, 2018).

In May 2018, the Cyclone Sagar affected northwestern Somalia, causing the destruction of farms and a number of evictions notably higher than the ones that happened in

¹⁸ The word Gu is used as a synonym to rainy periods.

¹⁹ More data around the topic can be seen in the Humanitarian Response Plan released in 2018 by The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).


the previous year²⁰. With these conditions, there was a rise of vulnerability in shelters, which were now even more controlled by local landlords and had a higher level of insecurity, felt particularly by vulnerable groups (UNOCHA, 2018).

Informal settlements and infrastructural problems, once added to the climate chaos, aggravated the number of cases of cholera, measles and AWD (Acute Watery Diarrhea) that appeared strongly since the scenario featured a shortage of healthcare and a lack of safe water (UNOCHA, 2018). The large number of persons shifting their localities and the overcrowding of habitations also played a huge part in the dissemination, along with the food insecurity factor²¹, still prevalent, and the concerning malnutrition problem, since Somalia is one of the top ten countries in its occurrence – 13.8% in the Global Acute Malnutrition rate, measured amongst children under 5 years old (UNOCHA, 2018). The challenges around the undernourishment issue involve the fact that people lost the means to produce and afford their own food (FAO, 2017). These obstacles grow even bigger because of the conflicts generated by rivalry in the communities, local tensions and influence of the terrorist agenda, which disturbs nutrition and welfare (UNOCHA, 2017).

Image 9 – An overview on the displacement and food security issues by area.

²⁰ There are currently 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), a number almost one million higher than the one measured in 2017 (UNOCHA, 2018).

²¹ In the Hirshabelle area, for example, there are 86000 people who are food insecure, as stated by the UNOCHA Humanitarian Response Plan (UNOCHA, 2018).



Source: UNOCHA (2018).

Aside from the complications around nourishment, the consequences of terrorism in the area are many and mainly target the most vulnerable circles. Since Al-Shabaab's recapture of control, there have been numerous attacks (INSTITUTE FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY, 2018). For example, Mogadishu was the target of a suicide attack on 14 October 2017, followed by a series of other deadly actions that took place in that very year. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)²² has also demonstrated intentions of creating ties with the country, positioning a small number of their fighters in Somalia in the hunt for non-believers.

²² The group's official name translates to The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Albeit *al-Sham* has no direct translation in English, it refers to the Great Syria area, hence the organization being best known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). However, the area overlaps into a few countries targeted by the group, namely Jordan, Palestine, Turkey, Cyprus, Israel and Syria itself. Therefore, the most accurate acronym stands as ISIL, since it means the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Additionally, many, specially Westerns such as the French and the English, choose to call it *Da'esh* — an Arabic acronym itself — intending to make it phonetically unpleasant and offensive, sounding similar to a derogatory Arabic term (HOGEBACK, [2015]).

Their violations include the capture of Qandala in 2016, aiming to turn the town into the new Islamic Caliphate but being pushed out soon after, and the following episodes of gun attacks and suicide bombings (INSTITUTE FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY, 2018).

Despite the frequent military actions aiming to destroy the terrorist group, the humanitarian measures taken by the government had a larger focus on the campaigns directed towards blood donation to the wounded and national mourning. However, the groups of higher vulnerability, such as women, children, disabled people and the LGBTQ+ community suffer from the rigidity and intimidation of terrorism on a different level. To exemplify: in the case of the LGBTQ+ community, there is a specific outlaw of homosexuality.²³ In the areas under the influence of Al-Shabaab, the strict interpretation of the *Shari'ah* Law has been reported to be used in order to punish people, and the lack of any protection laws to the non-heterocisnormative²⁴ habitants has been the cause of fear and depart from their native country (CHRISTMAN, 2016). The fact that the extra vulnerability of marginalized communities is a taboo topic in conservative cultures hides the additional obstacles faced by them when confronting the effects of starvation and violence.

4.5.2 Children: armed conflicts vs education

The situation of children in Somalia is increasingly difficult due to the unbearable conditions of hunger, deficient healthcare, warfare and the lack of a proper education. Since the past few years held an alarming amount of child casualties in the country²⁵ (UNOCHA, 2017), the fact that over 2 million infants face food insecurity and that the number of displaced children in consequence of the natural calamities has almost reached 700,000 should be enormous red flags for the necessity of protection of youngest (FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, 2018). The difficult accessibility to aid and vaccination, combined with the dirty water resources and malnourishment, makes their survival a challenge.

²³A law from the Somalia Penal Code of 1962 punishes homosexuality with imprisonment for 3 months to 3 years. (CHRISTMAN, 2016)

²⁴ A societal concept that views heterosexuality and cisgenderism as the expected and regular behaviors (WORTHEN, 2016).

²⁵ In 2011 famine was the responsible for the deaths of a quarter million people in Somalia, and half of those were children (UNOCHA, 2017).

Even if a child is able to endure the tough conditions, their basic needs are still not met properly, with only 30% of the youth having access to schools (UNICEF, 2015). Since one out of every 5 children²⁶ is displaced, the insecurity and imbalance of the settlements make it hard also for school-aged persons who are geographically closer to educational establishments to be able to attend classes. In addition, there is the issue around the quality of the lectures that are offered²⁷, with notable difficulties in the students' reading skills, for example (USAID, 2017). Furthermore, there is the insufficiency in teacher incentives, since the governmental capacity of supporting their salaries is faulty, along with the substantial insecurity in the areas resulted in the closing of primary schools and the even bigger vacuum in the learning system (UNOCHA, 2018).

The main reason why institutions have a hard time maintaining their safe conditions is the constant terrorist threat. The topic increases the challenges for girls, who, aside all other sorts of abuse, are also recruited to be in armed groups, suffocating their chances of an extensive education. Boys, who are recruited as well, have too been reported to be the victims of sexual abuse in the conflicts (BENNOUNA, 2018). The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, in its 2012 action plans, set the goal to end children's recruitment and assassination in the country, but the situation remains problematic (OHCHR, 2018).

In 2013, 54 attacks in schools were registered (UNITED NATIONS, 2014) and Al-Shabaab claims to be the author of most of these. Threats and destruction of school buildings were made in the past few years, since these facilities are considered easy targets. The academies, even though are protected by humanitarian law, were spots for aggression because of the political agenda, business advancement and military plans, with attacks being also held by clans, militias, national armed forces and other groups. Another problem is that a lot of the cases are not even reported: the state of fear promoted by terrorist groups in the area is responsible for this behavior, causing omission of certain events in order to avoid retaliation (BENNOUNA, 2018).

Aside from the physical struggles to which children are submitted, there is evidence of the immeasurable psychological trauma brought to kids involved in armed conflicts. The loss of friends and family has to be taken into account when analyzing the challenges of creating a

²⁶ Out of a 4.7 million children who are school-aged, only 972,000 have access to education (USAID, 2017).

²⁷ When asked to read a passage, almost half of the students who participated in a sample executed by the Early Grade Reading Assessment could not identify words (USAID, 2017).

stable schooling structure. Many children witnessed their loved ones being abused, tortured or raped - or even underwent it themselves. As a result, it is common for the infants to experience trouble sleeping, high levels of anxiety, depression and, in consequence, end up having problems concentrating in class, which adds to the battle for a solid educational system (MACHEL, 1996).

4.5.3 Women in Somalia

Just like other vulnerable groups in the country, the Somali women experience the chaotic situation from a different perspective. As children, although the upbringing in a conflicted country is severe for all genders, girls face challenges not present in their male peers' lives. Gender plays a massive role in classrooms, for example, with 90% of the teachers being male, a percentage which is intimidating for girls who are being raised in an atmosphere of abuse (USAID, 2017). The common rapes and forbiddance of access to schools are present in the childhood of Somali women, making the country the fourth highest in The Gender Inequality Index in 2015²⁸ (UNDP, 2015). These difficulties are shown when comparing the literacy amongst adult females and males²⁹ or even in the menial jobs women end up taking, when compared to the ones men usually exert (UNDP, 2015).

Childhood is cut short, with sexual violence, harassment, abuse and gang rapes as regular events and with practices which scar women for the rest of their lives. The genital mutilation is a procedure that has appeared throughout most of the country's history. Common amongst girls between 4 and 11 years old (UNDP, 2015), the practice, executed to prepare a girl for adulthood and banish pleasure from eventual intercourse, carries a huge mortality risk by itself³⁰, and it shows its consequences as a lifelong problem (FORD, 2001).

Adolescence is unlived, with early marriages arranged for girls, and 45% of the young adult females aged 20 to 24 having had their matrimony before reaching the age of eighteen (UNDP, 2015). Once pregnant, the young Somali women must face the outcome of the genital cutting and the overall deficient medical facilities, since there is a higher risk of death during childbirth if the clitoris and other areas were previously cut. The poor healthcare system has

²⁸ The Gender Inequality Index in Somalia is 0.776 (the maximum in the scale is 1), which places the country in the fourth highest position in the world (UNDP, 2015).

²⁹ The literacy for adult women is 26%, whilst men show a percentage of 36% (UNDP, 2015).

³⁰ 39% of women suffer immediate consequences from the procedure (FORD, 2001).

special consequences for girls also because of the set of needs to be met before labor, like the control over famine to prevent health failure during and after breastfeeding, for example (WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2018).

The efforts to minimize the suffering of women existed in the past, but the conflicted environment unsettled them. One example of this is that, before the collapse in 1991, Siad Barre's government gave support to end the genital mutilation and improve the general well-being of women, but since then, the conflicts and the terrorist influences played a big part in not letting these painful traditions fade overtime (UNDP, 2015). In 2013, the Ministry of Women and Human Rights was created and, in the following year, action plans regarding the ending of sexual violence during conflicts were established, but the fight against the consequences of inequality is still constant and much needed (OHCHR, 2018).

When it comes to terrorism, the gender stereotypes are used as a weapon for armed groups as they exploit the non-threatening image of women for discretion in their criminal activities. Gender roles are constantly being reassured, even outside armed groups, since women are traditionally excluded from decision-making in formal and informal arrangements. Gender inequality, just like the LGBTQ issues, is a taboo topic in the country, resulting in the appliance of customary law, making most of the violence against women go unpunished. Most of the decisions come from clan systems to which women cannot be associated with in the same way males are. In the Diya group, a traditional clan in the country, the custom established is to receive or pay money or blood compensations, and women are never associated with it as paying members, nor get the capital men do (UNDP, 2015).

During President Siad Barre's government, women were encouraged to take on leadership positions, but, soon after, their capabilities were once again undermined. The rigid interpretation of the *Shari'ah* Law in the areas of Al-Shabaab's dominance is mostly responsible for the forced usage of the veil and prohibition of female citizens from doing regular activities without the company of a male relative. The mixture of tradition, lawlessness, terrorist influence and unsatisfying health system makes the experience of women in Somalia far from equal to men. The challenges faced by the country reflect on their lives and highlight a history of prejudice and discrimination (THE RESEARCH COUNCIL OF NORWAY, 2017).

5 TOPIC B - THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY CAUSED BY TERRORIST ACTS IN WEST AFRICA AND SAHEL

The rise of terrorism is one of the foremost worldwide concerns, so it stands to reason that its manifestation in the regions of West Africa and Sahel is a call to action to all of those who seek to eliminate this growing threat. In order to unwind some of the main points of this complexity, the ensuing topics will first analyze the roots of the current understanding of terrorism, how and which terrorist groups operate in the region and what action is being taken to fight them.

5.1 Peace, security and terrorism in the UN

Even though mainstream opinions have only been focused on the word “terrorism” since the hijacking of 4 passenger planes in American flight zones and the subsequent crashing in New York City, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001, the word’s meaning is not an entirely new concept to the UN. The first time terrorism appeared as a term in an official UN document was in 1966 (UNITED NATIONS, 1966). In that same year, a sequence of violent manifestations took place in the regions of the State of Israel and the territory considered as Palestinian (ISRAEL, [201-])³¹, along with the hijacking of an Argentinian aircraft as a form of protest against British presence in the Falkland Islands.

As such, the General Assembly (UNGA) would include the unlawful coercion of a State by forceful means as a violation of sovereignty in its formal Agenda, resulting in the approval by consensus of UNGA Resolution 2225 (XXI), which categorically considers terrorism (albeit without a proper definition) as an indirect form of intervention in another State (UNITED NATIONS, 1966). In its terms, the aforementioned Resolution calls upon all States to

[...] carry out faithfully their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the

³¹ It is worth mentioning that, in the following year, Arab countries and Israel would engage in the Six-Day War, from 5-10 June 1967.

Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty [UNGA Resolution A/RES/20/2131, 21 December 1965] and to urge them to refrain from armed intervention or the promotion or organization of subversion, terrorism or other indirect forms of intervention for the purpose of changing by violence the existing system in another State or interfering in civil strife in another State. (UNITED NATIONS, 1966).

Afterwards, the UNGA would only lay upon the term again in 1973, when Resolution 3034 (XXVII)³² brought specific tackling of the matter, creating an *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism, made up of 35 member States. It had the purpose of considering member States' submitted proposals for finding an effective solution to terrorism, in order to submit its own report with recommendations about the problem (UNITED NATIONS, 1973).

Such recommendations were compiled and subsequently accepted by the UNGA, which in turn approved Resolution 34/145, containing practical measures of international cooperation for tackling the problem (UNITED NATIONS, 1980). As one may note, these suggestions, while commendable, have not provided such elimination as of yet. Worth noting is also the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annex to UNGA Resolution 49/60, which is a precursor to the modern understanding of terrorism and contains linguistic nuclei on the matter and forms concrete evidence of active trial to act on the topic (UNITED NATIONS, 1994).

However, even though the solutions adopted by the UNGA have yet to reach their goal, those steps can be appointed as the first efforts taken by the UN as a whole, to combat international terrorism. Since then, Resolutions adjusted the measures previously stated in order to better decide upon current threats.

It is interesting to note that, after 11 September 2001, there was an increase in the numbers of resolutions or decisions made which contained the word "terrorism" and, evidently, had the burden of following the American tragedy and the increasing public perception on the alleged inoperativeness of the UN.

Since the event, UN bodies, especially the UNSC, have turned to trying to reach a tentative and up-to-date definition of terrorism, as previous resolutions were non-binding and

³² The Resolution contained measures to prevent international terrorism, responsible for endangering or taking innocent human lives or jeopardizing fundamental freedoms and study the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence, which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes.

focused solely on specific acts within the frame of terrorism. Eventually, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1566 (2004), which, among others, managed to consensually define terrorism as

3. [...] criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature [...]. (UNITED NATIONS, 2004)

The Secretary General established in 2005 the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), comprised of 38 international entities, in order to better coordinate actions within the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which was subsequently adopted (UNITED NATIONS, 2019b). As recently as 2018, the CTITF was replaced by the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Compact, with its newly allocated seat in the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNITED NATIONS, 2019b).

In June 2018, the UN hosted the first High-Level Conference on Counter-Terrorism to address contemporary matters since the conversion of the UN CTITF to the Coordination Compact (UNITED NATIONS, 2018a). It joined the efforts of 159 member States and a myriad of intergovernmental organizations, specialized agencies, civil society and non-governmental organizations, UN Secretariat or UN agencies, funds and programmes. Secretary-General António Guterres outlined as his six goals for the conference

1. Strengthening international counterterrorism cooperation;
2. A renewed and sustained focus on preventing terrorism;
3. Underlining the importance of fully respecting human rights while tackling terrorism;
4. Reinforcing the need to make a strategic investment in young people to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism;
5. Shining a light on the tragic human cost of terrorism; and
6. Strengthening the role of the United Nations to assist Member States in tackling terrorism. (UNITED NATIONS, 2018a)

On a closing note, it is worth glossing over the pillars which set the foundations for the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, as the latter comprises an important institutional mean to coordinate global efforts for counter-terrorism.

5.1.1 UN's Counter-Terrorism Strategy

In 2006, in order to rewrite how the UN would engage in the fight against worldwide terrorism, the UNGA revised its previous resolutions on the matter to better adapt to the way terrorism organizes itself in the 21st century. In its 60th Session, the UNGA adopted by consensus Resolution 60/288 (UNITED NATIONS, 2006), containing a plan of action entitled Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Such Strategy has since been reviewed biannually, with the latest revision being from 26 June 2018 (UNITED NATIONS, 2018).

The Strategy consists of a plan of action composed of four pillars, each representing one of the main directives for sustaining global counter-terrorism efforts led by the UN. The first pillar, “Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism”, is based on pursuing the strengthening of UN presence in peaceful conflict resolution and raising cooperation in fields such as Human Rights and rule of law to support economic and social development (UNITED NATIONS, 2018).

The second pillar, “Preventing and combatting terrorism”, focuses on situations in which the conditions to the spread of terrorism are already established and the measures of the first pillar are not adequate to contain the problem. As such, the measures in this chapter include the apprehension and prosecution of perpetrators of terrorist acts in accordance to national and international law, emphasizing the importance of mutual judicial assistance³³ and extradition agreements. This pillar also highlights the relevance of coordinated work under UN agencies and other international organizations, such as the UNODC and INTERPOL, to create or strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms or centers (UNITED NATIONS, 2018).

The third pillar is called “Building States’ capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations”, and, as the name suggests, focuses on enlarging regional capabilities to prevent and combat terrorism, alongside encouraging specialized UN agencies to contribute,

³³ As a concept, mutual legal assistance refers to the direct cooperation between States’ Judiciary systems in order to better coordinate judicial provisions. By sharing information with less formality necessary than when compared to other traditional means, such as letters rogatory, it permits the speedy resolution of judicial matters which used to prolong themselves in time, due to the transnational nature of the offences (DOLINGER; TIBURCIO, 2017).

within their field of operation, to the efforts led by the Strategy. For instance, the World Health Organization is encouraged to provide technical assistance to States in order to prevent and prepare for biological attacks; the International Civil Aviation Organization, alongside World Customs Organization and International Maritime Organization, are encouraged to identify breaches in States' transport security; and the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are encouraged to help States prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear, chemical or radiological materials, among other activities (UNITED NATIONS, 2018).

The fourth pillar, "Ensuring Human Rights and the rule of law", sees the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. It reaffirms UNGA Resolution 60/158, which provides framework for the "protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism", while also calling all States to develop and maintain an effective rule of law-based national criminal justice system that can bring to justice every individual involved with terrorist acts, with due respect for Human Rights and fundamental freedoms (UNITED NATIONS, 2018).

5.2 An Overview on West Africa: history, conflict and terror

Although sometimes perceived as isolated events, climate change, organized crime and terrorism work together as a catapult for the chaos faced in West Africa. In a place built amongst the disrespect of hegemonic European countries, aridity, hunger and violence play a huge part in the disruption of the region's wellness.

5.2.1 Historical background

The countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo are located in West Africa, and, due to their geographical proximity, share parts of their history of conflict and resistance (FAGE, 2016).

Aside from the physicality of its countries' bonds, the west-African area is also branded as such because of their political and economic common points³⁴ (FAGE, 2016).

Ethnically, their particularities are endless, but there are aspects, like language, that show similarities between the countries, with the main idioms being Afro-asiatic, Niger-Congo and Nilo-Saharan. When it comes to religion, there's a huge effect of Christian and Muslim culture in the area, along with animist and traditional beliefs that resisted the constant foreign interventions in history³⁵ (ANSWERS AFRICA, 2018). There's also the immeasurable importance of the idea of ancestors that protect families or groups, as seen in societies like Côte d'Ivoire, where parallel relatives are believed to have impact in the material world to this day (LONELY PLANET, 2017).

This pattern, of very unique features mixed with connecting traits amidst the lands is followed throughout a lot of those countries' journeys, due to characteristics like similar weather and their colonization by the European. A lot of what is known about Africa by Western culture has to do with general descriptions, but by understanding views not so commonly publicized, it becomes clearer how rich and intricate the continent's traits are (CARREIRA, 2015).

Most of the information about the region's early history comes from Muslim writings, which served to deconstruct the European vision spread by the Western world. In contrary to the image of traditional peoples in Africa lacking any sort of societal development, the writings reveal that there were towns, mature agriculture, markets and monarchical systems. These structures were present long before the presence of the Europeans and even before the arrival of the Arabs, who controlled a lot of the trades which occurred in the area. In the scripts, there are also references to the surging of the kingdom of Ghana, with wealthy constructions, gold mines and large commercial appeal. This, along with other descriptions, goes against the tradition of discrediting Western Africa for its achievements, since a lot of their inventions are wrongfully associated to Egyptian and Caucasian culture by the hegemonic common knowledge (FAGE, 2016).

³⁴ The countries of Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger form what is known as West Africa, following the geographical classification. However, the last three countries are not classified as such when it comes to the political and economic criteria (FAGE, 2016).

³⁵ Sahel and Sahara have a predominance of Muslim culture, while Christianity is found mainly in southern coastal regions. However, there are hundreds of traditional religions in West Africa, some of which are strongly influenced by natural objects, for example (LONELY PLANET).

In the evidences regarding religion, there is much discussion on the topic of how Islam came to be such an important aspect in West Africa. Over ten centuries ago, the kings of Ghana, who already dealt with conflicts between nomadic groups, witnessed their organic involvement with Islamic customs. Slowly, the west of Sudan was converted to Islam and a huge reason for this were the diplomatic and commercial acceptance of the type of lifestyle there maintained. Other empires expanded and rivaled against a lot of the Islamic traditions alongside enlarging the trade market in West Africa (FAGE, 2016)³⁶.

At the same time that this type of activity saw its expansion and its influence in the strengthening of the region, it also attracted Europeans for the appealing trades and offers. Beginning their presence in the area, the Portuguese arrived in the 15th century and used the continent as a stop point before getting to even more lucrative trades in Asia. After the first decades of exploring, the slave trade that shipped Africans to the recently “discovered” America brought on a tradition that would haunt the region for centuries (FAGE, 2016).

The biggest concern amongst the European competitors was the commercial business, as countries such as England and France, fought for the best routes, making their presence extremely expensive and increasing their desire for capturing more people to turn into slaves (WEBSTER, 2016)³⁷. The human trafficking only slowed down around the 18th and 19th centuries, a time also marked by one of the Islamic revolutions in Western Sudan (FAGE, 2016).

The moral reasoning behind the decision to end the intense and lucrative business was the expansion of Protestantism and their campaigns against the trades of human beings, along with the yet unseen ideals following the French revolution. However, the economic and main reason behind the agreement was the necessity of negotiating for more commodities. Even though the slave trade diminished, European countries kept their high influence, with noticeable presence in Sierra Leone (where Great Britain was the main force), “helping” the country develop its liberal ambitions with a clear intention of keeping their dominance. France concentrated efforts in Senegal and, just like its Caucasian neighbors, kept on its influence in order to have access to more natural resources. This rising authority contributed to the fall of African kingdoms, which turned empires like Benin into mere colonies

³⁶ West African empires rose in the epoch of a higher political expansion and empires like the Mali, Songhai, Ancient Ghana and Oyo had great importance (FAGE, 2016).

³⁷ The number of African people imported during the 17th century has been estimated at 1,494,000 (FAGE, 2016).

(BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2019). This was followed by a scramble of the continent between European countries, who divided nations and cultures according to their strictly commercial interests (NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 2013).

Contrary to some countries that suffered from the domination of Europe, the West African lands only conquered their independence in the middle of the 20th century, as consequence of both World Wars and the Great Depression (NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 2013). This, combined with the uprising of African independence movements, gave rise to attempts of cutting ties with the colonial culture. Yet, the legacy of the European vision remained, changing local values and traditions (CARREIRA, 2015).

Another aspect that connects the components is the semiarid climate and poor rainfalls, attributes that add to a lot of the problems faced in the area (U.S GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 2016). Drought is recurrent and has helped to build an atmosphere of hunger, sexual exploitation, transnational organized crime, drug abuse and diseases. Aside from that, problems regarding terrorism and government issues add to the current situation in West Africa (MUGGAH, 2019).


5.2.2 Issues regarding Sahel and Lake Chad

The conflicts involving violence and arbitrariness in Africa have essentially become an element of the common knowledge and some specific areas in the continent feel these issues aggravated by climatic problems that go beyond the population's control. That is the case of the Sahel and Lake Chad, zones where the aridity and the ever-changing conditions add turbulence to an already chaotic environment.

These places show similarities through their arid weather and consequential social struggles. The Sahel, area that comprehends most of West Africa, suffers from low precipitation and deficient agriculture (MUGGAH, 2019). Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger form together the G5 countries, constituting a dome of nations that represents the interests of the area and the concerns with extremism, poverty and the chaotic scene aggravated by the weather (TONY BLAIR INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL CHANGE, 2017).

Hunger grows as an urgent affair, since the changing climate is responsible for 80% of their farmland being degraded (MUGGAH, 2019). The floods and droughts build a dangerous scene of food insecurity, as shown by the image below:

Image 10 – Food security in the Sahel.



Source: Robert Muggah (2019).

The climatic situation, that might find similarities with the previously discussed crisis in Somalia, is worsened by the unguarded borders, especially when it comes to criminal networks. Political militias and jihadist groups add to the problem, recruiting people from nomadic communities and taking advantage of the chaos to execute their plans. Even though in countries like Nigeria 8 million people are already receiving aid, the hunger matter is persistent and connected to every other affair faced by the persons living in the Sahel area. What the scenario also shows is that, out of all the regions in the world that are hugely affected by global warming, Sahelian nations in particular are an example of how much the situation can be a propitious stage for disorder and humanitarian crimes (MUGGAH, 2019).

Organized crimes and high tensions take the lives of civilians on a daily basis. In 2018, Mali endured the death of at least 882 people³⁸ and Niger is facing a deadly epoch of perpetrations committed by farmers, electoral problems and militias. Burkina Faso experienced the increase of jihadist attacks and now finds itself immersed in protests and disturbance (MUGGAH, 2019).

Another concern in the Sahel is the exponential growth of the population and its impact in a region which is not able to supply for the community already existent. Family planning is much needed, especially when it comes to the cultural and religious atmosphere that forbids, even as an unspoken rule, the consumption of contraceptive medicine. Health aid is already faulty and, for vulnerable groups like women, the crisis is felt mainly when suffering from the lack of safe medical assistance in the numerous pregnancies they endure. Since large families are seen as a sign of a successful life, measures to control the increase of the population are still taboo topics. It's known that, aside from pre and postnatal complications, female citizens perceive the excessive population and consequent growth of hunger and poverty as another way for sexually based crimes to go unnoticed. The plentiful births are, too, an indication of school evasion happening increasingly earlier, since the more time is spent in educational establishments, the later it is when people get married (MUELLER, 2019).

When it comes to trafficking, the problem is perceived from very diverse points, from threats to the wildlife and fauna to the issue regarding human smuggling, which reminds the world of the epoch of higher slavery, situation that today happens mainly to migrants. Mali, Niger³⁹ and Morocco are used as routes for these crimes, and the Sahel also faces problems with the trafficking of painkillers, a piece of information that might come as a shock, since the region is known for its lack of access to analgesics. An epidemic of AIDS has also sprung due to the use of drugs and sharing of devices. This tough situation, when combined with terrorist threats from locals and even foreign terrorist fighters, contributes to the chaos and humanitarian urgency in the area (UNODC, 2016).

In the other side of the spectrum, Lake Chad⁴⁰ was known throughout history for being the source of water for a region that is followed by its dry cycles. However, the prevailing climate change has shrunk the lake, located in the middle of the continent in the last few


³⁸ This number is eight times larger than the one from 2012 (MUGGAH, 2019).

³⁹ The most important smuggling route is through Agadez, a city in Niger (UNODC, 2016).

⁴⁰ Lake Chad is located in the northeast of Nigeria and far west from Chad.

years, shrinking it by 90% since the 1960s. This shortage and the tumult it has left in society, when mixed with poor governance, led to the diminishing of jobs and created the perfect scenario for the development of violent and extremist activity. The atmosphere of hopelessness, even though there are some engineering projects to regain the water flow to the lake, is a substantial reason why so many young people get involved with terrorist groups. Hunger, lack opportunities and the fury in some Islamist militants creates a propitious arena for recruitment (SKRETTEBERG, 2018).

Image 11 – Lake Chad through the years.



Source: Richard Skretteberg through Norwegian Refugee Council (SKRETTEBERG, 2018).

The initial background of Lake Chad tells the story of a promising land that attracted groups from all over the continent, like the Fulani pastoralists, Hausa agriculturalists, Yedina, Kuri and many others, being popular for the chance of subsistence it offered. The discovery of petroleum brought even more prestige for a region that offered resources for all of its surroundings (ALLMAN GRITZNER, 2013).

With the lake's diminishing, the area that was once a provider became the center of a turmoil which served as a stepping stone for terrorist action. Boko Haram approached the area, imposing their extremist religious beliefs and condemning any characteristic that is prevenient of Western culture. There have been also assumptions that the group's activities

hide interests in the region's oil (THE NATION, 2017). With these intents, the group is the main responsible for the huge numbers of deaths and displacements caused by conflicts. In this scenario, food insecurity also became a big issue, since the conflict was only additional to the dry cycle faced by Lake Chad. The body of water disappeared largely because of extensive irrigation systems and the lack of rain (SKRETTEBERG, 2018).

Ecological disasters are known for their destructive patterns and very obvious consequences to hunger and health urgency. In the Sahel and Lake Chad areas this pattern is followed but supplemented by a terrorist and extremist agenda. The observations made when analyzing these regions are that the natural calamities, although damaging on their own, are a background and an opportunity for the growth of a direct human influence in the crisis.

5.2.3 Drugs and Terrorism

The smuggling of drugs, as briefly talked about before, has found an easy shortcut in West Africa due to the chaotic atmosphere. Organized crime and trafficking have very similar roots, since they depend immensely on circumstances of desperation in which people are willing to take certain jobs, even if they suspect of their ethical conduct. The transit of illegal substances, primarily cocaine, heroin and analgesics, is a problem not only because the region serves as a midway for other countries which will receive the drugs, but also because a large part of the population has been struggling with abusive use of these chemicals, a situation similar to events occurred in previously colonized nations, like the opium imposition by the British Crown in China in the 19th Century (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2016).

Aside from these vulnerable locations being used as a passing ground for hegemonic countries to smuggle drugs, laboratories were developed to produce amphetamine-type stimulants. They are prepared, distributed in the local scene and then shipped to European locations, as well as markets like the ones in the Sahel (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2016).

Traffic transcends its mainstream form, with even the migration problem being a pathway for more illegal actions. There is the inter and intra-regional smuggling of migrants and a prominent chain of sexual trafficking of young women who come to the western part of Africa because of job promises (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,

2015). Lastly, there is also concern when it comes to rare species of animals, since they are also part of the route of illegal commercial services, and African wildlife is extremely lucrative. Aside from actual trafficking, piracy and robbery also influence the drug problem that disrupts the order in West Africa, with vessels being hijacked and maritime crimes motivated by oil disputes taking place (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2016).

The health issues are aggravated by the acute trafficking – since AIDS and hepatitis are direct consequences of some typical habits of drug users – along with the offers for recruitment into organized crime, creating ideal conditions for the strengthening of the terrorist agenda. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that, because of climate change, water and food scarcity are commonly used to exert control over locals (TONY BLAIR INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL CHANGE, 2017). Terrorism, although customarily perceived from different perspectives, is usually linked to transnational organized crime and the constant flow through borders that is typical of traffic. Acts of terrorism can be understood as any breach of a criminal law that disrespects culture and heritage, and those have most definitely proliferated in West Africa (GAM NKWI, 2015).

Its resurgence is a characteristic which shows the impact of natural catastrophes and lack of good governance that led a lot of people to bankruptcy and unemployment. Terrorism finds its way in with the rise of religious extremism, gathering its motives from economic, political or existential reasons. The population's vulnerability and helplessness are seen as creating a propitious environment for the expansion of organized crime, directly linked to terrorism (GALLAGHER, 2018) and recruitment, designing easier ways for these groups to practice their deadly actions. The western influence has also changed the atmosphere in terrorist actions, with the world's attention shifting to this matter because of the early 2000's attacks. However, the numerous attacks that happen on a daily basis and cause fatalities and forbiddance of access to basic resources to the African population are still not as publicized in the mainstream media (ELU, 2015).

5.3 Terrorist groups in West Africa and Sahel

The socioeconomic conditions of the region have proven to provide fertile ground to the propagation of radical agendas, as shown by the considerable number of terrorist groups there active, the most preeminent of which will be subsequently explored.

5.3.1 Nigeria's Boko Haram

Commonly known to the world as Boko Haram, this radical Islamic group originated from Maiduguri in 2002, the Northern Nigeria's Borno State capital. The organization is a result of accumulated grievances over social inequality and unjust power distribution in the north of Nigeria, which are root causes of violence that have not yet been addressed (ONAPAJI & UZODIKE, 2015). It grew rapidly in sophistication and lethality and has since posed a major threat.

DEVELOPMENT

Amidst socioeconomic inequality, marginalization and Christian-Muslim tensions in Northern Nigeria, Boko Haram was formed, advocating the return of a "pure" form of Islam and opposing Western values, which are seen as responsible for the national chaos (ONUOHA & OYEWOLE, 2018). It follows Salafist principles⁴¹ of strict scriptural interpretation, opposed to more liberal variations.

In the 2000s, the group remained mostly nonviolent, but later adopted militant tactics to pursue its goals. After open confrontations with security forces and great retaliation in 2009, Boko Haram endured considerable casualties, including its leader, Mohammed Yusuf. During the police's repression in Maiduguri, many suspects were arrested and extrajudicially executed, which triggered resentment amongst locals. Others disappeared, and those who fled became part of the group 'Islamists on the run' (WALKER, 2012). The remnants went underground until they re-merged even deadlier under Abubakar Shekau's leadership in 2010. Boko Haram adopted new tactics of abductions, assaults, assassinations, invasion of communities and suicide bombings (BUKARTI, 2017).

⁴¹ Salafists comprise a branch of Sunni Islam which believes that the purest Islam can be found in the early generations of Muslims, the *Salaf*, who lived their lives close to the Prophet Muhammed. Therefore, Salafists strive to imitate the first Muslims' habits and life-style (HAMID & DAR, 2016).

Boko Haram's two major attacks were its participation in the 2011 bombing of the Abuja's UN compound — killing 23 and wounding many more — and the 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok. These events drew international repercussion and the group established itself as a militant organization with proved capacity to carry out mass attacks (WALKER, 2012). However, its local support declined due to the abductions and mass slaughters during 2014 and 2015, when the activities of the group reached its peak.

It pledged allegiance to ISIL in March 2015, and, in November, was considered the deadliest terrorist group in the world (HUME; PISA, 2015). Nonetheless, the organization began to suffer major losses due to a military campaign of troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger — which will be further addressed in topic 5.4 — after the group's actions spilled over neighboring borders. Territories were recovered⁴² and Boko Haram was pushed to Lake Chad lands, with its capacity to launch major attacks hindered (BUKARTI, 2017). Nigeria's president Muhammadu Buhari prematurely announced, at the end of 2015, that the group was 'technically defeated', but it very much remained active and destructive, proving to be very adaptable (CUMMINGS, 2017). In fact, during 2017, the group reportedly killed an average of 2 civilians per day (TONY BLAIR INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL CHANGE, 2018).

Due to Abubakar Shekau's excessive brutality against Muslims civilians, including the use of child bombers, Boko Haram split into two main factions⁴³, although they are both still seen as Boko Haram. While some carried on under Shekau's ideology and leadership, Abu Musab al Barnawi, Yusuf's son, formed a new sect renouncing attacks against Muslim civilians and claiming to focus on government and security force targets. In August 2016, ISIL recognized Barnawi's newly formed sect as the rightful Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP or ISWA) (BLANCHARD & CAVIGELLI, 2018).

ISWAP recruits people, especially those internally displaced, and wins over locals by providing protection from Boko Haram and public services in devastated areas with little government presence (BUKARTI, 2018). The group keeps under authorities' radar by not appearing on videos or claiming responsibility for attacks⁴⁴. Researchers say ISWA,


⁴² This came at a price: people were left without their livelihood, resulting in thousands being displaced. The cases of human rights violations by the military also raise concern and distrust among the population. Additionally, in January 2017, security forces mistakenly bombed a civilian camp (RAMDEEN, 2017).

⁴³ Although these two are the most active ones, Boko Haram is actually made up of several factions, including Ansaru, Kogi and the Mamman Nur-led one (ZENN, 2018).

⁴⁴ Further information on ISWA can be seen at: <https://thedefensepost.com/2019/02/01/boko-haram-islamic-state-west-africa/>

considered less extreme than Boko Haram⁴⁵, has evolved into the dominant group. Its domain is in the Lake Chad region, since bordering countries have for long neglected the area (CARSTEN & KINGIMI, 2018). Nonetheless, ISWA's influence stretches into the countries of Niger and Chad. ISWA seems to be winning most of its battles against the military, deteriorating the situation in the northeast (CARSTEN, 2018).

Image 12 – Islamist insurgencies in Nigeria.



Sources: USAID; Maps4News (2018).

Despite apparent limited reach, Boko Haram as a whole remains active. In February 2018, it kidnapped more than 100 girls from a school in Dapchi, one of the largest kidnappings

⁴⁵ The group claims to leave unbothered Muslims who do not actively oppose the jihad (ZENN, 2018) and it does not deliberately target civilians nor use human bombers. They emphasize attacks on military targets and rely mostly on kidnapping for ransom.

since the 2014 Chibok event (MACLEAN & ABRAK, 2018). In the last months of 2018, it engaged in multiple village burnings and attacked two military bases in northeast Nigeria⁴⁶.

On 28 January 2019, Boko Haram killed at least 60 people in one of the bloodiest attacks in the decade-long conflict. Witnesses reported that Nigerian soldiers abandoned their posts a day before, demonstrating the state's failure to protect civilians (ALJAZEERA, 2019).

METHODOLOGY

Despite mainly focusing on Nigeria, Boko Haram's expansive ideology, following ISIL's, spills its activities into neighboring countries, taking advantage of the remoted Nigeria-Cameroon-Niger-Chad border region in order to maintain its bases and training camps (ZENN, 2014).

The group benefits from porous borders, which facilitates recruitments, and abductions, and state⁴⁷ and police⁴⁸ corruption. Its main sources of revenue are kidnapping for ransom⁴⁹ and robberies of less-secured facilities. Besides obtaining weapons from the Nigerian security forces, insurgent members manufacture their own, acquire them from sackings, trafficking groups and/or from the internal arms market (HIGAZI, 2013). Boko Haram attracts people — mostly young, unemployed or underemployed, or even foreign refugees — from across Lake Chad Basin countries by providing handouts, food, jobs and shelter (WALKER, 2012). The group expands its ideology by posting videos of sermons

⁴⁶ More updates available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/boko-haram.html>

⁴⁷ Amidst systematic corruption, member States who siphon money allocated for security apparatus are responsible handicapping troops, thus facilitating the growth of militant groups (ONAPAJI & UZODIKE, 2015). Local politicians are also reported of supporting the group in order to gain political advantages (ONUOHA & OYEWOLE, 2018).

⁴⁸ Demoralised, underpaid and discouraged soldiers often make it easy for insurgents to purchase or seize sophisticated weapons. The troops' resentment for their situation also causes mutiny and desertion (AFD, 2018).

⁴⁹ Many terrorist groups have become adept at abducting people, encouraged by state authorities' willingness to pay for hostage release or even to exchange prisoners. This creates a vicious circle of abduction, payment or concessions and then further abduction likely worsened, emboldening other criminal gangs to adopt the same strategy (BUKARTI, 2018).

online, capitalizing on people's frustration with the security forces' indiscriminate violence⁵⁰ and the social injustice (AGENCE FRANÇAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT, 2018).

The organization has proven to be very adaptable, evolving its tactics and changing its targets: after costing attacks on military compounds and government facilities, they have prioritized "soft targets", those which are relatively unprotected or vulnerable, such as schools, churches, remote villages, markets and parks, using suicide bombers, mostly comprised of children and women⁵¹ (TONY BLAIR INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL CHANGE, 2018). Other targets include industries that provide support to the government, as means to hinder state functionality and economy by frustrating state workers' activities.

By its exclusivist interpretation of Islam, Boko Haram rejects religious innovation and prohibits Muslims from taking part in activities associated with Western Society and employment under the Nigerian government. Advocating the rescue of first generations of Islam's traditions, the organization uses its ideology to justify the brutality used (BLANCHARD; CAVIGELLI, 2018).

Its condemnation of Western education explains the group's name: 'Boko Haram' roughly translates to "Western education⁵² is forbidden" (*Haram* being Arabic for 'forbidden' and *Boko* meaning 'fake', which came to signify Western education), claiming it corrupts Islamic society (HUSSAIN, 2016). Therefore, academic institutions with Western and liberal values are systematically targeted, as they are far more vulnerable than other governmental facilities. Boko Haram uses the subsequent educational vacuum for indoctrination and recruitment.

CURRENT SITUATION

Boko Haram's factions remain active, concentrating activities across the Lake Chad region and accelerating in attacks, especially against soft targets, by relying mostly on suicide


⁵⁰ It relies on extrajudicial executions and tactics of arresting as many people as it can, holding them hostage, intimidating, threatening and extorting them, leading to popular mistrust and hindering civilian collaboration (WALKER, 2012). There is great lack of accountability, allowing them to indiscriminately kill mere suspects. Many have died after being detained with no judicial process (CAMPBELL & HARWOOD, 2018).

⁵¹ In fact, Boko Haram used women more than any other group in 2017 (TONY BLAIR INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL CHANGE, 2018).

⁵² It refers to secular Western Education, which dates back to the colonial period when Western-dominated countries had missionaries acting in complete disregard to the local religions.

bombings and kidnappings⁵³. It still profits from popular grievances at government corruption and neglect, ongoing poverty and marginalization. A pressing issue has been the global terrorist network affiliation, especially since ISIL members see the Sahara-Sahel region as an attractive destination. Additionally, reports of human rights abuses by national security forces hinder international involvement⁵⁴ (CAMPBELL, 2014).

Image 13 – Suicide attacks and related deaths by Boko Haram.



Source: Council on Foreign Relations' Nigeria Security Tracker.

Though it is undoubtedly less powerful than it was in 2015, the organization has shown flexibility and will still pose a threat for years to come, making it necessary for

⁵³ Reports of kidnappings by Boko Haram have risen in number throughout 2018, the BBC says, based on the Council on Foreign Relations' data (GILES, 2019). In fact, the CFR provides weekly updates on the group's activities. These are available at: <https://www.cfr.org/boko-haram>

⁵⁴ Especially coming from Western powers, which are apprehensive of the human rights record of the Nigerian military, since it has often acted with a degree of impunity and disregard for the rule of law (ONAPAJO & UZODIKE, 2015).

countermeasures to target its ideology — perversion of scripture’s interpretation — rather than its violence alone, in order to allow peaceful Muslims to reclaim their religion from extremists (BUKARTI, 2017). Meanwhile, the group hinders the ability of aid organizations and donors to provide humanitarian relief for the ongoing crisis.⁵⁵

5.3.2 *Al-Qaida in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM)*

ORIGINS

Although the group was formally established only in 2007, its roots are in the Algerian Civil War. In 1992, after the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a coalition of Islamic religious parties, the Security Council of Algeria cancelled the elections and dismantled the FIS. Algeria immediately descended into violence that only finished at the end of the decade, costing an estimated 200,000 lives. In the Civil War, the so-called Afghan Algerians - foreign fighters who had returned from ‘*jihad*’ or training camps in Afghanistan - played a central role in the conflict (BOEKE, 2016).

Those groups were the basis of the newly born movement, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). It became the most violent and radical of the groups fighting against the government, based on a Salafi-Jihadist interpretation of Islam, defending an aggressive re-Islamization of the Algerian Society (THORNBERRY, 2011). Those whom the group nominated *takfir* (enemies of Islam) were classified as legitimate targets and therefore deserved to be killed, even if they were Muslims, elders, women or children (BOEKE, 2016). Its cruelty against civilians promptly made the group very unpopular among the population. Internally, GIA was divided. In 1998, a faction of the group withdrew and created the Salafist Group of Preaching and Combat (GSPC), with a strategy of focusing its attacks against military targets, condemning violence against civilians.

Soon, the GSPC gained members and support from the population, turning into the main Islamic armed group. However, the Algerian government’s amnesty program in the early 2000s lured many fighters away from the GSPC, creating disarray in its ranks. Following these setbacks, the GSPC began to expand its operations into other parts of Algeria and the greater North Africa (STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 2016). Initially more focused on

⁵⁵ UNHCR estimates that, since 2012, the conflict has displaced 2.4 million people and put more than 7 million at risk of starvation (UNHCR, 2018).

overthrowing the Algerian government and establishing an Islamic caliphate that would reinforce the *Shari'ah* Law in the region (LIMA, 2018), the GSPC started to expand its operations, reaching other countries in Maghreb, such as Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Mali.

The leaders of GSPC sought to increase links with global jihadists. In 2003, they pledged allegiance to Bin Laden (leader of Al-Qaida) and Mullah Omar (leader of Taliban). In 2005, members of GSPC were sent to Iraq to join the local insurgence. In 2006, GSPC formally joined Al-Qaida and, in 2007, the organization changed its name to Al-Qaida in the land of the Islamic Maghreb. This union favored both sides: for the GSPC, becoming part of Al-Qaida increased the organization's international profile and boosted its recruitment capabilities; for Al-Qaida, allying with the GSPC presented the group with the opportunity to expand its operations onto a new continent and thus demonstrate its resilience and continued power at a time when the global war on terror was reaching its zenith (STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 2016).

DOCTRINE AND OBJECTIVES

The AQIM defines itself as a Salafi-Jihadist organization. This ideology is an interpretation of Sunni Islam⁵⁶ that combines two different perspectives: Salafism and jihadism. According to a report from the National Defense Research Institute, a group is defined as Salafi-Jihadist by two criteria: first, the group emphasizes the importance of returning to a “pure” Islam, that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors; second, the group believes that violent *jihad* is *fard 'ayn* - a personal religious duty (JONES, 2014).

For a more complete understanding of AQIM's position, it is essential to face it with the concepts of “far enemy” and “near enemy”, developed by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb in his book *Milestones* (1964). The “near enemy” are the apostate regimes in Muslim countries and the “far enemy” is the West (BOEKE, 2016). During its history, the movement has changed priorities, although it has normally focused on the “near enemy”.

After the formal union with Al-Qaida, the group positioned itself as part of the global jihadi movement and as no longer exclusive to Algeria. It became more aligned with other

⁵⁶ Sunni Islam is the largest of the two major branches of Islam, the other being the Shi'a. While both agree on the fundamentals of Islam, there are many differences amongst them, mainly caused by historical, political, social and ethnic factors (BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2009).

terrorist movements that sought to combat Western interests and influence. AQIM believes that they are facing another Crusade commanded by Western countries that aims at fighting and uprooting Islam and North African governments as an extension of Western powers and interests (ALKHOURI, 2017). This point of view can be observed in a 2009 audio released by the leader of AQIM, Abd al-Malik Droukdel, cited by a report of Counterterrorism Research and Analysis, where he stated that:

I return briefly to show the danger of the new imperialistic attack, which is an extension to the old campaign, which aims to target our Ummah in its dearest of spiritual components and even its existential principles, and the principles of its continuity, and also to show the dirty role of these apostate and traitor regimes in our Maghreb countries for the interests of the countries that have imperialistic goals and expansionist interests like America, the European Union, and Israel, so perhaps that our Ummah would get ready and prepare to fight its inevitable existential battle, that, if it does not fight today, will inevitably fight it tomorrow. (DROUKDEL, 2009 apud ALKHOURI, 2017)

Due to the period of colonialism in the Maghreb, however, the AQIM considers France and Spain its far enemies, and not the United States, as posed by the Al-Qaida Core. Although AQIM has threatened those countries several times, the organization was never involved in an attack in their territory. Showing an example, according to Droukdel, cited by a report of Project Counter Extremism: “We seek to liberate the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of France and Spain and from all symbols of treason and employment for the outsiders, and protect it from the foreign greed and the crusader’s hegemony” (DROUKDEL, 2008 apud COUNTER EXTREMISM, 2018).

As aforementioned, even though the group had become part of Al-Qaida and engaged in the international jihad, its priorities did not change dramatically. They maintain a preference for focusing attention on the regional governments of Maghreb over Western Nations. It has, however, publicly expressed support for Islamist extremism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Chechnya, and Palestine (STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 2016).

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Due to the attacks of the United States, Al-Qaida Core has changed over the years, from a centralized organization into a completely decentralized one. This mutation resulted in a considerable autonomy of AQIM in relation to Al-Qaida. The leaders of the AQIM have freedom to structure the organization and to pursue its own goals, as it can be seen by their approach of designating North Africa and the Sahel as the primary geographic region for its operations (ALKHOURI, 2017). However, they are not spread from the core, as it can be seen, for example, in the split between Al-Qaida and ISIL, in which AQIM sided firmly with Al-Qaida and al Zawahiri (THURSTON, 2017).

AQIM is led by Abd al-Malik Droukdel. Beyond him, the high hierarchy is composed of a central decision-making body, the Majlis al-Ayan (Council of Notables), its own media wing, Al-Andalus Media Productions and a *Shari'ah* Council that governs Islamic legal matters (COUNTER EXTREMISM, 2018).


The current AQIM strategic leadership is based in the mountainous region of Kabylie, in Algeria, populated by the ethnic Berber people, who have a history of struggle with the central government for more autonomy. In the same way as the Al-Qaida Core, AQIM is a decentralized group. They are organized into battalions, which have several dozen fighters each. Battalion commanders have considerable independence, especially in the Sahara (THURSTON, 2017).

AQIM and its affiliates are active in multiple countries across North and West Africa. Their attacks are concentrated in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Reported attacks claimed by the organization also happened in Tunisia, Côte D'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Elements of the group are also reportedly active in Libya (ARIEFF, 2017).

The organization also has connections with other terrorist groups in Africa, as shown in the image below:

Image 14 – AQIM's network.

AQIM's network extends beyond the Sahel region. Its relationships range from cooperative to rhetorical. AQIM leadership statements have praised Ansar al Sharia in Libya's and in Tunisia's efforts, as well as those of Jabhat al Nusra in Syria.



Source: Andrew Gacom (2016).

Some of these other terrorist groups were once part of AQIM. In its history, there were some splits and reinstatements. In 2011, a Mauritanian group broke away, calling itself the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). In December 2012, the Veiled Men Battalion split from AQIM, rebranding itself as al-Murabitun. In late 2015, AQIM reincorporated al-Murabitun. In March 2017, a new coalition called Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (The Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims) unified AQIM's Saharan battalions, al-Murabitun, and two Malian jihadist groups, Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) and the Masina Liberation Front. Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wa-l-Musliminis led by Malian national and long-time AQIM ally Iyad Ag Ghali, who reports to Droukdel. (THURSTON, 2017).

FUNDING

The main source of income used by AQIM is kidnapping for ransom. The majority of the kidnapped are foreigners from the West. It is estimated that over the course of the first decade of the 2000s, the group raised over \$50 million from kidnappings alone (STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 2016). Although the kidnaps have been significantly reduced since 2013, they still occur. In 2017, AQIM held eight foreigners in the Sahara (THURSTON, 2017).

Beyond kidnapping for ransom, the group finances their actions by engaging in other criminal activities, such as protecting rackets, robbery, people and arms trafficking, money laundering, smuggling and facilitating drug trafficking from South America into Europe, according to The State Department's 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism (COUNTER EXTREMISM, 2018).

Furthermore, it is alleged that AQIM also receives donations from sympathizers and members in Western Europe and foreign governments. According to the Anti-Defamation League, The Algerian government has accused Iran and Sudan of funding the group (COUNTER EXTREMISM, 2018). Al-Qaida Core also finances its associates.

TERRORIST ATTACKS

Besides kidnapping activities, AQIM is also known for having launched hundreds of small-scale attacks over the years against the United Nations, local security forces and western interests (especially French). Unlike ISIL, who usually works to capture territory and implement its form of governance, AQIM attacks consist mostly of hit-and-runs and bombing operations (ALKHOURI, 2017), often ending with dead civilians. The most famous attacks happened in 2016, in Côte D'Ivoire, and in 2017, in Burkina Faso (COUNTER EXTREMISM, 2018).

In the first one, a member of AQIM opened fire at a beach resort in Côte D'Ivoire, killing 19 people (16 civilians and 3 soldiers). Among the dead, there were citizens from France, Germany, Burkina Faso, Mali and Cameroon. The other famous attack happened at a restaurant in Burkina Faso, where 18 people were killed by a gunman from the organization. The foreigners killed included two Kuwaitis, and one each from Canada, France, Lebanon, Nigeria, Senegal and Turkey (BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2017).

Only in 2018, there were nine reported attacks from the organization and its affiliates (COUNTER EXTREMISM).

5.3.3 Other terrorist groups

ANSARU

Ansaru is a militant Islamist group formed in 2012. Its members were once part of Boko Haram, being Ansaru a Boko Haram splinter group. The full Arabic name of this

organization is Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, which means "Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa".

The main reason for their separation was a divergence of thought on how the attacks should be conducted, with Ansaru denouncing Boko Haram's style of operation as "inhuman to the Muslim ummah", a reference to Boko Haram's massive assassinations of civilians. "Islam forbids killing of innocent people, including non-Muslims. This is our belief and we stand for it," al-Ansary, the leader of Ansaru, said in a video released in 2014 (GLOBAL SECURITY, 2016).

During its existence, Ansaru has carried out a number of kidnap attacks in Nigeria and is responsible for terrorist attacks which resulted in deaths, such as in 2013, when they kidnapped and executed seven international construction workers (GLOBAL SECURITY, 2016).

The United Kingdom listed Ansaru as a terrorist group linked to AQIM. This faction operated independently for a few years before fading into irrelevance, undermined by defections back to Boko Haram and the arrest of its top leader in 2016 (MATFESS, 2019).

JAMA'AT NASR AL-ISLAM WAL MUSLIMIN

The Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), whose name means "Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims," emerged in 2017, being a unification of four West African terrorist organizations: Ansar Dine, al-Murabitoon, AQIM's Sahara branch and Macina Liberation Front. All of these organizations were affiliated to Al-Qaida Core. This move was inspired by the process of unification of different factions in Syria, with the purpose of strengthening the terrorist movement (NEWLEE, 2018). JNIM's emir is the former leader of Ansar Dine, Iyad Ag Ghaly.

The group is subordinated to Al-Qaida, being described by them as the Al-Qaida's official branch in Mali. It has been considered the most powerful terrorist organization acting in Sahara. In the same way as other terrorist organizations in West Africa and Sahel, JNIM is guided by a Salafist-Jihadist interpretation of Islam, pursuing the ambition of subjecting Mali and its nearest countries to be ruled under *Shari'ah* law.

In 2018, US Department of State designated JNIM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2016). JNIM is responsible for several attacks since the organization was developed. In April 2018, the group attacked a French military base and UN

mission in Timbuktu, Mali, injuring several French soldiers. Beyond that, they also target civilians, as shown in 2017, when they attacked a resort frequented by westerners in Mali. Even an embassy, the French is Burkina Faso, was targeted (NEWLEE, 2018).

JUND AL-KHILAFAH

Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria (JAK-A) is a terrorist group that emerged in 2014, when top military commanders of AQIM broke away from the leadership and announced its allegiance to ISIL. The explanation for this split, according JAK-A, was because AQIM was “deviating from the true path”. Gouri Abdelmalek, the formal leader, said that: "You have in the Islamic Maghreb men if you order them, they will obey you," in reference to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-professed "caliph" of the Islamic State (VOCCIA, 2015).

This terrorist group became especially famous in 2014, when they broadcasted a video on the web showing the beheading of the French Hervé Gourdel. Gourdel was a 55 year-old mountain guide who had been hiking in a national park when he was kidnapped, after the French government had rejected the group's demands to halt airstrikes against ISIL militants in Iraq. After the beheading, Algerian Forces hardened confrontation with the group. In December 2014, Algerian troops killed the head of JAK-A, Abdelmalek. In May 2015, at least 22 militants linked to the group were killed by Algerian troops in a surprise attack. Constant raids devastated Jund al-Khilafah, making it not as expressive today as it was before (VOCCIA, 2015).

5.4 International efforts

Multiple initiatives have been taken and are currently underway in the area, promoted by countries in the region, foreign States or the UN itself, aiming to eradicate local terrorist activities. Some of these forces will be examined as it follows.

5.4.1 Multinational Joint Task Force

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a combined multinational formation, composed by military units from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Benin and Cameroon, with headquarters in N'Djamena. (NKWI, 2013). The decision followed the realization that the

problem with insurgent groups is not necessarily Nigerian, as initially perceived, but a major regional question (ALBERT, 2017).

The task force was organized in 1994, initially only by Nigerian military units, during the administration of President Sani Abacha, in order to combat banditry in the region and allow free movement along the northern border of the country. In 1998, the Force became multinational, as the mandate was expanded to incorporate units in neighboring Chad and Niger to address common cross-border security issues in the Lake Chad region. Its headquarters were located in Baga, in the Borno State (ALBERT, 2017).

With the increasing number of attacks by the extremist group operating in the region, on 30 April 2012, Chad's President Idriss Deby proposed the expansion of the MNJTF mandate to cover counter-terrorism operations, leading the task force to change its entire operational system (ALBERT, 2017). In March 2014, defense and military chiefs from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) – composed by Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria – met in Cameroon to agree on the need for a joint task force to combat arms trafficking, terrorism, cross-border attacks and violence as tensions escalate in the region. It was concurred that the initial mandate of the new task force would be to patrol the Lake Chad region, conduct military operations against arms dealers and suspected terrorists, and to facilitate free movement in the Lake Chad region (KINDZEKA, 2014).

In January 2015, Baga, the headquarters of the MNJTF, was attacked by Boko Haram. At the time, only Nigeria, Chad and Niger military were on the ground (ROGGIO, 2015). The soldiers serving in the Force were forced to flee and Boko Haram took over their base and the town, leading to the transfer of the headquarter from Baga to N'Djamena, capital of Chad (ALBERT, 2017).

Immediately, the member States of LCBC and Benin, a non-member, requested for a meeting to address its level of support for an expanded mandate to the MNJTF (THEROUX-BENONI, 2015). The meeting was held on the eve of the 24th African Union Assembly Summit in Addis Ababa, during which AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorized a more invigorated MNJTF deployment. In the Yaoundé meeting, the member States of LCB, the AU, ECOWAS, the EU and UN finished drafting MNJTF's operational plans, including its mandate, headquarters, leadership structure, rules of engagement, operational areas and requirements for supporting and sustaining the mission. These decisions brought the other member States of the LCB on board with the peace mission. Of the 8,700

troops for the mission, it was agreed that Nigeria would contribute with 3,250 personnel, followed by Chad with 3,000 (ALBERT, 2017).

The most significant administrative and operational changes to MNJTF that emerged from the meetings in 2015 were the redefinition of its mandate to be more focused on preventing Boko Haram from having free access to the borders of member States of LCB; increasing the number of troops; transferring the management of the force to the Lake Chad Basin Commission; and giving the position of the Force's commander to Nigeria's Major-General, alongside a Cameroonian as Deputy Commander and Chadian Chief of Staff.

In practice, the MNJTF does not deal with all the clashes and issues involving Boko Haram, since its mandate is limited to the protection of the borders between the countries of the LCB. It is estimated that, once borders are secured, each country will expel Boko Haram from their respective territories. In Nigeria, for example, the operations of the MNJTF were able to limit the activities of Boko Haram to the vast Sambisa forest. Their supply lines from neighboring countries have been totally cut off, to the extent that some of them are now beginning to negotiate their surrender, and their capacity of launching suicide attacks on Nigerian cities has been drastically curtailed (ALBERT, 2017).

It is important to emphasize the collaboration and mutual aid between different paramilitary forces operating in West Africa and the Sahel region. An example of this is the partnership between the MNJTF and the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order (JTF ORO), which has been in charge of the entire Borno State, whilst the MNJTF in Baga was in charge of the Lake Chad region. Albeit administratively independent, there has been synergy and collaboration between the two JTFs (MUSA, 2013)⁵⁷.

Nigeria did a lot in the direction of bringing peace to the West African sub-region, as evidenced by its leadership role in the peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone and in its own borders. However, the country was reluctant to allow foreign intervention on its territory; it aimed to retain ownership and exert its leadership in any attempt to combat Boko Haram (THÉROUX-BÉNONI, 2015). Otherwise, the responsibility of dealing with the problem fell on the LCBC to coordinate Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, which had to work together to find solutions to their mutual problems of insurgency from extreme violent groups acting in the region (ALBERT, 2017).

⁵⁷ More information on JTF ORO, its collaboration with MNJTF and other counter-terrorism operations in Africa at topic 5.4.4.

5.4.2 The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S)

In February 2014, the countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger came together to establish the G5 Sahel (G5S), seeking to promote security and development through organized action by means of regional and international cooperation (G5 SAHEL, 2014). Comprised of five agencies, it strives to protect peace and democracy and to improve governance, infrastructure and the lives of its peoples.

However, that objective is imperiled by the rise of terrorism, propagated heavily throughout the region (COOKE, 2017). The low levels of human development (UNDP, 2018), as well as crisis in governance, local conflicts and porous borders create fertile ground for the expansion of terrorist activities, cultivated by the disbelief people maintain in the States' ability to protect them (RUPESINGHE, 2018). Many attacks have been perpetrated in the last few years, targeting security forces and civilians and covering the countries' territories and borders (RUPESINGHE, 2018).

Having recognized terrorism as one of the major threats to the pursuit of stability, the G5S announced in February 2017 the creation of a Joint Force (FC-G5S)⁵⁸, authorized by the AU's PSC for a mandate of one year — renewed in April 2018 (RUPESINGHE, 2018) — and welcomed by the UNSC Resolution S/RES/2359 (2017). Categorized as an *ad hoc* security initiative⁵⁹, its mandate is to:

(1) combat terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking in order to create a secure environment by eradicating the actions of terrorist armed groups and other organized criminal groups; (2) contribute to the restoration of state authority and the return of displaced persons and refugees; (3) facilitate humanitarian operations and the delivery of aid to the affected populations and (4) contribute to the implementation of development actions in the space of the G5 Sahel. (EUROPEAN UNION, 2018, p. 3)

⁵⁸ *Force Conjoint du G5 Sahel*, as the organization's official language is French.


⁵⁹ A form of coalition which differs from regular peace support operations. More information can be found at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ad-hoc-security-initiatives-a-potential-force-multiplier-for-the-au>.

The Force is strongly backed by the French, whose army intervened in the Mali crisis of 2012, and which remains, to some extent, in the region⁶⁰. As it has the power to move across borders, the FC-G5S is seen as a mean to supplement the action of existing forces in the region, such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the French military (FRANCE, 2018), for it is able to operate regionally without antagonizing local communities (JALLOH, 2017). That is of interest to France, as the country seeks to eventually exit the area and transfer its counter-terrorism activities to the FC-G5S, in hope of relieving the work of soldiers allocated there and reducing the number of terrorist attacks in the homeland (RUPESINGHE, 2018). For more information on the French military presence in the region, see topic 5.4.3.

The first official effort by the Joint Force took place in Bamako, in July 2017, being preceded by 18 unofficial cross-border operations (RUPESINGHE, 2018). The contingent consists of approximately 5,000 military troops, provided by its member-States, and of a smaller number of law enforcement agents (NSDS HUB, 2018). They are divided into three sectors of the Sahel, covering the borders between the countries, and are able to conduct joint operations or pursue targets up to 50 kilometers within each country (NSDS HUB, 2018).

Image 15 – Resources of the FC-G5S.

THE G5 SAHEL AND ITS JOINT FORCE



⁶⁰ More information available at the following topic.

Source: Sahel and West Africa Club (2018).

The headquarters had been located in Sevare but were destroyed in June 2018 by an attack claimed by JNIM. They were eventually relocated to Bamako, Mali's capital city, and the HQ's construction was funded by the EU (DEFENSE POST, 2018).

Although supported by the international community, this initiative has not evaded criticism. One of the facets of the problem is the uncertainty around the identity of the enemy it faces. As it is not enough to declare war on terror, there needs to be a clear target (RUPESINGHE, 2018). That does not seem to be the case, as there are numerous armed groups in the region, not all of which are motivated by a radical agenda. It is also not easy to distinguish terrorists from compliant groups, or even from civilians. This risks the loss of support from the local populations and creates an environment of even deeper insecurity (NSDS HUB, 2018).

Furthermore, the lack of proper funding impedes the efforts from progressing as they should. Since the members of the G5S are some of the poorest countries in the world (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2018), the initiative depends on financial support from external powers. As the UN does not directly provide that support⁶¹, the G5S relies on contributions from bilateral and multilateral partners (NSDS HUB, 2018). Many have pledged to grant assistance and, in July 2017, the Sahel Alliance was launched⁶², as a form to better coordinate the efforts from such allies (FRANCE, 2018).

Nonetheless, according to the UN Secretary General's report S/2018/1006, only 199 million euros, out of the 415 pledged in February 2018, were actually received (UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 2018). A few other conferences have been held in which more funds were vowed, but they seem to be slow to materialize (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2018b). Logistical matters have also been raised as an issue, such as the vastness of the area, the arduousness of the climate and the integration of the missions (BELFAKIR, 2018). In that sense, the UNSC approved Resolution S/RES/2391 (2017), which allows MINUSMA to provide logistical support to the FC-G5S.

⁶¹ Although urged by the Secretary-General and France, the US refuses to back the FC-G5S, which would ensure it had regular, long-term and direct support from the UN. Notwithstanding, the US has pledged to bilaterally provide 105 million dollars to the G5S (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2018a).

⁶² Composed of France, Germany, the EU, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, Italy, Spain, the UK and Luxembourg (ALLIANCE SAHEL, 2018).

Finally, one of the main points agreed upon by the G5S's partners is the need to further invest in the progress of the region. Although one of the pillars of the coalition is the promotion of the States' development, that seems to have been neglected in favor of the militarization of the mission (PENNEY, 2018). As a way to rectify the situation, seeing the need to begin the stabilization process from the ground up and to deter the population from supporting terrorist groups (RUPESINGHE, 2018), its members and allies have adopted the compromise to fund initiatives which endeavor to improve security, governance and infrastructure, provide basic services and promote economic and social development (ALLIANCE SAHEL, 2018).

To that end, the Sahel Alliance is funding more than 500 projects in the region (FRANCE, 2018), between 2018 and 2022 (RUPESINGHE, 2018), and the G5S countries adopted the Priority Investment Program (PIP) (WORLD BANK, 2014), which will launch its own forty projects, and have devised their own plans on a national level. The last two solutions can be seen as very advantageous, as one of the leverages of the regionally-led initiatives is their ability to better converse with local communities, and, as past experiences with countries such as Somalia have shown, garnering and maintaining public support may be the key to effectively banish the terrorist threats (RUPESINGHE, 2018).

5.4.3 Operation Barkhane

The disagreements between the northern and southern parts of Mali have been an important issue in the former French colony ever since it became independent in 1960 and are the root cause of the main conflicts which affect the country to this day. Alongside them is the recent rise of terrorist groups in the area, especially AQIM.

The existing political instability was aggravated when the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) led a rebellion in the north of Mali in January 2012, quickly expelling the army from the area and declaring it independent under the name of Azawad, which became dominated by the separatists and Islamist groups (PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2017). In March of that same year, the National Committee for the Reestablishment of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (CNRDRE), formed by army officers who were not content with President Amadou Toumani

Touré (TRAN, 2013), performed a military coup, forcing the President to resign and taking power for itself under the command of President Dioncounda Traore (ICG, 2012).

In the wake of the disarray, the Islamist group Ansar Dine, with ties to AQIM, rose to prominence, occupying the area of Timbuktu and ending the alliance it once had with MNLA in favor of its mission of installing *Shari'ah* law in the country (STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 2016).

As Ansar Dine advanced towards Southern Mali, to the Mopti Region, President Traore requested France's aid (BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2018), which launched Operation Serval in January 2013 (PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2017). Its mission was to stop the Jihadist offense (FRANCE, 2019) and, with assistance from national and regional forces, it was able to take back control from major northern cities and to secure the area (THURSTON; LEBOVICH, 2013). The troops began to withdraw in April, formally handing over the security responsibilities to the Mali government and MINUSMA a few months later (BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2018).

However, it became noted that terrorist action exceeded states' borders, and it was now a regional issue. With that perception, France launched, in August 2014, operation Barkhane, which absorbed operation Serval, broadening its reaches (PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2017), as it became the product of a partnership with the member States of the G5S to combat regional terrorism and ensure cross-border security (WADDINGTON, 2014). It counts with those countries' military support and is able coordinate joint action and impede terrorists from finding refuge beyond national borders (FRANCE, 2019). In October 2017, the mission was updated to promote development and consolidation (GUIBERT, 2018b), now including the gathering of information relative to the population to build a database of knowledge and the securing of the area by the G5S forces (GUIBERT, 2018a).

It is the biggest French military mission since the Algerian War in 1962 (PENNEY, 2018), and the size of the operation has only grown, having started with 3,000 troops (WADDINGTON, 2014) and now reaching 4,500 (NOSSITER, 2019). It also equipped with aircrafts, helicopters, drones and vehicles (LE MONDE, 2014)⁶³, all of which cost an estimate

⁶³ Most of which are used in missions focused in the Liptako region, though mobility is preserved so to maintain the element of surprise against the enemy (FRANCE, 2019).

of 700 million euros annually (GUIBERT, 2018b). There are four permanent command bases, in Gao (Mali), Niamey (Niger), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and N'Djamena (Chad), and a few temporary bases (LATORRACA, 2015).

In June 2018 the UK sent its first troops to the region, accompanied by three helicopters, to work alongside the French military, although the British troops are not to be involved in combat operations (KELLY, 2018). Support has also been given by other countries, such as Germany and the US (FRANCE, 2019).

In 2018, Barkhane neutralized nearly 200 members of armed terrorist groups, and conducted almost 70 projects aiding the population (FRANCE, 2019). Nonetheless, there have been concerns raised regarding its efficiency and capacity, relating from the vastness of the area to be covered, the unpreparedness of the G5S's forces and the lack of military support from other countries, to the increase in attacks. (LATORRACA, 2015).

Whilst facing such obstacles, Barkhane assists the FC-G5S, as it is expected that the latter may one day take the former's place (BOUTELLIS, 2018). The French Minister of Defense has assured that the forces will remain in the Sahel as long as it is needed — which is not to say it is intended for them to stay forever (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2019).

5.4.4 Other counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL (UNOWAS)

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), based in Dakar, is a special political mission managed by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), created on 28 January 2016, by a requisition of the UNSC to the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel (OSES) and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) to fuse into a single entity (UNSC S/2016/89).

UNOWAS engages in preventive diplomacy, good offices and political mediation and facilitation in countries in West Africa and the Sahel, besides assisting sub-regional institutions and States in strengthening their capacities in these areas, as well as in addressing cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security. The Office works closely with other UN entities and umpteen regional and international partners, as the Economic Community of West African States, the Mano River Union, LCBC, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the G5S and the AU, focusing in a combination of synergies as a

counter-insurgency effort and as an improvement mechanism for regional and international security (UNSC S/2016/89).

UNOWAS was created for the purpose of promoting an integrated approach to conflict prevention and regional issues, including terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organized crime, drug-trafficking, other illicit forms of trafficking and maritime insecurity, in addition to its importance in fomenting good governance, preventive diplomacy, Human Rights and gender mainstreaming⁶⁴ in conflict prevention and conflict management initiatives. Besides that, UNOWAS leads the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, endorsed by the UNSC in June 2013, which includes a range of programs and initiatives in the areas of Governance, Security and Resilience (UNSC S/2016/1129).

The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for West Africa and the Sahel and Head of UNOWAS is Mohamed Ibn Chambas. He is assisted by a SRSG deputy, Ruby Sandhu-Rojon. Since its appointment in 2014, the SRSG has used its good offices in response to political and electoral crises in several countries, such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, Gambia and Togo. To assist in the combat of insecurity and promote sustainable development in the Sahel region, the SRSG for West Africa and the Sahel leads regional advocacy efforts for the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, which was endorsed by the UNSC in June 2013. The strategy includes a large number of innovative actions in the areas of governance, security and resilience in support of 10 countries in the Sahel.

JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATION RESTORE ORDER (JTF ORO) I, II and III

The unprecedented inhumane activities orchestrated by the Islamic fundamentalist sect Boko Haram drew strong response from the federal government of Nigeria, which took place, among other things, through the establishment and deployment of the JTF Operation Restore Order (OSAKE; AUDU, 2017). The first operation of the Joint Task Force directed to the Boko Haram insurgents was codenamed Operation Restore Order I, fixed on 12 June 2011 (OBADA, 2013), with the mandate of restoring law and order in the North-Eastern parts of Nigeria and in the Borno State in particular. At the end of that year, Operation Restore Order

⁶⁴ Gender mainstreaming is a globally accepted strategy for promoting gender equality. Mainstreaming involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities (UN WOMEN, 2001).

II and III were created to provide support and security against Boko Haram in the states of Bauchi and Yobe, respectively (OGBAZINO, 2015).

The operation consisted of 3,872 agents from the Nigerian Armed Forces, the Nigerian Police, the State Security Department, the Nigerian Customs Service, the Nigerian Immigration Service and the Defense Intelligence Agency (OBADA, 2013). Prior to the founding and deployment of the JTF, the Federal Government had established a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and, as previously mentioned, both TFs co-exists and have established a relationship of mutual partnership and collaboration (MBAH and NWANGWU, 2014).

It is possible to affirm that Operations Restore Order I, II and III achieved relative success, as they made attempts at restoring normalcy and building confidence in the population and checked, monitored and controlled the influx of illegal immigrants. To an extent, the operation made Maiduguri and its environs untenable to the Boko Haram terrorists, which then sort refuge in the Sambisa forest where they coordinated attacks. The Task Forces were also able to destroy some identified Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) production factories and recovered large cache of arms and ammunitions from Boko Haram terrorists (OBADA, 2013). Despite these efforts, security continued to deteriorate as extremists maintained their violence acts in the northeastern part of Nigeria, thus giving birth to Operation BOYONA (OSAKE; AUDU, 2017).

OPERATION BOYONA

Following the continued escalation of violence and destruction of lives and property in Northern Nigeria by the Boko Haram insurgents, the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces, Goodluck Jonathan, declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, whose names originated the acronyms BOYONA on 14 May 2013. Troops made up of men from the Armed Forces, the Police and other security agencies were deployed to secure the nation's borders and assert the territorial integrity of the nation, initially conceiving the Operation to deal with the deteriorating security situation in these States (ABDUL, 2013).

Some of the operational scopes were to destroy terrorist camps/bases, fish out perpetrators and bring them to justice. The mandate was substantially achieved with the destruction of terrorists' strongholds and bases mostly located in the desert borders of Chad

and Niger Republics⁶⁵. The biggest camp of Boko Haram located in the dreaded Sambisa forest in Southern part of Borno State was cordoned by Special Forces (ABDUL, 2013).

Apart from attempts at ensuring that peace returned to the affected States, efforts were made at confidence building mechanism as well, aimed at consolidating the achievements that were recorded by the Special Forces. Defense Headquarters Assessment teams who visited the States observed increased commercial activities as banks, markets and other public places were opened after operation BOYONA was launched (ABDUL, 2013).

⁶⁵ Some of the destroyed/secured camps included: Krenoa, Hausari, Marte, Chikun and Gudu in Northern Borno.

6 FINAL REMARKS

When analyzing chaotic areas in a continent, finding similarities in the roots of the problems faced by each area is an uncomplicated task. Somalia, with its history of military regimes as well as the consequent collapse - not only of a central figure of authority, but also of every characteristic that could provide shelter, food or security to the population - finds the essence of its obstacles in climate and political issues commonly observed in other parts of Africa. In West Africa, these correspondences are clear, with the very present articulation of terrorist groups and extremist sectors who haunt the residents and exclude them from any possibility of a stable environment. Both regions witness climate change and the growth of terror worsens matters with such elementariness that it becomes clear how intricate and connected every aspect of the lands are.

When it comes to territorial and political organization, Somalia and West Africa still are ground for disputes. Somalia faced Somaliland's independence, still discussed among officials as is yet to be recognized. Aside from that, there have also been disagreements between Somaliland and Puntland, an autonomous State. In West Africa, the problem with territory is mainly observed when analyzing the suspicious interest terrorist groups have in oil and the detrimental use of water in the Lake Chad, which led to the current crisis.

Due to the alarming situation, a growing necessity for interventions was raised upon the continent. In Somalia, the UN has been planning and executing missions since the 1990s, trying to control chaotic atmospheres, promote human rights and pursue reconciliations among clan leaders, aside from other agendas specific to the missions. As such, UNOSOM I and II, UNITAF, AMISOM and UNSOM contributed to peace-building and attempting negotiations with terrorists.

In West Africa, various initiatives are coordinated to guarantee a higher indicative of security. Countries came together as a task force for peace and, in 2014, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger got together to form the G5S, promoting security and protecting dying democracies. These, alongside other operations, show how the area is constantly being affected by terrorism and its lasting consequences. The situation's emergency derives mostly from the destructive behaviors of Boko Haram and, in a less recent

note, the colonization itself, conducted mainly by the French and the English in Somalia and West Africa.

When analyzing these regions, it is crucial to understand that even though there might be extensive research and apprehension regarding the matters there encountered, there is still not enough exposure of the issues. There is, obviously, constant work being done, with the last resolutions from the United Nations Security Council in Somalia stressing the disapproval of terrorism and human rights violations and in West Africa, reinforcing the importance of the G5S countries. The role of UNSC is crucial to the peacekeeping and the conquering and the maintenance of security in the African continent. Since it is sometimes viewed as an institution of hegemonic values, its recent cooperation with the African Union Peace and Security it's the kind of tie that will promote, not only peace, but mutual respect for cultures and beliefs.

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